The cotton trade: its bearing upon the prosperity of Great Britain and commerce of the American republics, considered in connection with the system of Negro slavery in the Confederate States

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CHAPTER I. Introduction — Early Culture and Manufacture of Cotton

Slavery j

CHAPTER n.

The Production of the South-western States — The Monopoly

OF THE Bank of the United States 19

CHAPTER in.

The Mississippi Union Bank Bonds 3D'

CHAPTER IV.

The Present State of the Trade — The Growth of Cotton in

the World 49

CHAPTER V.

British Opinions on the Cotton Question prior to the Dissolution of the American Union 65'

CHAPTER VI.

Remarks on the Speeches of Mr. Bright — Free and Slave

Labour 77

CHAPTER VII.

The Importance of American Cotton — The Political Heresies

OF Seward and Lincoln 92

Vm CONTENTS.

CHAPTER Vin.

PAGE

The American Cotton Crops — * Southern Wealth and Northern

Profits' 106

CHAPTER IX.

The British Cotton Trade — Statistics from 1697 to 1863 116

CHAPTER X.

The Wheat Trade of Great Britain, France, and America —

Exports of Produce from the States . . . .132

CHAPTER XI.

American Currency and Commerce — The West India Trade —

General Remarks 139

CHAPTER XII.

The African Slave Trade — Free and Slave Negroes in the

TO

WILLIAM H. GEEGOEY, ESQ., M.R

My beab Sir, — I have written some papers on the cotton trade, which, with these remarks addressed to yourself, I propose publishing collectively. I discuss at length several matters in connection with American affairs that have not before, I beheve, been fully considered.

During the last twenty-eight weary months — weary enough to all Confederate Americans in Europe — ^I have been more and more convinced, that the long train of calamities which, have occurred within that time might have been averted, but for the opposition on the part of the British ministry and Eadical members of Parliament to the motion which you, on March 4, 1861, gave notice of your intention to bring forward in favour of the recognition of the Southern Confederacy, then composed of the seven cotton States. Some time — a week or more — ^before my departure from America, on the 30th of that month, intelligence had been received in the Northern States of your proposition, which, coupled with the somewhat pacific tone of President Lincoln's inaugural message delivered on the same day, gave assurance to the public mind that the dissolution of the Federal Union would be accomplished in as peaceable a manner as was the case at its formation seventy-two years before, when eleven of the thirteen States * seceded ' from the * Articles of Confederation.' Confidence in such a happy issue was likewise felt, from the fact that the commissioners appointed by

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the Confederate States ♦ ' for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith,' had reached Washington on March 5, but at the request of Mr. Seward, through * a friendly mediator,' did nothing more than give formal notice of their arrival, in order to allow time for the new administration to become fairly organised. What happened subsequently is thus related by President Davis in his message of April 30, 1861 : —

It was not until the 1 2th of the month that they officially addressed the Secretary of State, informing him of their arrival, and stating, in the language of their instructions, their wish to make to the Crovernment of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the Grovemment of the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States desired a peaceful solution of these great questions ; that it was neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which was not founded on the strictest principles of justice, nor to do any act to injure their late confederates.

* South Carolina seceded from the Union on December 20; 1860| and her first act thereafter was to send commissioners to Washington to make a general settlement with her late political copartners. They arrived at the Federal capital on December 27^ and left on January 14, 1861^ the President haying declined to treat with them. It was not imtil February that South Carolina imited with the other cotton States in forming the Confederacy. In the meanwhile some correspondence had been conducted with a gentleman in London, who replied| upon good authority too, that an ambassador from the State would be received at this court by virtue of the Treaty of 1783. South Carolina did not cede her forts to the general government until 1806, and even then her conditions were, that she was to retain all sovereignty over them, her Legislature expressly reserving that control. So the Washington authorities never had jurisdiction in Charleston Harbour. The Constitution (Article I. Section 8) says : —

' Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all ' cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as ' may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, ' become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise ' like authority over all places purchased, hy the consent of the Legidature ' of the State m which the same shall be^ for the erection of forts, magazines, ^ arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.'

WILLIAM H. GREGORY, ESQ., M.P. xi

To this oommumcation no formal reply was received until April 8. During the interval^ the commissioners had consented to waive all questions of form, with the firm resolve to avoid war if possible. They went so far even as to hold, during that long period, unofficial intercourse through an intermediary, whose high position and character inspired the hope of success, and through whom constant assurances were received from the G-ovemment of the United States of its peaceful intentions, of its determination to evacuate Fort Sumter ; and further, that no measiires should be introduced changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate States; that, in the event of any change in regard to Fort Pickens, notice would be given to the commissioners.

The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy and candour and directness as the course of the United States G-ovemment towards our commissioners in Washington. For proof of this I refer to the annexed documents marked, taken in connection with further facts I now proceed to relate.

Early in April the attention of the whole country was attracted to extraordinary preparations for an extensive military and naval expedition in New York and other Northern ports. These preparations commenced in secrecy for an expedition whose destination was concealed, and only became known when nearly completed, and on April 5, 6, and 7, transports and vessels of war, with troops, munitions, and military supplies, sailed from Northern ports bound southward.

Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the commissioners requested the delivery of an answer to their official communication, and the reply dated on the 15th of the previous month, from which it appears that during the whole interval, whilst the commissioners were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever — ^to refuse even to listen to any proposak they had to make, and had profited by the delay created by their own assurances in order to prepare secretly the means for effective hostile operations.

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That these assurances were given has been virtually confessed by the Grovernment of the United States, by its act of sending a messenger to Charleston to give notice of its purpose to use force if opposed in its intention of supplying Fort Sumter.

No more striking proof of the absence of good faith in the Government of the United States towards the Confederacy can be required than is contained in the circumstances which accompanied this notice.

According to the usual course of navigation, the vessels composing the expedition, and designed for the relief of Fort Sumter, might be looked for in Charleston Harbour on April 9. Yet our commissioners in Washington were detained under assurances that notice should be given of any military movement. The notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent to Charleston to give notice to the Governor of South Carolina, and the notice was so given at a late hour on April 8, on the eve of the very day on which the fleet might be expected to arrive.

That this manoeuvre failed in its purpose was not the fault of those who controlled it. A heavy tempest delayed the arrival of the expedition, and gave time to the commander of our forces at Charleston to ask and receive instruction from the Government. Even then, under all the provocation incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen to our commissioners, and the treacherous course of the Government of the United States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the efiusion of blood, and directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had avowed himself to be nearly out of provisions, that we would abstain from directing our fire on Fort Sumter if he would promise not to open fire on our forces unless ^first attacked. This proposal was refused. The conclusion was, that the design of the United States was to place the besieging force at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fleet. The fort should, of course, be at once reduced. This order was executed by General Beauregard with skill and success, which were naturally to be expected from the well-known character of that gallant oflScer ; and although the bombardment lasted some thirty-three hours.

W. U. GREGOBT, ESQ., M.P. Xlll

our flag did not wave over the battered walls until after the appearance of the hostile fleet off Charleston.

Mr. William B. Eeed, of Pennsylvania, in *a paper containing a statement and vindication of certain political opinions/ dated August 14, 1862, thus furnishes an extract from a letter received by him from Judge Campbell, which gives some details of the treachery and baseness of Mr. Seward : —

Then, in the months of March and April 1861, came the interlude, if the word can be so applied, of the negotiations as to Fort Sumter, between the Confederate Commissioners and Mr. Seward. And on this point I feel authorised so far to interrupt my personal narrative as to adduce some unpublished testimony, if for no other reason, in order to do justice to a distant friend. I have said that since these troubles began I have had, with a single exception, no correspondent within the limits of the Confederate States. This exception is the Honourable John A. Campbell, of Alabama, formerly a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, whom I hope there is no offence in describing as an eminent jurist, a sound Union man till the policy of the Administration rendered Unionism in the South impossible, and a Christian gentleman. To him, having been honoured by his friendship previously, I wrote urging him to retain his place in the Federal judiciary. On June 5, 1861, he answered my letter, and thus referred to his own patriotic agency in a last and ineffectual effort to keep the peace.

' I suppose you must have seen my letters to Governor Seward in some of the Northern papers. There are some facts connected with them that I am glad to have an opportunity to communicate to you. When I visited Governor Seward, I had not had any communication with General Davis, or any member of the Executive Department of the Montgomery Government. The first knowledge I had of the demand of the Commissioners for recognition, or of Mr. Seward's embarrassment, was derived from Judge Nelson and Mr. Seward. I offered to write to General Davis and ask him to restrain his commissioners. I

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supposed that Mr. Seward desired to prevent the irritation and complaint that would natiurally follow from the rejection of the Commissioners in the Souths and the reaction that their expression (eic) would have at the North, He informed me that Sumter was to be evacuated, and that Mr. Weed said, " This was a sharp and bitter pang, which he (Weed) was anxious might be spared to them." Mr. Seward authorised me to communicate the fact of the evacuation to Mr. Davis, and the precise object was to induce him to render his commissioners inactive. I did not anticipate having any other interview with Mr. Seward. I supposed that Sumter would be evacuated in the course of a very few days, and without any other action on my part When upon the second and third interviews with him I found there was to be delay, I conversed with Judge Nelson as to the delicacy of my position, and it was at his suggestion and by his counsel that I agreed to be the ^' intermediary " until Sumter was evacuated. Neither of us doubted that the fort was to be surrendered or abandoned. The first notice of any other disposition was communicated on April 10. Colonel Lamon, the present Marshal of the district of Columbia, came to Washington with the family of Mr. Lincoln, I believe. He was with him at Washington in some familiar capacity. He visited Charleston in March, obtained access to Sumter, and left the impression on the mind of Crovernor Pickens that he was the agent of the Government, engaged in making arrangements for its evacuation. In the latter part of March, Crovernor Pickens sent a telegram to ascertain what had become of Lamon. I bore this to Mr. Seward, and he promised to enquire concerning him. His answer was that the President was concerned at any misconception of Lamon's words or visit, and desired me to converse with him ; that Lamon did not visit Charleston for him, and was not commissioned to make any pledge or assurance to bind him. Mr. Seward said Lamon would be at the State Department for me to interrogate him. I declined to converse with Lamon, and recommended that he (Lamon) should himself write to Governor Pickens to explain the matter. I asked Governor Seward about the evacuation of the fort. Without any verbal reply, he wrote : — " The President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so without giving notice to

Governor Pickens." Upon reading this, I asked if the President had any design to attempt a supply of Sumter. His reply contained an observation of the President. That I pass. But he said he did not believe any attempt would be made to supply Sumter, and there was no design to reinforce it. I told bim if that were the case, I should not employ this language, that it would be interpreted as a design to attempt a supply, and that, if such a thing were believed in Charleston, they would bombard the fort, that they did not regard the surrender of Sumter as open to question, and when they did, they would proceed to extremities. He left the State Department, I remaining there till his return ; and, on his return, he wrote these words : — '^ I am satisfied that the Government will not undertake to supply Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens." This excluded the matter of desire, and, with what had taken place, left the impression that if any attempt were made it would be an open, declared, and peaceful offer to supply the fort, which, being resisted by the Carolinians, the fort would be abandoned as a military necessity and to spare the effusion of blood — the odium of resistance and of the evacuation being thrown upon the late Administration and the Confederate States. Had these counsels prevailed — had the policy been marked with candour and moderation — I am not sure that even before this the fruit might have been seen ripening among the States in renewed relations of kindness and goodwill, to be followed ere long by a suitable political and civil union, adequate to the security of both sections at home and abroad. The ideas of imion and a common country, as applied to all the States, are ncno simply obsolete.'

This simple and precise narrative, introduced here as having been addressed to me, is, in the light of what has occurred since, a sad revelation, which needs no comment. Neither at home nor abroad does the Administration seem to have known that the best polic}' is fair play. I answered Judge Campbell's letter soon after its receipt, and, as evidence of my feelings and opinions then, I make an extract from my letter. * You speak of the united and resolute feeling at the South. Here it is very nearly as unanimous, and I can discern no signs of reaction. There are (I speak of this city) a few gentlemen who hold, as I

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do^ to the doctrine of recognition and peace, but it would do neither us nor you any good to say so. There is a local sentiment which it is not graceful or proper to defy^ and minorities must sometimes be silent. What is most painful is to be made conscious of insensibility of those around me to the fearful infractions of the Constitution and conceded law which are daily occurring. Professors of elementary law teach their students that the President may suspend the Habeas Corpus Act Learned and hitherto patriotic men, admitting the acts of the President to be wrong, justify the outrages on the ground of State necessity. This is worse than the other ; and this it is which alarms me as a Northern man and one whose lot must be in the North.

Had the objection to your motion not manifested itself so strongly in the quarters mentioned, and had there been any reasonable prospect of its success, the Washington government would never have been sustained by the American people in its attempt to invade Charleston Harbour, and the ' indignity to the old flag,' as the bombardment of Fort Sumter on April 13 was termed, would have made no more impression on the masses than the similar ' insult ' inflicted upon the transport steamer ' Star of the West' a few weeks previously.* Mr. Lincoln, taking advantage of the circumstance, issued his Proclamation on April 15, calling for 75,000 troops *to defend Washington and recapture Federal property.'

• The * old flag ' was adopted several years after in dependence, and only ii.-^ed for maritime purposes — the battles of the revolution were fought under the ensigns of the thirteen sovereign States. On all the buildings of tlie commonwealth, the State colours should have been displayed, on those of the city the municipal flag. A great deal of nonsense has been talked and written about the * Stars and Stripes,' which has been productive of mischief. All * sensation flags ' and ' spread-eaglei.^m ' ought to be avoided in future. The popular song, *The Star-spangled Banner,* had not oven a revolutionary origin ; it was written by the late Francis S. Key, while coniined as a prisoner with a uiunber of other Baltimoreans on board of an English ship off Fort M'Henry, during the last war with Great Britain. The descendants of these gontlcnicMi, each and all, ignore the verses, as well ai» the ihi/, now that to 'such base Ubus liave thev come at last.'

A large number of * three months' men * .volunteered at once for the protection of the capital, which in fact had never been threatened : not a single Southern soldier was at that time north of South Carolina.* The same Proclamation requested the members of Congress to meet in extra session on July 4. The news of the final withdrawal of your motion, at the request of Lord John Eussell, on June 7, having been received in the meanwhile, gave the war party confidence that they could carry out their designs without interference from abroad ; and the inflammatory speeches and writings of the republican senators, representatives, and newspaper editors

* Among the manj fiilBelioods cizculated hj the Yankees on both sidea of the Atlantie is the charge that the Southerners had, through the Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, been robbing the Northern arsenals. This was disproved in the report of Mr. Stanton, made to the House of Kepresentatiyee on February 18, 1861. The testimony fumished by his committee established : —

1. That the Southern States obtained in 1860 less, instead of more, than the quota of arms to which they were entitled by law ; and that some of them. North Carolina, Mississippi, and Kentucky, received none whatever, and this simply because they did not ask for them. Mr. Stanton remarked, * That there are a good deal of rumours and speculations and misapprehennons as to the state of fetcts in regard to this matter.'

2. That the Government had on hand in the year 1869 500,000 old muskets, which had been condemned 'as unsuitable for public service,' imder the Act of March 8, 1826. They were of such a character that, although offered at public and private side for 02^ each, purchasers could not be obtained at that rate, except for a comparatively small number. On November 80, 1850, Secretary Floyd ordered about one-fifth of the whole number (105,000) to be sent from the Springfield Armoury, where they had accumulated, to five Southern arsenals, ' in proportion to their respective means of proper storage.' This order was carried into effect by the Ordnance Bureau in the usual course of administration. Its date was months before Mr. Lincoln's nomination for the Presidency, and nearly a year before his election.

The Southern States were, in fact, entirely imprepared for the war. They were even too slow in their movements when the conflict began. Fortress Monroe ought to have been seized. And the surrender by Southern naval commanders of the ships of war under their control was an act of doubtful propriety. Those ships belonged to the South as much as to the North, and should have been taken into Confederate ports.

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excited the public mind and started the cry of * On to Eichmond' — Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas having by that time joined the cotton States. Thus the conflict began, and it has since been carried on by the office-holders, contractors, and other 'shoddy' men of the Northern States, the peaceable inhabitants being deprived of all power, even their right to express the voice of dissent.

Let us examine into this question of recognition, for there seems to be much misunderstanding in reference to the political status of the thirteen sovereign communities, now known as the Confederate States of America; to ^ demand 'recognition' for them is, in truth, only to ask for the fulfillment of treaties already existing. The Yankee assertion, that secession is rebellion, can be proved to be entirely untrue. France, on February 6, 1778, acknowledged the independence of the thirteen American colonies, as so many independent States ; this was even before the 'Articles of Confederation' were adopted ; the United Netherlands followed her example on October 8,. 1782 ; and Sweden, on April 3, 1783 ; Great Britain withheld her consent to the separation until September 3, 1783, ' provisional articles ' having been signed on November 30, 1782 ; and Spain, Prussia, and the other powers subsequently recognised the States. Under the treaty of Peace, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, were admitted as members (using the plural) of the family of nations ; Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, were included, they then being portions of those States. Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Florida, afterwards by a clause in the Federal Constitution, became 'free, sovereign, and independent States,' possessed of all the

rights of the original States ; and Texas, by a resolution presented to the Senate by the Hon. E. J. Walker [see Appendix], in 1837 rose to the dignity of an independent power. France, Holland, and Belgium, likewise acknowledged the independence of Texas in 1839 and Great Britain in 1840. It was not until 1845 that Texas entered the Federal Union.

According to the spirit and letter of the Constitution, and the practice under it, the erection of territories into States is equivalent to a recognition of their independence, and joining the Union signifies nothing more than intrusting their fcfreign affairs, as a matter of convenience and economy, to the central head.* Upon the admission of a new State, the representatives of the * Federal agency ' at foreign courts become also the ministers for that young power ; and, without protest, are received as such. Here, then, are thirteen sovereign States practically recognised by all the leading governments of the world.

John Adams, of Massachusetts, was the first * commissioner' sent to Europe to represent the thirteen original

* One of tlie arguments used by the FederaliBts againBt tlie acquisition of the Louisiana territory was that the limits of the Confederation would be too large^ and that the States in the South-west^ by the force of circumstanceSy might at some future time separate themselyes from those on the Atlantic^ after having thinned the latter of a portion of their population. Mr. Jefierson replied to these objections in a letter addressed to Mr. Breckenridge dated August 12^ 1803^ from which the following is an extract : —

* Beddes, if it should become the great interest of those nations to separate from this, if their happiness should depend upon it so strongly as to induce them to go through that conyulsion^ why should the Atiantic States dread it P But, especially^ why should we, their present inhabitants, take side in such a question P . . . The future inhabitants of the Atiantic and Mississippi States will be our sons. We leave them in distinct but bordering establishments. We think we see their happiness in their union, and we wish it. Events may prove it otherwise \ and if they see their interest in separation, why should we take side with our Atlantic rather than our Mississippi descendants P It Lb the elder and the younger son differing. God bless them both, and keep them in union, if it be for their good, but separate them if it be better t '

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States ; he was appointed to France in December 1777, and afterwards made Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain in 1779, but remained on the continent mitil aft;er the declaration of Peace. In the meanwhile, Franklin had succeeded him at Paris. Both of these statesmen received their authority from the 'Congress of Delegates' from the respective States, the * Articles of Confederation' not having been entered into untU March 2, 1781, and that * foreign agency ' was dissolved on March 3, 1789. Mr. Adams returned home in 1788, the Government of England having omitted to send a corresponding representative to the States, who, in retaUhtion for this discourtesy, refused to receive her consuls. Peace had then been established for five years. On April 30, 1789, a new foreign agency imder the Constitution was formed by eleven States, there having been in reality no imion whatever for the space of fifty-eight days ; but no notice was given to any of the governments with which the States had treaties of these changes : such notice, indeed, was not necessary, the individual commonwealths, as has ever been the case, having retained their sovereignty.

There was no representative from the American States in England from the time of Mr. Adams' departure until the arrival in London of Mr. Gouvemeur Morris, of New Jersey. Washington, as President of eleven States, requested Mr. Morris, who was in Europe on private business, to wait upon the Duke of Leeds, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The following letter was his authority for so doing. It bears a marked contrast to the bombastic, untruthful, and lengthy despatches of Mr. Seward : —

New York : October 18, 1789.

Sir, — It being important to both countries that the treaty of I)eace between Great Britain and the United States should be

observed and performed with perfect and mutual good faith, and that a tredty of commerce should be concluded by them, on principles of reciprocal advantages to both, I wish to be ascertained of the sentiments and intentions of the Court of London on these interesting subjects*

It appears to me most expedient to have these enquiries made informallj, by a private agent; and understanding that you will soon be in London, I desire you in that capacity, and on the authority and credit of this letter, to converse with his Britannic Majesty's ministers on these points, viz. whether there be any, and what, objections to now performing those articles in the treaty which remained to be performed on his part, and whether they incline to a treaty of commerce with the United States on any, and what, terms.

This communication ought regularly to be made to you by the Secretary of State ; but that office not being at present filled my desire of avoiding delays induces me to make it under my own hand. It is my wish to promote harmony and mutual satisfeu^ion between the two countries ; and it would give me great pleasure to find that the result of your agency, in the business now committed to you, will conduce to that end.

I am, &c.

Geo. WAfiHiNaTON.

Can it be doubted that North Carolina and Ehode Island, States remote from each other, which had not then joined the new * agency,' had a right at that time to likewise send a representative, separately or conjointly ? And, on the same principle, are not the States comprising the Southern Confederacy entitled to have ministers at the several European courts ? In fact, the Union under the Constitution might have been formed by any nine States. Surely the doors of the Foreign Office could not have been closed against the other four P