Our Navy in the War with Spain ... With more than one hundred illustrations

Front matter

REAR-ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY, OUR NAVY IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN BY JOHN R. SPEARS AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF OUR NAVY," ETC. WITH MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED ILLUSTRATIONS NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS Copyright, iSg8, by CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS V CONTENTS PAGE Introduction ....... xvii Chapter I. The Demand for Intervention . i Efforts to Subjugate the Insurgent Cubans that had Degenerated into a Pitiless War of Extermination Wherein even Women and Chil dren were Deliberately Starved to Death — Where Intervention was a Duty and Non-intervention not only Cruel but Dastardly. Chapter II. Teaching Spain to Despise Us . 8 When our Sense of Honor was so Low that American Ships were Seized on the High Seas by Foreign Men-of-war and we Permitted the Aggressor to Change the Real Issue —American Citizens Shot to Death Without Trial and an American Consul Confined to his Office by an Armed Guard — Two Striking Pictures of Spanish Diplomacy in the Histories of the Aspinwall and the Virginius.

Chapter III. The White Squadron . . 25 Money Grudgingly Provided for a New Navy — The Advisory Board — A Frigate, Two Corvettes, and a Despatch-boat — What ". Junketing" Did for the Navy — Discouraging the Younger Officers While Demanding Increased Service. Chapter IV. Armored Cruisers and Battle-ships 43 Building of the Ill-fated Maine — The New York as an Era Maker -Our Battle-ships that had Part in the War with Spain were not Wholly Free from Mistakes — The Beginning of our Industrial Independence — The Hessian Plans for Cruisers. CONTENTS VI TACK Chapter V. Treacherous Destruction of the Maine . . . ■ ■ • • "I Our Early Efforts to Remove Anarchy from Cuba— The Maine Sent to Havana to Protect Americans— The Undisputed Conclusion of the Court of Inquiry Regarding the Loss of the Maine. Chapter VI.

The Days Just Before the War Si A Display of Power that was Without Effect Because of Spanish Obstinacy — $50, 000,000 for Defence — A Fleet of Auxiliary War-ships — How we Learned that we Must Depend on our own Ship-yards — Sampson in Command — A Combination that Gave the Rest of the World Pause. Chapter VII. The War Message . . . 103 Summary of Reasons for American Intervention in Cuban Affairs -Aggravating Proof of Work of Spanish Spies and Spanish Insin cerity — Diplomatic Relations Ended — Threatening Movements of War-ships. Chapter VIII. First Shot of the War . 115 Capture of the Spanish Merchantman Buenaventura by the Gun boat Nashville — His Flag Hoisted in Honor of the Fine American Squadron Betrayed Him — Official Proclamation of the Blockade of Cuban Ports. Chapter IX. Brave Work Along Shore . 126 Cutting Cables Within Ninety Feet of the Beach at Cienfuegos Under the Fire of 1,000 Spanish Soldiers — Wounded who Suffered in Silence lest Groans Unnerve their Shipmates — The Winslow at Cardenas — A Torpedo-boat Sent to Cut a Gun-boat from the Piers of a Well-defended City — A Tale of Rare Heroism and Resourcefulness — Remarkable Tests of Courage in the Face of Superior Forces Afloat — Returning Fire from the Shore — At Matanzas and Cabanas.

Introduction

The principal object held in view, while writing this history, was to give, within con venient limits, an account in every way truth ful of those events of our war with Spain in which our navy had a part. And it seems proper to say here, first of all, that among the many remarkable features of this war few are more cheering to the student of history than the promptness with which the Administration spread before him the material that he need ed. And not only was the material furnished promptly ; it was also given almost in full. The official reports of the commanders of our ships, as well as of our squadrons, have been made public almost as soon as received by the Navy Department. The reports have been in every case at once modest and yet detailful statements of what had been done. Further than that, and better than that, from the point of view of a student of history, so many de spatches relating to such disputed matters as

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XVIII the conduct of the battle off Santiago have been printed, that no point of importance is now unsettled. It is possible to assert that this history has been taken, in all important matters, directly from official sources. As to parts of the narrative not taken from official reports and despatches the principal source of information has been in the accounts written by naval officers for such periodicals as Scribner's, the Century, Harper s, the Army and Navy Journal, and the Army and Navy Register. The people of the United States are greatly indebted to those officers who contributed, over their own signatures, to the general knowledge of what was done, and to the Navy Department, as well, for relaxing the rule that ordinarily prevents a naval man's ap pearing in print. I have also had a number of letters from and personal interviews with naval officers whose work I have described.

In addition to these sources of information I have had recourse in a few cases to what has been written by newspaper reporters. It is with extreme regret that I find a word of ex planation regarding the accuracy of the news paper reports necessary. A time ought to come, and so it will come, when every report er's sense of honor will be so strong that it will be as difficult to find a misstatement in a daily

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XIX paper as it is to find one now in a reputable monthly magazine. But that time is not yet here, and so I must say that I know every reporter whom I have quoted to be a trustworthy writer except one whom I do not know person ally, the reporter of the London Mail, whose interview with Admiral Montojo is given ; but I know the managing editor of the Mail, and his character warrants the use of that report in any history. Perhaps it may not be amiss for me to add here, that a very interesting feature of the war was the presence of many newspaper despatch boats in the operations around Cuba. No such work as they did was ever known before in the history of naval wars. And I know that the reporters so engaged were, with a few exceptions, unwearied and fearless in en ergy and enterprise, and were entirely sincere and faithful to the readers of the papers rep resented.

I speak from actual knowledge in this matter, for I was myself one of the re porters during the earlier months of the con flict on the Cuban coast. If any inaccuracies be found in this history, they are blunders and not due to a lack of trustworthy sources of information. But to give a truthful narrative of the events of the war is not quite all that I have attempted here. It seemed necessary to review briefly

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XX the events in the history of Cuba that com pelled us to interfere in the affairs of another nation. And this was the more necessary for the reason that we had been more or less in volved in the trouble between Spain and her " ever faithful " island of Cuba. It has been no pleasant task to recount even briefly the facts regarding Sp-in's rule in Cuba, and still less so the bearing of the affairs of the General Lloyd Aspinwall and the Virginius on the conflict just ended. But unless I have labored in vain, the reader must see that these accounts could not be omitted. Perhaps while perusing them it will be seen that undue patience and forbearance in international dealings, as in dealings between men, sometimes come to be considered an evidence of weakness ; that dig nity and firmness, backed even by physical force, are absolutely necessary if we would preserve peace and do right, especially when dealing with those who are weak and greedy and shifty.

As to the facts in the cases of these two ships, they were taken from an account of the Aspinwall, written for Scribner's Monthly by one connected with the administration then in power, and from a message of the President (Ex. Doc, No. 30, 43d Cong, 1st Sess.) con taining all the documents and much other matter relating to the Virginius.

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XXI Further than that I have given a short, but what I believe to be an adequate, account of the growth of our navy from the inception of the White Squadron. It is a matter that de serves attention for more reasons than one, but is needed here in order to help us comprehend the ability of our naval men. To describe the heterogeneous squadron with which Sampson went to San Juan, is to show his resourcefulness. The squadron of protected cruisers which Dewey took to Manila had a battle-ship task to accomplish in attacking ships and forts at once ; but what it lacked in armor-plate was made up by the Harveyized grit of its com manding officer and crews. On the whole here is a story the facts of which, however told, must stir the heart of every American who has red blood in his veins. It was a war to bring peace where anarchy reigned.

We sought the enemy in his own chosen arena. We met him man-fashion, and we literally swept him from the seas. Four of the finest armed cruisers and two of the best torpedo-destroyers in the world, with nearly a score of lesser war-ships were driven to the rocks or sunk out of sight, while hundreds of their crews were killed. And yet in all that work we lost one man killed, and less than a score wounded, while the damage done to our

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ships did not disable even so much as a single gun for one minute. Nor was our work in blockading and attacking shore batteries much less brilliant or much more destructive to us. There was never a war, afloat or ashore, like this. J. R. S. Rear-Admiral W'lliam T Sampson. OUR NAVY IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN

Chapter I The Demand For Intervention Efforts To Subjugate The Insurgent Cubans

THAT HAD DE- GENERATED INTO A PITILES: WAR OF EXTERMINATION WHERE- IN EVEN WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE DELIBERATELY STARVED TO DEATH — WHERE INTERVENTION WAS A DUTY AND NON- INTERVENTION NOT ONLY CRUEL BUT DASTARDLY. The student who is looking for the origin of our war with Spain must go back as far as 1 8 14, the very year in which the Spanish be stowed upon the island of Cuba the appellation of "the ever faithful." Spain had been over run by the armies of Napoleon, and a Napoleon had been placed upon her throne, but Cuba had proved faithful to the Spanish regime, and when the Spanish line once more entered the Madrid palace there was as sincere rejoicing in Cuba as in any district of Spain. Cuba was at this time in an especially prosperous condition. The cultivation of sugar and tobacco had but re cently been introduced.

A valuable class of citizens had come to her — the industrious French who fled from the negro revolutionists of Santo Domingo. The tremendous crops raised on virgin soil by slave-labor were sold at enormous prices. The Spanish Government looked at the prosperity of the colonists with the eyes of greed only. " In spite of the high sounding title of ' Faithful Cuba,' bestowed on her generous island sons, Spain subtly reverted to her old methods, and used their country as a conquered El Dorado, the quickly developed resources of which she was determined to turn to her selfish account, regardless of possible consequences. The Cubans, however, who had learned many things since the opening of the century, soon showed a distinct disinclination to submit to this process." Nor was it misrule alone that roused the antagonism of the Cubans, for though they were all of Spanish descent — and so far as the social leaders were concerned, of unmixed blood — they were treated as inferi ors by the Spanish officials, who came out to wring fortunes from the island, and what was infinitely worse, the Cuban ladies were con temptuously called pelareas, or "croppies," a term originating in their fashion of wearing cropped or short hair.

The Spanish repaid Cuban loyalty not only with increased taxation, but they added personal insult and contempt to financial injury. The Spanish system, first shown in its perfidy in 1 8 14, reached a climax of cruelty under Governor-General Weyler, known as "the Butcher," who landed at Havana on February 10, 1896. The Cubans had been in revolt from time to time for half a century, the last out break having been started early in 1895. Wey ler was appointed because he had in former years, in a subordinate capacity, made a reputation for pitiless rigor in the exercise of official powers in the island. He began his rule by proclaiming that all residents who did not actively aid him in extirpat ing the revolution were to be considered and treated as armed enemies, and that meant that they might be shot at the order of any Governor-General Weyler. officer of the army in command of any troop.

No form of trial was needed. The officer's order was sufficient. In the long war ending in 1878 the Govern ment had issued an order commanding all country residents to remain on their plantations at night, and to keep white flags flying above their buildings in token of their loyalty. Peo ple found beyond their landed limits might be shot, and buildings found with no white flag displayed were to be burned. Without waiting for this order to be promulgated throughout the country districts, the soldiers went forth to kill, pillage, and destroy. So it happened that thousands of innocent planters were murdered and robbed. But Weyler went still farther than that, for he compelled a few wealthy planters to take troops to their plantations, and there support them, while all other inhabitants, no matter how impoverished they might be, were compelled to concentrate themselves in the garrisoned towns.

These people brought from the farms were called reconcentrados. A few — here and there a family — were able, after mortgaging their land, to raise enough money to buy food. The small landholders, the Gua jiros, who held a few acres only, and lived from hand to mouth, together with the laborers or peons, were without any resource for obtaining even the commonest articles of food, save only as the rich gave them in charity. In this way tens of thousands of helpless people were brought to the garrisoned towns, to sit down in idleness, leaving the fields to lie uncultivated and the supplies of vegetables to cease. In short, this wras an order for the starvation of perhaps half the population. For the men who came to town one may feel but little pity. It was often said that if they lacked the courage to go to the mountains and join the insurgent bands in the fight for inde pendence they deserved no sympathy.

That is an iron dictum, but if it be accepted, there yet remain the thousands of women and children who could not fight and who were not per mitted to cultivate the soil — who were com pelled to lie down and die. OT the atrocities perpetrated by the Spanish soldiers in bringing these unfortunates to the towns — how unarmed men were shot for the pleasure of seeing them quiver and die, and how women were outraged — no adequate account has ever been given nor ever can be, nor ever ought to be. The foraging ants that ravage the tropics in search of insect prey are not as cruel as Weyler's soldiers were, for the ants instantly kill their victims, while Weyler's were reserved for the slow torture of starvation, where moth ers were compelled to look upon dying children and children upon dying parents, helpless to avert the fate that awaited all.

However much the numbers of the Cuban army were exaggerated in the public prints of the United States during 1896 and 1897, the stories of the suffer ing under Weyler were never half told, simply because no man was able to portray them as they were. Words failed. Having garrisoned the important towns, built block-houses along the railroads, and two lines of tiny forts connected by barbed-wire tangle ments (trochas) clear across the island, Weyler sat down to watch his victims die. The country that he controlled was what lay within range of his Mauser rifles, and not a yard more. The insurgents, though in small bands, and wretch edly armed, ranged the interior at will. Of systematic effort to hunt the insurgents from their retreats, there was absolutely none, and the forays that were made at rare intervals were worse than useless for the intended purpose, for they resulted in little more than the devastation of the plantations visited, while every injury done to Cubans was sure to bring reprisals in some form.

The Spaniards did manage to kill two or three leaders. Jose Marti and General Maceo became victims. But no head was made in wiping the insurrec tion away. The only thing accomplished was the all but utter prostration of every form of peaceful industry throughout the island, and the gradual extinction, by cruel starvation and murder, of such of the Cubans as came within the Spanish power. The English author of " Cuba, Past and Present," who refers to us as " the easily excited Americans," on "the very verge of hysteria," in speaking of. Weyler, says : " His desperate struggle to stamp out the revolt seems to have driven him to frenzy. He might be Cæsar Borgia come to life again. He conceived it his duty to extinguish the civil war at any cost, and he used the self-same meth ods which made the fame (or shame) of Her nando Cortez.

Since the days of Alva the horrors he perpetrated have rarely been equalled in human history." That was in Cuba, an island, lying just ninety miles off our coast, and entirely "within the economic orbit of the United States." Its prostrate people appealed to us for help. At that cry some who dreaded the influence of war, and the results of interfering with any matter beyond our own borders, replied that the Cubans were as cruel as their masters, which was true ; that they were incapable of self-government, which seemed altogether probable ; and that therefore we ought not to interfere. But others — characterize them as you will — replied : " If what you say of the Cubans be true, then we must interfere if it be only to drive from the Americas the barbarous government that could produce such a people."

And when these spoke the nation and the civilized world applauded. " There must be a stage in misgovernment which will justify the interference of by-standing nations," wrote Mr. Anthony Trollope, while in Cuba fifty years ago. And to this may be added the words of John Ruskin in his essay on "War:" " I tell you that the principle of non-inter vention, as now preached among us, is as selfish and cruel as the worst frenzy of conquest, and differs from it only by being not only malignant but dastardly."

Chapter II Teaching Spain To Despise Us When Our Sense Of Honor

WAS SO LOW THAT AMERICAN SHIPS WERE SEIZED ON THE HIGH SEAS BY FOREIGN MEN-OF-WAR AND WE PERMITTED THE AGGRESSOR TO CHANGE THE REAL ISSUE — AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOT TO DEATH WITHOUT TRIAL AND AN AMERICAN CONSUL CONFINED TO HIS OFFICE BY AN ARMED GUARD — TWO STRIKING PICTURES OF SPANISH DI- PLOMACY IN THE HISTORIES OF THE ASPINWALL AND THE VIRGINIUS. How we tried to restore order in Cuba before we resorted to armed intervention shall be told farther on. It is necessary to relate first two incidents in what is known as the ten-year war between the Spanish and the Cuban insurgents. Two American ships were seized by the Span iards under circumstances that warranted war on our part, but we showed extreme forbear ance in both cases, with the result that the Span iards came to regard us with a hearty contempt.

There is an old proverb which says, " when you clinch the devil you must use your claws." It applies here. If we had been firm in asserting our rights in 1869 and 1873 we should have had no war in 1898. On the morning of January 21, 1869, the American steamer Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall, while on her way from Port-au-Prince to Ha vana, found herself within five miles of the Cuban coast in a deplorable condition. She had weathered a gale that had lasted for three days, but the seas had swashed across her decks, poured down her hatches, drowned her fires and choked her pumps. Only by extraordinary efforts in bailing had she been kept afloat. But the sea had gone down at last and heading away on her course, she was making fair progress, when at noon she was overhauled by the Span ish warship Heman Cortes, and boarded by an armed force.

The Cubans were at that time engaged in what is known as their " ten years' struggle for liberty," and the Spaniards patrolled the Cuban coast to head off filibustering expedi tions. The Cortes was one of the patrol boats. To the Spanish officer, Captain McCarty brought the ship's papers, but the officer said : " I cannot examine them. My orders are to take you to Nuevitas." Captain McCarty protested, saying that he was " the bearer of despatches of the utmost importance for the Government of the United States," and for the American Admiral (Poor) in command of the station, then in Havana, but to Nuevitas he was obliged to go with an armed force on board. There he was detained six days, with his papers sealed in a trunk by the Spanish officials, when he was ordered to proceed to Havana still under guard.

This he refused to do unless his papers were returned to him, and the result of his refusal was that the Spanish steamer San Francisco towed him there. Here he and all his crew were still held as close prisoners on board until February 13th — in all twenty-three days after the ship was seized, before he was allowed even to communicate with the American Consul. So it was not until she had been under Spanish guns for a month that our Government learned of the outrage. Secretary of State Fish replied to the Con sul's formal notice by telegraphing : " Report particulars, and if seized on the high seas de mand immediate release." As she had been seized more than a marine league from shore, the demand was made. The Spaniards simply ignored it. The seizure was by no means the first of its kind, though because of the fact of Government despatches being on board, it was the most aggravating.

However, the State Department waited until February 26th, when the formal pro test of Captain McCarty was received by mail, and then it made a demand on the Spanish Min ister at Washington, Don Lopez Roberts, for reparation, adding to the demand these words : " This Government trusts that your Government will, when the matter shall have been brought to its notice, of its own accord offer a suitable apology for the indignity." This of ficial demand was made on March 5th. The Spanish minister waited a few days, and then unofficially informed the Secretary of State that the case was in the Prize Court at Havana ! A demand for a reply to the previous demand was at once sent, whereat the Spanish Minister sent another unofficial note saying that the Aspinwall had been " seized on suspicion that she had been land ing arms on the coast of Cuba."

Secretary of State Fish once more officially demanded her release, saying that even if she had landed arms Sagasta. there " you could not seize her for that unless you took her in Cuban waters." Of this the Spanish minister took no notice, so far as the record shows, and Secretary Fish did nothing until April 6th, when he notified United States Minister Daniel Sickles, at Ma drid, that " the President is not satisfied with this prolonged delay." At that Sickles, on April 8th, called on Prime Minister Sagasta, who replied that the case was " undergoing examination in the prize court." To this Sickles replied that the United States could not recognize the jurisdiction of a prize court unless a state of war existed between the Spanish and the Cubans. If such a war did exist, the United States would be obliged to recognize the Cubans as belligerents, and this would soon be done.

To this Sagasta replied that " the decision of the court will be given with all possible promptness." And that was about all the satisfaction Sa gasta would give him, though Sagasta did at last promise to release the steamer. Meantime the Aspinwall was lying beside the Spanish flag-ship in Havana. She was un der guard all the time and her crew were not permitted even to wet down her sides to keep the sun from starting the calking from her seams. After three weeks of this confinement the Spaniards brought a force on board to search her bunkers. The coal-handlers did not complete their search the first day, so that night they put an armed guard over the bunkers. At that Captain McCarty put his own crew to guard the Spanish guard and so prevent their sneaking arms into the bunkers during the night.

This fact is of importance, not alone as showing the Spanish character. It shows that Mc- Carty believed his own Government would be likely to ignore the real principle of the case if arms were found on board. Whether she had arms in her bunkers or not had nothings to do with the main principle in the case, for the As pinwall was an American ship and she had been seized on the high seas in time of peace. The Spaniards knew that they had no right to take her, but they were trying to establish a precedent, following which they might take ships wherever found when carrying arms to the insurgents in Cuba, and in their contempt for the Americans they thought they should succeed. As a matter of fact their feeling in this matter was well-nigh justified. Having waited a week for Sagasta to fulfil his reluctant promise to release the steamer, Minister Sickles, on orders from Washington, called once more to learn why nothing was done.

This was on April 14th. Sagasta replied that the local authorities at Havana had said that they " had no power to take the case out of court." At that Sickles declared em phatically that the United States Government considered the holding of the Aspinwall in a prize court an acknowledgment on the part of Spain that a state of war existed, and that belligerent rights would, therefore, be accorded the insurgents forthwith. Having said that, Sickles was about to withdraw when Sagasta stopped him and said : " The council of ministers decided yesterday to release the vessel forthwith on receiving from you a formal demand in writing for her surrender as an American vessel bearing official despatches." The written demand was made the same day, and it contained, shameful to relate, the words about her having official despatches on board.

Spanish diplomacy succeeded in evading the real principle at issue. They released her on the ground that she carried those despatches. They did not concede that they had no right to seize an American ship on the high seas, and, more than that, they did not release her forth with, as Sagasta promised to do, but waited thirteen days longer. The Colonel Lloyd As pinwall was held with her crew as prisoners on board for ninety-eight days, all told, before the guard was withdrawn. Even then Admiral Poor, who, with the old Severn and the monitor Saugus, was in Havana, felt obliged to send the Aspinwall to Key West without waiting for badly needed repairs, lest the rampant vol unteers of Havana destroy her under his guns. Close in the wake of the Aspitiwall case came that of the Virginius. The principles involved were much the same in both cases, but in the Virginius case American citizens were shot to death on the order of a Spanish military officer, and the Spaniards, with their agents and friends in this country, set up the claim that she was really a Spanish ship.

It appears that the Virginius was originally an English ship built to run the blockade during our civil war, that she was captured while engaged in her nefarious traffic, that she was sold as a prize in 1867, but reverted to the Gov ernment because she was not paid for, and that on August 20, 1870, she was sold to John F. Patterson for $9,800 cash. She was then lying at Washington. In September she was brought to New York and thoroughly overhauled and repaired On October 4, 1870, she cleared for Curacao with a cargo of one hundred and seventy barrels of bread, two boxes of saddlery, and four boxes of clothing, the whole of the value of $1,430, and the next day while going down the beach below Sandy Hook she overhauled the tug Virginia Seymour, and took from her twenty Cubans, of whom the leaders were General M. Quesada, his secretary, Adolfo Varona, and Senors Eloy Camacho and Domingo Mora.

It is certain that Patterson had complied with the law to the satisfaction of our Government officials, and that the papers of the Virginius were in proper form, but Patterson had violated the law — he had purchased the ship for the Cuban Junta Jn New York, and turned her over to Quesada, a Cuban. And thereafter she remained under the control of Quesada, although she had various Americans, from time to time, serving as captain. The Virginius reached Curacao on October 15th. A few days later came the schooner Billy Butts, and next day after her arrival she and the Virginius went out to sea, where the Butts transferred some hundreds of cases of arms, ammunition, and equipments, with four brass howitzers, to the Virginius, after which the Virginius went to Puerto Cabello and entered into an agreement with Guzman Blanco, the Venezuelan leader, by which Quesada was to help Blanco in a revolution then in progress, in return for which Blanco was to aid the Cuban insurgents later on.