The Atlantic coast

Preface

1\ acceding to • re [ueei to write the folloi i, the

writer bed to regret thai a brother offlcex had n<>t undertaken the teak, in the belief thai the reaoll would hare more fulh i:-ct the expectations oi the public With theTien ol

tting the Eacta aa oleerij ai rmaaiMn, the writer baa not apared hiznaeli in the examination ol whan within

ion, and trnata be maj thaa aaoape the just oriticiam of tli*- intelligent reader, the re too, aa tin n ihei I

■ (1 in advance <>t' publication tin- eritioJau of • of the more prominent acton in tb

The writer ia indebted to an able friend for thecriticiam that tli' !;. made np of qu< •* biofa ia

certainly the fact, Thia method I adopted to Kriv,>

ooenrrenoea bom every point of fien obtainable where the quotation is appoaite and no! designed to l"' deoeptire ot meretricious. They aometamea differ oonaiderablj and honestly ; each, howeTor, ia intended to preacnt the occurrence from a given point oi new. T<> theM haw been added inch comment, narration, or oonnection aa aoemed pertineni and likely to afford the reader aa clear an inflight of the wnee aa may be poanible. The writer would have gladly substituted a written detail and referred to hi.s authorities vi PREFACE.

had he supposed that it would be equally interesting and profitable to the reader, as compared with diverse statements honestly made and from as many points of view as there were intelligent observers to be found. Official reports have been carefully examined, and, indeed, form almost wholly the basis of what is presented.

It is desired to avoid exaggeration and adulation, as far as possible, leaving as it were to the reader to put on the gloss, or enthusiastic appreciation, with his own hand, and to present the facts without prejudice to friend or foe. It is for the reader to assign the merit of the men engaged, sometimes under trying difficulties, whether it be in victory, in lack of actual success, or in defeat. The public can of course more readily appreciate brilliant success than a lack of it, yet oftentimes a less measure of success does not measure a less degree of professional skill or of courage.

The publishers purpose presenting the naval operations during our civil war in three volumes. The first would naturally comprise events precedent and immediate, and as many of these transpired within the Capes of Virginia, they and matters of primary interest, and matters relating to blockaders and blockade-runners, will be found in the volume written by Professor Soley, U. S. Navy. This volume, which may be regarded as the second, treats of naval operations from Cape Hatteras to Cape Florida, along the coasts, and within the sounds, rivers, and harbors of this watershed.

As an actuality, two centres of operations existed : the one at Port Royal, the depot of supplies and usual headquarters of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron ; the other within the sounds, and on the coast of North Carolina, over

PREFACE Nii

which the North At Lmt io Blockading Squadron held

In order to avoid confusion, the events of each ■eotioii ire

treated separately,

It mac l»r added that 1 1 1« - writer commanded a nwool in the

battle <>f Porl Boyal and in rabseqiienl operations along that e<-ast until Ifay, L863, and in also present in the two bombardmentfl of Fori Fisher. He is under many obligations to the Navy Department, to the Ghieni of Bureau of Ordnance

and Construction, and to Colonel Robert \ Beott, I". S.

Army, far much valuable information not otherwise attainable, and aNo to -.-.. ial hi. mK fUTBSd in na\al and military affairs, for their kindly assistance.

Wakuim.k II c(V\l)>fri: n"ts.

List of Mats \i

OHAPTBB I.

Condition ok Tiir. Xavv at tiii: C.mmi n< i:mim Of the War, !

CHAPTER II. OHAPTBB ill SiUATE<;i< EUKOlfKO 16

OHAPTIH TV.

ton— Attack 01 POBT M< Ai.usi i it. . .71

OHAPTBB V.

Naval Attack on Ciiaki.kston i'l x CONTENTS.

CHAPTER VI.

PAGE

The Monitor Class of Vessels, Ill

CHAPTER VII.

Operations Against Charleston, 121

CHAPTER VIII.

Hatteras Inlet — Roanoke Island, .... 163

CHAPTER IX.

Reduction op Newbern — The Albemarle, . . . 189

CHAPTER X.

Fort Fisher, 219

CHAPTER XI.

Conclusions, 245

APPENDIX, 249

INDEX, 261

LIST OF MAPS.

MM

South Atlantic Coast, U

Chari.i.ston Harbor, H

Confederate Ironclad Atlanta Ill)

Tori-loo Boats Constructed at Charleston, S. C, . 140 Coasts and Sound- Of North (Mioi.ina. . . 103

Route to Newrf.rn 191

Naval Attack on Fort Fisher

Plan op Fort Fisher, 238

THE ATLANTIC COAST.

CONDITION OF THE nan v at Tin: nnniNM v ; Of THE

WAIL.

Politii'.m. events <'t* gn ity occurring in B

which grew out of the repeal of th< "Mi lonri Oompromi and later, the "John Brown raid 0 tober, ls»*>i>, had tamiliariied the people of the United States with sectional hostility and MftftdahfMJ The centres of direotion of aggressive action were in the South, and of defence against them in the North. South Oarolina tauntingly Bent her uniformed company "to net

rights" faraway from her own soil, end the North hud and men to resist force by force.

The violent unquiet elemenl ol the South had folly determined that the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency was in itself I war, and it had so organi

armed its forces as to bear down any reasonable consideration of tli«> differences between the two sections; nay, mote, it had, aided by the demagogues of thai section, constrained the men of though! and of character to accept the action of

these men as embodying their own ideas. In coming centuthe remarkable address of Alexander li. Stephens at II.— 1

Milledgeville, Ga., on the 14th of November, 1860, will be read as a clear exposition of the actual political differences that were magnified by demagogues into what were urged as monstrous wrongs, and abuses that war only could terminate.

Alter the election of Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Buchanan, in his last message to Congress, favored, as far as he could, the attempted separation of the States, by denying " the right of coercion" to the general Government. During the remainder of his administration the heads of the Departments generally so disposed the officers, war material, and the naval vessels in commission, as to best serve the Confederates when hostilities became an actuality.

The unhappy days rolled on, and at length Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated. State after State passed acts of secession, and others that were actually prepared to follow, cried " no coercion" or, "neutrality" as the price of remaining in the Union.

At Cummings Point, the nearest land to Fort Sumter at the entrance to Charleston harbor, a battery had been erected during February and March, for the avowed purpose of reducing that work. When the attack was made, or rather after Fort Sumter had fallen, on the 13th of April, 1861, the President called on the different States to furnish 75,000 men for a period of three months. This was met by scom and derision in all the bordering slave States, and Virginia at once passed her act of secession. Then it was, that the mask that had not concealed, and yet had been respected by the general Government, was thrown off by the conspirators. A prominent Navy officer then on duty at Washington said to those under him, even before this event, " The Government is virtually dissolved ; there is the semblance of one, nothing more. Disorder reigns every-

CONDITION OP THE NAVY. ft

where, except in the South, where i stable Government is alrcaily established, which will ere long p [uisitions

of membership in 1 1 1 * - to which JOO belong. Ml.

Lincoln will hardly attempt ooereion, it would b ttitu-

ti<>, i-d. Would you meanly m rve another people when

n<> war gTOWB out of the separation, or would you be base enough, for mah

ends to do so, were there ;i war against the people from whom

you have sprung, to whom you arc allied, ami whom t-an now SSrTS SO Well 1 "

Fordajs and even weeks the Government at ^ gave no sign nor token, ami when at last it did, Insid riousnees of preeentation had done sad work. Many *bl< onselnsh officers, without a thought ol treason, or without

re to do wrong or to do violence to the Governm found themselves, rather unwittingly than venelly, in the toils of tii.- enemy. These oondil

ind Southward, both in tin- army and the navy. T1

offioers who were floomod most lik< ly to be influenced to suit the ends of the oonspu boi d. a-

e, within favoring distri

On the it h of March, L861, I eticut,

who had been Secretary of the Navy for the four previous years, ws ted by Gideon Well.-, of tin

remained in that position for the eight yean following. At that date the chiefs of Bureaus wi re a- follow-: 01 lards mid Docks, Captain Joseph Smith; of Construction, John Lenthal; of Provisions and Clothing, Boreti . of

Ordnance and Eydrograph y, Captain I M tder;

of Medicine, Burgeon William Whelan. These offioers had i incumbents for years, and remained throughout the

Civil War, with the exception of Captain MauTuder, a

Virginian, who remained in office, loyally serving the purposes of the inchoate Confederacy, until the seizure of the Norfolk Navy Yard, when he tendered his resignation, and was dismissed by the President as a recognition of unfaithful service.

"Within a few days after the attack on Fort Sumter, of the 78 captains on the active list, 12 resigned or were dismissed ; of 114 commanders, 39 ; of 321 lieutenants, 73. J

The Confederates had been organizing their forces for months, and menaced Washington, Fortress Monroe, and Norfolk Navy Yard. It was absolutely a matter of doubt under the actual circumstances whetner they might not accomplish the possession of all of these places. It was of the utmost importance to the inchoate Confederacy to get possession of the Norfolk Navy Yard and secure the large amount of ordnance stored there and to establish a good line of defence.

Nothing could more effectually serve their purpose than the pretended loyalty of the officers remaining attached to the Navy Yard who effectively cajoled the Commandant, who was old and feeble, and actually distracted by reason of the turmoil. At the final moment he was left alone, without one officer* and with but 40 marines attached to the Yard to support his authority.

The attack on Fort Sumter and its surrender affected the people of the North and of the South quite differently ; while those who captured the fort boasted that they had "finished the war," the people of the North awoke to a painful realization of the fact that a war existed that must be fought to the end, and they girded up their loins as best they could ; but

1 After the 4th of March, 259 officers of the navy resigned their commissions or have been dismissed the service (Report Secretary Navy, July 4, 1861). Many others, belonging to States that had already seceded, had previously resigned.

CONDITION OF THH N AW. 5

the North was long in attaining that intensity of purpose that is so potent when untrained bodies of troops meel in conflict. Fori Sumter m regarded in the pnblio mind, North an. 1 South, as the citadel of the failiese, the incarnation of rebellion, and a^ sneh it was attacked and defended.

Failing in the fled attack, with grim satisfaction, after a time the men of the North saw its walla crumble and fall

from tlic lire of gum four thousand yards away, until fnun

their point of view, it had n<> longer shape nor semblan* a fort, nor was a tingle piece of ordnance permitted to stand upon what had once been its walls; hut the satisfaction of

the North was not complete until, in the most formal manner,

the flag that had been hauled down, foUl

and hour from that event, again floated «.\. r th. imiss of

ruins known m Fori Sumter.

Jn the confusion at the North, growing Out <'f QUI

nations hastily Sent in. ahandonnieiit of dul of others, and in SOUK he

wondered that the Norfolk I rd fell into tin- hands

of the Confederates, with its three thousand cannon, it- tine

dry dock, numerous well-appointed Workshops, material,

and small arms. It i- m.t too much to ny DOW, that it

should bare been held at any ood of in'.

to hare destroyed the eannon, workshops, arid ships.

There is an extenuating fact that may he stated a- a i justification of officers who were recreant. For half a c. ntury perhaps, there had ffristftd a kind of culture of foali

te. instead of to the (Jovernment which tl. I : it

was paraded as ■ dogma, and was in i degree acknowL d

i»\ some officers from the South in the military service of the

Government, more than half of whom, prior to the Civil War, either came from the slave State- or had married within them. Able and educated men, acknowledging this "doctrine," thought they had only to resign to hopelessly embarrass the Government. There was certainly for a time great confusion, and in the case of the Norfolk Yard, great loss. The difficulties are very properly stated in the Eeport of the Secretary of the Navy, before referred to. " With so few vessels in commission on our coast, and our crews in distant seas, the Department was very indifferently prepared to meet the exigency that was rising. Every moment was closely watched by the disaffected, and threatened to precipitate measures that the country seemed anxious to avoid. Demoralization prevailed among the officers, many of whom, occupying the most responsible positions, betrayed symptoms of that infidelity that has dishonored the sendee."

Turning to the vessels of the navy in commission, we find that they had been placed as far as possible in positions to render them least available. On the 4th of March the home squadron consisted of twelve vessels, and of these only four were in Northern ports ; two of these were small steamers, a third a sailing store-ship. The fourth had only a month before entered a Northern port ; the commander, a South Carolinian, had loitered off the coast apparently undecided. After reaching port he remarked to an officer of the vessel that he had hesitated whether to obey his orders or go to Charleston, and was quite thunderstruck when told that his hesitation had been observed and he would have been put in irons had he made the attempt. Several of the vessels in Southern ports or at Vera Cruz were commanded by Southern officers, who it was supposed would deliver their vessels into the hands of the Confederates, but principle or policy was sufficient to spare such an attempted national disgrace.

The sailing frigate Sabine, 50 guns, the sailing sloop St. Louis, 20, and the steamers Brooklyn, 25, and Wyandotte, 5, were at Pensacola ; and the sailing vessels Macedonian, 24,

CONDITION OF THE NAVY. 7

Cumberland. 24, and the steamers Pocahontas, 5, and Powhatan, 11, were returning from Vera Cms.

On the coast of Africa were th<' sailing sloops Constellation and Portsmouth, 22 guns each, the Btore-ship Relief 2 gone, and the ateamera Mohican, 6, Mystic, 5, Sumter, 6, an<l Ben Jacinto, 18. The steam I a, 20, was returning

from Japan, and armed a( Boston April -J<»th.

No one versed in naval mattera can read the above di tion of force without reeling indignant ai the Bad thai it was so placed solely to (Savor the conspiratora Those on the »f Africa were oui of the way of the receipt of orders, as La apparent from the fad thai they were issued as soon as possible after the 4th of March, and it was noi until tl • of September thai the fix of the United Stat •

To the vessels in the Mediterranean the mails were more ible ; the last of tho three steam vessels tin home July 8, 1861 The Richmond, L< and Iroquois, 6 guns, were then available. Ti. Congress, 50 guns, and the steamer Seminole came from the coast of Brazil, the last-named arriving home A From the East Indies, on December 80, 1861, I Hartford, 16, Daootah, 6, and tail sloop John Adams m route. The steamers Pensaoola, 18 I Washing-

ton, and Mississippi, 11 guns, at Boston, should be added as available. There were some old aailin have been pnl in commission, bul those in si found «»f so little use that they were lei : ■els could be obtained. In rather ind nditi si in

the Northern navy yards were the steam tri pat Wi Minnesota, Colorado, andBoanbke, Msh. Hiese

lust-name. I at a> early a date as possible were put in commission ami sent as ■ supporting faros to blockading from Cape Hatteras to the Eio Grande, the far-off boundary with Mexico. To maintain even the appearance of a blockade over the harbors, sounds, and numberless inlets required the purchase of every vessel under the flag that had possibilities of usefulness.

At New York and Boston Navy Yards there were dry docks, and at each several ways for building ships, and at Portsmouth, N. H., and Philadelphia more limited facilities for construction. To supply the needs and waste of war required the employment of every shipbuilding yard in the land.

The personnel of the "old navy," as it was called, depleted as above described, was quite insufficient to meet the exigencies of the Civil War ; instead of 5,000 men afloat, as before that event, no less than 50,000 were required. To officer these men, intelligent officers and seamen from the merchant service were sought, who, after passing examinations to establish their professional fitness, were given acting appointments in various grades. It is proper to add that as a whole they fairly fulfilled reasonable expectations, and after the war was over and passing other examinations, more than fifty of these volunteer officers, many of whom would do honor to any navy, entered the regular service under provisions of law.

Just previous to the Civil War our naval vessels were as well supplied with smooth-bore shell guns and with boat howitzers as any service afloat ; this was effected with considerable difficulty by the late Rear-Admiral Dahlgren when in an inferior grade. The special value of rifled ordnance under certain conditions had not yet been properly established, and there were but few pieces afloat, but they soon formed a part of the battery of every vessel.

In pages that follow, the inferiority for service of vessels " improvised " for war purposes will become painfully appa-

CONDITION OF THE NAVY. 9

rent. The machinery of steamers built for commercial purposes is far more exposed than of vessels designed to carry guns ; the question of war is simply one of relative strength and preparation of the combatants ; in that respect the National vessels in commission, as a whole, were immensely superior to those of the Confederates, or any that could be built and fitted for service within the limits of the Confederacy. The difference between a very vulnerable naval force and another still more so, was not only regarded with gratulation, but in sheer ignorance and vanity was magnified and expressed in the grandiloquent phrase that "the United States had the strongest navy in the world," when ninetenths of the vessels bearing guns under the National flag would have been quite powerless to meet vessels of war of the same tonnage of any civilized nation. Toward the close of the war we had several double-turreted vessels of an improved Monitor type that were in their day by all odds the strongest vessels then afloat, yet at the present time they would be but "paper ships" under the fire of many vessels of nearly all of the navies of the world.

It is so pleasant to deceive ourselves, that now, when our flag waves over a wide and broad land, with its fifty-two millions of inhabitants, some of our legislators insist that " no nation would dare attack us." Others speak of "appropriating liberally for the building up of a navy " and then gravely propose the munificent sum of $1,300,000 for the cruising navy and half that sum, more or less, to complete an improved Monitor. To the naval mind, or to the person who looks at forces relatively, there is something painfully ludicrous in such propositions. The men " who fought out the war " are rapidly passing away ; their rude experiences, on both sides, now happily capable of serving a common and National purpose, will soon be wholly of the past. Then, in 1* wars that we invite, from a lack of preparation in what plight will we be on land or on the seas ? To the old officer, whether of the land service or that of the sea, these are painful reflections ; so far as he is individually concerned, for usefulness he has almost passed away ; his experiences have taught him what a lack of practical experience and a want of preparation costs a nation in a struggle with another whose military and naval establishments are constant and trained to their duties.

Recognizing the necessity of professional education in the extremity of war, in May, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy applied for an assistant, and Gustavus V. Fox was appointed Assistant Secretary. He entered the naval service as midshipman in 1838, passed through the professional instruction existent, and the intervening grades, to that of lieutenant, and resigned in 1856 to engage in civil pursuits.

Abroad we had enemies who desired our downfall and aided it as far as could be done without openly declaring their hostility ; so far as a lack of friendship wTas concerned, it applied quite as much to the South as to the North; nothing but probable complications nearer home, growing out of hostile interference, as well as the shame of attacking us without reasonable pretext, prevented " armed intervention," as it would have been called.

At home wre had what were known as "sympathizers," spies, and even traitors in the civil services, who obtained the most accurate information of intended movements and gave it to the enemy. Certainly the skies were dark for years, yet through all the difficulties and shortcomings the nation supported its existence with fearful cost of life and treasure.

Beyond the Capes of Virginia and to Cape Florida, in relation to which this volume treats, a blockade, first of form

CONDITION OP THE NAVY. 11

and later of fact, was being established, but so far as hostile guns of opposing forces were concerned within this region they opened first at Hatteras Inlet, more than four months after the war had taken definite shape. The capture of Hatteras Inlet seemed at first of little import to the military mind, but it grew in its proportions, and as will be seen by the following chapters, was no mean event, more important, too, from successive developments, for which it was the gateway.

From the time of the fall of Sumter vessels were prepared and despatched to blockade Charleston, and operations of this nature were extended as the means at hand permitted ; it may be readily supposed, however, that until the capture of Port Royal, at least, it was rather nominal than real. If vessels were captured, even in entering the principal ports, it was due rather to the stupidity of the persons attempting to run the blockade than to the effectiveness of the force employed to prevent it. Should a vessel of ordinary or light draught be desired to reach Charleston, she could be taken into Stono, or North Edisto Inlets, or into any of the channels of St. Helena, or into Port Royal Harbor, and from thence in a few hours find her way into Charleston ; and if desired to reach Savannah, and fearing to approach Tybee Bar, she could enter either Warsaw or Ossabaw Sound, and find her way to her destination without difficulty. To prevent all this, and eventually, effectively as far as j)ossible, and for securing a military base of operations it was essential that a good port on the Southern coast should be seized and held, and for that purpose not one was more desirable in every point of view than Port Royal. As the Confederates had few vessels of war, and none when military operations began, the blockade ot the coast, and effective aid to the army in the capture of forts, was naturally regarded as the limit of usefulness of the navy, and when, at Port Royal, the guns of the navy alone secured the fall of the forts; then the army had to occupy and secure them against the attacks of the enemy, and naval guns then became subsidiary or auxiliary, within their power of action, to army operations, as well to strengthen military lines as to extend them as far as deemed practicable, to embarrass and hold in check as large a land force of the enemy as possible.

PART OF THE

Military Department

THE SOUTH

AXDOF

SOUTH ATLANTIC COAST

Scaliu>i Miles

CHAPTER II.

THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.

In the early part of October, 1861, the steam frigate Wabash was sent from blockading duty to the harbor of New York, to fit for service as the flag-ship of a force destined to our Southern coast, for the purpose of capturing and holding some convenient Southern port to serve as a depot for coal and other supplies, for the use of the vessels maintaining the blockade of the many inlets, harbors, and sounds that lie along the coast from the northern limits of South Carolina to the southern cape of Florida, over which district, what was known as the South Atlantic blockading squadron held its watch. The possession of a harbor was essential to maintaining a proper blockade, as coaling in rough water, if not impossible, is at least a slow and difficult operation. To go around Cape Hatteras to Hampton Roads in order to coal, as had been the case, hundreds of miles from the blockaded ports, lessened the effectiveness of the blockade by the absence of a large number of vessels going and coming, and when they arrived out, much of the coal taken in was already exhausted.

On the 10th of October Flag-Officer Samuel Francis Dupont hoisted his flag on board of the Wabash, commanded by Commander C. R. P. Rodgers. Every effort was made on the part of the flag-officer and his staff to make necessary requisitions and get on board the necessary stores and fitments required for the vessels of war, and for other vessels purchased for war purposes, few of which were adapted to carrying heavy batteries and to withstand the buffetings of rough seas, but they were the best to be had, and as a whole served the required purpose. This heterogeneous fleet of purchased vessels, ferry-boats, and freight stealers of small size, were despatched to Hampton Roads as soon as fitted, and the flag-ship, accompanied by the vessels of war proper, including four gunboats built on contract for completion in ninety days, left for the same destination on the afternoon of the 17th and arrived the day following, exercising at target practice during the passage. The Xl-inch pivot guns on board of the gunboats were found handy and effective within their range.

Hampton Roads at that time was crowded with vessels of war, transports, and coaling schooners. Those destined for the command of Flag-Officer Dupont were supplied with stores and coal as soon as possible, as were also the numerous steam transports carrying some 12,000 men, under the command of General T. W. Sherman, with provisions and army outfits of all kinds. A steamer called the Governor, suitable for inland waters rather than to the sea, having on board a battalion of marines numbering 600, under the command of Major John G. Reynolds, was also attached to the expedition.

After receiving sealed orders as to destination — to be opened only in the event of separation — this motley force, numbering fifty vessels, steamed out of Hampton Roads on the morning of the 29th of October. There was considerable delay in forming a double echelon line outside of Cape Henry, and then the fleet proceeded slowly toward Cape Hatteras. The day previous to this force leaving, the flag-officer had despatched twenty-five coal-laden schooners relieved in part of their cargoes, under convoy of the sail sloop of war Vandalia, with orders to rendezvous off Tybee Bar in the event of parting company. This with the view of concealing the destination of the fleet.

At 1 a.m. of the 31st the breeze was fresh from the eastward, and the sea rough. Owing to the set of the current and by getting too far to leeward, two of the transports struck lightly on Hatteras shoals, when, with a view to their safety, they all steamed out to the eastward, causing some confusion. After passing Hatteras the course was shaped along the coast. At noon on the 1st, a dull heavy sky and southeasterly wind, constantly increasing, gradually settled into a heavy gale. In the afternoon, the flag- officer made signal that the vessels would take care of themselves. As darkness settled over a stormy sea they were seen here and there under such storm sail as their commanding officers directed.

It was an anxious night ; a furious gale swept the waters, and as many of the vessels were certainly indifferent sea boats, grave apprehensions arose as to their safety. The gunboats behaved well, which had been doubted from their motions in rough water when in Hampton Eoads.