From Boulogne to Austerlitz, Napoleon's campaign of 1805

Front matter

3!lCTmSOT M'Mtimvi'M'Jk!L'i. ' 0CT »j i^: « WMH!' l t!'''W'> t tg l!Bf'^''^-"l yUL

BY

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CHAPTER II Character of the Opposing Forces . . .10

The Grand Army — Infantry — Cavalry — Artillery — Characteristics of the French — The French in Attack — French Leaders — Napoleon — Youth of French Generals — Napoleon's System of Work — The Austrian Army — The Russians — Theatre of Operations — Comments

Chapter III

Napoleon's Plans — Plans of the Allies — Napoleon's Preparations — Reconnaissance — Austrian Preparations — The March to the Rhine — Proclamation to the Grand Army — Passage of the Rhine — Comments

Chapter IV

Orders of 28th September — Diary of Events — Passage of the Danube — Action in Wertingen — Action at Haslach — The Enemy destroyed by Marches — The Circle completed — Surrender of Mack — Comments vi CONTENTS

Chapter V Page

Violation of Prussian Territory— Trafalgar— Napoleon's Plans— Supply Arrangements— The Valley of the Danube — French Movements — Situation of the Allies — Russian Retreat — French Advance— Destruction of an Austrian Column — The Russians cross the Danube — Battle of Durrenstein — Entry into Vienna — General Situation — Napoleon's Dispositions — Murat's Pursuit — Battle of HoUabrunn — Advance to Brunn — Comments

CHAPTER VI Operations in Italy and the Tyrol . . .72

Operations in Italy — Battle of Caldiero — Operations in the Tyrol — Comments

Chapter VII

General Situation — The Field of Austerlitz — Movements of the Allies — French Position — Napoleon's Orders — Plans of the Allies — The Morning of 2nd December — Attack on the French Right — Napoleon's Counter-stroke — Action on the French Left — Repulse of Bagration — Destruction of the Allied Left— The Battle ends— Pursuit— The Fruits of Victory — Comments

CHAPTER VIII The Causes of Success go"

MAPS AND PLANS In Pocket —

From the Rhine to Ulm— From Ulm to Austerlitz — Northern Italy and the Tyrol— Country round Austerlitz— Battle of Caldiero— Battle of Austerlitz

In Text-

From Boulogne to the Rhine .... 25

Country round Ulm • • . . . c^

Chapter I

The Peace of Amiens — The Invasion of England — German Views on Invasion — The Third Coalition — Villeneuve's Failure — Sea Power and Preparation for War — Patriotic Spirit

In sketching the events which led up to the campaign of Austerhtz, in 1805, it is necessary to go back to May The Peace 1803, when the Peace of Amiens came to an end. of Amiens That peace could probably in no case have remained lasting. The continued occupation of Malta and Alexandria by England ; the toleration of a scurrilous press, directed against the First Consul, in London ; the British naval preparations — all these were calculated to arouse the hostility of Napoleon, while territorial acquisitions by France in Genoa and Piedmont, and the character of the First Consul himself, were not factors which made for the maintenance of peace.

The renewal of hostilities with England marked the initiation of Napoleon's project for the invasion of that The country; for this purpose the Grand Army

Invasion of was assembled on the shores of the Channel, England ^nd a corps imder Bernadotte was stationed in Holland. In July 1803 the First Consul established his famous " Continental System " for the exclusion of British trade from the continent of Europe ; in March 1804 the seizure and execution of the Due d'Enghien aroused the

A I horror and indignation of all the dynasties of the Continent.

In May, Napoleon was cfowned Emperor of the French, thus consolidating his military and political power in the state. He had now at length supreme authority, both to direct policy and to organise the means to carry it into effect. By July he had assembled a numerous and wellequipped army for the invasion of England, and his troops in camp at Boulogne swore allegiance to the newly made Emperor, who was seated in the iron chair of Dagobert, in the midst of his vast camp, from whence in the misty distance he could discern, in imagination if not in reality, those white cliffs of Albion which marked the goal of his ambitions. From Boulogne he proceeded to Aachen, the ancient capital of Charlemagne, his predecessor in the Empire of the West a thousand years before. Nothing but the humbling of England appeared wanting to the triumph of his genius and ambition, and to the establishment of almost illimitable power. " Masters of the Channel for six hours, we are masters of the world," wrote the Emperor, and there appears to be little doubt that his intention of invading England was real, although many historians have averred the contrary. Certainly, the preparations for. a descent Were equally efficacious for carrying on a Continental war, which, according to many, was the intention he cloaked under - his scheme of invasion. In pursuance of this scheme he had assembled an army of 150,000 men on the shores of the Channel, and had collected a large niunber of flatbottomed boats and other transports to convey them to the English coast. The French coast was fortified against English attacks, and every preparation was made for the expedition, down to the smallest detail.

The clearance of the Channel or the absence of the

English fleet was all that was wanted for the project to be put into execution ; and for this purpose Napoleon had organised a great fleet, at first under command of Latouche Treville, and " subsequently under Villeneuve. This squadron was to draw off the English fleet to the West Indies, while a second squadron, under Gauteaume, which was in Brest harbour, would convey Augereau's division to Ireland.

Napoleon considered that he would be able to destroy the shipyards of Plymouth and Portsmouth, and enter London in three weeks, there to dictate terms of peace. In Ireland he would find a disloyal population eager to welcome any enemies of England, and ready to raise the flag of revolution. It is recorded that an Irish exUe named O'Connor, a general of division in Augereau's army, had several interviews with Napoleon in May 1805, and endeavoured to persuade him that the best way to conquer England was to go first to Ireland. It was agreed that all the English in Ireland should be exterminated. That the danger in Ireland was real is shown by the events of 1798, when a raiding party of 1000 landed in that country without opposition after a sixteen days' voyage, having escaped the observation of the English navy. Four times they defeated British forces opposed to them ; captured 11 guns, and for nearly three weeks engaged the attention of all the troops in Ireland, some 10,000 men.

Napoleon was not the last to entertain ideas as to the feasibility of the invasion of England ; and in this connection, and to throw some light on the views of the General Staff in Berlin, the following passage from the work of the late Count Yorck von Wartenburg' is of considerable interest : —

' "Napoleon as a General." By Count Yorck von Wartenburg (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.)-

" This plan shows his genius at its full height. The idea which underlay his landing was perfectly correct ; it was German ^ putting into practice of the highest rules of Views on war, namely, ' try to put your strong points as Invasion to time and space against the enemy's weak points.' Napoleon's strength lay in his army and war on land ; England's strength consisted in its fleet and in war at sea ; to attack her in such a way that his strength might be brought to bear was, therefore, assuredly good strategy. Napoleon has been condemned because the execution of his plan is said to have been impossible. But if we remember all that has been declared impossible in the history of the world by contemporaries, and yet was achieved by the power of genius, who can say that a landing of his army in England would have been an impossibility for Napoleon? Hannibal's great plan of crossing the 4Jps and attacking Rome in Italy and conquering it there, would perhaps have been considered impossible now had it remained a plan only.

"The fact that this landing was not effected, and England not conquered, is generally considered by historians as the salvation of Europe, ior one country at least escaped Napoleon's domination. I do not share this opinion. The States of the Continent suffered at the time too severely and directly from Napoleon's tyranny for them to realise that England had not less exclusively, though in a more practical and enduring manner, its own interests in view, and by no means those of Europe at that time. Had Napoleon entered England at the head of his army, his strength would on the one hand have been weakened thereby, and the Continent would have obtained greater freedom of action, and on the other hand England, shaken to its very foundations at home, would not have been able to concentrate, as it did, almost the whole colonial possessions of the world in its own hands, and the Continental powers would nowadays have a' more equal share of them." This passage is interesting and instructive, even though the author's reasoning may not be entirely logical, for it indicates the trend of Teutonic thought with regard to our Colonial Empire.

The execution of the Due d'Enghien in March 1804 had roused the governments of Europe against Napoleon, but only the Tsar Alexander had broken oft diplomatic relations in consequence. The French Emperor still awaited on the shore of the English Channel the favourable moment for the invasion of England. His plans, however, suffered a severe blow in the death of Latouche Treville, his most competent admiral, who was succeeded by VOeneuve, an able commander, but timid and lacking in enthusiasm.

In April 1805 Villeneuve sailed for the West Indies, drawing Nelson and the English fleet after him, and returning in the ensuing month to European waters, whither he was followed by the ships of England.

In the meantime the newly made Emperor had been crowned King of Italy at Milan ; and he had concluded The Third negotiations with Prussia, under the terms of Coalition which the Prussian troops in Hanover were relieved by the French army. Pitt's opportimity for the formation of a third coalition had now arrived. Austria, alarmed by the augmentation of the French army in Italy on the occasion of Napoleon's coronation at the capital of Lombardy, was strengthening her forces and negotiating with Russia for co-operation in the coming war. The Peace of Luneville had left Austria crippled, with her power and prestige in the councils of Europe greatly diminished. But Napoleon's preparations for the invasion of England, leading him to concentrate his attention on that enterprise, appeared to afford her an opportunity of recovering her lost provinces. Already, in October, a sanitary cordon was established on the Austrian frontiers of Italy and Switzerland, nominally for the exclusion of yellow fever, which had broken out in Spain, but in reality to cover ulterior designs. And when the French troops assembled for Napoleon's coronation at Milan, in May 1805, Austria increased her forces in Carinthia and the Venetian provinces.

Pitt, meanwhile, was engaged in forming a third coalition with Russia, Austria, Sweden and Naples against France. Austria was weak in military strength, owing to the reorganisation that was in progress in her army, and it was agreed that Russia should put two armies into the field. Sweden was of little account, and in September Naples came to terms with the French Emperor.

But Napoleon was fully aware of what was going on, and had already turned his eyes towards the Rhine and Danube. His correspondence with his foreign minister, Talleyrand, shows that he contemplated the possibility of a land campaign. Early in August 1805 the idea gained strength, and on the 23rd he wrote to Talleyrand from Boulogne that his squadron had left Ferrol, and if it joined the Brest squadron, and entered the CSxannel, he would yet be master of England. Failing in the plan of invasion, he would, he said, strike his camp, and march to Germany with 200,000 men. He would not lay down his arms until he had Naples and Venice, and had so enlarged the territories of the Elector of Bavaria that he would have nothing more to fear from Austria.

VUleneuve's orders were to assemble the French and Villeneuve's Spanish fleets and set sail from Ferrol. He Failure ^as to sweep the Channel, raise the blockade of Brest, and so clear the passage for Napoleon's army of invasion. But VUleneuve was wanting in energy and enterprise ; on the report that an English fleet was approaching, he returned to safe harbourage at Cadiz, and before the end of the month Napoleon's Grand Army was on the march to the Rhine.

The lessons of this period are mainly those of the influence of sea power, and the necessity of preparation _ for war in time of peace. We see that, without

command of the sea. Napoleon could accomplish nothing towards the invasion of England. We also perceive that, failing the maintenance of that command, England would have been a helpless prey in the absence of suflicient strength of land forces. But if command of the sea conferred immunity from invasion, it proved in no way decisive. England, having no army to speak of, could do but little injury to a Continental nation; Trafalgar did not eclipse Austerlitz. Great issues are fought out on land, and Napoleon was finally conquered at Leipzig and Waterloo. What would have happened had the English fleet been destroyed ? It is placing the issue on one chance to have no second line of defence in case of defeat at sea. It is like fighting a battle with all your troops in the first line, and no reserve.

Napoleon himself said : "A nation is very foolish when she has no land forces to rely upon in the event of Preparation a picked and warlike army of 100,000 men for War arriving in her midst." It has been said and thought by the ignorant that a half -trained force or the uprising of the people would suffice to deal with invasion. But what could such effect against an army of trained and disciplined warriors ? What has it ever effected — as recorded in the history of the world ? " From the beginning of the formation of national entities until the present time the idea of popular uprisings to repulse foreign invaders has ever been a universal conceit, an indelible vanity that neither the erosion of ages has erased, nor the deluge of blood issuing from them has washed away. Yet, while there exists not an age that has not resounded with the triumphant hoof -beats of invading armies, the truth is there is not a single instance in the whole military history of the world where the mobile armies of a warlike race have been destroyed or defeated by the popular uprisings of a militantly decadent state." ' Preparation does not imply merely the provision of armed forces and armament, " neither is money the sinews Patriotic of war, if the sinews of men's arms in base and Spirit effeminate people are failing." ^ Preparation

includes the cultivation of patriotic feeling, the direction of the thoughts of the people into unselfish and pure "channels, where they will place ideas of nationality and the love of country before the meaner instincts of personal comfort. For man is the primary instrument in war, and no number of guns, armaments or " dreadnoughts " can supply the want of the national and patriotic spirit of self-sacrifice. Ml history tells the same tale. Ancient Rome and Sparta were free and strong for many ages, thanks to their armies drawn from the people, but they declined when they put their trust in mercenary troops. Gibbon tells us : " The theory of war was not more famiUar to the camp of Cassar and Trajan than to those of Justinian and Maurice. The iron of Tuscany or Pontus still received the keenest temper from the skill of the Byzantine workmen. In the construction and use of ships, engines and fortifications the barbarians admired the superior ingenuity of a people whom they so often vanquished in the field. The science of tactics,

EUROPE 7#^i8o4-i8o5 the orders, the evolutions, the stratagems of antiquity, was transcribed and studied in the books of the Greeks and Romans. But the sohtude or degeneracy of the provinces could no longer supply a race of men to handle those weapons, to guard those walls, to navigate those ships and to reduce the theory of war to bold and successful practice."*

It was the patriotism of the French people, their military spirit and love of glory, that enabled them imder Napoleon to conquer half Europe, and to carry their arms in triumph from Madrid to Moscow. It was the steady patriotism of the English, in spite of the presence in their midst of unpatriotic factions, that gave them the mastery of the sea, led them for twenty years to contend with the tyranny of Napoleon, and built up their great Colonial Empire.

^ " Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire."

Chapter II Chaeacter Of The Opposing Forces

The Grand Army — Infantry — Cavalry — Artillery — Characteristics of the French — The French in Attack — French Leaders — Napoleon — Youth of French Generals — Napoleon's System of Work — The Austrian Army — The Russians — Theatre of Operations — Comments

Napoleon had available something over 200,000 men, with 300 guns, organised as follows into the Grand Army.

The

Emperor

Chief of the Staff, Berftiiei

The Guard

Bessieres Infantry Divisions

Cavalry Divisions

First Corps

Bernadotte

Drouet Rivaud

Kellermann

18,000

Second Corps

Marmont

Boudet

Grouchy

Dumonceau

Lacoste

21,000

Third Corps

Davout

Bisson Friant Gudin

Vialannes

27,000

Fourth Corps

Soult

St Hilaire Vandamme Legrand Suchet

Margaron

41,000

Fifth Corps

Lannes

Oudinot Gazan

Treilhard

18,000

Sixth Corps

Ney

Dupont Loison Malher

Tilly

24,000

Cuirassiers

Dragoons

Cavalry Reserve

Murat

Nansouty d'Hautpoul

Klein Walther Beaumont Bouvrier

Dismounted Dragoons

Baraguey d'Hilliers

22,000

CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSING FORCES ii

The Seventh Corps, under Augereau, 14,000 men, was in process of formation. The Bavarians (20,000), Wurtemburgers and Baden Contingent numbered together 28,000, making a total of 219,000 men. Bemadotte was in Hanover ; Marmont's Corps round Utrecht, in Holland. He had in addition 50,000 men and 100 guns in Italy under Massena's command, while there was also a force of 20,000 under St Cyr at Naples, which was able to join Massena on conclusion of a treaty of neutrality in September.

Napoleon himself characterised the Grand Army as "the finest army that has ever existed." It is probable that this estimate was justified. We search in vain in the pages of history for the record of an army so well organised, trained and commanded, and inspired by a spirit so warlike and patriotic. It had been in camp undergoing continuous training for eighteen months, and had attained a high standard of efficiency in every respect, whilst it had the great advantage of being trained by those who would lead it in war. While the ranks were filled with young men, there was a valuable leaven of veterans who had fought on the battlefields of Italy and Egypt.

The infantry was composed of infantry of the line and light infantry, formed into demi-brigades (regiments) of two, or in some cases three, battalions, one Infantry i^attalion being allocated to recruiting and reserve purposes. Four demi-brigades formed a division. In action the light troops advanced skirmishing in extended order and taking advantage of all cover; behind them followed the infantry in formed bodies in two or three lines, the attack being made generally in column. In these manoeuvres, in deployments, and in skirmishing and attack in column with the bayonet, the troops had acquired great proficiency. The infantry was armed with a flint gun, effective from one hundred to two hundred yards, but ranging double that distance. Each man carried fifty rounds, and thirty more were in reserve.

The cavalry consisted of heavy and light horse — cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars and mounted chasseurs. _ They- were armed with sabre and pistol, and

in some cases with carbines. We know that Napoleon recognised the necessity of equipping cavalry with carbines ; on one occasion he wrote : " How is it possible to carry on any but a defensive war, covered by entrenchments and natural obstacles, if one has not cavalry fairly equal to that of the enemy ? An army superior in cavalry will have the advantage of being able to conceal its movements, of having good information of the enemy's movements, and of delivering battle when it pleases. Defeats will have few evil results, and victories will'be decisive." He wrote again. Count Yorck tells us : "It is universally conceded that the cuirassiers have difficulty in using their carbines ; but on the other hand it seems absurd that 3000 or 4000 brave men should be exposed to surprise in their cantonments or stoppage on their marches by a couple of light companies. ... I cannot reconcile myself to seeing 3000 men, picked troops, liable to be overwhelmed by any partisan leader during a popular rising or in a surprise by light troops, or to be arrested on their march by a few good sharpshooters behind a stream or a house ; it seems absurd. It is my wish that every man should have a musket, even if it be only a very short carbine. . . . Place some proposal before me so that these 3000 men may not have to depend on infantry to protect them in cantonments, and that they may be able to clear their way if any infantry, inferior in numbers, attack them. ... As to lancers, see whether we can arm them with both carbine and lance ;

and if this is impossible, at least one-third of each troop ought to be armed with carbines." A knowledge of such records of history might save us from having to learn these lessons again from bitter experience.

The cavalry regiment was organised in four squadrons. Cavalry brigades were variable in strength. The dragoons were principally employed in reconnoitring and on outpost duties. Like all great commanders, Napoleon knew well how to utilise his cavalry. In action the bulk was assembled in reserve.

The artillery, consisting of guns which had the disadvantage 'of being of numerous calibres, was formed into divisions, and was generally massed, its fire ^"^^ being concentrated on points of attack. It is noteworthy that co-operation between the three arms had been taught, and was thoroughly understood ; the artillery especially had learned to give close support to the infantry. The gunners were armed with musket and bayonet. Troops were well clothed and shod and especial attention was paid to the commissariat. While in general the army lived on the country, magazines were formed when convenient. Each man carried three or four days' supplies, and double that amount was on regimental wagons. The transport was furnished by the contractors of a private company.

In morale the French soldiers were now unequalled. The inauguration of the Empire had added to the power Character- ^^^ prestige of Napoleon, whose troops were isticsofthe inspired by his presence, his reviews and his French personal distribution of honours at the camp at Boulogne. They possessed that which is half the battle — confidence in themselves and their commanders, and in the certainty of victory. They endured fatigue and privation with remarkable constancy. They were active and enterprising, wonderful marchers, of superior intelligence, and most susceptible to appeals to their love of glory. They knew well how to adapt themselves to the ground and to take advantage of its natural features. Every French soldier had the hope of reward and promotion, for many officers, and even marshals, had risen from the ranks. It could be truly said that each one had a baton in his knapsack.

The regimental officers were excellent, constantly with their men, to whose training and well-being they devoted all their time and interest.

, G^eneral Foy gives us a description of the French advance to the attack : " The action was begun by a The French cloud of skirmishers, both horse and foot, in Attack thrown forward according to a general idea, and not directed as to the detail of their movements. They harassed the enemy; escaped his massed troops by their speed, and his guns by their extended formation. They were relieved with the object of continuing their fire, and they were reinforced to increase their effect. The field artillery came up at a gallop and fired grape and canister at point-blank range. The line of battle broke up in the direction of the attack, the infantry in column, for it had no fire to deliver, the cavalry in rlgiments or squadrons ready to act in any direction. When the hail of bullets and shot began to thicken, the soldiers advanced at the double, charging with the bayonet, the drums beat the charge, and the air resounded with the oft-repeated cries of ' Forward ! Forward ! ' "

This fine army was led by such a galaxy of military French talent as the world has never seen. Napoleon Leaders himself was at the zenith of his physical and intellectual power.

The assumption of the imperial purple had made him supreme in the state as in the army. He had gained in personal experience of war since he commanded the army of Italy, but he had what was of more value — the experience derived from the study of history, and none of his campaigns excelled in execution the first one, when his previous experience was that of history only. But he had gained in prestige with the nation and the army, which regarded him as invincible. The great officers of the army, the marshals, were the devoted slaves of him who had raised them to the highest pinnacles of glory. It has been said that " only in despotisms are men in high offices chosen only for their fitness," another factor of success. The decline of military skill in Rome began, Machiavelli 1 tells us, from the time when science and talent were despised, and only those gained distinction who knew how to please the authorities. But in the French army at this period, merit was the sole basis of promotion and reward.

A remarkable feature of the French armies of this epoch is the youth of the officers, a factor that must be Youth of taken into accoimt. But the value of youth French is nothing new ; it is a distinctive feature of Generals all history. At thirty-two, Alexander's career was drawing to a close ; at twenty-six, Hannibal was acclaimed leader of the Carthaginian army ; at twenty-six, Napoleon Bonaparte was conducting his most brilliant campaign with the army of Italy; at thirty -four Wellington had won the battle of Assaye, and twelve years later, after bringing the arduous Peninsular War to a successful conclusion, he vanquished the great man whose mighty genius was already declining at the early age of forty-six.

In 1805, of the French officers who commanded the » "The Art of War."

i6 NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1805

corps of the Grand Army, only two, Augereau and Bemadotte, were over forty years of age. Napoleon himself, Lannes, Soult and Ney were thirty-six ; Davout was thirty-five and Marmont thirty-one. Half the divisional commanders were between thirty and forty, while only a single one was fifty.

The campaign of Jena, in the ensuing year, when the Prussian army was led to destruction by venerable creatures of routine, furnishes us with another example in this connection. The Duke of Brunswick, " a spendthrift, a loose liver, and a martinet," was seventy ; MoUendorf was over eighty; Karlkreuth was sixty -six; even the fiery Blucher was over sixty, and only a few of the younger officers understood Napoleon's revolutionary tactics and strategy. To look to more recent times, most of the successful commanders of the American Civil War were comparatively young meni

When they advance in years, most men lose in energy of both body and mind ; they become too old to learn, and too confirmed in their opinions to adopt methods that are new, but that may be rendered necessary by altered conditions. They have a tendency to become soft and enervated, and disinclined to physical discomfort. Their peculiarities become accentuated; their fad% are fully developed, and their ideas do not advance with the times. Age may have its advantages, bringing a calm calculation frequently absent in youth and securing its possessor against hasty, impetuous and perhaps ill-advised action. But on the other hand, where an original or novel mode of operations is called for, or where brilliancy and dash are required, younger commanders are more likely to succeed than those who are wedded to antiqxiated and obsolete ideas. The youth of his generals was not the least factor in Napoleon's success in war. The Emperor himself said that no general had any enterprise left after his forty-fifth year. He proved this in his own person, for in 1815 his genius and his physical powers were already in a profound decline, notwithstanding the brilliant conception of the Waterloo campaign. At Austerlitz he said : " One has but a short time for war. I am good for another six years, and then I shall have to stop."

And what manner of men were Napoleon's generals ?

As leaders of men they were unequalled by any in Europe. Accustomed to look to their chief for guidance in all things, they developed little power of initiative on wide theatres of war, though fine tacticians. Bernadotte was clever, and a good leader under the eye of the Emperor, but, like many of the others, incapable of exercising independent command.