The Campaigns of the Rebellion

Front matter

THE Campaigns of the Rebellion. BY ALBERT TODD First Lieutenant, First U/^CArtillery. MANHATTAN, KANSAS: Printing Department, State Agricultural College. 1884. WASHINGTON I James J. Chapman, Agt. Copyright bt ALBERT TODU. 1884. PREFACE, This little book does not profess to be a history -of the Rebellion, nor indeed of all the campaigns of that war. Its aim is to give, in a very brief form, an account of the principal operations of the principal armies. No attempt is made to give the causes of the war, or to deal, in any way, with its political aspects. Of course, in a book of one hundred and thirty pages, very few details can be given. A paragraph must often do the work of a chapter, and a sentence that of a paragraph. The author fears that, as a consequence of this condensation, he has not always been able to make his statements exact.

He has sometimes been obliged to overstate, sometimes to understate, the truth in order to make his meaning clear. However, he trusts that no vital misstatement has been made. The authorities consulted have been : the " Cam paigns of the Civil War " ( Scribner's Series) ; the "History of the Civil War," by the Comte de Paris; aud the " Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," by William Swinton. In many cases it has been almost impossible to obtain, with any degree of accuracy, the losses in battle, especially on the side of the Rebels. The best attainable figures have been

Preface

. taken, however, both for these losses and also for the numbers engaged. Both have been given in round numbers. It is regretted that the smallness of the present edition has prevented the preparation of proper maps. It is hoped that the small maps given will make clear the description of the more detailed operations. For the general operations any good map of the United States may be used. A few additions and corrections to the text will be found at the end of the volume. The author makes no attempt to apologize for or to explain the use of the terms " Union troops " and "Rebels;" for he thinks that these appellations need neither apology nor explanation. This volume has been printed, as the title page shows, on the press of the Kansas State Agricultural College; and the author acknowledges the obligations he is under to Mr. George F. Thompson, the Superin tendent of Printing, for the care which has been taken in the mechanical execution of the book. State Agricultural College, Manhattan, Kansas, February, 1884. CONTENTS.

Chapter I

Page Preliminary 1 CHAPTER H. The Peninsula 5 CHAPTER HI. Bull Run Number Two 14

CHAPTER IV.

Antietam 21

CHAPTER V.

Fredericksburg 26

CHAPTER VI.

Chancellorsville .32

CHAPTER VII.

Gettysburg and Mine Run 37

CHAPTER VIII.

Wilderness to Cold Harbor 47

CHAPTER IX.

Petersburg and the Valley Campaign . . CONTENTS. VI.

CHAPTER X.

The Western Theatre 69

CHAPTER XL

Donelson and Pittsburg Landing . ... 72 CHAHTER XII. Vicksburg 80

CHAPTER XIII.

Mill Springs to Murfreesboro 93

CHAPTER XIV.

Chickamauga and Chattanooga 96

CHAPTER XV.

Atlanta 105

CHAPTER XVI.

Thomas in Tennessee 118

CHAPTER XVII.

The March to the Sea 124 Notes MAPS, | The maps will be found at the end of the voliim I. To Illustrate Operations in the East. a. Richmond and Petersburg. 0. Bull Run. c. Antietam. (1. Fredericksburg. Chancellorsville and the Wilderness. e. Gettysburg. II. To Illustrate Operations in the West. a. Fort Donelson. b. Island No. 10. c. Murfreesboro . d. Vicksburg. e. Vicinity of Chattanooga. f. Atlanta. (/. Nashville. CAMPAIGNS OF THE REBELLION.

CHAPTER L PRELIMINARY.

The great Prussian strategist, Von Moltke, has said that the struggles between the Union troops and the Rebels in our Civil War illustrate no principles of strategy ; that they were only contests between armed mobs. Without for one moment admitting the truth of this statement, but leaving it without discussion here, it may be said that such as that war was, so will be, to a great extent, any other war on this continent. In it was engaged the best military talent that we had, and we cannot hope to bring into future wars better troops or better leaders. Its lessons, therefore, are valuable to us, however worthless they may appear to military men of other countries. In the prosecution of this war, we may say gener ally that the armies operated in two different regions of territory, or theatres of war.

There were minor ac tions and campaigns, but the great contests took place in Virginia, and in the West, or rather fn that part of it which includes the States of Kentucky, Ten nessee, the northern parts of Mississippi and Ala- CAMPAIGNS OF THE REBELLION. bama ; and later, northern Georgia and the Carolinas. It was inevitable that Virginia would be the great battle ground of the war ; for the Rebel capital was near its center, while the National capital was just across the river from its borders. The two capitals were but one hundred miles apart ; and back and forth the war surged over this space for four long years, while twice, for short periods, the Rebels carried their forces into loyal territory. We shall first tell the story of these Virginia campaigns. Here the most thoroughly disciplined armies on each side met each other.

On the Union side, the army was known as the Army of the Potomac, while the Rebels designated their troops the Army of Northern Virginia. From June, 1862, till the close of the war, the latter was commanded by the ablest gen eral that either side produced, — Robert E. Lee. The Union army during this time had five different com manders, — McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Meade and Grant. It is no imputation upon the patriotism or zeal of any of these five to say that the Army of the Potomac never had a leader worthy of it. Grant succeeded by sheer bull-dog tenacity, and because the Confederacy was simply exhausted. Had he taken command of the army when McClellan did, he prob ably would have failed quite as ingloriously. The operations of the year 1861 in Virginia may be passed over very rapidly.

The Rebels had collected a force of about 30,000 men in the vicinity of Bull Run Creek and Manassas Junction. About 8,000 of these were across the mountains in the Shenandoah Valley. They were all under command of General Joseph E. Johnston. Against this force Gener.il Mc- Dowell marched out of Washington with about 28,000 troops. On both sides the troops were in a poor PRELIMINARY. state of drill and discipline; but the Rebels were rather better in these respects, as they had been pre paring for the war. The battle which took place near Bull Run Creek was fought without much system. In the early part of the day (July 21st), the Rebels were driven back, being somewhat less in numbers than the Union troops. But later the 8,000 from the Shenandoah Valley came down on the railroad to Manassas Junc tion, quickly joined their retreating comrades, and the fortunes of the day turned.

The Union forces tied in disorder, and most of them did not stop till they were safe within the entrenchments around Washington. However, the Rebels were in no condition to pursue, and the city, which, at the news of defeat, had exhib ited a scene of the wildest excitement, was left unmo lested. General Winfield Scott was at this time at the head of the Union armies, but he was an old man and felt that he must give way to younger blood. The only material success that the Union forces had gained up to this time was in West Virginia, where General George B. McClellan, a man about thirty -five years of age, had routed the Rebel forces, and, as it proved after wards, saved that region of country to the Union. In casting about for a new leader, all looked to McClel lan ; and, accordingly, on the 27th of July, 1861, he was appointed to the command of the Army of the Potomac.

He found it a motley collection of men, brave and patriotic, it is true, but not an army in the proper sense of the word. He set himself to work at once to evolve orders from this chaos. New troops were all the time coming in. He organized them into brigades and divisions, and by October 1st, 1861, re ported present for duty 150,000 men. CAMPAIGNS OF THE REBELLION. For several months the country had borne with pa tience the inaction of the army while being organized, but as the fall and winter came on and still no ad vance, the President, Congress and the people became impatient ; and the cry of "On to Richmond," which had been heard at intervals from the first, became loud and deep. But still McClellan waited. He had indeed at one time proposed an advance upon the Rebels, who were still at Centerville and Manassas, but the movement was not made; and he gave out that he had another plan in view which, however, he did not as yet divulge.

Chapter II. The Peninsula

In January, 1862, the President ordered an advance beyond Manassas, in order to make the enemy with draw from that point. McClellan was now forced to submit his plan to the President. It was, to descend the Potomac, land at Urbana on the north bank of the Gloucester peninsula, from there to march rapidly to West Point at the head of the York river, and thus put himself within striking distance of Richmond before the Rebels should withdraw from Centerville. The objection to this plan was, that it would leave Washington to a certain extent unprotected. The discussion between the President and McClellan con cerning this movement lasted for some time. Final ly the President yielded, undoubtedly against his bet ter judgment, and ordered the advance by the Penin sula. He stipulated, however, that an ample force should be left to guard the Capital.

The very day after the order was issued authorizing the movement. the Rebel troops under Johnston evacuated Center ville and retreated towards Richmond. The plan which McClellan had endeavored to keep secret had leaked out, and the possibility of surprising the Reb el chieftain vanished in thin air. In addition to the route to Richmond by way of Manassas, there was also a way by Fredericksburg. and Johnston retired behind the Rappahannock so as CAMPAIGNS OF THE REBELLION. to guard this route. Being thus in a central position, he could oppose himself to McClellan whichever way the latter should come. McClellan still clung to the Peninsula plan, but was forced to modify it somewhat, so as to land at Fort Monroe, and go up the Yorktown peninsula instead of the Gloucester. He had before contemplated the possibility of having to take this route, but had ex pected that the James river would be open so that he could advance upon either side of the Peninsula.

But Norfolk was still in the hands of the enemy, and the Union forces could only move along the York. Here, too, there was an obstacle. Yorktown had been seized by the Rebels and fortified, and it would be necessary to take or turn it before the advance to Rich mond could take place. To effect this, McClellan pro posed that the Navy should cooperate by sending gun-boats to bombard Yorktown, and also that Gener al McDowell's force of 40,000 men, which had been left to defend Washington should be sent to march up the north bank of the York to compel the evacuation of the fortification. . He understood that both these aids had been promised him, but in the end neither came to him, at least as he expected them. The movement to the Peninsula commenced a little after the middle of March, 1862. McClellan soon had at Fort Monroe 60,000 men and more were to follow, exclusive of McDowell's force which was expected.

April 4th, the march up the Peninsula began. Mc- Clellan knew that there were defensive works at Yorktown, but did not think that the advance of his troops would be seriously impeded south of that point. By marching one wing of his army on to wards Williamsburg, he believed he would threaten the communications of the Rebels so as to cause a THE PENINSULA. 7 withdrawal, or, indeed, that he might surround and capture the entire force at Yorktown. The orders for the march on the 5th were, one wing to press on to the Half- Way House, and the other to march to Yorktown and halt in front of it. As orders, these were admirable ; but when the left started out on the morning of the 5th, it found its way blocked by en trenchments along Warwick Creek. Indeed, the to pography of the country was materially different from what McClellan thought it.

The Warwick, in stead of running nearly parallel to the James from Williamsburg, as he thought, really runs across the Peninsula from the vicinity of Yorktown. The Reb els had extended their works along the creek clear across the Peninsula, and here McClellan's left was brought up standing. With the forces at his com mand, however, it would seem that there should have been no difficulty in forcing this line, which was nec essarily thin, as Magruder, the Rebel commander, had but 15,000 men for all his defenses. But the unexpectedness of the check apparently disconcerted McClellan; and, moreover, he thought that Johnston had brought up reinforcements to Ma gruder. The facts are, that Johnston's troops did not come up for over a week after. Me Clellan, however, always overestimated the strength of his opponent.

He waited, all the time begging the President to send him more troops. Finally, about half of McDowell's force was sent him, and was ordered to ascend the Gloucester peninsula, taking the works at Gloucester Point opposite Yorktown on the way, and then to march on and compel the evacuation of Yorktown by threatening the rear. While McClellan had been waiting before Warwick Creek, he had prosecuted siege operations against CAMPAIGNS OF THE REBELLION. the Rebel works at Yorktown. Regular approaches and parallels had been dug, and all was going well to capture the place — sometime. But on the morning of May 5th, just one month after 60,000 men had been stopped by 15,000, the Rebels mai ched out of their fortifications, and retreated up the Peninsula. They had probably never intended to hold Yorktown permanently.

Johnston wished time to collect his scattered forces before the struggle which he knew must come. Having made this concentration, he withdrew the Yorktown line. The Union troops were ordered to pursue at once ; but it was several hours before they got off. Two corps were to go by water to West Point, then march inland and cut off the retreat of such bodies of the enemy's troops as should be below them on the Pe ninsula. In the end nothing came of this movement, as the Rebels were too quick, and did not allow them selves to be cooped up. McClellan stayed behind at Yorktown to superintend the movement of these troops. The forces moving by land came upon the enemy near Williamsburg. It not being perfectly clear who was directing the pursuit and attack, the latter was commenced somewhat on the principle of "every man for himself."

A bloody, indecisive bat tle was fought (May 5th), and the Rebels again re treated further up the Peninsula. After this battle the Union troops continued their advance up the Peninsula ; the troops which came by water joined them ; a new depot of supplies was es tablished at White House ; and, by the 21st of May, the Union army found itself, in spite of all blunders and false movements, on the north bank of the Chickahominy, and less than a dozen miles from the city which had been the war-cry of the North for so THE PENINSULA. long. The force in front of Washington had been in creased to about 40,000 men while these movements had been going on, and McClellan now asked that these might be sent to his aid, as this could now be done without uncovering Washington, at least from any direct movement of the Rebels.

The President finally assented, and Me Clellan prepared for another advance. The advance he made ; but he was again destined to disappointment with regard to the rein forcements. About this time, the noted "Stonewall" Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley. Opposed to him, on the the Union side, was Banks, always a military failure. Jackson drove him back to the Poto mac, and the authorities in Washington were again terrified for the safety of the city. McDowell, who had advanced beyond Fredericksburg, was ordered ro return to the defense of the Capital. Still McClellan, according to his own statement, had, in spite of his losses in battle and from other causes, 80,000 men on May 14th, probably more than there were under Lee, who had just relieved Johnston. Two weeks later (May 31st), the returns show that McClellan had nearly 130,000 men all told.

Of course, not all of these were ready for active operations ; but, after mak ing all deductions, there was still a magnificent force. During the latter part of May, McClellan pushed a part of his force across the Chickahominy. The spring rains had made the roads wretched, and all movements were made with extreme difficulty. However, his front was pushed forward until Rich mond was only four or five miles distant. A portion of his troops he placed to guard the issues of the White Oak Swamp, thus indicating that already he was making ready for a possible change of base to the James river. CAMPAIGNS OF THE REBELLION. On May 31st, the Rebels attacked McClellan, and chose for the point of assault the troops that were nearest Richmond, on the Williamsburg pike. Af ter a stubborn fight, the Union troops fell back.

The scheme of the Rebels was to cut them off from their communications across the Chickahominy, and either destroy or capture them. McClellan sent reinforce ments from the north bank of the river, and the scheme was frustrated. The next day, June 1st, the Rebels attacked again; but were unsuccessful; and soon after the Union troops advanced and took up their old advanced positions. This battle is known as Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines. From this time on until the latter part of June, there was little done. The country was practically a swamp ; and operations were almost of necessity sus pended. McClellan sent over to the south bank still another corps, leaving about 20,000 on the north bank, under General Fitz John Porter. McClellan's whole effective forces now numbered about 92,000 ; Lee's, 80,000.

Along towards the latter part of the month, a new factor was introduced. "Stonewall" Jackson came back from the Valley, and descended the north bank of the Chickahominy. He held a conference with Lee, and it was decided to attack the troops north of the river. Accordingly, a large portion of Lee's army was crossed over to that side to cooperate with Jack son. Enough were sent over to make with Jackson's troops a force of 55,000. It was a daring move ; for had McClellan proceeded against what were left (probably not over 30,000) with his 70,000, Richmond would almost certainly have been captured. McClellan, as soon as he had heard that Jack son had come, evidently gave up all idea of the imme- THE PENINSULA. diate capture of Richmond, and devoted all his ener gies to securing a retreat to the James.

On the 26th, the Rebels attacked the advanced Union forces at Me chanicsville, north of the river. During the day, the latter held their own, not all of Jackson's force being yet up ; but the next morning they fell back to the main body at Gaines' Mills. Here on the 27th a bloody battle took place. The Union troops fought desper ately ; but they were outnumbered, even after some reinforcements had been sent from the south bank. That night all the Union troops crossed to the south bank of the Chickahominy. And now began the famous retreat to the James. It is justly regarded a masterly movement. Some stores were destroyed, but the greater part were moved in safety to the river. The retreat was made through the White Oak Swamp, and it was necessary to guard all the roads leading through it from Rich mond.

From the 28th of June till the 1st of July, there was fighting every day. At Glendale on the 30th, there was a desperate struggle. The Rebels made a strong assault, endeavoring to cut off the troops not yet through the Swamp. Could they suc ceed in doing this, Jackson, who had crossed the Chickahominy, would come down in rear, and the fate of the Union troops would be sealed. The effort was unsuccessful, and the next day the whole Union army was assembled at Malvern Hill to make a stand against the onslaughts of the enemy. This hill is on the north side of the James, and is admirably adapted for de fense, being steep and precipitous at nearly all the points where assaulting troops can approach it. The Union artillery was skilfully posted so as to sweep the ground over which the Rebels must come.

The battle raged with more or less activity from 1 p. m. CAMPAIGNS OF THE REBELLION. until 9 p. m. Then the Rebels retired, baffled at every point of assault. During the night, the Union army was removed to Harrison's Landing, seven miles down the river. The great Peninsular campaign had ended in failure, though not in disgrace. The Union forces fought well everywhere, but all for naught. They had been involved in no grea'. disaster; in fact, 'in the majori ty of the battles, they had been victorious. Yorktown had been taken, the Rebels driven back from Wil liamsburg ro the Chickahominy, and from the Chicka hominy to the works around Richmond; a brilliant change of base had been effected with but trifling loss of baggage or men, right in the presence of a determined and energetic enemy ; — and yet Richmond was practically just as far from McClellan as when he started from Washington for Fort Monroe three and a half months before.

Just where to lay the blame for this fiasco it is hard to say. McClellan was a very popular man with his troops, and to-day there can be found many a member of the Army of the Potomac who will assert, and bring forward many strong argu ments to prove, that had the Union leader been prop erly supported by the Government at Washington, he would have marched into the Rebel capital. Yet it seems to those who look at "it, free from person al preferences, that McClellan lacked that instinct which tells a general when to be prudent and when to be seemingly rash. He was a humane man. He did not like to see his men slaughtered; and to this may be attributed some of his failures. Besides, there was distrust between the President and his advisers, and McClellan as commander of the army. The President never liked the Peninsular campaign.

Mc- Clellan, with good reason perhaps, had little faith in THE PENINSULA. 13 the military capacity of Lincoln and his Cabinet, especially of Stanton, Secretary of War. After all, possibly this failure was for the best. Had Richmond been taken at this time, it is not im probable that a peace would have been patched up between the North and South. The slaves would not have been freed, and the " irrepressible conflict" would only have been smothered to break out again and again, until negro slavery should have been abol ished.

Chapter III. Bull Run Number Two

On the 26th of June, 1862, the various small bodies of Union troops in northern Virginia were consolidat ed into one army, and placed under command of Major-General John Pope. These forces were very much scattered, and several weeks . elapsed before anything was done. McClellan's army, which had found a resting-place at Harrison's Landing, July 2d, remained there doing nothing until August 3d, when, against McClellan's wishes, it was withdrawn from the Peninsula, and the greater part of it sent to reenforce Pope. The latter officer had come from the West, where he had had considerable success. Not long after as suming command of the army in northern Virginia, he issued an address to his trjops. The aim of the address was to inspire the army with confidence, but, unfortunately, it had almost the opposite effect.

The troops who had come from McClellan thought the ad dress reflected on that general, and, ever loyal to their old leader, they looked with disfavor on their new chief. .Pope during July collected the scattered forces which had been assigned to his command, and push ed them forward along the Orange & Alexandria railroad towards Gordonsville and Charlottesville. The former place is the point where the road branches, one BULL RUN NUMBER TWO. line going through Richmond, and the other through southwestern Virginia and the mountains to Tennessee and the South. Had Pope pushed forward rapidly and occupied this place, he would have had an im mense advantage ; but Lee saw that his communica tions with the southwest were threatened, and sent "Stonewall" Jackson with a considerable body of troops to occupy Gordonsville.

This Jackson did July 19th, but, as he was inferior in numbers to Pope, attempted no offensive operations immediately. August 2d, Lee sent another corps to Jackson. At this date Pope's army Jay along the turnpike • from Culpepper to Sperryville. On the 7th and 8th, Jack son crossed the Rapidan and moved towards Culpep per. Pope sent forward a part of his army under Banks to meet him, and on the 9th a battle took place at Cedar Mountain. Banks attacked first the Rebel right with considerable spirit ; then transferred the main attack to the left which, with the center, com menced to break and retreat. But fresh troops were brought up, and Banks was obliged to retire, though by no means routed. He took up a new position in front of Culpepper and checked Jackson when he again attempted to advance to that place, and on the 11th the latter returned to Gordonsville.

As soon as Lee saw that McClellan's troops were really being moved from the Peninsula, he resolved to throw immediately most, if not all, his force against Pope and defeat him before McClellan's troops could get to his aid. On the 15th of August, Jackson had been reenforced by a large part of Lee's forces. At that date Pope had pushed his troops to the Rapidan or near it. On the 20th, Jackson, who had commenced to ad vance upon the arrival of the troops from Lee, crossed CAMPAIGNS OF THE REBELLION. the Rapidan. Pope, hearing of this advance, with drew his army on the 18th and 19th behind the Rap pahannock. When Lee, who had now come up and taken command of the Rebel forces, arrived before that river, he found the fords well guarded by the Union troops, and he decided not to attempt to force a crossing.

Ordering Longstreet to remain in front of Pope, he sent Jackson to turn the right flank of the Union line by crossing the Rappahannock further up and pro ceeding towards Warrenton. Jackson crossed one brigade at Sulphur Springs on the 22d, but that night the river rose, and he abandoned the crossing, draw ing the brigade back on the night of the 23d. During this same time Stuart, with the Rebel cavalry, made a raid in rear of Pope, struck Catlett's Station on the railroad, and made some captures. Pope, on learning of Jackson's attempted flank movement, sent part of his troops up the north bank of the Rapp ahannock ; and on the 24th the two forces looked across the river at each other at Sulphur Springs. On the 25th Jackson took his march again. crossed the upper Rappahannock, and reached Salem (a station on the Manassas Gap railroad, west of the Bull Run Mountains) that night, after a forced march of thirty -five miles.

The next day, the 26th, he passed through the mountains by Thoioughfare Gap, pressed on rapidly, and by sundown reached Bristoe Station on the railroad. He destroyed the railroad at this point, and sent Stuart with his cavalry to seize Ma nassas Junction. Stuart did this, capturing a few pris oners and an immense amount of stores including rations. The movements of Jackson had been emi nently successful ; but he was by no means in a safe position. Pope lay between him and the remainder BULL RUN NUMBER TWO. of the Rebel forces. Should the latter try to join Jackson by following the route he had pursued, they would be, at the shortest, two days in doing it, while Pope could reach him in a day. This separation of Lee's army was certainly a daring movement, and, had it been unsuccessful, would undoubtedly have been harshly criticised.

By this time, August 26th, Pope had been reenforced by considerable bodies of troops sent from Mc- Clellan's army, which had arrived from the Peninsula. It seemed as if he had but to strike Lee's forces one after the other, and, having a superiority of force over either, to beat them in detail. The movements which he made on the 27th to this end were undoubtedly correct. He sent 40,000 men to Gainesville to bar Longstreet's advance through Thoroughfare Gap, sup porting them with other troops directed on Greenwich, while he himself, with another part of the army, struck towards Manassas Junction to attack Jackson. Fitz John Porter was at Warrenton Junction, and, as soon as relieved by Banks, he was also to move on Gainesville. The movement to Gainesville by the large force of McDowell, 40,000 in number, was successfully made.