Analogy, considered as a guide to truth, and applied as an aid to faith

Front matter

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SECTION 2. Historical Retrospect of Speculation on the Subject

SecTION 3. Recent Misconceptions of Butler’s Argument, Section 4. Tendency to an Undue Extension of Analogy, Section 5. Additional Sources and Applications of Analogy,

The Inquiry divided into Three Parts :—

I. The General Doctrine of Analogy ; _ II. The Sources of Analogy in Matters of Faith ; III. Analogy applied to Modern Religious Questions, .

BAgi bask!

THE GENERAL DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY,

CHAPTER I. Analogy; Wuar iT 1s?

SECTION 1. Recent Definitions of Analogy, SECTION 2. Butler’s Account of Analogy, SEcTION 8. Distinctions between Different Cases of denies

CHAPTER II. Analogy-; How it Differs from Metaphor

Section 1. Analogy and Metaphor depend on Different Relaion

Section 2. Danger of Confounding Metaphor with Analogy, Section 3. A True and False Anthropomorphism,

CHAPTER III. Analogy ; its Ground in Nature and Man, SECTION 1. The Ground of Scientific or Logical Analogy,

SECTION 2. The Ground of Symbolical or Emblematic Analogy, .

Section 3. The Ground of Theological or Religious Analogy, Page vill CONTENTS

Page CHAPTER IV. Analogy; Its Influence on Thought and Language, 104 Section 1. Influence of Analogy on our Conceptions, . : 104 SECTION 2. Figures of Thought and Speech, : ; : 108 Section 3. Analogies and Images Compared, ; : 122 CHAPTER V. Analogy ; The Wide Range of its Application, : 126 Section 1. Its Application to our Common Natural Knowledge, 126 Section 2. Its Application to every Branch of Science, . 129 Section 3. Presumptions in favour of its Application to Natural il Revealed Religion, . ; ; 132 SECTION 4. The Scriptural Applications at Analogs , ; 135 CHAPTER VI. Analogy; Its Several Distinct Uses, : : 143 SECTION 1. Its Use for Illustration, } ) 144 SECTION 2. Its Use for Classification and Arran cette : 148 SECTION 38. Its Use for Suggestion and Discovery, : ; 150 SEcTION 4. Its Use for Argument and Proof, . : 154 SECTION 5. Different Uses of Analogical Reasoning, : : 162 CHAPTER VII. Analogy; Its Relation to other Proofs, 179 SECTION 1. Its Relation to other Proofs in our Common Natusal Knowledge, : 179

SECTION 2. Its Relation to other Proofs in our Religions Knowielae 184

CHAPTER VIII. Analogy ; How Related to other Laws of Thought, 198

CHAPTER IX. Analogy ; Is it a Safe Guide? : ; 207 SECTION 1. The Alleged Defects of Analogical Kagel ; 208 SECTION 2. True and False Analogies, . ; : : 212 SECTION 8. Illustrative Cases, ive bioeae

CHAPTER X. Analogy; Its Peculiar Charm, : : : 228

BARTOLI.

SOURCES oF ANALOGY IN MATTERS oF FaIru, : : é 237

CHAPTER I. Analogy in respect to the Laws and Conditions of

Thought, 2 242 CHAPTER II. Analogy in respect to the Manifesto of Truth, 249 CHAPTER III. Analogy in respect to the Extent and Limits af

Knowledge, . , 259

CHAPTER IV. Analogy in respect to Thought and Language : 265 CHAPTER V. Analogy in respect to Evidence, ; 269

Contents

CHAPTER VI. Analogy between the Volumes of Nature and Revelation, ,

CHAPTER VII. Analogy between the fhiepeeribe of Nurs Hit Scripture,

CHAPTER VIII. Analogy between Human tad Dine estates ; CHAPTER IX. Analogy between Secular and Religious Education, CHAPTER X. Analogy between a little Child and a Christian Disciple, . : : CHAPTER XI. Analogy between Natural ee Rorentet Lee CHAPTER XII. Analogy between Human and Divine Relations, CHAPTER XIII. Analogy between Scripture and Experience, CHAPTER XIV. Analogy between the Constituent Truths of Revelation, : : CHAPTER XV. Analogy between Hens aaa oer CHAPTER XVI. Analogy between the Old and New Testaments,

Preface

In the Preface to a former work on the evidences of Natural Religion,* the author intimated his intention to follow it up with another on the Witness of God, or the Divine Evidence of Revealed Religion. The present treatise is not to be regarded as the fulfilment of that intention. In preparing the materials for his intended work on the Christian Evidences, he was struck with the predominant influence of Analogy, both on our estimate of the evidence, and on our conceptions of the truths, of Religion, whether Natural or Revealed; and it occurred to him that a treatise on that subject, considered in its various aspects and relations, might be useful as an intermediate link, and might form a vinculum, or bond of connection, between the two great branches of our Religious Knowledge. ‘The occasion and object of the present Inquiry are fully explained in the Introduction.

From the nature of the subject, as well as from the plan which the author has adopted in treating it, he found it scarcely possible to avoid repeated references to the same topics in different connections ; but these apparent repetitions will serve, it is hoped, to place such topics in different lights, and to increase, rather than to impair, the effect of the general argument.

Some questions have been discussed in connection with the General Doctrine of Analogy which may appear to be somewhat abstruse and metaphysical ; but they could not have been omitted or evaded, if any attempt were to be made to get at the root of

* “ Raith in God and Modern Atheism Compared.” 2 vols. 8vo. 1856.

Xi PREFACE.

some prevailing errors on the subject. Those who feel no difficulty in regard to these speculative points, need not dwell on them, but pass on to the Sources and Applications of Analogy in matters of Faith, which may be more generally interesting, as being more practical, and closely connected with the facts of our common experience.

The author lays his account, of course, with criticism ; and he is not disposed to deprecate, or even to shrink from, it. He will thankfully receive, and consider with the utmost care, any strictures which may serve to correct the errors into which he may have fallen, or tend to enlarge his views of the important subject which he has undertaken to treat. He can truly say, that no one can be more sensible than himself of the manifold defects of his' work; but he is well assured, nevertheless, that the general scheme of thought is, on the whole, sound and invulnerable.

In the present state of literature, there is little encouragement to hope for immediate or rapid success in issuing a work of this kind. But “Let the bread float on the waters !” says Coleridge ; “if it be the Bread of Life, it will not have been utterly cast away.” Animated by this assurance, one who believes with Bacon that “books should have no patrons but Truth and Reason,” and who is assured, as the author is, that his work is designed for the vindication of both, may humbly, yet hopefully, commit it to the press, and say of it, without presumption, in the words of Milton —‘“]t shall be ventured yet, and the Truth not smothered, but sent abroad, in the native confidence of her single self, to earn, how she can, her entertainment in the world, and to find out her own readers,—few, perhaps, but those few, of such value and substantial worth, as Truth has been ever wont in all ages to be content withal.”

51, LAauRIsTON PLACE, EDINBURGH, November 1863.

INTRODUCTION,

OCCASION AND OBJECT OF THE INQUIRY.

(1.) The following pages have been written under the impression that a fresh discussion of the principle of Analogy, and of its application to recent phases of religious opinion, might not be unseasonable in the present critical times. That principle will be considered, in the first instance, in its most general aspect, as a Guide to truth, a Ground of inference, and a Reason for belief, in every department of human knowledge; and then, secondly, and more specially, as an Aid to Faith, in so far as it may be legitimately applied either to the Evidences, or the Doctrines, of Natural and Revealed Religion.

(2.) The profound work of Bishop Butler, which is so generally known, and so justly esteemed, must ever retain its standard value as one of the few imperishable monuments of human thought. It appears to have been suggested by a remark of Origen to the effect, that “He who believes the Scriptures to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in them as are found in the constitution of Nature itself.” This pregnant statement,—the brief utterance of a singularly original and versatile mind,—involves a principle which can hardly fail to be received as self-evident on the instant when it is clearly apprehended; and yet, the more it is reflected on, it will be felt to contain a profound meaning under its apparent simplicity,—to possess an elastic and ever-growing expansiveness,—and to admit of manifold and most important applications. That principle was the vital germ of Butler’s work; it bore the same relation to the “ Analogy” which the acorn bears to the oak.

A

Deposited in his rich, vigorous, and fertile mind, it took root, and, springing up, appeared at length in its maturity,— not an artificial structure, but rather an organic product, slowly but spontaneously developed from one prolific seed.

(3.) Butler’s work, however, is entirely directed to the application of the principle, and waives all discussion of the principle itself. It assumes the existence in the human mind of a power of perceiving analogies, and makes its appeal to that power by presenting a variety of instances in which the evidences and truths of religion are manifestly analogous to those of our common secular knowledge; but it neither investigates the mental laws by which Analogy becomes a ground of inference and a guide to truth; nor the corresponding provision which is made for this method of reasoning in the constitution and course of Nature. Butler’s mind was eminently practical; the most characteristic feature of his genius was profound sagacity and common sense; and although he was abundantly capable of purely abstract speculation, he rarely indulged in it, where his conclusions could be established by a direct appeal to facts. Hence, at the commencement of his treatise, he expressly waives all discussion of some points which might seem to lie at the foundation of his whole method of reasoning, and which have attracted attention more recently in connection with psychological inquiries respecting the nature, origin, and foundation of human knowledge.

Snot. I.—Toprics WAIVED BY BUTLER.

(4.) In the introduction to his work, Butler waives the discussion of some points which can hardly fail to be regarded as of fundamental importance. “It is not my design,” he says, “to inquire into the nature, the foundation, and the measure of probability ; or whence it proceeds that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the errors to which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic, and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly con- - sidered. It is enough to the present purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural and conclusive. For

TOPICS WAIVED BY BUTLER. 3 there is no man can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.” It is worthy of notice, that Butler here speaks of different degrees of probability as arising from the perception of analogy; degrees of probability ranging from a mere “ presumption,’ up through the various shades of “opinion,” to “full conviction ;” and further, that the example adduced,—namely, the belief that “the sun will rise to-morrow,” —hbelongs to the third class, and is a case of strict induction. He admits, therefore, that the analogy of our past experience, in combination with the action of our natural laws of thought, may give rise to a conviction so strong that it may be said to amount to a moral certainty ; and this he ascribes neither to experience alone, nor to reason alone, but to reason acting on experience under the guidance of Analogy. But he offers no explanation of the mental laws which are concerned in the process; nor does he lay down any rules for determining the “ measure” of probability in different cases, or for guarding against the “ errors” to which reasoning from analogy is liable. He waives the question whence it proceeds that “likeness” should beget various degrees of belief ; _ assigning as his reason for doing so, the imperfect state of that branch of Logic—the logic of Probability, to which it properly belongs. Leibnitz acknowledged the same defect in the science of Moral or Probable Evidence,* but neither he nor Butler undertook to supply the desideratum.

(5.) Butler was fully entitled to apply the principle, without entering into any philosophical explanation of it. For when one is convinced from his own experience, and from what he knows of his fellow-men, that any law of thought has a real existence in the human mind, and that it is in universal and constant operation there, it is not necessary that he should either explain its origin or prove its validity, before he appeals to it in argument. He may

* “Tart de juger des raisons vraisemblables n’est pas encore bien établi; de sorte que notre logique a cet évard est encore trés imparfaite, et que nous n’avons presque jusqtvici que Vart de juger des démonstrations.”

—Meditations, pp. 41,48. Leibnitz and Woltf supplied some useful hints on the ‘‘ Logic of Probability,” which was afterwards treated more fully by

Mendelsohn, Condorcet, and Laplace, and especially by GaArve,—‘ De Nonnullis que pertinent ad Logicam Probabilium.” See DEGERANDO, ‘‘Histoire Comparée,” II. 135, 156. In our own country, the subject has been parcelled out in separate treatises on ‘‘ Induction,” ‘‘ Moral Evidence,”

‘“‘ Analogy,” and ‘‘ Historical Testimony.”

assume it at once, and proceed to apply it, in the confident persuasion that, if it be indeed a principle of reason, it will come into spontaneous exercise, in every sane and healthy mind, on the presentation of appropriate objects. Believing that the perception of Analogy determines many of our judgments in common life, and constitutes one of the most familiar grounds of inference, Butler founds his reasoning upon it, without troubling either himself or his readers with any psychological inquiry concerning it. And he was entitled to do so, just as he might have asked his readers to look upon a visible object, without explaining the process of vision or the laws of optics, and to listen, without unfolding the theory of sound, or the laws of acoustics.

(6.) It may be useful, however, to note the points which he expressly waives, as these will serve to indicate some of the chief lines of inquiry which remain to be pursued. He declines to discuss three points :—The first is, “the nature, foundation, and measure of probability :” its. nature, or what it is, and how it should be defined; its foundation, or in what circumstances it arises, and on what ground it rests; and its measure, or the rule by which we should estimate its amount in particular cases, since it may exist in different degrees, as “a presumption,” or as an “ opinion,” or as “full conviction.” The second is, the connection between a sense of probability and the perception of Analogy ; or the explanation of the psychological fact—“ whence it is that likeness should beget those beliefs which it does necessarily produce in every one.” The third is, the need of a criterion, or of certain canons and safeguards by which we may be protected against “the errors to which reasoning from analogy is liable.” All these points belong to the general doctrine of Analogy, considered as a ground of more or less probable reasoning ; and the mere fact that the discussion of them is avowedly waived in Butler’s treatise, may be accepted as one reason for instituting a fresh examination of the subject.

(7.) But this reason will acquire additional force if it can be shown that, since the age of Butler, some progress has been made in the psychological explanation of those laws of thought on which analogical inference depends, and also in the exposition of the principles which determine the nature, foundation, and measure of probability. It must be confessed that “the logic of Probability” is still an imperfect science, whether it be viewed in rela-

TOPICS WAIVED BY BUTLER. i) tion to the mental laws on which it depends, or the rules and canons which should regulate our confidence in its various applications. But unquestionably some progress has been made in explaining the one, and in systematizing the other. The question, “Whence it proceeds that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it,” has been discussed, in our own country, by such writers as Hume, Priestley, and Mill; and on the Continent, the theory of Probability has been elaborately discussed, and applied to some subjects with all but mathematical precision, by Laplace, Condorcet, and others. But it is of more importance, with reference to our immediate object, to remark, that concurrently with the rapid advance of Inductive Science in all departments,. there has been instituted a more careful analysis of the Inductive Process itself,—an examination of the principles on which its validity depends, and of the precise circumstances which render its conclusions more or less certain. It should never be forgotten that all Induction belongs to the head of moral, as distinguished from demonstrative reasoning; and that all its conclusions, however certain, fall to be ranked under the head of probable truth. The logic of Induction is still incomplete, but its foundations have at ieast been laid; and all inquiry on the subject is evidently tend- Ing more and more towards the conclusion so emphatically announced by the late Professor Baden Powell, that “Tum Sou. or Inpvuction 1s ANauLoGy.” The speculations of Whewell and Mill on this subject, different and even opposite as they are in other respects, agree in this, that the perception of Analogy is necessarily involved in every process of Induction, and even in those preliminary operations of the mind which are subservient to it. Sir William Hamilton, too, resolves all reasoning into the exercise of Comparison, and the perception of resemblance or difference. “It may startle you,” he says, “ to hear that the highest function of the mind is nothing higher than Comparison ; but in the end I am confident of convincing you of the paradox. Generalization, which is the result of Synthesis and Analysis, is an act of Comparison, and is properly denominated Conception. Judgment is only the comparison of two terms or notions directly together; Reasoning is only the comparison of two terms or notions with each other through a third. Conception or generalization, judgment, and reasoning, are thus only various applications of

Comparison, and not even entitled to the distinction of separate faculties.”*

(8.) Considering that the perception of resemblance or difference is involved in every act of judgment, and every process of reasoning, some reflective minds have been Jed to think that Analogy should not be left to occupy the subordinate place which has usually been assigned to it in works on Logic, as if it were only a lower species of moral or probable evidence ; and Mr Field has even proposed to place it at the head both of the Inductive and Deductive methods of reasoning, as the swmmum genus, or the generic principle, on which all logical results ultimately depend. He pro- ~ poses to supply a deficiency in these two methods, and to “ restore philosophy to its original ground and native simplicity, upon the basis of a genuine logical Analogy, which supplies the forms sought through Induction, and the Universals to which Syllogism owes its validity.” Agrecably to this design, he treats at large of what he calls “ Analogism” or “the Analogical process,’ considered as “the basis of other modes,” or as a “ third organ necessary for their completion;” and arrives at the conclusion, that “‘ Analogism comprehends Syllogism and Generalogism fundamentally.”+

(9.) Whatever may be thought of Mr Field’s peculiar idea of “ Triadism” or “ 'Trichotomy,” as applied to the classification of the Sciences, and even to the subdivisions of each, he has unquestionably thrown some new light on the general subject of Analogy. His treatise is far from lie g perfect, but it is eminently - suggestive; and, like a sharp eceneie it has turned up ground that had long lain fallow, and penetrated deep enough to lay bare the rock, and to open up veins of precious ore. Mr Field has fairly raised the question—How far the principle of Analogy is involved in all the processes both of Inductive and Deductive reasoning. And if it can be shown that by far the largest portion of our merely secular and scientific knowledge depends on the validity of that principle, this will serve at once to place the analogical truths of Theology on a firm foundation, and to afford a strong additional reason for a fresh discussion of the grounds on which they rest. For nothing can be more important, in the present state of speculation, than to show that Analogy, as applied

* “ Lectures on Metaphysics,” vol. } Field, ‘‘ Analogical Philosophy,” Tlipiae, I. Ixi. Lexi. 215 209:

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT. f)

to Religion, is neither less legitimate nor less valid than when it is applied to any other department of human knowledge; and that in Science, as well as in common life, it asserts its prerogative, as a law of human thought, and a ground of rational belief.

(10.) From what fad been said it appears that’ Butler avowedly waived the discussion of some points relating to the general theory of Analogy,—that these points have received some illustration in the progress of Psychological Inquiry,—and that they have a close connection with the doctrine of Induction, which has recently engaged the special attention of many south ctl inquirers. And these considerations are adduced as a strong reason, or at least as a sufficient apology, for a fresh examination Ue the wnt doctrine of Analogy, especially in its relation to the evidences and the truths of Religion.

Secor. IJ.—HiustroricaL RETROSPECT OF SPECULATION ON THE SUBJECT.

(11.) A second reason for instituting a fresh examination of the subject, is suggested by the historical course of speculation in regard to it, before and after the appearance of Butler’s work.

(12.) The entire absence of speculative, and even of psychological, discussion in such a work as the “ Analogy” is the more remarkable, because, in the earlier part of last century, there existed a strong tendency among educated men to inquire into the subject. While Butler was engaged, during nearly thirty years, in slowly maturing his views, other vigorous minds were busily occupied with the same theme. The first edition of what is now called par excellence the “ Analogy” appeared from the Dublin press in 1736; but it had been preceded by three able treatiseson the subject from the pen of Bishop Browne. The first, published in 1697, was “ A Letter” in answer to a book entitled “ Christianity not Mysterious,’ and was addressed to “all those who set up for Reason and Evidence in opposition to Revelation and Mysteries;” the second, entitled “The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding,” was published in 1728; the third, entitled “Divine Analogy, or Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human,” appeared in 1733. These works, but especially the two last, were devoted to the discussion of Analogy, as a law

§ OCCASION AND OBJECT OF THE INQUIRY.

of human thought, which regulates the method of our conceiving and expressing certain truths, and to the application of this doctrine as a means of confirming the evidences, and explaining the language, of Theology, Natural and Revealed. In the interval which elapsed between the publication of the second and third of these treatises, the acute and subtle mind of Bishop Berkeley was attracted to the same subject; and in his “ Minute Philosopher,” which appeared in 1732, he offered some strictures on a few unguarded expressions which Bishop Browne had unfortunately employed, but showed at the same time his own high appreciation of this method of reasoning, by presenting a continuous series of analogical illustrations, applied, often with great felicity and force, to the defence and confirmation of religious truth. Twelve years after the appearance of Browne’s first and shortest treatise,—his “ Letter” of 1697,—Dr King, Archbishop of Dublin, preached and published in 1709 a “ Discourse on Predestination,” in which the doctrine of Analogy is applied to some of the leading questions between Calvinists and Arminians, and which, we are told, “attracted so much attention as to pass through at least six editions soon after its appearance.” To this Discourse Bishop Browne took exception, in the Introduction to the second edition of his “Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding,” published in 1729,—acknowledging, indeed, that “ His Grace rightly lays down Analogy for the foundation of it,” but adding, that “for want of having thormughly weighed and digested it, and by wording himself incautiously, he seems entirely to destroy the nature of it, insomuch that while he rejects the strict propriety of our conceptions and words, on _the one hand, he appears to his antagonists to run into an extreme even below metaphor, on the other.” On this and similar grounds it was also assailed by Dr John Edwards and others. |

(13.) It can scarcely be supposed that a discussion in which such men as Archbishop King, Bishop Browne, Bishop Berkeley, and Dr Edwards were engaged, and which had a direct’ relation to the ground-principle of his own great argument, did nob engage the attention of Bishop Butler; yet it is not a little remarkable, that he takes no notice of it, and never once alludes to the able treatises in which it was carried on, although they had all been published several years before his own. This omission might seem unaccountable, were it not for Butler’s well-known aversion \

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT. 9 to controversy,—the thoroughly practical design of his work,— and perhaps, also, his connection in early life with Dr Samuel Clarke and the school of divines who adhered to him, whose speculations found no favour, and received no quarter, at the hands of Bishop Browne. But Butler’s silence, in the circumstances to which we have thus briefly referred, was itself significant, and two important inferences may be drawn from it. The first is, that, in his opinion, the principle of Analogy might be valid, and the process of analogical reasoning conclusive, notwithstanding whatever difficulty might be felt in regard to the philosophical explanation of either; and the second is, that, while he fully appreciated the value of Analogy in its relation to religious truth, he-did not adopt the peculiar theory of Archbishop King,— for in speaking of “the opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing practice,” he never founds on the supposition that we can have no knowledge of the Divine Prescience or Predestination ; and uniformly, throughout his whole treatise, he argues as if he believed that the wisdom, power, and goodness, which we ascribe to God, were of the same nature or kind, with similar properties which are revealed in the light of our own consciousness, although immeasurably superior to them.

(14.) King, Browne, and Butler made use respectively of the same principle of Analogy, but they applied it to different controversies, and in different ways. King attempted to apply it to the Galvinistic and Arminian controversy, as if it admitted of a partial and one-sided application to the intellectual perfections of God; Browne applied it to the Socinian and Arian controversy, chiefly in the way of explaining and vindicating the analogical language, which is used in Scripture to express the peculiar doctrines of Revelation; Butler applied it to the Deistical controversy, with the twofold view of enforcing, in the first instance, the practical truths and duties of Natural Religion, and of vindicating, in the second, the peculiar claims and doctrines of Revealed Religion. Butler’s work, which appeared in 1736, was followed in 1750 by “The Analogy of the Divine Wisdom in the System of Things,” from the pen of Richard Barton, B.D., who refers to his illustrious predecessor in the same walk of inquiry, and excuses himself for writing again on the subject by the naive remark, that “ Analogy is copious, and may afford matter for more books than one;”—-a remark which may still suggest an apology for any one who ventures to institute a fresh examination of Analogy, with a view to the special exigencies of the present times. (15.) Since that period, and especially in more recent times, the writers who have sought to illustrate and apply the principle of Analogy, in connection with the evidences and truths of Religion, may be divided into two distinct schools, which are severally marked by peculiar characteristics, and exhibit, in some important respects, different, if not opposite, tendencies.

‘The one, adhering to the general principles of Bishop Browne, and imbued with the practical spirit of Bishop Butler, is represented in modern times by Dr Tatham in his “Chart and Scale of Truth,” who explains our analogical conceptions of Divine things, and vindicates the analogical language of Scripture, on the same principles which had been expounded in the “Divine Analogy” of Browne,— by Bishop Hampden in his “ Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity,’ which contains an able exposition of the leading principle of Butler’s treatise, although it exhibits occasionally an undue degree of deference to the opinions of more recent writers belonging to the opposite school,—by Bishop Shuttleworth in his “Consistency of Revelation with Itself, and with Human Reason,” —by Mr Grinfield in his “ Vindicize Analogicee,’—by Mr Davison in his Notes to “ Discourses on Prophecy,’—by Richard Watson in his “ Review of Grinfield,’—and by Dr Chalmers in his “ Prelections on Butler’s Analogy.”* The other school, following in the wake of Archbishop King, and seeking to carry out his peculiar views to the full extent of their legitimate application, is represented in our own times by Bishop Copleston in his “ Inquiry concerning Predestination,’—by Mr Dalby in his “ Defence” of Copleston against the strictures of Grinfield,—and by Archbishop Whately, who republished King’s Discourse, with Notes and strong commendation, in the appendix to his Bampton Lectures. The difference between these two schools is more important than, at first sight, it may seem to be. It does not consist merely in a different application of the same principle, but in a different view of the radical nature, and real import, of the principle itself; and may be expected, therefore, when the tendencies of each system have been fully developed, to terminate in widely different results.