The Coldstream Guards in the Crimea

Front matter

THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS IN THE CRIMEA a BY THE SAME AUTHOR. Including an Account of the Political Events and Campaigns with which the Regiment has been associated. A HISTORY OF THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS From 1815 to 1885. With numerous Coloured Plates, Drawings, and Maps, by Lieutenant Nevile R. Wilkinson. Crown 4to, cloth, gilt top, 2 guineas net. " Colonel Ross-of-Bladensburg may justly claim for this magnificent volume that it is something more than a regimental chronicle. . . . The book is full of interest. The reputation of any ordinary work of the kind would be made by the illustrations alone." — Times. "The Coldstream Guards is fortunate in its chronicler. The book is a valuable contribution to military history." — Spectator. "The book is invaluable alike to the soldier, the civilian, and the politician." — Saturday Review. THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS IN THE CRIMEA BY LT.-COL. ROSS-OF-BLADENSBURG, C.B. LONDON A. D. INNES & CO. BEDFORD STREET

Preface

. The following pages are a reproduction of the Crimean portion of a History of the Coldstream Guards from 1815 to 1885, which was published a few months ago. Such parts have been omitted that refer to matters, less interesting to the public generally than to the Officers past and present of the Regiment and to their friends. But otherwise the present volume contains all that was written in the larger work upon the hostilities conducted against Russia in the middle of the present century, and upon the action of the distinguished Corps, just mentioned, during that memorable period. The struggle for Sevastopol forms the main feature of the one great European war, in which we have been engaged, since the defeat of Napoleon I. at the battle of Waterloo. Though obscured by other events, it is still fresh in the minds of all thoughtful Englishmen ; and while a great deal has already been written about it, we cannot say that the subject has yet been exhausted.

Indeed, this is far from being the case ; and it is possible that only in the present day — when the leading actors of the great drama have all disappeared — will historical criticism sufficiently elucidate many of the important points, connected with events in the East between 1853 and 1856, which up to now have scarcely been weighed and considered as they deserve. As a slight and very imperfect contribution to the history of this war, I now venture to present this small book to my

PREFACE.

. VI readers. I do so with no little diffidence, being well aware of its many shortcomings. But I have the conviction that few modern episodes in the annals of our country are more worthy of their attention than this one is ; while I also have the pleasant assurance that the brave deeds and the heroic endurance of our splendid Crimean soldiers must always excite a warm and enthusiastic interest among all classes of Englishmen. I desire again to express my grateful thanks to General Sir Frederick Stephenson, G.CB. (now Colonel of the Cold stream Guards), and to General Hon. Sir Percy Feilding, K.C.B. (late of the Coldstream), both of whom served throughout the war with Russia, for the interest they showed in my work when I was preparing the larger book, — of which the following pages form a part, as has been mentioned above, — and for the trouble they took to enable me to carry it out ; also to Major Goulbourn, Grenadier Guards, who kindly lent me the very interesting Crimean diary of the late Colonel Tower.

Lastly, I also beg to offer my acknowledgments to Messrs. Blackwood & Sons, and to Messrs. Seeley & Co., for their courteous permission to use the maps in Mr. Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea, and in Sir E. Hamley's War in the Crimea; as well as to Lieutenant Nevile Wilkinson, Coldstream Guards, whose maps, drawn originally for the larger book, I have been allowed to reproduce here. J. R.-OF-B. August, 1897. CONTENTS.

Chapter I. How England And France Were Drawn Into The War

PAGE Position of Russia in Europe — General attitude of the Western Powers — State of the Continent in 1853 — Of France — Friendly feeling towards England — Alliance between the two nations — Condition of Austria, Prussia, and Germany — The Tsar's quarrel with the Sultan — Commencement of the war — The Vienna Note — Its failure — Turkish successes on the Danube — The affair of Sinope — Events that caused it — And how it involved England and France in the struggle 1

Chapter II. The Allies In The East

Three Battalions of the Brigade of Guards ordered on Foreign Service — Departure of the Coldstream from London — Arrival in Malta — Concentration of the Allies in the Mediterranean — Occupation of Scutari — General Lord Raglan assumes command — The British Army begins to form — Want of transport — The Allies move to Varna — Women at the seat of war — Good feeling between the British and French troops 19

Chapter III. Operations In Bulgaria

Course of the war on the Danube — Siege of Silistria — Bravery of the garrison — The Russians fail to take it— Other failures, and their retreat from Turkish territory into Bessarabia — Intervention of Austria — Importance of this event ; and how it affected the war — The Allies in Bulgaria — Their inaction — Sickness among the troops — Return to Varna — Preparations for the invasion of the Crimea— The organization and strength of the Allies y CONTENTS. VIII

Chapter IV. Determination To Attack Sevastopol

TAGE Small results gained by the Allies— Embarrassment of the British Government— Sudden determination to attack Sevastopol- Inconveniences of this resolution — Russian position in the Trans-Caucasian provinces— Conditions under which the Crimea was invaded— The object of the expedition not kept secret— The isolation of the Peninsula not attempted — Lateness of the season — No provision made for a lengthened operation ... 51

Chapter V. Landing In The Crimea

The allied Armada sails from Varna to Eupatoria — Landing effected at "Old Fort" — How the troops were equipped — Serious deficiency of transport — The move to Sevastopol — Strength of the invaders — Their order of march — Skirmish on the Bulganak — The enemy on the Alma river opposes the advance of the Allies — Preparations made to dislodge him — Description of the field of battle — Strength and position of the Russians 64

Chapter VI. Battle Of The Alma

Commencement of the battle — Advance of the Light and Second Divisions — Deployment of the First Division — Advance of the Guards and Highland Brigades — Defeat and flight of the Russians — No pursuit — Losses — Bravery and steadiness of the British troops — The Allies lose valuable time after the battle — Arriving at last before their objective, Sevastopol, they refuse to attack it — General description of Sevastopol 76

Chapter VII. Flank March Round Sevastopol

Predicament of the Allies — Determination to attack the south side — Flank march — Strange meeting with the rear of Menshikoff's army — Occupation of Balaklava by the British and of Kamiesh Bay by the French— The Allies refuse to assault Sevastopol ; they prefer to bombard it — Depression of the Russian garrison, who fear a prompt assault — Their strength and the state of their defences — Successful efforts to strengthen the latter CONTENTS. IX 122 M.

Chapter VIII

A REGULAR SIEGE UNCONSCIOUSLY BEGUN. PAGE Description of the upland of the Chersonese occupied by the Allies — Position of Menshikoff s army — Of the French— Of the British — Weakness of the right flank of the allied line— Nothing done to defend it — Supply of tents to the troops — Preparation for the projected bombardment — Official confidence in an immediate success — Severe duties — How the enemy utilized the unexpected respite accorded to him 109

Chapter IX. The First Bombardment

Importance and magnitude of the operation — Results of the first day's fire — No attack — Continuation of the bombardment — No better result — The insecurity of the British right flank — Augmentation of the Coldstream for the purposes of the war — Russian reinforcements begin to arrive — Battle of Balaklava — Cavalry charges — Consequences of the battle — Sortie against our right flank — Its failure— Its object — Another bombardment projected early in November

Chapter X. Conditions Under Which The Battle Took Place

Large Russian reinforcements reach the Crimea —Menshikoff determines to drive the invaders into the sea — Position and strength of the enemy — Numerical strength of the Allies — Length of the line to be defended by them — Plan of attack — Prospects of the Russians — Their confidence of victory — Description of the field of Inkerman — Position of the Allies opposing the attack — Hearing the sound of fire, the Guards move quickly to the front

Chapter XI. Early Stages Of The Fight

Events of the morning — Unexpected approach of the enemy — Confusion in the Russian arrangements for the attack — First struggle with the British outposts — The Second Division soon involved — Arrival of General Bullet's Brigade — Inequality of the numbers engaged — Arrival of the Guards' Brigade ; their strength and composition — Situation on the field at that moment — The Guards move to the Kitspur, and join the rest already engaged there CONTENTS. X

Chapter XII. Struggle On The Kitspur

PAGE The Sandbag battery on the Kitspur, the central point of the main attack — A contest against very superior forces— A confused but exceedingly fierce struggle — Impossibility to describe accurately the exact details as they occurred — Arrival of the Fourth Division under General Cathcart — His manœuvre and its failure — Arrival of the French — Exhaustion of the Guards — They withdraw to Home Ridge 166

Chapter XIII. Repulse Of The Russians

Operations of the French — Successes of the British artillery — Repulse of the Russian attack — Retreat of the enemy — No pursuit — What the garrison of Sevastopol did during the day — Operations of the Russian forces in the valley of the Tchernaya — Their unaccountable inactivity — Great losses incurred on both sides— Those among the Coldstream Officers abnormally large — Reaction after the struggle — A scene of carnage — Extraordinary gallantry of the British troops 179

Chapter XIV. Distress Of The Army

Prostration of both sides after the battle of Inkerman — Sevastopol not to be taken in 1854 — Tardy arrangements made for the winter — Depletion of the ranks — The right flank is at last secured — Violent hurricane of the 14th of November ; stores scattered and destroyed — The winter begins in earnest — Causes of the sufferings that overwhelmed the army — How Government attended to its wants — No road between the base and front — Miserable plight to which the army was reduced 19;

Chapter XV. Operations During The Winter

Indignation in England, and the measures taken to relieve the army — Admirable manner in which the misfortunes were borne by the British soldiers— Testimony of the commission of inquiry — The Russians quiescent during the winter — Operations of the Allies— The French extend their siege-works— The Turks brought to the Crimea and occupy Eupatoria— Their successes at the battle there— The Guards brigade are sent to Balaklava CONTENTS. XI

Chapter XVI. Events Of The Spring Of

1855. PAGE Stay of the Brigade at Balaklava — Improvement in the condition of the men — Return of the Guards to the front, June 16th — Changed aspect of affairs before Sevastopol — Review of events during the time spent at Balaklava — Interference by Napoleon III. in the course of the war — Second bombardment — Operations paralysed — General Canrobert resigns, and is succeeded by General Pelissier — Energy displayed by the latter — Third bombardment 229

Chapter XVII. End Of The Siege

Fourth bombardment ; assault on Sevastopol — Its failure — Death of Lord Raglan ; succeeded by General Simpson — Siege operations continued — Battle of the Tchernaya — Fifth bombardment — Sixth bombardment ; the second assault — The Malakoff is captured — Failure of the assault on the Redan — Fall of the south side of Sevastopol — The Russians evacuate the town, and retreat to the north side — State in which the Allies found Sevastopol ... 241

Chapter XVIII. How The Unfinished War Languished

Home events during the war — Sympathy of Her Majesty with her Crimean soldiers — Badges of distinction added to the Colours — Inactivity of the Allies after the fall of the south side of Sevastopol — Causes for this — Small expeditions against the Russian coast — The fall of Kars — Sir W. Codrington succeeds as Commander of the Forces — The winter 1855-56 — Negotiations for a peace, which is concluded, March 30th, 1856 ... 263

Chapter XIX. Return Of The Troops, And Summary

Events after the cessation of hostilities — A British cemetery in the Crimea — Embarkation and return home — Regimental Crimean statistics — British losses during the war — Computation of Russian CONTENTS. XII PAGE losses— The Crimean Guards Brigade at Aldershot ; visit of Her Majesty the Queen — Move to London, and cordial reception there — Distribution of the Victoria Cross — Summary of events connected with the war 281

Appendix

A. General Order, No. i, Constantinople, April 30, 1854 ... 297

APPENDIX.

B. Death of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, G.C.B 299

APPENDIX.

C. Ages and previous Occupations of the Non-commissioned Officers and Men of the ist Battalion Coldstream Guards, and Drafts sent to the East, engaged in the War with Russia 302

APPENDIX.

D. Deaths in the ist Battalion Coldstream Guards by Months during the War with Russia 304

APPENDIX.

E. i. Return of the Numbers Killed in the Crimea ... 306 2. Return of the Numbers Wounded in the Crimea, Dead, Invalided, etc. 307 MAPS. No. i. — The Black Sea Region Tosace 31 ,, 2. — The Crimea from Eupatoria to Sevastopol M (,- ,, 3. — The Battle of the Alma 86 ,, 4. — The Country near Sevastopol ,, I02 ,, 5.— Sevastopol I2, ,, 6.— The Battle of Inkerman M ,66

Chapter I. How England And France Were Drawn Into The War

Position of Russia in Europe — General attitude of the Western Powers — State of the Continent in 1853 — Of France — Friendly feeling towards England — Alliance between the two nations — Condition of Austria, Prussia, and Germany — The Tsar's quarrel with the Sultan — Commencement of the war — The Vienna Note — Its failure — Turkish successes on the Danube — The affair of Sinope — Events that caused it — And how it involved England and France in the struggle. The Empire of Russia — except for the great ex pansion in Central Asia which has taken place during the last forty years, and which has now brought its frontiers close to India — was scarcely less vast and formidable in 1853 than it is at present. Stretching from Germany on the west, to the Pacific Ocean on the east, bordering the Black Sea, and pressing on Turkey, Persia, and China, it occupies an immense and continuous territory, both in Europe and in Asia, and exercises many and im portant influences over the civilization of the world.

Inhabited generally, by a docile agricultural popu lation who live in the plains, and whose liberties and property are at the mercy of a strong executive power, it is ruled by an Autocrat both in name and in reality, and is governed by a trained army of ubiquitous administrators and officials, who enforce his decrees, and coerce the whole people to spend their existence in the service of the Tsar. The organization of Russia, less adapted, perhaps, to secure the welfare of her subjects than to accom plish the will of her rulers, is skilfully constructed ; and the sagacity she displays in the conduct of her affairs, is as conspicuous in the manner she brings fresh conquests within her grasp, as in that by which she controls and assimilates the numerous and heterogeneous nationalities, that are to be found within her borders.

But here her advantages end. Russia has no seaboard, and her foreign commerce, incommen surate to her size and importance, is not sufficient to enable her to develop her vast resources, or to consolidate the stupendous forces with which her disciplined intelligence, large possessions, and teem ing population should endow her. A glance at the map reveals the disability under which she labours. Fettered in the north by an ice-bound ocean, she WE WERE DRAWN INTO IT. 5 has but two outlets through which to reveal her strength, and these are blocked by the narrow channels of the Sound and the Bosphorus. That Russia is ambitious and greedy of power, few will deny ; but her encroachments are not altogether due to the mere love of extending her territories. Her existence, as a nation of the first rank, is menaced by her maritime weakness, and until she frees herself from the shackles that cripple her commercial activity on the sea, she is the ready and easy victim of the Power that holds, and has strength to use, the keys of her house.

But, added to this, her statesmen have long perceived that, as soon as they shall have gained the Bosphorus, they will win a commanding supremacy over the destinies of the world. While, therefore, they are impelled to a system of aggrandisement, in order to force their way to the sea and to preserve the life of their Imperial structure, they by no means despise the glorious goal of wide dominion, to which the success of this policy must infallibly conduct them. This, then, is, and has been for many generations, ever since their genius conceived the design, the reason which has urged them relentlessly to enlarge their possessions in Poland, Persia, and in Central Asia, and to exhibit undying hostility towards the Turkish Empire. The Western Powers have not failed to recognize the danger to which they are exposed by this active and aggressive policy, and Great Britain, having vital interests of her own in the far East, has never been able to view with unconcern the absorption of Turkey by her Northern rival.

Hence, it has come about that, when the Sultan has been threatened, many nations of the West have en deavoured to go to his assistance, and to ward off the disaster that seemed to be imminent. But their efforts have been badly directed. For, divided among themselves, pursuing divergent interests, interfering without wisdom, or led away by false conceptions of the real situation, they too often manacled the defensive power of Turkey, and gave victory to the Russians, when the latter had not won it by their own strength. In this way Russia advanced and prospered, — by the ascendency that organized intelligence will ever command over a policy of mere sentimental or unreflective ex pediency, — until 1853, when another crisis was impending in the East, which produced a great European war, and terminated the long peace that had existed since 18 15.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the origin of the war. It arose from a trivial incident — the possession of the keys of the Holy Places in Pales tine. The Emperor Nicholas I. reigned at St. Petersburg at that time, and he claimed these emblems of superiority as head of the Greek Church ; so also did the French, in virtue of an old Treaty made in the sixteenth century, which, they affirmed, constituted them protectors of the Latin Church in the East. The Sultan adjusted the petty cause of dispute, and thereupon the Tsar made fresh demands, which the Porte resisted. These will be adverted to presently, but a word will be necessary here to describe briefly the position of affairs, that existed on the continent of Europe. France did not long maintain the Republic set up by the Revolution of 1848.

Louis Napoleon, nephew and political heir of Napoleon I. — in spite of the old decree banishing the family of that great Emperor,— was elected President for four years by a large majority (December 20th). Strengthening his position with the army, by appeals to past glory, and with the people generally, by the maintenance of order in troublous times, he resolved to revive the Empire, and succeeded in December, 1S51, in constituting himself President for ten years, with largely increased powers, and with the title of Prince. Twelve months later (December 2, 1852), he was proclaimed Emperor under the name of Napoleon III., and was so acknowledged by Europe. The new Sovereign was not blind to the advan tages which a friendship with England would confer upon him ; he was even anxious to conciliate a people he had known and respected in the days of his exile.

The defect in his title, moreover, was best obliterated by the adoption of a policy of adventure. The appearance of the Eastern cloud furnished him with an opportunity he was glad to seize ; and, as it became darker, so did he, the more readily, co-operate with the British Cabinet, in their attempt to disperse it. When it was determined that peace could no longer be maintained, an alliance was cemented between the two countries, and England and France, so often in the past un happily opposed in war, were at length found side by side in the strife, combating the same foe and loyally supporting each other in the field of battle — rivals only in the honour and glory to be derived therefrom. And yet this union was not without serious drawbacks. Seldom can a confederacy of inde pendent States be satisfactory ; for each has different interests to serve, and conflicting opinions too frequently weaken the efforts of those who have banded themselves together to accomplish an object avowedly dear to all.

In 1854 the alliance was definitely established ; it became I' entente cordiale, as it was felicitously termed, and, when the war was in progress, harmony and mutual respect and confidence reigned between the armies engaged. But, as a price, to please Napoleon, England gave up some of her most cherished customs of naval warfare— a sacrifice which the armed forces of Europe had in vain sought to wring from her, and hostilities assumed a direction which, as will be seen, did the least damage to the enemy, and effected injury to the cause which the British nation had most at heart. The popular explosion in France in 1848, affected not only that country, but produced widespread results, and its consequences were felt, like the Revolution of 1830, all over the continent of Europe. In Austria the crisis had been peculiarly acute, and the Hungarians and Italians rose in rebellion against the authority of their Sovereign.

The latter was able to re-assert his power in Lom bardy by his own resources ; but in Hungary the resistance was so strong that, when the Tsar offered the assistance of his troops, the proposal was accepted, and Russian bayonets reduced the Magyars to obedience, and placed them once more under the Austrian Emperor (1849). In Prussia and in the petty States of Germany less difficulties had been experienced ; but the temper of the people had been aroused, and they clamoured for reform and a greater control over their own affairs. The German Princes were alarmed ; they distrusted their subjects, and relied for counsel and aid upon Russia — the only Power whose government, like theirs, was despotic, but who, unlike them, had no fear of a popular ebullition. In truth, the credit of the Tsar was in the ascendant in Central Europe : he ostensibly saved Austria from disaster, if not from dissolution ; he intervened in the question of the Danish Duchies,* which then agitated the whole of Germany ; and he mediated successfully between Austria and Prussia, when they became rivals and jealous of each other, on account of the efforts of the latter to restore in her own favour the Imperial Consti tution of Germany, which had come to an end in 1806.

In short, the Emperor Nicholas controlled the German nations ; he arbitrated in their dif ferences ; and could involve them in serious trouble should they see fit to dispute his pleasure. When Russia, therefore, not content with the settlement effected with respect to the Holy Places, determined still to provoke a quarrel with Turkey, the Western Powers were not united upon the problem that invited their attention. England and France alone resolved to resist her pretensions, while the others — Austria, Prussia, and the minor States of Germany — practically ranged themselves on her side. The demands made upon the Porte are of little importance ; any pretext is good, where an object is to be gained. The Sultan was re quired to accept the protection of Russia over his Christian subjects, and he refused to submit (May 23, 1853).

In this determination England agreed ; indeed, it * Schleswig and Holstein, torn from Denmark in 1864. is clear that it would have been impossible for him to deliver over a very considerable section of his people into the hands of his hereditary enemy. Thereupon a Russian force, under Prince Michael Gortchakoff, crossed the Pruth (July 2nd), occupied the Principalities (now the kingdom of Roumania), and established itself upon the Danube. The Turks immediately made great efforts to meet the emergency, by collecting troops and despatching them both into Asia Minor, and into Bulgaria. But no declaration of war took place, for the Western Powers persuaded the aggrieved party to have patience, while they sent representatives to Vienna to try to avert hostilities by the arts of diplomacy. These endeavours failed entirely, not to say ridiculously.

An Instrument was drafted, called the Vienna Note, to which both the Tsar and the Sultan were to consent, as a basis for a future arrangement. The former did so readily, but the latter peremptorily refused his adhesion to it. That he was right, is shown by the fact that the Note was so loosely drawn, as to be capable of an inter pretation, whereby the full demands of Russia would have been agreed to by Turkey ; and in the negotiations which followed, it became apparent that this was the only interpretation which the Emperor Nicholas had adopted ! So the interven tion projected at this centre of Russian intrigue, came to an end with the full concurrence of the British and French Governments, who were obliged to recognize that they had been duped. In October, the Porte formally called upon General Gortchakoff to evacuate the Danubian Principalities, and ordered Omar Pasha, the Turkish Commander in-chief in Bulgaria, " to commence hostilities if, after fifteen days from the arrival of his despatch at the Russian head-quarters, an answer in the nega tive should be returned."

After the stated interval, towards the end of the month, the war commenced, not only on the Danube, but also on the Armenian frontier in Asia. Interesting as is the campaign that now began, to the student of military history, it will be im possible to describe it at any length in these pages. It must suffice to say that, at the end of the year, the results in Asia were unimportant. There were victories on both sides, but no great progress was achieved by either of the combatants. It was different in Europe, for there, thanks to the skill and energy of Omar Pasha, and to the gallantry of his troops, the Turks gained many and con siderable advantages. Crossing the Danube at Turtukai, they secured a position on the northern bank of the river at Oltenitza, in the face of superior forces, and repulsed every attempt to dislodge them.

Again, having established themselves firmly at Kalafat, opposite Widin, they attacked and dealt a crushing defeat (early in January, 1854) on a strong corps, which had entrenched itself in their vicinity near Citate. The Ottoman troops were everywhere victorious in this theatre of operations ; the Russians, on the other hand, were beaten and disorganized, their morale shaken, and their losses, on their own admission, amounted to 35,000 men. While these successes were being won, an incident occurred which caused the war to spread, and drew England and France into its meshes. A small Turkish squadron of a few frigates and smaller vessels lay at anchor at Sinope ; whereupon, a far more powerful Russian fleet, consisting of heavily armed and large ships, approached under cover of a fog, surprised them, and completely destroyed them (November 30th).

The attack was conducted under circumstances of considerable barbarity ; no quarter was given, the ships were sunk, the wounded and the helpless were not spared, and 4000 men were slaughtered or drowned. When the news of this action reached Europe, indignation, already aroused by previous events, could not be restrained in England, and so strong was the feeling evoked in the country, that war could no longer be avoided. At first sight it may appear strange, that the story of useless butchery, perpetrated in war time, should produce so violent a resentment ; but when events are reviewed, the reasons for it will be per ceived. It is necessary to glance at these events, in order to understand some features connected with subsequent operations. The guiding line of thought that influenced the statesmen of the two Powers, interested in curbing the aggression of St. Petersburg, was the conviction that Russia was at that time overwhelmingly power ful, and that the Ottoman Empire was in the last gasp of impotence and decrepitude.

The Emperor Nicholas had for long fostered this idea, and had carefully instilled it into our Government. With this object, he made a journey to this country as early as 1844, and he pressed it upon our Ambas sador at his Court, in secret communications held in the spring of 1853, before the actual crisis had taken place. We were then told that Turkey was " a sick man — a very sick man " who might at any moment " die upon our hands," and that it was therefore advisable to divide his inheritance ; and our cupidity was tempted by the offer of Egypt, and even of the island of Crete, if we would take these bribes, and give Russia a free hand. We believed these assertions of omnipotence on the one hand, and of prostration on the other, though needless to say we had no desire to share in the spoils.