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I. HE GREEK TESTAMENT: with a critically
Kevised Text : a Digest of Various Readings : Marginal References to Verbal ana Idiomatic Usage : Prolegomena : and a Critical and Exegetical Commentary. For the use of Theoloeical Students and Ministers. 2 vols. 8vo. By Henbt Alford, M.A., Vicar of Wymeswold, Leicestershire, and late Fellow of TMnity College, Cambridge. Vol, /., price £1 4a,, containing the Four GoapeU, now ready. Vol, II, prepafing,
A TREATISE ON MORAL EVIDENCE, Ulus-
trated b^ numerous Examples both of General Principles and of Specific Actions. By Edwa&d Abthub Smbdlet, M.A., late Chaplain of Trinity CoUege, Cambridge. 8vo. 1%, 6d,
III,
THE APOLOGY OF TERTULLTAN, with English
Notes and a Prefeu^, intended as an Introduction to the Study of Patristical and Ecclesiastical Latinity. B^ H. A. Woodhau, LL.D.i late Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. 8yo. Ss. 6<f. Second Edition,
AN ANALYSIS OF PALMER'S ORIGINES LI-
TURGIC^ ; or. Antiquities of the English Ritual ; and of his DISSERTATION on PRIMITIVE LITURGIES : for the Use of Students at the Universities, and Candidates for Holy Orders, who have read the original Work. By W. Bbal, LL.D., F.S.A., Vicar of Brooke, Norfolk. 12mo. 3*. 6rf.
V.
FOUR SERMONS Preached before the University
of Cambridge, in November 1849. By the Rev. J. J. Blunt, B.D., Margaret Professor of Divinity.
1. The Chxt&ck of ExoLAND^its Communion of Saints.
2. The Chu&ch of England— its Title and Descent.
3. The Church of England — its Tbxt — the Bible.
4. The Chubch of England— its CoMMSNTARY—the Prater- Book. 68,
VI.
By the tame Author,
FIVE SERMONS Preached before the University of
Cambridge. The first four in November 1845 ; the fifth on.tlie General Fast Day, Wednesday, March 24, 1847. 8vo» 6a. M,
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
PEOF.CHARLES A. KOFOID AND
MRS. PRUDENCE W. KOFOID
• *
DISCOURSE
ON THE
STUDIES OP THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.
BY
ADAM SEDGWICK, M.A., F.R.S.,
WOODWARDIAN PROFE8B0R, AND FELLOW OF TRINITY OOLLEOK.
THE FIFTH EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS,
▲in>
A PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.
LONDON :
JOHN W. PARKER.
CAMBRIDGE : JOHN DEIGHTON,
M • OCCC L«
CamlirQrgr :
I? SO
TO
THE MASTER,
FELLOWS AND STUDENTS
OP
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
AND
ESPECIALLY TO THOSE AT WHOSE REQUEST
IT IS PUBLISHED,
THE FOLLOWING DISCOURSE
IS DEDICATED
BT THEIR AFFECTIONATE AND FAITHFUL SERVANT,
THE AUTHOR.
Preface to the Fikst £oitiow
Preface to the Fifth Eoitiok, PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.
8BCT. PA««
1 Introductoiy Remarks on the Doctrine of Final Causes . ix
2 Theory of Spontaneous Generation, TransmuUtion of Spe-
cies, &C. xvii
3 Foetal Trausfoitnations, and their bearing on the Theory of
Development xxTii
4 Organic Phenomena of Geology, and general remarks on
their bearing on the Theory of Development . xliv
6 Animal and vegetable Remains of the Primary or Palasosoic
Division Iviii
First Forms of Vegetable and Animal Life as described in The VetHgety &c Ixxviii
6 Fossils of the Secondary Division, &c Ixxxix
7 Organic Remains of the Tertiary Division, &c. . cvii
8 Materialism. Mechanical and Moral Laws. Laws of
Chance. Tendencies of Modem Science. Fantastical views of Nature. Evils of rash Generalisation. Education, &c. . cxl
0 Conditions of the Mind that liave led men to deny a Personal Creator. Atheism and Pantheism. Illustrations of the doctrine of Final Causes. Galvanic and Phrenological Hypotheses, Mechanical Inventions, &c. . . clixiii
10 On the Ideal Theory of Locke— imperfections of his Analysis. Schools of the Idealist and the Sensualists. Mischief of setting up Idealism as the interpreter of material nature, illustrated by the works of Oken, &c. cxcii iw3t4J34
VI /
CONTENTS.
Digression on some Discoyeries of Oken followed out by Owen. Archetype of Nature. General Scale of Nature. Never existed at one time in the History of the Earth. The reconstruction of the Scale subversive of the Theory of Development, &c
PAOB ccvi
Reconsideration of the Argument for Final Causes. Miracles. Belief in a First Cause, and Moral Conclusions from it. Induction the Fountain of all Material Truth, &c. ccxxix
PART n.
Pantheistic views of Revelation and its Evidences, and Comments on the Newtonian Philosophy. Evidences of Christianity, Historical and Prophetical. Moral Purity of the Gospel. Its Propagation and effects on the Progress of Man, &c cclvi
Arguments from Analogy ccciv
Recent Changes in the University Course. Modem Science of Cambridge—Philosophical Society. Modem external improvements. Moral and social character of the Students, &c cccxxiii
Extemal Improvements in Cambridge .... cccxliii
Modem religious movements. Principles of the Church of England contrasted with those of the Church of Rome. Tracts for the Times* Terms of Communion. Immorality of the Tracts, Acts of Apostasy. Causes of error in our estimate of religious and moral questions. Tme Catholicity. Conclusion ccclxvi
DISCOURSE,
(pp. 1-94).
Appendix To The Discourse
NOTK PAOB
A Examples of the Method of Induction 95
B General Diffusion of the Imponderable Agents through Space . 102
C Reply to Fanatical Objections against the Study of Physical
Science IW
D On the Nebular Hypothesis 118
£ Religious Bearing of the Study of Nature~.La Placets Sentiments on Education — Natural and Revealed Religion — Fanatical Objections to some passages in the Discourse .127
F Natural Theology — Paiey — Examples of Adaptation in Comparative Anatomy, derived from the Teeth and Jaws of Mammols 143
G Heathen Views of Final Causes. Reasons which have led Men
to reject the Truth of Natural Theology .150
H Objections to some passages in Paley's Moral Philosophy . 160
SUPPLEMENT TO THE APPENDIX.
No.
I. Additional Remarks on the Nebular Hypothesis 176
II. Animal Creations by Galvanism 183
III. On the Placoid and Ganoid Fishes in the Palseozoic Strata,
and their places in the Organic Scale 185
IV. On the supposed Interchange of Vegetable Species — Hybridi-
zation—Alternate Generations of Steenstrup — Parthenogenesis of Owen, &c 193
V. On the Development of the Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms
in the oldest known Fossiliferous Strata .... 207
VI. On the supposed derivation of the Terrestrial Flora from the
Marine, by a Natural Transmutation of Species . 212
VII. On the Use and Abuse of the word Law ; and on the methods
by which we rise to a right conception of it among physical Phenomena — Kepler's Laws — Bode*s Law — Kirkwood*s Law, &c. ib.
VIII. A Series of Extracts from Oken*s Physiopf^otophy . 222
IX. Remarks on the Theory of The Vestiges^ and on the Author's ExplanatioTM — Moral and Religious considerations opposed to Materialism 247
X. Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society — The
Prr/twte of W. Wordsworth, &c 314
ERRATA.
Preface, p. xviii. 1. 21, fwr in which read from which
xxzTii. 1. 20, for a back-bone read a back-bone and spinal
chord Ixiv. 1. 12, for a Ceatradon read a Cestractont Ixxxii. second Note, for p. 64 read p. 65. xcli. 1. 28, for Brachiopoda read Cephalopoda clx. Add the following foot-note.
See Supplement to the Appendix, No. IX. ccxv. L 7> for the Radiata read those Radiata cccxii. 1. 8, for eyidences our read evidences of our ccdxTt. 1. 15, for Churchman Low read Churchman and Low ccccx. 1. 22, for self-love breed read self-love and breed ccccxv. 1. 6 from the bottom, for It read it lb. last line, for (we dare to say logically) read (we dare to say) logically Appendix, p. 122, L %for round our own read round their own Supplement to Appendix, p. 178| 1. 16, /or infra p. 27 read supra p. 27.
Preface
TO THE FIRST EDITION.
The substance of the following Discourse was delivered in the Chapel of Trinity College, on the day of the Annual Commemoration in December last, and is published at the request of the junior Members of the Society, to whom it was more immediately addressed. As the long delay in its publication requires some apology, the Author begs leave to state, that the request, on which he is now acting, first reached him during the Christmas vacation, when he was absent from the University ; and that for some weeks after his return he was so much occupied in completing a course of lectures and in passing two memoirs through the press, that the Lent Term had nearly expired before he had time to revise his MS. for the printer. Without any further delay it was then struck off as far as page 33 ; and he hoped to have published it at the commencement of the Easter Term.
During its progress through the press he found however that he had undertaken a more difficult task than he had imagined : for having animadverted with much freedom on some parts of the
X PREFAGB TO THE FIRST EDITION.
Cambridge course of reading, he felt himself compelled, before he dared to give what he had written to the public, to enter at more length on a justification of his opinions. On this account, his remarks on the classical, metaphysical, and moral studies of the University (extending from p. SS to p. 91) were cast over again, and expanded to at least three times their original length.
Before this part of his task was completed, an attack of indisposition compelled him for a short time to quit the University; and on his return the languor of ill health, and a series of engagements of which it is not necessary here to speak, prevented him from immediately resuming it : so that the latter part of this Discourse was not printed till a late period in the Easter Term, when most of the junior Members had left the University for the long vacation. On this account he resolved not to publish before the University reassembled in the October Term.
Lest he should be accused of printing a discourse too widely differing from the one he was requested to publish, he wishes to state, that (with the exception of mere verbal corrections) it is, as far as p. 33, in the form in which it was first written, and that the conclusion has undergone no change : and in the two parts which have been so much expanded, he has preserved the scope
Preface To The First Edition. XI
and sentimentB, and in many instances the very words, of his first sketch. The notes added in an Appendix are not written to serve any purpose of ostentation. By most academic persons they may be considered unnecessary : but should a single reader find them of use in explaining or enforcing what is stated in the text, the Author will not regret that he has written them.
He has attacked the utilitarian theory of morals, not merely because he thinks it founded on false reasoning, but because he also believes that it produces a degrading efiect on the temper and conduct of those who adopt it. It is, however, more easy to pull down than to build up ; and he thinks it unfortunate that there is no English work on morals at once unexceptionable in its principles, and cast in such a form as to meet the wants of the University. Bishop Butler^s three Sermons on Human Nature and his Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue have lately become subjects of examination in Trinity College. Of their kind, they are works of inestimable value: but they are devoted rather to the discussion of the principles of morality than to the establishment of a system of moral philosophy ; and they are considered by most persons, who begin to speculate on such questions, both difficult and uninviting.
Before concluding this Preface, the Author dis-
• •
XU PRBFACB TO THE FIB8T EDITION.
claims any notion of holding out the following pages as a formal dissertation on academic studies. Such an attempt would be far above his powers ; not falling in with his usual habits of thought^ and requiring research for which he has neither time nor inclination. What is here printed treats of subjects treated of a hundred times before, and professes no originality, except what it derives irom the circumstances under which it was delivered and the persons to whom it was addressed. Should it be the means of leading even a small number of them to think more justly on any of the subjects of academic learning, and to combine moral and religious habits of thought with those severe physical studies, during which the best faculties of the mind are sometimes permitted to droop and wither, his most earnest wishes will be accomplished.
Trinity Colleoe, CAMBRinoE,
PREFACE
TO
THE FIFTH EDITION.
§ 1 . Introductory Remarks on the Doctrine of Final
Causes.
This Edition, with the exception of a few verbal corrections too insignificant to require any formal notice, is a reprint from the text of a Discourse — first published in 183S. Several additions have, however, been made to the Notes of the Appendix, and their arrangement has been changed. Note (D) on the Nebular Hypothesis*, and note (E) in reply to some objections which had been taken to the religious principles of the Discourse, are entirely new. In note (G) I have added a translation of the Greek extract from Xenophon^s MemoraMUa : and about two pages have been added to note (H) (note (E) of the former editions), on Paley's Principles of Moral and Political PMhsophy. I do not wish to change one sentence of what I had written on the UtiUtarian Theory of Morals ; because my opinions on that subject are unchanged, and I think it not expedient to write upon it at greater length.
As the Discourse and the Notes 6( the Appendix were written at different times, after long interruptions, and to meet specific objections, I have been led into
* See the Supplement to the Appendix No. I. 8. D. 6 1
X PRBFAOB TO THE FIFTH EDITION.
several repetitions which might be avoided in a more formal treatise : but the very repetitions are not perhaps without their use. During the passage of this edition through the press, I intended, in a concluding note, to discuss some points just touched on in the body of this little work ; and, especially, to notice at considerable length the development of organic forms in the successive strata of the earth. I, however, soon discovered that the subject was far too large for a single note : and had there been no other reason for leaving this part of my task incomplete, the interrupt tions of ill health would have prevented me from giving more than the bare outline of an argument which I hope to fill up at some future time. The outline, such as it isy I have thought it best to subjoin in this Preface ; requesting the reader to consider it not so much an attempt at a full and formal argument, as a series of suggestions, which may be, perhaps, hereafter more expanded and better enforced.
(1) The kingdoms of nature are presented to our senses in a succession of material actions, so adapted to one another as to end in harmony and order. All these changes and movements among the things around us seem to be produced by powers of nature we call second causes: but the mind of man cannot and will not rest content with second causes, and is constrained to look above them to some First Cause. Among the things produced by the hands of man we are able to separate works of accident from works of design : we gain this knowledge by experience, and by reflecting on
PREPACK TO THE PIPTU EDITION. XI
what passes within ourselves : and it is by taking this knowledge with us in our judgments on the works of Ood, that we are naturally led to a conception of an intelligent First Cause, capable of producing all the phe* nomena of the visible world.
On the other hand, it is said by Geoifroy Saint- HilairCy and other materialists of the same school, " We ascribe no intention to God, for we do not trust the feeble powers of reason"..." we observe facts, and pretend only to the character of historians"..." we cannot make an intelligent being of nature," &o. &c. There is a latent sophism in ail such statements as these ; and were the authors of them true to their own principles, they ought to stop short among individual phenomena, and never ascend to the conception of any general law of nature.
While they deny the indications of a God, they deify dead matter, by deriving from it works that have all the external characters of things produced by design and high intelligence. We are constrained, by the very law of our common being, to ascend to the conception of some power ordaining and directing the natural movements and changes we see around us. Among these changes we see the most obvious marks of intelligence. How are these indications to be accounted for ! We cannot deify dead matter, and make of it an intelligent cause. We are, therefore, constrained to speak of an inteUigent power superior to nature ; because we cannot, without the assumed existence of such a power, so comprehend the works of nature as to bring them
b2
Xii PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITIOK.
into co-ordination with the knowledge we have of ourselves, and our experience of the things around us.
(2) The doctrine of Final Causes, drawn from the structure of the organic world, has perhaps been stated at sufficient length in the following Discourse, and the Notes of the Appendix. It cannot be better stated than in the homely and graphic argument of Socrates {infra p. 151): The eye is made to see, the ear is made to hear, and the organs of every living being, so far as we can comprehend them, have a design and purpose. Under this point of view '' these various organs seem altogether the contrivance of some wise artificer who loves the beings he has created,^'' {ynfra p. 152). Organic structures give us, therefore, a clear proof of the doctrine of Final Causes ; and these causes have not, according to one of the quaint conceits of Bacon, been unfruitful, like virgins dedicated to God; but in the hands of Cuvier, Owen, and many other great physiolo- ^sts, have not only rationaUzed a multitude of known truths, but have also been continually pregnant with new discoveries.
The same school of materialiBts, to whom I have already pointed, object to our language as well as to our principles. It is true that in all cases we are compelled to express our meaning in words which are but the reflexion of our own nature. We know what we mean by our own muscular force, and we apply the same word force^ it may be figuratively, to the powers of nature producing mechanical movement. So also we comprehend the meaning of cause and effect, will and
• • •
PBEFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. Xlll
design, as applied to the works of our own hands : and in like manner we analogically apply these words to organic structures and anatomical designs proceeding from the workmanship of God. But should we gain by any change of the language whereby we describe the phenomena of the organic world as reflected in the mind of man ? While speaking of organic bodies shall we only tell, like the modem materialist school, ^' of the principle of connexion" — " the elective affinities of organic elements" — "the equilibration of organs,'' — &c., and think that our words are one jot less figurative and more true to nature ? On the contrary, I think them more figurative and incomparably less true to nature than the language in more common use among the naturalists and physiologists of this country. The language just quoted is used for the express purpose of keep^ Jng out of sight an intelligent First Cause ; while those who have invented it are constrained to deify the dead elements; forgetting all the while that they have on every side of them, and within themselves, the phenomena of mind as well as of matter ; and that every material structure or material change produced by man, and bearing any similitude to the mechanical organic structures subservient to life, is the result of design and will. So intimately are the proofs of design and purpose woven into the frame-work of organic life, that, spite of themselves, the modem materialists often find it impossible (as they themselves allow) to describe the phenomena before them, without falling into language implying the reality of those very final causes which
XIV PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.
they have in theory denied. And let not this fact be ascribed to an imperfection in the words of daily use ; but rather let it be appealed to as a proof of nature's teaching, and a true reflexion of her image by the mind of man, before that mind has been warped by any theory. (3) Of organized beings we know the beginning and the end, and we know the leading purposes to which their organs are subservient. Hence in speculating about the functions of organic structures, we may often use the doctrine of Final Cause as the foundation of our reasoning and the source of true induction. This we cannot do in questions that are purely physical : for while we contemplate any great physical law we neither know its beginning nor its end ; neither do we comprehend its whole purpose. Thus, while analyzing the properties of light by direct experiment, we should only desert the true road to discovery were we to tum^ aside to consider the adaptation of light to our wants ; or the anatomy of the eye, and its fitness to convey the impressions of light to the visual sense. Bacon saw this distinction clearly, and wrote well upon the misapplication of final causes. Could he have prophetically anticipated the modem discoveries in physiology, perhaps his censures would have been somewhat qualified, or applied with more caution: but philosophers of every sound school \rill be ready to subscribe to the great truths conveyed in the following sentences (Advancement of Lea/ming^ Book II.) : " The handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical
PRBFACB TO THB FIFTH EDITION. XY
causes, and given men the oocasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth on that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes.".... ** They are indeed but remoras and hinderances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search of the physical
causes hath been neglected, and passed in silence."
^'Not because these final causes are not true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that track. For otherwise, keeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there
is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them;"
^^ both causes being true and compatible ; the one declaring an intention, the other a consequence only.^^
(4) While considering the orderly movements of nature, we speak of second causes, and our language defines correctly the manner in which the phenomena of nature are reflected in the human mind. But how did these phenomena begin, and by what power were they first set in movement ! These questions inevitably lead us to a conception of a creative power of nature, quite distinct from the vulgar operations carried on before our eyes : and thus are we led to speak of the creative power, as well as of the suttaininff power of God. These ideas are distinct ; and to confound them under
XVI PREFACB TO THE FIFTH EDITION.
one general expression would only be a denial of our nature, and an utter confusion of thought, in our use of general terms. One expression tella us of the beginning of natural phenomena, the other defines their continuance in subordination to law.
It may be true that we oan form no adequate conception of creative power ; neither, on the other hand, have we any adequate conception of the sustuning power, whereby the order of the natural world is upheld. It may also be true that in the mind and will of the intelligent First Cause there is no distinction between the exercise of a creative and a sustaioiug power. Of this we know absolutely nothing ; and what do we gain by such a speculation ! It is irreverent, and out of the reach of sound philosophy ; for we cannot, to use the words of Bacon, " fly up to the secrete of the Deity by the waxen wings of the senses." When applied to nature all our language is inadequate, luid but feebly shadows out such ultimate truths of the material world an would express the will and purpose of the great First Cause. But our knowledge is not unreal because it is limited; provided it be only the expression of that form of truth which defines the reflexion of the natural world in the mind of man, while he is honestly employed upon the materials surrounding him, and neither forgets his own faculties, s the evidence that is before him. such views as these, it has been affirmed, ild in nature only a chain of second causes know neither the be^nning nor the end ;
PRBPAG£ TO THB FIFTH BDITION. XVU that we have no right to speak of a Creator or of a creative power; becaufie the links of nature's chain may be infinite in number, and the order of nature may have been eternal. With such a view of nature we may end in downright atheism ; or, if we accept the indications of intelligence in the natural world, we may perhaps advance one step farther, and try to satisfy the longings of the mind in some cold scheme of pantheism. As a matter of fact, views, like those just pointed at, have been brought forward again and again by men who have denied the being of a Ood ; or, if they could not bring themselves so far to belie their inner nature as to deny the being of a God, were at least resolved to deprive him of his personality, of his creative power and will, and of his providential government. To combat such opinions is not the immediate purpose of this Preface ; for I wish to deal with facts rather than opinions. Whatever semblance of truth they may have, while we arrest ourselves among the laws of dead matter, they are utterly without meaning when applied to the forms of organic life : for it is now beyond dispute, and is proved by the physical records of the earth, that all the visible forms of organic life had a beginning in time. To have established this point is v the glory of Geology.
^ 2. Theory of Spontaneous Generation^ Transmutation
of SpecieSy ^c.
To combat or explain away the previous conclusion a new scheme of nature was invented. It was con-
XVIU PREPAOE TO THB FIFTH EDITION.
tended that we know nothing but second causes, and that they are all in all — that the commencement of organic life was nothing more than one of the material changes in the endless cycle of movements going on continually before our eyes — a new material conbination produced by the elemental powers of the natural world ; and as purely natural as any new mechanical deposit or any new chemical combination. This view of the commencement of the organic world was called qxm-
i taneous ffmieration.
But our theorists were not content to rest at this point. They further assumed that the humblest forms of organic life, having thus begun, had also a natural tendency to breed upwards, so as to ascend (by a law of progressive development) on a natural scale of \
organic forms: — that a monad thus passed by natural means (and by natural means only) into the more complicated form of some zoophyte — the zoophyte into a mollusk — the mollusk, by a like succession of natural steps, into a fish, a reptile, a bird, and a mammal : — and lastly, that by a like natural progression (in which all idea of creative power is excluded) some inferior mammal passed into a monkey, and a monkey into a man. The successive changes, implied in this theory, were not sudden, but slow and gradual, and brought about, during the lapse of ages, by the insensible sliding of one species into another. Thus by the simple operation of second ^
causes we obtain, on the principles of this theory, two classes of phenomena, one defined by the words span-
\1 tan&0U8 generation^ the other by such terms as progressive
PRBFAOB TO THE FIFTH EDITION. , XIX
de^dopmmt^ or tra/ntmtUation of sp&eies : and thus we are supposed naturally to account for all the phenomena of organic life and the whole sequence of animated nature.
The authors and early defenders of this theory were, perhaps without exception, unbelievers in every form of Revealed Truth. They were materialists in the rankest sense of that term. They denied all distinction between material and moral phenomena — ^regarding them both as nothing more than the varied mani* festations of the powers of second causes. Most of them formally denied all proofs of design in nature, and all indications of an overruling Providence ; and thus struck at the foundation of Natural Religion. But a doctrine may be true, and yet may be turned to evil purposes. The first questions for discussion are the following — Is this doctrine true t Has the animal kingdom been first produced by sponianeous generation^ and afterwards perfected by tra/Mmutatwn and progressive devdopment f
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