The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza

Front matter

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Introduction

BY

Vol. II.

(SELECT LETTERS.) TtEVISED EDITION.

LONDOX : GEORGE BELL AND SONS, YORK STREET,

COVENT GARDEN. 1891.

CXXSWICK press: C. WHITTINGHAM and CO., TOOKS COLRf,

CHANCERY LANE.

CONTENTS OP VOL. II.

PAGE

On the Improvement op the Ukderstandixg • • . 1

Of the ordinary objects of men's desires 3

Of the true and final good ....••. 6

Certain rtdes of life 7

Of the four modes of perception 8

Of the best mode of perception 10

Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas , . .12

Answers to objections 16

First part of method. Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas 18

And from false ideas ........ 24

Of memory and forgetfulness . • / • • • .31 Mental hindrances from words — and from the popular confusion of ready imagination with distinct understanding . 33 Second part of method. Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas ........ 34

Its means, good definitions. Conditions of definition . • 35

How to define the understanding .38

Part I. Concerning God 45

Prop. I. SnJ)s'ance is by nature prior to its modifications . .46

Prop. II. Two stibstances, whose attributes are differcfif, have

nothing in common ........ 46

Prop. 111. Things t which have nothing in common, cannot be

one the cause of the other 47

Prop. IV. Two or Tnore distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attrUnUes of the

substances^ or by the difference of their m^ifications . . 47

Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute .... 47

Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by anotlier substance .......... 47

Prop. VII. Existence belongs to th^ nature of substance . . 48

Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite ... 48

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Prop. IX. The more reality or heing a thing haSj the greater the number of its attributes 50

Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself 50

Prop. XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each compresses eternal and infinite essentiality, neces^ sarily exists 51

Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would foUow that substance can be divided • . 54

Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible . • 54

Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived 54

Prop. XV. WhcUsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived 55

Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways — tha^ is, all things which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect . . 59

Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone 59

Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things 62

Priip. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal . 62

Prop. XX. 2he existence of God and his essence are one and tlie same ........... no

Prop. XXI. All things, which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, must always exist and be infinite, or in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute 63

Prop. XXII. Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite 65

Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modifi^d by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite 65

Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence 65

Prop. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence 66

Prop. XXVI. A thing, which is conditioned to act in a particular Tnanner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act 66

Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, caiinot rnider itself unconditioned . 66

Prop. XXVIII. Every i?idividual thing, or everything which is finite and has a coruiitioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence ; and likewise this cause cannot in its k. -M

• •

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turn exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity • • 67

Trop. XXIX. IJothing in the universe is coniin^jent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature .... 68

Prop. XXX. Intellect fin function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attrihiUes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else 69

Prop. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, ^'C, should be referred to passive nature, and not to active nature 69

Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause 70

Prop. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order diffirentfrom that which has in fact obtained • .70

Prop. XXXIV. God^s power is identical with his essence . 74

Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists 74

Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect docs not follow 74

Appendix , , • 74

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the ^lind ... 82 Preface ,82

Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a think' ing thing 83

Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an ex' tended thing 84

Prop. III. In God there is necessarily the idea, not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence 84

Prop. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one ... 85

Prop. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is co?isiaered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute ; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God omd of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects, or the things perceived, but God himself, in so far as he is a thinking thing . . 85

Prop. VI. 2 he modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute oj which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute 86

Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of thi9igs 86

Prop. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, tluU

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PAGE do not exist, must he comprehetided in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the format essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God . . .87

Prop. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God, not in sofa/r as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so fur as he ts affects by a third idea, and so on to infinity 88

Prop. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man — in other words, substance does not constitute the actual being of man 89

Prop. XL The first element, which constitutes the actual being oj- the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing 90

Prop. XU. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or there will mcessa/rily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence, Ihat is^ if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind . 91

Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in otJier words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else 92

Digi'ession on the nature of bodies — Axioms I., II. Lemmas L— III 93

Axioms L, II • . . .94

Definition — Axiom III. — Lemmas IV., V 95

Lemmas VI., VIL 96

Postulates 97

Prop. XIV, The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so, in proportion as its body is capaMe of receiving a great number of impressions . . 97

Prop. XV, The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas 97

Prop. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body , . 98

Prop. XVII. If the human body is affected in amanner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind mil regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the huma^i body be affected in such a way as to exclude the existence of the said external body . 98

Pi*op. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also 100

Prop. XIX. The hitman mind has no knowledae of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications, wherdty the body is affected .... 101

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Prop. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knoW' ledge of the human body 102

Prop. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind, in the same way as the mind is united to the body . . .102

Prop. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications . 103

Prop. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modificatioths of the body . 103

Prop. XXiy. The huma/n mind does not involve an aaequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body . .104

Prop. XX V. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body 104

Prop. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any extendi body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body 105

Prop. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself 105

Prop. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mindy are not clear and distinct, but confused . . .105

Prop. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind 106

Prop. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge oj the duration of our body 1 07

Prop. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves . 107

Prop. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true 108

Prop. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false 108

Prop. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true 108

Prop. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragrnentary, or confused ideas involve . 108

Prop. XXXVI. Inadequate or confused ideas follow by the same necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas . 109

Prop. XXXVII. That which is common to all, and is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thin/Q 109

Prop. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and are equally in a pari and in the whole, canhot be conceived except adequately 109

Prop. XXXIX. That, which is co7nmon to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body^ and which is present equally in each part of

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either or in the whole, will he represented hy an adequate idea

in the mind 110