A Commentary on the Campaign and Battle of Manassas, of July 1861 ...: With a Summary of the Art ...

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Preface

The following commentary upon the campaign and battle of Manassas was originally purposed as a magazine article consequent to the raising by General Joseph E. Johnston of certain personal claims in respect to those events, in an article published by him in the Century magazine for May, 1885.

The full treatment of the subject, however, carried these pages beyond the limits of a magazine paper and their publication was therefore deferred.

Perhaps I might have left the question raised by the author of that article to be determined upon the facts as already known and attested. On the other hand, I have considered that, when an historical issue is made, it may be justly required that he whom it chiefly concerns should contribute thoroughly to its elucidation, leaving impartial history to decide. It is under the sense of this duty, mani-

• •• iv PREFACE.

fold in its aspects, that I have felt bound to makea circumstantial exposition of the subject in question. with all its pertinent relations.

In order to aid the non-professional reader to a better understanding- of what was the proper military conduct on the Confederate side at the time and under the conditions covered by the present commentary, I have appended a summary of the Art of War which — together with certain orders issued by me while commanding in Northern Virginia and in the West, and of permanent applicability in the business of war — I had published in pamphlet form at Charleston in 1 863 for the instr tion of the officers in my Department.

G. T. Beauregaj

ANALYTICAL CONTENTS.

Preliminary Statement

I. General Beauregard Commands the Confederate

Forces in the Battle of Manassas . 3-12

Documentary official testimony that, upon the janction of the Shenandoah forces with the Army of the Potomac, General Johnston, though the senior, waived the command for the impending bailie to (leneral Beauregard — General Beauregard's report — His letter to Stonewall J acltson— -Congratulatory letters to him from the Secretary of War and General I-ee — General Johnston's ai^- nony against the above fact refuted — Illuslnitiom from home and European history — Corroborative illustration from Bneral Johnston's personal career — The Georgia campaign — The ksbuig campaign — Retreat from Fairfax Court-House — Counterit Centreville.

II. (the Situation as it was at the Time 13-17

pnandoah Valley General Johnston's field of operations — Btry between Washington and Richmond and east of the J General Beauregard's field of operations— General 1 proposes a concentration of forces to foil General . intended advance on Richmond — Nod -assent by inston, until he discovers that his own adversary, son, had disappeared from his front — Arriving at e of General Beauregard's collision with Genwaives the command for Ih9 o

VI ANALYTICAL CONTENTS.

III

General Johnston's Inquiry from the Government AS TO HIS Authority ; Rank of Confederate Officers 18-23

General Johnston, den3ring that he waived the command, quotes a fragment of President Davis' official telegram, and makes a miscitation from his history — Real text of that history and the full telegram — Relative rank of Generals Johnston and Beauregard — Order of commissions in the Confederate service — General Johnston's controversy with President Davis as to the Act of Congress regulating the same — Object of General Johnston's inquiry, which elicited the President's above telegram — Letter of the President conferring on General Beauregard the rank of "General."

IV. The Strategy of the Campaign and the Plan of

Battle 24-38

General Johnston's ill-styled criticism of General Beauregard's plans — He seeks impliedly to claim authorship of the strategy of the campaign — History of that strategy — General Johnston's practical misappreciation of its aims and hesitation to attempt its execution ; his adversary executes upon him the same movement which he doubted his own ability to perform — Consequent peril to the Confederate States — The proper military action for General Johnston — Railroad transportation provided for him by General Beauregard — General Beauregard's alternative proposition that General Johnston march via Aldie upon General McDowell's right rear, instead of coming directly to Manassas — General Johnston's criticism of it answered — His inconsistent propositions, as to the value of the Southern troops, applied according to his polemic needs — Illustration from the defence by the forces of Colonel Evans and Generals Bee and Bartow against General McDowell's flanking column in the battle of Manassas — Proper effect of the proposed Aldie movement upon General McDowell's right rear — Illustrations from European warfare of the effect of flank and rear attacks — General Johnston's distrustful calculations — Stonewall Jackson's similar and ready, though more difficult, movement upon General McClellan's rear, in 1862 — Other inconsistencies of General Johnston's propositions in strategy.

ANALYTICAL CONTENTS. VU

V. The Military Situation upon the Eve of the

Battle . 39-46

General Johnston's alleged disclosure, upon reaching Manassas, that General McDowell should be attacked next morning to forestal General Patterson's arrival — The offensive already determined by General Beauregard — His Special Order No. 100 for the falling back of his advanced posts and the assemblage of all the forces upon Bull Run — His Special Order No. 120, of July i6th, for the offensive — General Johnston's professed disability, arising from the absence of the ** configuration" on General Beauregard's maps — Those maps made not for him, but General Beauregard — Their sufficiency — General Johnston's experience as to such requirements inferior to General Beauregard's.

VI. General Beauregard's Plan of Attack and Order of

March 47-63

General Johnston's criticism in the Century magazine of General Beauregard's plans of attack and his description of his own conduct — Contrasted with his ** Narrative" — Contrasted with his report — Exposition of his errors as to said plan — The Order of Battle and the position of the forces along Bull Run — His miscomprehension of the order — His claim that General Beauregard prepared one differing from what was settled upon — His criticism of the form of the order, ** By command of General Beauregard " — His later pretexts for not correcting this — His apparent apprehension of defeat, suggested by the langruage of his "Narrative" — His present alleged intention to alter the Order of March of the forces after the movement as directed by General Beauregard would have begun — Effect of such attempted action.

VII

General McDowell Threatens the Confederate Left ; General Beauregard Orders the Offensive Movement to Begin . . . 64-70

Non-arrival of some of the promised Shenandoah forces — General Beauregard, concluding from reports in the night that General Mc-

VIll ANALYTICAL CONTENTS.

Dowell will attack his left and left centre, orders the forces, at 4.30 A.M., to be ready to execute his orders to attack — At 5.30, his left being threatened, he orders it to hold its position and directs an attack by his right and centre upon the Federal left flank at Centreville, in which General Johnston concurs — General Mc- Dowell detaches a force of 14,000 men, by a circuitous forest defile, against General Beauregard's left rear — General Beauregard's critical view of the operation of these opposing ofifensive plans.

VIII

General Johnston's Claim as to the Assignment of THE Forces of Generals Bee and Jackson ; the Facts AS to their Assignment . . . 71-74

IX

General Johnston's Statement that the Confederate Attack by the Right Wing and Centre WAS Frustrated by the Report of Strong Bodies in Front 75

X. First Events of the Battle .... 76-88

General Johnston's claim that up to 11 a.m. he was waiting in rear of Mitchell's Ford for evidence of General McDowell's design, which he then discovered to be against the left, and that he made the battle in that quarter — Contrast between his professed waiting till II A.M. for General McDowell's design with his professed disclosure of the necessity that General McDowell must be attacked in the morning, so as to forestal General Patterson's arrival — Danger of such passive conduct — Necessity for a commander who intends the offensive to attack early — General Beauregard's orders to attack issued by 5.30 a.m. — Parallel with Waterloo — General Beauregard, accompanied by General Johnston, takes a position in rear of Mitchell's Ford, not to await General McDowell's design, but to observe and follow up the offensive movement directed against the enemy's left flank — General Johnston's elliptical or mistaken statements as to the movements of the troops of Generals Bee and Jackson and Colonel Hampton.

ANALYTICAL CONTENTS. IX

THE ACTUAL COURSE OF EVENTS UP TO II A.M.

General Beauregard's signal officer, Captain E. P. Alexander, reports to him by despatch, and at last in person, the signs observable on the extreme left — General Beauregard despatches an officer thither with instructions to send him a report every ten minutes — Before any such report, General Beauregard hears from General Jones that General Ewell, the commander of his forces on the extreme right, had not yet come into position — He sends orders to General Ewell to hasten forward — The firing increasing on the left, General Johnston proposes to give his personal assistance in that quarter, while General Beauregard remains directing the offensive movement — General Beauregard learns from General Ewell that he was not merely delayed, but had kept till then his original position, having received no order to move — General Beauregard, deeming it too late, countermands the whole movement, and resolves to fight the battle out on the left — General Johnston concurs, though disavowing any positive opinion — General Beauregard directs reinforcements from the right to the left, and sets out thither with General Johnston — Language of General Beauregard's report — Surmise that General Johnston, if exercising the command, would in that exigency have fallen back to the Rappahannock — Language of General Johnston's report.

XL

The Events of the Action on the Left . . 89-100

General Johnston's account — His pretension, in his ** Narrative," and in a controversial private letter, that the new battle-field was as unfamiliar to General Beauregard as to himself — Abandonment of this pretence in his Century article — His controversial motive for that pretence — Inferences from it — General Beauregard's thorough reconnoissances of the whole country — The command of the forces for the battle exercised by him included, as a matter of common-sense, all its varying phases — The reasons for it intensified when the battle shifted to the left — Being responsible for the battle, he retained command of the field, while General Johnston, as though a chief of staff, took the position urged upon him by General Beauregard as best servient to his needs — General Beauregard's official commendation of the manner of his performance of this duty — General Beauregard's position the proper one for the commander — General Johnston's varying location of the field to suit his

X ANALYTICAL CONTENTS,

different arguments — His artificial enumeration of the forces — After the rout, Generals Holmes and Ewell not sent by him to cut o£f the enemy — His erroneous suggestions of his personal view and conduct of the field — His unacquaintance with the course of the action.

XII

•General Johnston's Error as to a Message Reporting THE Coming of a United States Army, 101-102

XIII. •General E well's Part IN THE Action . . 103-118

General Johnston's criticism of General Beauregard's comment on General Ewell's action — His personal motive for that criticism — General Beauregard's high esteem for General Ewell — His comment not a censure — General Johnston's remarks on Greneral Beauregard's allusion to Desaix and Stonewall Jackson — Explanation of General Ewell's part in the plan of battle — General Johnston's misstatement as to General Ewell's report and the positions of the enemy — His trifling with his readers — Effect of General Ewell's action, if he had moved according to the plan of battle — General Johnston's condemnation of the plan a negative proof that he was not exercising the command — The personal question as to General Ewell — General D. R. Jones' report that he communicated his order to General Ewell at 7.10 A.M. — General Ewell entitled to the benefit of the doubt — General Beauregard's order to General Ewell and General D. R. Jones (the commander of the neighboring forces to Ewell's) — General Jones' report — General Ewell's report — Correspondence between General Beauregard and General Ewell.

XIV. General Johnston's Aftersight Criticisms as to the

First Positions OF THE Forces . . 119-122

General Johnston, arrogating the victory, imputes to himself ' ' great fault" for not sending Generals Holmes' and Early's forces from the extreme right to the extreme left early in the morning — Incompleteness of this criticism — A great fault to have done so— Effective work for those forces on the right — The real fault as to their employment — Value of criticisms of aftersight, unless in view of the data and opportunities disclosed at the time — Remark of Frederick the Great as to the criticism of military plans.

ANALYTICAL CONTENTS. XI

XV

The Failure to Advance on Maryland and Washington AFTER THE VICTORY . . I23-I28

General Johnston lays the failure to advance after the victory upon the alleged greater demoralization of the Confederate than of the Federal troops — General McDowell's and General McClellan's description of the demoralization of the Federal troops from their defeat — General Johnston's pretence repugnant to all facts — Fifteen thousand Confederate troops unengaged and fresh — High spirits of the remainder — Influence of success on the morale of an army — Value and effect of the victory of Manassas — The above judgment confirms General Jordan's surmise that General Johnston, if he had come earlier to Manassas, would not have fought, but made a retreat — Greneral Johnston's condemnation of any scheme of crossing the Potomac — His contradiction thereby of his approval of the Fairfax Court-House plan in October, 1861 — This very plan, nevertheless, claimed by suggestion as his own.

XVI

General Jordan's Summary Criticism of that Part OF General Johnston's " Narrative " Touching THE Manassas Campaign . . . . 129-132