History of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac : including that of the Army of Virginia (Pope's), and also the history of the operations of the federal cavalry in West Virginia during the war

Introduction

The preparation of the following pages, especially that portion dealing with the events of the first two years of the war, has not been easy. To evolve a gen oral historv from those of individuals, and yet not deal with any one regiment to the prejudice of others; to separate the operations of the cavalry from those of the other arms, and yet preserve that degree of relationship which a part bears to the whole; to touch upon the details of the battle and the march, and yet not transgress the prescribed limits of this little history— all these have been difficulties which have severally and collectively taxed the writer's resources to the utmost. The almost total absence of works of reference, except histories of individual regiments and the official records of the War of the Rebellion, has in itself involved a vast deal of labor. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that a history of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac might very easily have filled three times as many pages as have here been devoted to it; and the writer has, much against his will, been compelled to cut out matter of the greatest interest. At the same time, while he has borne in mind that this history is intended to be a faithful chronicle of the life of the Federal cavalry, he has tried not to lose sight of the fact that a mere record of events is certain to be monotonous reading.

OF THE

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

At the breaking out of the War of the Rebellion the cavalry force at the disposal of the United States Government consisted of the First and Second Regi ments of Dragoons, one regiment of Mounted Rifles, and the First and Second Regiments of Cavalry. When President Lincoln issued his call for three-months volunteers, another regiment, the Sixth, was added to the five others, but, for the time, this was the extent of the increase in the cavalry. Volunteer infantry and artillery poured into Washington from all parts of the North, but volunteer cavalry neither came nor wer encouraged to come. Absurd as it now appears, it was the intention of the Federal authorities to confine the cavalry to the six regular regiments. The North conri denlly expected to crush the Rebellion at once. Cavalry was an expensive arm, and experienced officers knew that years were required to produce an efficient trooper. Even such a veteran as General Scott gave it as his opinion that, owing to the broken and wooded character of the field of operations and the improvements in rifled firearms, the role of the cavalry would be unimportant and secondary. McClellan's report of the preliminary operations in West Virginia says: "Cavalry was absolutely refused, but the governors of the States complied with my request and organized a few companies, which were finally mustered into the United States service and proved very useful."

Only seven companies of cavalry took part in the battle. of Bull Run, but the firm front which they dis played while covering the precipitate retreat of the Federal army probably saved a large proportion of the army from annihilation by Stuart's cavalry, and has never received the recognition which it deserved.

On the 27th of July, 1861, McClellan assumed com mand of what was destined to be called the Army of the Potomac, and the regular cavalry regiments were reorganized, and renumbered consecutively from "one'' to "six."

With the organization of the Army of the Potomac begins the real history of its cavalry, but for two long years — until its reorganization under Hooker — its history is one of neglect, disorganization, and misuse. .McClellan's one idea of the shortconiings of the cavalry was that it was not large enough. Meanwhile it furnished guides, orderlies, and grooms for staff officers, and was so divided up among corps, division, and brigade commanders as to completely subvert its true value, bringing sarcasm and ignominy on what should have been one of the most powerful factors in the overthrow of the Rebellion.

The drill regulations of the cavalry at the breaking out of the war — called at that time "tactics"- — were modified from those of the French dragoons, and had been found nnsuited to the needs of cavalry operating in the United States. General Philip St. . G. Cooke had accordingly prepared a new system, which was approved by the War Department in October, 1861, but did not come into use on account of the conditions which obtained at the time. This, without doubt, proved a great restriction upon the usefulness of the arm.

The armament of the volunteer regiments, which were mustered in with some show of interest after the disaster at Bull Run, were along the same lines as that of the regular regiments of that day, and was in charge of General Stoneman. Though suffering from a deficiency in cavalry arms and equipments, every cavalry soldier was armed with a saber and revolver as soon as circumstances permitted, and at least two squadrons in every regiment were armed with carbines.

One volunteer regiment, the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Rush's Lancers), was armed with the lance, in addition to the pistol, twelve carbines being afterwards added to the equipment of each company, for picket and scouting duties. The lances were carried from December, 1861, until May, 1863, when they were discarded for the carbine, as being ill-adapted for use in the wooded country through which the command operated.

The carbines issued were of various patterns, generally the Sharpe's, until the advent of the Spencer in 1863. The revolver was the Colt's. The saddle was the McClellan, -and, with the remaining horse equipments, had been adopted through recommendations made by General McClellan after his official European tour in 1860. The saddle, however, was covered with rawhide instead of leather, and became very uncomfortable when split.

The original regulations governing the mustering in of volunteer regiments required the cavalry to furnish their own horses as well as horse equipments;* but this was later modified, and the Government furnished them, as they had done to the regular regiments. But the horses furnished were in most cases very poor animals, due to fraud on the part of Government contractors, and tlie overtaxed resources of the Quartermaster's Department.

On the l"ith of October, 1861, the organization of the cavalry consisted of a small brigade under General Stoneman, and some eleven or twelve other regiments, attached to divisions of infantry.* Its strength, November 12th, aggregated 8,125, of which but 4,753 are reported as "present for duty, equipped." It was constantly drilled during the fall and winter, with enough scouting and outpost duty in the Virginia hills to give the cavalry regiments a foretaste of actual service. And just preceding the Peninsular cam paign. General Stoneman with a brigade made a reconnaissance along the Orange & Alexandria Railroad as far as Cedar Run.

In March, 1802, the Peninsular Army was trans ported southward, and the siege of Yorktown was begun. The cavalry reserve, which was under that veteran cavalryman, General P St. G. Cooke, was organized as two brigades under Generals Emery and Blake, and consisted of six regiments. f The rest of tBmory's Brigade: Fifth U. S. Cavalry, Sixth U. S. Cavalry, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry. Blake's Brigade: First U S. Cavalry, Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Barker's squadron Illinois Cavalry.

the cavalry was divided up among the array corps and the various headquarters. Every available hour spared from outpost duty was still utilized for drill, and when the enemy abandoned his lines at Yorktown, the cavalry was called upon to pursue.

General Cooke encountered the enemy in force at Fort Magruder, but as he failed to be supported by Hooker's Division through causes which have become historic, he was obliged to fall back. But not before the First U. S. Cavalry had made two brilliant charges, capturing a regimental standard. Major Williams four squadrons of the Sixth U. S. Cavalry, which was cut off by a large force of the enemy, saved itself by promptly wheeling about by fours and charging the pursuers.

Had there been a larger force of Federal cavalry, or had it been properly supported by the infantry divisions, it is probable that the battle of Williamsburg, which followed, would never have been fought. Longstreet had not intended to fight here, but finding his rear guard successful and posted in a strong position, and a large portion of his force involved, he gave battle.

The cavalry took little part in this battle. Williamsburg was abandoned by the enemy on the Gth, and Colonel Averell, with portions of the Third Penn-

Army of the Potomac. If

sylvania and Eighth Illinois Cavalry, pressed on in pursuit as far as New Kent, recovering five pieces of artillery and capturing twenty-one prisoners.

"From this time on," as a distinguished cavalry officer has said, "affairs with the cavalry, through no fault of its own, went from bad to worse. Detachments from its strength were constantly increased, and it was hampered by instructions which crippled it for all useful action." But in spite of the disadvantages under which it labored, it displayed the same brave devotion to duty which was afterwards to be put to such good account during the last two years of the war.

During the next few days, the cavalry was almost constantly engaged in reconnaissance duty, and although there were numerous minor skirmishes, nothing of importance occurred until the taking of Hanover Court House (May 27-29), when the Fifth and Sixth United States Cavalry, supported by the Seventeenth New York Infantry, cut off and captured the greater part of an entire regiment — the Twenty-eighth North Carolina Infantry — continuing the pursuit two and one-half miles beyond the town.

In pursuance of the general plan of cutting the enemy's communications with northern Virginia, cav airy brigades under General Emory and Colonel Warren destroyed the bridges over the South Anna and

I'amunkey livers, and engaged in many creditable skirmishes with the enemy Some of the volunteer cavalry, during these operations, were under fire for the first time.

The cavalry's part in the battle of Fair Oaks (May 29th) was insignificant. Nothing else could be expected, considering its disunited condition and anomalous status; so that when, two weeks later (June 13th), Stuart, with about 1,200 cavalry, passed completely around the Federal army and fell on the weak right flank of the cavalry, there could be but one result. The cavalry was blamed for not having given notice of Stuart's approach; and when General Cooke, with a small cavalry force, was tacked on to an infantry division and told to catch Stuart, his failure to strike his swift-moving adversary was criticised in ihese words: "I have seen no energy or spirit in the pursuit by General Cooke of the enemy, nor has he exhibited the characteristics of a skillful and active guardian of our flanks.''*

Time lias shown that General Cooke received positive orders from the commanding general of the left wing 1o regulate his pursuit by the march of the infantry column, and on no account to precede it. "The oflicer of to-day, even though he has had no experience

♦Report of General Fitz John Porter.

in war, with the record of cavalry marches before him, can imagine the effect of such an order on a dashing, chivalrous, enthusiastic cavalry officer, chafing under the restraints that had already been placed upon him by a soldier who had learned from the books that a forced march for cavalry for one day was twenty-five miles."*

In the passage of the Army of the Potomac over the Chickahominy, General Porter, with the Fifth Army Corps, was charged with covering the movement and keeping the enemy in check. All the cavalry was placed under his orders, and the battle of Gaines' Mill, which followed (June 27th), is remarkable for the stubborn resistance of the cavalry under General Oooke.f

The line of battle formed the arc of a circle, almost parallel to the Chickahominy, and Cooke's division, consisting of two small brigades, was placed behind the breaks of a plateau, in rear of the extreme left of the line. During the day the Confederate army, reinforced by the army of Stonewall Jackson from northern Virginia, made four desperate assaults on the Union lines, and every available infantryman was

♦General Merritt, in Journal V. S. Cavalry Association, June, 1895.

brought into action. In rear of the left of the line there was not a single reserve, save the cavalry and considerable artillery. The day was fast drawing to a close, when the Confederates made a final effort to force the left flank and cut it off from the bridge over the Ohickahominy The center and left of the line gave wav under overwhelming numbers, many of the regiments being completely demoralized. The reserve artillery, left without support, had begun to limber up, when, by order of General Cooke, they were ordered to maintain their position, and were assured that the cavalry would support them. The artillery willingly complied and opened a heavy tire on the advancing infantry lines. When almost too close for an effective charge. General Cooke ordered Captain Whiting, commanding the Fifth TT. S. Cavalry, to charge with his regiment. Numbering but 220 sabers, the little force moved out under a heavy fire, and a portion of the line struck the enemy intact, and were only slopped by the woods at the bottom of the slope The casualties in the charge were ."s, with 24 horses killed, a sacrifice that was well worth the results attained. Under cover of the charge the artillery was safely withdrawn, its bold stand having delayed the enemy's advance long enough for the re-forming of the best disciplined infantry regiments.

Had this determined stand not been made, the seizure of the Chickahominy bridge and the capture of at least a portion of Porter's command would undoubtedly have followed. And yet General Porter reported that the cavalry caused the loss of the action. The Comte de Paris, in a letter to General Cooke, February 2, 1877, has said: "The sacrifice of some of the brav^ est of the cavalry certainly saved a part of the artillery, as did, on a larger scale, the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa. The main fact is that with your cavalry you did all that cavalry could do to stop the rout."*

Not a more glorious act occurred during the entire war than this misrepresented charge of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, as a sacrifice for the withdrawal of the artillery The survivors should have been decorated, and, had they belonged to a French or German army. they would undoubtedly have been thus rewarded.

About June 24th General Ktoneman was placed in command of all the cavalry on the right of the army (about 2,000 in all), and was charged with picketing the country towards Hanover Court House. During the Seven Days' battles he was guarding the region from the Meadow Bridge to the Pamunkey, with the

♦"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II., page 344.

Seventeenth New York Infantry and Eighteenth Massachusetts in support. The maneuvering of the enemy was such as to cut off Stoneman's command from Porter's corps, and, after falling back on White House, where he destroyed immense quantities of stores to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands, he retreated to Yorktown, arriving there the 29th instant. These cavalry regiments attached to the army corps during this movement performed arduous and painstaking duties.

By an order published July 8, 1802, part of the volunteer cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was organized by General Stoneman into two brigades, commanded by Colonels Averell and Gregg/' -To Averell was assigned the task of thoroughly patrolling the country in front of the right wing and flank, and to Colonel Gregg was given similar duties on the left flank. Diminutive as this force was for the many duties it was called upon to perform, it performed

*First Brigade (Averell's) : Third Pennsylvania, First New York, Fourth Pennsylvania, Cavalry.

Second Brigade (1, Gregg's; 2, Pleasanton's) : Eighth Illinois, Eighth Pennsylvania, Sixth New York.

To Sumner's corps, Barker's squadron.

To Heintzelman's corps, Delaney's squadron, Fifth Pennsylvania Cavalry.

To Keyes' corps, one squadron, Eighth Illinois Cavalry.

To Porter's corps, one squadron, First New York Cavalry

To Franklin's corps, one squadron, First New Ynrlr Cavalry. l "■ them well. But again was the cavalry called upon to furnish guides scouts, orderlies, and escorts, until the regiments dwindle down to mere nothings. In fact, as General Merritt has said, "After Gaines' Mill, the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had no history of which it had reason to be proud, until the reorganization of the army, with Hooker in command."

II

On the 26th of June General John Pope had been assigned to the command of the Army of Virginia, composed of the commands of Generals Banks, Fremont, and McDowell. Fremont had succeeded Rosetrans in command of the Mountain Department, March 29th, but under his administration and those of his predecessors, the Federal cavalry in West Virginia had performed no conspicuous deeds. The country was ill-suited for maneuvering large bodies of cavalry ; but for scouting and reconnoitering small bodies could be made very useful, as shown by the value to Meridian of the hvbrid commands known as McMullen's Rangers, the Ringgold Cavalry, and Burdsall's Cavalry. Tu fact, partisan warfare was a distinct feature of the operations in West Virginia throughout the war.

A year after the beginning of the war, the Mountain Department, which included West Virginia, contained thirty-six companies of cavalry, aggregating 2,741 men; but they were poorly equipped and mounted— many of them dismounted. And these, with the insufficient infantry and artillery forces, guarded a frontier 350 miles long, 300 miles of railroad, and 200 miles of water communication.

In his report of the battle of Kernstown (March 23, 1862) — one of the bright spots in the successive misfortunes of the Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley — General Shields says: "My cavalry is very ineffective. If I had one regiment of excellent cavalry, armed with carbines, I could have doubled the enemy's loss."

The cavalry which Fremont brought to the Army of Virginia were partly dismounted, and the horses of those who were mounted were in a great measure so broken down and starved as to be well-nigh useless. The mounted forces of Banks and McDowell were in much the same miserable condition. The consolidated morning report of July 31, 1862, shows that out of 8,738 cavalry in the three corps, 3,000 are deducted as "until for service." Such a proportion is a commentary on the condition of the cavalry of the Army of Virginia at this time.

And yet this little force did excellent service; partly, perhaps, through the efficiency of those who commanded it, but principally on account of its wise use by the commanding general.

Pope's general instructions directed him to cover Washington, and pending the transfer of McClellan's troops from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek, Va., he was charged with resisting at all hazard any possible advance of the enemy.

Accordingly General King, at Fredericksburg, was directed to send out detachments of his cavalry to operate on the line of the Virginia Central Railroad and destroy communications between Richmond and the Shenandoah. The cavalry expeditions sent out were highly successful.

At the same time Banks was directed to push all his cavalry towards Gordonsville, and its execution was entrusted to General John I. Hatch, an officer of the regular cavalry. But this officer, instead of pushing forward with all haste, burdened himself with infantry, artillery, and wagon trains, so that when Pope supposed the bridges and railroad destroyed in the vicinity of Charlottesville and Gordonsville, Hatch's command had just reached Madison Court House. This movement illustrates the common idea of the use of cavalry at this period. Hatch's delay

20 Ilistonj of the Cavalry,

allowed Jackson's advance to occupy Gordonsvillc and the movements contemplated became impracticable. Hatch was relieved from command, and was succeeded by Buford, as chief of cavalry of Banks' corps.

On August 7th the cavalry of the Army of Virginia was distributed as follows: Buford's brigade, at Madison (1ourt House, picketing the Kapidan from Barnett's Ford to the Blue Ridge; Bayard's brigade at Bapidan Station, picketing from Barnett's to Raccoon Fords. (Buford and Bayard were young officers of the regular cavalry.) Pickets were also established from Raccoon Ford to the forks of the Rappahannock. The whole disposition of the cavalry was admirably arranged as a screening force, and on August 7th and 8th performed valuable service in retarding Jackson's advance and keeping Pope informed of the enemy's movements.

At the battle of Cedar Mountain,* which occurred the following day, the cavalry fell slowly back as the enemy advanced, and rendered effective service throughout the day, a squadron of the First Pennsylvania Cavalry making a most gallant charge against a body of the enemy which was about to charge the Union batteries. The squadron lost an aggregate of 93 men out of the 104 who participated in the charge

As Jackson fell back across the Rapidan, the cavalry kept touch with him, and reoccupied their old picket line, stretching from Raccoon Ford to the base of the Blue Ridge. Reconnaissances, too, were pushed forward, and a cavalry command sent out on August 16th captured General Stuart's adjutant-general with important dispatches, the tenor of which strongly influenced Pope in his decision to fall back across the Rappahannock, which he did August 17th and 18th.

At this time the cavalry was greatly fatigued. Pope says: "Our cavalry numbered on paper about 4,000 men, but their horses were completely broken down, and there were not 500 men capable of doing as much service as should be expected from cavalry " That the cavalry would play an unimportant part iu the subsequent movements leading up to and culminating in the battle of Bull Run would be expected from their miserable condition. With broken-down horses it was impossible to cover the front of the army, or to make reconnaissances. Speaking of the condition of the cavalry on the morning of the battle of Bull Run, Pope says: "The artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness and saddled continually for ten days, and had had no forage for two days previous." But the services of the cavalry under their two efficient brigade commanders could not receive greater praise than when General Pope says: "Generals Bayard and Buford commanded the cavalry belonging to the Army of Virginia. Their duties were peculiarly arduous and hazardous, and it is not too much to say that throughout the operations, from the first to the last day of the campaign, scarcely a day passed that these officers did not render service which entitles them to the gratitude of the Government."*

Thus did the cavalry acquit itself. It had not always been used wisely, nor was it kept supplied with remounts and forage as it should have been. Efficiency, which comes only with experience, was gradually gaining ground in spite of many obstacles. The true worth of cavalry, and consequently its true employment, was beginning to be better comprehended. An order issued by General Pope, soon after the battle of Cedar .Mountain, directing the cavalry detachments at brigade and division headquarters to report 'for duty to their chiefs of cavalry, and greatly reducing the number of orderlies, marks a decided change in the condition of the cavalry; but the time was still far distant when it was to be given a status in keeping with its importance, and when it was able to vin dicate itself in the eyes of those who "never saw a dead cavalrvman."

rmy of the Potomac. 23

III

On the 5th day of September, 1862, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia were consolidated, and General McClellan assumed command of both armies.

Contrary to public expectation, General Lee invaded Maryland instead of attacking Washington, and the Army of the Potomac, while shielding the national capital, endeavored to keep touch with the army of invasion. Had McClellan had at his disposal at this time an adequate cavalry force, his task would have been made infinitely more simple.

But the cavalry, especially that portion which had passed through Pope's campaign, was in deplorable condition for aggressive action. Pleasanton's cavalry division, weakened though it was by its experience on the Peninsula, was best able to take the field, and early in September was reconnoitering the fords of the Potomac. On the 9th it occupied Barnesville, and captured the battle-flag of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry. On the 13th the right wing and center of the Federal army having reached Frederick, the cavalry cleared the passage over the Catoctin Hills, and early on the morning of the 14th found the enemy occupying advantageous positions at South Mountain, on either

24 History of the Caralry,

side of the gap through which the National Road

passed.

The enemy was routed from his positions by the Federal army, but the cavalry took little part in the battle. Pleasanton deployed a portion of his cavalry dismounted during the day, causing the enemy to mass a considerable force on the right of the Confederate position.

Lee's army withdrew so as to cover the Shepherdstown Ford of the Potomac, and the cavalry, followed by three army corps, pursued by way of Boonesborough. At the latter place the cavalry caught up with the enemy's rear guard, and, charging repeatedly, drove the enemy two miles beyond the town. The enemy left 30 dead and 50 wounded upon the field, besides 2 pieces of artillery and 250 prisoners captured; while the loss to the Union cavalry was but 1 killed and 15 wounded.

On the 17th, the date of the battle of Antietam, the cavalry moved to Antietam Bridge, which was found to be under a cross-fire of the enemy's artillery. Cavalry skirmishers were thrown forward, and, aided by the horse batteries of the division, the enemy's batteries were driven from their positions. The main battle was between the infantry and artillery of both armies, and resulted in the withdrawal of Lee's army into Virginia.

On the 18th the cavalry was feeling the enemy and collecting stragglers; on the 19th, pushing the enemy's rear guard at the fords of the Potomac; and thereaf ter, for some time, it was so disposed as to cover the principal fords, making frequent reconnaissances into Virginia to develop the enemy's position and movements.

For these duties the strength of the cavalry was found to be inadequate. Overwork and disease had broken down the horses to such an extent that when on October 11th General Stuart made a raid into Pennsylvania with 2,000 men, McClellan could mount but 800 men to follow him.*

To meet this raid, Averell — then on the upper Potomac— moved down the north side of the river, while Pleasanton, taking the Cavestown — Mechanicstown road, was disposed to cut off the raiding force should it cross by any of the fords below the main army. Upon arriving at Mechanicstown, Pleasanton learned that the enemy was but an hour ahead of him — retreating towards the mouth of the Monocacy; and, although his own force numbered about one-fourth that of the enemy, he pursued vigorously,! and attacked

♦Rebellion Records, Vol. XIX., Part I., page 71.

For strength, "present and absent," see Appendix 7.

fPleasanton marched seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours.

Stuart's rear guard with such energy that the latter was prevented from crossing the Monocacy Ford, and was forced to move to White's Ford, three miles below. Had the latter ford been occupied by troops as was originally ordered, it is quite probable that Stuart would have been captured or badly crippled. A larger cavalry force, or even a supply of serviceable horses for the Army of the Potomac, might have prevented this raid, which had the effect of drawing a considerable force from Lee's tired army, produced great consternation among the people of the North, and led to the loss of much property.

On September 10th General Buford had been announced as chief-of-cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, but the office was simply a staff position, and was attended -with very little, if any, independence of action. So far as the cavalry was concerned, the chief-of-cavalry was the executive officer of the commanding general.

On October 1st General Bayard was assigned to the command of all the cavalry about Washington, south of the Potomac; and on the 21st General Pleasanton was given a cavalry brigade, consisting of the Sixth U. S. Cavalry, the Eighth Pennsylvania, the Eighth Illinois, the Third Indiana, and the Eighth New York < 'avalry regiments.

Army of Itie Potomac ~7

On the 20th Pleasanton crossed the Potomac at Berlin, and during the next few days was employed, as was also the brigade of Bayard, in gaining information of the enemy's movements, resulting in skirmishes at Snicker's Gap, TJpperville, Aldie, Mountville, Philomont, and Manassas Gap. On November ,5th his brigade fought an action at Barbee's Cross- Boads, with Stuart's command of about 3,000 cavalry, accompanied by four pieces of artillery. Gregg, with the Eighth Pennsylvania and the Sixth United States, turned the enemy's right; Davis, with the Eighth New York, attacked the left; and Farnsworth, with the Eighth Illinois, moved against the center. During the engagement, Davis was met by a much superior force, about to charge him. He quickly overcame the disproportion in numbers by dismounting several of his companies behind a stone wall, and their galling front and flank fire soon threw the enemy into confusion. This accomplished, Davis, with the remainder of the regiment, mounted, charged, routed the enemy, and drove him from the field. The Confederates left thirtyseven dead upon the field, while the Fnion loss was but five killed and eight wounded. This maneuver of fighting dismounted behind obstacles with a portion of a command, and charging the enemy in the flank with the remainder mounted, became a very common and effective method of fighting throughout the war.