From the Yalu to Port Arthur : an epitome of the first period of the Russo-Japanese war

Front matter

t 1

1 WtM

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE

Preface

This brief summary of the First Period of the Russo-Japanese War covers only the operations of the Japanese armies; no reference being made to naval operations except when land and sea forces co-operated.

The naval history of this war should be written by a naval man.

The basis of the work is the Japanese official reports daily received from the Imperial Headquarters before being given to the press, supplemented by important information from other reliable sources.

Much confusion has arisen from the difference in spelling of the various places in Manchuria which doubtless will continue until the record of the Russo-Japanese is written in a universal language.

On the accompanying maps an earnest effort has been made to the end that the places shown shall correspond in spelling with the text.

LIST OF MAPS.

1. The Theatre of War.

2. The Battle of the Yalu.

3. The Battle of Nanshan.

4. The Battle of Tehlisz.

5. The Battle of Fenshuiling.

6. The Battle of Tashihkiao.

7. The Field of Operations of the Battle of

Liaoyang, and of the Sha-ho.

8. The Kwantung Peninsula.

9. The City and Harbor of Port Arthur.

Part I. From The Yalu To The Sha-ho

(hat'ter. Page.

I. Japan's notification to Russia. Declaration of War.

Troops landed in Korea. Action at Port Arthur, and Chemulpo. Transport and supply 1

II. Japan's preparedness. Ammunition and supplies 7

III. Kuroki's (First) army advances towards the Yalu.

Military operations. Preparations tor crossing the river. Disposition of Russian forces Kuroki's plan of campaign. Disposition of Japanese forces. The Battle of

the Yalu 6

IV Russian attempts to recover Motienling. Kuroki resumes the offensive. Actions at Hsihoyen and Chaoki-

apao 23

V. Battle of Yushulintsz and Yangtszling. Russian General

Keller killed 27

VI. Oku's (Second) army waits behind Elliot Islands the re-

sult of the battle of the Yalu. Tlie Second army lands on Liaotung Peninsula. Pulantien and Pitsewo occupied. Action at Sanshilipao. Occupation of Kiulichwang. Advance on Kinchow The battle of Nanshan. Strength of the Russian position 29

VII. Occupation of Dalny. Its condition 39

VIII. The battle of Tehlisz. Importance of Tehlisz 42

IX. Occupation of Kaiping. The Russian position 45

X. Yingkow occupied. Attack on Tashihkiao. The Russian

position. A night attack 47

XI. Advance on Haicheng and Newchwang. Successful

action and occupation 51

,\II. Nozu's (Fourth) army lands at Takushan. Actions at

Wangkiatun, Chienkiatung and Chipanling 53

vii

FROM THE YALV TO PORT AR'THCK.

Chapter. . Pag»

XIII. Advance on Fenshuiling and account of battle. The

Russian position. Capture of the Fenshuiling Defile. Actions at Hsienkiayu. Hsuitsaikeu and Sinpanlayu Crj

XIV. Japanese advance on Tomucheng. Action near Yang-

shukeu. Composition of the ''Takushan" army. ... 61 XV. The situation on August 1st. Ten great battles have been fought to date. The three Japanese armies

united under Field Marshal Oyama 64

XVI. Japanese army headquarters at Haicheng. Russian disposition. Preliminary operations to a general advance. Position in the vicinity of Liaoyang. Position of the First Japanese army. Advance of the Second and Fourth armies, and engagements. Russians retreat north of the Sha-ho. Operations of the First army. A bayonet charge by night. Disposition of Russian forces near Liaoyang 66

XVII. Advance on Liaoyang. Position of the Japanese forces up to the evening of August 31st. Engagements at Mangkiafang, Tsaofangtung, Fangkialing and Sin-

luitung 72

X^^III. Battle at Sheushanpao. Strength ol the enemy. Actions of the three armies. Night attack of Russians repulsed. Carried by assault. Russians in full retreat 75

XIX. Russian retreat and Japanese pursuit. Liaoyang railway station bombarded by guns captured from the enemy. A further advance. Enemy's troops concentrating near Yentai coal mine 79

XX. Last general advance. Liaoyang captured and occupied. Operations of the three armies from August 24th to Sept. 4th. Russian positions. Strength of

the Russian forces. A ten days' struggle 82

XXI. Operations of the Right army from August 28th to

September 5th. Russsian strength 86

XXII. Operations of the Central army on September 3rd and

4th. Gallantry of the 20th Japanese regiment 91

XXIII. Operations of the Left army from August 30th to September 4th 94

FROM TEE TALU TO PORT ARTHUR.

Chapter

XXIV.

XXV.

XXVI.

XXVII.

XXVIII.

Page.

Casualties at Liaoyang. Spoils of War. Strength of the hostile forces. Description of Liaoyang, and vicinity. Importance of its occupation 102

Advance towards Mukden. Severe fighting at Pingtaitsz. Russian movements. Proclamation of Kuropatkin. Battle of the Sha-ho. General situation on October 9th. The Russians assume the offensive. Severe fighting near Penchihu. Operations of the three armies. A general attack. Russian retreat. Japanese pursuit. A general advance. The heights of Maershan and Lienhwashan carried. Mangkiafang, Rukia and Kukiatsz occupied. Russian advance repulsed. Heights south of Shahopao carried. Further operations. Russian casualties. Japanese disaster 108

Description of the fighting on the extreme right of the Japanese army. Resume of operations from October 2d to the 13th 127

Strength of the hostile forces in the battle of the Shaho. Spoils of war. Comments 133

Operations from the battle of Sha-ho to the end of the year 1904 139

Part II. The Siege Of Port Arthur

Chap ter. Page-

XXIX . Report of operations from May 26th to July 31st 145^

XXX. Report of operations from August 1st to October 30th. Imperial solicitude for safety of non-combatants. The enemy refuses to surrender. A general attack. East and west Panlungshan forts captured. Imperial message to the army. Progress of engineering work. Kuropatkin fort taken. Russian warships severely damaged. Hachimaki yama taken. Situation in Port Arthur 1 5.>

XXXI. A general attack. "P" fort captured. Steady pro-

gress of siege. Assault on Sungshushan. Capture of 203-metre height. Bombardment of enemy's warships. Akasaka-yama taken. Condition of Russian warships. Torpedo attacks on the Sevastopol. Messages from General Stoessel. North fort of Tungkikwanshan captured. Prizes of war. Occupation of Houyangshukeu. Capture of Erhlungshan fort. The Russian defenses on the northwest of Port Arthur. Sungshushan captured. Capture of "H" fort and Panlungshan (new) fort. Wangtai fort taken . . 178.

XXXII. Stoessel proposes surrender. General Nogi's reply.

The enemy destroys forts and warships. Change of zone of blockade. Signing of the Capitulation. Articles of Capitulation. Supplementary Stipulations. Stoessel communicates with the Tsar. Interview between Stoessel and Nogi. The transfer of forts and prisoners. Spoils of war. The A'ictorious Japanese army enters Port Arthur 19(>

XXXIII. Particulars of the capture of the Panlungshan forts.

Success of the Sappers. Attack on the West fort. Fighting on Akasaka-yama. Occupation of the 203- metre height 210-

XXXIV. Major General Nakamura on the Siege of Port Arthur.

The last days of Port Arthur. A week at Port Arthur just after the Surrender 221

Appendix. I. Order of Battle of Japanese Armies 237

Appendix. II. Order of Battle of Russian Armies 251

xi

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

1904. Feb. 5. Japan's notification to Russia.

8. First shot fired at Port Arthur.

9. Naval action at Chemulpo. 10. Japan's Declaration of War. 28. First collision near Ping-yang.

March 28. Action at Chong-ju.

April 3. Occupation of Wi-ju.

May 1. Battle of the Yalu.

5. Oku's army lands on Liaotung Peninsula.

6. Occupation of Ferighwangcheng.

8. Action at Sanshilipao.

12. Occupation of Kiulichwang.

19. Nozu's army lands at Takushan.

20. Action at Wangkiatung. 23. Advance on Kinehow. 26. Occupation of Kinehow.

26. Battle of Nan.shan. 28. Occupation of Dalny.

28. Action at Aiyangpienmen.

Jun" 5. Skirmish near Chienkiatung.

7. Occupation of Saimachi.

8. Occupation of Siuyen. 15. Battle of Tehlisz.

18. Action near Chipanling.

27. Occupation of Motienling. 27. Battle of Fenshuiling.

.luly 4. First Russian attempt to recover Motienling.

6. Occupation of Hsienchang.

9. Action at Hsienkiayu.

9. Occupation of Kaiping.

10. Actions at Hsuitsaikeu and Sinpanlayu.

17. Second Russian attempt to recover Motienling.

19. Actions at Hsihoyen and Chaokiapao. 25. Battle of Tashihkiao.

July

Aug.

25-27.

30-31.

Sept.

Oct,

, 9.

10-18.

From Oct.

, 20.

to Dec.

FIW-M THE TALU TO PORT ARTHVlt.

Occupation of Yingkow.

Action near Tomucheng.

Battle of Yushulintsz and Yangtszling.

Occupation of Haicheng and Newchwang.

.Japanese Army Headquarters at Haicheng.

First army occupies right bank of Tang-ho.

Second army attacks Anshantien.

Fourth army attacks Liushantun.

Fighting west of Liaoyang-Haicheng road.

Occupation of Tasbimenling and Hiangshantsz.

Actions at Mangkiafang, Tsaofangtung, Fangkiatung

and Sinluitung.

Battle at Sheushanpao.

Line of heights occupied by Japanese army. Attack on Hohyingtai.

Liaoyang captured and occupied.

Severe fighting at Pingtaitsz.

Severe fighting near Penchihu.

The Battle of the Sha-ho.

General advance, and capture of Russian positions. Heights south of Shahopao carrii d.

Japanesp lose 14 guns near Santaokangtsz. Russian retreat from Penchihu toward Kaotailing.

The hostile armies face each other across the Sha-ho with frequent skirmishes but no engagements worthy of notice.

THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

Japanese troops enter Dalny.

Occupation of Waiteushan and Shuangtijii^-^lnin Russians assault Pantao.

Russian assault on Kienshan.

Fighting at Shuangtaikeu and Antsz'ling. Takushan height captured.

East and west Panlungshan forts captured. Kuropatkin fort taken.

Hachimaki-yama captured.

Capture of "P." fort. 203-metre height captured and held.

Akasaka-yama taken.

North fort of Tungkikwanshan captured.

Occupation of Houyangshukeu.

Capture of Erhlungshan fort.

Capture of Sungshushan fort. 1905. Jan. 1. "H." fort and Panlungshan (new) fort captured. Capture of Wangtai fort.

General Stoessel proposes to surrender.

Signing of the Capitulation of Port Arthur. Prisoners of war turned over to the Japanese Array Transfer of forts, warships, etc. completed. Entry of Japanese Army into Port Arthur.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

30,

Dec.

Jan.

PART I.

From the Yalu to the Sha-Ho.

Chapter I

Notification to Russia by Japan. — The long-drawn-out negotiations had come to an end, and Japan notified Russia that "Further prolongation of the present situation being inadmissible, the Imperial Government has decided to terminate the pending negotiations, and to take such independent action as it may deem necessary to defend its menaced position and to protect its rights and interests."

This meant War, but the Russian Bear, in the over-confidence of his might and position — which had been further strengthened by unparalleled success in the huge game of bluff that for years had deceived not only all the Powers, but himself as well — could not believe it possible that his pigmy antagonist would dare to fight.

Note well the date of this notification — February 5th.

Telegrams were sent at once to Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, to convey to the Russian Government the statement of Japan's resolution and to prepare to apply for his passports.

At the same time Baron Komura, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, conveyed a formal intimation to Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister in Tokyo, that whereas the Japanese Government had made every effort to arrive at an amicable settlement of the Manchurian question with Russia, the latter had not evinced any disposition to reciprocate this peaceful purpose:

therefore Japan could not continue the diplomatic conference. She was regretfully compelled to take independent action for the protection of her rights and interests, and she must decline to accept the responsibility of any incidents that might occur in consequence.

Declaration of War Promulgated. — ^Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister, left St. Petersburg on February 10th and repaired to Berlin. On this date also the Declaration of War was issued as an official notification to the Powers. The Russian Minister, Baron Rosen, left Tokyo on February 11th.

First Shot Fired at Port Arthur. — It was not until midnight of February 8th — three days after Russia had received notification of Japan's warlike intentions — that the first hostile shot was fired by the destroyers of Togo's squadron at the enemy's ships in Port Arthur — and the war was on.

Action at Chemulpo. — The succeeding day (the 9th) Rear-Admiral Uriu's detached squadron at Chemulpo disposed of the Russian cruisers Varyag and Koreetz.

It is not the writer's purpose to follow the numerous naval actions and maneuvers off Port Arthur, which followed in quick and startling succession, and showed Japan's great naval ability and superiority, but rather to summarize briefly the various land actions and the movements of the Japanese armies. — First Troops Landed in Korea. — The first detachment of the First Army was landed at Chemulpo on February 8th, under cover of the Japanese squadron. From Chemulpo to the Yalu River is a distance of about 330 miles, through a rugged hilly country, with roads hardly worthy of the name, and which, at this season, were full of snow and ice.

Transport and Supply.— The question of transport and supply was a vital one to the Japanese Army. Let us see how it was met.

During the previous three years the writer, as the American military attach^ at Tokyo, had had unusual advantages in visiting and inspecting the military posts and headquarters of every division of the army, extending from the HokkaidS in the north to Kyushu in the south, including also a month profitably spent in Formosa.

The annual fall maneuvers of the Japanese Army in 1901, 1902, and 1903 had likewise furnished much food for thought on all these questions.

The conclusions drawn are that to-day the Japanese Army has no superior in many vital points; the discipline is superb, the men render absolute instant obedience to their officers, who are studious, well informed, and keenly observant in regard to all details. No confusion in an emergency, no boisterous commands, nor unnecessary speech mark their every, action. They are each a part of a great and complete system, well organized and well, administered.

Every Japanese in uniform, from the Field Marshal to the newest conscript in the ranks, exhibits an unquestioned loyalty . and devotion to his Emperor and his country that is marvelous to contemplate, and is the key-note of discipline. Thereis but one conclusionj-isu'ch men with such leaders are invincible.

Requirements op Officers. — One of the requirements of a military or naval officer is that he must speak and be familiar with one other language besides his own, be it French, German, English, Russian,^ Chinese, or Korean. You can imagine the result and see its fulfillment in the present war.

It was a comparatively easy matter, therefore, to select officers and specially-instructed men to precede the Army into Korea and Manchuria. That this was done is without question ; results speak for themselves.

The transport and supply of the Japanese Army in its long march to the Yalu never failed. With their small carts and coolies, they not only kept up with the troops, but, until reaching the Yalu, preceded them. When a detachment of troops halted for the night, food and shelter (if the latter could be had), were waiting for them.

4 FROM Turn YALV TO PORT ARTHUR.

One thing greatly aided the supplies being on hand when they were needed, and it is indeed the key-note of proper supply — no package weighed more than seventy-five pounds (gunammunition alone excepted), and as a rule the packages were of uniform size, so that an exact number could always be carried on the carts, or packed on animals or on coolies. Every package was distmctly marked as to its contents and amount, and no confusion existed in its distribution. Neither heat nor cold, mountain passes nor rough trails stopped the continuous procession of the human-supply train, which, like a column of ants, wended its tortuous way northward to the Yalu.

The following quotation is taken from an article entitled "How Japan Moves," written from Korea towards the end of April by Mr. MacKenzie, of the London Daily Mail:

"How Japan Moves. — Nothing should give the friends of Japan more confidence than the way the details of supply is being managed here. The arrangements are the more noteworthy because of the contrast supplied by the other side. The Russians sent their cavalry from Manchuria into Korea hampered by baggage-wagons, and having to depend mainly upon ■what they could gather from the people. At every step their troops had to stop and hvint for fodder.

"The Japanese have gone to work in a different style. Long ago they started Korean language classes in Tokyo for picked soldiers. While some of the best Japanese officers were making their way through Manchuria and Mongolia others went all over northern Korea. Men living as Koreans, speaking the language like natives, regarded even by the natives as people of their own race, were in every district. The Japanese knew not only every road and trail, but apparently every person. Thus, when fighting came, they knew the land, while the Russians living in' its borders, did not. Every Japanese officer has his map of the part of the country he is working in. The Russians, apparently, have had to make their maps as they go, for the first Russian scouting expeditions have been accompanied by staff oflScers who drew plans and sketched as they went. The Russians have had difficulty m^btaining relia.ble interpreters, and, if reports speak true, have been utterly misled more than once by information received from Koreans — the Japanese have their own people trained for that purpose.

"The first great movement northwards was not of troops, but of transport. A few soldiers were forced up to save Ping-yang from the Russians, but the remainder waited until there were supplies ready for them. In every town between Seoul and Ping-yang, Japanese dressed as coolies, but armed with rifles, appeared on the streets. One man in plain imiform takes possession of a temple or a palace, and gigantic stocks of food and clothing arise, as it were, from the earth. Here is a moun- , tain of red blankets, there an avalanche of cooUe loads of rice.', Here come men from fifty miles away driving cattle; while the advance guard of Japanese troops is still miles away in the rearJ You enter a village, knowing that it is at least two days before the first soldiers pushing on from Seoul can reach there. At the entrance to the village you will probably find a newly-erected notice-board with a large map showing every house and road aroimd, and with minute directions below for the billeting of the troops.

"You go some miles off the main road to find one or two cavalry vedettes and a civilian bargaining with the Koreans about the purchase of pigs and rice. And very likely an army of coolies is setting out in another direction for soldiers who are coming on a side road.

"The same foresight is shown in every detail — ^the rice is made up to the exact weight for a coolie to carry; these weights are further calculated — so many to a pony or ox-load. Picked natives are decorated with stripes of red to show that they are now in the service of His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Transport Corps.

"At this time the Japanese do not haggle over money. Coolies are paid wages never before dreamed of, and the price of pack-ponies has gone sky-high. It must be borne in mind, in justice to the Russians, that the Japanese have worked in this land before. Campaigning in Korea is no new thing to them. Their armies marched through it in 1894 and spent a hard winter in northern Korea.

" 'It has been very hard work,' the head of one of the Japanese transport stations said to me. 'Our first problem has been to get our supplies over from Japan. Every transport ship is wanted for the troops. There is very little to be had from the country itself; the people are so poor that they have not got enough to sell to us.'

"At every step one sees the care taken for the comfort of the individual soldier. He has to have a hard time, but the military authorities see to it that what comfort he needs shall be there for him. Hours before a company, even on a forced march, reaches a place, men have arrived ahead, have prepared the houses, lighted great fires in the streets, and have cooked food ready for them. The essence of a successful business is organization. Japan has adopted that as the essence of war."

Chapter II

Japan Has to Give Up Port Arthur. — From the close of the China-Japan War in 1895, when — at the instance of Russia — Japan was compelled by the Powers to relinquish her hold on Port Arthur on the ground that it imperiled the integrity of the Chinese Empire — only to see that port a few months later pass under the control of Russia — Japan commenced her preparations for the present war.

Japan's Preparedness. — Secretly, quietly, and systematically, every move was towards the one end — when she might be able to meet her huge antagonist in the field.

Officers of ability, engineers, and agents were selected who could speak the language, and traveled in various disguises all over Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia.

Surveys were made, accurate maps were prepared of the whole region east of Lake Baikal. These indomitable spirits lived among the people, spoke their language. They knew well every foot of ground they would have to fight over, every mountain defile, every road and trail, every river — its depth and availability for water transport. They traversed on foot the entire route of the Siberian Railway east of Lake Baikal, noted the bridges, tunnels, trestles, and curves. They are also credited with having organized later, bodies of mounted bandits, having in view the destruction of the railway bridges and portions of the great line of steel, but of this nothing is known certainly, and it may be but idle rumor.

That the Japanese possessed a more accurate knowledge of

that region of country -held and controlled by the Russians than

the Russians themselves is as true as the oft-quoted statement

that at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War the Germans

knew more about France and her communications than did the

French themselves.

Bureau of Military Intelligence. — ^The bureau of secret military intelligence of the Japanese War Department is iaferior to none, and many lessons, no doubt, could be learned therefrom, were such a thing permissible.

AivtMUNiTiON AND SUPPLIES. — For more than a year prior to the outbreak of war the arsenals in Tokyo and Osaka were running their ammunition departments day and night; the Government clothing factories made innumerable uniforms, blankets and underwear ; shoo factories under Government control piled up cords of boots and shoes ; and so the work went on, day by day, night by night, quietly and unostentatiously, without comment or public criticism.

The procession of transport supply still goes forward regularly and continuously from an apparently inexhaustible store.

The great question of ammunition supply for naval ships, siege, field, and mountain guns and for small arms is also of vital importance. Hundreds of thousands of rounds have been used in the various engagements by land and sea, and yet the supply is not exhausted.

Chapter III. *

The First Army — Commanded by General Kuroki.

First Army Advances Toward the Yaltj. — The Japanesp troops moved slowly northward; the rough roads, trails, and niountain passes were full of snow, and the rivers and streams encountered were covered with ice not always sufficiently strong to be utilized.

The hardships and difficulties were many, but were endured with that cheerful stoicism so characteristic of the race, and no difficulties, however great, proved to be insurmountable.

Collision of Scouts at Ping-yang. — On February 28th the scouts of the opposing armies came into the first collision near Ping-yang, and after a short skirmish the Russians were repulsed. Another skirmish occurred on March 8th at Pak-chhon (midway between Ping-yang and Wiju); on both occasions the enemy retreated northward.

Action at Chong-ju. — On March 28th a body of Japanese cavalry and infantry encountered the enemy, about 600 in number, a short distance from the south gate of Chong-ju. The Russians were defeated and forced to retire, the Japanese taking possession of Chong-ju. Later in the same day a body of Japanese infantry attacked a Russian force some two miles to the northeast of Chong-ju and compelled it to retire in the direction of Wiju (seventy miles away). The Japanese casualties were 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, and 3 men killed and 2 officers and 10 men wounded ; Russian losses, unknown beyond the fact that a few of their dead and wounded were left on the field.

Occupation of Wiju. — On April 3d Japanese scouts entered Wiju and found no Russians there. The natives stated

10 FROM THE YALV TO PORT ARTBVR.

that the enemy had re-crossed the Yalu on the preceding day. The advance guard arrived at Wiju on April 6th. Evidently all hope of the Russians being able to offer resistance south of the Yalu was abandoned.

In view of the nature of the country between Ping-yang and the Yalu, it might reasonably have been expected that the Russians would have checked the Japanese advance in that region. With the exception of the coast-wise road there are no routes offering any reasonable facilities for the passage of troops, and the Cossacks might have made the advance extremely difficult.

The Cossacks. — It is interesting to read the first Japanese appreciation of the Cossacks. An officer of rank is reported as saying that in their habits these men differ from any people he has ever met. They live more like savages than civilized beings. They prefer to bivouac in the open to sleeping under cover, and their powers of endurance in covering long distances is remarkable. It is with regard to intelligence and courage that this officer denies them any praise. At Chong-ju they had all the advantages of position, but they made no attempts to utilize them. They can ride from fifty to sixty miles a day, and cannot easily be captured. The speed of their horses does not much differ from ours, but they are tough and hardy, and are more used to traverse mountain trails and difficult passes. They are far from being courageous, as has been repeatedly proved. The

' fact that a young Japanese lieutenant with twenty cavalry soldiers stood off a force of eighty Cossacks successfully for two hours (until reinforcements arrived) shows the fighting quality

I of the Cossack soldier.

Small Skirmishes. — Small skinnishes occurred along the Yalu between Wiju and Yong-ampo on April 11th and 12th and again on the 21st, the Russians being repulsed on each occasion. Military Operations. — On April 27th the Japan Mail had a leader on the military operations, from which the following is quoted :

"Some impatience has been shown by observers, who, without noting the essential points of difference between War-ships and battalions of troops, are surprised that while the navy has done so much the army should have done so little. But the question is, has the army done little? The army has transported itself to the Yalu, and that alone is no small achievement.

"If we refer to the China-Japan War of 1894, it appears that, whereas the order for mobilization was issued on the 5th of June the two divisions that marched from Seoul and from Yuensan, respectively, did not come together under the walls of Ping-yang until the 15th of September, on which day the chief land battle of the war was fought there. The 17th of October found these two divisions on the banks of the Yalu. Thus it appears that an interval of 133 days was required to carry two divisions from from Japan to the Yalu.

"Now on the present occasion the mobilization order was issued on the 7th of February, and the van of the army of three divisions reached the Yalu on the 6th of April — an interval of 58 days. We are not permitted to speak explicitly of numbers, but it will be no violation of the veto to note that three divisions of the Japanese Army to-day represent a force nearly three times as large as two divisions represented in 1894.

"The net result is that fifty-eight days' work has accomplished in 1904 three times as much as 133 days accomplished in 1894.

"Nor is that the whole story. When the troops landed in Korea ten years ago the time was early summer ; the roads were in their best condition, and the climatic conditions most favorable for campaigning. When the troops landed there in 1904 they found all these things as unfavorable as possible. Immense difficulties have had to be encountered. The van of the army seems to have moved with comparative ease, there still being sufficient frost to consolidate the paths and bridge the rivers. But every succeeding day produced a change for the worse. Soon it became impossible to drag artillery, and the troops, instead of pushing forward, had to devote themselves to the task of road-making. These things do. not occur to an ordinary onlooker, but to the mind of military men they are plain and significant. So far from complaining that time has been wasted, the sentiment should be one of admiration that so much has been done so quickly. After all, we must remember that great risks attended these over-sea operations at the outset. The ocean paths were not secure against attack; even the heavy blow delivered at Port Arthur in the beginning by the navy did not insure security, nor have the subsequent blows insured it altogether. A newspaper is not free to discuss these matters in full detail, but when the historian takes pen in hand his conclusion will certainly be that greater haste on the part of the Japanese would have meant worse speed, and that the movements which the situation dictates could not have been attempted earlier."

Preparations for Crossing the Yalu. — It is both interesting and instructive to note that on the very day (April 27th) the foregoing extract appeared in print Kuroki's army began its preparations for crossing the Yalu into Manchuria.

Description of Country. — ^At Wiju the Yalu has a width of from 7,000 to 8,000 metres, but the actual water surface is comparatively small, the bed being occupied by many islands, of which the largest (Keum-chong-do) measures nearly ten miles in circumference. These islands divide the river into three channels. Only the central one, however, cannot be crossed without a bridge or boat ; the two side channels are passable by wading waist-deep, unless the river be in flood. On the Manchurian side the banks are steep, and the walled city of Kiulien, nearly opposite to Wiju, stands on ground elevated some sixty metres above the river.