Victory in defeat; the agony of Warsaw and the Russian retreat

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Cornell University Library

3 1924 027 947 369

The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text.

General Alexieff, Chief of Staff of the Russian Army

THE AGONY OF WARSAW AND THE RUSSIAN RETREAT

BY

STANLEY WASHBURN

Special Correspondent of the London Times ivith the Russian Armies in the Field

ILLUSTRATED

London

CONSTABLE & CO., LTD.

PRINTED IN GARDEN CITY, N. Y., U. S. A.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN

TO MY WIFE

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The first sixteen articles which appear in this little volume were originally produced in the Chicago Tribune, and the author tenders his thanks for permission to reprint the same in book form. Chapter 17 is reproduced due to the courtesy of Harper's Weekly, and thanks are tendered to the London Times for the permission to republish the sketch of General Alexieff which appears in this book as Chapter 18.

S. W.

Lakewood, N. J.

Contents

PAGE

I. Foreword 3

II. The Move on Warsaw via Galicia . 12

Introduction

This little volume has been written with the intention of presenting as far as possible at this time, and within the information available to the writer, the Russian side of the great campaign which ended in the capture of Warsaw by the Germans, and was followed by the great Russian retreat. There are many assets in war as there are in peace, and the greatest among these is character. Efficiency, preparation, and science have their innings at the beginning of a conflict, but the one enduring asset which a nation has is the character of its people. If time be given for this to develop, then the end is certain. The great crisis in Russia was during that period when the psychology of the nation was crystallizing, and when this had taken place the danger to Russia was largely passed. Certainly I would in no way minimize the strength, fortitude, and patriotism of the Germans, which have been

INTRODUCTION

extraordinary from the beginning of the war, but I am still of the opinion that the greatest test of character is not in victory, but in defeat. It has seemed to me that the world has not appreciated the fact that there can be victory in defeat, but this is none the less true, when, as has happened in Russia, reverses have provided time in which the character of the nation has asserted itself, and the Empire has been able to repair its lack of vision before the war by preparing itself after the blow has fallen. This is what has happened in the Empire of the Czar, and it is for this reason that I am calling this little book "Victory in Defeat," for I believe that the Russian reverses have been so costly and demoralizing to their victors, that history will judge them as the greatest single source of the German downfall, which is in my opinion inevitable whether it be insixmonths or in two years.

S. W.

Lakewood, N. J.

March 1, 1916.

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Foreword

The Russian campaign has from the beginning of the war been one of great and sweeping movements involving huge armies, advancing and retreating, sometimes victorious, sometimes defeated, but always fighting and never demoralized nor discouraged. There have been a number of distinct phases in Russia each of which really represents a small separate war. First was the Russian advance into East Prussia, culminating in the disaster of Samsonov's Army at Tanenberg the first month of the war. Following this was the German counter-attack and advance into Russia with its failure to advance with any depth, and subsequent evaporation. Simultaneously was being enacted the Russian campaign in Galicia which cleaned the Austrians out of Galicia and advanced the armies of the Czar to the very walls of historic Cracow. In October, 1914, in Poland itself was the phase of the first German invasion of Poland which took the Teutons to within sight of Warsaw only to get a glimpse of their cherished goal before they were forced back to their own frontier. The next phase was the second great German advance in Poland with the terrific battles around Lodz and a dozen heavy battles which brought them by December up to the famous Bzura line in Poland; there, with exhausted momentum, they sank into the mud and snow of December. For a month there was a lull along the Russian front, when in latter January there opened a new campaign, beginning on the Bolimov position before Warsaw, with seven days of continuous German attacks which it was hoped would pierce the centre of the Bzura line and land the

VICTORY EST DEFEAT

Teutons in the capital of Poland. Casualties involving nearly 100,000 in a week and resulting in scarcely a dent on the Russian line convinced the Germans that this was a hope unattainable, and while the echoes of the guns on the Polish plain were still in the air they began another drive in East Prussia which resulted in heavy Russian losses but profited the Germans little but the gain of a few square miles of Russian territory, and a heavy loss of German lives with no commensurate gain. But the Germans were not discouraged, and the moment it became obvious that the Russian retreat in East Prussia was going to have no great strategic value to them they at once swung south from Mlawa toward Przasnys in an endeavor to take Warsaw from the north by cutting the line between the Polish Capital and Petrograd. Fighting had now been going forward on a huge scale for nearly two months, and by early March the impetus of even the Germans was beginning to flag and their drive south from Mlawa was a flat failure, resulting in their retirement with heavy losses, including nearly 15,000 prisoners. By April 1, 1915, it became clear then, that, viewed from its larger aspects, the German campaign against Russia had failed. Territory they had taken to be sure, and battles they had won in large numbers, but the centre of their strategy, Warsaw, still lay as far from their grasp as in December, 1914, and the Russian Army not only was not demoralized but was actually getting stronger each day. In the meantime the armies of the Czar were steadily winning their way through the Carpathians and in general having things their own way in Galicia. Almost on the heels of the German failures to get results around Warsaw in March came the collapse of Przemysl and the surrender of 135,000 Austrians. Thus we find that by April 1, 1915, the Germans after terrific losses and sustained fighting of months had accomplished comparatively little, while the

Russians, in spite of reverses, were gaining ground steadily against Austria. The fall of Przemysl came at a time when the Russian armies in the southeast were sweeping steadily ahead in the Bukowina, driving the Hungarians and Austrians headlong toward the great Hungarian plain. The result of the German failure in the north plus the Russian successes in the south was having the most disastrous effect imaginable on the soldiers of the Dual Alliance. Hungary, seeing a direct menace on Buda-Pesthe, both from the Bukowina and the passes of the Carpathians, became dissatisfied and began to show signs of consideration of a separate peace. General Ivanov himself, who was in command of all the Russian armies in Galicia, told me that the situation in Austria- Hungary was becoming so acute that there was every probability that unless some step were taken by Germany and taken quickly, that the Empire of the Kaiser faced the possibility of the complete collapse of his Allies.

It became obvious to all then in April that if the Kaiser was to protect his "heel of Achilles" in Silesia he must do something to bolster up the Austrians and Hungarians, who showed only too clearly their anxiety to quit. Probably the politicians and diplomats at Vienna never shared this desire, but that the troops at the front were ready to make peace was perfectly clear. I was told by an authority whose credibility I cannot question that when the news of the fall of Przemysl reached the Austrians on the summit of the Carpathians they threw their hats in the air and shouted : "Hurrah! Now we will have peace!" This situation then, plus the fact that Italy was hanging on the brink of the war, was undoubtedly responsible for the program of the Germans which began with the drive in Galicia and the subsequent campaign which resulted in the capture of Warsaw. This movement began in early May and the operations since then fall into three distinct phases. First, the Galician drive which aimed to restore the morale of the Austro-Hungarian troops, to check Italy from entering the war, and which contemplated the destruction of the Russian Army. The Germans, never lacking in foresight, no doubt figured that in any event, even if they failed to demoralize or annihilate the Russian Army, the reoccupation of Galicia would leave them on the flank of Warsaw and give them the chance to attack the Polish salient from the south. The second phase extended from the occupation of Lwow (Lemberg) to the capture of Warsaw, including the terrific fighting on the Chelm-Lublin and Narew line.

The third phase represents the retreat from Warsaw and brings us practically up to November 1, 1915, when it became obvious that the entire German line had come to a final stand and that its momentum was lost, probably for the winter, and certainly for the fall. It is my purpose to sketch as briefly as possible the operations of the Russian Army from May 1st until November 1st. In order that the conditions precedent may be clear it has seemed wise to trace the earlier operations briefly as in the foregoing paragraphs, so as to refreshen in the mind of the reader the conditions that existed in May when the Germans began their greatest campaign against Russia. The writer was with the Russian armies in the field from October, 1914, until November 1, 1915. During this time he was in all of their active armies except one, covered some 10,000 miles of country ranging from the Bukowina to the Baltic, was at the positions in scores of places, and with the exception of Robert R. McCormick and the brilliant American Military Attache, Lieut. Sherman Miles, was the only American to have any considerable access to the fighting lines in Russia. It is quite true that constant association with an army tends to prejudice one in its favor, and it is equally true that in operations on so vast a scale and associated with such chaos and confusion it is difficult to secure any exact perspective. The story of these movements and operations may be and probably is inaccurate in part, for it is impossible at this time to secure the data necessary to write history, but within his sources of information and with the sincere intention of being absolutely fair to the enemy the writer submits herewith the account of this great campaign as it has seemed to those on the Russian side of the conflict.

II

THE MOVE ON WARSAW VIA GALICIA

The Russian line in Galicia early in May ran in a general way along the banks of the Dunajec-Ropa-Biala rivers, extending roughly from the Vistula southerly to the spurs of the Carpathians, through which the Army of Brussilov based on Dukla was working its way satisfactorily through the famous Dukla Pass. To understand the situation of the Russians it must be realized that already the armies of the Czar were beginning to feel the pinch of a shortage in ammunition and in miscellaneous material of war. The reason for this lack of munitions, especially shells, was not due entirely to incompetence and corruption, though undoubtedly glaring defects in the Petrograd Bureaucracy played their part,

Eastern battle-lines at the end of April, 1915 but rather to the fact that the Russians as well as every other belligerent save Germany had completely underestimated the quantities of material that modern conditions would make necessary. The War Office no doubt planned their reserves in shells based on their Manchurian experiences, when this war has shown that nearly ten times the amounts have been used. This is probably due in large part to the fact that the new Russian field gun is a genuine quick-firer with a theoretical speed of more than twenty shots a minute. In the early stages of the war I knew of one battery that fired 525 rounds of ammunition per gun in a single day, and by spring the pinch was already being felt. Russia is not a highly industrial country, and even when she mobilized such assets as she had, she could not begin to feed her guns. Shut off from the short and convenient routes to the outside world, she found that even when material ordered could be shipped her, it must still be long and weary weeks before it could reach the firing line. So it was that early in May she faced the enemy lines in Galicia with the realization of this problem just dawning on those in authority. On the line from the Vistula to the Carpathians stood the famous Third Russian Army, commanded by the Bulgarian Radko Dimitrieff, who had won fame in the Balkan campaign as a military commander. In his front line and immediate reserve he had five army corps, or somewhere in the neighborhood of 200,000 troops, for the corps were at that time fairly well filled up from earlier losses.

The lines running west of Tarnov and before Gorlica had been approximately stationary for several months, during which time the enemy had been practising with their artillery at least twice a day, with the result that on this entire front the batteries had the range within a few feet of practically every conspicuous object in the landscape which was within their line of vision, while every turn and twist of the Russian trenches had been verified and mapped by the enemy aeroplanes, and ranges ascertained almost to the inch. Along toward the end of April the Russian flyers became aware of the concentration of troops and material in the theatre of operations west of Tarnov. Many people have asked me why the Russians did not meet it on the same scale. The answer is simple. Though the Russians have millions of men and even plenty in uniform and under training, they did not have the rifles to put in their hands nor the guns and shells which should give them support. In addition the Russian railroad systems were in no way comparable, strategically, to those of the Germans and Austrians, and they could not fling masses of troops about from one quarter of the empire to another as the Germans have been able to do. Besides this, the Russian front extending from the Baltic to the Bukowina had already absorbed the greater part of the Russian effectives and they could not easily increase their strength on the Dunajec without robbing the even more important Warsaw or Courland fronts, on both of which the enemy were not entirely inactive. What happened on the Dunajec line was the first of the great German artillery drives. I cannot, of course, verify the statements as to numbers of the enemy, but I give here the figures as estimated by the Russians. In addition to a number of Austrian corps already on the Galician line, the Germans sent at least six new corps for the first blow, while some place the number as high as ten. The sector chosen for attack was that lying from Tarnov toward Gorlica. The Russian observers quickly detected during the last days of April the hitherto unheard of concentration of guns which they estimated to be 2,000 in number on a front of forty miles. These guns were said to be grouped in tiers, one battery behind another, the heaviest being in the rear. The

Beginning of the Teutonic advance in Galicia, May 1, 1915 sizes ranged all the way from the regular field artillery up to the heavy Austrian siege guns. It was claimed by the Russians that in this host of guns there were 200 of eight inches or better. Probably the largest were the Austrian 12- inch Skoda howitzers. There was little that the Russians could do to guard against this impending avalanche save to wait patiently for the storm to break and do their best to outlive the fury of shell and machine-gun fire with the hope that they could then repel the infantry attacks which were sure to follow. The storm broke on a front of forty miles which was held by three corps, the more particular designation of which does not help this story. In two hours the enemy batteries fired, according to the Russian estimates, 700,000 shells ranging from the field shrapnel up to the 12- inch high explosives. The Russians were not routed, as the Germans asserted, at all. They simply remained and died. The few that tried to retire on supporting lines were caught in the open, where every object on the landscape had been ranged on exactly, long before, and thousands more were literally swept away. The first line of the Russian defense was so torn and swept by shell fire that observers say that it could not have been recognized as ever having been a line of defense at all. But in spite of the fury of the first two hours the Russians did not then abandon their lines. We are told that it took between three and four million shells finally to weaken them so that the infantry could attack. I have no figures obtainable to indicate what portion of the losses were killed, what portion wounded, or what part strayed and were taken prisoners. I do know this, however, that when the fragments of the three centre corps which had numbered 120,000 at the beginning were finally pulled together on the San, 100 miles or so in the rear, two weeks later, the total strength that rallied around the colors did not exceed 12,000.

The result of this terrific fusillade, in plain language, was to leave a gap in the Russian line forty miles across, and through this the Germans and Austrians poured like a leak in the dyke. Hurriedly rushed-up reserves taken from where they could be spared fought a rear-guard action of sorts, destroying railroads and bridges, so that the German advance was slowed down to not more than three or four miles a day.

The flanking corps to the north and south of the gap fell back fighting steadfastly against the terrific odds, but as far as I know were not broken. The capture of Gorlica and the advance on Dukla threatened the line of communications of the Eighth Army that was well over the summit of the Carpathians. The Germans, no doubt, figured on bagging this entire army, which indeed they might have done but for the skill and brilliancy with which Brussilov pulled his men out of the Passes. In spite of all haste one division was cut off as it came out, though it succeeded in cutting its way through the enemy and rejoining the main body now falling back on Przemysl. In the meantime the Russians were furiously preparing for a stand on the San, and to gain time threw against the advancing German hosts several corps, among which was the famous Third Caucasian, which not only stopped the advance for several days but actually advanced ten miles into the German centre before it was brought to a standstill. The other armies had been extending their flanks as they fell back, and by the time the enemy reached the San they found the forty -mile gap closed up and much to their surprise, no doubt, saw they were again confronting a solid Russian line, already fairly well dug in on the San line of defense. This ended the first phase of the Galician drive. To one who knows the true situation the wonder is, not that the Germans advanced, but that they did not annihilate the Russian Army in

Galicia. But their chance had gone, and though they had recaptured for Austria a large area and had killed and bagged a large number of Russians, the big game had slipped through their fingers and the primary object of the blow, i. e., the destruction of the Russian Army, had failed.

Ill

THE READJUSTMENT IN GALICIA

In the modern warfare, with its huge extended fronts, there develops in every theatre of operations what might be called the keystone of the strategy therein. The breaking of a certain line on a large scale results in the pulling out of the keystone of the arch and resulting chaos in the whole line, though it may be that but a single army of many has been seriously crippled in itself. This is exactly what took place in Galicia. At the inception of the movement the three centre corps of the Third Army, as already mentioned, were practically wiped out and the whole Galician line thrown into oscillation. The one sector being broken and the one army being thrown back necessitated changes in the whole front, even from Warsaw to the Bukowina. The army of General Ewarts (the Fourth) which had been standing defiantly for months just north of the Vistula on the Nida River, found with the retreat of its southern neighbor, that its flank was dangerously uncovered. It was obvious instantly that for the salvation of the whole line the corps of Ewarts (then four in number) must commence a retirement which would always keep the flanking corps in touch with the nearest corps of the army to its left. So immediately after the Galician drive Ewarts began to fall regretfully back in what one might call a sympathetic movement. As I was in this army several times during this movement I can speak with some degree of accuracy of what the Germans advertised as a rout. I have been in all of Ewarts' Fourth Army Corps except one and have talked with officers and men from all of these units.

There was not one but insisted that this army not only was not compelled by any local situation to retreat, but that had it been operating without any connection with the line as a whole, it could actually have advanced. It is too late in the war to go in for a detailed discussion of the tactics of Ewarts' retreat, which is stale history now. Suffice it to say, however, that while the Fourth Army was changing its front to a more easterly position two of its corps alone accounted for more than 25,000 German and Austrian casualties and prisoners, with a loss to themselves of less than half that amount. The Germans who rushed on with the idea that the road to Moscow lay open before them kept running into the rear guards of Ewarts, who were literally being dragged back by a leash due to orders of the Great General Staff, and at every contact the Russians, regardless of orders, broke loose and landed blow after blow on the Germans and Austrians, first in one place and then in another. So much, then, may be said for the "rout" of Ewarts. The Third Army, standing on the ill-fated line of the Dunajec, was, as I have described, practically wiped out, and its disaster was responsible for the whole retreat. The next army was the Eighth, commanded by the dashing cavalry officer, Brussilov, who never until this time had been obliged to retire. This army was caught halfway through the Passes of the Carpathians, and in the disaster of its northern neighbor its right flank was exposed and badly crumbled, but, by extending its front to the north and pulling together at Przemysl, it was able to check the momentum of the onrushing Germans on the San. We are invited to believe by the Central Powers that the San battle was a pitched one and that both that and the ones that followed on the old Grodek line and around Lwow were great victories. The facts of the case are, and I speak with the authority of the highest command in Galicia, that from the first day's fighting on the San it was decided by the Russians practically to give up Galicia for the

VICTORY EST DEFEAT

moment. The Germans and Austrians were receiving reinforcements hourly, and a definite stand at any point meant a combat under conditions favorable to the Germans and an invitation to them to deliver a crushing blow. The want of ammunition had now become acute, and I know of certain Russian batteries on the San at this time that had not above a score of rounds of ammunition to the gun. Przemysl was not in a state of defense, as repairs on the works destroyed by the Austrians before the surrender to the Russians in March had not yet been completed. Holding Przemysl, then, was like trying to hold a ruin, and when the Germans began to bring up their heavy guns the holding of the fortress was not even considered by the Russian higher command. Reinforcements were not available to the Muscovites on an important scale, while the whole railroad system of Germany was working overtime that the Galician blow might not falter. One in Germany at this time stated that for days on end the railroad lines of Eastern Germany were flooded with troops moving eastward and wounded coming back from Galicia. This witness stated that for the three consecutive days in which he had opportunity to make observations, there was a doubleheaded train passing eastward every fifteen minutes loaded to the roof with troops and munitions. The Russian information brought the same news. It was quite obvious, then, that it was the Russian policy to withdraw, fighting a rear-guard action, and inflicting the biggest loss that they could get without risking their army to a crushing defeat. From the San until the present writing the Galician armies have never been seriously endangered. The Dunajec drive, as I have shown, was the result of the enormous concentration of artillery and months of practice preceding it, which had secured the accurate ranges. Neither on the San nor at any other point did the Germans have the opportunity to bring up any such mass of guns. As soon as their concentrations, looking toward a repetition of the early May movement, began to gather head, the Russians retired. It was evident that the balance would come sooner or later, when the lengthened German lines and the shortened Russian communications would adjust the scales and bring the whole line to a standstill once more. Thus it was that the Russians held Przemysl and the San line for a while and took a large toll of casualties from the enemy, and just as they were in a position to be rushed, evacuated it only to make a second stand on the so-called Grodek line, the scene of the Austrian defeat of the preceding September campaign. When the Germans had massed their formations and artillery for a crushing blow on this line, the Russians fell back on Lwow, and after repeating their tactics before the Galician capital, again retired to the so-called Krasne line, where they remained for several months, having safely eluded the momentum of the

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VICTORY IN DEFEAT main German blow. In the meantime there had been two other armies to the east engaged in this movement. The neighbor of Brussilov was the Eleventh Army, which retired from its advanced Carpathian position from which it was threatening the Hungarian plain to the Dneister River, then to the Gnita Lippa position, and later to the Ztota Lippa and a little farther east to what is approximately its position to-day. This army was widely advertised as a ruined and routed organization. The commander told me himself that in the six weeks of his retreat his army had taken more than 56,000 enemy prisoners, not to speak of the losses he inflicted in killed and wounded. That he lost heavily in stragglers and casualties of his own is probably true, but the loss he inflicted was without doubt greater than his own. His neighbor army to the eastward was the Ninth. I spent a week in this army during the last days of the retreat and was at the positions in many places.

VICTORY EST DEFEAT

Every man I talked with denied that this army had been defeated locally, and without exception every officer I talked with stated emphatically that it could advance any day against its own enemy but for the orders of the higher command. This forced it to retreat to keep in touch with the Eleventh, which (as I have shown) came back to be in touch with the Eighth, whose flank in turn had been exposed by the destruction of the Third Army, the keystone of the whole line. I am inclined to take the statements made me in the Ninth Army, because the records show that it was actually advancing daily in the Bukowina theatre of operations for eight or ten days after the Germans were driving through in Western Galicia. The news of the first week in January, 1916, from the Russian front shows the capacity of this army which has been bearing the brunt of the fighting on the recent Russian offensive and indicates that the assertions made to me in July were not ill-founded; for the moment the higher command unleashed this army it at once poured back into the very theatre of operations from which it had retired last summer. In regard to the assertions of the number of prisoners taken I must admit that these were obtained from Russian sources which naturally never minimize their own prowess. I am inclined to accept it at par, however, due to the fact that I personally saw over 6,000 prisoners in three days taken during the retreat toward Tarnopol in early July from the scene of the fighting around the Gnita and Ztota Lippa, both of which, by the way, were heralded in the German press as great Austro- German victories.