Ethics:In Theory and Application

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ETHICS

Part ONE PAGE

I. Tor Nature AND Scope or Eruics .

Definition—Moral Conduct—What Ethies Assumes—The Realities of Moral Experience— Standards—Moral Consciousness and Ideals— The Ideal Element—Quantity and Quality— Custom and Ideals — Moral Philosophy— Moralizing—The Moral Reaction—Morality.

II. THe IDEAL AND THE PRACTICAL

Moral Struggle — The World Crisis — Moral

Benefits—The Larger Problems—The Individual Problem—The Sphere of the Ideal— The Practical—Recent Tendencies—Sources of Idealism—Lite as an Art—The Creative Art—The Larger Moral Analysis—The Need for Criticism—Summary.

III. Tue REALM OF VALUES

Ethical Judgments—The DEAnive hee

Interpretation—Ethical Interpretations—The Position of Ethics--Moral Necessity—Goodness and Beauty—Sources of Value—Reasons for Values—Human Basis of Values—Lower and Higher Values—The Moral Order—The Supreme Values—The Need for a Practical Scale — Extrinsic and Intrinsic Values — Values Spring from the Deed in the Given Situation.

IV. PsycHoLoGicAL PRINCIPLES ‘ ; A .

Psychology and Ethies—Human Nature—The Social View—Social Consciousness—The Un- | conscious — Temperament — Efficiency—Mental Levels—Fullness of Life—Conversion— xi

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Value of Psychology—Need of Criticism— Activity—Mental Elements—Instinct — Desire —Wish and Will—Will—Habit—Intuition.

V. Conpuct AND CHARACTER .

Moral Integration—Feeling—Motives—Intention and Motive—The Basis of Motives—Dynamic Motives—Character—Elements of Character— Unity of Character—The Self—The Self as Ideal—The Self as Conscious—The Self as Person — Spontaneity — Creative Intuition— The Spirit.

VI. THe Dawn or Moratity

Man and Nature—The Original “Motives—The

First Problems—Group Morality—The First Virtues—The Function of Custom—Levels of Development — Conventionality — Development of Authority—Moral Evolution—Prevailing Conceptions—The Universal Element— Reflective Morality — Emotional Origins— Reason as Origm—Summary.

VII. Morat OBLication

Generalization—Moral Action—Moral ie ee

—Judgments and Intentions—Objects of Moral Judgment—Moral Law—Moral and Civil Laws—Origin of Moral Law—Authority of Moral Law—The Sanctions—The Nature of Moral Obligation—Evidences from Experience—Moral Law and Obligation—Law as Necessary—Obligations and Values—Law and the Self—Inner Obligation—The Ultimate Basis—Right—The Nature of Rights—The Absolute Element.

Parr Two vailing Attitudes — Pleasure-seeking — The Scope of Pleasure—Characteristics of Pleasure ba |

. 115 Ethical Types—Classification of Theories —The

TX. UvinrrariANism AND EvoLuTion a é Utility as the Good—Mill’s Doctrine—Social

X. Srorcism AND SELF-SACRIFICE , ets Discipline—The Cynics—The Simple Life—Sto-

XI. FormAtism AND INTUITION 3 i ; r The Good Will—Kant’s Aim—Moral Reason—

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—Pleasure and Pain—Simple Hedonism— Later Forms of Hedonism—Objections to Hedonism—Hedonistie Caleulus—The Calculus Defended—Pleasure and Happiness—Happiness as the Test—Happiness as a Motive— The Element of Satisfaction—Signs of Well-being—Need of a Seale.

Utilty—Objections to Mill’s Doctrime—Evolutionary Hedonism—Criticism of Spencer’s Ethics—The Organic View—Sidgwick’s View —Ideal Utilitarianism—The Value of Utilitarianism—FE'stimate of Evolution—Moral Reason and Evolution.

icism—The Rational Standard—Divine Law— Independence—Equanimity — Self-consistency —Roman Stoicism—Mareus Aurelius—Reason as Arbiter — Self-sacrifice—Asceticism—Self-denial—Uneertainties of Self-sacrifice—Selfsaerifice as Instrumental—Devotion—Limitations of Self-sacrifice.

The Categorical Imperative—Rational Freedom—Estimate of Kant’s Ethics—Intuitionism—Objections to Intuitionism—Ambiguities of the Term—Self-evident Truths.

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XII, IpEALism eee.

Soerates—Plato—Aristotle—Nature and Spirit

—The Reconciling Principle—True Autonomy —Paulsen’s Solution—Janet’s Eudemonism— Types of Goodness—Extrinsie Goodness—Intrinsie Goodness—The Moral Organism—Interdependence—The Test of Goodness—The Stages of Goodness—Self-determination—Coordination—The Ideal Self.

XiV Contents CHAPTER PAGE XIII. Duty AND RESPONSIBILITY . - : ; ‘ . 189

XIV. Sin anno Evin Z “ : : x g Theories of Evil—Evil in General—Moral Evil

XV. Conscience .. 2

XVI. THe Prostem or FrRerpom

The Moral Constant—Goodness and Duty—Dnuty and Inclination—Objections to Duty—The Command of Duty—Love and Duty—Duty for Duty’s Sake—The Conflict of Duties—Loyalty —The Ought—The Ought as a Standard—As a Basis of Judgment—The Creative Ought— Duty as Adjustment—Right and Wrong— Good and Bad—Responsibility—Moral Responsibility—Accountability.

—The Social Evil—Crime—The Reality of Evil—Vice—Sin—Mistakes—Crime and Disease—Knowing and Doing—Evil and Responsibility—Sin is Irrational—Evil is Disorganization—Summary.

Variability of Conscienee—Conscience as a Faculty—As a Voice—The Moral Constant— The Evolutional View—As a Dictate—Religious Sentiments—Conscience as Divine— Practical Clues—Elements—The Growth of Conscience—Conscience as a Synthesis—The Element of Authority—The Ethical Scale— Objections to Martineau’s Scale—Need of a Working Scale—Summary.

tion—Divine Omnipotence—The Bad Will— Calvinism—The Necessitarian View—Determinism—Cosmie Evidences—Evidences from Biology—Sociological Evidences—Physiological Determinism—Evidence from Psychology— Ethical Evidences—The Psycho-physical Argument—Ethical Objections—The Element of Attention—Personal Acts—Moral Decisions— Heredity and Environment—The Moral Situation.

. 208 ee . 226 Seope of the Term—Popular Conceptions—The

, . 245 Scope of the Question—Fatalism—Predestina-

XVII. Toe Nature or FREEDOM .

Freedom of the Beles ateanings 6 of the Term—

XVIII. Optimism AND PEssIMIsM . ayipete noe Interpretations of Freedom—The Ruling Love—

XIX. THe WortH or THE INDIVIDUAL ‘ Egoism—Altruism—Naturalism as a Soruonte

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Inner Freedom—lIdeal Freedom—The Element of Chance—Choice—Awareness of F'reedom— Ideal Causality—Moral Deeds—Initiatives— Personal Action — Indifference—Self-determination — Rational Freedom — Virtue as Knowledge—The Element of Attention—Immediate Certainty—Kantian Freedom—Bergson’s View—Freedom Defined—Limitations of Freedom.

Types of Freedom—The Degrees of Freedom —Freedom as an Ideal—Popular Optimism— Moral Optimism — Pessimism — Pessimistic Types—Limitations of Pessimism—The Values of Pessimism—Meliorism—Limitations of Evil —Summary.

Altruism as a Natural Fact—Objections to the Naturalistic View—Altruistic Origins—The Reaction Against Egoism—The Individual as Starting-point—Self-love and Altruism—The Basis of Values—The Union of Opposites— Consciousness as the Type—The Social Relation—The Ideal Unity—The Social Will—The Individual and Orthodoxy—Creative Work— Vocations—Limiting the Individual.

Part THREE

XX. THE VIRTUES ‘ z i

The Value of esetedoerEs Na ature ‘of Virtue

—The Greek View—Classifications—Prudence — Self-control — Temperance — Courage — Manliness — Hndurance — Independence — Patience — Wisdom — Self-culture — The Christian View.

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CHAPTER XX.

XXII. Tue SpHERE oF ALTRUISM .

XXIII. Tests or Virtue . sean Sie Ss : The Unity of Virtue—Comparison of eeu

XXIV. Morat Forcrs The Problem of Taealism—How erty are Real-

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THE SOCIAL VIRTUES .

Sources of Social it eee es

View—The Scope of Justice—Equality—Natural Equality—Spiritual Equality—Proportionality—Opportunity—Equality and Justice —The Self-determining Individual — Good

Fortune—Benevolence — Charity — The Good -

Life—Summary.

The Ideal Neighbor—Service—Reciprocity— Compensation — Participation — Mutuality— Love as a Motive—Love and Justice—The Concrete Universal—Ethical Love—Marriage —Friendship—The Implications of Friendship—Fundamental Relationships.

Contrasted Types— Codes as Tests— The Golden Rule as a Test—What This Rule Demands—Moderation as the Test—Universality as the Test—Casuistry—Qualifying Ideas— Limitations of Rules—Test Questions—The Value of Analysis—Conscientious Seruples— Coming to Judgment—Evidenees of Moral Suecess—Moral Correlations—The Geometry of Virtue—Objections to this View—The Complete Test—The Need of Simplifying—A Working Seale of Values—The Still Small Voice.

ized—Ideas as Forees—Objections to this View —Synthetie Action—The Causal Series— Values and Causes—Effective Forees—How Mind is Conditioned—Attaining Fitness— Favorable Conditions—Effective Deeds—Moral Failures—Higher Values as Forces—The Power of Ideals—The Value of Inner Peace— Ideal Attitudes—Ideals as Objectives—Virtues as Forces—Efficacious Virtue—Moral Education—Moral Mechanisms.

Sada e 8 «ia wae Giving—The Mechanisms of Giving—Gifts—

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Contents Xvi

CHAPTER PAGE XXV. Morat PRoBLEMS . . : b 4 5 F . 407

Social Consciousness—The Effect of Consciousness— The Larger Self-consciousness — The Honor System — Misdemeanors—Consisteney as a Test—Compromises—Smoking and Selfishness—Serving One Master—Lawlessness— Christ in Business—Work—Arousing the Moral Will—The Problem of Duality of Self —Sources of Duality—The Content of Mental Life—Substitution—Repressions—Man’s Mental Environment—The Moral Environment— Self-mastery—True Self-expression.

XXVI. INTERNATIONAL Eruics . : : : : . 425

World Issues—International Law—Sources of International Principles—Ethies and Laws— Popular Sovereignty—The Rule of the Best— The Two Ethical Types—Representative Democraecy — Anti-nationalism — Ultra-democracy—McDougall’s Solution—Christianity and Democracy—International Progress—The Social Consciencee—The American Conscience— Social Conscience Defined—The International Conscience—Organic Codperation—The Ethieal Horizon.

XXVII. Morat Progress . ‘5 4 : i d ; . 444

Progress as Inevitable—Ancient Views of the World—Modern Conceptions—Growth—Evolution—History—What Civilization Means— Our Spiritual Needs—The Religious Horizon —Finality—Christianity as a lLife—Moral Advance as the Test—What is the Moral Test —Community of Interests as the Test—Moral Changes—Self-discovery as the Test—The Law of Progress—Social Equilibrium—Moral Betterment—Goodness and Its Conditions—Progress in Our Ideals—Statie and Dynamic Elements—National Ideals—Progress in the Social Conscience—Alexander’s Definition of Progress—The Productive Principle.

XXVIII. Eruics anp RELIGION . re . 464

Points of Resemblance—The Problem of Loyalty —Priority of Experience as a Clue—Theology

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XXIX.. Uttimmate VALUES Aaa er dies Pt First and Last Things—The Conservation of

PAGE as a Sign—Precepts as the Test—Religious Realities—The Element of Controversy—Liberalism—Contacts and Divergencies—Ethies as the Criterion—Creeds as Fetters—Religion as Life—The Content of Religion—The Contributions of Christianity—The Christian Type— Christianity as Final—Doctrinal Limitations— The Ethical Problem To-day—Summary.

Values—The Basis of Values—Being as the Basis—Inner Experience as the Basis—The Present Life as Basis—The Value of Faith— Beyond Agnosticism—Ethieal Points of View —Christianity as Ultimate Basis—The Philosophy of History—The Future Life—Moral Persistence—Man’s True Selfhood.

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ETHICS IN THEORY AND APPLICATION

Chapter I The Nature And Scope Of Ethics

Definition.—Ethics is the science of the moral life. It is concerned with human conduct in relation to character and a conception of the good, commonly referred to as the highest good. It considers conduct with reference to right and wrong, good and evil, the basis of moral obligation, the nature of duty, conscience, freedom; and the problems of egoism, altruism, social service and development in the light of the highest ideals. It is the science of the ideal element of life on its moral side, the science of moral values or goodness, the permanent element in human conduct in contrast with the transient. Morality, or the moral life, is the sphere of activity with which the science of ethical values is concerned. The experience exists long before the philosophy. The science seeks to make explicit the distinctions, standards, laws, meanings, and values implied in the moral experiences of the race. {tt brings to a focus the ideal interests involved in conduct judged to be conduct of the highest type, conduct pursued with a purpose in view which involves a philosophy of life]

4 The Basts of Ethies

Moral Conduct.—Conduct known as moral differs from the behavior of organisms in general. Science describes the behavior of animals with reference to energies operating mechanically in bodily organisms. This mechanical behavior is said to take place in response to stimuli, as in reactions to light; and interest centers about the natural environment with its forces, the sense-organs, the bodily or perhaps the chemical conditions. The description is made as simple as possible with reference to the implied reflex or instinct, as when wild geese are seen in flight, following a leader, or when various species of quadrupeds are found herding together. As part of the mechanical order of nature, man too may be described with reference to what his organism is seen doing, as he works, plays, responds to bodily wants and needs, foregathers, makes war, or dwells in peace with his neighbors. For biology man is a unit among many other units whose behavior psychology describes for us by regarding the mind as in intimate relation with the body. But the simpler the description of man’s life the more matters are left over as not yet accounted for. When activities which are measurable become the standard, questions of worth or value, and ultimate purpose persist in coming up for later consideration. While man may indeed respond to a herd instinct, as one of the higher animals whose behavior isdetermined by his habitat and his heredity, he is also an individual in a sense which marks off his life from that of even the highest animals we know.

Moral conduct presupposes activities which the various descriptive sciences, such as biology and psychology, portray, but it is especially concerned with the quality of man’s inner life, his intimate experience, the contrasts and conflicts which in a measure separate him from external nature. For such conduct implies that man becomes self-conscious and in a degree self-directive. It discloses judgments passed upon the conduct of others, involves a persistent contrast between the ideal and the actual which runs through his whole experience. Thus his inner life may be far removed from the behavior of his organism, as in war, when his heart may disapprove of what his hands are compelled to do. His inner life may seem indeed to have had a higher origin and to imply a standard radically different from that of brute foree. His inner life implies interests which develop without limit and in such a wealth of sentiment that each man dwells in a measure in a world of his own; the world of personality, of efforts to be individual, produce, excel, attain more abundant life. His ideals as surely exist for him as the experiences which bring him in contact with nature and ally him with animals. Hence the need for a special science which takes up matters of profoundest interest when we have sought the utmost that can be bestowed on us by history, economics, psychology, the arts, and even when religion has brought its surest satisfactions. Moral conduct then is distinctively concerned with judgments implying contrasts between higher and lower, in which emphasis is placed, not on the mere origins or bodily conditions of the energies pulsating in man, but on the ends pursued. Man is regarded as a person in so far as he knows himself, wills to be a complete individual in the light of a moral standard. If then we define ethics as the science of the conduct of life, in contrast with behavior, we especially note that ‘‘conduct’”’ is an active term, implies something to be done; hence an art of morals should follow from the science of morals, and we should consider under what conditions moral conduct becomes most effective.

What Ethics Assumes.—In thus beginning with the facts of moral conduct, with its varied problems, as discovered by the individual, ethics regards man as a real self in relation to other moral selves, in a real universe of space and time, although the moral order of the universe may also be said to be independent of given space and particular time. It is also assumed either that man is morally free or that, so far as his conduct may be determined, he is still accountable for his actions; that is, the facts in any case are admitted by those who believe and those who disbelieve in freedom of will. The presence of an ideal element, a realm of eternal principles, sometimes called ‘‘the world of appreciation,’’ is implied. That is, the reality of duty and right, the existence of the moral order, is regarded as sure, howbeit this reality is not attested to in the same way as the existence of things in space which we see and touch. (Indeed, in various connections nothing is so real for man, nothing so convincing, or unescapable as the pronouncements of conscience, the judgments of his fellowmen, and the results of conduct which neither law-courts nor the mutations of time can take away. Ethics is the one science which above all others pushes through doubts and contrasts to a single princi

The Realities of Moral Experience.—This experience for individual man constitutes his inner life or world, ‘‘inner’’ not in the sense of being discoverable by self-analysis as if you and I were cut off in utter exclusiveness from each other, in contrast with deeds done, as when by an act of heroism another’s life is saved. It is moral experience as conceivably existing for all, hence as in its way, disinterestedly there for an intelligent observer to witness in its fullness. While at one moment we may be aware of employing physical forces, eating and living like animals; conscious of desires that are unappeased, of appetites that are unchecked; of temptations to do wrong, to cheat, lie, steal, take cowardly advantage, to be idle or lazy: at other moments we are aware of aspirations, ambitions to be good, respected, influential in the best sense, upright, true to the highest we know. The conflict makes us know what we eall conscience, which sits in judgment on our motives, and conduct, and somehow affects our conduct so that we can not explain it as due to the individual self alone. In ease we yield to temptation, if we sin, drop down in the scale of actions, we are made more painfully aware of conscience, shame, remorse, guilt. [Thus conscience, giving us a sense of responsibility, shows how profoundly real is moral experience. | Some try indeed to flee from conscience, lightly concluding that if their misdeeds are not found out all will be well with them; but the contrast is part and parcel or our nature. No less strong is the conviction, among those who fathom this persistent moral experience, that there is a greatest good for the greatest number which we might all labor to achieve.

The most familiar description of this experience is that we are aware of two ‘‘voices,’’ one telling us to do right, the other bidding us do wrong. Even if we do not do wrong, we are aware that we might have yielded. Hence, the question arises, Have we two natures that must remain two? The moral problem is to make of the diversity, however great, one consistent self, to bring order out of chaos. Plainly, we must divide our problem, asking: What are these impulses arousing into action within us? What is the self morally regarded in relation to its two natures? What shall guide us in the adjustment? What is the nature of the goodness we seek and to which we assign the highest value? Are we really free to act in and from ourselves? What is the authority of conscience? What is the basis of moral obligation? What is the relation between these matters of the individual life and the problem of our relation to society ?

Standards.—In all departments of life we find people tending to classify according to norms or standards, for example, standards in architecture, in the construction of railroads, in methods of business, in reference to music and painting, in language, in computation, in reasoning. In the moral life we seek a standard that we may judge, gauge our impulses, weigh our desires, and put an estimate on our volitions. For we find it impossible to say that all motives are equally good. The moral life is not like a plain. The barest act of condemnation, the merest sentiment of dissatisfaction implies a higher and a lower alternative, and the higher suggests a highest, hence a scale. We find that wrong deeds are not merely lower, and right deeds higher, as if they occupied a fixed position in the scale; our judgments imply that some acts of conduct are of greater worth in a seale involving progress such that the greater of today may be only the great tomorrow. We seem to be in quest of an absolute standard; and not without reason have idealists put the Beautiful, the True, and the Good in most intimate relation as somehow constituting a realm of eternal values.

There is indeed a popular theory that the way to be rid of an undesirable tendency is to express it, for example, the impulse to swear, the tendency to be uncouth, to say anything that occurs to you, do anything you like, even disregard law; since this is ‘‘a free country.’’ But experience shows that desire is insatiable. We are creatures of habit and tend to continue expressing. Mere expression is indeed no guide. This sort of life not only fosters selfishness, it is selfishness. So we need a way to estimate our tendencies in the light of their origin, nature, and results. Otherwise we would assume that because a thing exists, therefore it is right; we might even say, with Pope, ‘‘ Whatever is, is right.’’ (People often try to defend this statement that what exists is right) But we find our thought involved in a whirl of complexities and contradictions when we try to apply this assumption universally, when we tend to accept human society as it is, with all its injustice, its hatreds, and its warfare. Over against these ready assumptions stands conscience calling for a scale of values. If the right exists, if values are real, and goodness a fact—this indeed is the great truth we have gone in quest of amidst relativities which baffle and uncertainties which dishearten.

Again, the popular assumption appears in the guise of a proposition that there is but one thing we can do, as if it were written in the book of fate precisely what desire we should express. But our moral consciousness all the while puts conflicts before us, with the conviction that the alternatives are real: we feel it incumbent upon us to make a choice, and somehow the conviction also persists that a choice will make a difference, perhaps for untold years or for eternity. We aré aware that we shall be held accountable, and this would be unmeaning if there were but one course to pursue. We are at times left to act on faith, make the venture. There appears to be a law over us in all these matters. For better or worse, we find ourselves choosing. Plainly, much depends on our standard in thus choosing, and our standard implies acceptance of author-

The Nature and Scope of Ethics is ity, civil, ethical, or religious. .And however we may have procrastinated we may begin now to acquire the highest standard, as we might in the fine arts seek the masters of music to know what the supreme music is. Wherever we look we find a relationship implying quests or the ultimate standard concerning the Beautiful, the True, and the Good.

Moral Consciousness and Ideals.—The most appealing way to put the matter is in terms of ideals, without at first asking whether there is anything absolute about morality. If we were to confine ourselves to what 1s, life would indeed be prosaic, as in the drudgery and routine of many occu- .pations. We know that very much depends on the way a thing is done, what we hope to achieve, the opportunities for relaxation we have in mind. We are able by ideal consciousness to change almost anything in life from prose to poetry, even labor or work may become ‘‘self-expression’’ of which we heartily approve, granted a certain attitude which makes it so. Education enables us to live in world upon world where it is the ideal meaning that signifies, as we pass from history to a special science, as we compare economic relations, systems of government, types of belief. Love admits us to the world of the heart, and for the sake of love we labor, sacrifice, persist; and love as an incentive sends us forth into the realms of Beauty and Truth, as well as into the sphere of the Good. All these activities mark a departure from what merely exists, and in so far as moral judgments intermingle there is a transition to what ought to be. Life should be for love’s sake, we say, it should be made beautiful, truth should prevail.

If in some sense that which ought to be already is, so that moral experience is realization, the ‘‘ought’’ is potential in the self or the moral order; and the contrast remains between ideal and actual in the given world of experience. Then too the moral ideal is in large part a human achievement. We contribute to the ideal by meeting life, with its poverty or stern necessities, accepting alternatives and winning victories where the odds are apparently against us. The moral life is not a mechanical unfolding. We live under an actual system of government where customs are being tried out, where legal enactments are undergoing tests. The significant fact is that the ideal element assumes the right to rule. We feel the need of an art of life to help us work together so that the ideal element shall indeed triumph. Ethics comes forward to increase in value by its criticisms whatever any practical science or art may already have contributed as its share. Action, it is said, is concerned with the particular which can never be exhausted by general principles, example is better than precept, and experience better than either.*

The Ideal Element.—Inquiring more closely into the activities of the individual than when we are merely inter+ ested in describing his behavior, for instance, in the stock exchange or the theater, as students of ethics we note distinctions between \(1) the instincts which prompt man from within, the spontanéity which sends him forth to produce, organize, achieve; (2) the conditions which life takes on, in contrast with its tendencies; (3) the conditions it encounters, the opposition which produces inner struggle and which may be turned to account in the development of character; and (4) the tendencies of life as made explicit in the ferm of ideals, or purposes} We are all dimly aware at least that it is the ideal element which makes life worth while. By making the ideal element explicit in relation to conduct and character, ethics is partly a science but also in part directly practical. The love of life which is so strong implies: this quest for the ideal which is never satisfied with conduct or science alone, but which seeks closer ecérdination between theory and practice. If ethics did not exist we would need to create it. Whether we have previously realized it or not, we have needed to distinguish the ideal element from mere utility.

Quantity and Quality—The need for our science becomes indeed the greater the more insistently external life breaks in upon us, with its attempts to reduce everything to measurement, dollars, mechanical skill, and speed. Unwittingly, we are constantly making selections in quest of a scale of values which shall set us free from mere mechan-

1J,8. Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics, p. 13.

The Nature and Scope of Ethies 9 ism. Bare fact teaches us that we are creatures of heredity and environment, conditioned by the stream of events which records itself in the plastic substances of the brain. Buta life of never-ceasing effort springing up from within reminds us that we can not escape responsibility. Over against the sheer play of circumstance is the play of motives, intentions, purposes; the quest for balance, wisdom, justice; and the demand for progress in the relationships between individual and society such that inner virtue shall become social conduct. Even when we yield most fully to love of pleasure, over against it is conscience, our awareness of this inner situation, with its ideal element, its sense of moral obligation or duty, its intimation that there is an end which we ought to pursue.

We may define the good in a preliminary way as the end we aim at, despite any failure, while the right is a particular thing done toward the realization of the good. The wrong deed is conduct which conflicts with this standard. Ethical philosophers differ indeed regarding the sources, foundations and ultimate ends pursued. But our first interest is to see that moral science is implied in all our conduct whether we are aware of it or not. The method to be pursued in this volume ealls for constant appeal to the life going on round about us today, so that all statements may be tested or verified by concrete analysis of moral life as thoughtful individuals know it.

Custom and Ideals.—That to be moral means in a profound sense to take exception to that which exists in favor of that which ought to be, is evident even in the definition of the term from which the name of our science is derived. The term morals is derived from mores (customs, manners), and came into use to translate the corresponding Greek word ethos (custom, habit, usage), from which the term ethics has come. The term would seem to indicate that to be moral is to obey established customs and usages. There is a sense in which this is true. The moral spirit tends to express itself in habitual forms, in codes like the Ten Commandments, and institutions like the Christian Church; and to be righteous in a given period of history may mean to stand by these established forms. But the mere fact that a custom exists in society or that a principle has received formulation in a code, whatever that code may be called, however high its authority, is no guarantee that it is right; and men have sought for centuries to determine precisely what is right with reference to a given commandment, such as, Thou shalt not kill. It is not a mere question of fact, never an affair of mere origin, not even if the custom is said to be established by law revealed from heaven. Blind obedience is not ethical. A custom which was in very truth moral when it became habitual, under conditions which then obtained, may in course of time become allied with purely external observances and serve other than moral ends by persisting as a habit. It is forever the moral spirit, the inner principle of judgment or authority that makes a custom moral. If that spirit moves elsewhere we follow it, even at the risk of deserting external observances altogether. A custom becomes moral for me because I relate it to my ethical ideal.

History discloses various peoples pursuing their distinetive modes of activity, their folkways, as in the danee, the ceremonial of initiation. Some of these folkways become customs, that is, settled habits, mores which are insisted upon, while others are not vested with moral authority. Out of these social habits come in time moral codes, and a code in turn implies a system. So the great moral systems of the world are seen in contrast, and one may if he prefer begin the study of ethics by investigating the great systems to see if he can discover a standard.2 The habit of the individual ordinarily harmonizes with the custom of the tribe which prescribes rules for its members. But moral habits become more specific than other habits, and the moral life is more ideal in content than custom in general, with its relation to conventionality and good form. We form habits for various purposes, the highest of which are moral. We adopt customs as we follow fashion, submitting to its decrees, responding to its changes. We are moral in re-

2 See, for example, P, V. N. Myers, History as Past Ethics, 1913; CS 1S) Fullerton, A Handbook of Ethical Theory, 1922, Chap. a sponse to custom long before we ask why. The tribe imposes its customs on the individual, and the only righteousness seems to be what the tribe decrees, the only wrong that which the tribe condemns. But later the individual compares custom with custom, refusing to regulate his conduct by the fact that things have always been done in a certain way. Although morality has grown up amid custom, the moral life tends to become more distinctive by calling customs in question. War was long taken as a matter of course as the only way of settling disputes or enlarging territory, and is only at this late day receiving the criticism which it deserves. In a sense the individual becomes ecnfessedly moral by putting his conduct in relation to every custom whatsoever to see if social habit meets with rational approval. Custom develops in the fields of politics and economies, as well as in the spheres of the practical arts and the fine arts. Ethics is distinguished by a peculiar kind of criticism, even of its own sources and the highest moral codes as history discloses them. And so in time the moral law comes to be regarded as a constant or immutable principle, not dependent on tribal decrees, not limited by any group of commandments, by time, place, leader, book, nation, or institution. Hence the distinctive terms, such as right and wrong, goodness, conscience, duty, moral obligation, moral freedom, need to be considered by themselves. “Ethics, defined as ‘‘the science of values in their relation to conduct as a whole.’’* undertakes the supreme critcism of conduct and systems, customs and codes, individual and social habits, and makes a comparative estimate of all interests regarded as worth while