The First Napoleon. A sketch political and military

Front matter

THE FIRST NAPOLEON A SKETCH, POLITICAL AND MILITARY BY JOHN CODMAN ROPES _ MEMBER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY, THE M1LITARV HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS, THE HARVARD HISTORICAL SOCIETY ; FELLOW OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES; AUTHOR OF " THE ARMY UNDER POPE,1' IN THE SCRIBNER SERIES OF "CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR"' BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY (&6e OibersiOe Æamnri&Bf 1SS5 Copyright, 1885, Br JOHN CODMAN ROPES. AU rights reserved. The Riverside Press, Cambridge; Electrotyped and Printed by LT. 0. Iloughton and Company.

Introduction

. The Lectures which are published in this vol ume were delivered in Boston, under the auspices of the Lowell Institute, in March, 1885. They are now submitted to the public without substan tial alteration. A few appendices are added. So much has been written about Napoleon that the publication of another book on his life and work may seem to some to require a few words of explanation. Let me, then, say, that in the sketch which I have given of Napoleon's foreign and domestic policy, I have chiefly pro posed to point out what I conceive to have been the real nature of the contest in which he played so prominent a part, and the actual political capacity at that time of the peoples over whom he ruled or whose institutions he shaped. I have not undertaken to write a new history, but simply to indicate the lines upon which a new history might be written.

The task of rectify ing the fundamental notions with which nearly all historians have approached the study of the epoch of Napoleon is the task which I proposed to myself.

INTRODUCTION.

. I have, therefore, endeavored to point out clearly the distinction between the extension of personal liberty, the removal of abuses, the abo lition of privileges and disabilities, and the like ; leo-al and social changes, on the one hand, and the acquisition and enjoyment of political power by the people, on the other. These results are very often confounded, but they are really very different things. I have also called attention to the fact that, where political rights are conferred upon populations whose previous political experience has in no wise fitted them for the exercise of those rights, they will continue, in spite of the most advanced constitutions and laws, to be subject to somebody or other, as completely as before such rights were conferred. Accordingly, I have endeavored to show that the task of the French Revolution was a very different one from what it has been generally supposed to be by historians and writers of the liberal school.

The Revolution undoubtedly did abolish the great and crying abuses, and it in troduced important improvements in legislation. It gave, in fact, to the populations of the west of Europe much better administrative govern ments than any they had ever enjoyed before. But, suddenly to transform those populations, whether by its convulsions or its enactments, into self-governing communities, to confer in a moment upon the bourgeois and peasant of the

INTRODUCTION.

. V continent the political capacity inherited by the English freeholder and the American farmer, was, in the nature of things, impossible. Once let a clear-headed man get hold of this distinction, and he will see that very many of the crit icisms which have been levelled at Napoleon's government of France and her dependencies are entirely misdirected. He will also, I think, be in clined to regard it as a very fair question whether Napoleon did not understand the political needs and capacities of his generation far better than any of his critics. The real character of the Napoleonic wTars can not be mistaken. It was no soldier's ambition that carried the great conqueror from Madrid to Moscow. At the bottom of the twenty years' strife was the " irrepressible conflict " between liberty and equality on the one hand, and privi lege and despotism on the other.

What the rul ing classes had always enjoyed they defended by the sword; what the people had gained they maintained at the point of the bayonet. Add to this, that Napoleon saw in the alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia a menace and a danger to the more liberal and progressive civilization of western Europe. Much of what he foresaw has actually happened. The weight of this alliance now presses heavily against France herself. There is now no western Germany. That there is now an Italy is mainly due to the enlightened sagacity of another Napoleon. But the three emperors VI

INTRODUCTION.

. to-day control the affairs of the continent. Na poleon's aim — the establishment of a sort of federative union, under the protection of France, of the states lying west of the Elbe, the Tyrol, and the Adriatic, which should accept the modern ideas of equality and toleration, and which were thenceforth to be free to mould their institutions in accordance with the views of an en lightened policy accommodated to the growing political capacity of the populations, free from the dictation of Berlin, St. Petersburg, or Vienna — will never be carried out now. But it was to accomplish this end, to bring it about that the three great reactionary monarchies should be powerless to interfere with or encroach upon the progressive states of the West, that French and German soldiers fought the Austrian Kaiser at Wasrram and the Russian Czar at Borodino.

Opinions may differ as to the desirability of this aim, but when it is once clearly conceived as a project for the location of the centre of political power in the more enlightened western states of the continent, the foreign policy of Napoleon — so far, that is, as it was initiated by him, and not forced upon him — becomes intelligible and well worthy the most careful consideration. The truth is, that Napoleon was not aiming at the conquest of Europe, as has been so often said, but at such an adjustment of the balance of political power in Europe as would definitively relieve the freer and more progressive states of

INTRODUCTION.

. VII the West from the aggressions and the predom inant influence of the three great military mon archies of the East. It will be seen that there are many incidents in the career of Napoleon to which I have not adverted ; many, and some of them, very likely, important, events in the history of the times of which I have not even spoken. While some of these omissions are no doubt accidental, by far the greater part are deliberately made. I have not attempted to write a history, even an abridged history. I have confined myself strictly to pre senting what appear to me to be the more im portant and characteristic features of the period, and to pointing out what seems to be their true political significance. It is hoped that the few military narratives and discussions in the following pages will not prove unacceptable.

Knowing the much greater familiarity of the general public with the details of the campaign of 1815, I have thought that a somewhat extended examination of it would be interesting. Much national, and, of late years, political, prejudice has entered into the discussion of this subject in Europe, but it would seem that it ought to be possible for Americans to arrive at an impartial estimate of the credit and blame which should attach to the chief actors in that famous drama. J. C. R. 99 Mount Vernon Street, Boston, October 1, 1885. LECTURE I. TOULON AND ITALY. Our general knowledge of the Napoleonic epoch ; and of " the various views about it 1 Our difficulties in arriving at conclusions ... 1 State of things in Europe in 1789 2 Divine right of kings 2 Oppressive privileges of the favored classes ... 3 Different countries ........ 3 Russia .......... 3 Prussia 3 Austria .......... 3 France .......... 4 Italy 4 General improvement in the preceding century . . 5 Backwardness of Spain ....... 5 No such thing as government by the people possible anywhere .......... 5 Practical reform, not assertion of rights, the need of the times . ......... 5 The American Revolution a wholly different matter .

C Assertion of the rights of man by the French Revolutionists accompanied by despotic government ... 7 Cause of this anomaly ....... 8 The French people did not exercise political rights, but gained liberty and equality ...... 9 The losses of the privileged classes occasioned by the reforms of the Revolution ...... 9 Their hostility to the new system X TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Fierce and aggressive character of the Revolution . . 10 Alarm of the privileged classes throughout Europe . . 11 "Irrepressible conflict" between the principles of the Revolution and those underlying existing European society . 11 War everywhere ...••••■ H The volunteers and regular army of France . . .12 First appearance of Napoleon Bonaparte .... 12 His character as a soldier 12 His studies 1* His attention to detail 13 Anecdote .....-•■•• 13 The Siege of Toulon ........ 14 Appointed general, and serves with the army of Italy . 15 His aversion to cruel measures ...... 15 His alleged indifference to the evils of war ... 16 The 9th of Thermidor, 1794 18 Changes in public opinion ...... 18 The Constitution of 1795 18 Provisions ensuring continuance of Republican rule . 19 Revolt of the Sections, 13th Vendemiaire, 1795 . . .19 Bonaparte's marriage to Madame Beauharnais . . 20 Her character ......... 20 Bonaparte appointed to the command of the Army of Italy 21 Sketch of the campaigns of 1796 and 1797 . . . . 23 Bonaparte's dealings with the Italian states . . .25 Growth of his reputation as a general .... 26 Augereau, Massena, Lannes ...... 28 The 18th of Fructidor, 1797 29 Character of the new government . . . . .30 The expedition to Egypt ....... 30 Nature of the contest in Europe ...... 32 Illustrated by the revolution in Naples .... 34 The side of France the side of progress . . . .34 Suppression of the Parthenopæan Republic ... 36 Lord Nelson sets aside the capitulation . . . .36 And has Caraccioli hanged 37 Reverses of the French in Italy and on the sea . . .38 Unpopularity of the Directory ..... 39 It is felt to be a mere temporary expedient . . .39 Return of Bonaparte from Egypt .....

LECTURE II. THE CONSULATE. Weakness of the Directory 42 Popularity of Bonaparte ....... 42 The 18th of Brumaire, 1799 43 The French people of that time unable to govern themselves . . ■ 43 What the Revolution could and what it could not accomplish 44 Danger of a return of the Bourbons .... 45 Necessity of a change in the form of government . . 45 The coup d'etat followed by no proscriptions ... 46 And generally acceptable to all classes . . . .46 The three Consuls 47 Amnesty to the emigrants ....... 47 Bonaparte's efforts for peace fail ..... 48 Return of the French army from Egypt . . . .49 The war with Austria resumed ..... 49 Campaign of General Moreau in Germany . . . .50 Campaign of the First Consul in Italy .... 51 His plan .......... 52 His army . ........ 52 He crosses the Alps 53 Marches upon Milan ....... 54 Then turns to seek the Austrians . . . . .54 Difficulties of the Austrian situation .... 55 Battle of Marengo 56 Effect of the victory 57 The campaign discussed : — Its completeness of design ...... 57 Its audacity ........ 58 Napoleon's peculiar characteristics as a general . . . 594" He frequently takes unjustifiable risks .... 59 Comparison between him and Moreau . . . .59 Lanfrey's criticism too severe ...... 60 Napoleon's fault very common in men of affairs . . 61 Peace concluded with England and Austria ... 62 The Jacobins oppose the Consular government . . .63 But have no following among the people ... 63 The Royalists are supported by the British government .

TABLE OF CONTENTS. The Infernal Machine of December, 1800 ... 65 The conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal . . • .66 Character of Georges ....•■• 66 His plan is openly to murder Bonaparte in the streets . 66 His devotion to the cause of legitimacy .... 67 His plan is favored by the Comte d'Artois . . . .67 And assisted by the British government .... 68 Strength of the Legitimist prejudice 68 Citation from Scott's Life of Napoleon .... 69 Excitement in Paris on the discovery of the plot . . 70 The Due d'Enghien suspected of complicity with it . 71 He is arrested at Ettenheim in Baden . . . .72 And tried by court-martial at Vincennes and shot . . 72 Charges against Bonaparte ....... 72 General principles applicable to a case of this nature . 73 The arrest clearly justifiable ...... 74 The doings of the court-martial ..... 75 Constitution of the court ....... 75 The original records lost ....... 75 Savary's statement of the Duke's reply to the court . . 76 The court really had no option but to condemn him . . 77 The real question was, Why was he tried ? ... 78 Bonaparte's reasons ........ 78 The Duke's papers seized at Ettenheim . . . .78 His anxiety about them ....... 79 Bonaparte examines them ....... 80 He frames questions out of their contents ... 80 Probable contents of the papers ...... 81 Miot de Melito's statements 82 The Duke's anxiety to see the First Consul . . .82 Responsibility for the promptitude of the execution . 85 Savary probably not responsible 86 Bonaparte certainly not ....... 86 It was most likely a mistake of the Judge Advocate . . 86 Summary of the case ....... 87 LECTURE III.

NAPOLEON IN GERMANY. Suppression of the conspiracy of Georges . . . .88 Reforms of the Consular government j . . . . 89 Lanfrey's perverse criticisms Cause of Lanfrey's animosity against Napoleon . . 90 The Code Napoleon 91 Napoleon's share in this great work .... 91 Its great utility 93 The Concordat 94 Establishment of the Empire 96 Demanded by public opinion ...... 97 Dilemma of the Republican theorists . . . . .97 The Empire really a change for the better ... 98 The Peace of Luneville and its consequences . . .99 French influence in Germany ...... 100 Its wholesome character ....... 100 Opposing view of German nationalists .... 100 Stein and the Knights of the Empire 101 Fyffe's objections to French interference examined . 103 Necessity for these changes in Germany .... 104 No national feeling then existent in Germany . . . 105 The course of the West German States justified . . . 106 Italy becomes a kingdom ...... 107 Causes of the coalition of 1805 ...... 108 The projected invasion of England ..... 108 Its probable fate, if it had been attempted .... 110 Battle of Trafalgar 110 The campaign of 1805 in Germany . . . . .111 German allies of France . . . . . . ' .

Ill Capture of Ulm and entry into Vienna .... 112 The French advance into Moravia 112 Danger of Napoleon's situation 112 Hostile demonstration of Prussia ..... 113 Battle of Austerlitz 114 Causes of his great success on this occasion . . . 115 A different policy should have been followed by the allies . 116 Peace of Presbourg ........ 117 What we should look at in these conflicts .... 118 The result of the war a benefit to Europe . . . 119 The Confederation of the Rhine established . . . 120 Continuance of the war by England . . . .121 Her attitude towards France not unlike her attitude towards the United States in the late Civil War . . 121 The policy of Prussia vacillating 123 The war party finally prevail 124 Great age of the leading Prussian generals . . . . TABLE OF CONTENTS. The campaign of Jena 126 Manœuvres prior to the battle ..... 127 Battles of Jena and Auerstadt 127 The Emperor rewards Davout ..... 128 Conquest of Prussia • 128 Battles of Eylau and Friedland 129 Peace of Tilsit 129 LECTURE IV.

TILSIT TO MOSCOW. t Peace of Tilsit 130 Establishment of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw . . . 130 And of the Kingdom of Westphalia .... 130 Its new Constitution ........ 131 Its characteristic features 131 Napoleon's letter to Jerome ...... 132 Napoleon's views of the needs of the western states of Europe ......... 133 His treatment of the Neapolitan Bourbons and of the Spanish Bourbons ......... 135 His mistaken view of the Spanish people . . . 136 What he tried to do for Spain 137 Spain rejects the new system . . . . . . 139 Napoleon invades and leaves Spain ..... 140 Austria declares war without provocation . . . 141 The campaign opens at Abensberg and Eckmiibl . . 142 Battle of Aspern . 143 Battle of Wagram 145 Remarks on this battle ....... 149 The Peace of Vienna ........ 149 Beneficial changes effected throughout the Empire . . 150 The continental system ....... 152 The stability of the Empire dependent on Napoleon's life 152 The divorce of the Empress Josephine .... 154 Causes of the continuance of the wars .... 156 The fundamental difference between the old and the new systems 156 The aggrandizement of the Empire of Napoleon . . 157 War impending between France and Russia . . . 158 Its general causes 158 The Polish question : Russia's plans Russia hopes to break the power of Napoleon . . . 161 Napoleon hopes to reestablish Poland ..... 162 His preparations and armies ...... 163 He crosses the Niemen ....... 163 Position of the Russian armies ..... 164 Napoleon succeeds in separating them .... 165 But fails in forcing Barclay de Tolly to fight alone . . 166 Operations about Smolensk ...... 167 Junot's inaction at Valoutina 169 Napoleon's situation at Smolensk ..... 169 He determines to advance on Moscow .... 171 Battle of Borodino ........ 172 His mistake in not putting in the Guard . . . .174 He arrives at Moscow ....... 175 LECTURE V. MOSCOW TO ELBA.

Condition of the French army at Moseow . . . 176 The city is burnt 177 Retreat unavoidable ....... 178 Napoleon's inexcusable delay 180 Possibility of effecting a safe retreat .... 180 Activity of the Russian armies ...... 181 The discipline of the Grand Army impaired . . . 182 Battle of Malo-Jaroslawetz 183 The retreat commenced ....... 184 Arrival at Smolensk. The cold begins .... 184 Terrible losses ......... 184 The different corps retreat separately on Krasnoi . . 184 Battle of Krasnoi 185 Heroic conduct of Ney ....... 186 The weather moderates ....... 186 Reorganization of the army at Orcha 186 Mistake of Koutousof ....... 187 The crossing of the Beresina ...... 188 Criticism on Napoleon's conduct 189 The retreat continued to Wilna 191 Severity of the cold 192 Napoleon leaves the army 192 Sir Robert Wilson's opinion of this step .... 192 The army falls back to Kowno and thence into Prussia .

TABLE OF CONTENTS. Losses of the campaign 1""* Partly due to preventable causes 194 Sufferings of the Russians 1"° The French army practically dissolved .... 195 Disgraces ul conduct of General Yorck .... 195 1 Retreat of the Austrian contingent a»o Russia gains the Grand Duchy of Warsaw . . • 198 The Czar aims at the " Deliverance of Europe " . . . 198 The attitude of Prussia and Austria .... 199 Awakening of the Legitimist party throughout Europe . 202 Great efforts of France and her allies for the coming campaign 202 Prussia joins the coalition ...... 203 Liberal promises of the allies ...... 203 They appeal to the sentiment of German nationality . 204 The real state of the countries forming the French Empire 205 Napoleon obstinately persists in the Spanish war . . 207 And in keeping up the continental system . . . 207 The new Grand Army and its faults ..... 208 Opening of the campaign of 1813 ..... 209 Battles of Lutzen and Bautzen ...... 210 Austria exacts terms for her neutrality .... 211 Napoleon refuses to yield anything ..... 211 His folly in so doing ....... 213 Austria joins the coalition ....... 214 Battle of Leipsic ........ 215 Napoleon's terrible mistake in not concentrating his armies 215 He refuses reasonable terms of peace ..... 217 His obstinate and reckless persistence in continuing the war 219 Campaign of 1814 and fall of Paris 219 LECTURE VI.

THE RETURN FROM ELBA.

State of France in 1814 220 Unpopularity of Napoleon ....... 221 But there existed no desire to return to the old regime . 221 The allies refuse to treat with Napoleon .... 222 Folly of this course 222 And of restoring the Bourbons ...... 223 Napoleon exiled to Elba Louis XVIII. on the throne ...... 225 His difficulties ....... 226 Discontent in the army ....... 227 The Judiciary interfered with 228 The fanaticism of the returned emigrants .... 228 The Constitution of Louis XVIII 229 It avails the king but little ...... 229 Hard terms exacted from France ..... 231 Depression of manufactures . . . . . .231 Napoleon not held responsible for these troubles . . 232 He leaves Elba and lands near Cannes .... 233 His unopposed march to Paris ..... 234 League against him of all the European Powers . . . 235 Folly and injustice of this course ..... 236 The liberal party in France 237 They alone are lukewarm ...... 238 The several courses open to Napoleon 239 State of Italy and western Germany .... 241 Occupation of Belgium by the allies 241 Armies of Wellington and Bliicher 242 Napoleon's plan of campaign ...... 242 \ His army and its chiefs ....... 243 | Napoleon and Davout 244 Soult takes the place of Berthier ..... 246 Condition of Wellington's army ...... 247 And of that of Bliicher 247 Napoleon crosses the Sambre ...... 248 Ney and Quatre Bras 249 The Prussians concentrate on Ligny ..... 250 Wellington fears that Napoleon will turn his right . . 250 Concentration of the French at Frasnes aud Fleurus . . 252 Napoleon resolves to attack the Prussians . . . 253 Battle of Ligny 253 Ney's partial concentration at Frasnes .... 255 The first corps under d'Erlon march towards Saint Amand 255 Battle of Quatre Bras 256 The staff-officer's error 256 - Result of the battle of Quatre Bras 257 Consequences of d'Erlon's not being engaged . . . 257 Criticism on Bliicher and Wellington 258 — TABLE OF CONTENTS.

LECTURE VII. WATERLOO AND SAINT HELENA. The morning of the 17th of June 261 No sufficient reconnoissances made ..... 261 Careless confidence of Napoleon ..... 262 He detaches Grouchy in pursuit of Bliicher . . . 263 The Bertrand order 263 The Emperor marches on Quatre Bras, and Grouchy on Gembloux 264 Criticism of the Emperor for not attacking the English at Quatre Bras ........ 265 Bliicher retires on Wavre ....... 266 Grouchy's letter of ten p. M. of the 17th .... 266 Grouchy ascertains that the Prussians have fallen back on Wavre 268 His true course ........ 268 His delay in starting on the 18th ..... 269 He declines to march to the sound of the cannon . . 270 Situation of the two armies at Waterloo .... 271 Wellington's position ....... 272 Delay of Napoleon in commencing the action . . •. 272 Battle of Waterloo 273 Attack upon Hougoumont ....... 273 D'Erlon's attack and its failure ..... 274 Losses of the English.

Death of Picton .... 274 The Prussians seen approaching ..... 275 The sixth corps detached to resist them .... 276 Inadequate force of infantry in the front . . . 276 The cavalry put in ....... . 276 Failure of the cavalry attacks ...... 276 Losses of the English from artillery and skirmishers . . 277 La Haye Sainte taken ....... 278 Critical condition of Wellington's army .... 278 The action near Planchenoit ...... 279 The sixth corps reinforced by a portion of the Guard . . 279 Napoleon determines to put in the Old Guard against the English 280 Arrival of the Prussians on the English left . . . 281 A cessation of offensive operations the wiser course . 280 Attack of the Imperial Guard and its failure . . .

The Prussians defeat Lobau and carry Planchenoit . . 283 Rout of the French army 283 Great praise due to Wellington and Bliicher . . . 284 Review of the campaign 285 Successes of the French on the 15th and 16th . . . 285 Fatal neglect in not ascertaining the direction of the Prussian retreat after Ligny .... ... 286 Napoleon's mistaken conjecture as to that direction . 286 His delay in starting Grouchy 286 Grouchy's duty on the 18th 286 The despatches sent Grouchy 287 Grouchy rejoins the wreck of the army .... 292 The situation in Paris after Waterloo 293 Napoleon's abdication ....... 294 Efforts of the provisional government to obtain recognition 294 Convention of Paris ........ 295 Louis XVIII. resumes the throne ..... 295 Napoleon exiled to Saint Helena 295 His life there 296 His treatment by the English government .... 296 His commentaries on his wars ...... 297 Absurd charges against him 298 His death and funeral 298 The Bourbons restored . ...... 299 Trial and execution of Ney ...... 299 Indifference of Wellington 300 He allows his convention to be violated by the king . 301 The reaction on the continent ...... 301 Erroneous view of Napoleon by liberal writers . . 303 Estimate of Napoleon and his work ..... 304 Charge of selfishness . . . . . . . 306 His character and his acts 307 APPENDICES.