The Campaign of Marengo. With comments

Front matter

SEitt) Comments BY HERBERT H. SARGENT FIRST LIEUTENANT AND QUARTERMASTER, SECuND CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY ; MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS; AUTHOR OF "NAPOLEuN BUNAPARTE's FIRST CAMPAIGN" LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER, & CO. LI? paternoster house, charing cross road Copyrighted in Great Britain. (Hiutorrsitg $h*css : John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A. D E D I C AT I O N BY A SOLDIER TO THE SOLDIERS OF HIS COUNTRY IT is written in a certain book, with which most of us are familiar, that a day will come when there shall be no more wars. But that time is far distant. When the laws of human society change, wars may cease, but not till then. All around us is strife ; the weak are ever falling before the strong. The grass takes its strength from the soil and air, and each blade struggles for food and light with its neighbor.

The beast consumes the grass, and man destroys the beast. We struggle on, contending with one another and with the world, and encountering defeat and death when we meet a stronger power than ourselves. Such is Nature's stern law. It regulates the life of the worm that crawls at our feet, governs the actions of men, and determines the destinies of peoples. The conclusion is therefore reached that until man can rise above this law, the time will not come when there shall be no further need of armies, and when war shall be no more. DEDICA T/ON. 6 No country has ever become great without soldiers. They lay the foundations of nations. In the history of every great people there is a record of battles fought and battles won. At Lexington, at Bunker Hill, at Gettysburg, men died that a nation might live.

Is it any wonder that we should be proud of our profession? " Whoever has a heart," says Von der Goltz, " feels it beat higher and becomes enthusiastic for the profession of the soldier." Napier says: " War is the condition of this world. From man to the smallest insect, all are at strife ; and the glory of arms, which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honor, forti tude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temper ance, excites the brave man's patriotism, and is a chastening corrective for the rich man's pride." We cannot know whether we shall be called upon to fight for our country ; we may be called, or not ; but we shall deserve no less the gratitude of our countrymen, if we remain always ready. Wars have been necessary in the past ; they will be necessary in the future. " Man needs must fight To make true peace his own He needs must combat might with might, Or might would rule alone." " The decisive events of the ivorld take place in the intellect. It is the mission of books that they help one to remember it."

Introduction

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1 After a war one ought not only to write the history of what has taken place, but also the history of what was intended. — Von der Goltz. UPON Bonaparte's return from Egypt in October, 1799, he found England, Austria, and the small states dependent upon them wag ing war against France. The allies were united in an effort to crush the French Republic. They were sanguine of success. Against this formi dable coalition France stood alone. Before Bonaparte's return, a Russian army, com manded by Suwaroff, had also been fighting the French in Italy and Switzerland ; but, having been defeated by Massena, Suwaroff had retreated with the remnants of his army into the valley of the Danube, and thence had proceeded into Russia. The defeat of Suwaroff had caused the Russian Emperor, Paul the First, to believe that his army had not been properly supported by the Aus trian armies.

He therefore felt angry and bitter 1 See Map 1. towards Austria. As soon as Bonaparte became aware of the state of the Emperor's mind he collected the Russian prisoners then in France, gave them new uniforms and new arms, and sent them back to their own country. These acts and others of a conciliatory nature pleased and flattered the Emperor Paul, and enabled Bonaparte, soon after his return, to detach Russia from the alliance. Of the two great powers at war with France, England had been more active and more successful upon the sea; Austria, upon the land. In the battle of the Nile, Nelson had dealt the French navy a terrible blow, from the effects of which it never recovered. England was now mistress of the sea. Having her fleets in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Genoa, she was prepared to assist Austria in her efforts to overthrow the French Republic.

During Bonaparte's absence in Egypt, Austria, aided by Russia, had pushed forward her armies to the boundaries of France. One large Austrian army1 in western Germany was watching the crossings of the Rhine; another in northwestern Italy was fighting the French along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. From the theatre of opera tions made memorable by Bonaparte's victories 1 Though troops from several of the small German States dependent upon Austria formed a part of this army, it is referred to as an " Austrian army," because the bulk of the troops com posing it were Austrians. INTROD UCTION. 17 in 1796-97, Austria had almost driven the French eagles. Bonaparte's battles of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli seemed to have been won in vain. Austria had all but recon quered Italy.

Except -along the narrow seaboard between the Apennines and the sea, no French soldiers were to be found upon Italian soil. Such was the situation when, in November, 1799, Bonaparte became First Consul of France. At this time his acts certainly indicated a desire for peace. He wrote to the governments of Eng land and Austria, deploring the futility of a con tinuation of the conflict, and suggesting that the war should cease. His overtures, however, were coldly rejected. He was forced to fight. Against this powerful coalition peace could be obtained only by victorious battle. Industriously Bonaparte prepared for war. France was in a deplorable state. The treasury was empty ; the soldiers were ill fed and ill clad ; recruits and supplies were obtained with difficulty; civil war existed in certain parts of western France ; and the armies of the Republic had met with defeat again and again.

Over the French people this condition of affairs had cast a gloom which the magic of Bonaparte's name alone could dispel. During the winter of 1799-1800 his energy and activity were apparent everywhere. His procla mations aroused the spirit and patriotism of the French people, and gave them confidence in their government, and hope of success under his leader ship. He placed the finances upon a firm basis, crushed out the civil war, caused arms to be man ufactured, and supplies to be collected ; and from the levies that he ordered he organized sufficient forces to strengthen materially the French military power. Of the two French armies in the field, he sent re-enforcements to the Army of the Rhine, gave the command of it to General Moreau, and ordered General Massena to take command of the Army of Italy, which, half-starved upon the rocks of Genoa, was struggling heroically against overwhelming odds.

At this time, too, he began to collect, drill, and organize, in different parts of France, bodies of men who were destined to unite near Lake Geneva, and together with other troops in France already organized, were to form a third army, to be known as the Army of Reserve. Before entering into the details of the campaign, it is necessary to describe the topography of the theatre of operations, to point out the situations of the opposing forces, and to explain the plans of the contending powers. Bordering France on the east are Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. The Alps, covering Swit zerland like a huge network, give to this country the appearance of an immense bastion, which, extending east, separates Germany from Italy. From Switzerland these mountains extend through INTRO D UC TION. 19 and beyond the Tyrol.

They separate the valley of the Danube from the valley of the Po. In Switzer land they are known as the Swiss Alps ; in the Tyrol, as the Tyrolese Alps. On the north side of them are the States of Swabia, Bavaria, and Upper Austria ; on the south side, Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venice. Extending south from western Switzerland to within about thirty miles of the sea, the French Alps form part of the boundary line between France and Italy; thence, turning east, they ap proach the Italian shore, and are here known as the Maritime Alps; still farther east, along the shores of the Gulf of Genoa, they are called the Apennines. With the exception of a few passes, this great mountain chain, almost enclosing northern Italy, forms an insurmountable barrier to the soldier. Even over the passes, especially across the higher ranges, communication was, at the time of which we write, extremely dangerous.

The snow and ice, the glaciers, avalanches, frequent storms, and steep declivities, made these mountain roads hazardous and difficult for the passage of armies. The principal passes in the Swiss Alps are the St. Gothard, the Simplon, and the Great St. Bernard ; in the French Alps, the Little St. Bernard, and the Mont Cenis; in the Maritime Alps, the Col di Tenda and the Col di Ormea; and in the Apennines, the Col di Cadibona and the Bochetta. Lying partly or entirely within this territory are three large rivers and their tributaries. They have their sources in or near the great chain of the Alps, and drain the tributary country. The Po rises in the French Alps, and flows east through northern Italy. The Danube rises in western Germany, and flows east through Bavaria and Austria. The Rhine rises in Switzerland, flows north into Lake Constance, thence, forming the outlet of the lake, flows west to Bale, where it turns abruptly and flows north for the rest of its course.

Early in April, 1800, an Austrian army of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, com manded by Marshal Kray, guarded the right bank of the upper Rhine. The right wing extended beyond Strasburg ; the left, well up into the Alps east of Switzerland ; and the centre, forming the greater part of Kray's army, occupied the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine made by its change of direction at Bale. Kray's line of com munication was along several roads down the Danube to the Austrian capital. Facing the Austrian army, on the opposite side of the river, was the Army of the Rhine, com manded by Moreau. Including the French forces in Switzerland, it numbered one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, and extended from the St. Gothard on the right to Strasburg on the left. It had for a base of operations the frontier for- INTRO D UCTION. 21 tresses of France, and Switzerland, which was occupied by the French.

The Austrian army in northwestern Italy con sisted of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, and was commanded by General Melas. The greater part of it was in the vicinity of Genoa and along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. The remainder, occupying the fortresses and guarding the entrances to the passes of the Alps, was scattered throughout northwestern It aly. This army had its base of operations on the Mincio; and its line of communication was by several roads down the valley of the Po to its base, thence by two roads : one north through the Tyrol across the Brenner Pass into the valley of the Danube; the other northeast through Friuli across the Pontebba Pass to Vienna. Opposed to the army of Melas was the Army of Italy. It consisted of forty thousand soldiers, of whom thirty-six thousand, commanded by Mas sena, were holding the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda.

The remainder, four thousand strong, commanded by General Thurreau, was guarding the Mont Cenis Pass in the French Alps. The line of communication of the Army of Italy to its base of operations on the Rhone was by the Genoa- Nice road. A British fleet, commanded by Admiral Keith was in the Gulf of Genoa; and a British corps twelve thousand strong, commanded by General Abercromby, was at Port Mahon in Minorca. Such were the main features of the theatre of operations, and such were the positions and num bers of the opposing armies that were facing each other in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy, at the beginning of hostilities early in April, 1800. Against the Austrian armies, supported by the British navy, and a British corps which might at any time be thrown upon the coast of France, Bonaparte could not, with his two armies, expect to make much headway.

His chances of success were small ; the odds against him were too great. Unless he could increase his own forces, a French victory was doubtful. Thus it was that early in the winter he had seen the necessity of creating an army of reserve, which could be sent to re-enforce Moreau in Germany or Massena in Italy as cir cumstances might require. But the Army of Re serve had not yet been assembled. The divisions composing it were still scattered throughout France. Their organization, however, was being rapidly pushed forward, with the intention that early in May they should unite near Lake Geneva and form an army of forty thousand soldiers. On the French side, Bonaparte, at the head of the French Republic, had for the first time full control of all military operations. Hitherto, great as had been his achievements in Italy and in Egypt, he had acted as a subordinate,

INTRODUCTION.

. 23 merely directing the operations of his own army; but now his military genius was to have full play. On the Austrian side, the Aulic Council, con sisting of twenty-one members, directed all military operations. This council, which held its sessions at Vienna, not only made the plans of campaign, but also issued detailed orders to the Austrian commanders, and furnished them information re garding Bonaparte's plans and manœuvres. At this time the ablest soldier in Austria was the Archduke Charles. Already he had greatly distinguished himself in several campaigns. He reasoned that, inasmuch as Austria, England, and Russia had failed to crush the French Republic in 1799, before Bonaparte's return to France, the allies stood little hope of success after Russia had withdrawn from one side, and Bonaparte had been added to the other.

He therefore advised his government to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace. To the Aulic Council he also gave valuable advice upon the military situation. But no attention was paid to his suggestions. In fact, before the campaign opened, the Archduke was relieved of his command in the army, and sent into Bohemia in a kind of honorable exile. The plan of campaign adopted by the allies was that the Austrian army under Kray in Germany should remain on the defensive, holding Moreau in check if possible, while the Austrian army under Melas in Italy attacked the Army of Italy along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. By this means, the allies expected that the Austrian forces in Italy, so superior in numbers to the French, would be able with the help of the British fleet to blockade Genoa, and to drive the Army of Italy across the Var into southern France.

This movement being accomplished, the purpose was that Melas, supported by the British navy and Abercromby's corps, should invade France, and attack and capture Toulon. Further more, the allies hoped, by adopting this plan, to receive some support from the Royalists in the south of France. If this operation succeeded, it was expected that Moreau would detach a sufficient force from the Army of the Rhine to march on Toulon for the purpose of driving back the allies: whereupon Kray could attack the Army of the Rhine, thus weakened, with much hope of success ; that, in fact, he could take the offensive, force the crossings of the Rhine, and invade France. In this calculation no plans were made to attack the French forces in the great stronghold of Switzerland. If, however, the allies succeeded in their designs, Kray and Melas could unite their armies in France, thus cut the communications of the French forces in Switzerland, and smother them, as it were, between the two great Austrian armies.

In view of the facts that the allies were flushed INTRO D UC TION. 25 with their recent victories, were superior to their adversary in numbers, and also held the mastery of the sea, they expected great results in the coming campaign. With so many advantages on their side, their plans seemed both reasonable and accomplishable ; but they reckoned without the genius of Bonaparte. On the other side, Bonaparte had two plans, both of which it will be well to examine, that the reader may grasp the breadth of Bonaparte's in tellect in originating strategic conceptions. Both plans were based upon the fact that the great stronghold of Switzerland, extending like a huge wedge between the Austrian army in Germany and that in Italy, was occupied by the French. This natural fortress, almost impregnable, could be used as a base of operations from which to attack either Kray in Germany or Melas in Italy.

The first plan conceived by Bonaparte was to leave Massena in Italy on the defensive to hold Melas in check, then to unite the Army of Re serve with Moreau's army, cross the Rhine in force between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, and attack that part of Kray's army occupying the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg. By an attack in this direction, Bonaparte calculated that he could defeat Kray, drive him north, sever his communications with Vienna, and either destroy or capture his army. If successful in this operation, he could descend the Danube and seize the Emperor's capital; then by taking possession of the Tyrol and the Carnic Alps, he could occupy the Brenner and Pontebba passes, which operation would sever the communications of Melas in Italy and cut him off from Vienna.

With Kray's army captured or destroyed, with the French holding the only passes by which the Austrians in Italy could retreat, and with Bonaparte in possession of the Austrian capital, the campaign must end ; the Austrian Emperor would be compelled to make peace. This plan had many advantages. It would, if successful, be far-reaching in its results ; it would not only destroy Kray, but would paralyze the operations of Melas; it would, to use Bonaparte's expressive words, " reconquer Italy at Vienna." Though this plan promised great results it was not carried out. A rivalry between Moreau and Bonaparte was the principal cause. The former, being jealous of the latter, refused to serve under him. Though the First Consul had shown his confidence in Moreau, and, by appointing him to command the Army of the Rhine, had recognized his great military abilities, nevertheless Moreau objected to having Bonaparte direct the operations of the combined armies in person.

In fact, he stated that he would send in his resignation if the First Consul took command of the Army of the Rhine. At a later day this would undoubtedly have resulted in Moreau's losing his command ;

INTRODUCTION.

. 27 but at this time Bonaparte was not in a position to force a quarrel with him. He had need of Moreau's great military talents. Furthermore, the commander of the Army of the Rhine had the unbounded confidence of the soldiers under him, and was at that time the only general in France, except Massena and Bonaparte himself, who was able to direct successfully the operations of a large army. Victory was Bonaparte's object. To be victorious, it was necessary to utilize the ser vices of every great soldier of France. Doubtless, too, in adopting another plan, Bona parte was influenced somewhat by the hope of gaining a great victory with the army that he him self had created. If he could cross the Alps with the Army of Reserve and strike a blow which would decide the fate of Italy, he alone would reap the glory.

Moreover, by following in the footsteps of Hannibal, he would be more likely to dazzle the French people, and to fix deeply in their minds the splendor of his achievements. Bonaparte's second plan was that Moreau should cross the Rhine and attack Kray in such a direction as to push him back from Lake Constance towards the north ; that he should then detach a corps of twenty or twenty-five thousand soldiers from his army and send them across Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass into Italy, where they were to unite with the Army of Reserve to be led by Bonaparte in person over the Great St. Bernard Pass. With these forces Bonaparte purposed to march south, cross the Po, seize the line of retreat of the Austrians, and force them to fight a battle to recover their communications. Should he succeed in this manœuvre, a single victorious battle would decide the fate of the Austrians in Italy ; for it would sever their com munications and cut them from their base of operations.

To Melas, therefore, a defeat would mean the ruin, capture, or annihilation of his army ; to Austria it would mean the loss of Italy. The success of this plan depended upon the skill with which Bonaparte could deceive the Austrians in Italy as to his intentions ; for should they learn of the existence of the Army of Re serve, and of Bonaparte's intention to cross the Great St. Bernard, they could concentrate near the Italian entrance to the pass, and overwhelm the French divisions in detail as they issued into Italy. It was necessary, therefore, that the strength, destination, even the existence of the Army of Reserve, should be kept as secret as possible. To accomplish this, Bonaparte published in the news papers, and announced in various ways, that the Army of Reserve was assembling at Dijon in France, and that it would soon be sent to re enforce the Army of Italy.

At the same time he took care to collect there only a few thousand men, consisting mostly of conscripts and old soldiers. The wide publicity given the matter caused the INTR OD UC TIOA T. 29 spies of England and Austria to gather at Dijon, but finding there only unorganized conscripts and veterans too old for active service, they sent word to their governments that no such army existed. Consequently the Army of Reserve was believed to be imaginary, and was ridiculed and caricatured throughout Europe. Both Melas and Kray were completely deceived. Feeling certain that there were but two French armies with which to contend, they had great hope of success. Moreover, the information received from the Aulic Council confirmed them in this opinion. Melas, in particular, regarded the matter as a ruse of Bonaparte, intended to divert the Austrians in Italy from invading France.

He therefore felt secure in his positions, and pushed forward his forces with renewed energy. Feeling certain that he had fathomed Bonaparte's stratagem, he rested in a security which doomed him to defeat. Meanwhile the divisions of the Army of Reserve were concentrating. They were marching through France ; and were rapidly assembling near Geneva, from which place they were to be led across the Alps into Italy. This army, so secretly organized, and so derided throughout Europe; this army, whose very existence was doubted by the allies, was destined to amaze the world by the brilliancy of its exploits. Bonaparte will lead it over the Great St. Bernard Pass across the Alps, descend like an avalanche into the valley of the Po, cut the communications of the Austrians, and defeat them in the hard-fought battle of Marengo.

He will emulate the deeds of Hannibal. He will lead forty thousand soldiers across the highest mountains of Europe, surmount every obstacle in his pathway, overthrow every force sent to oppose his progress, and by a single march and a single battle reconquer northern Italy. COMMENTS. In making war upon France the Austrian forces were obliged to advance along both the Danube and the Po; for if they confined their operations exclusively to the valley of the Danube, they must yield northern Italy to the French ; or if they restricted their operations wholly to the valley of the Po, they must lose western Germany, and leave unguarded the direct route between France and Austria. The Austrian forces were, therefore, divided into two armies: one of which confined its operations to the valley of the Danube ; the other, to the valley of the Po.

In advancing towards France, these armies became farther and farther separated from each other. Kray's army in western Germany and the army of Melas in northwestern Italy were separated by Switzerland and the great chain of the Alps. As Switzerland and the passes of the Swiss Alps were held by the

INTRODUCTION.

. 31 French, there could be no direct communication between Kray and Melas. Though the great high way of the Tyrol, which crossed the Alps over the Brenner Pass, was in possession of the Austrians, it was so far in rear of the Austrian armies that re-enforcements could not be sent over it from one army to the other without making a march of several hundred miles. In fact, the nature of the country was such that during active operations neither army could expect to receive any support from the other. They were independent armies of equal strength. Each had a separate com mander, and each had its own line of operations and its own line of retreat. On the other hand, the three French armies were so situated that they could support one another. With Moreau's army on the Rhine, Massena's along the Apennines, and the Army of Reserve between them near Lake Geneva, Bonaparte could move the last along the roads of eastern France to re-enforce either of the others as circumstances might require.

In this way Bonaparte could re-enforce Massena with the Army of Reserve, which would increase the Army of Italy to eighty thousand combatants. Or, should Massefia be driven back across the Var into France, Bonaparte could leave Moreau on the defensive along the Rhine with a part of his army, withdraw the remainder, unite it with the Army of Reserve, and with these combined forces added to the remnants of Massena's army, destroy Melas in the south of France. Had the Austrian armies succeeded in invading France simultaneously, Bonaparte would have de tached a containing force 1 against one army, and then have massed his remaining forces against the other. By repeating this manœuvre, first against one army and then against the other, he would have attempted to defeat both. In this case, the Austrian armies would enter France from different directions ; one from the east, the other from the southeast, separated by Switzerland and the French Alps; and since the French armies, even while falling back, would still be between the Austrian armies, Bonaparte would, from his central position, have the advantage of interior lines, and could rapidly combine his forces against his adversaries in succession.

How well he would have succeeded in this manœuvre can best be judged by what he accom plished by similar manœuvres. In the Italian campaign of 1796-97, when the Austrians advanced against Bonaparte on both sides of Lake Garda, he united his forces at the foot of the lake; and, by throwing a strong force against one and then against the other of the 1 Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another portion of the hostile forces. — Wagner.

INTRODUCTION.

. 33 advancing armies, defeated both in succession before they could unite. In these manœuvres, with a total force of forty-five thousand soldiers, he defeated seventy-two thousand Austrians. In the campaigns of Arcole and Rivoli, the Aus trians likewise advanced with divided forces. In the former, forty thousand Frenchmen opposed sev enty thousand Austrians ; in the latter, forty-four thousand Frenchmen opposed sixty-five thousand Austrians. By skilful combinations, similar to those just described, Bonaparte defeated the Austrian armies in both campaigns. In 1814, when the Prussians, under Blucher, and the Austrians, under Schwarzenberg, were ad vancing from different points of the French frontier upon Paris, the results obtained by Napoleon's leaving a retarding force before one army, and by massing his remaining forces against the other, were still more remarkable.

With a force numeri cally inferior to either army opposed to him, he succeeded in winning battle after battle. Though in the campaign of i8i4wefind strategical problems with which we are not now concerned, yet Napoleon's victories there in the face of such odds show what he might have accomplished had Kray and Melas crossed the French frontiers and ad vanced on Paris. But the combination that offered Bonaparte the greatest chance of success yet remains to be con sidered. Should Massena be able single-handed to hold in check the Austrians in Italy, Bonaparte could unite the Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong, to Moreau's army of one hundred and thirty thousand. This junction would give Bona parte one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers with whom to attack the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians under Kray.

With such a superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would probably have annihilated the Austrian forces in the valley of the Danube. But the mere superiority in numbers, which, by this combination, might have been obtained in Ger many, is not the only advantage which Bonaparte could have derived from the positions of the op posing armies. In order to understand the sub ject better and see, perhaps, in a measure, the whole strategical situation as it appeared to Bona parte himself, it will be necessary to examine somewhat carefully the positions of the opposing forces, and point out the advantages which the possession of Switzerland gave to the French. Since Moreau's army was in position in France along the west bank of the Rhine from Strasburg to Bale, and extended into Switzerland along the south bank of the Rhine from Bale to Lake Con stance, Bonaparte could use either France or Switzerland as a base of operations from which to attack the Austrians in the Black Forest.