The Afghan war of 1879-80

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Preface

The interest aroused by the massacre of our ill-fated Embassy to the Amir Yakab Ehan^ the subsequent capture of Gabul^ and the hard-won successes of our armies during the occupation of the city, can scarcely yet have passed away ; and I have, therefore, ventured to republish the series of letters which, as a special correspondent, I wrote in the field. They are a simple diary of the war ; and though in this form they may lack conciseness, they have at least the merit of such accuracy as an eye-witness can alone hope to attain. It was my good-fortune to be the only special correspondent with the gallant little army which moved out of Ali Eheyl in September, 1879. The Government of India had notified that " non-combatant correspondents " would not be allowed to join the force, the history of whose achievements was to be left to regimental officers, who might in their spare hours supply information carefully vis^, to such newspapers as chose to accept it. So carelessly was this strange order issued, that Sir Frederick Roberts never received official intimation of its existence, and he welcomed me at Ali Eheyl on the eve of his departure for Kushi as, I am sure, he would have welcomed any other correspondent who had chosen to cross the frontier, and push' on without escort and with their own baggage animals. I make this explanation in justice to General Boberts, upon whom the responsibility of excluding correspondents has been falsely thrown. Regarding the letters now republished, Mr. Frederick Harrison in the Fortnightly Review has been good enough to describe them as viii Preface.

" admirably written, with very great precision and knowledge." While not sympathizing in the least with Mr. Harrison's criticism of Sir Frederick Roberts's punishment of Cabul, in support of which criticism he mainly relied upon my letters, I am grateful for his estimate of my work. I can scarcely hope that all my critics will be equally generous.

I have carefully gone into details where military movements of importance had to be described, and the sketch maps can be relied upon as showing exact distances and positions.

Howard Hensman,

Special Correspondent of the Pioneer, Allahabad. Cabul, August, 1880.

The above was written when all was peaceful in Afghanistan,

but the disaster at Maiwand once more threw the Cabul army into

excitement, and General Roberts had to march to the relief of

Candahar. This now historical march and the victory at Candahar

on September 1st, are described in detail in Part 11. of this.

volume.

H. H.

Allahabad, November let, 1880.

i. i. MM

CHAPTER I. Massaobb of Cavaonabi — Thb Kubbam Field Fobce moves UPON Cabul

CHAPTER n.

Yaeub Khan in the Bbitish Camp .

PAGE

CHAPTER ni.

The Advance to Chabasia and the Battle of that Name, etc. 20

CHAPTER IV.

Captube of Shebpub Cantonments — The Affaib of the Asmai

Heights 38

CHAPTER V.

Cabul Occupied by Genbeal Robebts 51

CHAPTER VI.

The Stobes in Bala HissAti Absenal — ^Disastbous Explosions, ETC. .......... 64

X Contents.

CHAPTER VII.

PAOE

Execution of Prominent Afghans : the Case of the Kotwal

OF Gabul, etc 82

CHAPTER VIII.

Fighting in the Shutargabdan Pass, etc 93

CHAPTER IX.

Abdication of Yakub Khan; his Abbest, etc. ... 99

CHAPTER X.

The Bbitish Army moves into Shebpub; opening Communication with the Khtbeb Fobce, etc 114

CHAPTER XI.

The Bala Hissab Dismantled — Raiding fob the Mubdebebs

OP Cavagnabi — Execution of numeeous Sepoys 127

CHAPTER XII.

Appeoach of Winteb — Opbbations against the Sahs, etc. 142

CHAPTER XIII.

Difficulties as to Supplies — Bahadub Khan's Contumacy;

his Villages Desteoybd, etc 153

CHAPTER XIV.

Yakub Khan Depobted to India — Affaibs in Afghan Tubk-

iSTAN — ^Tbibal Uneasiness about Cabul, etc. . .170

CHAPTER XV.

The Decembeb Tboubles — Fobmidable Stbbngth of Mahomed Jan — Repulse of General Dunham Massy — ^Thb Afghan Abmy befobe Cabul 184

Contents. xi

CHAPTER XVI.

PAOB

The FioHTraa ksowsD Cabul — General Roberts withdraws

WITHIN Sherpur, etc. 198

CHAPTER XVII.

The Siege of Sherpur — ^Musa Jan proolaimbd Amir bt the • Afghan Leader, etc 218

CHAPTER XVin.

The Siege of Sherpur {continued) — ^Mahomed Jan delivers HIS Attack — Its Failure — Reinforcements from the Ehtber Line, etc 239

CHAPTER XIX.

Dispersion of Afghan Armt — General Roberts Re-occupies

Cabul — Uniyersalitt of the late Jehad — ^A Looted City 259

CHAPTER XX.

Punishment of Mir Butcha and his Kohistanis — ^Asmatullah Khan's Operations about Jugdulluck — Deportation of Daoud Shah 273

CHAPTER XXL General Roberts proclaims an Amnesty — ^Afghan 'Chiefs at Cabul — ^Message from Mahomed Jan — News of Abdur Rahman Khan, etc 283

CHAPTER XXIL The British Hospital in Cabul — "How we Liyb in Sherpur " — " How THEY LiYE IN Cabul " 297

CHAPTER XXIII.

Sherr Ali's Efforts to raise an Army — Gun-making, etc.

IN Cabul — The Ghazi and his Mode of Warfare . 320 xii Contents.

CHAPTER XXIV.

PAGE

The Early Life of Abdur Rahman Khan — Prominent Afghan

Characters, etc 339

CHAPTER XXV.

Mr. Lbfel Griffin arrives at Sherpur to investigate the Political Situation — The Malcontent Chiefs in Durbar — Explanation of British Policy 355

CHAPTER XXVI.

General Ross goes out to meet General Stewart — ^A Second

Successful Battle at Charasu 373

CHAPTER XXVII.

General Stewart at Cabul — His March from Candahar — The Battle of Ahmed Khel — Capture of Ghazni, Action AT Urzoo, etc 388

CHAPTER XXVni.

"The Divine Figure from the North" — ^A Period of Calm

— The Kizilbashes, etc 403

CHAPTER XXIX.

The Amirship offered to Abdur Rahman — Cavalry Action

AT Padkhao Shana 415

CHAPTER XXX.

Formal Recognition of Abdur Rahman by the British — His

Interviews with Mr. Griffin — A Settlement arrived at 431

CHAPTER XXXI.

News of Maiwand — General Roberts marches to relieve Candahar — Cabul evacuated by General Stewart — The Settlement with Abdur Rahman 450

Contents. xiii

CHAPTER V. The Operations on the Hblhund— The Disaster at Maiwand 646

Conclusion 668

Appendix 666

LIST OF MAPS ILLUSTRATING ENGAGEMENTS.

-**-

1. Engagement on Heights near Cabul, Ootobbb 6, 1879 *2. Actions abound Cabul, Dbcembeb 11 to 14, 1879 . 'S. Opebations neab Cabul, Dbcembeb 13 and 14, 1879 i. The Siege of Shebpub — Plan or the Dbongbs

^. The Battle of Ahmed Khel, Apbil 19, 1880 . '6. The Action at Ubzoo, Apbil 23, 1880 '7, The Battle of Candahab, Seftembeb 1, 1880 . 18. The Siege of Candahab — Plan of the Dbfbnobs "9. The Operations on the Helmund, July, 1880 . lO. The Battle of Maiwand, July 27, 1880 .

TO FACE PAOB

OF

18 7 9-8 0.

PART I.

THE OCCUPATION OF CABUL— THE BRITISH BESEIGBD AT SHERPUR— DISPERSAL OF THE TRIBES.

Chapter I

Inirodnction— The Cavagnari Mission — Takub Khan's Eyasion of the Gundamuk Treaty — Tarbnlence of the Herat Regiments — Nakshband Khan's Warning — The Oatbreak — Taknb Khan's Behaviour— Reception of the News in India — The Seizure of the Shntargardan, and Preparations for the Adrance upon Cabul.

The Treaty of Gnndamuk had for its chief object the direct representation of the British Government at the Court of the Amir Yakub Khan, and, in pursuance of the terms of the Treaty, Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., was received at Cabul, as Resident, on July 24th, 1879. Mr. William Jenkyns, of the Indian Civil Service, accompanied him as secretary to the Mission. An escort of twenty-five sowars and fifty sepoys of the Guides' Corps was the only means of protection at the Embassy's command, implicit faith being placed in the Amir*s promise to guard the lives of his guests. Lieutenant Hamilton was in command of the escort, and Dr. Kelly, surgeon of the Guides, was the medical officer attached to the Mission. Including servants and followers, there were in all some 200 souls gathered in the Residency in the Bala Hissar from July 24th until the outbreak of the Herat regiments on the morning of September 3rd. It would be out of place to describe at length the course of events which culminated in the Massacre, but from the tone of Sir Louis Cavagnari's letters there can be no doubt the Amir was never anxious to carry out to the strict letter the terms of the Gundamuk Treaty. Taking the ofl&cial diary sent weekly from Cabul to the Indian Government, it appears that every outward honour was paid to the Embassy upon its arrival, but that Yakub Khan was so suspicious of his Ministers and nobles, that he told off men to watch the Residency. These spies furnished the names of all who visited Cavagnari without the Amir's knowledge.

Then came rumours of petty chiefs having been punished for their fnendship to the British during the late campaign, although one of the main points of the Treaty was directed against this very contingency.* The Amir always avoided reference to this subject, and as Sir Louis Cavagnari could not obtain direct evidence of the amnesty clauses being departed from, no redress could be obtained. Apart from palace intrigues, which are always rife in Cabul, there seemed no direct element of discord at work in the capital until the troops from Herat reached Sherpur Cantonment on August 5th. These regiments had not shared in the humiliation of the defeats suffered by the Cabul soldiery at AK Musjid and the Peiwar Kotal ; they taunted their comrades in arms with cowardice, and boasted of their own prowess ; and their turbulence soon assumed a dangerous form. A ressaldar- .major of one of our cavalry regiments, Nakshband Khan, an old and tried soldier, was spending his furlough at his village of Aoshahr, two miles from Cabul, and he seems first to have caught the alarm. When the Herat regiments marched, or rather swaggered, through the streets of Cabul, with bands playing, many of the soldiers abused tke Kafir elchi (ambassador) by name, calling out to the populace, "Why has he come here?" and showing too clearly that their passions were dangerously excited. Nakshband Khan learned from a fellow-countryman in the ranks that the soldiers had been ordered so to shout in the

* Sirdar Sber AH Khan Kandabari, Governor of Gandahar, assared Sir Donald Stewart that Yakub Kban, from the first, never intended to pardon the chiefs who had aided us. Such a course of policy would haye seemed madness in the eyes of eyery Afghan, Raid the Sirdar ; not a man would have understood it.

Massacre of the Embassy. 3

streets. Full of this news, he went to our Envoy and warned him of the coming storm. Sir Louis Cavagnari was a man notorious for his disregard of personal danger : he was brave to a fault, and this turbulence among the Afghan soldiery scarcely shook his composure. ** Never fear," was the answer to the Ressaldar ; " keep up your heart, dogs that bark don't bite ! " **But these dogs do bite ; there is real danger," urged Nakshband Khan. The reply was characteristic of the man : he hid taken up his post and nothing could break down his determination to remain at all hazards ; he quietly said, " They can only kill the three or four of us here, and our death will be avenged."

This is the story as told by the Eessaldar, who can scarcely be romancing ; but no word of the warning is given by Cavagnari in his letters to the Viceroy, all of which are full of sanguine hope even as late as August 30th. His last message was sent on September 2nd, and concluded with the words ** All well," — and this within twelve hours of the attack upon the Residency. He trusted altogether to Yakub Ehan — for what could an escort of seventyfive men avail against an army ? — and almost his last written words were : " Notwithstanding all people say against him, I personally believe Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements." This blind trust in the Amir was soon to be rudely broken down, for Yakub was found wanting even in willingness to save the lives entrusted to his care.

The story of the outbreak in the Bala Ilissar, and the massacre of the Envoy and his followers, is written at length in the Bluebooks. The tale is too well known to bear reproduction : the heroic struggle against overwhelming odds has, perhaps, rarely been equalled, for there were only four British ofl&cers and a* handful of native soldiers to meet an army. Yakub Khan sat in his palace, vacillating and sullen, with the noise of the fight ringing in his ears, and the roar of the soldiery and the fanatical populace surging into his council- chamber : but he made no sign. There were councillors who urged prompt chastisement of the mutinous sepoys : there were regiments at Bala Hissar which mirjihi have loyally obeyed orders ; but the man who had pledged himself to preserve our Envoy only took the cunning precaution

B 2 of sending out Daoud Shah, his commander-in-chief, to ** remonstrate *' with the armed rabble. It was like remonstrating with a tiger when the hunter lies at his mercy : like giving the word '' halt ** to the incoming tide : Daoud Shah was thrust back by the first men he met, but they used their bayonets tenderly, and his wounds were slight. And when it was all over, when the excited crowd roared through the Bazaar, with Cayagnari*s head held on high, there seems to have come upon Yakub that fear of vengeance which he had hitherto thrust aside. Forty years before the body of another Envoy had been hung on the butcher's hooks in that same Bazaar ; treachery had scored a success which promised to be lasting ; but Pollock had come with a victorious army from Peshawur, while Nott fought his way from the south, and the Char Chowk was soon a heap of ruins. How soon would the vengeance of an outraged nation again fall upon Cabul ?

Shortly after midnight of September 4th Sir Frederick Roberts, who was in Simla, engaged on the work of the Army Commission, was called up to receive a telegram. It was from the Eurram Valley, and conveyed the first news of the Massacre, which he then and there hastened to carry to the Commander-in- Chief. The shock was so terrible that men were paralyzed for the moment, but the next day the machinery of Government was put in motion, a council of war was called, and on the afternoon of September 5th the following instructions were sent to Brigadier General Dunham Massy, then commanding the Eurram Field Force at the Peiwar Eotal* : —

" From the Quarter Master General in India to Brigadier- General D. Massy, commanding Eurram Field Force ; dated Simla, 5th September, 1879.

** Move 23rd Pioneers, 5th Ghoorkas, and Moantain Train to Shutargardan, crest of pass ; to entrench themselves there and await orders. Ten days' supplies."

In accordance with these instructions, Swinley's Mountain Battery of six 7-pounder guns, escorted by the Pioneers and Ghoorkas, moved upon the Shutargardan, which was occupied

* This telegram is of some importance, as showing the qaickness with which the Viceroy and the military aathorities recognized the necessity of seizing the Shutargardan before the Cabnl troops or the local tribesmen could occupy the Pass in strength.

Seizure of the Shutargardan. 5

dout opposition on the 11th of September. Colonel Currie, of 23rd Pioneers, commanded this small force. The 72nd High" lers and the 5th Punjab Infantry followed in a few days to ire the road between Ali Eheyl and the Pass, while the 7th npany of Bengal Sappers and Miners was ordered up from ilozan (near Kurram) to improve the road beyond the Shu- ^rdan. In the meantime, the following appointments had been ie : — Colonel Macgregor to be Chief of the Staflf to Majorleral Sir Frederick Boberts, Commanding the Force ; Brigadier leral Macpherson, C.B., Y.C, to command the Ist Infantry gade ; Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B., to command the [ Infantry Brigade; Brigadier-General Dunham Massy, to imand the Cavalry Brigade ; and Brigadier- General Hugh igh, C.B., y.C, to be Boad Commandant. On September 12th leral Roberts arrived at Ali Kheyl. On the 13th General Ler took command of the troops in the Shutargardan ; which 18, by the 18th of the month, was held by the troops which had yed up originally, together with the whole of the 72nd Highders and the 7th Company of Sappers and Miners. The posi- L was strongly entrenched and every precaution taken against irprise by the neighbouring tribes.

laving secured the Shutargardan, Sir Frederick Roberts cast ut for means to complete his transport, it being intended to re 6,000 men upon Cabul with as little delay as possible, th the usual carelessness which marks the operations of Indian lies, and perhaps with a desire to curtail expenditure, the isport of the Kurram Valley Field Force had, upon Cavagnari's arture for Cabul, been allowed to dwindle down to insignificant portions. There were in the Valley, when the news of the ssacre was received, only 1,500 mules, 500 sickly camels, and I pack-bullocks. These were just sufficient to enable the Comsariat Department to furnish supplies to the winter garrison Jbe Valley. Without loss of time all the available animals in hawur and near the frontier were ordered to be sent to Ali 3yl, and eventually the army was provided with almost 2,000 les, between 700 and 800 camels, and upwards of 600 bullocks.*

On October 14th, at Cabal, the returns were : — Moles, 1,973 ; camels, 675 ; bul- ^ 604 ; and 230 yabas (ponies purchased in Cabul).

The Gajis, Turis, and local Ghilzais were induced to send in animals with drivers, and this " local carriage '* was of great service. Padshah Khan, the most influential of the Ghilzai chiefs, declared himself willing to aid us in the collection of supplies, and his friendship at this critical moment was all-important. On the 14th of September the Nawab Sir Gholam Hassan Khan, who had started from Candahar to join Cavagnari at Cabul, reached the Shutargardan. He had heard news of the Massacre and had turned off the Ghazni Road and made for our most advanced post. The fact of his non-molestation on the road proved that the Logar Valley was quiet, and this was confirmed by a reconnaissance on the 16th, when General Baker went as far as the Shiukai Kotal, half-way between Kushi and the Shutargardan. On the 22nd the Mangals to the number of 200 or 800, raided upon a small convoy carrying telegraph stores near Earatiga, east of the Pass, killed six sepoys of the escort (originally only eleven men), and twenty-one coolies and linesmen. They also succeeded in carrying off eighty-four mules. This showed that our convoys would probably be attacked daily, and General Baker ordered that no escort should be less than twenty-five armed men to 100 transport animals.

Chapter II

Letter from the Amir— Baker's Advance to Kushi— Arrival of Takub Khan io the British Camp — The State of Cabul — Excitement along the Line of Communication —Departure of the Last Convoy from Ali Kheyl— Narrow Escape of Sir F. Roberts — The Amir's Attempt to delay the Advance — Durbar at Kushi— The Advance ordered — Lastructions to the Troops.

The news of the preparations at Ali Kheyl and the Shutargardan reached Cabul very rapidly, and a letter from General Roberts to the Amir was also safely received. In reply Yakub Khan wrote as follows : —

** To General Roberts. I have received your letter of the 7th, and was much pleased. I fully understood what was written. Complete confidence was restored, and a sense of relief felt in the friendship shown by the Viceroy, as my prosperity found favour in

Yakub Khajis Anxiety, 7

his sight. I am dreadfully distressed and gi-ieved at the recent event, but there is no fighting against God's will. I hope to inflict such punishment on the evil-doers as will be known worldwide ; and to prove my sincerity, I have twice written on this subject, and the third time by my confidential servant, Sher Muhammad Eiian. I now write to say that for these eight days I have preserved myself and family by the good offices of those who were friendly to me, partly by bribing, partly by coaxing the rebels. Some of the Cavalry I have dismissed, and night and day am considering how to put matters straight. Please God^ the mutineers will soon meet with the punishment they deserve, and my affairs will be arranged to the satisfaction of the British Government. Certain persons of high position in these provinces have become rebellious ; but I am watching carefully and closely every quarter. I have done all I could to ensure the Nawab Ghulam Hussain*s safety. I trust to God for the opportunity of showing my sincere friendship for* the British Government, and for recovering my good name before the world."

The Amir's anxiety, or perhaps terror it should be called, had reached a climax at this time. On the one hand were the Sirdars who had thrown in their lot with the mutinous troops, and were trying to persuade him to raise a jehad, or religious war; and, on the other. General Roberts and his army, already on the move from Ali Kheyl. With the idea that he might save his capital from destruction, or, as was afterwards suggested, that he might delay our advance until the tribesmen had assembled at Cabul, Yakub Khan resolved upon thro\ivdng himself into the British camp, and claiming such protection as we could afl*ord. Before doing this he sent two members of the Cabul Durbar to Ali Kheyl, viz., the Mustaufi HabibuUa Khan and the Wazir Shah Muhammad, or, as we should describe them, his Chancellor of the Exchequer and his Prime Minister. They bore a letter in which their sovereign announced his intention of flying from Cabul and placing himself in General Roberts's hands. Before this took place, however, the advance from the Shutargardan had begun, General Baker having pushed forward the troops at his disposal in the following order.

On 24th September. — Four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery.

12th Bengal Cavalry. One company 72nd Highlanders. 5th Ghoorkas.

On 25<fc September. — F-A Royal Horse Artillery. Seven companies 72nd.

On 26th September, — Two guns No. 2 M. B. 23rd Pioneers. 7th Company Bengal Sappers. Six companies 5th Punjab Infantry.

On 27th September. — 14th Bengal Lancers.

On 28th September. — One squadron 9th Lancers. 5th Punjab Cavalry. 92nd Highlanders.

On the 27th, Sir F. Roberts had moved his head-quarters from Ali Kheyl westwards^ and on the same day the Amir, with a considerable escort, arrived at Kushi. He was received with every mark of respect, and a guard of honour, furnished by the 92nd Highlanders, was placed at his tent. His camp was pitched at a little distance from the British army.

Having joined General Roberts at Ali Kheyl on the evening of

September 26th, I may take up the story of the advance from about

that period. I will therefore give my letters as they were published

at the time : —

Ali Kheyl, 28ffe September.

The unexpected news of the arrival of the Amir Yakub Khan at Kushi last night has been received with general satisfaction, as affairs are much simplified as regards the military position. There has been much doubt all along as to the sincerity of Yakub' s protestations, and it was not easy to determine the line of action when Cabul should be finally reached. But the Amir's authority has plainly crumbled to the dust in his capital ; and, if not a fugitive, he must have come as a suppliant to us to reinstate him on the throne, at the same time that we avenge the Massacre of the Embassy. It seems far more probable, however, that he is a fugitive ; for it is stated that Cabul is in a state of anarchy, which can only mean that the populace have fraternized with the mutinous troops and have driven out a sovereign who had made terms with the Kafirs. If this be really so, the fate of the city, in case any opposition is shown when our army moves forward, should be sealed. The only argument an Afghan understands is direct and severe punishment for offences committed, and the

The Cabul Mutineers. 9

punishment should now be dealt out without stint, even if Cabul has to be sacked. Not a man in the force that is now about to make the final advance would feel other than the keenest pleasure in seeing Cabul bum, for it is hopeless to expect an armed rabble, such as that which now holds the city, to show a steady front when General Roberts's army closes with them. They lack leaders to direct their movements, and though arms and ammunition may be plentiful in their midst, their organization is about equal to that of a European mob suddenly placed in power after a long period of strict government. Their capacity for mischief is as limited as that of any other rabble, for their future movements are all dependent upon outside influences. If left to their own will, they would probably split up into factions, of which the strongest would eventually sweep away all rivals ; but when menaced by a stronger power, they must either dissolve, or by sheer doggedness attempt to dispute possession of that which they have gained. The Cabul mutineers are not of a type which " die but never surrender," and although they may risk a brush with the British forces, they wiU most likely seek safety in flight before any severe thrashing can be given them. It will be most aggravating if this proves to be the case, but until the Amir has explained in detail the course of events from the time of Sir Louis Cavagnari's death, an exact estimate of the position at Cabul cannot be arrived at. The conference which is sure to take place with Sir Frederick Roberts in a day or two will settle what course is to be taken, and it is to be hoped no undue tenderness will be shown in laying down the lines upon which the policy of the next few weeks is to be carried forward. By Wednesday at the latest a completely equipped force of over 6,000 men will be at Kushi, and on the following morning the march will begin. Sunday next should see the British troops encamped before Cabul, and then will begin the punishment of a city which is only connected in the saddest way with the expansion of our power in Asia.

Sir Frederick Roberts did not reach Earatiga, his first march from here, yesterday, without a warning that the tribes are determined to do mischief so far as lies in their power. The warning was conveyed in the practical way of his party being fired upon at Jaji Thana in the Hazara Darukht defile near the end of lo The Afghan War, 1879—80.

the journey, and I am sorry to say Dr. Townsend was hit in the face, and is reported to be severely wounded. As the telegraph line has since been cut we have not been able to learn full particulars of the attack, or with what loss the assailants were driven oflf. No other casualties occurred in General Roberts's party, but a detachment of the 8rd Sikhs, who were sent down from the Shutargardan to patrol the road, were not so fortunate. They were attacked by a large body of tribesmen and lost five men. There has been considerable excitement all along the line from ThuU to Shutargardan during the last forty-eight hours, as reports of intended attacks by Mangals and Zaimukhts have been sent in by friendly villagers. The camps at Ali Kheyl, the Peiwar Kotal, Kurram, &c., are very weakly guarded now, as so many troops have been sent on, and this fact is evidently known to the tribes, who are bent upon mischief. It is impossible to foretell when an attack will be made ; but so serious did the chance seem yesterday, of large numbers of the Mangals coming down in this direction, that the 67th Foot, who were to march to-day for Karatiga, have been detained. It was fully expected that the Peiwar Eotal would have been attacked last night, and as only two companies of the 8th Regiment were there, the chance of a smart fight was looked upon as certain. But nothing came of the alarm, so far as I can learn, and the post will be strengthened by men from Kurram, as soon as possible. The 81st N.I. must now be well on its way to the Valley, and as soon as it arrives, better arrangements can be made to protect the camps. The Mangals are said to have asked permission from a friendly tribe in the valley between this and Peiwar Eotal to pass through their territory, and this request can only have been made with a view to harass our communications. The camps are so large — having hitherto been garrisoned by considerable bodies of men — that with reduced strength commandants can scarcely be expected to guard every yard of sungar* that has been raised for defence. With the 85th Foot and the 81st N.I. available for use from Kurram to the Shutargardan all would be well, but the date of their arrival here is uncertain. I do not think, however, that these petty annoyances will hinder the all-