Analysis and theory of the emotions, with dissertations on beauty, sublimity and the ludicrous

Front matter

HCrNRLF

V

I. pi liilr

Chap. 3. On the Sources op Beauty

Sec. 1 . Does Beauty depend entirely on Association ? 75

Sec. 2. On the real Sources of Beauty 100

part II.— on sublimity.

Chap 1. Wherein Sublimity differs from Beauty 129 Chap. 2. On the Sources of Sublimity 137

Dissertation on the Ludicrous Emotion.

Chap. 1. On the Nature of the Ludicrous Emotion 149 Chap. 2. On the Sources of the Ludicrous Emotion 154

ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.

Part I.

Analysis and Classification.

The object of the present work is to analyse and classify the Emotions, and by means of this analysis to trace their origin. And in order not to interrupt the general view of the Emotions, such of them as claim a lengthened inquiry will be treated of afterwards in separate Dissertations.

The emotions may be classified in various ways : first as simple and compound, the former class comprising but few, the latter very many emotions. The simple emotions are these, Joy, Grief, Wonder, Desire, Fear, and possibly one or two more, such as Weariness of mind from repetition, and Ennui from vacancy, which however may be classed under the general head of grief. All the other emotions are either modifications or compounds of these elements.

B

Z ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.

Another classification may be derived from the circumstance whether the emotions do or do not necessarily involve the notion of Time. Emotions not necessarily involving the notion of time, are the elementary emotions of Joy, Grief, and Wonder, as well as Cheerfulness, Melancholy, Beauty, Sublimity, the Ludicrous emotion, etc.

Emotions necessarily involving the notion of time are of two sorts, as they look to the past, or as they look to the future, and therefore they may be subdivided into the Retrospective and the Prospective. Of the former kind are Regret and Remorse ; of the latter. Desire and Fear, and every compound emotion embracing desire as one of its elements.

Though each of these classifications has its advantages, yet is there another which I would propose as preferable to either, for it is equally true to nature, and probably of more practical use. < Some emotions are not immediately connected with ^outward action, while others are. Of the first sort are simple Joy and Grief, Cheerfulness, Melancholy, Beauty, Sublimity, etc. These like every feeling, nay like every thought, may lead to outward action, but they may not, and they never immediately precede it ; whereas. Desire and Fear, in some form or other, directly urge to action, and when this takes place, they are always the

PRIMARY DIVISION. 3

immediate antecedents. This distinction seems sufficiently well defined, and sufficiently important, for the purposes of classification.

Agreeably to this view, our primary division will be into the PASSIVE and the ACTIVE emotions.

CLASS FIRST.— Passive Emotions.

These the mind suffers^ but they are not the agents in motion.

This class may be divided into two orders, into emotions which have not, and those which have a necessary reference to other individuals, or to our own past conduct. Under the first order we may enumerate the following.

y^' I. II. — Joy and Grief, emotions of an opposite ^ character but of a simple nature, and as such, c unsusceptible of analysis and definition.

Under these may be classed, either as species or varieties, the following emotions. Under Joy,

1. Cheerfulness^ which is permanent but gentle Joy.

2. Mirth : a lively joy, the result of ludicrous emotions.

Under Grief,

1. Melancholy^ w^hich is Grief permanent, but not intense.

2. Weariness of Mind, arising from sameness

B 2 or repetition ; a simple emotion, and allied to Grief. 3. Ennui, from vacancy of mind, also a simple feeling, and of the nature of Grief.

III. Wonder, an emotion produced by what is new, likewise a simple emotion and not to be analysed.

IV. Beauty.^^

V. Sublimity.*

VI. The Ludicrous Emotion.*

Ennui is the malady of those who have no sufficient occupation; and a tendency thereto depends upon that peculiar frame of mind in which desires are weak in proportion to the intellectual faculties. Increase desire, or diminish intellect, and in either case you drive away Ennui. And though melancholy be not unfrequently the result of long continued misfortune, yet it is the grief of those especially who have no positive evils, and is often greatest in youth, when everything smiles upon us, and abates with advancing years. The cares and active occupations of mature life effectually expel this dreamy sentimental emotion. Youth, so to say, can better afford to be melancholy, for upon youth consolations shower.

We have little sympathy with Ennui, but more with melancholy, probably because we are aware

* For a particular account of these emotions, see the dissertations contained in this volume.

PASSIVE EMOTIONS. O

that the frame of mind indicated, is very different. The man who suffers habitually from Ennui, is likely never to do much good, for in him the active principles are deficient, but the Melancholy wight gives a better promise. The frame of mind which tends to melancholy seems to consist of sensibility ' more than ordinary, and of eager wishes and aspirations after great things, united with little hopefulness, but with much tenacity. Desio senza speme would be a suitable motto. This constitution of mind is however far from unpromising; for delicate sensibility, which implies delicacy of conscience, is highly moral ; and eager desire, with constancy, will force its way almost without hope.

Tenacity of thought and feeling supposes frequent recurrence of the same ideas ; and sameness has a tendency to lower the tone of spirits. It is thus that tenacity favours melancholy.

Though Ennui and Melancholy differ so widely in themselves, as well as in their causes, yet the remedy for both, as indeed for every ill, but for them especially, is occupation.

CLASS FIRST.— Passive Emotions.

Order Second: Emotions having a necessary reference to others, or to our own past conduct, either towards ourselves or others, and therefore bearing b ANALYSIS OF THE EMOTIONS.

upon morality and remotely influencing practice.

Though the emotions already considered may have an influence upon practice, yet the influence is neither so near nor so general as in the case of the second order, which in the usual course of things leads on to the active emotions. It may be divided into the Immediate and the Retrospective Emotions, according as they look to the present or to the past.

The Immediate Emotions are,

I. Sympathy and Antipathy.

Sympathy is an emotion of pleasure arising from the contemplation of some pleasure in another, or of pain on the contemplation of pain.

Antipathy is exactly the reverse of sympathy, and is quite an exception to the general law, for sympathy is the rule of human nature.

II. Pride and Humility.

Pride, a pleasing emotion, arising from the consciousness of some real or supposed excellence in ourselves, or connected with ourselves, as compared with others.

Humility is a painful emotion, arising from the consciousness of some real or supposed defect in ourselves, or connected with ourselves, as compared with others.

Retrospective Emotions.

I. Remorse is a compound state of mind, com-

BEMORSE, SHAME. 7

prising : (1) a judgment of condemnation on our own past conduct; (2) an emotion immediately consequent thereon. The precise nature of this emotion may be a matter of some doubt ; it is evident that it cannot be quite the same as that which belongs to Moral Disapprobation when felt towards others, for though in common language we are said almost to hate ourselves, sometimes to be angry with ourselves, by reason of a base action, yet we cannot seriously desire our own injury. The emotion of Remorse, then, is not Hatred, but Grief; grief modified by the reflection that we have done wrong, and accompanied with the resolution of acting better in future. I repent, or think again, I am sorry for my sin, is the language of Remorse, and well describes it. First comes the thought or reflection that we have done wrong, then the sorrow, lastly the resolution consequent on that sorrow.

The grief of Remorse partakes of the nature of Humility, but not to the same extent as the next and kindred emotion. Shame.

II. Shame and Remorse are the two grand bulwarks of morality, and though allied and often mixed one with another, yet they are by no means identical. The nature of the actions which gives rise to each differs considerably. Remorse never arises but from some action which in the retrospect appears to ourselves morally wrong ; whereas shame is often roused by acts really indifferent as concerns morality, and sometimes, as in the case of false shame, by deeds positively praiseworthy. Even when the conduct which rouses Shame is of an immoral nature or tendency, the shame is often out of all proportion to the degree of guilt. A woman is more ashamed of a slight act of immodesty than of a crime. Chastity is a virtue particularly guarded by Shame ; for in women especially, a breach of Chastity gives far more shame than remorse. These and similar considerations prove to us that shame peculiarly depends upon opinion ; and as the opinion changes, so will the shame. Adam Smith informs us, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, that the native Americans would be greatly ashamed of living together openly like us, as man and wife; and we know that a Turkish woman is ashamed of showing her face. What would she think of our ladies who uncover themselves down to the breast ^ In England many men are ashamed of being poor, others are ashamed of their poor relations, or of being seen in unfashionable company, or in unfashionable places ; but will any one say that mere poverty or vulgarity is vice *? or is it despised where equality prevails*? In the English great public schools, where the sons of gentry alone resort, a boy is ashamed of being ill-drest; in the great day-schools in Scotland, frequented by all

KEMORSE, SHAME. 9

classes, a boy is rather ashamed of being well drest. I have known schools where a boy would have been ashamed to be found reading his Bible. Shame, then, is an emotion much more subject to the caprice of opinion than Remorse. Shame originates in the consciousness, not that we have done wrong, but that we have done something that lays us open to Ridicule or Contempt. Now, as Ridicule and Contempt, the former especially, are often awarded where there is no moral delinquency, so Shame is frequently felt where there is little to blame. Shame, then, is variable, because it depends chiefly on the sentiments of others, and upon sentiments of Ridicule and Contempt, which themselves are liable to change.

Since Shame arises from Ridicule or Contempt, it contains, as might be supposed, a strong mixture of Humility ; but Humility is not the whole, as is proved by that outward sign which distinguishes Shame from all other emotions, the Blush.

Anger generally reddens, but sometimes, like fear, renders pale the face ; Love and Jealousy are said to give a tinge of green or yellow ; Pride and Humility are known by the expression of the countenance, and almost by every act; Grief by tears, Wonder by silence ; but Shame communicates that beautiful crimson which comes and goes like sunshine in a chequered sky, overspreading in a moment face, neck, arms, and bosom. This sign of c an inward emotion is one of the most charming things in nature, and a peculiar effect must have a peculiar cause, in the emotion of Shame, which, therefore, besides Humility, comprises a feeling which is , properly its own, and of the painful sort.

CLASS SECOND.— Active Emotions.

This very important class of emotions may be divided into two orders ; for some of them look only to the good of self; some to the good of others, either in whole or in part. The former may be called the solitary or self-regarding, the latter the social active emotions.

Every one of the active emotions contains Desire or Fear in some form or other, as one of its elements ; and Desire and Fear simply as such, admit not of analysis or definition. To these alone, and only when intense or permanent, the term Passion is properly applied.*

Before entering upon the different kinds of Desire, we must observe that this emotion, in all its species and varieties, is often combined with Belief, and according to the degree of probability, that is of apparent probability, the compound becomes modified in character, and assumes different names, such as Wish, Hope, Expectation, Confidence. In all

* For a more detailed account of the principal desires, see the Author's "Enquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Human Duty." Book First, Part 1 1.

ACTIVE EMOTIONS. 11

these the essential elements are the same, and vary only in degree, for in all, desire is combined with Belief, an emotion with a relation, and in all, the degree of probability modifies the intensity of Desire. Certainty of not succeeding, and certainty of succeeding, in other words Despair and Security, both destroy desire, which depends upon Uncertainty, and therefore, as we approach the opposite limits, the desire will begin to decline ; so that the degree of probability most favourable to ardour will be between the two extremes, and at some distance from either.

Order First : Solitary or Self -regarding Active Emotions,

1. Ambition in its proper signification is desire of power, though it be often used in a more vague sense for desire of superiority of any kind ; in other words of eminence, —

Power is valued on three accounts ; first for itself, for there is a peculiar gratification attached to the exercise of power in any line, quite independent of consequences, and this gratification is original and elementary.

Secondly, power is valued, as many other things are valued, because they argue Superiority, and feed Pride.

Thirdly, power is valued from its consequences, which are apparent to all. c 2

2, Desire of Wealth :

Covet ousness, Avarice.

Covetousness is an eager desire for getting riches, and, as commonly used, the word expresses Blame for some supposed moral turpitude in the desire.

Avarice is an eager desire for saving riches, and it also expresses that the desire is blameable.

Stinginess, narrowness, parsimony, are lower degrees of avarice, and these words consequently express a lower degree of blame.

Frugality, Economy, are also a desire for saving, but these words convey praise.

Riches are valued first for their uses in spending and consuming, but sometimes also, as it would seem, for their own sake. When riches seem to be valued for themselves, as by the confirmed miser, what are the essential circumstances connected with them for which really they are prized"? These circumstances will be found to be two which are very nearly allied, namely, the feeling of power, and that of security, inseparably attached to riches, and the latter is the principal cause. Great desire of power, or ambition, overcomes Avarice, for money must be spent in order really to create power, as Caesar began by ruining himself in order to acquire popularity ; but in the eyes of the timid, security is impaired by every expense which promises no immediate return. Fear, therefore, is the grand promoter

DESIRE OF REPUTATION. 13

of Avarice, and on that account Avarice is apt to increase with age.

3. Desire of Reputation^ of Fame, or Glory.

These are all modifications of one and the same emotion, which in its humble form is merely a Desire, but in its higher a powerful passion.

Reputation is valued on many accounts. First, it is valued for its own sake ; Admiration and Esteem, like Affection, being certainly delightful in themselves without any reference to consequences. So far desire of Reputation is primary or original, like desire of affection or power, and unlike desire of wealth, which has been shown to be derivative.

Secondly, Reputation is valued because it seems to fortify our good opinion of ourselves, and so cherishes Self-Complacency, Self- Admiration, or Pride.

Thirdly, Reputation is valued on account of its consequences ; for whether it be for moral worth or for ability, Reputation is useful in every pursuit.

From the above it appears that desire of Reputation comprises a desire for two distinct things, Esteem and Admiration ; the one founded on moral worth, the other on talents or some other personal excellence, not necessarily connected with morality, for instance, Grace or Beauty ; and as we long for the one more than the other, so the desire will change materially both in its nature and in its consequences.

Reputation, as we have seen, is valued partly because it fortifies our good opinion of ourselves. But this opinion may refer either to moral worth, or to talents and other accomplishments, and, in the latter case especially, Reputation ministers to our Pride, and feeds the universal passion for Superiority. Here then the humble desire begins to swell into the passion, the passion for Fame or Glory, which fills the whole man.

The passion for Fame is chiefly a desire of Admiration, for it may exist with little or no care for Esteem ; and herein lies the danger. So long as men shall admire superior talents, or accomplishments, even when abused, for that they do so is certain, so long will a thirst for glory be the charm and terror of mankind.

But other principles unite to heighten this intoxicating passion. We all wish to extend as well as to perpetuate our being, and fame through the aid of Fancy, conduces to these wished-for ends. An extension of Fame seems to us an extension of self, as common language proves, for we are said to live in the breath of our admirers, and these may be innumerable : and a perpetuity of Fame seems an immortality, for we call illustrious authors, as Bacon and Newton, immortal. The passion for Glory is, then, the child of Imagination, and it partakes of that unspeakable charm which surrounds its magical pa

CURIOSITY. 15

rent.* One very common form of this desire is Vanity^ a term which always conveys disapprobation.-]-

4. Curiosity^ or Desire of Knowledge for its own sake, without reference to the use or application thereof. The great spur of Curiosity is Novelty, and on that account it is apt to decline with years, unlike Ambition, Desire of Wealth or of Fame, which rather increase with age. Curiosity is the proper passion of Philosophers, for this alone looks to the end which they propose to themselves, whereas other passions, such as Desire of Fame, though they may rouse the intellect, frequently lead us aside from the path of truth. Though Curiosity is not without its dangers, yet on the whole it is the safest of all the Self-regarding Active Emotions, because it is the most solitary, and the most independent of other men. Hence it is free, in a great degree, from those anxieties which wait upon the rest of the passions. It is generally an agreeable stimulus, seldom a rankling goad.

5. Desire of Life^ or of Continued Existence, here and hereafter. Though without some pleasure

* For a more particular account of this passion see '* An Enquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Human Duty." — Book First, Part II. Chap. ii. Sec. v.

f For a more particular account of Vanity, which is the wish for display^ see Note at the end of this Analysis.

we could hardly desire life, yet this feeling seems distinct from desire of pleasure.

As it is with Riches so with Life. Had Riches been of no use to us they would certainly never have been valued ; but, after a time, from long association, they come to be prized by some for their own sake. So, though Life without enjoyment could hardly have been an object of desire, yet since there can be no enjoyment without life, therefore, from constant association, life came to be prized for itself. Certainly the desire does not vary directly as enjoyment; since the young, who enjoy most, are frequently most prodigal of their days, while the old, who enjoy least, are often the most eager for life.

This desire, though in general exceedingly permanent, is inferior in intensity to many; for not only may it be overcome for a time by various other passions, as by Love, Ambition, Covetousness, Desire of Glory, Curiosity, but it may be even extinguished and give place to a contrary wish.=^ Sudden and violent grief, or long-continued pain,

* Bacon even says " It is worthy the observing that there is no passion in the mind of man so weak but it meets and masters the fear of death. Revenge triumphs over death ; Love slights it ; Honour aspireth to it; Grief flieth to it; Fear pre-occupates it ; nay, we read, after Otho the Emperor had slain himself. Pity, which is the tenderest of affections, provoked many to die, out of mere compassion to the sovereign, and as the truest sort of followers. — Bacon's Essays : of Death.

LOVE. 17

mental or bodily, may give rise to desire of death ; but mental distress alone terminates in self-destruction. As an element of religious feeling, Desire of Existence becomes of first-rate importance ; but the religious emotions will come under another head.

Class Second. — Order Second : Social Active Emotions.

This order of Emotions may be subdivided into the Benevolent, and the Malevolent.

Benevolent Emotions.

Most of the emotions comprehended under this head are either different species, or merely varieties of

I. Love. Love, in v^hatsoever form, comprises at least two elements : first, a certain pleasure derived from beholding or reflecting on the beloved object; secondly^ a desire of good to that object. These elements are essential, for they are sufficient to constitute Love, and without them there can be no such emotion.

Under this genus may be enumerated as species :

L General Benevolence, or Love to Mankind in general, which is the simplest species of Love, and

I may remark that the custom of self-sacrifice on the death of a Chief, prevailed of old among the followers of princes both in Spain and in Gaul. — See Plutarch in Sartorioy and Cesar de Bello Gall. Lib. in.

distinguished from other species by the circumstance of its being indiscriminate.

2. Friendship^ and every private attachment, whether transient or permanent, slight or deepseated, contains a third element in addition to the two above mentioned, namely, the desire of being loved in return.

3. Love^ properly so called, Love between the sexes, comprises a fourth element besides these three, namely, the sensual desire, which is so powerful, that the word desire^ when used by itself, often signifies this alone.

These three species are quite distinct ; but the following are only modifications or varieties of the same.

Thus, Patriotism is general Benevolence limited to our own countrymen.

Party Spirit, Esprit de Corps, the Clannish Spirit, are also General Benevolence still further limited to our own party, sect, clan, or profession.

Family Affection, again, from the nearest and dearest that exists between parent and child, down to a slight regard for distant relations, is a modification of Friendship, taken in its widest sense, for whatever partiality we may entertain towards relatives, we certainly wish that it should be reciprocal. No doubt there are differences between Friendship in its strict sense, and family affection, depending in part upon

GRATITUDE. 1^

this, that Friends, properly so called, are of our own choosing, while Relations come by nature; but these differences are not sufficient to constitute a difference of species ; they form therefore only varieties.

Gratitude is Love towards an individual on account of some benefit conferred intentionally. This last consideration somewhat modifies the emotion, for we feel that love is due, and though love in every form desires the good of its object, Gratitude is not satisfied unless that good be our own act. Such however is our natural dislike to anything like constraint in affection, that the very circumstance which ought to command our love, sometimes prevents any real warmth of feeling. This is especially the case where the love ought to be the strongest, namely, where the benefit conferred has been very great ; for then, not only is the constraint most felt, but along with it is a sense of inferiority, and the greater the favour, the greater the humiliation. Hence the more Pride prevails in the character, the less is it open to gratitude.

When a return seems to be expected, then the irksomeness of constraint is felt in the highest degree ; while the idea thus suggested that the benefit was not gratuitous, serves as an excuse for Ingratitude.

Religious Emotions are of a compound nature, D 2 embracing, firsts a feeling of Gratitude towards God for all his benefits conferred upon us ; and Gratitude is a variety of Love, comprising a delight in contemplating God, and a wish to do all things pleasing in His sight, as well as a desire of favour in His eyes.

Secondly^ the Religious Emotion comprehends the desire of continued existence, that longing after immortality which all men feel, but chiefly the intelligent and good. The dolt and the wicked man may be content with this life, but the enlightened and the virtuous never cease to pant for an hereafter.

Love, in some form or other, is the grand solace of human kind ; Love, properly so called, is the most violent, the most complex, the most wayward, the most imaginative, the most captivating of the passions, and for a time the most happy ; but the Religious Emotions, though occasionally violent, are in general calming, and give a permanent and unspeakable satisfaction.^

Besides the above, there are other emotions and mixed states of mind, of which Love forms a component part ; for instance :

Admiration. This is a state of mind which seems to occupy the interval between pure Love and

* This is the delectation interieure of the good, the spiritual Malebranche.

PITY. 21

Esteem, comprising as it does some AflFection, as well as a favourable Judgment concerning its object. But it is essentially distinguished from either by the presence of Wonder, which is a necessary element of Admiration ; and it is owing to this element in particular, that the compound state of mind is on the whole more allied to emotion, than to cool intellectual decision.

Esteem. Here the emotion of Love is reduced to the lowest degree compatible with any partiality, while on the other hand the judgment as to the merits of the object is serious and decided. Esteem is synonymous with Moral Approbation, or, if there be a shade of difference, it is that the latter refers more particularly to the outward expression, the former to the inward sentiment.

Respect, Respect is a mixture of Love with Humility ; and Humility tempers Love with something approaching to Fear. Moreover, Respect seems to comprise a certain exercise of the judgment.

In Veneration., the Humility is deeper, and consequently the love is more tempered with Fear; while in Awe., fear predominates.

IL Pity. Pity and Love are emotions so nearly allied that it is not possible to conceive any person susceptible of the one, and at the same time unsusceptible of the other ; meaning by Love no more than general Benevolence ; though Pity frequently gives rise to a warmer affection.

Pity, or Compassion, embraces two elements : first, a feeling of pain at the sufferings of another, secondly, a desire to relieve those sufferings ; and though other feelings may follow, those two alone seem to constitute the emotion. The desire, however, which forms a part of Pity, probably admits of a further analysis, for it seems to be compounded of (1) a desire of relief to the sympathetic pain which we ourselves experience, instantly followed by (2), a desire of removing the occasion of that pain, viz. the sufferings of a fellow creature.

Thus it appears that the primary element in Pity is Painful Sympathy, which seems necessary to produce the other, Desire of Relieving, and without the first it does not appear that we should ever have felt the second. Love, on the other hand, seems to begin with pleasing Sympathy, a feeling for the joy of others, followed by the wish to promote that joy ; and when our fellow creatures have become associated in our minds with pleasure, the first element of love exists. Sympathy, then, is the foundation of both Pity and Love ; and we can hardly conceive the one without the other, (on the proper occasion), for how can we feel for Grief without feeling for J oy ^ how can we desire to relieve pain without desiring to confer pleasured

HATE. 23

Conversely, if we love any one we must pity his misfortunes, and the greater the love the deeper the pity. Indeed, it is well known from experience that a feeling which began in Pity frequently terminates in ardent Love ; that the helplessness of women, their delicacy of constitution, nay, their very ailments and sufferings, often rouse the tender passion. From the above it follows that Sympathy, a feeling for the weal and w^oe of others, is an ultimate fact in Human nature, and the origin of Love and Pity.

CLASS SECOND.— Order Second.

Family Second: The Malevolent Emotions. As almost all the Benevolent Emotions are species or varieties of Love, so nearly all the Malevolent are species or varieties of Hate.

L Hatred, in whatsoever form, contains at least two elements ; first, a certain pain derived from beholding or reflecting on the object hated ; secondly, a desire of evil to that object. These elements are essential, for they are sufficient to constitute Hatred, and without them there can be no such emotion. Under the Genus Hate may be enumerated as species,