McClellan's own story : the war for the Union, the soldiers who fought it, the civilians who directed it and his relations to it and to them

Contents

Biographical Sketch of George Brinton McClellan i

Introduction by the Author 27

Chapter I

Causes of the war — Principles of the Union — State-rights and secession— Slavery — Immediate and gradual emancipation — Douglas and Lincoln — War imminent — The South responsible— A slander refuted — McClellan always for the Union — Enters the service — Made major-general of volunteers in Ohio. 29-41

Chapter II

Beginning of the war in the West — Apathy at Washington — Value of State governments — Incidents in organizing Western army — Kentucky — Campaign in Western Virginia — McClellan called to Washington... .. 42-56

Chapter IV

Arrival at Washington — Reception by Gen. Scott and the President— Condition of the capital — Takes command of the Division of the Potomac — State of the army — Numbers, increase, and position of troops .... 66-81

iii

IV CONTENTS.

PAGE

Chapter XII

Review of the situation — McClellan succeeds Scott in command of all the armies — Their condition ; general disorganization ; no plan for the war — McClellan s plans for the whole war — Simultaneous movements throughout the country — Orders to

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Burnside for North Carolina expedition ; to Halleck and Buell for operations in the West ; to Butler for the New Orleans expedition — Halleck and Grant— Correspondence of McClellan and Grant .. 198-221

Chapter XXV

Beginning of the Seven Days— McDowell coming, but not yet — McClellan resolves on flank movement to the James river — Preparations— Battle of Gaines's Mill— The movement goes on — McClellan charges Stanton with intent to sacrifice the arm-y 410-425

Chapter XXIX

The army at Harrison's Bar — Indecision at Washington — The Harrison's Bar letter — Army ordered home — Protests of- McClellan— On the bank of the James river the fate of the Union should be decided — Transportation not provided — Withdrawal of the army — Transfer to front of Washington. 481-507

Chapter XXX

The army reaches Alexandria ; sent forward to Pope — Pope's campaign— McClellan's work at Alexandria — The last man sent forward — Stanton's ironical order — McClellan commands a hundred men — Halleck in despair — McClellan's volunteer services.. 508-527

Chapter XXXII

Recalled to save the capital — Pope defeated — The President appeals to McClellan — He accepts command — Alarm in Washington— Enthusiasm of the army — The capital safe — The order of Sept. 2 — Halleck's testimony — Stormy cabinet meeting 534-548

Chapter XXXIII

Maryland invaded — McClellan not to command in the field — Halleck declines advice about Harper's Ferry — The North in danger — McClellan assumes command — The halter around his neck — McClellan unrestrained — Marching, and reorganizing the army on the march — Harper's Ferry lost — Mc- Clellan relieves it, but Miles surrenders — Franklin's victory at Crampton's Gap 549-565

Chapter Xxxviii

After the battle — The position reviewed — Condition of the army — Reorganization and supply — Visit of the President — He approves McClellan's course — Details of supplies needed and not received — Shoes, clothing, blankets, tents, horses — Dates of receipt of supplies — Plans of advance into Virginia. 618-644

Chapter XXXIX

Crossing the Potomac — -The march of a great army — Overtaking the enemy — Another battle imminent — Removed from the command — Burnside brings the order — Farewells to the army .. 645-653

Chapter XL. Illustrations

PAGE

i. Steel plaie : Portrait of Gen Geo. B. McClellan ; from a photograph taken in 1S85 ... .. .. .Frontispiece

2. Statuette, by J. A. Bailly : Gen. McClellan on horseback. ... xi

3. Map of the Peninsular ...... .... 255

4. McClellan Reconnoitring at Yorktown. Drawn by A. R. Waud . 271

5. PI an of the Siege of Yorktown.. .... .. , 273

6. Dan Webster : Gen. McClellan s favorite war-horse. From a

photograph .... 329

7. Gen. McClellan at the White House : Drawn by A. R. Waud.. . . 361

8. Gen. McClellan, Gen. Morell, Prince de Joinville, Comte de Paris,

Col. Colburn, and Col. Sweitzer, at Gen. Morell's headquarters. From a photograph by Brad}' 413

9. McClellan posting the batteries at Malvern Hill. Drawn by A.

10. Fac-simile of despatch, Gen. McClellan to Gen. Halleck. From

McClellan's original despatch-book 522-523

11. Map of the Battle of Antietam 585

12. The Burnside Bridge over the Antietam. From a photograph

13. McClellan at Antietam. Drawn by A. R. Waud .... 599

14. McClellan's Farewell to the Army of the Potomac. Drawn by

A. R. Waud , 649

Note. — Mr. A. R. Waud accompanied the Army of the Potomac while under McClellan'* command, and the illustrations dra« n by him are from his original sketches made on the spot in 1S62.

Statuette by J. A. Bailly.

W C. PRIMK, LL.D.

LIFE, SERVICES, AND CHARACTER

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

George Brinton McClellan, son of George McClellan, M.D., and Elizabeth Brinton McClellan, was born in Philadelphia, Penn., Dec. 3, 1826. His school education was in that city ; in 1841 and 1842 in the preparatory school attached to the University of Pennsylvania. He entered the Military Academy at West Point in 1842, graduating in 1846, when he was assigned to the Corps of Engineers as second lieutenant. In Sept. of the same year he went with the army to Mexico, where he served with distinction during the war. He was breveted first !.~utenant for gal Ian try at Contreras and Churubusco, captain for Chapultepec.

At the close of the Mexican war he commanded the engineer company and brought it to West Point, where he served with it, acting also as assistant instructor of practical engineering until 1851. In that year he superintended the construction of Fort Delaware. In 1852 he accompanied Capt. R. B. Marcy on the Red river exploring expedition. In 1853 and 1854 he was on duty in Washington Territory and Oregon, as an engineer officer, exploring a proposed route for the Pacific Railroad.

In the spring of 1855 the government sent a commission of army officers to Europe, instructed to obtain and report information on military service in general, and the practical working of changes then recently made in military systems.

The commission was specially instructed to give attention to the organization of armies, transports for men and horses, embarking and disembarking them, hospitals and ambulances, clothing and camp equipage, arms and ammunition, fortifications and sea-coast defences, engineering operations of a siege in all its branches, siege-trains, bridge-trains, boats, wagons — in short, to study and report on the whole art of war in Europe. As the Crimean war was then in progress, and the British and French forces were besieging Sebastopol, this was an important point for the objects of the commission, which consisted of three officers — Maj. R.

Delafield, Maj. A. Mordecai, and Capt. G. B. McClellan. They proceeded to Europe in the spring of 1855, amply accredited to American representatives and the several governments on whose courtesy they would have to depend for opportunities of study and observation.

The British government extended to them every possible courtesy. From the French and the Russian they could obtain no facilities. They were received in the Crimea with soldierly kindness by Gen. Simpson, who had succeeded Lord Raglan in command of the British forces. Here they had ample opportunity for the study of military operations on a grand scale. Leaving the Crimea in Nov., they pursued their duties in various European states. The list of military posts and fortresses which they examined is very long, abounding in names illustrious in the history of wars. McClellan's Report on the arms, equipments, and organization of " the three arms " was, says a distinguished soldier, "a model of conciseness and accurate information, and added to his already brilliant reputation." It may be noted as an interesting fact that the Secretary of War who issued the elaborate instructions to this commission, and selected its members for their special ability and fitness, was Jefferson Davis. Five years later, when he was at the head of a political and military rebellion, one of the commissioners utilized his experience and information in organizing and leading the armies of the Union for its suppression.

In Jan , 1857, McClellan, then captain in the 1st Cavalry, resigned his commission and accepted employment, first as chief-engineer, afterward as vice-president, of the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Later he became president of the Eastern Division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company.

On the 22d May, i860, he married Ellen Mary Marcy, daughter of Capt. (afterward Gen.) Randolph B. Marcy, and established his residence at Cincinnati, O., where he was occupied in his business when the civil war began, and he offered his services to his country.

No volunteer in the army made greater personal sacrifices. He was in the enjoyment of a large income ; his prospects in life were brilliant. Like all soldiers of the old army, he had led a wandering life, with no one place to call a home. He had now for the first time made for himself a place of rest with his young wife, in which thev were gathering those personal belongings which go so far to make life happy and rest delightful. The sacrifices of the soldier's wife are as great, often greater, than those of the husband. McClellan's wife was a soldier's daughter. The spirit of obedience to the call of duty ruled them both alike. No words can fitly express the perfectness of that love which was the light of both their lives. It was expressed in a few lines of his letters which I have suffered to appear in this volume, in a thousand passages and words which are omitted.

His life from April, i86r, to Nov., 1862, forms the subject of this narrative, which I have entitled "McClellan's Own Story."

He was commissioned major-general of volunteers in Ohio on the 23d April, 1861.

On the 14th May he was made major-general in the United States army and placed in command of the Department of the Ohio.

On the 26th May he issued a proclamation to the Union men of Western Virginia, and an address to his soldiers whom he led to what has been known as the Western Virginia campaign. On the 22d July, having freed Western Virginia from secessionists and preserved its people to the Union, he was summoned to Washington, and, arriving there on the 26th, was assigned to command the Division of the Potomac.

He found Washington in a perilous condition. The defeat at Bull Run had demoralized the administration and the army. No one had formed any, the most vague, idea of what was to be done or how to do anything. Up to this time the administration had shared with the people of the North and an unconsidering press the opinion that the rebellion was but a mob, to be scattered in one or two free fights by impetuous onsets of patriotic men. Now the shout, "On to Richmond," had been suddenly and appallingly hushed. Paralysis had followed. Not even Scott or McDowell, or any military adviser of the administration and people, had thought of making ordinary military provision for the defence of Washington against an enemy whose shell might at an}' moment shatter the dome of the Capitol. 'Ihe military condition of the whole country, Western Virginia alone excepted, was chaotic.

Probably there were other men in America as well fitted by natural ability and education for the great work in hand, but they did not appear. No other one has been indicated as the proper man for the occasion. That occasion demanded a calm foresight of the vast needs of the country in the coming, the then present, peril, the ability to provide for every one of them, and — the expression is homely but precise — the staying power to make the provision perfectly, calmly, completely, unmoved by the cries, however honest and anxious, of an alarmed people, equally unmoved by the criticisms of the envious and the clamors of the unprincipled.

If the wisdom which sought the ablest military advice in that moment of alarm had been displayed throughout the war by entrusting to military knowledge and ability the conduct of campaigns and the direction and execution of the work of war, the expense of treasure and blood would have been vastly less, and the end would have been much more speedy. Instead of this, after McClellan had assured the safety of the capital, and the alarm of the civilians had subsided, they assumed the direction, interfered with and delayed military preparations, and undertook the specific management of campaigns and armies, while they took care that the delays and defeats which they caused should be charged on soldiers in the field.

We who were then living can with the utmost difficulty carry our minds back to the conditions under which McClellan was called to save the capital and country. It is impossible for the present generation to realize the blindness of the people or appreciate the prevision of the young general. We now look back to all that which he foresaw, foretold, and provided for. So intense had been popular feeling that it was regarded 3 as treason to think or say that secession was in great strength, that the South would not be easily conquered.

He was alone in the clear atmosphere, above the scene of physical and political warfare, and saw what others could not or would not see. Mr. Lincoln probably came nearer to accepting his views than any one else. From this time on the President reposed confidence in him ; and there is small reason for doubt that, but for the interference of politicians, Lincoln and McClellan would have brought the war to an end in the summer of 1862. But Mr. Lincoln soon had two wars on his hands. He was at the head of the Union and at the head of a political party. Both were threatened with division. He desired to save both, probably believing that the unit}' of his party was essential to the saving of the country. In this view can be explained much which is otherwise inexplicable in his dealings with the general, to whom up to the very last he gave the most frank and full private assurances of his confidence.

The " staying" powers of McClellan were the salvation of the Union. Alone in his outlook, he was alone in the execution of his great work. The fortification of Washington accomplished, and a sufficient force organized and disciplined for its defence, he directed his labors to the next great need — an army. The people, the sovereigns, had not the remotest conception of the meaning of the word "army." Very few soldiers in this country had grasped the idea. No one but McClellan had observed that the able and educated soldiers of the South had long been organizing that vast machine which, once created, moves with irresistible force over all obstacles until met by another machine of like construction and greater power, or which is handled with greater skill. The Arm)' of the Potomac grew like a Vast engine constructed by a master-mind. Its history is the reward of the constructor, ample, and the only reward he

.ever received.

There was one characteristic of McClellan's mind which some would regard as a defect, and which certainly placed him at a disadvantage in his relations with the men in Washington. He was slow to suspect evil

.of any man. This trait was exhibited in his private life, and he never wholly lost it. The philosophic reader will find interest in the indications

.afforded in his letters of his gradual awakening to the controlling presence in Washington of a class of men known as politicians. Soldiers, accus-

itomed to honest service for definite purposes, imbued with high principles of honor, can with difficulty recognize the existence of men in public life

vwho are willing to manage public interests for private or party gain.

He .knew the past history of his country by heart. He remembered

• the illustrious names and records of men whose high ambition had been to serve the people as statesmen, whom no one had ever thought to charge

• with personal or party motive" in any of their acts as trustees and representatives of the people. Was the day of such American senators and representatives gone by ? Was legislation henceforth to be for the perpetuation

' of hold on office, for the success of party, with the mere pretence of good i to country? Now .that .the general trust of governmental powers had become a specific trust of blood to be poured out and treasure to be expended for the salvation of the Union, it did not occur to him that any of the trustees could dream of using that treasure and blood for personal advantage. When men professed honest patriotism he believed them.

Nor do the people themselves, in times of excitement, yield readily to the belief that among their leaders are some who are not honest and patriotic. But in calm retrospect they are generally more wise. It would not be difficult already to make a catalogue of names of men who were prominent in Washington and elsewhere during the war, who secured for the time the reputation of patriotic leaders of opinion and directors of events, whose memories have been allowed, as they deserved, to rot.

All our history demonstrates how such men abound, and secure influence and power at every seat of government, municipal and general, wherever patronage is to be distributed and money to be expended. Thej' are very ignorant indeed who imagine that, in the greatest opportunity for such men ever afforded in America, there were none of them at the front. They were legion.

The history of the war is inextricably involved in the history of party politics. No one can understand the former without knowledge of the latter. Nor can the great services of McClellan be in any way estimated, his marvellous steadfastness in duty, his herculean work in Washington, and his brilliant career at the head of the Army of the Potomac, without giving full value to the fact that from a short time after his arrival in Washington politicians formed an enemy in his rear often more formidable to him and his army than the enemy in their front toward whom alone the eyes of the people were then directed.

The Republican party which re-elected Mr. Lincoln in 1864 was not the same party, either in principles or in voters, which had elected him in i860. The Democratic party of later years is not in any aspect the party of Mr. Buchanan's time. Old issues were dead, annihilated by the fire on Fort Sumter. The Republican party-machinery existed, the machine politicians held it in hand, and ardent partisans throughout the country kept up a semblance of party distinction by denouncing all opponents as sympathizers with secession and traitors. But in the early summer of 1861 there was but one party in the North, the party of the Union and Constitution. Here and there was a Southern sympathizer whose utterances furnished material for newspapers and orators to grow wild about, but the number of these was insignificant. The entire body of the Northern people were united in one sentiment. And this enthusiastic unanimity was the more wonderful because there had been a very widespread sympathy in the North with the doctrine of secession, on which the leaders of the South had based much expectation. This sympathy was not in one political party alone. Startling as the statement may be to some, the fact is easily demonstrated that there had been as many if not more secessionists among Northern Republicans than Democrats. There is no more trustworthy indication of a man's political opinions than the doctrines taught by the newspaper he takes regularly and reads relipiously. One powerful Northern journal taught that the right of secession was as clear as the rights asserted in the Declaration of Independence, that a Union pinned together by bayonets was not worth having, that the erring sisters ought to be let go. This journal claimed and had 200,000 subscribers, which implies at least a half million regular readers, a large part of whom accepted the doctrine of secession. There was a body of men in the North, of considerable numbers, known as the Abolitionists, who had steadily advocated disunion, their motto being, " The Constitution of the United States is a league with death and a covenant with hell." Many of them were voters with the Republican party. It is therefore unquestionable that a considerable portion of the Republican party had been indoctrinated into a belief not only of the right but of the desirableness of the secession of the Southern States. That a considerable portion of the Democrats had held the same views no one doubts. But the challenge to arms was accepted by Republicans and Democrats with one voice and act. All sympathy with secession vanished, and it would be absurd now to deny that there were as many Democrats as Republicans among the volunteer soldiery of the war.

'lhe people and the army thought of one subject only — the suppression of the rebellion, while politicians, Democrats as well as Republicans, looked to the spoils of present power and the means of confirming that power in future elections.

Congress, at the moment of McClellan's arrival in Washington, as if to instruct him in his duty, expressed the unanimous sentiment of the North in a resolution which declared "that the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States, now in revolt against the constitutional government, and in arms around the capital ; that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to its country ; that this war is not waged, on our part, in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired ; and as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

McClellan accepted this instruction. It expressed his own views and those of every lover of his country in the North.

But if this purpose were achieved in this way the Southern States, kept in the Union by a strong hand, would reappear in future elections as a solid South against the machine politicians who had gained power in i860. If the white vote could be suppressed and the slaves be freed with the immediate right of suffrage, their vote might be controlled and a solid South secured for those who had given them the right of voting. But how could the people be led to favor this policy ?

Various schemes were devised to accomplish the desired end. For a time efforts were made to induce the North to adopt a policy which

Mr. Chase formulated in an interview with Mr. Wade of the Senate and Mr. Ashley of the House, Dec. 11, 1861.

Mr. Chase said (Warden, p. 390) that a State attempting to secede, the State government being placed in hostility to the Federal government, "the State organization was forfeited, and it lapsed into the condition of a Territory" ; that " we could organize territorial courts, and, as soon as it became necessary, a territorial government"; that "those States could not properly be considered as States in the Union, but must be readmitted from time to time as Congress should provide." Mr. Wade and Mr. Ashley were understood to concur in this doctrine ; and, as matter of fact, it was given out as sound doctrine and was widely advocated in newspapers and at war-meetings engineered by politicians in various parts of the North.

Mr. Chase was too good a lawyer not to recognize the absurdity of the doctrine as American law. It was pure secession doctrine at bottom, and subversive of the whole system of government in all the States. The firmness of conservative Republicans, and the adherence of Mr. Lincoln to the doctrine of the Congressional resolution, kept a large portion of the people from accepting it. Perhaps the greatest service which Mr. Lincoln rendered his country was in the sagacious manner in which he prevented this revolutionary doctrine from becoming the avowed policy of a party. Its success would have been more fatal to the Con stitution than the acknowledgment of the Southern Confederacy.

The abolition of slavery as " a war measure " was proposed and advocated at the same time. This was more popular. But neither Mr. Lincoln nor any military authority could perceive its practical use as a weapon of war, and, although a tremendous pressure was brought to bear on the President, he steadily refused to issue "a bull against a comet." The political position was therefore complicated. The process of coalition, by which politicians who had been Democrats as well as Republicans came together and formed the radical wing of the Republican party, is worthy the study of every one interested in the history of popular government. A powerful combination was formed. It had no leader, for too many of its members were " every man for himself," while each was seeking one or another personal benefit. Its common purpose was to manage the war in such way as to secure control of the country in the elections in 1864 and afterwards.

There was a body of noble, conservative, and patriotic men in the old Republican party strong enough to interpose many obstacles in the way of the radicals. The latter adopted the customary tactics of unscrupulous partisans in this country, and visited on all who opposed thum storms of foul epithets and charges of sympathy with the rebellion. Mr. Lincoln was alternately praised and vilified. But no one of the radical coalition was his friend or desired his continuance at the head of the party. Some old Democratic politicians, recognizing good prospects of its success, joined the radical party. Congress in time yielded to its control. A committee called The Committee on the Conduct of the War was created, to be the machine of partisan politics, in control of the most unscrupulous leaders of the combination, who used it to good effect in the deception of the confiding people of the country.

It is profoundly interesting, and there is something grotesque in it also, to observe how the shrewd and far-seeing Lincoln kept the headship of both elements, conservative and radical, prevented their often-threatened division into two parties, defeated each of the rival candidates for his office, and finally compelled his own renomjnation and their support in his re-election.

To secure for their purposes the leader of the armies had been one of the first and most important objects of the radicals. If a victor he was morally certain to become the idol of the people. "What can we make out of McClellan?" was the question of all; "What can I make out of McClellan?" was the question of each. Thus in that marvellous apocalypse, his private diary, Mr. Chase writes (Warden, p. 500) that a friend said to him, " Col. Key often expressed his regret that McClellan had not conferred with me and acted in concert with me. I replied that I thought if he had that the rebellion would be ended now." " I was quite

willing he should repeat to McClellan what I had said." Undoubtedly had McClellan attached himself to Mr. Chase, or any other Presidential candidate, in the manner suggested, he would have been supported by a powerful political combination. But the bargains of politics were foreign to his work and nature. He was creating an army and using it for the people, not for himself ; certainly not for Mr. Chase or any other aspirant to position.

The success of McClellan in 1862 would have been doubly fatal to the politicians. The old Union would have been restored and the general would command the political situation. Therefore McClellan must not be successful. His popularity must be destroyed. AVhatever of falsehood could be invented must be published concerning him. His successes must be decried. Above all, he must not be allowed to win a decisive victor)^. Neither a quick ending of the war nor a victorious campaign by McClellan would enure to party success.

The argument of personal rivalry and part)' requirement was pressed on Mr. Lincoln without success. However loyal McClellan was to his country, the Secretary of the Treasury said he urged his removal because " he was not loyal to the administration."

As it began to be evident that Mr. Lincoln would not adopt the radical policy, nor discharge McClellan and appoint some general suited to radical purposes, nor manage war matters with special regard to future partisan considerations, it became important to gain the War Department, and place in it a secretary who would do what the President would not. Thus the course of the war could be controlled, generals could be driven with reins, the President himself could be deceived, misled, to some extent managed.

Mr. Edwin M. Stanton was selected, and Mr. Chase, with great adroitness, described by himself, induced Mr. Lincoln to appoint him as sue-

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. g

cessor to Mr. Cameron. The religious emotion with which Mr. Chase recorded the success of this scheme indicates the view he had of its vital importance to the radical cause.

Mr. Stanton was a lawyer of moderate abilities, a man of peculiar mental constitution. Without moral principle or sense of personal honor, he was equally ready to change front in public politics and to betray private friendship, and was therefore eminently suited to the purposes for which he was selected by the men with whom he had formed a secret alliance. But he was as untrustworthy in that as in other associations, and at the very moment when Mr. Chase, confiding in him, was intriguing to bring him into the cabinet, he betrayed Mr. Chase's confidences and defeated his plans, for his own purposes. Those who knew him well were in the habit of describing him as one of those who "always kick down the ladder by which they have climbed." His ambition was unbounded and his self-reliance absolute. He did not depend, as do ordinary politicians, on a larger or smaller body of followers and political dependants. No one shared his aspirations, and none were to claim gratitude or reward in his successes.