Outlines of descriptive psychology; a textbook of mental science for colleges and normal schools

Front matter

(50rneU Uttioetaitg ffiibratg

THE LIBRARY OF

EMIL KUICHLING, C. E.

Preface

This book has been written with a definite intention constantly in view. In size, selection and arrangement of material, style, and mechanical structure, my effort has been to adapt it to certain beginners, with an average grade of culture and amount of time at disposal. In a word, it is — as its title designates — a text-book of the science of psychology for colleges and normal schools. I have, therefore, had in mind, from first sentence to last, both the pupil and the teacher in their mutual relations. No pains has been spared to make the presentation of the subject such that it can be intelligently and " economically " yet thoroughly studied and successfully taught.

It will doubtless facilitate my general purpose if the explanation of it is extended into a few particulars. And first, attention is called to the fact that this work aims to give a complete but summary treatment of the phenomena of human mental life, from the different points of view, and with all the methods of research, which belong to modern psychology. The aid of experimental and physiological investigations is constantly sought. But these investigations are — at least at present — almost entirely unable to deal with the later and more complex developments of the mind. Unless we describe, and as far as vi PREFACE

possible explain, the growth of intellect, the knowledge of Self and of Things, the formation of the higher sentiments and emotions, and the conditions for the attainment of character, we neglect the main part of the task of the psychologist. Our picture of the mental life may have a scientific appearance, but it is not at all the faithful picture of a developed human mind. In aiming at what is, perhaps, best called the " balancing " of the material, I have tried to give these " higher faculties," without neglecting the treatment of more fundamental processes, the amount of space they naturally deserve and require.

The method which I have followed is both analytic and genetic. The First Part describes those elementary forms of functioning which analysis discovers as entering into all mental life. The Second Part traces the evolution of the principal " faculties " of mind, as much as possible in their combined and interdependent action. In both parts I have drawn upon all the different sources of the science, with grateful acknowledgment of help from workmen of various schools, but without handing in my allegiance, or dogmatically teaching to my readers, the opinions of any school. This attitude, as well as the text-book character of the work, explains many of its omissions. There are scarcely any footnotes, and comparatively few definite references of any kind; there are no extended quotations from other wiriters; the details of discussion and of argument for the author's views are wanting here, and must be sought in his other works. At the same time care has been taken not to create the impression that the views of this book are beyond all need of comparison with other

PREFACE Vii

investigators. On the contrary, commendatory or critical reference to others has been freely introduced; and a very brief bibliography, which it is hoped will lead the student to wider reading, has been appended to each chapter.

In the style of presenting the various subjects I have tried chiefly to secure clearness, conciseness, and order. These seem to me the more important qualities in such a text-book as this aims to be. But these qualities make it impossible to introduce lengthy stories or disquisitions aside, or other interesting illustrative material. The pupil, on his part, should begin the science, as he should begin every scientific study, with the determination to do honest and faithful work. This determination will soon secure a more intelligent and lasting interest in the subject than can otherwise be gained by any devices of the author, however skilful. But the teacher on his part is left free to supplement the- text-book from his own resources, and to stimulate the pupil to draw upon all his own experience for illustrative and life-giving details.

A few words are also needed to place the present work in its proper relations to other works on the same subject by the same author. The "Elements of Physiological Psychology " and the " Outlines of Physiological Psychology " are not at all displaced by this book in the use of those who wish to study mental life with more detail, from the experimental and physiological points of view. Indeed, where there is time for this, reading of one of the physiological psychologies may be combined with the use of the present work. For younger pupils, or those who have less time, the " Primer of Psychology " will still be

Vlll PREFACE

preferred; while more advanced students, and beginners who have more leisure for reading than belongs to the college classroom, or who object to the definitely text-book form of presentation, will probably prefer the larger "Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory."

I wish to make grateful acknowledgment of the help received from my colleagues, Professor George M. Duncan and Dr. Edward W. Scripture. Professor Duncan read all the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions toward adapting the book better for classroom use. Dr. Scripture has greatly assisted in preparing the diagrams, — several of which are of his own devising, — and has carefully scrutinized the experimental material. Both of these gentlemen have read all the proofs. I feel that their experience as successful teachers, added to the experience of the author, may reasonably be relied upon to have produced a serviceable text-book of psychology. The author alone is responsible for the opinions advocated and for the method of their presentation, as well as for any mistakes and deficiencies which may have escaped his observation.

It is as both pupil and teacher that I send out this text-book of psychology, and ask for it kindly consideration from other pupils and teachers.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

Yale University, January, 1898.

Chapter I Pages

Introductory 1-1&

PART FIEST

THE PEO CESSES OF MENTAL LIFE

CHAPTER n Consciousness and Elementary Self-consciousness . 20-35

CHAPTER in Attention and Discrimination 36-57

CHAPTER IV Sensation 58-87

CHAPTER V Feeling 88-111

CHAPTER VI Conation and Movement 112-123

CHAPTER VII

Ideation 124-152

ix

X CONTENTS

PAET SECOND

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL LIFE

CHAPTER VIII

PAGEB

CHAPTER IX Perception by the Senses 168-226

CHAPTER X Memory 227-245

CHAPTER XI Imagination 246-256

CHAPTER XII Primary Inference and Judgment .... 257-271

CHAPTER Xin Thought and Language 272-292

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

Knowledge of Things and Knowledge of Self . 808-327

CHAPTER XVI The Emotions and Sentiments 328-353

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER XVn

PAGES

Will and Character 354-374

CHAPTER XVIH Ttpes and Principles or Mental Development . 375-394

CHAPTER XIX Body And Mind 395-421

OUTLINES OF DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Definition of Psychology. — Although it requires much time and study to form a worthy conception of the science (its nature, method, and aims) of which we are to treat, the following preliminary statement will be of use: Psychology is the systematic description and explanation of the phenomena of consciousness, as such. For the phrase "phenomena of consciousness," such terms as "conscious states," or "processes," "psychical (or mental) activities," or even the technical word "psychoses," may sometimes be substituted. For the principal classes of these phenomena the familiar words, sensations, feelings, ideas, memories, imaginings, thoughts, sentiments, decisions, choices, etc., must often be employed. What all these conscious states in fact are, and what conditions accompany and determine them, every adult knows to some extent by his own experience. But the complex structure, so to speak, and the manifold causes and connections of many of them, still baffle the supremest efforts of expert inquirers. What these phenomena actually are, as conscious states, and how they come to exist and to follow each other in the order which they in fact assume, forms the primary subject of the investigations of psychology.

Our definition has restricted the sphere of psychology to conscious states, or psychoses, as such. This rather uncouth way of helping out the formula is necessary, for the following reasons. From a certain point of view (and this is the distinctively psychological), all the sciences may he regarded as only "systematic description and explanation " of man's conscious states. Science itself is a human psychical activity ; it is systematic and verifiable knowing. And since there is no such thing as knowing in general, every scientific fact or law is, in what is called its subjective aspect, somebody's perception, imagination, or cognition. That which, for the scientific botanist, is a real thing, a tree or a plant, is for psychology a "phenomenon of consciousness "; it is in either case a perception or conception to which the attribute of "scientific" or "unscientific" may be ascribed. The scientific geologist, too, gathers the facts of his science only by his own observation, or by belief in the reports given by others of their observations, — in either case, helped out by imagination and memory. His scientific generalizations are, therefore, for the psychologist the conclusions of the mind's observing and reasoning processes; they are judgments, thoughts, conjectures, as to what is true or was true. But judgments, thoughts, conjectures, etc., are psychical events; they never are, and never can be, anything, iVt themselves considered, but conscious states.

Now it is " in themselves considered " — the perceptions by the senses, the memories, thoughts, conjectures, as such — that the psychologist studies the phenomena of consciousness.

Psychologist's Point of View. — The student of nature is sometimes said to take the objective point of view, in distinction from the point of view taken by the psychologist, which is, by way of contrast, then called subjective. The distinction is valid and worth the making; but it requires a word of explanation. "We have just seen that all the sciences of nature may be regarded as conscious states of

NATUEE OP PSYCHOLOGY 3

the men who observe the facts, and who think out the connections between the facts. But this is to affirm that physics, chemistry, geology, botany, and all similar forms of knowledge may be regarded as in some sort "subjective." On the other hand, when I consider my own thoughts or imaginings, and when I reflect upon the nature of the being which can behave in this way, — can be said to "have "the thoughts and imaginings, — I am making these psychical processes and psychical powers the " objects " of my observation and reflection. Sensations, as truly as stones, — beliefs, as actually, though not so successfully, as bees and beetles, — volitions, as undoubtedly as volcanoes, — can be made the objects of scientific investigation. Yet the psychologist's point of view is properly called subjective.

The more important bearings of this distinction between the subjective and the objective cannot be made clear at present. But there can be no doubt about some items of our experience which enforce the distinction. I am the owner (in German the Tragef) of my conscious pains and pleasures, of my thoughts and sentiments, as I am not of any of the natural objects which belong to me. In turn, your feelings and thoughts are "yours"; and those of the third man yonder are " his " ; they are neither yours nor mine. Conscious states, as such, are always and unavoidably held, by the one who observes or reflects upon them, to belong to some conscious subject, or Self, whose states they are. Only the subject of these conscious states can make them the immediate object of observation. Only the signs or manifestations of them can be observed by others: such as the eye that kindles with love, or the cheek that flushes with anger, or the action that follows the decisive choice. On the other hand, the owner, or subject, of the conscious states does become aware of them as no other observer can. His knowledge is — at least, to some extent — internal and subjective, while the knowledge of others can only be external and interpretative. But more in regard to this distinction will follow in other connections.

Assumptions of the Psychologist. — The student of mental life can no more dispense with all assumptions than can the student of any form of particular science. Psychology has as much right to its list of facts and truths that are taken for granted as has either physics or biology. No attempt will here be made to give an exhaustive treatment of the legitimate assumptions of the psychologist, or even to enumerate them without omission of any. Neither can the psychologist, any more fitly than the devotee of any form of physical science, be called upon to define all the terms, or to analyze completely all the conceptions, which he is obliged to employ. The following, however, sljould be noted as among the most important.

It is assumed that there are such facts as conscious processes, or psychoses. But to assume this is only to admit that men perceive and feel and reason and choose; and such an admission no one can fail to make. On the other hand, a scientific definition of consciousness cannot be given, and it is foolishness to seek it. For definition implies science ; and science itself, from the psychological point of view, we have seen to be an elaborate collection of related conscious acts. To define consciousness would, then, be to resolve what is most primary and elemental into what is bewilderingly complex, and uncertain.

It is also assumed that conscious processes may be observed and studied, and that, as a result of such consideration, they may be the better understood. The immediate evidence for this assumption lies partly in every one's experience; but fuller proof requires an examination of the method of psychology and of the doctrine of self-consciousness. The treatment of these topics will follow later.

NATUEE OF PSYCHOLOGY 5

It is further assumed that conscious processes are connected with each other. In some valid meaning of the words, the sequent mental facts are dependent for their character and origin on previous mental facts. Mental phenomena are not chaotic or wholly oblivious of law and order, Since all the ordering of facts and the total conceptito of law, which "science" implies, are primarily of mental origin, the mental processes; as such, cannot prove wholly disorderly and unsubmissive to law.

It is assumed, finally, that many of our conscious processes — and mental life generally — are dependent upon a variety of external conditions. The common experience of men justifies this assumption. Indeed, without making it, we can scarcely see how experience itself would be possible. It is, of course, unscientific to begin psychology with such an assumption as this : " The immediate condition of a state of consciousness is an activity of some sort in the cerebral hemispheres ; " or with any similar statement taken for granted. In a preliminary way, psychology does not even so much as know whether there be any cerebral hemispheres. But the psychologist, like the student of physics or of chemistry, is obliged to assume that "things " do exist, and that they furnish conditions for the origin, order, and character of many of our conscious states. For example, I cannot investigate the mental phenomena of sensation and perception without referring them to the existence and action of the thing perceived by the senses. The whole doctrine of the quality and quantity of sensation, and of the arising and growth of the knowledge of natural objects, connects psychology with physics, with chemistry, with physiology, and with biology.

The ultimate nature of the Mind, the reality of Things, and the actuality of those causal relations whi(?h every one assumes to exist between things, are subjects for pro-

6 DESCBIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

found philosophical inquiry. It is, indeed, difficult for the psychologist to avoid introducing such subjects into his discussion of mental phenomena. Without disputing at present as to how far metaphysics is desirable, or even necessary, as an admixture in psychology, we simply insist upon taking at the beginning a naive and common-sense point of view. There are things, — to be perceived, remembered, thought about, known, and acted upon; and in our perceiving, thinking of, knowing about, and dealing with them, these things influence us. There are also beings that perceive, remember, think, know, and act upon things. They are called "Minds," and it is the facts and laws of their life which psychology investigates.

Psychology as Science. — After what has just been said, it seems almost needless to raise the question whether psychology can claim for itself a scientific character. If by science is meant a system of indubitable facts and laws so established that deductions from them amount to a demonstration, why then there is scarcely any such knowledge in the possession of the human race. Some astronomy, some physics, and a little of chemistry would seem to cover about all. But there is a use of the word "science " which is at once more valid and more generous. Wherever there are facts which admit of fairly accurate observation, and which can be classified and their conditions and interconnections discovered, there is material for a scientific growth. That mental facts can be thus dealt with, no one has a right to deny who has not made himself expert in the use of all the means for studying these facts which the modern age provides. That a body of facts and of generalizations worthy to be called "a science of psychology" actually exists, is sufficiently proved by its literature.

Psychology as Descriptive. — Like all the others of a considerable group of scientific disciplines, psychology has

KATCRB OP PSYCHOLOGY 7

gained its principal successes thus far in . the way of enlarging the descriptive hintory oi mental life. Description is, of course, the primary thing in laying the foundations of every science. What are the facts ? We need first to have them accurately and fully described. We need also to have them described in a genetic way ; in a way, that is, to correspond with the order of their rise and development. This is the great need, and it is the fundamental achievement of all biological studies. Study of all things that are alive has thus far resulted, for the most part, only in an accumulation of descriptive histories. Why the facts are such as we find them to be, and why they are so arranged and connected, it is in general impossible to say. To describe, with keen analysis, helped on by experiment and in dependence upon cognate sciences, the phenomena of consciousness, is the primary aim of psychological investigation. Its principal modern achievements are in the fields of such description. But this aim is subordinate to a more ultimate aim. The supreme final purpose of psychology as descriptive science may be defined as follows: To give an accurate and full history of the development of that form of life which we call the Human Mind.

Psychology as Explanatory. — No genuine scientific endeavor is satisfied with mere description. Explanation both accompanies and follows, though usually in a lagging way, the course of descriptive science. In the stricter meaning of the word, science begins only when a knowledge of conditions and effuses is joined with a knowledge of facts. The psychologist always keeps this aim steadily in sight. He, too, is never satisfied simply to know what the facts are, but ever strives to ascertain under what conditions, and as due to what determining causes, the facts occur. He particularly desires, where this is possible, to establish an accurate measurement and to take the relative values of conscious states ; as well as to connect them, in terms of wider and yet wider generalizations, with that varied life of nature which constitutes the environment of the individual mind.

Explanations in psychology may, in general, proceed in any one of several directions ; or, rather, each of several directions must he followed in order to obtain the fuller explanation of mental processes.

First, the more elaborate mental processes may be explained by analyzing them into the simpler and more elementary processes. For every conscious state, especially of the adult mind, is exceedingly complex. And as the mind develops, the complexity of its processes in general increases. " Explanation " by way of psychological analysis has been compared to the work of the chemist; and there are striking likenesses existing between the two kinds of scientiiic research. But there are yet more striking differences. For mental processes, such as the more elementary kinds of sensation, ideation, and willing, are not real existences, capable, like the atoms, of being actually separated out of their combinations. The effect upon psychological science of such likenesses and differences as exist between psychological analysis and the analysis of the physical sciences will become more evident later on. It is enough to say here that the words " factors, " " elements, " " fusion of factors " (or elements) do not mean the same thing in psychology as in physical science. They are figurative, and are designed on the one hand to characterize the comjplex content of consciousness, and, on the other hand, to affirm our power of discriminating the different partial aspects of this complex content.

Second, the physical conditions of psychical processes—such as the external stimuli, the structure and functions of the bodily organism, and the total natural environment — may be studied, and, when discovered,

NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 9

used to explain these processes. This form of explanation renders psychology dependent upon physics, physiology, and biology ; and it results in establishing important connections between it and these other sciences.

Third, the psychologist aims to explain the later phenomena of mental life by dependently connecting them with the earlier phenomena. In doing this he is always, indeed, obliged to confess that his explanation is not complete. For there is something other and more in the later stages, where these are also the "higher," than can be found in conditions furnished by the earlier and lower. But, on the other hand, the latter do explain the former, in somewhat the same way as that in which a knowledge of the structure of the young tree or young animal explains the maturer functions of the same being. The key to all such explanation is, of course, the complex conception of " Development." Psychology endeavors to give a systematic exhibition of the general conditions and laws which control the evolution of the mental life of the individual man.

Fourth, psychology is just beginning to recognize the immense influence upon the individual of his social environment. It was this which the lines of the German poet emphasized : —

" Would'st thou make thine own acquaintance. Then see how other men behave."

Of this entire great truth, the other side is expressed by the same poet in the lines which follow: —

" Would'st thou understand thy fellows, Of thine own heart take regard."

There is not a mental function of the individual man which is not better understood as dependent upon the social conditions of his birth, education, and daily surroundings.

10 DESCBIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

Problem of Psychology. — The mental life of the individual man is full of unsolved and difficult problems. Every mental process has its peculiar problem, or rather group of problems. He who eats and digests his dinner furnishes the practical answer to questions for which no physiologist has a sufficiently full and unimpeachable theory. The plain man in the daily use of his powers of vision is a puzzle to the psychologist. Normal perception by the senses is no less full of problems than are the illusions of the dreamer or the hallucinations of the hypnotized or the insane. It is with an appetite for hard problems that the student of psychology should approach the subject.

All subordinate problems, however, may be merged in the one great, inclusive problem before psychology. , This problem may be stated as follows : To understand the real nature of that mental life of which all conscious states are members and parts, and to know the conditions and laws which control its genesis and development.

Method in Psychology. — In spite of much debate over psychological method, we cannot consider this question as worthy of detailed consideration. Indeed, one can scarcely speak with propriety of the method in psychology. All means to a more accurate and complete description of conscious states, and to the fuller and more precise knowledge, of their external conditions and their interconnections, belong to legitimate psychological method. Those who make a fight for what they call "objective" and "scientific" method as against introspection, or for experiment as against reflection, are not so wrong in what they claim as in what they are inclined to deny. The so-called " new psychology " has no existence as a complete break-off from the old psychology. The laboratory and the study, the " reacting-table " and the thinker's "chair," cannot be kept unacquainted with each other without injury to both.

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY 11

Introspection in Psychology. — At the same time there is a way of ascertaining the facts, and, to a certain extent, the conditions and laws of relation between them, which is peculiar to the scientific treatment of mental states. This way, or method, is called " introspection " ; sometimes "reflection," or "secondary" or "intentional self-consciousness." True, self -perception is often selfdeception. And it has been correctly argued that we cannot even begin to examine our own consciousness, with a view to know its contents, without at once profoundly modifying the very contents we propose to examine. To suppose that what we "think about " our psychoses is a true description of the actually existing psychoses themselves, has fitly been pointed out as chief of the psychologist's fallacies.

On the other hand, the very modification which our activity in self-observation introduces may itself be observed. And he who denies that some sort of "immediate awareness " of one's conscious states is possible runs counter to all human experience. " Surely " — every man affirms with naive but invincible conviction — "I may know that I have, and when I have, a bodily pain, and whereabouts in the system of bodily localities I am obliged to place it." And how can I doubt that I have thoughts, and what I think about this or that sensible object or abstract question ? Only the development of psychological science itself can determine the dangers and safeguards, the risks and fallacies, of the introspective method in psychology.

Reserving further hints for other connections, we afiirm, in a preliminary wa,y : Self-olservation of conscious states is able not only to reveal them to us as true objects of knowledge, but also to assist us to analyze those states and to discover their real conditions. And without self-observation such states can neither be known nor analyzed.

The marked improvement which the training of one's powers of introspection brings about is matter of indubitable experience with the earnest student of psychology. This improvement is especially marked, for example, in the direct analysis of the overtones which it becomes possible to detect in the complex musical sound of ordinary experience. Another good example is found in the experience of those who carefully observe their skin sensations, with a view to separate the different elements which blend in the case of what is called "feeling" things with the hand. Undoubtedly our so-called "feelings" in general are very difficult of description and of scientific treatment. But this is not because we are not immediately aware of them in any trustworthy way. On the contrary, it is of our present feelings, especially when they are obtrusive and strong, that we are most directly and unequivocally aware.

Experiment in Psychology. — While a certain amount of experiment has alvvaj-s been connected with investigations in psychology, the use of carefully prepared and closely guarded experimentation is a very modern achievement. The value and success of the so-called experimental method ought not to be questioned. At the same time, its devotees are tempted to exaggerate its promise and its superior productiveness. It certainly caa never be pursued without dependence upon introspection. And it is easier, perhaps, to excel in the manipulation of mechanism than in the trustworthy report of the content of consciousness, as indicated and measured by the mechanism. Moreover, it is only the comparatively simple sensory-motor activities, the less complex and subtle associations, and the more elementary forms of feeling and choice, which lend themselves readily to experiment.

In spite of the lengthy and heated debate which has been carried on over the use of introspection, and over the method of psychology in general, there is really little chance for an intelligent and wide difference of view. Physiological and experimental psychology can no more dispense with introspection than can the most old-fashioned kind of the so-called "old psychology." But, on the other hand, physiology and experiment have contributed much the larger part of the assured

METHOD OP PSYCHOLOGY 13

and permanent recent additions to psychological science. Again, when Volkmann rejects both the inductive and the deductive methods and introduces what he calls the " genetic " method, he can cany out his own way of handling mental phenomena only by virtually using the methods he rejects. On the other hand, the " genetic " method, or study of the genesis and development of individual mental processes and of the whole mental life, is characteristic of modern psychological science ; as it is, indeed, of all the modern sciences. Some of the most distinguished followers of this method, however, — as, for example, Herbart and his successors in Germany, and Herbert Spencer and his adherents in Great Britain and this country, — have misused this method by substituting their own theoretical abstractions for the ' actual and living activities of the mind.