A history of European thought in the nineteenth century

Front matter

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GoLDWtN Smith Hall

FROM THE FUND GIVEN BY

Preface

As the plan of this work is fully given in the Introduction, only a few points, chiefly of a personal character, remain to be touched on here.

The first refers to the motive which led me to a course of studies, extending over more than thirty years, of which this book is the outcome.

The object of the book is philosophical, in the sense now accepted by many and by divergent schools — i.e., it desires to contribute something towards a unification of thought. When in the beginning of my philosophical studies I became convinced that this is the task of philosophy, I felt the necessity of making myself acquainted, at first hand, with the many trains of reasoning by which, in the separate domains of science, of practical and of individual thought, such a unification has been partially and successfully attempted. Such a survey seemed to me indispensable. The possession of a map showing the many lines of thought which our age has cultivated seemed to me the first requisite, the basis from which a more complete

VI PREFACE.

unification would have to start. The following pages contain the result of this survey. Like every survey, it can claim to be merely an approximation. It gives outlines which closer scrutiny will have to correct and fill up.

My original intention was to complete this survey in three volumes, corresponding to the three divisions of the subject set out in the Introduction.

Some of my friends, who desired that the publication of the book should not be unduly delayed, considered that the Introduction and the earlier chapters of the work would give something intelligible in themselves, and urged the advantage of smaller volumes. I therefore decided to complete the first part of the history, which deals with scientific thought, in two volumes instead of in one.

For the information of my readers, I mention here that the two last chapters of this volume, which treat of the astronomical and of the atomic views of Nature, will be followed in the second volume by similar chapters on the mechanical, the physical, the biological, the statistical, and the psychophysical views of Nature, and that it is my intention to close the first part of my subject by an attempt to trace concisely the development of mathematical thought in this century.

My thanks are due to many friends who have supported me with assistance and encouragement.

I consider myself fortunate in having secured for the revision of the whole volume the invaluable aid of Mr Thomas Whittaker, B.A., whose profound erudition, know-

PREFACE. VU

ledge of ancient and modern literature, and great editorial experience, were well known to my late friend Professor Groom Eobertson, during his successful editorship of the first series of 'Mind,'

Mr S. Oliver Eoberts, M.A., of the Merchant Taylors' School, has kindly read over the fourth, and Professor Phillips Bedson, of the Durham College of Science of this city, the last, chapter of this volume. The Introduction has greatly benefited by a thorough revision by my brotherin-law, Dr Spence Watson, a master of the English language.

I must also thank him and Dr Thomas Hodgkin for having given me what I value as much as assistance — namely, encouragement.

One indeed to whom I am in this respect more indebted, perhaps, than to any one else — whom to have known has meant, for many, a revelation of the power of mind and the reality of spirit — is no more: Ernst Curtius. While I was writing the last pages of this volume, in which he took a warm interest, the tidings arrived that he had passed away. But she who was nearest and ' dearest to him is still with us — a true priestess of the higher life, who has kept burning in the soul of many a youthful friend the spiritual fire when it was in danger of being quenched by the growing materialism of our age.

J. THEO. MEEZ.

The Quabbies, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, November 1896.

CONTENTS OF THE FIRST YOLUME.

Introduction

I. Thought, the hidden world, 1 ; The only moving principle, 2 ; History of Nature, how to be understood, 2 ; Not intelligible without intellect, 2 ; History of savage tribes, what is it ? 3 ; Two ways in which thought enters into history, 4 ; Definition of thought impossible, 4 ; Relation of outer and inner worlds undefined, 5 ; Many meanings of thought, 5 ; Thought of the present age, 6; Contemporary history, to what extent possible and valuable, 6 ; Supposed objectivity of historians, 7 ; Value of contemporary records, 8 ; Mystery of the life of thought, 8 ; Latent thought the material for genius, 8 ; Contemporary record of thought more faithful, 10 ; Events of the immediate past, 10 ; Changes of language, 11 ; Coining of new words, 12 ; Object of this work, 13 ; Not a political history, nor a history of science, literature, and art, 13 ; Influences which have a result on our inner life, 14 ; Personal knowledge necessary, 14 ; American influence only touched upon, 14 ; Only French, German, and English thought treated, 15 ; Unity of thought, a product of this century, 16 ; Voltaire, 16; Adam Smith, 16; Coleridge and Wordsworth, 17; Mme. de Stael, 17 ; Paris the focus of science, 17 ; Babbage, Herschel, and Peacock, 18 ; Liebig's laboratory, 18 ; Comte's philosophy, 18 ; Constable's influence in France, 19 ; Science become international, 19 ; The light which etymology throws on the history of thought, 20 ; Goethe, 22 ; Peculiarity of the German language, 22 ; New thought has found new words, 23 ; De Bonald and Max Miiller, 23 ; Thought, how expressed in French and German, 24 ; Philosophy of history, 25 ; Want of precise terms in German and French, 26 ; Carlyle, 26.

X CONTENTS.

II. The two factors of intellectual progress, 27 ; Object of the book, 28 ;

Nineteenth century, what it has achieved : (o) Method of knowledge ; (i) Unity of knowledge, 29 ; Search after truth, 29 ; Method of science, practised by Galileo, &c., defined by Bacon, &o., 30 ; Disintegration of learning, 30 ; Apparent distance between science and poetry, 31 ; Closer connection between science and life, 31 ; What has nineteenth century done for the ideals ? 32 ; Deeper conception of the unity of human interests, 33 ; Different terms for expressing this unity, 33 ; Definition of thought, 33 ; Age of encyclopjedic treatment, of learning, 34 ; Unity of knowledge gradually lost sight of, 35 ; Lectures on " Encyolopiidie " in Germany, 37 ; Enoyclopsedias did not fulfil their promise, 39 ; French were masters in science in beginning of the century, 41 ; Reaction in Germany against metaphysics, 43 ; Reform in school literature, 44 ; Germany has taken the lead in studying the life of thought, 46 ; Transition from metaphysical to historical method, 47 ; Herbert Spencer, 48 ; Lotze, 48 ; Herder's 'Ideen,' 60; Humboldt's 'Kosmos,' 51 ; Lotze's ' Microoosmus,' 52 ; What the mental life of mankind consists of, 55 ; Methods have their day and cease to be, 56.

III. Necessity of choosing a road, 57 ; No central event in our age, 58 ; Is history of thought history of philosophy ? 60 ; Goethe's work involves the deepest thought of the century, 61 ; Philosophy retrospective, 62 ; Two questions, 63 ; Speoujation, 64 ; Philosophy defined, 65 ; Division of the book, 65 ; Neither science nor philosophy exhausts " thought," 66 ; Thought also hidden in literature and art, 66 ; Goethe's and Wordsworth's influence, 67 ; Unmethodical thought, 68 ; Summed up in term " religious thought," 69 ; Science is exact, 69 ; Subjective interests, 70 ; Philosophy intermediate between exact science and religion, 71 ; Threefold aspect of thought : scientific, philosophical, individual, 72 ; Difficult to separate the three aspects, 74 ; French thought centred in science, 75 ; State of philosophy in England, 75 ; Goethe's ' Faust ' representative of the thought of the century, 76 ; A period of ferment, 76 ; Caused by the Revolution, 77 ; Thought of century partly radical, partly reactionary, 77 ; Byronic school, 78 ; Revolutionary theories, 79 ; Thought to be considered as a constructive power, 80 ; Darwin, Spencer, and Lotze, 81 ; Romanticism, 82 ; Scientific thought to be dealt with first, 84 ; Hegel's doctrine, 85.

CONTENTS. XI

Part I.— Scie¥tific Thought

Three chapters on the growth and the diffusion of the scientific spirit in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Chapter I. The Soibntifio Spirit In Peancb

Our century the scientific century, 89 ; Difference of English and Continental notions of science, 91 ; Relation of science and life, 92 ; Foreseen by Bacon, 93 ; Defect in Bacon's Philosophy, 94 ; Corrected by Newton, 95 ; Bacon's and Newton's ideas taken up by French philosophers : Bacon and Newton compared, 96 ; Laplace's work, 97 ; French Academy of Sciences, 99 ; Continental methods in mathematics, 100 ; Modern analytical methods, 102 ; Older synthetical methods, 103 ; Influence of science on French literature, 104 ; Absence of this influence in England and Germany, 106 ; Schools of science in Paris, 106 ; Promoted by Governments of Revolution, 108 ; Condorcet, 110 ; Lakanal, 111 ; Elcole normale, Ecole polyteohnique, 112 ; Monge's 'Descriptive Geometry,' 114 ; Science of Chemistry, 114 ; New mathematical sciences, 116 ; Crystallography, vll6 ; Theory of probability, 118; Laplace gained his results by disregarding " individuality," 124 ; The centre of interest in the sciences of life, 125 ; Into this centre Cuvier carried exact research, 128 ; Cuvier's training, 133 ; Cuvier the greatest representative of the Academic system, 136 ; Science during the Revolution and First Empire, 138 ; Popularisation of science in France, 142 ; Literary and national popularisation, 142 ; Dangers of the former, 143 ; The Revolution added the practical popularisation, 145 ; Influence of the first Napoleon on science, 149 ; Napoleon favoured the mathematical sciences, 151 ; Discountenanced V contemporary philosophy, 152 ; Used statistical methods, 153 ; Prominence given deservedly to French names by Cuvier, 155.

Chapter II. The Scientific Spirit In Germany

Foundation of German universities, 158 ; Development of the universities by the people, 159 ; Geographical distribution of the universities, 162 ; Full development of the German university system, 163; Philosophical faculty, 164 ; University of Gottingen, 164 ; Relation of universities and

XU CONTENTS.

high schools, 166 ; The university a training-school for research, 167 ; The ideal of Wissenschaft, 168 ; Developed under the German university system, 170 ; Reception of exact science in Germany, 174 ; Science not yet domiciled during the eighteenth century, 178 ; Scientific periodicals, 180; Gauss's mathematical researches; 181 ; Scientific spirit enters the universities in second quarter of century, 183 ; Jacobi's mathematical school, 185 ; Chemical laboratories established in 1826 through Liebig, 188 ; Cosmopolitan character of German science, 189 ; Liebig's organic analysis, 191 ; Biology a German science, 193 ; Cellular theory of Schleiden, 194 ; and Schwann, 195 ; Ernst Heinrioh Weber, 196 ; and Johannes Miiller, 197 ; Psychophysics, 198 ; Spirit of exact research and Wissenschaft, 202 ; Encyclopaedic view necessary in philosophy and history, 203 ; Philosophy of Nature, 204 ; Conflict between the scientific and the philosophical views, 205 ; A. von Humboldt, 206 ; Influence of Berzelius on German science, 208 ; Philosophy of Nature and medical science, 209 ; Science for its own sake, 211 ; Bequest of the classical and philosophical school, 211 ; Completeness and thoroughness of research, 213 ; Combination of research and teaching, 214 ; Combination of science and philosophy, 215 ; Biology grown out of science and philosophy combined, 216 ; Du Bois-Reymond on Muller, 217 ; "Vital force" abandoned, 218 ; Mechanical view in biology, 219 ; Criticism of principles of mathematics, 221 ; The exact, the historical, and the critical habits of thought, 222.

Chapter III. The Scientific Spirit In England

Scientific organisation abroad, 226 ; Similar institutions in Great Britain, 227 ; English science in the early part of the century, 229 ; Alleged decline of science in England, 230 ; Criticisms of Playfair, 231 ; Babbage's criticisms, 233 ; Foreign opinions on English science, 235 ; English replies to Babbage, 238 ; Foundation of the British Association, 238 ; Characteristics of higher mental work in England, 239 ; Academies and universities not always impartial, 240 ; Fourier, 241 ; Fresnel, 241 ; Plucker, 242 ; Grassmann, 243 ; Central organisation wanting in England, 243 ; Thomas Young, 244 ; Dalton, 245 ; Faraday, 246 ; Green, 246 ; Boole, 247 ; Babbage, 248 ; Characteristics of English thought, 249 ; Absence of schools of scientific thought, 250 ; Individual character and practical tendency of English science, 251 ; English peculiarities more pronounced during earlier part of the century, 252; Unique character of English universities, 254 ; Ideal of "liberal education," 255 ; Union of education and instruction, 258 ; Educational organisations in England, 262 ; The

CONTENTS. XUl

Royal Institution, 264 ; Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, 265 ; John Dawson of Sedbergh, 267 ; The Scotch Universities, 267 ; The Royal Society of Edinburgh, 269; The 'Edinburgh Review,' 270; The Analytical Society of Cambridge, 271 ; University life in Scotland, 271 ; The Dublin Mathematical School, 274 ; Importance of British contributions to science, 276 ; Diffusion of scientific knowledge on the Continent, 276 ; Isolation of English men of science, 277 ; Individualism of the English character, 279 ; Changes during the last fifty years, 280 ; British contributions to biology, 282 ; Jenner, 284 ; English love of nature, 284 ; Union of individualism and naturalism in England, 286 ; White of Selborne, 288 ; The Geological Society, 290 ; William Smith, 291 ; Charles Bell, 292 ; Historical Geography, 294 ; Martin William Leake, 296 ; Work of the three nations compared, 298.

Chapter IV. The Astronomical View Op Nature

The scientific spirit in the first and second half of the century, 302 ; Science become international, 303 ; Disappearance of national differences, 305 ; Special scientific ideas, 306 ; Philosophy of science, 306 ;' Whewell's ' History ' and ' Philosophy,' 309 ; Philosophy and science, 311 ; Leading scientific ideas mostly very ancient, 312 ; Mathematical spirit, 314 ; When first introduced into science, 317 ; Newton's 'Prinoipia,' 318 ; The gravitation formula, 319 ; Lines of thought emanating from it, 321 ; Element of error, 323 ; Laplace and Newton, 326 ; Several interests which promote science, 326 ; Insufficiency of observation, 328 ; Practical interest, 328 ; Fooalising effect of mathematical formulae, 332 ; Matter and force mathematically defined, 334 ; Weight and mass, 336 ; Gravitation not an ultimate property of matter, 338 ; Attraction and repulsion, 342 ; Electrical and magnetic action, 344 ; Law of emanations, 344 ; Molecular action, 346 ; The astronomical view : Cosmical, molar, and molecular phenomena, 348 ; Special interest attached to molar dimensions, 350 ; Geometrical axioms, 352 ; Difficulty of measuring gravitation directly, 353 ; Astronomical view of molecular phenomena, 354 ; Capillary attraction, 356 ; Boscovich's extension of the Newtonian formula, 357 ; Coulomb's measurements, 360 ; Extended by Gauss and Weber, 360 ; Davy and Faraday, 363 ; Ampere and Weber develop the astronomical view, 366 ; Weber's fundamental measurements, 368 ; Necessity of developing the infinitesimal methods, 373 ; Newtonian formula the basis of physical astronomy, 375 ; The Newtonian formula unique as to universality and accuracy, 377 ; Is it an ultimate law ? 378 ; Laplace's opinion, 378 ; Opposition to the astronomical view of nature, 381.

XIV CONTENTS.

Chapter V. The Atomic View Of Nature

Recapitulation, 382 ; Atomic theory, 385 ; Lavoisier, 386 ; Phlogistic theory, 388 ; Theory of combustion, 389 ; Rule of fixed proportions, 392 ; J. Benjamin Richter, 393 ; Dalton, 394 ; Berzelius, 396 ; Atomic theory and gravitation compared, 396 ; WoUaston's prophecy, 397 ; Rule of multiple proportions, 398; Equivalents, 399; "Simplex sigillum veri," 401 ; Prout's hypothesis, 402 ; Discovery of Isomerism, 405 ; Organic Chemistry, 407 ; Liebig's definition of same, 409 ; Type theory, 411 ; Uncertainty in chemical theory about middle of century, 413 ; Two aspects of the atomic theory, 415 ; A convenient symbolism, 417 ; Neglect of the study of affinity, 420 ; Kopp on chemical theory in 1873, 421 ; The periodic law, 422 ; Difference between chemical and physical reasoning, 424 ; The kinetic theory of gases, 426 ; Avogadro's hypothesis, 427 ; Neglect of same, 429 ; Development of the atomic view, 431 ; Pasteur's discovery of " Chirality," 431 ; Atom and molecule, 432 ; Joule's calculations, 434 ; Clausius's first memoir, 435 ; Internal energy of molecules, 436 ; The atomic theory accepted as a physidal theory about 1860, 437 ; Clerk Maxwell : The statistical view of nature, 438 ; Doctrine of averages, 440 ; Geometrical arrangement of atoms, 441 ; Crystallography, 441 ; Analogy between crystallographic and atomic laws, 444 ; Isomorphism, 444 ; Polymorphism, 446 ; Structural and stereo-chemistry, 447 ; Valency, 447 ; Atomic linkage, 449 ; The carbon tetrahedron, 450 ; Defects and insufficiency of the atomic view, 451 ; Theories of chemical affinity, 452 ; Practical influences, 453 ; Change in definition of organic chemistry, 454 ; Criticisms of the atomic view, 455.

A HISTOEY OF EUEOPE AN . THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

INTEODUCTIOK

I

Behind the panorama of external events and changes iwhich history unfolds before our view there lies the ^o,^'**™ hidden world of desires and motives, of passions and energies, which produced or accompanied them ; behind the busy scenes of Life lie the inner regions of Thought. Only when facts and events cease to be unconnected, when they appear to us linked together according to some design and purpose, leading us back to some originating cause or forward to some defined end, can we speak of History in the sense which the word has acquired in modern language; and similarly do the hidden motives, desires, and energies which underlie or accompany the external events require to be somehow connected, to present themselves in some order and continuity, before we are able to grasp and record them.

VOL. I. A

That which has made facts and events capable of being chronicled and reviewed, that which .underlies and connects them, that which must be reproduced by the historian who unfolds them to us, is the hidden element of

2. Thought. Thought, and thought alone, be it as a principle the°oiiy' of action Or as the medium of after-contemplation, is principle, capable of arranging and connecting, of combining what

is isolated, of moving that which is stagnant, of propelling that which is stationary. Take away thought, and monotony becomes the order.

3. This assertion may seem bold to many, who would look Nature, how rather to the grand phenomena of Nature than to the

to be under- ox i -n

stood. narrow limits of man's activity. A few remarks will, however, suffice to show that my proposition is not opposed to the view which they take. It may be urged that, independent of human life altogether, the earth has a history, the planetary system has a development, and that, according to modern theories, evolution is the principle which governs inanimate as well as animated nature; that rest and sameness are nowhere to

4. be found, everywhere change and unrest. But change

Notintelli- ' J o 8

gibie with- and uurest do not necessarily constitute history. Motion

out Intel- •' *'

'°°'- and change would be as monotonous as absolute rest,

were they merely to repeat themselves endlessly, did . the whole movement not produce something more, and were this something more not greater or better than the beginning. But greater and better are terms which imply comparison by a thinking beholder, who attaches to one thing a greater value than to another, judging by certain ideal standards, which are not in the objects or process of nature themselves, but are contained only in his own think-

INTRODDCTION. 3

ing mind. It may be that a mechanical and mindless series of changes can produce numbers without end, or forms of countless variety: but this process would deserve the name of history only if either the transition from unity to multiplicity, or the production of formal variety, were capable of being understood by a thinking mind, — if the result of the process were a matter of some concern, if an interest were attached to it, if a gain or loss could be recorded. The pendulum which swings backwards and forwards in endless monotony, the planet which moves round the sun in unceasing repetition, the atom of matter which vibrates in the same path, have for us no interest beyond the mathematical formulae - which govern their motions, and which permit us mentally to reproduce, i.e., to think them. A combination of an infinite number of these elementary movements would have as little interest, were it not that out of such a combination there resulted something novel and unforeseen: something that was beautiful to behold or useful to possess, something that was valuable to a thinking mind in a higher or lower meaning of the word.

But if, even in inanimate nature, the processes of change acquire an interest, possess a history, only if referred to a thinking mind which can record, understand, and appreciate them, how much more is this the case when we deal with human affairs, where man is not only the thinking beholder but the principal agent ? Here the historic interest would cease, were the succeeding years and ages to produce no valuable change, were the rule of existence 5 and the order of life to repeat themselves in unceasing Sv^F "' monotomj. The .savage tribes of Africa have a history: but is it? '

INTRODUCTION.

this history is all known when the order of the day, the year, at most of a generation, is known. Even the highly complicated but stagnant life of China would have a short historical record — many thousands of years taking up no more space than as many days of modern European history:

"Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay."

Thus it is that Thought becomes in two ways a subject of great interest and importance to the historian. Of every change in nature or human life we can ask : What has been its result in the world of thought ? What gain or loss, what progress, has it worked in the minds of men, of us the beholders ? Has it increased our knowledge, enriched our stock of ideas, deepened our insight, broadened our views and sympathies- — in one word, has it added to our interests ? has it made larger and fuller our inner life ?

And of every change in human affairs we can ask this further question : What part has thought, the inner life, played in this change ? These two questions mark the task of the historian of Thought.

I do not think it necessary or practicable at this stage to explain minutely the terms with which we have so far been dealing. Many a one might be tempted to ask for a definition of Thought, or for a preciser statement of the actual relation between Nature, Life, and Thought.*

' In refusing to define what I mean by Thought, I take up the opposite position to that occupied by Prof. Max Miiller in his latest work, 'The Science of Thought,' London, 1887, p. 1, where he says : " I mean by Thought the act of thinking, and by thinking I mean no more than combining. I do not pretend that others have not the right of using Thought in any sense which they prefer, provided only that they will clearly define it." So far as definition is at all a part of the work of the historian, I maintain that it is the result ancS

INTRODUCTION.

Such definitions must be left to the reader himself, if in course of the perusal of these volumes he finds it necessary to form abstract theories on these points. Any definition given now would inevitably involve us in controversies, which would be embarrassing and confusing. I rely upon the general and undefined sense of the word Thought, assuming that every one will connect some intelligible meaning with it, some meaning which will enable him to understand the very general proposition with which we started, the existence of an s.

Belatlon of

inner or hidden world behind the world of external outer and

inner world

events and facts, . the continually changing nature of undefined, this inner world, and the connection and reaction between the two worlds. "Whether in time and in importance the outer or the inner world is the first, whether within the latter equal value attaches to the clearer province of Eeason, i.e., defined Thought, to the obscurer regions of Feeling and Imagination, and . to the unconscious world of Impulse, these are questions which it is not necessary to answer at present. As, it was enough to point to the existence of the two worlds of Life and Thought, so it will be enough to notice that thought does not mean merely defined, clear, methodical 9.

^ Many mean-

thought, but likewise the great region of desire, impulse, i^^^*y^^ feeling, and hnagination, all of which play, we must admit, a great part in the inner life of the soul as well as in that of the outer world..

outcome of his narrative, the impression which he leayes on the mind of the reader when he has perused the work. History is not mainly a science which proceeds by analysis ; it is the attempt to collect and arrange in a living picture an enormous mass of detail.

Too rigid definitions, like lines which are too hard . and marked, spoil the total effect.

In this sense of the word we have in the following treatise to deal with the History of Thought : not, however, with the history of thought in general, but with

10. that of a defined period, with that of the present age the present and the age immediately preceding it, — the age, in fact,

to which the writer and his readers belong, of which they have a personal knbwledge and recollection more or less wide and intimate. It is the latter circumstance which has made me select this special portion of the history of thought; for it is that portion of which, it seems to me, I and my contemporaries should — if we go about it in the right way — know most. As every person is his own best biographer, so it seems to me every age is, in a certain sense, its own best historian.

11. We know that this has been frequently denied so far

Contempor- i., ni-i

ary history, as external events (that which many persons call history

to what ex- ^ ^

and'yafu-""'' ^*'' ^^^^^^''>^^) ^^^ conccmed. Contemporary writers do **''■ not, it is stated, get beyond mere records of events,

records at once one-sided, incomplete, and confusing. It is indeed necessary to have the records in great number and variety : because the true and real record can only be given by him who combines all these many records into one, who avoids the errors arising from special points of view, from naiTOwness of outlook, from individual ignorance, blindness, or prejudice. Still, in spite of such defects, the contemporary records will always remain the most valuable sources for the future historian who may succeed in sifting their various testimonies, combining and utilising them to produce a fuller and more consistent picture of the bygone age. But while his work may be only temporarily valuable, theirs is lasting. It is hardly doubtful that, after hundreds or thousands of years have passed, the simple, detailed, and perhaps contradictory, narratives of contemporary witnesses will outlive those more elaborate and artistic efforts of the historian which are so largely inspired and coloured by the convictions of another — viz., his own — age. For as Goethe has remarked : " History must from time to time be rewritten, not because many new facts have been discovered, but because new aspects come into view, because the participant in the progress of an age is led to standpoints from which the past can be regarded and judged in a novel manner."^

Most of the great historians whom our age has produced will, centuries hence, probably be more interesting as exhibiting special methods of research, special views on political, social, and literary progress, than as faithful and reliable chroniclers of events ; and the objectivity 12. on which some of them pride themselves will be looked objectivity

■^ ofhistor-

upon not as freedom from but as unconsciousness on their '""spart of the preconceived notions which have governed them. But where the facts recorded and the mind which records them both belong to the same age, we have a double testimony regarding that age. The events, and the contemplating mind, supplement each other to form a more complete picture, inasmuch as the matter and the medium through which it is viewed bplong to the same time. And so it comes to pass that historians like Thucydides, Taeitns, and Machiavelli are looked upon as

' ' Materialien zur Geschiehte der Farbenlehre,' Werke, 2te Abtheilung. Band 3, p. 239. I quote from the new edition, brought out by the German Goethe Society.

perfect models in the art of writing history, and the memoirs of many modern statesmen are more lastingly valuable than the more elaborate and connected narratives of remote and secluded scholars.