The foundations of character : being a study of the tendencies of the emotions and sentiments

Front matter

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Preface

A SCIENTIFIC treatment should not diminish, but increase the general interest taken in character. To bring together the various aspects of the subject, — which, in literature, are treated in isolation from one another ; to lead up to a general conception of it ; to study the methods by which the knowledge of it may be increased in accuracy and extent ; these are to make approaches to a scientific treatment of character. While I have had chiefly to confine myself to a study of the tendencies of the emotions and sentiments, this has been, throughout, my aim. This book, then, is a study of method. Yet I do not claim that this method is essentially new. It is in the main the hypothetical method of the sciences ; it has had to be adapted to the treatment of character : that is all. Yet for a long time, like the philosophers of old, I was trying to find indisputable foundations. How long it took me before I saw the necessity of being content with good working hypotheses ! Hence, as I only try to find such hypotheses, to interpret the facts of character as far as I have grasped them, I do not put them forward as finally true or adequate theories. On the contrary, I have tried to show how they may be corrected and improved as the facts come to be systematically investigated. And I have sought to give them such a form that they can be made use of and improved by others without being wholly abandoned. To make real progress possible has been my aim throughout. I have wondered whether, in following a plain method of science and common sense in the treatment of a subject, around^which such an amount of valuable opinion has accumulated, we cannot ensure an

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PREFACE orderly development ; so that each age, taking up the conclusions of the preceding age, not contemptuously, but with respect and hope, may first master its knowledge and wisdom, and discern their legitimate applications, before attempting to judge in what respects they are defective and inadequate : — just as the progress of physical science depends on our first mastering the knowledge already attained in some branch of it, and on conserving that, before attempting to solve the new problems there suggested.

What has astonished me is that the thoughts of the past that bear on life and character are not thus regarded, but either despised and neglected, or reverenced in that wrong way according to which these thoughts have only to be accepted and preserved. Whence arise, in respect of the wisdom of life, what are called “ platitudes,” and in respect of political life, rigid institutions ; and both of these, instead of protecting mankind against the revolutionary spirit, invite it.

A great difficulty which I have found in the course of my work has been to collect the facts or observations of character on which I had to rely. I wish I could have collected them on such a scale as Prof. Westermarck has achieved in his wonderful book on “ The Development of the Moral Ideas.” Such material as I have obtained has been drawn much more from literature than from any other source ; and this was inevitable, because psychology has hardly begun to concern itself with these questions. After our own great poets, my chief resource has been the great French prose writers ; and I take this opportunity of expressing my unqualified admiration for that literature, and my indebtedness to it. Everywhere I have found in it that psychological curiosity so frequent in the dramas of Shakespeare, but so rare in our prose writings.

One of the principal hypotheses in this book is the theory of the sentiments which I published in Mitid nearly twenty years ago. I have to thank Prof. G. F. Stout who was the first to adopt it, and to make it more widely known in his admirable “ Manual of Psychology.” Since then it has been accepted, or at least found serviceable, by a number of eminent writers, among whom I may mention Prof. E. Westermarck,

PREFACE

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Prof. James Sully, Mr. W. McDougall, F.R.S., Prof. Boyce Gibson, Prof. A. Caldecott. I have specially to thank Mr. McDougall for the generous praise in his “Social Psychology,” of what little I had accomplished, which, coming to me at a time when I was uncertain as to the plan of my book, was a great encouragement and help. I have also to thank Dr. F. W. Mott, F.R.S., for valuable physiological suggestions, and also his daughter, Miss P. Mott, for having collected some cases for me, and provided their references. Finally I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to Prof. Carveth Read for the labour and self-sacrifice involved in reading and correcting my proofs, which he did in the thorough and conscientious way characteristic of him ; for his having drawn my attention to certain omissions, and for many valuable suggestions. Prof. Stout and Mr. McDougall also kindly read certain parts of the proofs bearing specially on the treatment of ‘instinct.’ I hope to publish before long another volume treating of the sentiments in the same detail which I have in the present volume given to the primary emotions. This is necessary to complete the plan of my work.

London,

February, 1914.

A. F. S.

I

A COMPLETE science of mind would include a science of character. The best approach to such a science through the study of the primary emotions and their connected instincts. This study to be directed to an analysis of tendencies. How far we can study the emotions in isolation, pp. 1-2. — The bearing of the James-Lange theory on this problem, pp. 3-5. — Mr. McDougall’s theory, as bringing into prominence the active side of emotion, p. 6.

II

Such knowledge of character as we possess unsystematic and inexact, p. 6. — Neglect of the true nature of the wisdom of life in fables, proverbs and maxims, p. 7. — The advantage of a science of character in education, p. 8. — and in interpreting the ruling ideas of the past and present, p. 9.

chapter 1. MILL’S conception of a science of character

His conception of Ethology, as founded on the Laws of Psychology, p. 13. — as connecting generalisations about character with these laws, p. 13. — His conception of Empirical Laws, as subject to exception, p. 14. — of Causal Laws or Laws of Mind ; of Laws of Ethology, as axiomata media, and of the method of this science as deductive, p. 14. — His conception of its practicability, dependent on the existence of a sufficient number of empirical laws and of laws of

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XII mind ; the former have not been collected, p. 15.— His “Laws of Mind” are no other than the laws of association, the laws of retentiveness and of “mental chemistry,” p. 16.— These laws unsuitable for interpreting facts of character, pp. 17-19-

Chapter II. The Law Of Organisation As It Is Disclosed In The Mind

Two kinds of forces in character, the one working to higher forms of organisation, the other, to lower : both pursue ends and organise the means to them, thereby producing systems, pp. 20, 21. — The Law of Organisation as the fundamental law of character, exemplified by all the forces and systems of character, pp. 21, 22, 23. — These organic laws alone capable of interpreting popular generalisations about character, p. 23.

Chapter III. The Systems Of The Emotions

I. Of the Constitution of Character.

The organic laws of character, those of our instincts, emotions and sentiments : character as constituted by these forces, pp. 24, 25. — What we attend to in the stream of perception and thought largely determined by these forces ; their tendencies often counteracted by the mechanical laws of association, pp. 25, 26. — In contrast to this conception, popular conceptions of character reduce it to a number of detached qualities, p. 26.

2. Oj the Nature of an Emotional System, and of the Different

Primary Emotions.

The systems of character being forces, the first to be considered those of the primary emotions : part of these systems organised in the body, part in the mind, pp. 27, 28. — Fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, joy and sorrow, include instincts or innate tendencies in their systems : the appetites classed with these primary systems, pp. 28-31. — Also the impulses for repose and exercise ; for self-display and self-abasement ; all of them include instinctive tendencies, and pursue innately determined ends, pp. 28-34.

Chapter IV. The Systems Of The Sentiments (i)

i. Of the Innate Bond Connecting the Primary Emotions.

Consideration of the greater systems of the Sentiments that organise many of the lesser systems of the emotions, p. 35. — The base of the greater systems, an innate organisation of the dispositions of fear, anger, joy and sorrow, pp. 36-38.

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2. Of the Sentiment of Parental Love.

This sentiment also called the “ parental instinct ” : not one instinct ; includes a variety of instincts of different kinds, nutritive, defensive, offensive, sportive ; also a variety of emotions, as fear, anger, joy, sorrow, and others. The sight of offspring tends innately to arouse this sentiment : its disinterested character, pp. 38-43.

3. Of the Source of Disinterested Action.

The source of disinterested action traced by biologists to certain instincts ; by psychologists to either sympathetic or tender emotions : neither of these essentially disinterested, pp. 43-45. — Independently of these emotions, love naturally disinterested. The emotions of fear, anger, joy and sorrow, organised in maternal love, are disinterested, because innately connected with a disinterested, instinctive behaviour, pp. 45-47.- — The disinterestedness of pity, not dependent on its quality of tenderness, p. 48.

Chapter V. The Systems Of The Sentiments (ii)

i. Of the Theory that Love and Hate arc Emotions.

The representations of Love in dramatic poetry evidence that love includes a number of emotions, pp. 51-54. — Spencer's theory of love as a compound emotion cannot interpret the diversity of its behaviour, pp. 55-56.

2. Of the Sentiments that are most Commonly Found among Men.

Self-love, sexual love, family affection, friendship ; the sentiment for games ; impersonal sentiments ; the sentiments of respect and hate pp. 56-58.

3. Analysis of Hatred.

The emotional system of hatred contrasted with that of love, pp. 58-61. — The chief problem of the sentiments to understand the laws of their growth, constitution and decline, pp. 61-62. — The “laws of mind” to be sought for among the systems of character, p. 62.

Chapter VI. Of The Will And Intelligence As Constituents Of Character

We must personify the systems of the emotions and sentiments in order to isolate them and to simplify our problem, pp. 64-65. — The will and intelligence evoked in subordination to some impulse, emotion or sentiment. The question of ‘real' or indeterminate choice and ‘ pure reason ' beyond a science of character, pp. 65-67.

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Chapter VII. Of The Method Of A Science Of Character (i)

i. Of “ The Laws of Mind."

Mill assumed that “ the laws of mind,” as laws of tendency, are not merely “approximate generalisations,” p. 68. — Of the reciprocal relation of the laws of organisation and the laws of association, p. 70. — The laws of mind as laws of organisation. We cannot attach a higher validity to the form given to them than to the form given to “ empirical laws.” They are empirical laws. Their function as laws of tendency to interpret empirical generalisations about character, pp. 70-72.

2. Of the “ Empirical Laws" and the Difficulty of Discovering Theni.

No one has made a collection of these laws : the great thoughts of literature seldom expressed in the form of laws of character, pp. 72-74.

3. Of the Nature of the Wisdom of Life Contained in Fables, Proverbs

and Maxims.

Fables imply laws of character but do not express them ; proverbs contain advice, exhortation, reproof, consolation, maxims, advice or reflections, pp. 75-S0. — Mill formed a mistaken opinion of the nature of the material to be obtained from literature for the inductive base of the science, pp. 80-81.

Chapter VIII. Of The Method Of A Science Of Character (ii)

1. Of Certain Qualifications which the Method of a Science of Character

should possess.

A chief deficiency of Mill’s method due to his not regarding a conception of character as an indispensable part of it, p. 82. — The conception of his successors, due to the influence of analytical psychology, suggested unfruitful problems, p. 83. — Our conception synthetic, and in harmony with the point of view of literature ; can utilise its material ; which suggests natural, instead of artificial problems. Our conception to be used as a hypothesis ; becoming, as it unfolds, a number of hypotheses, and including all the provisional laws we adopt ; becoming ever more complex, and therefore more adaptable to the vai'iety and complexity of the facts of character ; suggesting fresh problems, and leading to the discovery of new laws, because furnishing the clues to such discovery, pp. 83-87. — Besides being employed as a method of discovery, to be used as a method of gradual proof by directing attention to the facts which conflict with its hypothetical laws, pp. 87-88. — Examples to show how the laws may be progressively raised to the standard of scientific laws, pp. 88-92. — The importance of continuity of development. The urgent need at present of a sufficient number of hypothetical laws, which it is the aim of the present work to furnish, pp. 92-93.

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Chapter IX

THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER, i. The Qualities of Conduct.

The method of observation, as directed to the knowledge of character, gives no knowledge of what the forces of character are ; seems to give this, because we attribute to character the qualities observed in conduct, pp. 94-97. — Analysis of the method of characterisation of Theophrastus, La Bruy£re and others : a quality of conduct, an emotional disposition, or a sentiment (or several of them together) employed to compose a character, pp. 97-100.

2. The Conception of Conduct.

Conduct as the expression or behaviour of some system of character is a part of this system ; the will of this system implicated in it : the qualities of conduct in this sense also qualities of character ; we can voluntarily aim at acquiring such qualities, pp. 100-103. — Other qualities, proper to character itself, as qualifying its emotions and sentiments ; thence taken to qualify the conduct of these systems. Hence two kinds of qualities, (1) those first observed in conduct and attributed afterwards to character ; (2) those first belonging to character and attributed afterwards to conduct. Our conception of character, taken at first to include the systems of the emotions and sentiments, now to be advanced a further stage to include both kinds of qualities, pp. 1 03-1 04.

Chapter X

OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE QUALI- TIES OF CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS AND SENTIMENTS.

This problem suggested by the last addition to our conception of character : What qualities of character any given emotion or sentiment tends to foster. Assumption that every sentiment tends to acquire the qualities it needs, as it tends to organise the emotions it needs, pp. 105-109.— Of the injustice of our affections, pp. 109-110.

Chapter XI. Of The Relative Ethics Of The Sentiments

1 . Of the Virtues of Sentiments.

In the first stage of Love its qualities and virtues develop spontaneously ; in the second stage, only through effort and reflection, as we become conscious of possessing these qualities in insufficient degree. Hence the Ideals of a sentiment, pp. 1 1 1-1 12.

2. Of the Ideals of Sentiments.

All the qualities of a sentiment may suggest such ideals, and tend to develop certain emotions appropriate to them, as aspiration, admiration, remorse and shame, pp. 11 2-1 13.

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3. Of the Duties of Sentiments.

Besides ideals and the special emotions supporting them, sentiments of love tend to develop duties relative to their ends, with complimentary emotions of self-approval and self-reproach. These three, the virtues as the fruit of their wills, the ideals as the aspirations of their wills, and the duties as the commands of their wills constitute the Relative Ethics of sentiments, pp. 113-116. — Particular sentiments, besides what are common to all, apt to have characteristic virtues and duties of their own, pp. 1 16-117. — The function of ideas of duty to arouse the self-control of the system as a whole, pp. 117- 118. — Hate, in distinction from love, has no relative ethics, and tends to destroy all sense of obligation toward its object, pp. 118-119.

4. Of the Distinction between the Relative Ethics of Sentiments and

the Conscience.

The Relative Ethics of sentiments partial to their objects, the Ethics ot conscience approximate to impartiality, pp. 1 19-120.

Chapter XII. The Sentiments As The Source Of Types Of Character

The qualities which a particular sentiment acquires tend to qualify the character as a whole ; but those qualities of the character which it does not need, tend, apart from other influences, to atrophy. Hence every sentiment tends to develop a type of character of its own, pp. 121-127.

Chapter XIII. Of The Influence Of The Temperament On The Character

i . Of the Distinction between Temper and Temperament.

Our temperament part of the innate constitution of the mind, including, not the emotional dispositions in general, but the particular manner in which these are felt and manifested by different persons. The way in which, in a given individual, a particular emotion is felt and manifested is its temper in him ; the way in which the emotions in general are felt and manifested by him is his temperament, pp. 128- 129. — The temper of an emotion subject to great change in the course of life, pp. 1 30-13 1.

2. The Doctrine of the Temperaments.

Its assumption that certain emotional qualities attach to all emotions. The superficiality of the sanguine, the depth of the bilious, as affecting their character as a whole. The irascible, though superficial in respect of anger, not therefore in respect of all other emotions. The child superficial in many directions, but generally liable to feel fear more deeply than adults. Impossible to suppose that the ‘depth’ of the bilious attaches to all their sentiments, pp. 131-137. — Conflicting u

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opinions concerning the nervous and the phlegmatic. The quickness of the nervous may not attach to all mental processes, and may not include quickness in respect of emotion. The slowness of the phlegmatic may be due to deficient energy or to low grade of intelligence. They may be quick in responding to the stimuli of certain emotions, as anger or fear. Slowness may be due to lack of interest, or to self control, pp. 1 37-142.

Of the Chief Defects of the Classical Doctrine of the Temperaments.

(1) The assumption that the same emotional quality pervades all the emotions in the same type of temperament. (2) The distinctions between the types are based on conceptions of degree which are necessarily vague. (3) These types are exaggerations. The sanguine and bilious at opposite poles in respect of superficiality and depth ; somewhere between them all existing temperaments must be found. The nervous and phlegmatic at opposite poles in respect of quickness and slowness ; somewhere between them all existing temperaments must be found. All real temperaments mixtures of the four pure temperaments in varying proportions. (4) The classical doctrine does not enable us to infer anything of the temperament of a given individual beyond what we have observed it to be, pp. 142-147-

Chapter XIV. Of The Influence Of The Natural Tempers On The Stability

OF SENTIMENTS (i).

1. How Far the Temper of one Emotion Involves a Corresponding

Temper in Other Emotions.

The natural tempers of fear and anger probably not the same in either sex, p. 148. — Sensibility to an emotion taken to mean the degree and manner of its response to stimuli. — Five qualities of sensibility (1) range ; (2) quickness of response ; (3) delicacy ; (4) intensity, and (5) durability of the emotional response, pp. 149-150. — Cannot infer that the natural temper of one emotion attaches to all others, but may infer that it attaches to other emotions having affinities with its own. Thus the joyous temper renders us correspondingly insensible to repugnance, sorrow, despondency and despair, but correspondingly sensible to hope and confidence. The sorrowful temper renders us correspondingly sensible to despondency and despair, but correspondingly insensible to joy, hope and confidence, pp. 1 50- 157-

2. Of the Influence of the Stability of Sentiments of Tempers that have a

Broad Sensibility to foy.

The more the sensibility to joy approaches the widest possible range, the more it increases the instability of all sentiments ; the more widely and evenly it is distributed over a given class of objects, the more unstable it renders the sentiments formed for members of the class : a limiting condition, the varying degree of enjoyment obtainable from different objects, pp. 157-162.

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Chapter XV. Of The Influence Of The Natural Tempers On The Stability

OF SENTIMENTS (il).

I. Of the Influence of the Tempers that have a Narrow or Restricted

Sensibility to Joy.

In proportion as the range of sensibility to joy, in respect of a given class of objects, is narrow, the love formed for any individual member of the class is constant, pp. 163-169. — In proportion as the sensibility to joy is narrow, the joy is more intense and lasting, and capable of establishing a durable bond between itself and its object, pp. 169-171. — The conception of character unfolded in this book has suggested many problems of character, and led to our formulating provisionally many laws of character to serve as hypotheses for the foundation of the science, pp. 1 71-173.

BOOK II. The Tendencies of the Primary Emotions, chapter 1

INSTINCT AND EMOTION.

i. The Meaning to be Assigned to the Ter?ns Instinct and Emotion.

Emotion defined to include both a cognitive and conative attitude as well as an attitude of feeling, p. 178. — Emotion, a system, because its constituents are organised for an end. Three principal parts in the system of an emotion, (1) the emotion itself in consciousness, (2) the instincts and other tendencies organised in the nervous system, (3) the external behaviour by which the end of the emotion is attained, pp. 179-180. — The term ‘instinctive’ most generally used to denote behaviour the capacity to form which is inherited ; sometimes also used to denote emotions when aroused by stimuli innately connected with their excitement. The term ‘instinct’ defined as an inherited disposition excited innately by certain stimuli, evoking innately in response a specific kind of behaviour, and directed innately to achieve a certain end, pp. 180-183. — Some instincts produce actions complete and useful ; others, actions incomplete and useless apart from other and acquired actions combined with them. Human instincts belong to the latter class, and become serviceable through other actions acquired by experimentation and imitation : these methods inherited, not acquired, pp. 183-185.

2. The Relation of Instinct to Emotion.

The system of a primary emotion may contain several instincts. One or other of these instincts maybe excited, and evoke the specific behaviour characteristic of it, without simultaneously exciting the emotion.

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One or other of these instincts may sometimes be found organised in the system of a different emotion. An emotion tends to include in its system all instincts and other dispositions that subserve its end, pp. 185-192.

3. Of the Significance of the Physiological Theory of Emotion for the

Science of Character.

The functional changes connected with an emotion either do or do no' subserve its end. On the whole, though their influence is often bad, they do subserve it, when not too marked. The function of its instincts is to furnish the proximate ends of the emotion, and a specific mode of behaviour instrumental to this end, pp. 192-194. — The excitement and maintenance of emotions by ideas destroys the original balance of the instincts, and renders possible the debasement, as well as the elevation, of human character, pp. 195-196.

CHAPTER II.

FEAR.

i. Of the Meaning to be given to the Tertns ‘ End,' ‘ Object ’ and ‘ Cause ’

of Efnotion.

Emotions are systems because they have ends, namely, those results which they are organised to achieve in order to satisfy their impulses. ‘ Cause ’ means some conspicuous condition on which the emotion depends; ‘object,’ the thing to which the emotion is referred, pp. I97-I99-

2. The Primitive Varieties of Fear.

These to be distinguished by some instinctive mode of behaviour peculiar to each, and the proximate end to which this behaviour is directed : as (1) flight, (2) concealment, (3) silence, (4) a clinging to something, (5) a shrinking from something, (6) immobility or simulation of death, (7) crying out for protection, (8) defence by aggressive actions, (9) disinterested action on behalf of young, pp. 199-206.

3. The Varieties and Functions of Fear in the Sentiments.

The end of primitive fears to safeguard the organism. Man develops other ends and new forms of behaviour adapted to them, pp. 206-207. — There are endless different ways in which man learns to counteract the occurrence of some event that he fears because of his love of an object, pp. 207-210.

4. The Common End of Fear.

The common end of fear to prevent the occurrence of an event, threatening either the life of the body or the fulfilment or maintenance of the end of some sentiment, pp. 2 10-2 15. — This end too abstract to distinguish the end of fear from the end of anger. Fear distinguished from anger by its generally pacific behaviour. Fear necessary for the biological end, as well as for the ends of sentiments, pp. 216-217.

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5. Of the Growing Control of the Instincts of Fear by the Emotion.

As long as the instinctive behaviour of fear remains under the exclusive control of the stimuli that innately evoke it, the emotion is a mere accessory of instinct. The emotion, placed in supreme control of the instinctive and acquired dispositions of its system in proportion as it is aroused by ideas, foresees its end, and is organised in sentiments, pp. 2 1 7-2 1 9.

6. Of Fear as One of the Primary Emotions and Root-Forces of

Character.

The tests of a primary emotion : (1) Its early appearance in child-life ; (2) Its diffusion in the animal-world : (3) Its irresolvability into other emotions ; (4) Its innate excitability by sensory stimuli, and (5) its manifestation in some form of instinctive behaviour. Judged by these tests, fear seen to be a primary system. Former attempts to resolve it into a mixture of sorrow and aversion, pp. 219-223.

CHAPTER III.

ANGER (I).

I. The Primitive Varieties of Anger.

These varieties distinguished by different forms of instinctive behaviour directed to different proximate ends, as (1) Destruction ; (2) Overcoming opposition ; (3) Prevention of attack ; (4) Revenge or punishment ; (5) Securing obedience or subordination ; (6) The doing of any of these things on behalf of others. This disinterested anger may be instinctively aroused ; and though, in its behaviour, it employ egoistic forms of anger, these are modified to secure defence of another animal ; this modification appears in part to be innate, pp. 224-241.

CHAPTER IV.

ANGER (il).

I. Of the Varieties of Anger that are Acquired iti the Sentiments.

The anger directed to inflict pain probably acquired, both in respect of its behaviour and end, pp. 242-245. — Of anger as directed, under the control of love, to the end of reformation, — also to the end of recalling the loved object to the forgotten duties of love, pp. 245-246. — The anger of pride directed to the end of humiliating its object. In these acquired varieties anger has a lower emotional intensity than in the primitive, pp. 246-247.

2. Of the Common End of Anger.

Wherever we find one or other of the instinctive or acquired dispositions of anger present and active, there we shall say that anger is present, whether the emotion is or not, pp. 249-250. — The same difficulty about the common end of anger as of fear : no end that

XXI distinguishes the one system from the other. It is their modes of behaviour that distinguish them. The aggressive behaviour of anger sufficiently distinguishes it from fear. Its utility consists in the sudden increase of energy it imparts, and in the number of forms of aggressive action which it puts at the service of the emotions and sentiments, pp. 250-251.

3. The Relation of the System of Anger to the Emotion.

In the development of anger, as in the case of fear, the emotion comes to assume a position of supreme importance in relation to the instinctive and acquired tendencies of its system, pp. 251-252.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE LAWS OF THE INTERACTION OF FEAR AND ANGER.

I. Of the Complicated Relation of the Systems of Fear and Anger.

That the systems of anger and fear do not wholly tend to exclude one another, but that their respective emotions do, pp. 253-256.

2. Of the Relation of Jealousy to Fear and Anger.

The behaviour of jealousy shows it to be a derivative of fear and anger, which implies the action of self-love and a lowering of its self-valuation ; hence concealed out of shame. The emotion of jealousy, though unique, has a variable composition, inclining sometimes more to anger, sometimes more to fear ; and its end requires the support of the tendencies of both emotions. In jealousy the systems, and even the emotions, of fear and anger appear to be harmonised, pp. 256-262.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE QUALITIES OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT THAT HAVE THEIR SOURCE IN ANGER AND FEAR.

i. How far the Quality of Courage Belongs to Anger.

Anger innately possesses the quality of courage, defined as a readiness to risk the life of the organism to which it belongs for the attainment of ends, pp. 263-265.

2. To what Kinds of Fear the Quality of Cowardice Belongs.

The egoistic varieties of fear innately possess the quality of cowardice, as tending to avoid risking the life of the organism to which they belong, p. 265.

3. Of Disinterested Fear as an Innate Source of both Courage and

Caution.

Fear on behalf of others implies love ; is an innate source of courage and caution, pp. 265-268.