The conquest of Scinde : a commentary

Part II

ÆPAIGN IN SCINDE AND TREATMENT OF THE AMEERS WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS EDINBURGH AND LONDON MDCCCXLVI KDINfilsRGH : PRINTED BV T. CONSTAULK, n:l.\TKH IOHER MAJKSTV. THE CONQUEST OF SCINDE. A COMMENTARY.

PART II. SECTION

X. ADVANCE ON HYDRABAD. My position, while the events under consideration were in progress, was in the last degree painful and anomalous. I was constrained to take an active and somewhat prominent part in an invasion which I had strongly deprecated, even when it was merely hinted at as a possible contingency. This invasion led to the infliction of still further injustice on the unhappy Princes of Scinde ; and, emphatically as I denounced that injustice to Sir Charles Napier, I was bound to vindicate his con duct in my communications with his victims. On the Ameers I had to urge the necessity of a speedy Y settlement of affairs, and, at the same time, to demonstrate to the General that, consistently with the course which he pursued, no satisfactory adjustment of them could ever be arrived at.

I was called upon to obtain their assent to demands against which I had solemnly protested as a positive robbery ; and I had to warn them against resistance to our requisitions as a measure that would bring down upon them utter and merited destruction, while I firmly believed that every life lost in consequence of our aggressions, would be chargeable on us as a murder. Under the circumstances of the case, I feel confident that the suffrages of all who are competent to pronounce on the subject will be given in favour of the measures which I recommended to be adopted towards the Ameers of Khyrpoor. The Hydrabad Princes were differently situated. Unless implicated in the fate of their cousins, and subjected like them to exactions unauthorized by the treaty, or goaded on to despair, no difficulty was to be apprehended in settling their affairs.

But menace and command had been employed, and suddenly to have changed our tone, must have appeared to them vacillation — not forbearance. A march upon their capital had been threatened : if, after driving their kinsmen to extremity, and proceeding so far in executing our threat against themselves, we had suddenly halted before the ratification of the treaty, our motives could not have failed to be miscon strued ; and the mistake would have proved fatal to them. It became, therefore, merciful to persist in that threatening attitude, although its first assumption was alike impolitic and unjust. Ac cordingly, when Sir Charles Napier rejoined his army, after returning from Emaumghur, I fully concurred in the propriety of his prolonging his march southward, not only as calculated to expe dite the final submission of the Ameers of Lower Scinde, but as tending to dispel any faint hopes the Princes of Khyrpoor might still entertain that by standing aloof they possibly might obtain better terms.

When, however, I expressed myself approvingly of such a course, I never imagined that their plenipotentiaries would be sent back, and the un conditional tender of their seals disregarded ; nor did I contemplate the continued advance of the General after every thing which we demanded had been yielded, or was in a fair way of being obtained. I was in ignorance, moreover, of much that I now know, and which the reader has already been apprised of, else I most certainly should have endeavoured to dissuade the General from advancing farther with his army than Pir Abu Bukkur. The reader has seen how unfortunately my previous efforts to save the Ameers of both pro vinces were frustrated : it now becomes my painful duty to show, that although I eventually failed to avert hostilities, my want of success is wholly attributable to two causes for which I am not responsible : the one, the withholding from me those powers with which I ought to have been invested ; the other, the continuance on the part of Sir Charles Napier, of the same violence and indiscre tion which had characterized his every act till his policy attained its final consummation on the field of Meeanee.

Before, however, proceeding to nar rate the events which occurred subsequent to my arrival at Hydrabad, I must, in justice to the Ameers of Lower Scinde, recall to the reader's recollection certain passages in the history of Sir Charles Napier's negotiations towards them. The General's first diplomatic act had been to cancel certain privileges guaranteed to the Ameers by the British Government. His subsequent pro ceedings were well calculated to impress them with the idea that this was but the prelude to fresh in vasions of their rights ; and it scarcely required even such offensive displays of austerity to con vince them that mischief was at hand. No sooner had our armies been extricated in triumph from Affghanistan, — partly through the assistance rendered bv the Ameers, — than the latter beheld us suddenly change our tone and assume a menacing position.

Rumour told them that, no longer requiring their friendly aid, and ceasing to dread their hostility, the English con templated the appropriation of their country ; and every circumstance tended to confirm the rumour. I read in the " Intelligence" from Lower Scinde of the 3d November, that — " The Ameers are -wholly at a loss to comprehend the reason of the withdrawal of the (political) agency of Scinde and Beloo chistan, as announced to them by Major Outram, and look on it as preparatory to their country being abandoned to the pleasure of the Afighan tribes." In the " Intelligence" of the 9th idem, I find the following : — " During the past week, each day has brought a message from one or other of the Ameers, begging that some one might be allowed to remain at Hydrabad in a political capacity.

Their Highnesses do not hesitate to say that their differences will come to open rupture on the removal of British influence from their Court ; and Meer Shadad has announced his intention of build ing a small fort at Meysur as a future residence." To augment their fears, a large army was col lected at Sukkur, at a period of profound peace, and extensive military preparations were going forward, the sole object of which, the Ameers not unnaturally concluded, was the invasion of their country. Captain Mylne reported that the Sukkur army was viewed with alarm, " and any but friendly motives" attributed to its concentration : yet, with all these incentives to make an effort for their in dependence, they calmly reasoned on their ina bility to cope with us, and neither collected troops, nor, so far as Captain Mylne could ascertain, meditated their collection.

Yet their fears in creased apace, and ere long acquired consistency. Sir Charles Napier's letter, indeed, to Ali Morad, which Ali Morad, doubtless, took care to commu nicate, gave them good reason to fear that their case was prejudged. " You know, for I heard it from your own lips, that the Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde were in league against us, all except his Highness Meer Sobdar and yourself." " Wo ATTEND THOSE WHO CONSPIRE AGAINST THE POWERFUL ARMS OP THE COMPANY : BEHOLD THE FATE OF TlPPOO SuLTAN, AND THE PAISHWA, AND THE EjIPEROR OF CHINA !" Even the assurance given by the General, that the British Government desired not to appropriate Scinde, but to see it great and flourishing, was calculated still further to alarm them ; for it con tained the proviso, that its Princes must be as faithful to our nation as Ali Morad and Sobdar ; that the other Ameers were not so, Sir Charles Napier had announced.

The treaty was presented to the Lower Scinde Chiefs, and accepted, as it had been by those of Khyrpoor ; yet still, assuming their hostility, and beguiled by the false reports of Ali Morad, Sir Charles Napier declared his intention of continuing, in the direction of Hydrabad, the march ostensibly undertaken with a view to see that the " armed bands" were dispersed at Khyrpoor. On the 1st of January, the General again added to their fears, by another striking instance of his contempt for treaties. He proclaimed his intention of placing killadars, appointed by Ali Morad, in every fort in Upper Scinde ; and, lest the Ameers of the Lower Province should imagine that they enjoyed any exemption from like aggres sions, the following very unnecessary notification was added : — " And I will act towards the Ameers of Hydrabad as I SHALL FIND THEIR CONDUCT DESERVES."

To the minds of men who had been pronounced guilty of conspiracy against the British, such an intimation must have vividly recalled " the fate of Tippoo Sultan, the Paishwa, and the Emperor of China," and could scarcely fail to awaken very painful presentiments. Nor were these likely to be effaced by the letter addressed, on the following day, to Meer Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad. " / came to Khyrpoor," wrote the General, " to see hoic mat ters stand, and I mean to go to Hydrabad to do the same. * * * I hear of troops collecting in the south. Armed bands shall not cross the Indus, therefore I take troops." * The results of Sir Charles Napier's negotiations with the Ameers of Khyrpoor, and of his march upon their capital, were the deposition of Meer Roostum, and the flight and spoliation of his family.

Had not the Ameers of Lower Scinde good grounds to assume that the march to Hydra bad would terminate in like disasters to them selves ? Conscious that no troops had collected in the south, could the Princes of Lower Scinde otherwise than conclude that the reason assigned * The sequitur is a strange one. The representative of a nation which is by solemn treaty bound not to introduce its jurisdiction into the territory of an ally, invades that territory under the most ridiculous pretences, and impresses its sovereigns with the conviction that he meditates the seizure of their country. He hears that troops are collecting in consequence of the uncontrollable alarm created by his own violent proceedings : lie strictly prohibits (contrary to solemn treaty) their collection, and assigns as a rea son for prolonging his invasive course, that it appears to have alarmed the invaded !

Civilized nations are perfectly entitled to invade ; for " barbarians" to take precautions is alike impertinent and treasonable ! was but a pretext for the invasion of their territory ? Even before the General had advanced on Khyr poor, while yet his march to the southward was but talked of, we read in the "Intelligence" of the 20th of December, that — " They have all taken into their heads that the Gene ral IS MOVING TOWARDS HYDRABAD, AND THAT NOTHING WILL SATISFY HIM EXCEPT THE POSSESSION OF THE FORT AND GUNS THERE. The belief certainly appears any thing but extra vagant or improbable. The treaty, with all its penal clauses, had been accepted ; and it now appeared to them that the General's advance was solely undertaken to provoke that resistance which he had hoped the treaty would, but which it had failed to elicit.

We cannot, therefore, wonder that they talked amongst themselves — as the spies represented they did — of making no more concessions to a power whose insolent demands rose in proportion to their submissiveness. It was re ported on the 20th December, that — " Meer Zungnee Khan has contrived to bring all the Ameers of Hydrabad to agree together, among whom are Meer Sobdar and Meer Hoossein Ali, who have all sworn on the Koran that they will not make anymore concessions to the English." During the subsequent month, as the reader well knows, events occurred which must have driven to resist ance any Princes less impressed than ivere the Ameers with the irresistible poiver of our arms, and the exhaust less nature of our resources. Emaumghur had been plundered and destroyed ; and apparently for no other reason than that the exactions of the treaty, and the invasion of Upper Scinde, had failed to provoke opposition ; unheard of demands were made on their brethren of Khyrpoor — demands of which the treaty made no mention — demands which deprived of the means of subsistence a great proportion of the nobles of the land.

And they beheld a benign and grey-headed monarch, who had conferred the most substantial benefits on the English — whom Governors-General and British envoys had caressed and honoured — dethroned, despoiled, insulted, and trodden under foot, accused of hostility, and proclaimed a liar. Yet, conscious of their inability successfully to resist us, and fearing to draw on themselves the fate of their cousins, they refused them admission into Lower Scinde, and deputed vakeels empowered to affix their seals to any terms the General might dictate. The Ameers and their feudatories were, how ever, men ; and to believe that, while the events above narrated were in progress, they had not contemplated the possibility of being driven to resistance, would be to believe them fatuous and blind ; to assume that they did not meditate defending themselves, if concession failed to save them from destruction, would be to assign to them a mean ness of character which did hot belong to them.

When, therefore, they sent the vakeels, they might well have provided them with letters of summons to certain of their Chiefs, to be transmitted if an amicable adjustment could not be effected.* But that the Ameers even then actually had recourse to this precautionary measure, was erroneously assumed by Sir Charles Napier. * Let the following extract from the " Conquest of Scinde," (p. 254,) testify to the generosity of the Historian : — " In this crisis, the Ameers played, as usual, a double part. Assenting to the wishes of the war party, they has tened the arrival of their feudatories, but they also sent deputies to the British camp with tlie credentials of ambassadors, the instructions of spies, and the powers of military commissaries : they carried secret letters to command the Chiefs of the Northern trihes on the right side of tlie Indus, allies and feudatories alike, to come with all their fighting men to the general assembly near HydraJiad," This tirade is founded on the circumstance, that on the llth of February Sir Charles Napier arrested some horsemen who were proceeding to Hydrabad, on the leader of whom was found an order to attend to the instructions of Gholam Shah.

This summons, and an accompanying note from Meer Mahommed of Khyrpoor, like every other document damnatory of the Ameers, Sir Charles Napier forwarded to Lord Ellenborough, and with it transmitted the following memorandum : — " The Gholam Shah was Mahommed Khan's deputy, with full powers to meet Major Outram ; and there can be no doubt whatever, that this note (which is entirely wrritten with the Ameer's own hand,) relates to the raising of the Murree tribe. This note being to the same person, as the treasonable letter, in my opinion, proves this, and shows that Gholam Shah was acting the part of plenipotentiary, spy, and recruit ing officer, too, against us. He had truly full power given to him." I have (that my opponents may have no room for cavilling) assumed that the His torian is correct in stating that the ambassadors were furnished with these letters of summons.

On this assumption, I feel that every right-minded man will exonerate the Ameers from the charge of "treasonable" conduct ; — nay, I will go further, and maintain, that if the assumption be incorrect, the Ameers were culpably forbearing. The impression likely to be conveyed by Sir Charles Napier's allusion to the Murree tribe, coupled with the Histo rian's allusions to the " Northern tribes," that the mountain Murrees were summoned, is ludicrously absurd. The Chief to whom this letter was addressed, was Hyat Khan Murree, a Scindian Murree, a subject of the Ameers, whose village — Goram-ka-Shehur — is situated about thirty miles north-west from Sukkurunda, or about three or four days' journey from Hy drabad ! As I have already said, I have assumed that the "treasonable" summons was entrusted to the ambassadors, to be forwarded should it be deemed requisite.

By Sir Charles ATapier's testimony, however, it would appear that such was not the case .'—that the forbearing and suffering Ameers did not even take that precaution which it was culpable to neglect! The The vakeels, as we have seen, waited on Sir Charles Napier on the 30th of January ; but he, instead of availing himself of the full powers with which they were entrusted, directed them to take to Hydrabad the utterly ruined fugitives of Upper Scinde!* What other conclusion could they draw from this, than that the General was determined to involve the Princes of both provinces in one common fate ? They wrote from Sir Charles Na pier's camp to apprize their masters of their dan ger, and let the words employed sink deep into the heart of him who reads : — " The General is bent on war ; so get ready.' I know not that they accurately described the General's feelings — but I do solemnly believe that no other conclusion was open to them.

The vakeel who is particularized as having communicated this warning, was Meerza Khoosroo ; and I read in the ambassadors did not reach the General's camp till the 30th of January ; they were still with him on the 31st ; and it was probably not till the 2d or 3d of February that they arrived in Hydrabad. Not till, then, when the vakeels told them that war was determined on by Sir Charles Napier, did the Ameers, according to the evidence adduced against them, begin to collect their troops. And not till the 5th of February, (according to Sir Charles Napier,) when they beheld the army advancing in violation of what they understood to be the General's promise, did the Ameers issue this summons to Hyat Khan Murree. For it is in reference to a letter of the 5th, that Sir Charles Napier thus writes to Lord Ellenborough, when handing up the summons— "for at the same time that he (Meer Mahommed) wrote the letters I send * * * he wrote to me the letter marked 3, deprecating my march before the 0th," &e. * Yet the Ameers of Lower Scinde's compliance with this order, and that against tlieir will, is made a charge against them by the Historian.

" They received the Khyrpoor Ameers and their armies with open arms, and 60,000 men were assembled." evidence against the Ameers, with Mr. Brown's signature attached, collected nearly a year after the melancholy events to which it refers, that — " When the Meerza returned to Hydrabad, the order for col lecting troops was given." And had the time not come ? A crisis had arrived when the Ameers were bound by every feeling of which our nature acknowledges the in fluence, to make a stand. The purity of Sir Charles Napier's motives, and his aversion to bloodshed, are not elements of the question. His heart the Ameers could not search, but his acts they beheld ; and those acts could bear but one construction. The Belooche feudatories, there cannot be a doubt, were nothing loath to obey the summons.

To imagine that they had beheld, unmoved, the ruin which had fallen on some of their brethren, and which they feared might overtake all, is to assume that they were more than angels, or less than men. Yet, though prepared to resist, if submission failed to avert destruction, the Ameers shunned war. Sir Charles Napier and his army might be cut off, and another army and another general might be made to share their fate, but the Princes of Scinde too well knew the illimitable resources of our empire, not to be aware that retribution would follow — retribution swift, terrible, and sure. Their mountain passes, their rigorous climate, and their distant position, had not availed theAffghans ; and the Ameers required not to be told that, hemmed in on every side, with the seaports and river in our possession, with all the resources of the Western Presidency of India within three days' water communication, their open country could not many months be defended against the British.

Although, when their vakeels announced that Sir Charles Napier was " bent on tear," the Hydrabad Princes summoned their feudatories, it is evident (from an intercepted letter) that for some time afterwards they hoped to avert hostilities. But ere I reached Hydrabad, Sir Charles Napier had again distracted the minds of the subjects of his diplomacy with doubts and fears, which it had been both politic and generous to spare them. The 1st of February, the reader may remember, was the last day of grace allowed to the Chiefs of Khyrpoor in Sir Charles Napier's proclamation of the 27th January. When he sent back the vakeels of Hydrabad on the 31st of that month, desiring them to take with them the Ameers of Upper Scinde, it was necessary to extend the period allowed to the latter for acquiescence.

In the memorandum furnished to the vakeels, the General thus expressed himself: — " I will not commit any act of hostility against those Ameers (Upper Scinde) till I hear from Major Outram ; but I shall march more near to Koonhera, in case the Ameers of Khyrpoor do not proceed to Hydrabad, where they must be on the 6th February ; and if the Ameers of Khyrpoor do not dismiss their soldiers, I will attack them. This is an extension of the time given by the proclamation, viz. the 1st of February. If I do not receive a letter from the deputies of Hydrabad, on the 5th of Feb ruary, I will march against Meer Roostum on the 6th." When Sir Charles Napier thus wrote, he ima gined that I should be able to start for Hydrabad on the 30th of January. By the intrigues of Ali Morad, I was unable to leave Sukkur till the 4th of February, — the day on which Roostum arrived at Hydrabad; and unforeseen and unavoidable acci dents prevented my reaching that city till the Sfh.

On the very day on which I left Sukkur, Sir Charles Napier acknowledged that the miscarriage of his letter was " a strange affair," and expressed his suspicions that Ali Morad had stopped it ; under these circumstances it had been generous, and no more than just, to apprise the Ameers, that in consequence of the contre-temps that had oc curred, he would of course delay his march. This, however, was an act of consideration too marked to be extended to barbarians. On the 5th he wrote to me, assuming that I was then " fairly off," and would be at Hydrabad next day. On the 6th, he again wrote, and expressed himself "sure" that I was then at Hydrabad ; "barring accidents," was the parenthetical proviso, — but the events which had occurred might have satisfied him that acci dents were by no means easily barred; and as he himself intimated that a steamer with treasure was aground, it might have occurred to him that the one bearing his Commissioner was not exempt from a like contingency.

These considerations, and the circumstance that the ambassadors had promised that Roostum should accompany them, might have induced the General to extend to the Ameers the semblance of courtesy ; and under the circumstances, the motives which influenced him were little likely to be misconstrued. But such a course comported not with the policy of Sir Charles Napier. He continued his march on the 6th. "The deputies have sent me promises that Roos tum will go to Hydrabad." Sir Charles Napier wrote on the 5th of February, — " my conditions were that he or his representatives should go, not promise to go. I know what an Ameer's promises are, and especially his. / therefore march to-morrow for a village named Mora, sixteen miles on the ■road to Hydrabad." The next day he again wrote — " The vakeels wrote to me that Meer Roostum would go to Hydrabad.

They have not said that he is gone : so to keep my word I have marched thus far" My reader will probably agree with me that this sudden eagerness to demonstrate the inviolability of an Englishman's word, was somewhat prudish. When the intelligence of preparations being made for an advance reached Hydrabad, the ter rified Ameers despatched by express the following deprecatory appeal against what they regarded a breach of plighted faith, which was received on the 7th :— " According to the agreement with your Excellency, Meerza Koosroo Bey, Yoosoof Bey, and Gholam Shah Lugharee, pro ceeded to our brother Meer Roostum, and proposed with him regarding his movement towards Hydrabad, as a strong friendship, brotherhood, and relationship was existing between us. The Ameer had started for Hydrabad previous to any invi tation ON OUR PART, WHERE HE AND MeER NUSSEER KhAN and Meer Mahommed Khan arrived on the 4th of February.

Your Excellency having promised to our vakeels that, until the arrival of Colonel Outram, and discussion of matters, you would remain at Nowshera till the 9th instant, and not move further on this part, we beg to inform your Excellency that Colonel Outram did not reach this up to the 5th, and Meer Roostum, who is an old venerable man, and the Chief and head of all the family of Meer Choker Khan, has suffered gross treatment AND GREAT INJUSTICE, WHICH IT IS OUT OF OUR POWER TO EX- PLAIN. When Colonel Outram reaches Hydrabad we will tell him all that has passed, through whom your Excellency will learn every thing about the affair, and also enter into the details of the treaty with Colonel Outram ; and it is well known that at Koonhera the Ameers' family and army are remaining, and Colonel Outram, having delayed coming here, we hope that your Excellency on no account will move further on, because that will be entirely unfriendly, and it is contrary to the laws of the British and that of friends, and it is improper.

The army which is at Koonhera is only meant for protecting the baggage and families of Meer Roostum. We hope your Excellency will not think otherwise." Sir Charles Napier had said, (according to the Parliamentary version of his " memorandum,") that unless he received " a letter from the depu ties of Hydrabad on the 5th of February," he would march against Meer Roostum on the 6th. He merely required that the aged Ameer should be at Hydrabad on the 6th, and he promised that he would commit no act of hostility against Roostum' s kinsmen till he heard from myself. This memorandum was furnished at a time when he believed I should be at Hydrabad ere the date specified for Roostum's arrival. In the interim, he learned that I had been unnecessarily detained; this detention he himself suspected was caused by Ali Morad, whose only object in effecting it he well knew must have been to injure his relatives : on or before the 5th, he received all that he had specified as necessary to arrest his onward march — a letter from the deputies of Hydrabad ; that letter stated that Roostum certainly would be at tlie capital by the day specified ; yet, because they had not told him that the Ameer had actually qone, and because, as he elseivhere says, he knew the value of an Ameer s promises — he advances !

To criminate Sir Charles Napier is as far from my wish as it is remote from my province ; to vindicate the Ameers, however, is necessary to my own vindication, and I unhesitatingly affirm that the Princes of Hydra bad, knowing as they did that Roostum had ar rived among them two days prior to the date spe cified by Sir Charles Napier, ignorant of the cause of my detention, learning that the force was pre paring to advance, and viewing these circum stances in connexion with the General's previous proceedings, had grounds for believing that their destruction was determined on, — that they would have been justified in using every means at their disposal for the sacrifice of the British army, and would have richly deserved their present fate had they not forthwith summoned Hyat Khan Murree, and every old man and stripling who could be brought to augment the array of warriors at their disposal.

Let any Englishman imagine himself in the position of these Chiefs, and honestly say what would have been his conduct — and what his im pulses. z Such was the state of matters when I reached Hydrabad. On my arrival, the usual deputations were sent to meet me, and arrangements were made for a conference with the Ameers in the evening. In reporting my arrival to Sir Charles Napier, I apprized him of what I had from the first foreseen must be the inevitable result of throwing the Khyr poor Chiefs on the hospitality of their cousins, — that the restoration of Roostum would be demanded by the Ameers of Hydrabad. The possibility of the occurrence of hostilities, I could not but contemplate. But though imminent, they were even yet not unavoidable. The warriors then assembling around the capital of Scinde had been brought together by our own measures.

A common sense of injury and danger, and a chival rous detestation of our ungenerous and unjust con duct alone united them : a simple act of justice would have dissolved. their bond of union, but that was peremptorily denied. I thus wrote to the General : — " They (about 100 convalescents of H. M. 22d Regiment pro ceeding up the river, whom it was my intention to detain,) with Captain Wells's detachment of thirty Sepoys, which I received from the Comet, will enable me to hold our steamers here, if not the agency also, until you reach Hydrabad, should the Ameers commence hostilities, which, notwithstanding their blustering, I do not believe they intend to do, it being their usual practice to make a show of intending hostilities to get better terms : besides, had they really intended to proceed to extremity, they would certainly have removed tlieir women from Hydrabad, which it does not appear they have made any preparation for doing.