Campaign between the French Army of the East and the British and Turkish forces in Egypt ... Translated from the French [of a part of Reynier's 'De l'Égypte après la bataille d'Héliopolis'] . To which are added [in an appendix] Observations ... by an English Officer of Hompesch's dragoons [i.e....

Front matter

s CAMPAIGN BETWEEN THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE EAST AND THE BRITISH AND TURKISH FORCES IN EGYPT. £Y GENERAL REYNIER. TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH. TO WHICH ARE ADDED, OBSERVATIONS and CORRECTIONS EY AN ENGLISH OFFICER, OF HOMPESCH'S DRAGOONS. LONDON : ritlNTED FOR J. RIDGWAY, YORK STREET, ST. JAMES* SQUARE. l802. r-.n'tM by S G«S*P.LL, lit! e bluccn Street, Holbuu:.

ADVERTISEMENT.

GENERAL Reynier lately published a book at Paris, entitled, De I'Egypte apres la Bataille d'He/iopo/is, which has had a very extensive circulation on the continent. One part of that work is particularly interesting to this country : it consists of a history of that memorable campaign which terminated in the conquest of Egypt by the British troops under the command of Lord Hutchinfon; and is completely trans lated in the following pamphlet. In the course of the translation, it has been thought more proper to retain the names given to certain ranks and corps in the French army, than to substitute English terms, which are not in all cafes precisely analogous. The ortho graphy of the original as to Arabic names has also, except in a few instances, been adopted. The The corrections and remarks on General Rey nier's statement, which Sir Robert Wilson has so obligingly furnished, must add greatly to the value of this publication; and extracts are added from the London Gazette, that the reader may have an opportunity of comparing at once the fame operations, as described in the dispatches of the British commanders, and the account which has now issued from the French press. CAMPAIGN CAMPAIGN BETWEEN THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE EAST AND THE British and Turkish forces, in egypt.

Section I

Arrival os the English Fleet — Military Dispositions. J. HE British army assembled at Rhodes and Ma cri had, by the beginning of Pluviofe (Jan. 21), received every thing necessary for opening the campaign. The English Ministry were extremely desirous that their troops should act against Egypt without delay ; but the Turks were not so eager to concur in that enterprile ; they ap peared to dread the success of their allies as much as their defeat. The Vizier, recollecting the result of the battle of Heliopolis, was afraid to expose himself to new disasters, and determined not to move until the English should smooth the way for him. His authority was disregarded in most of the provinces of Syria; and he was com pelled to form an army by reinforcements and supplies from the capital. The Captain Pacha £ was was at Constantinople with a part of his fleet ; he was more inclined to treat with the French than to incur the hazard of a new expedition, and waited patiently for the decision of the wavering councils of the Porte.

The several commanders, persuaded that their efforts for the recovery of Egypt would prove fruitless, were unwilling to expose themselves separately to the chance ot a first reverse. The orders from England, however, became im perative, and the troops of that nation prepared to act. Their generals were not ignorant of the tried courage and that habit of victory which distinguished the army with which they had to contend ; but they were at the fame time well informed of the character of its commander : they hoped to profit by his errors, to establish themselves on some points of the coast, to weaken the French by partial actions, and finally to maintain their ground until they should receive reinforcements, and be supported by the operations of the Vizier and the corps from India. They left jVIacri, therefore, as soon as they learned that the Captain Pacha had failed from Constantinople for the purpose of rein forcing them with 6000 Albanais and Janissaries ; and appeared on the 1st of March 1801 in the road ot Aboukir.

The landing, however, was not effected until the 8th, as the north and north-east winds produced a surf which was very unfavourable to disembarkation on that part of the coast. On the 1st of March the frigate La Regeneree entered the port of Alexandria. She came from Rochefort., and had on board 300 men of the 5ist st demi-brigade, a company of artillery, and some ammunition. The Lodi brig, which arrived the same day from Toulon, gave information that lhe had fallen in with Admiral Gan theaume's squadron, which was destined for Egypt with a reinforcement of 4 or 5000 men. Circumstances had, however, rendered it ne cessary for this squadron to put into Toulon, and it was now easy to perceive that the favour able moment for reaching Alexandria was past; but the arrival of this frigate, and the intelligence brought by the Lodi, afforded the army the as surance, that the government was earnestly de sirous of giving it every necessiry support.

The appearance of the English fleet was known at Cairo on the 4th of March at three in the afternoon. ' According to the intelligence received, the boats were hoisted out for landing the troops, and three English officers of engineers being taken reconnoitring the coast below Aboukir, no doubt remained as to the point which was menaced. Every one was already convinced, that General Menou had deluded himself by constantly dis crediting all the reports which reached him from every quarter relative to this expedition ; he would not even permit any vessels to be sent out to observe the preparations of the English, and to watch their motions. A corps of reserve established on the coast might have sucesst Lilly opposed a disembarkation, but no such thing existed j the coast was even stripped of troops, and the forts were very indifferently supplied with provisions.

B2 All All accounts agreed in stating that the Vizier was not yet ready to act, and that he would not pass the Desert until he was certain that the English had been successful. It was also evident, that Aboukir was the only point of the coast on which a descent could be, advantageously made ; because that road afforded a shelter for a fleet, and was within a convenient distance of Alexandria. Every one who had paid any at tention to the organization of Egypt, and its system of defence, every one who knew the force of the army of the East, was convinced, that the only good disposition which could be made with the French troops was to concentre them. When the news of the arrival of the English was received, the whole army expected to be marched to Aboukir ; the measures adopted by General Menou, therefore, excited universal astonishment.

He ordered General Reynier to proceeed immediately to Belbeis, with two demi bngades and the artillery of his division; Gene ral Moraud to march instantly to Damietta, with 500 men of Rampon's division, which had previously been called to Cairo; and General Bron to repair to Aboukir with the <x%<\ regiment of chasseurs, which consisted only of 230 horse. The remainder of the cavalry were to wait for orders at Boulack. The division of Lanusie dfd not set out until the 5th ; and even the 88th, the strongest demi-brigade of that division, was recalled to Cairo on the day of its de parture. Several officers endeavoured to convince General neral Menou of the necessity of speedily assem bling the army near Aboukir. They observed, that the Vizier would not advance until he was certain of the success of the English ; that there "would be sufficient time to beat them, and to proceed afterwards to Salahieh, before the Turkish troops could reach that post ; that even were the Vizier; by more rapid movements, to obtain some slight advantages, his troops would be easily dispersed when they were informed of the defeat of theirN allies ; and finally, that to divide the army was to expose it to the most imminent danger, &c. Such was the nature of the observations which General Reynier * transmitted in writing to General * Letter from General Reynier to General Menou.

Cairo, 1 3 Ventofe (March 4). You have ordered me, Citizen General, to depart for Belbeis with two demi-brigades and General Robin ; your order shall be executed, because it is the first duty of 21 soldier to obey ; but the interest of the army requires that I should make some observations, to which I hope you will listen. I am directed to defend that frontier, which may, perhaps, be attacked by the Vizier ; but my opinion is, that, in our position, its defence ought to be at present abandoned. The Vizier is arrived, or about to arrive, at El-Ari(h ; but it is not probable that he will march farther until he hears that the English have obtained some success. His preparations for pasting the Desert are not. completed, and he will merely send some parties to Katie.h, or a little beyond it : but if he march and attack Salahieh, that place is capable of holding out until troops can be sent to its relief.

While the enemy on the coast is attacked, he may perhaps push forwards some parties to Belbeis or Cairo ; but that is by no means so dangerous as the progress which the English may be suffered to make. The General Menou, and which he afterwards repeated in conversation, adding, that it was now the The army landing at Aboukir may consist of 10 or 12,000 men; if General Friant has not defeated the advanced guard of the disembarkation, he must now be (but up in Alexandria, and we shall want the whole of our disposable force to engage the English. When the Turks landed at Aboukir, Bonaparte left only I co men at Belbeis and Salahieh, very few at Damietta, and a small garrison in Cairo. He concentrated the army to march to Aboukir : our present situation is similar, and similar dispositions ought to be adopted.

The grand maxim of war, to counterbalance the deficiency of numbers by the rapidity of movements, is particularly applicable to the state of our army. It appears to me that my division should be marched along with all our disposable troops towards Alexandria. The garrison of Saiahieh is more than sufficient for its defence ; I shall reinforce that of Belbeis a little ; the dromedaries will scour the Desert, and I shall give the necessary instructions to the commanders of the forts. I have fought the English several times, and, in common with the troops I command, I am desirous of assisting to beat them in Egypt. • I mentioned this expedition to you in several of my former letters; it is important, and we ought to neglect nothing to defeat it in a manner glorious i to the army of the East, and worthy of the examples which {he other armies have given us.

If you wish for farther information respecting the disembarkation belore you determine on marching all the troops to Alexandria, I request thai you will order my division to remain here, or at Biiket-el-Hadji. This disposition is more conformable to my plan for the defence of Syria, and the troops would be in a better position for proceeding to Alexandria whenever you may judge that movement proper. This letter, and the observations it contains, are dictated by a sentiment of profound respect for the interest of the army. At this moment we ought all to unite to extricate ourselves victoriously from the position in which we are placed ; menaced as we are on two opposite points by two different the duty of every one to forget their animosities, and to think only of opposing the enemy : but all this produced no effect.

Finding it impossi ble to make him alter his plans, General Reynier hoped that his departure might remove the jea lousies and fears which his presence inspired, and that the other Generals would then have an opportunity of urging the fame remarks with more success. General Menou was, however, deaf to every representation ; and as on the next, and some following days, he received no intelligence of the landing, he persuaded him self that the dispositions he had made were excellent. Doubtless/ since he was obstinately resolved to remain at Cairo, and to divide the army, the only means of saving Egypt was to have chosen another commander. The circumstances of the cafe, and the distance of the government, might have authorized such a proceeding : it would, however, have been a dangerous example for discipline, which great success could alone have justified, but for the obtaining of which no preparation had been made.

It was impossible to foresee that the English would continue on the coast seven days without landing ; besides, different armies, but the one of which is far more dangerous than the other. General Menou'j Reply. You shall hear from me at Belbeis, Citizen General ; I shall leave you ignorant of nothing, and every thing will be taken care of. You must guard the Syrian frontier. Depart quickly. I salute you. Abd. J. Menou. after after a victory, it might have been said that General Menou would also have conquered.

Section II

Landing of the English — Battle os the %li % Ventose,or 13th March. ON the 7th of March the wind changed to the north-west, and the sea having become more calm, the enemy began to disembark. They sent some armed boats towards the mouth of Lake Maadieh to take possession of the raft, and to interrupt the direct communication be tween Alexandria and .Rofetta ;' but about a hundred men employed for that purpose were driven back by forty grenadiers of the 61st, and the enterprise miscarried. On the appearance of the British fleet, Gene ral Friant distributed his troops in the following manner : Infantry Cavalry At Rofetta and Fort Julien three companies of the 61st At Edko and the Square House* a battalion of the 75th, a company of grenadiers of the 25th, and a detachment of the 3d regiment of dragoons, in all — 150 300 150 * The name of an old caravansary, which the French had converted into a military post. 1 At < 9 } .. « i Infantry Cavalry At Aboukir, two battalions and the-- grenadiers of the .61 st 700 Two battalions of the 7.5th. 700 The half of a battalion of the 51st and the 25th — 250 The 1 8th dragoons — — . 100 A detachment us the 20th ditto 80 The whole force at Aboukir was, therefore, 1 550. foot, 230 horse, and ten pieces of cannon.

He left only the seamen and the invalids to guard Alexandria. The corps at Aboukir was too weak to prevent the disembarkation of an army which had at its disposal a vast number of boats, and all the facilities which a British squadron can afford. General Friant could have no hope of success, except by endeavouring to drive back into the sea the first troops that landed before they had time to form, or to throw the boats into disorder by a well-directed fire of artillery. The English, who founded their expectations of success chiefly on the weakness of the corps appointed to guard the coast, selected their best troops for this first operation. They assembled all their boats ; and on the 8th of March, before daybreak, disembarked the following troops under the command of Generals Moore and Ludlow : Guard* c Guards - ------ 2000 23d Regiment _ - - - 600 28th ditto ------- 600 40th ditto ------ 250 42d ditto ------ 900 58th ditto ------ 600 "Cprsican Legion _ - - - 400 Artillery - - - - - - 200 Marines ------ 3.00 Total 5850 The boats slowly approached the coast in five divisions.

The French troops, to protect them selves against the fire of the enemy's gun-boats, which were ahead, and on each quarter of those that carried the troops, took a position behind the sand-hills in the following order. The 61st: demi-brigade, with a twelve-pounder, two howitzers, and two four-pounders ; its right towards the commencement of the dike of Lake Maadieh ; the 1 8th of dragoons to the left of that demi-brigade ; the 20th of dragoons, and the 75th, on the western side of the. height of the Wells. The detachments of the 25th and the 51st, with two eight-pounders and a howitzer, formed a body of reserve between the last corps and the fort of Abotikir.- The height or hill of the Wells consists of rnoveable sand, and has a rapid declivity, par ticularly towards the sea. This is the only point where troops could, on their first landing, find an advantageous military position*.

The English boats ■* After the battle of Abeukir on the 7th Thermidor, year boats remained for a long time in the bay ; at last they divided into two lines. They closed when they came within cannon reach, and gained the shore at the foot of the height. The sailors fat erect, and rowed regardless of the French artillery, but the soldiers were placed in the bottom of the boats. The right, on landing, quickly climbed the height, and drew up in order of battle. The left extended itself towards the rear, in such a manner as to support its flank by the sea. The 6ist demi-brigade soon charged the enemy's left, which couLI not withstand this first shock. A company of grenadiers, which had taken possession of twelve boats, attacked it in the rear. A number of the enemy threw down their arms ; but they were supported by the troops which landed from the second line of boats .

The 6 1 st alone, being then no longer able to repulse the English, regained the height, and confined its efforts to sustaining the combat. The 1 8th and the 20th dragoons charged on the left of the 61st, the first troops that formed on the height. These two corps, which were repulsed on this first attack, attempted a facond charge on the enemy's left, but the fire from the second line compelled them to retire. The 75th was too tardily informed ot the landing, and found the English formed on the height : in a moment one half of the troops in the most advanced platoons were killed or wounded year 7 (26th July 1799)* Bonaparte ordered a sort to be built on this height ; but it was neglected for less important fortifications, though the government had recommended its construction to General Menou.

This fort would have rendered a landing very difficult. C 2 by by the fire of the enemy's line. It could there fore manœurve no farther, and was obliged to retire. The artillery on the left did not produce a sufficient effect : attempts were made to bring the cannon nearer the height by detachments of the 51st and of" the 25th. The nature of the ground, however, delayed this operation, and the English were formed on their arrival. They joined the 75th demi-brigade, which had retired to the distance of 300 toises. The 6istwas then ordered to retire. The soldiers had been engaged for two hours with the enemy, and being animated in consequence of haying obtained some success, quitted the field of battle reluctantly. This demi-brigade ef fected its retreat in the best order, brought off its artillery, and formed the rear guard.

A company of the 51st was detached to reinforce the garrison of Fort Aboukir, and the troops assembled at the Embarcadaire *. Alexandria was left with almost no garrison ; and as the English had it in their power to undertake some new enterprise which might have prevented the troops from protecting that important place, they retired towards it during the night. The battalion of the 76th, the detachment of the 25th, and the 3d dragoons, which were at Edko, were ordered by signals to come to Alex andria : from a mistake in the interpretation of this order, the Square House, a fortified post, * This name is given to a part of the bay of Canopus, where the tongue of land which separates the sea from Lake Maadieh is very narrow, being not more than 150 toises broad. the the preservation of which was of importance in defending the passage of the mouth of the lake, was evacuated and dismantled.

Fifty men of the 6ist remained at Rofetta ; and at Fort Julien a company of the fame brigade, and some invalids. When the Englissi were certain that the French troops had repeated, they sent a detachment to the height which commands the village of Aboukir, to blockade the fort, and pushed their advanced guard to the defile of the Embarcadaire. The disembarkation of the Englissi was known at Cairo on March i ith, at five in the evening. All the army then saw the error which had been committed, in not marching when the first information was received* The seven days which had elapsed between the appeaiance and the landing ot the enemy, was a most favour able opportunity, which was now entirely lost. The cavalry could have arrived by forced marches on the 8th. Two days after, 10,000 men and fifty pieces of cannon might have been assembled near Aboukir.

This force would have completely destroyed the Englissi, by mak ing an attack before they could have time to put themselves in proper order, land their artillery, and intrench their camp. But this crisis was past, and success became now more doubtful. We were informed that the Vizier was encamped at Yabneh, that he was expected at El-Anih, and that he was preparing to pass the Desert. It was uncertain whether we had yet time to defeat the Englissi and return to the frontier of Syria before the Vizier arrived there; and besides, intelligence was received that a part of the Eng lish fleet from India was already in the Red Sea. We We were also ignorant whether the English had vigorously pursued the troops which opposed their landing; whether these troops. had sustained a considerable loss ; and whether the enemy had not profited by this first success to attack Alexandria immediately, and to obtain possession of it by a coup-de-main.

That town was not in a condition to hold out eight days against a regular attack. There was reason to apprehend that we might not arrive until after its fall ; and even though the English ssiould not have attacked it, sufficient time had been given them to intrench themselves in a strong position. Finally, it was to be feared that they had obtained some partial advantages over the three demi-brigades, dispatched under the command of General Lanusse. These considerations ssiewed the necessity of speedily assembling a considerable body ofthe army, of evacuating several posts, and of leaving only weak detachments in those which it might be judged necessary to maintain. On the i 2th of March, General Menou dispatched from Cairo the 88th demi-brigade, a battalion ofthe 25th, 850 men ofthe 21st, who had arrived trom Benisouef, the cavalry, and a park of artillery, which he limited merely to three twelve-pounders.

He wrote to General Rampon to march to Rahmanieh with the 32d, the carabineers of the 2d, and a part of the 20th of dragoons ; and to leave at Damietta, Lesbeh, and the other forts, the remainder of the 2d light, 1 CO dragoons of the 20th, and a company of light artillery. General Reynier was ordered to march the 13th, to Rahmanieh by the route of the Delta, and to fend the 9th demi-brigade 1 , to to Cairo, to replace the 85th, which was to proceed to Rahmanieh. This very ambiguous order seemed to direct that general to stay at Belbeis, with his artillery and a few troops, without the means of opposing the Vizier. Two demi-brigades of his division were dispersed in the fortresses of Cairo, Belbeis, and Salahieh^ and as the march of the first, by the Delta, would have been very tedious at this season, General Reynier determined to proceed with it by the way of Cairo, and to place himself at the head of the two demi-brigades of his division, which were ordered to meet the enemy, and to carry with him his artillery.

These dispositions left too many troops at Damietta, Cairo, Belbeis, Salahieh, and in Upper Egypt. General Menou did not desire the latter to be evacuated; but, after his departure, General Belliard transmitted an order to that effect to General Donzelot. On the 8th, General Lanusse arrived at Rahmanieh. He heard the sound ofthe cannon of Aboukir, and proceeded immediately to the assistance of General Friant. On the 1 oth he effected his junction with him, on the heights of Nicopolis, before Alexandria. The cavalry, which had been, since the 18th, reinforced by the 22d regiment of chasseurs, formed a main guard near a house situated about half a league from the Embarcadaire. The part of the Englissi army which first landed was long left to itself. The disembarkation ofthe other troops, as well as of the artil lery and horses, was retarded by the state of the weather, weather, and was not completed until the nth.

On that day, the English directed their course to the Embarcadaire, which was already occupied by their advanced guard, and there they finally organized their force. They began their march on the 12th, about eight in the morning, and drove in the main guard of cavalry, which had sent notice of their approach. Generals Friant and LanuiTe, con sidering that Lake Mareotis was not practicable at this season, and that if the English established themselves on the dikes of the Canal of Alexandria, it would be difficult for the rest of the French .army to form a junction with the troops. they commanded, resolved, even with their feeble means, to oppose the progress of the enemy, in .order to preserve this * important communication. They therefore intrusted the guard of Alexandria to the seamen and the in* valids, and advanced to the point of Lake Maa-» dieh, on the heights near the Roman camp, with the following troops : ' ' _ i-k '» INFANTRY. |* | j {3. -| c *"* tf'S 2 General of Division -. 25th derr.i-brigade, Men £ 'Jtje % Friant.

I 2d and 3d battalion 500*— — — i General of Brigade s 61 st ,.. - 600 — _\ Delegorgue. J 75th - - 750' I Artillery 1 2 I — Genera! of Division'-*.' , ,A Lanusse. I4?.1'8!* ,. " 6J° 3 General of Brigade f *8'5 of ,he hne " 650---- 2 Silly. J bcith aitto - 800 z Light artillery - 42 .. * ■ TMi I TllTn CAVALRY. CAVALRY. General /-22<1 regiment of chasseurs - of J Detachment of the 3d dragoons Brigade j 18th ditto - - Bron. of the 20th ditto 230 men. 150 8o 6o 520 TOTAL. Infantry - - 3850 men. 'Cavalry - 520 ditto. Artillery - 22 pieces. With this small force, Generals Friant and Lanusse had the boldness to wait for the whole Englissi army, which consisted of 16,000 in fantry, 2000 marines from the fleet, and 200 dragoons, with ten pieces of cannon. The Englissi moved slowly along : their in fantry marched with difficulty over the moveable sands, through which they had to pass.

Some gun-boats advanced into Lake Maadieh, as far as their left, accompanied by a great number of vessels, loaded with ammunition, provisions, and fressi water. When they saw the French troops posted on the heights they wissied to occupy, they halted, and a reciprocal cannonade took place. They did not venture to attack, but encamped about three in the afternoon, at less than two leagues distance from their former position. They recommenced their march on the 1 3th, at daybreak. As they dreaded the French im petuosity, and particularly the cavalry, they formed themselves into three lines. There was a square in their centre, the sides of which were composed ofinfontry, in close Columns. d The The left wing was first in motion. It pro ceeded along the margin of Lake Maadieh, for the purpose of supporting itself on the canal, and of turning the right of the French : the centre next began to march, and last of all the right.

The centre marched stowly behind a height, which masked the position of the French, and the left wing appeared to be detached. General Lanusse hoped to cut it off, by a vigorous attack, before it could be supported by the rest of the army. He suggested this to General Friant, ordered the 69th to advance on the heights next the sea, and occupy the right of the enemy ; left a battalion of the 1 8th in reserve, on the heights of the Roman camp, a battalion ofthe 4th light, with one piece of artillery and one howit zer, to the right of these heights, and marched himself with the rest of his troops and the 22d regiment of chasseurs. While the brave Lanusse commenced his movement, the centre of the Englissi appeared on the height. The first line advanced, and it was then no longer possible to reach the flank of the left wing without engaging this line.

The 22d regiment of chasseurs charged the first line with the greatest bravery, passed through it, and made two battalions lay down their arms ; but the fire of the second line, which was executed with great quickness and precision, obliged them to retire and abandon their prisoners. Mean while the 4th light, led by the Adjutant-com mandant Boyer, engaged, with advantage, the remainder ofthe first line, and made it fall back. The 1 8th formed in order of battle, on its left ; but the column which advanced on the right of 3 the the English centre extended so rapidly on the flank ofthe 1 8th, as to throw it into disorder by its fire. It was thus rendered unable to com plete its movement in front. The 4th light, and the 22d chasseurs, being too much inferior to continue the action alone, began now to retreat.