The Campaign of 1870-1871. Operations of the South [German] Army in January and February, 1871. Compiled from the Official War Documents of the Head-Quarters of the South Army ... Translated by Colonel C. H. von Wright

Front matter

J IMPORTANT MILITARY WORKS, Published by Henry S. King & Co. THE OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMIES IN FRANCE, FROM SEDAN TO THE END OF THE WAR OF 1870-1. With large Official Map. From the Toumals of the Head-Quarters Staff- By Major William Blume. Translated by E. M." Jones, Major 20th Foot, late Professor of Military History, Sandhurst. Demy Svo. Price qs. TACTICAL DEDUCTIONS FROM THE WAR OF 1870-1. By Capt. A. v. Boguslawski. Translated by Col. Lumlf.v Graham, late iSth (Royal Irish) Regiment. Demy Svo. Uniform with the above. Price ,s. "Above all should every infantry officer make these tactical conclusions the object of his serious studies, about which there must be great controversy. Out of these deductions alone can we get the lessons in infantry operations for war, and for training during peace In all essential things, according to our conviction, the author has rightly apprehended the lessonsof the late war. and his views are a guide and criterion that will be of service to every officer." — Militair iVcchenblatt.

III. STUDIES IN TROOP-MARCHING. By Col. von Verdy du Vernois. Translated by Lieut. H. J. T. Hildyard, 71st Foot. Demy 8vo. Uniform with the above. [Parts I and II in August. "I recommend the two first numbers of Colonel von Vekdv's ' Studies' to the attentive perusal of my brother officers They supply a want which I have often felt during my service in this country, namely, a minuter tactical detail of the minor operations of war than any but the most observant and fortunately placed Staff Officer is in a position to give. I have read and reread them very carefully, I hope with profit, certainly with great interest, and believe that practice, in the sense of these "Studies.' wculd Le a valuable pteparai ion for manoeuvres on a more extended scale. " Beauchamp Walker, Maj. -General. Berlin, June, 1S72."

IV. THE ARMY OF THE NORTH-GERMAN CONFEDERATION. A brief description of its organization, of the different branches of the Service, and their role in war ; of its mode of fighting, &c. By a Prussian General. Translated from the German by Col. Edward Newdigate. Demy 8vo. Uniform with the above. [In the Press. Other Military Works are in preparation, of which due notice will be given. Henry S. King & Co., 65, Cornhill, London. N°I. THEATRE OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH ARMY. Henry S.King iC 6b Cornhill .London. The Campaign of i 870-1 871 OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH ARMY In January & February 1871 COMPILED FROM THE OFFICIAL WAR DOCUMENTS OF THE HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE SOUTH ARMY BY Count Herrmann von Wartensleben COLONEL IN THE GENERAL STAFF Translated by Colonel C. H. von Wright CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, 8TH ARMY CORPS LONDON Henry S. King & Co., 65 Cornhill LONDON : PRINTED BY SPOTTISYVOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE AND PARLIAMENT STREET {All rights reserved')

Preface

. The entry of the French Army of the East into Switzerland at Pontarlier on the 1st of February, and the importance of this event, are sufficiently known. Under the influence of this catastrophe, which deprived France of her last means of resistance, Gambetta resigned office ; the South of France, hitherto scarcely touched by the war, was now well nigh defenceless, and open to the victorious Army of the invader ; whilst the guarding and maintenance of nearly 90,000 French soldiers devolved upon neutral Switzerland. This situation had no small share in furthering the work of peace, which had been resumed at Versailles ever since the capitulation of Paris. The causes which produced this event are not so well known as its results. The event itself was made pretty generally known on the 1st of February by the Swiss line of telegraph Verrieres — Berne, whereas the despatches sent from Pontarlier did not reach Versailles until several days later, the bearers having to traverse deeply snowed-up mountain roads before they arrived at the nearest telegraph station on the Doubs.

Added to this, the preceding movements of the South Army during the second half of January, which led to the above-mentioned catastrophe, had to be carefully concealed, in order to ensure their success. We feel it a duty we now owe to historical justice to make Preface. IV known the authentic Head Quarters documents, particularly as they bear witness to the praiseworthy exertions of the troops during that short and decisive campaign in the Jura mountains. The following pages treat principally of the strategic operations of the South Army and their guiding motives. As far as regards tactics, all actions are mentioned, and the general course of the more important ones is described, but without entering into details. In the first place, strategy plays a prominent part in the campaign of the South Army, and then it is well known how difficult it is to give the details of actions justly and accurately before all the different reports of the troops have been carefully compared, and conflicting statements cleared up.

The time has not yet come for doing this. Nevertheless, everyone concerned will find in this book the framework into which his own doings fitted. If, during the rapid course of events, many could not at the time understand the connection of their own individual day's work with that of others and with the general object in view, this book will explain it to them. As we have already stated, this narrative is founded on the official documents of the Commander-in-Chief s Head Quarters; it is written from their point of view. In order that it might con tain lasting materials for the future historian, it was necessary, whilst following the course of events, to show the close connection between their causes and their results. No use has been made of any of the literary works that have appeared on the campaign, in order not to render the picture indistinct by intro ducing opinions and facts which, at the time such works were written, could neither be conclusive nor known.

On the other hand, it was impossible to avoid mentioning some few cases in which, by reason of prevailing circumstances, the measures taken by the Commander-in-Chief, and the sense in which they were Preface. V understood by parts of the Army, did not harmonize so perfectly as was otherwise the case. In these cases, however, the wish to treat them objectively will be manifest, for the motives on both sides and the pro et contra of the different opinions will be stated. It is scarcely necessary to allude to the well-known fact, that in war many ways lead to the attainment of the object in view, if only the one adopted plan be consistently and unwaveringly adhered to. We assert that the Commander-in-Chief of the South Army carried out his plan in this manner. It is true the full extent of its successful results was only attainable by such leaders and such troops as those under General Manteuffel's command.

Note. — The distances are given in English miles, of which 4\ are equal to one German mile. CONTENTS. I'AGE Preface ............. iii Introduction. — State of affairs on south-eastern theatre-of-war previous to the I formation of the South Army ......

Chapter I

General Manteuffel takes command of the army inChatillon. — Reflections on the state of affairs, and first resolutions formed ... 6 II. March of the army across the Cote-d'Or ; tidings of the battle of Belfort 14 III. The Ilnd and vnth Army Corps wheel to the right towards the Saone 23 IV. March of the Ilnd and vnth Army Corps to the Doubs. — Dole and Quingey occupied. — General Kettler's actions at Dijon — Advance of the xivth Army Corps in the country between the Doubs and the Ognon (January 20th to January 23rd) ..... 2S V. Position of the vnth Army Corps in front of Besancon. — Reconnoitring actions on both banks of the Doubs. — The mid Army Corps gains possession of the Jura roads. — Actions at Salins. — The xivth Army Corps moves to the right, crosses the Ognon, and then joins the vnth Army Corps on the Doubs. — Operations of the 4th Reserve Division on the left bank of the Doubs (January 24th to January 27A) 45 VI.

The xivth Army Corps arrives in front of Besancon. — Advance of the South Army towards the Swiss frontier. — Actions at Sombacourt and Chaffois (January 29th) ; at Frasne (January 30th) ; at Vaux (January 31st); at Pontarlier and La Cluse (February 1st). — The French Army of the East forced over the Swiss frontier. — (January 28th to February 2nd) Contents. VIII CHAPTER PAGE VII. Occupation of Dijon ......... IOI VIII. Possession gained of the whole of the departments Jura and Cote-d'Or. — The South Army fronts towards Lyons. — Belfort surrendered; the armistice extended to the South Army and the three eastern departments. — (From the 3rd to the middle of February) . . 109

Appendix

. I. Order of battle of the South Army (including strength and losses) . 121 II. Order of battle of the French Army of the East ..... 127 III. Order of battle of the French Armee des Vosges 131 IV. Note to page 24 . . . . . . , . . . . G OPERATIONS of the SOUTH ARMY IN JANUARY and FEBRUARY 1871. >*K°« —

Introduction

. State of Affairs on the South-eastern Theatre of War previous to the Formation of the South Army. After the fall of Strasburg (September 27) General Werder marched southwards in the district west of the Vosges mountains, and after divers successful actions occupied the country between the Saone and the Cote d'Or. The force under his orders was the Xivth Army Corps, consisting originally of the Baden Divi sion and General Goltz's detachment ; the latter afterwards invested Langres. The 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions (Generals Tresckow and Schmeling) soon arrived at this part of the theatre of war, for the purpose of besieging Belfort and the South Alsatian fortresses, and of cooperating with General Werder under his orders. By the middle of December General Werder was master of the country as far southwards as the line Dijon — Gray — Vesoul Montbeliard.

Farther to the west stood General Zastrow, who had been at Auxerre with the 13 th Division and the Corps Artillery of the vnth Army Corps ever since the end of No vember. It had been found necessary to bring these troops up B '< from Metz, because the lines of communication, and particularly the railways used by the German troops, that traverse the broad intermediate space between the scene of operations of the lind Army and that of General Werder, needed protection against the enemy's partisan Corps and Franctireurs. In the beginning the only force which the enemy had to oppose to General Werder consisted of those troops that were partly under Garibaldi's command at Autun, and partly operating under that of General Cremer from Beaune and Dole. The whole of this force was estimated at about 30,000.

From the middle of December on, however, it became evident that considerable forces were arriving at the fortress Besancon from the South. In consequence, General Werder evacuated Dijon, raised the investment of Langres, and concentrated the greater part of his troops at Vesoul, from whence he could cover the siege of Belfort more effectively. He was reinforced by General Debschitz's detachment, which had been about this time formed in South Alsace, and was now pushed forward to Delle. Inclu sive of the besieging Corps at Belfort, General Werder now had 62 Battalions, 34 Squadrons, and 23 Field Batteries under his command. ( Vide Appendix.) Some time after this, intelligence reached His Majesty's Head Quarters at Versailles, that the greater part of those French Corps d'Armee that were being reorganized at Bourges and Nevers — viz. the XVth, xvilith, xixth, and xxth Corps, under General Bourbaki — were on their way to the railway at Chalon-sur-Saone.

This seemed to denote the intention of joining those forces which had been brought up to Besancon from the south. In consequence General Zastrow received orders to march from Auxerre to Montbard, so as to draw nearer to General Werder ; ai the same time the 60th and 72nd Regi ments of Infantry were despatched from Metz and Chaumont to Montbard, and placed under the command of Colonel Dannen berg. A few days later reports of a different nature arrived. Introduction. 3 The advance of strong hostile forces from Cosne and Briare along the Loire, and other information received, led to the sup position that Bourbaki was still at Nevers and Bourges with his main force, and was preparing for an offensive movement in the direction of Montargis and Paris ; the more so as the enemy's troops at Besancon remained perfectly inactive.

General Zas trow, therefore, was ordered to return to Auxerre. At the same time the lind Army Corps was despatched from the Army of investment at Paris to Montargis, to join General Zastrow in opposing Bourbaki's expected march on Paris, whilst the lind Army assumed the offensive against General Chanzy's forces. These movements commenced in the beginning of January, 1871, and were in the course of execution when General Werder reported positively that troops of the xvinth and xxth French Corps were in front of him. Simultaneous accounts also arrived that Bourbaki was already at Dijon, and was advancing with 60,000 men and 80 pieces of Artillery. In addition to this, a report sent in by a reliable emissary gave the tenor of the new French plan of operations. According to this Bourbaki was to leave one Corps at Vierzon, to be reinforced by the xxivth Corps, lately formed at Besancon out of the troops of Generals Cremer ' and Bressolles, and to assume the offensive against General Werder, so as to reconquer Alsace, and permanently intercept the main lines of communication of the German Army.

The only doubt on the subject was, whether the XVth Corps had also followed Bourbaki to the eastern theatre of war as well as the XVIIlth and xxth. This position of affairs necessitated the presence of consider able forces at the south-eastern seat of war, the component parts of which had to be brought up from very different directions, from the Loing, the Yonne, and the Maas. The lind Army Corps was ordered to march immediately from Montargis to the neighbourhood of Nuits-sous-Ravieres. The 1 According to later French accounts, Cremer seems to have commanded an inde pendent division of the Army. B 13th Division and Corps Artillery of the Vilth Army Corps were despatched to Chatillon-sur-Seine. The 14th Division of the same Corps, hitherto attached to the Ist Army and employed in besieging the Ardennes fortress, had now become available, Mezieres and Rocroy having capitulated in the beginning of January ; it received orders to proceed by rail to the neighbour hood of Chatillon.

Colonel Dannenberg's Brigade, which had reached the neighbourhood of Montbard, was placed under the orders of the Vilth Army Corps, with instructions to cover the march of the latter against attacks proceeding from Dijon and Autun. It was calculated that both Corps would reach the line Nuits — Chatillon by about the 12th of January. Con sidering the events that had taken place in the meantime, it was to be expected that further operations would be necessary before their junction with General Werder's troops could be effected. General Werder received orders to cover the siege of Belfort above all things, and to maintain his communications with South Alsace at the same time. Should the French advance westwards of the Vosges mountains, he was not to offer any direct opposition to this march, but was to watch it, jointly with the troops of the Governor-General of Lorraine,1 and, as soon as the French forces in his front diminished, he was to assume the offensive, and operate against their line of com munication.

The Army now formed out of the lind, Vilth, and Xivth Army Corps was named the ' South Army,' and His Majesty gave the command of it to General Manteuffel, hitherto Com mander-in-Chief of the ist Army. General Werder was, how ever, instructed to conduct the operations of the troops hitherto under his orders, and to report to His Majesty's Head Quarters 1 The Governor-General of Lorraine, General von Bonin, resided at Nancy; the Governor-General of Alsace, Lieutenant-General Count Bismarck Bohlen, at Hagenau. They had troops under their orders with which they garrisoned these provinces and the stations (' Etappen') along the lines of communication. The civil and military authority in Lorraine and Alsace were placed in their hands. Introduction. 5 direct, until such time as the Commander-in-Chief should have virtually assumed the command.

General Werder's successful action at Villersexel on the 9th of January not only again proved the presence of the XVinth and xxth, but also of the xvth and xxivth French Corps and the enemy's march on Belfort. General Werder now aban doned Vesoul, left only 3 Regiments of Cavalry and 2 Bat talions under Colonel Willisen at Lure, to watch the enemy's movements, and reached the neighbourhood of Belfort early on the nth, after a night march, with the Baden Division, General Schmeling's Division, and General Goltz's detachment. This march was not disturbed by the enemy, the attack at Villersexel having deceived him, and, for the moment, checked his march. Such was the progress of events up to the moment when General Manteuffel — who had been summoned to Versailles per telegram, arriving there on the 10th — started early on the nth for Chatillon-sur-Seine, after receiving verbal instructions from His Majesty the King.

Part of the General Staff and some of the aides-de-camp of the 1st Army accompanied General Man teuffel to the South Army, the Head Quarter's Staff of which, especially that part connected with the administration, had to be formed ad interim during its march. His Majesty appointed Colonel Wartensleben, hitherto Quarter-Master-General of the ist Army, to be Chief of the Staff of the South Army, and Major Lewinsky, of the General Staff, to be Quarter-Master-General of the same.

CHAPTER I.

General Manteuffel takes Command of the Army in Chatillon. — Reflections on the State of Affairs, and first Resolutions formed. General Manteuffel arrived at Chatillon on the evening of the 1 2th, and announced the assumption of his command with the following words : — 'When His Majesty the King entrusted me with the command he remarked, that the task allotted to the Army was one of great difficulty, but that he knew his troops. Soldiers of the South Army, with God's help, we will justify the trust our Lord and Master puts in us. I herewith take command of the Army.' It cannot be denied that the momentary position of the South Army was a1 critical one. One half of it — 62 Battalions, 34 Squadrons, 23 Field Batteries, under the command of General Werder — was before Belfort ; the greater part on the line Delle — Montbeliard — Hericourt — Frahier, fronting south and west, with an advanced guard thrown forward towards Arcey, whilst General Tresckow's Division was engaged in investing the fortress itself.

Immediately in front of General Werder was an enemy of nearly threefold numbers ; the out posts of both sides were in close contact. The other half of the Army, with the Commander-in-Chief himself, was gradually coming into line near Chatillon : being ten days' march distant from Belfort, it was unable to take any direct part in the decisive actions which were daily expected near the latter place. That General Werder would be utterly overwhelmed by the Position of the A rmy. 7 enemy's superior numbers was a thing not to be anticipated. He had betimes taken the precaution of fortifying his line, and had placed heavy artillery in suitable positions. Besides this, experience gained at other parts of the theatre of war, had shown that, highly as the truly creative activity of the French September Government and its astonishing results must be acknowledged, still the quality of the newly-levied armies of the Republic did not equal that of the former Imperial Army.

They had, it is true, a sufficient force of artillery, some of which was even superior to that of the latter; but they had but little cavalry, and the great bulk of their numerous and well-armed infantry was deficient both in organization and drill. It fought well in de fensive positions, but failed in that intrinsic firmness, which is so necessary during lasting and energetic offensive operations. When attacking, it seldom went beyond the preparatory advance of a dense swarm of skirmishers ; the attack itself often failed as soon as it was met by Artillery fire. Added to this, the organization of the enemy's ammunition and provision trains for so large a mass of troops was faulty, whilst the consumption was irregular and enormous. These circumstances crippled the free action of the newly-formed Armies, and compelled them to cling to their lines of railway.

Even the latter, however, did not afford sufficient relief ; and the danger, when they were menaced, was so great as to compromise even defensive operations. It was thus that General Manteuffel had, in the battles of Amiens and La Hallue, during his northern campaign, succeeded in forcing an enemy, superior to him in numbers, to abandon his strong positions, and to retreat with heavy loss behind the northern fortresses. Although these considerations gave good reason to hope for a successful issue at Belfort, still the situation of the Army there was for the moment critical, and required the promptest and most effectual support that time and space allowed. The position of the other half of the Army was as follows : Ever since the 3rd of January the lind Army Corps had been marching, without a day's halt, from the neighbourhood of Paris to Montargis, and from thence onwards.

Punctually, on the day appointed, the 12th, it reached Nuits with the 3rd, Noyers with the 4th Division. With the exception of one Battalion of the 8th Infantry Brigade and of part of its train, it was complete. The 13th Division of the vilth Army Corps was between Mussy and Chatillon, the 14th at Montigny. In consequence of delays which had taken place in the railway-transport of the latter Division, it was not nearly assembled ; 4 Battalions, several Batteries, and the whole of its train had not yet come up. Colonel Dannenberg's Brigade was engaged in operations against Garibaldi's troops, which held the whole of the Cote d'Or at this period, detachments from Dijon and Autun scouring it in all directions. Under ordinary circumstances it would have been decidedly advisable to give the lind Army Corps some rest, and in the meantime to await the completement of the Vilth Army Corps ; for the successive passage of detached bodies of troops and baggage through a mountainous district infested by the enemy's free corps was in itself dangerous, much more so at this moment, the garrison of the fortress of Langres having been lately considerably increased (to the amount, it was said, of 20,000 men) and an enterprising commandant placed at its head.

Although the place was, indeed, watched from Chaumont by a detachment of the Governor-General of Lorraine's troops, still these barely sufficed for the fulfilment of their main object, viz. the protection of the important railway communication between Blesme and Chatillon. All these circumstances rendered it therefore expedient to postpone the commencement of opera tions until the formation of the lind and Vilth Army Corps was completed in good order, and until their communications were securely based. The precarious position of the Xivth Corps, how ever, outweighed these considerations, and did not admit of any delay. Impressed by this main idea— the necessity of losing no time— General Manteuffel, immediately after his arrival at Cha tillon, gave orders in the course of the same night to push forward Review of the Position. 9 the advanced guards of both Corps as far as the line Montbard — St. Marc — Lengley — Aubepierre, immediately.

The great object in thus throwing forward the advanced guards, each of which was accompanied by a detachment of pioneers, was to gain possession of, and, if necessary, repair, all the principal roads leading eastwards before the arrival of the main bodies of the Corps. The direction of the subsequent operations of both Corps was decided on on the morning of the 1 3th. We must here insert the remark that General Manteuffel did not deem it expedient to exert any immediate influence on the course of events at Belfort, and therefore refrained from sending direct orders to General Werder. The distance was so great that to do so would have been but a mere form, besides which it was in accordance with His Majesty's instructions, that General Werder should act independently so long as the direct co-operation of both halves of the Army did not virtually exist.

For the present, therefore, communications between Generals Manteuffel and Werder were confined to mutually telegraphing the daily events and instructions on either side ; these telegrams passed through Versailles. General Werder having been ex pressly released from the duty of guarding the district westwards of the Vosges mountains (the territory under the Govern ment-General of Lorraine), this task now fell to the half of the Army under General Manteuffel's orders. The pushing forward of the advanced guards of the lind and Vilth Army Corps up to the line Montbard — Aubepierre, still admitted of a choice between the routes to Vesoul or Dijon for the coming operations of the main bodies. Under existing circumstances no other one was, however, possible. Very weighty and tempting reasons spoke for a march on Dijon.

The principal and best roads from the neighbourhood of Montbard and Chatillon traverse the mountains in this direction, and converge towards Dijon. It was there that the two Prussian Corps d'Armee might expect to obtain a sure and easy success over Garibaldi's isolated Corps ; besides which the capture of the ancient capital of Burgundy was in itself a desirable object. For the return of the French troops to Dijon after the evacuation of the town by the XlVth Army Corps, had been turned to account by the French press in every possible way, both politically and morally ; as had also previously been the case when Orleans was momentarily re-occupied. Added to this, the route to Dijon being farther from Langres, the march could be more easily protected from this fortress, and, possession once gained of the line of railway, Nuits — Dijon, it would, when repaired, afford the best line of communication in rear of the two Corps, and would form a basis for their future operations.

According to all military principles, the march to Dijon would have been both correct and certain of success, if the immediate interest of the Army concerned was alone taken into consideration, without regard to the state of affairs at Belfort. There, however, reasons immediately became apparent that induced General Manteuffel to declare for the route to Vesoul, in spite of all these undeniable advantages. The important point of the situation did not lie at Dijon, nor in Garibaldian or any other detached Corps, but in the enemy's main force. As soon as the latter was once overcome, and its power of resistance broken, everything else would follow as a matter of course. This main force was in front of Belfort, where a struggle of uncertain issue was pending. Although the lind and Vilth Army Corps could not take any part in this struggle within the next few days, still incessant marching would daily diminish the intervening distance, and, by sending advanced guards, especially cavalry, far on ahead, they could make their approach felt by the enemy.

If the crisis could be delayed but for a few days, their march against the enemy's strategic flank must soon be felt, and would help to dis engage our endangered comrades at Belfort, at the same time pro tecting the territory of the Government-General of Lorraine from invasion in the direction of Epinal. Any delay in carrying this out would be productive of evil, and a march to Dijon would Progress of Arrangements. 11 have caused delay, the route to Vesoul being the shortest line of march to the flank of the enemy's main army. If General Werder had, in the meantime, been forced to retreat to Alsace — a by no means impossible contingency — then the rear of the French pursuing Army would be attacked. Should, on the other hand, the enemy retreat before General Werder, it would always be possible, by wheeling to the right, to operate against the former and his line of communication (this after wards took place).

On the forenoon of the 13th General Manteuffel resolved to take the Vesoul route, well knowing that it involved considerable disadvantages. Quitting safe and good roads, he now had to pass between the two hostile positions, Dijon and Langres, from both of which the march had to be protected. The mountainous district of the Cote d'Or between these two places is totally deficient in good cross-roads, leading south and north, so that the different columns could neither assist each other during the march, nor could their movements be directed by Head Quarters as long as the passage of the mountains lasted. Finally, one must be prepared to give up the line of communication to Chatillon very soon after issuing from the mountains, so as to obviate the necessity of weakening the army by posting detachments in this direction, it being General Manteuffel's determination to afford effective assistance, and to obtain a decisive success, and therefore to operate against the enemy's main forces with two complete Army Corps.

With this view, therefore, it was now already intended to establish the basis of the army at Epinal, to which town all supplies for the army, in particular the still missing trains of the vnth Army Corps, were to be directed. For completeness sake, we must here remark that the authorities at Versailles had ordered the formation of a special ' ' In- 1 Each Army had its ' General Etappen Inspection,' each Army Corps its ' Etappen Inspection ; ' the former a lieutenant -general, the latter a major-general or colonel. spection of Etappes ' for the South Army, and the Inspector- General of ' Etappes ' of the lind Army had been instructed to send a superior officer to Chatillon for this purpose. From un foreseen circumstances, however, the latter did not receive his orders until the month of March, so that no ' Inspection of Etappes ' was formed for the South Army during its operations.