The aftermath of war; an account of the repatriation of Boers and natives in the Orange River colony, 1902-1904

Prefatory Note

This volume is chiefly based on impressions gained in South Africa in the course of five years' service, from 1900 to 1904, firstly as an Intelligence, and secondly as a Eepatriation Officer. By the courtesy of the Orange Eiver Colony Administration, Government documents have been freely placed at my disposal for the purpose of its compilation. The account given is, however, in no sense of the word official, and I must accept entire responsibility for the conclusions drawn and the opinions expressed therein.

The book has been written with a twofold object. On the one hand it is an attempt to describe not only the generosity and the liberality of the repatriation scheme, but also to indicate the exceptional difficulties under which that scheme was carried out. On the other hand it is an endeavour to vindicate those engaged in the task of repatriation from the charges of waste and extravagance which have been recklessly brought against them. I have not hesitated, however, to criticise very freely the department to which I had the honour to belong, and I have striven throughout to give a strictly impartial record of its work. This record is that of an eye-witness — of one whose impressions of the Dutch, however erroneous they may be, are based, not on hearsay, but on actual intercourse both in war and peace.

vi PREFATORY NOTE

I have for the most part confined myself to the particular subject under consideration, but the book may be found to contain a certain amount of information — of practical utility to intending emigrants and of interest to students of South African politics — concerning a Colony whose fate at the present moment hangs strangely in the balance.

G. B. BEAK.

OXFOKD, 1906.

CONTENTS CHAPTER I

PAGE

CHAPTER n Concentration - - - - - - 21

CHAPTER HI Article X. of the Terms of Vereeniging - - 31

CHAPTER IV Divers Difficulties - - - - - - 62

CHAPTER V

ANOLA.L Diseases and their Treatment - - - 94

CHAPTER VI Back to the Land - - - - - - 119

CHAPTER VH

CHAPTER VHI Repatriation from Within and Without - - - 212

CHAPTER IX Compensation ------- 238

vii viii CONTENTS

APPENDICES

PAGE

A. Circular as to the Method of keeping Accounts - 263

B. Terms for Land Settlers . . . . 267 C (I.) AND (IL). Close of Repatriation and Institution

D. Extension of Relief ..... 272

E. AcknowledGxMents of Indebtedness - - - 274

F. Staff employed -...-. 276

G. Statement of Expenditure . . . . 278 H (I.) and (IL). Instructions issued regarding Claims - 280

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

The Vaal Eiver near Venterskroon - The Orange Kiver near Aliwal North Springfontein Refugee Camp - A Typical Bijwoner . . . .

A Typical Bijwoner Family Some of the Headquarter Staff A Ruined Dorp ----- The Caledon River near Jammersberg Drift The Mallein Test . - - -

Repatriation Cattle - . - -

The Central Remount Depot at Bloemfontein - ... -

Repatriation Waggons on Trek

De Uitspan -----

The Arrival of Repatriation Stores at a District Town - . - -

The Drive in for Rations - -

Early Occupation . - - .

A Typical Ruin . - - - -

Some Conductors and 'Boys' -

A Veldt Fire . . . . .

Piccaninnies ploughing - - - -

Frontispiece face pag n

)5

)5

JJ

>5

X LIST OF ILLUSTEATIONS

The Repatriation Central Store at Bloem-

FONTEIN . . . - , To face page 174

Lieutenant-Colonel H. J. McLaughlin, D.S.O. „ 212

Three of his Subordinates - - • - „ 212

Major T. Marcus McInerney - - - „ 238

Claims Officers starting on Trek - - „ 238

Map - ' - - - - - At end

Chapter I

' Cry " Havock 1" and let slip the dogs of war.' — Shakespeaeb.

' Lordinges (quod he), ther is ful many a man that crieth "Werre, Werre," that wote ful litel what werre amounteth.' — Chaucer.

VoN MOLTKE.

Possibly no contest was ever fought with more humanity than the late South African war, to which this volume is a sequel. And yet causes of complaint between the combatants, which have been prominent in every other war, were not absent from this. It is unnecessary, and probably futile, to enter into a discussion of individual acts of treachery and cruelty alleged by either side and given undue prominence in the newspapers of both countries. It must be remembered that the battle-field is hardly the place whence impartial criticism can be expected to emanate, and, oddly enough, ' war breeds animosity against justice, more especially amongst those who take no part therein.' ^ Causes of complaint there have been, and always will be so long as the sword is the final arbiter to which human nature appeals.

How very far-fetched were the majority of charges^ brought

1 Vide in this connection, ' Usages of War in South Africa,' by John Macdonell, C.B., Nineteenth Century, December, 1900.

2 The following is a specimen quoted by Mr. Macdonell : ' Presque journellement des nouvelles de violations graves des lois de la guerre nous parviennent. Des temoins oculaires sent venus nous dire qu'a Elandsby the ill-informed continental press against British officers and British soldiers will be clear to anyone who cares to read Blue-Boolvs already published on the subject, and who takes the trouble to question those who participated in the contest.^ The code promulgated from the Hague in 1899, and ratified in September, 1900, may be regarded as the latest expression of civilized opinion on the usages of war. But it is not laagte on a perce aux lances des hommes inoffensifs, qui avaient jete bas les armes et leve les mains en signe de se rendre, et qu'on a depouille les pauvres blesses qui gisaient sur les champs de bataille de leurs montres, de leurs bourses, et meme de leurs habits, comme c'est arrive entre autres avec le General Kock ; que Ton a laisse massacrer les habitants du pays enemi par les Linchive-Caffres a Derdepoort ; qu'on a assujetti les prisonniers aux jeux monstrueux de 'pig-sticking' et de ' lemon-cutting,' comme I'a declare sous serment un prisonnier evade, nomme Kannemeyer ; que Ton a tue raide des prisonniers qui s'indignaient de la nianiere inhumaine avec laquelle on trainait vei's Boshof, apres le combat dans lequel le brave Colonel de Villebois-Mareuil fut tue, des prisonniers franrais et autres, quoique grievement blesses, lies aux chevaux pendant des heures jusqu'a qu'ils s'atl'aissaient.'

* Vide ' Krigserfarenheter van Boerkriget,' by Captain Wester. ' Captain Wester protests vigorously against the aspersions cast on the conduct of the British troops in South Africa ; he did not see a single instance of any infraction of the laws and customs of war, and was filled with admiration at the magnanimity and humanity of the men under very trying circumstances, while he considers British officers to be " above all, gentlemen in the truest sense of the word " ' (The Times).

* The inhabitants of Ladybrand, of various nationalities, having heard the statements made by a section in England and by the press on the Continent of Europe, charging the British soldier in South Africa with cruelty and barbarism towards women and children, and knowing this to be totally unfounded, feel in duty bound to emphatically contradict such accusations, and stigmatize them as vile slanders ' (Meeting at Ladybrand, February 28, 1902).

' That this meeting, comprising as it does people residing in Winburg, O.R.C., of various nationalities and of every shade of political opinion, and who have an intimate knowledge of every phase of the South African War, from the commencement of hostilities to the present time, emphatically and indignantly protests against the gross slanders and infamous fabrications circulated by the continental press against the valour, honour, and humanity of the British troops, and further, this meeting desires to record its opinion that the conduct of the British soldiers, throughout the campaign, has been in every respect exemplary ' (Meeting at Winburg, February, 1902).

in reality applicable to the Boer war, because the late republics * were neither signatories to the convention nor had given in their adhesion.' In her post-war policy, however, Great Britain has evidently striven to give the vanquished every possible benefit of the international agreement, and it may be, therefore, useful to note what rules the Hague Convention lays down on the subject of devastation. Articles 23 and 50, the most important ones in this connection, are worded as follows : ' Article 23. — In addition to the prohibitions established by special conventions, it is particularly forbidden . . . (g) To destroy or seize the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively required by the necessities of war.' ' Article 50. — No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, may be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible.' ^ These articles are the expression of civilized opinion. It may be interesting to trace to what extent they were violated, and, if it be found that they were violated, what plea is forthcoming to justify their violation.

It is evident that, at the commencement of the war, the destruction of property was neither contemplated by the British nor condoned by the Boers. A proclamation issued by Lord Eoberts on March 26, 1900, reads as follows : * Notice is hereby given that all persons who within the territories of the South African Eepublic and Orange Free State shall authorize or be guilty of the wanton destruction or damage — or the counselling, aiding, or assisting in the wanton destruction or damage — of public or private property, such destruction or damage not being justified by the usages and customs of civilized warfare, will be held responsible in

* This article was, apparently, contravened by Section 6 of Proclamation No. 6 of 1900 : ' Where any damage is done to the railway a fine of 2s. 6d. per morgen will be levied on the area of the farm or farms on which the damage is done, and the farms in the immediate neighbourhood of the damaged place may also, if I deem fit, be subjected to a similar fine.' This proclamation was, so far as can be traced, enforced in five cases, all in the Winburg district, and in every one of these the fine imposed was later either wholly or partially refunded,

1—2 their persons and property for all such wanton destruction and damage.'^ Yet, early in February, 1900, the Governments of the republics had complained of damage done by the British soldiery, and on February 12 Lord Roberts had called their attention to the destruction by Boers of farmhouses in Natal." A somewhat acrimonious correspondence as to the usages of civilized warfare continued for some months. This was not unnatural. * War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it,' said a soldier whose practice agreed with his maxim. 'War is war, and not popularity hunting,' says Grant. * War is hellish work ' is Napier's description of it. * There is no clear via media between peace and war,' remarks a recent writer ; ' when the dogs of war are let loose, the cry is havoc. '^

On May 20, 1900, Lord Roberts admitted having ordered the destruction of two farms in the Bloemfontein district ' because, while a white flag was flying from the houses, his troops were fired upon from the farmsteads '; and he stated that ' he should continue to punish all such cases of treachery by the destruction of the farms where they occurred.'^ This is quite in accordance with the usages of modern warfare. ' He who allows his house to be used as a _?;/ace cVarmes, a fortress from which to fire upon the enemy, must, according to military usage, expect to have his house burned.' There were doubtless many cases of hardship, because very frequently the owner was not consulted, and he could do little or nothing to prevent his house being so utilized by a Boer commando.^

On September 2, 1900, the Commander-in-Chief telegraphed to Commandant General Botha that orders had been given

i Proclamation, March 26, 1900, Cd. 582.

3 Nineteenth Century, December, 1900.

^ ' Much has been said of Boers firing on British soldiers from farms which flew the white flag. What actually happened again and again was that woixien and non-combatants flew the white flag on a homestead, and that armed Boers carried on hostile operations on other parts of such farms without any regard to the doings of those in the farmhouse ' (Morning Leader, September, 1900).

that the farm nearest the scene of any attempt to injure the line or wreck a train was to be burned, and that all farms within a radius of ten miles were to be cleared of all their stock, supplies, etc.^

A precedent may be found for the above in an order issued by General Sherman on November 'J, 18G4, which is worded as follows : * In districts and neighbourhoods where the army is unmolested no destruction of property should be permitted ; but should guerillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, the army commanders should order and enforce demolitions more or less relentless according to the measure of such hostility.'-

By October, 1900, the war on the Boer side was considered to have degenerated into operations carried on by irregular, irresponsible guerillas. The organization of the Boer army was primitive, but such as it was it was in force until the end. Laxity of discipline is the continual complaint of De Wet and other leaders, and the commandants were severely handicapped thereby.^ In answer to a telegram from General Botha, urging that the republican forces were still perfectly organized, Lord Eoberts pointed out that their tactics were not those usually associated with organized forces, but had degenerated into a guerilla warfare, which he would be compelled to repress by those exceptional methods which civilized nations had at all times found it necessary to use under like circumstances.'*

1 Cd. 582. This was in accordance with the proclamation of June 19, 1900. This proclamation again conformed to the usages of civilized warfare {vide Lawrence, pp. 377 and 378).

- In 1871 the German Governor of Lorraine ordered, ' in consequence of the destruction of the bridge of Fontenoy to the east of Toul, that the district included in the Governor-Generalship of Lorraine should pay an extraordinary contribution of 10,000,000 francs by way of fine, and announced that the village of Fontenoy had been immediately burned' {Hall, § 156).

3 ' The Boer discipline must have been a curious growth, and when we realize the intense individualism of the fighting men, we begin to see the greatness of the achievement of Botha and Delarey in keeping thein together at all ' (' The African Colony ').

* Lord Roberts ' was unable to see that the Boers, being essentially a nation of farmers, would regard with comparative equanimity the loss of

Roughly, from this date onwards, then, may be said to have commenced that series of exceptional measures which were destined finally to bring the republican leaders to their senses, and that * process of attrition ' which was to culminate, after more than a year and a half of march and countermarch, in the terms of Vereeniging. It was at this period

their towns, largely the resort of races alien to themselves. . . . "When those towns were gone, he persisted in believing that it was contrary' to the usages of war for his enemy to remain in arms. Hence liis mistaken resolve to treat, not as regular combatants, but as rebels, who required punishment rather than defeat, a white race defending their homes with a bravery and resource which have rightly won the admiration of the world ' (T]ie Times ' History of the War in South Africa,' vol iv.).

The following would appear to cover the case in point. It does not, however, confound skedaddling and flight with bravery and defence, as Tlie Times historian appears to have done : ' On the other hand, one speaks of guerilla war or petty war when, after the defeat and the capture of the main part of the enemy forces, the occupation of the enemy territory, and the downfall of the enemy Government, the routed remnants of the defeated army carry on the contention by mere guerilla tactics. Although hopeless of success in the end, such petty war can go on for a long time, thus preventing the establishment of a state of peace in spite of the fact that regular war is over and the task of the army of occupation is no longer regular warfare. Now, the question whether such guerilla war is real war in the strict sense of the term in international law must, I think, be answered in the negative for two reasons : First, there are no longer the forces of two States in the field, because the defeated belligerent State has ceased to exist through the military occupation of its territory, the downfall of its established Government, the capture of the main part, and the routing of the remnant, of its forces ; and, secondly, there is no longer a contention between armed forces in progress. For although the guerilla bands are still fighting when attacked, or when attacking small bodies of enemy soldiers, they try to avoid a pitched battle, and content themselves with the constant harassing of the victorious army, the destroymg of bridges and railways, cutting off communications and supplies, attacking convoys, and the like, always in the hope that some event or events may occur which will induce the victorious army to withdraw from the conquered territory. But if guerilla war is not real war, it is obvious that in strict law the victor need no longer treat the guerilla bands as a belligerent Power and the captured members of those bands as soldiers. It is, however, not advisable that the victor should cease such treatment as long as those bands are under responsible commanders, and observe themselves the laws and usages of war. For I can see no advantage or reason why, although in strict law it could be done, those bands should be treated as criminals. Such treatment would only call for acts of revenge on their part, without in the least accelerating the pacification of the country. And it is, after all, to be taken into consideration that these bands act, not out of criminal, but patriotic motives. With patience and firmness the victor will succeed in pacifying these bands without recourse to methods of harshness' (Oppenheim, vol. ii., p. 67).

that the war entered upon a stage not wholly anticipated or provided for by International Law.

In the preamble to the Hague Convention it is stated : ' These provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, so far as military necessities permit, are destined to serve as general rules of conduct for belligerents in their relations with each other and with populations. It has not, however, been possible to agree forthwith on provisions embracing all the circumstances which may occur in practice.' The code is avowedly incomplete ; it expressly excepts military necessities, and it contemplates additions to meet unforeseen contingencies. Of military necessity the man on the spot must admittedly be the best judge, and it is not therefore surprising to find both combatants defending their actions on this ground.^

The situation in South Africa at this time was not altogether unforeseen, but it was really an extremely difficult one for which to provide. A fruitful source of dissension in past wars has been confusion as to the nature of military occupation. The Boer army had been overthrown in the mass, and the capitals of the two States taken, but powerful bands, still unsubdued, were roving about freely, and towns occupied by the British one day were evacuated the next.^ The theatre of

1 Vide telegram : ' From State President, O.F.S., and State President, S.A.K., sent from Bloemfontein 9.20 p.m., February 19, 1900, to H.E. Lord Roberts, Cape Town. With regard to the sending away of certain of Her Majesty's subjects from their dwellings to beyond the lines of those parts of the country occupied by the Burgher forces, we can affirm to your Excellency that the instances where such — and that only quite recently — has occurred, it was necessary in the interests of oitr military operations, as in all instances there was at least strong presumption existing that they did not behave themselves quietly and occupy themselves solely with their daily avocations, but either themselves acted as spies, or assisted spies to make our movements known to the enemy.'

Cf. also reply of Lord Roberts, dated Paardeberg, Febuary 24, 1900, whence the following is extracted : ' I, however, am fully convinced that no wilful destruction of property has taken place except such as was absolutely necessary for military purposes,'

2 ' I am told,' reported the R.M. Senekal at a later date, 'that during the war every citizen, on rising in the morning, was wont to go and see which flag was flying over the Court-house, to ascertain if an admiration of the Union Jack or Vier-Kleur would be most acceptable to the authorities there.'

war was too extensive for the British ever to expect, without emplojang exceptional measures, to cope with an enemy who had adopted guerilla tactics. The fighting area had to be reduced. Diminution of territory involved not only the removal of the inhabitants — a subject which will be dealt with later — but also the destruction of property and the clearance of supplies.

It was the widespread destruction of farmhouses, and wholesale devastation in certain specified areas, which called forth such a storm of adverse criticism. And yet, in view of the Hague Convention, such criticism would appear to be unnecessary. All the rules adopted at the Hague are prefaced by the qualification, * autant que les n6cessit6s militaires le permettent.' And ' military necessity ' includes many things. Lieber, in his definition, admits that ' it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy, of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords necessary for the sustenance and safety of the army.'^ The definition of the term ' lay waste,' drafted by General Sir Archibald Hunter, and approved by Lord Roberts, was no less comprehensive, and entered more into detail. Civilized opinion, then, as expressed at the Hague, acknowledges devastation to be legitimate under certain circumstances, and holds that the question of the necessity for such devastation must be decided by the accredited representatives of the belligerents themselves.^

The main difficulty in the situation at the close of 1900 from the British point of view, and for the Boers the main

2 As a matter of fact, ' the private movable property of the inhabitants of an enemy's country was always at the mercy of the invader, and liable to destruction or pillage, and it only came to be spared when the invader saw that such a course was for his advantage. Wholesale pillage undermines the discipline of troops, and to destroy the crops of a country is to cut off supplies from the invading force as well as from the inhabitants '

'Law of War,' J. S. Eisley, p. 139).

source of hope, lay in the fact that a sort of general running light, apparently of indefinite duration, was being carried on throughout the length and breadth of the recently annexed republics. It was obvious that, if the federal forces were ever to be overcome, the theatre of war must be curtailed. The commandos were scattered over so large a tract of territory, and Great Britain had, consequently, to divide her forces to such an extent, that they were unable to cope adequately with the Boers in anyone district. So long as the Boers were able to continue the struggle in every district, victory for the British seemed indefinitely postponed. But if the enemy could be compelled to abandon certain areas, and to concentrate on certain points, then victory was assured to the British by sheer force of numbers, if by nothing else. To compel the republican forces to evacuate certain districts, and to concentrate in certain others, was the object with which the clearing of the country was commenced.

To assign anything like a definite date for the beginning of devastation in the Orange River Colony is somewhat difficult. A few farmhouses were burned for specific reasons during the earlier stages of the war ; this particular form of destruction may probably be said to have reached its zenith between the months of June and November, 1900.^

It is true that it called forth a storm of hostile criticism from both the home and continental press. This was almost to be expected. The ' consummation devoutly to be wished ' — namely, the conclusion of the war — was for the moment lost sight of in the measures adopted to bring it about. The barren veldt, the absent sire, the weeping women, the homeless little ones, all combined to form a picture which appealed to the heart of the general public, and which was, consequently, fully treated by the descriptive and imaginative war correspondent. The majority of Boer farmhouses are,

1 'With Eimington,' Letter XXIII., dated Kroonstad, September 6, 1900 : ' The various columns that are now marching about the country are carrying on the work of destruction pretty indiscriminately, and we have burnt and destroyed by now many scores of farms.'

however, to the more prosaic mind, unimportant from an economic standpoint ; and their destruction, so long as the crops, herds, and flocks were left untouched, did not materially affect the sinews of war.^ There is little exact information to be obtained from Blue-Books on the subject of farm burning. The only period covered by the Government return is from June, 1900, to January, 1901.'^ During that time 352 farmhouses were burnt by the British. There are no data to show what amount of destruction was done by the Boers, but they lived on the country through which they passed, ransacking most of the outlying stores ; and the claims which were later submitted in this connection go to prove that it was fairly extensive.

But, whatever the amount of damage to property done by both combatants may have been, the chief drawback to such clearing as had hitherto been accomplished lay in the fact that it was absolutely unsystematic. It was carried out in a casual, whimsical sort of a way, with no pretentions to either method or consistency.^ In the true spirit of martial law

^ ' Indeed, the loss of crops and stock is a far more serious matter than the destruction of farm buildings, of which so much has been heard' (Sir A. Milner to Mr. Chamberlain, Cd. 547).

' Stench, flies, dust, discomfort, dirt — these are the almost universal characteristics of the Boer's home within. Without it is a plain, roughbaked brick or mud-walled, oblong structure, roofed with corrugated iron, and devoid of the smallest attempt at architectural beauty. The stoep or veranda shades at least one side of the house, possibly a willow or a gumtree or two hard by ; rarely, very rarely, there is a ring-fenced plot of garden, wherein unkempt rose-bushes eke out a forlorn existence ' (' A Subaltern's Letters to His Wife,' p. 95).

- Cd. 524. This return cannot be considered complete even for the period mentioned, and Mr. Chamberlain's later estimate {vide The Times for March 5, 1902) of 600 is probably far below the actual figure.

The author's estimate, based on work with the Eighth Division during the war, reports received immediately after the conclusion of peace, and repeated tours throughout the colony, is that 75 per cent, of the farmhouses suffered more or less severely, and that 5,000 were practically destroyed.

^ ' Kroonstad, Lindley, Heilbron, Frankfort, has been our round so far. We now turn westward along the south of the Vaal. Farm burning goes merrily on, and our course through the country is marked, as in prehistoric ages, by pillars of smoke by day and fire by night. We usually burn from six to a dozen farms a day, these being about all that in this sparsely-inhabited country we encounter. I do not gather that any special every column commander did that which was right in his own eyes.^ No distinct general orders had been pubhshed on the subject, and a considerable amount of confusion was the natural result. By November, 1900, farm burning had become so indiscriminate that it was found necessary to issue instructions defining its limitations.

These were contained in Order XL., dated November 18.^ * As there appears to be some misunderstanding with reference to burning of farms and breaking of dams, Commander-in-Chief wishes following to be lines on which General Officers Commanding are to act : No farm is to be burnt except in case of treachery or when troops have been fired on from premises, or as punishment for breaking of telegraph or railway line, or when they have been used as bases of operations for raids, and then only with direct consent of General Officer Commanding, which is to be given in writing. The mere fact of a burgher being absent on commando is on no account to be used as reason for burning the house. All cattle, waggons, and food-stuffs are to be removed from all farms ; if that is found to be impossible, they are to be destroyed, whether owner be present or not.'