Body and mind: a history and a defense of animism

Front matter

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A HISTORY AND A DEFENSE OF ANIMISM

BY

Preface

IN writing this volume my primary aim has been to provide for students of psychology and philosophy, within a moderate compass, a critical survey of modern opinion and discussion upon the psycho-physical problem, the problem of the relation between body and mind. But I have tried to present my material in a manner not too dry and technical for the general reader who is prepared to grapple with a difficult subject. For I hold that men of science ought to make intelligible to the general public the course and issue of scientific discussions upon the wider questions to which their researches are directed, and that this obligation is especially strong in respect of the subject dealt with in these pages. Among the great questions debated by philosophers in every age the psycho-physical problem occupies a special position, in that it is one in which no thoughtful person can fail to be interested ; for any answer to this question must have some bearing upon the fundamental doctrines of religion and upon our estimate of man's position and destiny in the world. And that interest in this question is widespread among the English-reading public, is shown by the dense stream of popular books upon it which continues to issue from the press both of this country and of the United States.

The greater part of this book is, then, occupied with a survey of modern discussions and modern theories of the psycho-physical relation ; but without some knowledge of the course of development of speculation upon this topic it is impossible to understand the present state of opinion. I have written, therefore, in the earlier chapters a very brief history of the thought of preceding ages. This historical sketch makes no pretence of being a work of original research ; in putting it together I have relied largely upon the standard histories of philosophy and science, especially O^^ vii viii BODY AND MIND

the histories of philosophy of Ueberweg, Lewes, and Hoffding, F. A. Lange's " History of Materialism," Erwin Rhode's " Psyche," Sir Michael Foster's " History of Physiology," the " History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century " of Dr T. Merz, and the " Vitalismus als Geschichte und Lehre " of Dr Hans Driesch.

The history of thought upon the psycho-physical problem is in the main the history of the way in which Animism, the oldest and, in all previous ages, the most generally accepted answer to it, has been attacked and put more and more upon the defensive in succeeding centuries, until towards the end of the nineteenth century it was generally regarded in academic circles as finally driven from the field. I have therefore given to the historical chapters the form of a history of Animism.

The sub-title describes this book as a defence, as well as a history, of Animism. I hasten to offer some explanation of this description, lest the mere title of the book should repel a considerable number of possible readers.

The word Animism is frequently used by contemporary writers to denote what is more properly called primitive Animism, or primitive Anthropomorphism, namely, the belief that all natural objects which seem to exert any power or influence are moved or animated by " spirits," or intelligent purposive beings. It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that the Animism I defend is not of this primitive type. But this is only one variety of Animism, one which seems to have been reached by extending the essential animistic notion far beyond its original and proper sphere of application. The modern currency and usage of the word derives chiefly from Prof. Tylor's " Primitive Culture," and I use it with the general connotation given it in that celebrated treatise. The essential notion, which forms the common foundation of all varieties of Animism, is that all, or some, of those manifestations of life and mind which distinguish the living man from the corpse and from inorganic bodies are due to the operation within him of something which is of a nature different from that of the body, an animating principle generally, but not necessarily or always, conceived as an immaterial and individual being or soul.

" Primitive Animism " seems to have grown up by extension of

PREFACE ix

this notion to the explanation of all the more striking phenomena of nature. And the Animism of civilized men, which has been and is the foundation of every religious system, except the more rigid Pantheisms, is historically continuous with the primitive doctrine. But, while religion, superstition, and the hope of a life beyond the grave, have kept alive amongst us a variety of animistic beliefs, ranging in degree of refinement and subtlety from primitive Animism to that taught by Plato, Leibnitz, Lotze, William James, or Henri Bergson, modern science and philosophy have turned their backs upon Animism of every kind with constantly increasing decision ; and the efforts of modern philosophy have been largely directed towards the excogitation of a view of man and of the world which shall hold fast to the primacy and efficiency of mind or spirit, while rejecting the animistic conception of human personality. My prolonged puzzling over the psycho-physical problem has inclined me to believe that these attempts cannot be successfully carried through, and that we must accept without reserve Professor Tylor's dictum that Animism " embodies the very essence of spiritualistic, as opposed to materialistic, philosophy," ^ and that the deepest of all schisms is that which divides Animism from Materialism.^

The main body of this volume is therefore occupied with the presentation and examination of the reasonings which have led the great majority of philosophers and men of science to reject Animism, and of the modern attempts to render an intelligible account of the nature of man which, in spite of the rejection of Animism, shall escape Materialism. This survey leads to the conclusion that these reasonings are inconclusive and these attempts unsuccessful, and that we are therefore compelled to choose between Animism and Materialism ; and, since the logical necessity of preferring the animistic horn of this dilemma cannot be in doubt, my survey constitutes a defence and justification of Animism.

I have chosen to use the word Animism rather than any other,

not only because it clearly marks the historical continuity of the

modern with the ancient conception, but also because no other

term indicates precisely all those theories of human personality

^ " Primitive Culture," vol. i. p. 415. 1 Op. cit., p. 502.

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which have in common the notion which, as I believe, provides the only alternative to Materialism. The word " Spiritualism " as used in philosophy is ambiguous, and it has been spoilt for scientific purposes by its current usage to denote that popular belief which is more properly called Spiritism. Nor is all Animism spiritualistic ; during long ages the dominant form of it was a materialistic Dualism. The term " psycho-physical dualism " accurately expresses the essential animistic notion ; but it is cumbrous, and the word Dual'ism is apt to be taken to imply metaphysical Dualism, an implication which I am anxious to avoid ; for Animism does not necessarily imply metaphysical Dualism, or indeed any metaphysical or ontological doctrine, and may logically be held in conjunction with a monistic metaphysic, or indeed with any metaphysical doctrine, Solipsism alone excepted. The expression " psycho-physical interactionism " will not serve my purpose, because (as we see in the philosophy of Leibnitz, and in that modification of the Cartesian system known as Occasionalism) Animism may be combined with the denial of psycho-physical interaction. Again, the term " soul-theory " does not cover all varieties of Animism, in illustration of which statement I may remind the reader that the late Prof. James advocated a distinctly animistic view of human personality, which he called the " transmission theory," but explicitly rejected the conception of the soul as a unitary and individual being.

The reader may perhaps be helped to grasp the long argument of the book, if I make here a summary statement of its course. The first six chapters trace in outline through the European culture-tradition, from primitive ages to the present time, the history of Animism and of the attacks upon it from the sides of metaphysic, epistemology, and the natural sciences, and they indicate the principal doctrines proposed as alternatives to it. Chapters VII., VIII., IX., and X. display the grounds on which at the present day the rejection of Animism is generally founded. It is shown that, although in former ages the psycho- physical problem has generally been regarded as one to be solved by metaphysic, it is now widely recognized that the issue must be decided by the methods of empirical science ; and it is shown how

PREFACE xi

the modern rejection of Animism finds its principal ground in the claim of the physical sciences that their mechanical principles of explanation must hold exclusive sway throughout the universe, a claim which I venture to characterize as " the mechanistic dogma."

Chapters XI. and XII. state, examine, and display the special difficulties of, the more important of the monistic doctrines proposed as substitutes for Animism. The least unsatisfactory of these are closely allied, and in accordance with current usage are classed together under the head of psycho-physical Parallelism. In Chapter XIII. it is shown that the choice of Parallelism or Animism is a dilemma from which we cannot escape, unless indeed we are prepared to adopt all the absurdities of thoroughgoing Materialism or of Solipsism.

Chapters XIV., XV., and XVI. examine the modern arguments against Animism, and show that no one of them, nor all of them together, logically necessitate its rejection.

Chapters XVII. to XXIV. exhibit the inadequacy of the mechanical principles to the explanation of the facts of general physiology, of biological evolution, of human and animal behaviour, and of psychology, and bring forward certain positive arguments in favour of Animism.

Chapter XXV. states my attitude towards the work of the Society for Psychical Research, and shows how, as it seems to me, the results hitherto achieved by that line of investigation strengthen the case against the " mechanistic dogma."

In the last chapter I have tried to draw together the threads of the argument, and regarding the " mechanistic dogma " (the only serious objection to Animism) as discredited, I have weighed the claims of the principal varieties of Animism in a discussion which results in favour of the hypothesis of the soul. Finally, I have endeavoured to indicate a view of the nature of the soul which shall be in harmony with all the facts established by empirical science,

I am aware that to many minds it must appear nothing short of a scandal that anyone occupying a position in an academy of learning, other than a Roman Catholic seminary, should in this twentieth century defend the old-world notion of the soul of man.

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For it is matter of common knowledge that " Science " has given its verdict against the soul, has declared that the conception of the soul as a thing, or being, or substance, or mode of existence or activity, different from, distinguishable from, or in any sense or degree independent of, the body is a mere survival from primitive culture, one of the many relics of savage superstition that obstinately persist among us in defiance of the clear teachings of modern science. The greater part of the philosophic world also, mainly owing to the influence of the natural sciences, has arrived at the same conclusion. In short, it cannot be denied that, as William James told us at Oxford three years ago, " souls are out of fashion."

But I am aware also that not one in a hundred of those scientists and philosophers who confidently and even scornfully reject the notion has made any impartial and thorough attempt to think out the psycho-physical problem in the light of all the relevant data now available and of the history of previous thought on the question. And I am young enough to believe that there is amongst us a considerable number of persons who prefer the dispassionate pursuit of truth to the interests of any system, and to hope that some of them may find my book acceptable as an honest attempt' to grapple once more with this central problem. And I am fortified by the knowledge that a few influential contemporary philosophers adhere to the animistic conception of human personality, or at least regard the psycho-physical question as still open, as also by certain indications that the " mechanistic dogma " no longer holds the scientific world in so close a grip as during the later part of the nineteenth century.

" Animism," writes Professor Tylor, " is, in fact, the groundwork of the Philosophy of Religion, from that of savages up to that of civilized men." ^ And, though modern Pantheisms have generally rejected Animism, the statement remains substantially correct. And it must be admitted that most of those who have defended Animism in the modern period have been openly or secretly moved by the desire to support religious doctrines ^ " Primitive Culture," i. p. 426.

PREFACE xiii

which they have accepted on other than scientific grounds. It follows that anyone who undertakes to defend the theory is liable to be suspected of a bias of this kind.

These considerations are my apology for setting down here a personal confession, which may aid the reader in judging of the nature and degree of any bias that may have affected my presentation of the arguments for and against Animism. I believe that the future of religion is intimately bound up with the fate of Animism ; and especially I believe that, if science should continue to maintain the mechanistic dogma, and consequently to repudiate Animism, the belief in any form of life after the death of the body will continue rapidly to decline among all civilized peoples, and will, before many generations have passed away, become a negligible quantity. Nevertheless, I claim that the discussions of the following pages are conducted with as much impartiality as is possible for one to whom the argument seems to point strongly towards one of the rival hypotheses. For I can lay claim to no religious convictions ; I am not aware of any strong desire for any continuance of my personality after death ; and I could accept with equanimity a thoroughgoing Materialism, if that seemed to me the inevitable outcome of a dispassionate and critical reflection. Nevertheless, I am in sympathy with the religious attitude towards life ; and I should welcome the establishment of sure empirical foundations for the belief that human personality is not wholly destroyed by death. For, as was said above, I judge that this belief can only be kept alive if a proof of it, or at least a presumption in favour of it, can be furnished by the methods of empirical science. And it seems to me highly probable that the passing away of this belief would be calamitous for our civilization. For every vigorous nation seems to have possessed this belief, and the loss of it has accompanied the decay of national vigour in many instances.

Apart from any hope of rewards or fear of punishment after death, the belief must have, it seems to me, a moralizing influence upon our thought and conduct that we can ill afford to dispense with. The admirable Stoic attitude of a Marcus Aurelius or a xiv BODY AND MIND

Huxley may suffice for those who rise to it in the moral environment created by civilizations based upon a belief in a future life and upon other positive religious beliefs ; but I gravely doubt whether whole nations could rise to the level of an austere morality, or even maintain a decent working standard of conduct, after losing those beliefs. A proof that our life does not end with death, even though we knew nothing of the nature of the life beyond the grave, would justify the belief that we have our share in a larger scheme of things than the universe described by physical science ; and this conviction must add dignity, seriousness, and significance to our lives, and must thus throw a great weight into the scale against the dangers that threaten every advanced civilization. While, then, I should prefer for myself a confident anticipation of total extinction at death to a belief that I must venture anew upon a life of whose nature and conditions we have no knowledge, I desire, on impersonal grounds, to see the world-old belief in a future life established on a scientific foundation. To that extent, and to that extent only, I think, my inquiry is biassed.

Finally, I wish to state emphatically that my inquiry is not conceived as a search for metaphysical truth, but that it is rather conducted by the methods and with the aims of all empirical science ; that is to say, it aims at discovering the hypotheses which Vv^ill enable us best to co-ordinate the chaotic data of immediate experience by means of a conceptual system as consistent as may be, while recognizing that such conceptions must always be subject to revision with the progress of science. Of course, if the term metaphysic be taken in the older sense as implying an inquiry into that which is not physical, the theme of this work is metaphysical ; but that is a usage which is no longer accepted ; metaphysic is now distinguished from empirical science by its aims and methods rather than by its subject-matter. I claim, then, for the conception of the soul, advocated in the last chapter of this book, no more than that it is an hypothesis which is indispensable to science at the present time.

Chapter I

Primitive Animism or Anthropomorphism — The ghost-soul — Burial customs — Origin of ghost-soul — Ghost-soul not immaterial — Extension of original idea of soul — Survivals of ghost-soul — Hebrew Animism — Homeric Animism — -The Ionian physicists — Post-Homeric Animism — Greek Materialism — Plato — Aristotle — Stoicism and Scepticism ....... 1-27

Chapter V

The attack on "Substance" — Locke leads the attack — His dualism — The Deists — Bishop Berkeley's idealism — Hume's scepticism — The Wollfian rationalism dominant on the Continent — French materialism of the "Enlightenment" — Kant's reconciliation of Spiritualism with Materialism — The Vitalists . 61-78

Chapter VI Animism In The Nineteenth Century

The romantic speculation — Reaction against it — The modern phase of psycho-physical discussion introduced by Fechner — Modern defenders of Animism in Germany, France, Great Britain, and America .... 79-86

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Chapter VII Modern Developments Of Physical Science Adverse To Animism

Solipsism unacceptable — The psycho-physical problem to be dealt with by methods of

empirical science — Kinetic mechanism — The law of the conservation of energy 87-93

Chapter VIII

THE RISE OF THE MECHANISTIC PHYSIOLOGY AND OF THE " PSYCHOLOGY WITHOUT A SOUL "

Hylozoism of the " Enlightment" — Vitalists — Mechanical explanations of vital processes confidently assumed— The search for the seat of the soul fails — The doctrine of the reflex type of all nervous process — Unconscious cerebration — The association-psychology andthe law of habit — The dependence of thought on integrity of brain-functions — The law of psycho-neural correlation — The composite nature of the mind ....... 94-ii£

Chapter IX The Influence Of The Darwinian Theory

Lamarckism — Neo-Darwinism— Organic adaptations mechanically explained — No need for teleology— Continuity of evolution — Interment of Animism by Tyndall .......... 119-121

Chapter X Current Philosophical Arguments Against Animism

Inconceivability of psycho-physical interaction — Variants of the inconceivability argument — Immediate knowledge of consciousness, but not of the soul — Rapprochement of science and philosophy on basis of Monism . . 122-125

Chapter XI

Epiphenomenalism — Its " energetic " variant — Psycho-physical Parallelism proper — Phenomenalistic Parallelism — Psychical Monism as expounded by Paulsen, Strong, Clifford, and Fechner — Fechner's "proof" of the sub-conscious — Fechner's " day-view " of nature — Continuity of evolution — Psychical Monism compatible with scientific Materialism — Its many advantages . . . 122-148

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Chapter XII

EXAMINATION OF THE AUTOMATON-THEORIES AND OF THE SPECIAL ARGUMENTS IN THEIR FAVOUR

Epiphenomenalism combines the difficulties of materialism and of interaction — Parallelism proper must go on to accept the identity hypothesis in one or other of its two forms — The " two-aspect doctrine " meaningless — Therefore " Psychical Monism" the only form of Parallelism deserving of serious consideration—The difficulty of doing without " things "^ — My self is not my consciousness, but rather the sum of enduring conditions which we call the structure of the mind — Difficulties of the compounding of consciousnesses — Difficulties common to all forms of Parallelism — Universal consciousness — It necessitates assumption of unconscious consciousness — Parallelism of mechanical sequences with the logical and teleological . . . 149-178

Chapter XIII

IS THERE ANY WAY OF ESCAPE FROM THE DILEMMA — ANIMISM OR PARALLELISM ?

The acceptance of "idealism" does not absolve us from the psycho-physical problem — Kant neither resolved nor dissolved the problem— Three attitudes towards it of Post-Kantians, represented by Parallelism of Paulsen, the ambiguity of Lange, and the transubjective Idealism of Ward — The last implies Animism as hypothesis necessary to natural science . . . 179-188

Chapter XIV

Proposed dualism of science and philosophy^A calculable universe — Animism does not necessarily imply metaphysical Dualism or Pluralism — Parallelism admits only pantheistic religion — Parallelism incompatible with belief in any continuance of personality after death — Fechner, Kant, and Paulsen fail to reconcile the mechanistic dogma with human immortality— High authorities for and against Animism ......... 189-205

Chapter XV

EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMISM FROM EPISTEMOLOGY, "inconceivability," AND THE LAW OF CONSERVATION OF ENERGY

Necessity of giving all scientific explanation the mechanical form not proved — Guidance without work— Various possibilities — Argument from conservation of energy describes a circle — Difficulty of defining the " physical " — Immediate awareness not the highest type of knowledge ..... 206-223

Chapter XVI

EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMISM DRAWN FROM PHYSIOLOGY AND GENERAL BIOLOGY

Inadequate conceptions of interaction alone give plausibility to arguments from cerebral physiology — Continuity of evolution a postulate—But, if accepted, not fatal to Animism — Statistics and teleology — Abiogenesis . . . 224-234 xviii BODY AND MIND

Chapter XVII The Inadequacy Of Mechanical Conceptions In Physiology

Last half-century has done nothing to justify physiological materialism — The impossibility of mechanistic explanation of morphogenesis and heredity — Experimental embryology, restitution, and regeneration — Organisms and machines — Organisms and the degradation of energy .... 235-245

Chapter XVIII Inadequacy Of Mechanical Principles To Explain Organic Evolution

Neo-Darwinism based on mechanistic assumption in regard to heredity — Natural selection implies the struggle for existence — Difficulties of Neo-Darwinism — Diminished by " organic selection " — But this is a teleological principle — Mutations not fortuitous — Regeneration not explicable on Darwinian principles — Resuscitation of Vitalism — Appendix on organic selection . . . 246-257

Chapter XIX

INADEQUACY OF MECHANICAL CONCEPTIONS TO EXPLAIN ANIMAL AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

The " total reactions" of animalcules are not tropisms — Persistence and " trial and error" among the lowest animals — Purely instinctive actions initiated by perceptions which involve mental synthesis — Instinctive actions co-operating with intelligence imply more extensive synthesis — Meaning and purpose as factors in instinctive behaviour — Human instincts — "Meaning" is an essential link between sense-impression and reaction — Values .... 258-271

Chapter XX

THE ARGUMENT TO PSYCHO-PHYSICAL INTERACTION FROM THE "DISTRIBUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS"

Darwinism implies the usefulness of consciousness — And not merely of infra-consciousness, but of integrated personal .consciousness — True consciousness accompanies not all nervous processes, but only those which result in modification .......... 272-280

Chapter XXI

Two lines of argument — The metaphysical (Lotze) valid, but not capable of convincing— The physiological — The sensorium comnncne, variously conceived — All these conceptions untenable — No physical medium of composition of effects of sense-stimuli— Some medium -demanded by our intellect — Why refuse to trust it? — Fechner's doctrine of the threshold and of psycho-physical continuity— The facts of sensory " fusion " incompatible with Parallelism, however stated — Multiple personality ....... 281-300

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Chapter XXII The Psycho-physics Of "meaning"

The association-psychology ignored "meaning" — But without meaning "ideas" are meaningless — The doctrine of the "psychic fringe" — Spatial meanings are not identical with clusters of kinaesthetic sensations — Sensations are merely cues to meanings — And meanings are relatively independent of sensations and have no physical parallels ...... 301-311

Chapter XXIII

The facts of feeling-tone — Feeling has no immediate correlate among the brain-processes — Yet feeling determines the trend of thought and action — Feeling and the establishment of associations — Feeling and evolution — The peculiarities of conative process have no physical analogues . . . 312-329

Chapter XXIV

Parallelism implies that all mental retention can be described in terms of brain-structure — The fantastic ' ' memory-cell"— Motor-habit the type of all retention founded in brain-structure — But true memory cannot be identified with habit — The law of neural association as generally stated is false — All remembering involves co-operation of two factors, habit and true memory — Suggestion towards a theory of memory ....... 330-346

Chapter XXV

THE BEARING OF THE RESULTS OF " PSYCHICAL RESEARCH " ON THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM

The search for empirical evidence of survival — Telepathy seems to be established — Hypernormal control of bodily by mental processes — Post-hypnotic appreciation of time ......... 347-354

Conclusion

Animism preferable to Parallelism — Four varieties of Animism — The animistic " actuelle Seele " — The transmission theory of James and Bergson — The objections to the soul-theory flimsy, if psycho-physical interaction is accepted — The contentless soul — The soul a developing system of psychical dispositions— Multiple personalities are of two kinds, both consistent with the soul-theory — The vegetative functions of the soul — The soul-theory and organic evolution .......... 355-379

Chapter I Animism In The Ancient World

IT would seem that from a very remote period men of almost all races have entertained the belief that the living man differs from the corpse in that his body contains some more subtle thing or principle which determines its purposive movements, its growth and self-repair, and to which is due his capacity for sensation, thought, and feeling. For the belief in some such animating principle, or soul, is held by almost every existing race of men, no matter how lowly their grade of culture nor how limited their mental powers ; and we find evidences of a similar belief among the earliest human records.

Among the more highly civilized peoples, the soul has generally been regarded by the more cultured members of each community as an immaterial being or agency ; but the distinction between material and immaterial things was only achieved after long ages of discussion and by many steps of refinement of the conception of the soul. The belief most widely current among the peoples of lower culture is that each man consists, not only of the body which is constantly present among his fellows, but also of a shadowy vapour-like duplicate of his body ; this shadow-like image, the animating principle of the living organism, is thought to be capable of leaving the body, of transporting itself rapidly, if not instantaneously, from place to place, and of manifesting in those places all or most of the powers that it exerts in the body during waking life. Sleep is regarded as due to its temporary withdrawal from the body ; trance, coma, and other serious illness, as due to longer absence ; and death is thought to imply its final departure to some distant place.

That this belief is a very real one among many peoples, is shown by their careful observance of customs in which it finds expression. Thus, among some of the peoples who entertain this belief, it is customary to avoid wakening a sleeper, lest his wandering soul should not return to him ; and, if it becomes absolutely necessary to waken him, it is done as gradually as possible, in order that his soul may have time to find its way back to the body. Or again, the friends of a sick person will procure a medicine-man, who, falling into trance, will send /his soul after the retreating soul, to arrest it if possible on its journey toward the land of the dead, and to lead it back to the body of the patient. And after death the friends or relatives will take all possible measures to aid the departing soul .on its journey, and to promote its welfare in the land of shades, where it is believed to lead a life very much like that of its embodied state in this world. ^

The burial customs of many peoples afford the best evidence that the disembodied soul is conceived as like in all essential respects to the living whole of soul and body. The widespread custom of killing slaves or wives on the death of a man of some importance is an expression of the belief that the souls of the, victims will accompany his soul and will continue to serve it as they served him before death. And the even more widely spread custom of burying or burning with the body of the dead man his most valued possessions, especially weapons and ornaments, is due to the belief that even these things have their shadowy duplicates or ghost-souls, which can be carried away by the departing soul and used by it as the real objects were used by the living man.

Professor E. B. Tylor first clearly expounded this primitive conception of the ghost-soul, showed its wide distribution in space and time, and illustrated with a wealth of detail its many variations, in his celebrated chapters on Animism ; '^ and there can be no reasonable doubt that he has given the true account of its origin, in attributing it in the main to reflection upon the experiences of dreams and visions, in conjunction with the objectively observed facts of sleep, trance, and death. In sleep, while the body lies at rest, the sleeper remains unconscious of the surroundings of his body ; he seems to himself to visit other scenes, to meet and converse with other persons, and to have the use in these dream-adventures of his dress and weapons. In visions and