A Narrative of the Peninsular Campaign, 1807-1814. ... Abridged from 'The History of the War in the Peninsula' by ... Sir W. F. P. Napier ... By W. T. Dobson, etc

Preface

OLONEL William Francis Patrick Napier, C.B., author of the "History of the War in the Peninsula," the work which is here epitomised, was born in 1785, and entered the army at the early age of fifteen. Taking part in the expedition to Copen hagen in 1807, in the following year the young soldier was sent to Spain, where he served during the whole of the Penin sular War, in which he was several times wounded. For some years he was lieutenant-governor of Guernsey, rose to the rank of major-general in 1841, and was created K.C.B. in 1848. Colonel Napier's reputation, however, rests less on his military career than on his writings, which are all characterised by elo quence and strength of thought, while his marked enthusiasm and strong national feeling were never allowed to interfere with accurate and impartial statement of historical facts, and these features have imparted a life-like and graphic power to the de scriptions in his narrative of the Peninsular War, which has ever been considered the most important of all his works, and also the most valuable and most reliable record of the events to which it refers.

PREFACE.

. VI Attached to the 43rd regiment all through the war, Colonel Napier was an eye-witness to and an actor in many of the trans actions which he relates regarding the struggle for independence which devastated the Peninsula for six years, and having also the advantage of a wide acquaintance with many distinguished officers who took part in these transactions, was thus enabled to correct and supplement his own personal knowledge with their recollec tions and opinions. Ample testimony has been borne to the accuracy of Colonel Napier's statements, and to the diligence and acuteness with which he collected his materials. A masterpiece of detailed military history, passages from Napier's " War in the Peninsula " are said to have been recounted round the watch-fires and told in the trenches before Sebastopol, and never without warming the soldier's heart, firing his mind, and nerving his arm.

Most of the varied opinions, military observations, and statis tical details are excluded from the present work, the chief object aimed at being to give only the principal events in the mighty stream of battle controlled by Wellington, which, bearing the glory of Britain in its course, burst the barriers of the Pyrenees, and left deep traces of its fury on the soil of France. CONTENTS. CHAP- PAGE I. FIRST CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL— ROLICA — VIM1ERO . . I II. SIR JOHN MOORE RETREAT TO CORUNA — BATTLE OF CORUNA 19 III. THE FRENCH SIEGE OF ZARAGOZ A 43 IV. GRIJON— PASSAGE OF THE DOURO 59 V. CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA 76 VI. CIUDAD RODRIGO — THE COA — ALMEIDA — BUSACO — TORRES VEDRAS 96 VII. SABUGAL — FUENTES ONORO ALMEIDA — ALBUERA — BADAJOS . Il6 VIII. ELBODON — AI.DEA DE PONTE — CAPTURE OF CIUDAD ROD- RIGO I43 IX.

SIEGE OF BADAJOZ— CAPTAIN GRANT I5S X. ALMAREZ — THE FORTS OF SALAMANCA 1S5 XI. BATTLE OF SALAMANCA— SIEGE OF BURGOS .... 201 XII. BATTLE OF VITTORIA — FIRST SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN . . 225 XIII. BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES 246 XIV. SAN SEBASTIAN — SAN MARCIAL — VERA 273 XV. PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA — VERA — FALL OF PAMPELUNA . 290 XVI. BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE 307 XVII. BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE 322 XVIII. PASSAGE OF THE GAVES — GARRIS — THE ADOUR . . . 346 XIX. ORTHES — AIRE — BORDEAUX 365 XX. VIC BIGORRE — TARBES — TOULOUSE — BAYONNE .... 3S3 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. LANDING OF THE BRITISH ARMY AT MONDEGO BAY Frontispiece PAGE BATTLE OF VIMIERO 13 PASSAGE OF THE DOURO ... 59 BATTLE OF TALAVERA S6 BATTLE OF BUSACO 1 06 SIEGE OF BADAJOS 1 58 BATTLE OF SALAMANCA 20O 22S BATTLE OF VITTORIA PORT OF BAYONNE 323 PORT OF BORDEAUX 365 MAP OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 40S b

Chapter I. First Campaign In Portugal

'^y^yyTf WING to the scandalous and degrading dissensions (jf/S5KgjS|\^X prevalent between rival parties in Spain about the 1 Ly\/j /. beginning of this century, Napoleon Bonaparte '^vi^A<<c hoped to find means of ultimately subjugating the t^A-y^^tsilT} wh0]e peninsula of Spain and Portugal to his yoke, — and this was neither a recent nor a secret project — as he had already overawed the greater part of the Continent. In the earlier years of Napoleon's career, the courts of Madrid and Lisbon had joined, with apparent cordiality, in the general league of European nations against the propaganda of the doctrines of the French Revolution ; but the imbecile King Charles of Spain, alarmed at the progress which the victorious troops of France were making, hastened to put an end to a desultory and disastrous war by a more disgraceful peace in a treaty at Basle in 1795, this treaty being followed soon after by a defensive and offensive league, concluded at St. Ildefonso.

From this time onwards, Spain had obsequiously obeyed the commands of Napoleon, and placed her resources at his disposal ; the flower of her army had fought in his Polish campaign, and many of their number had found a bloody grave amid the snows of Eylau, to serve the purposes of his selfish ambition. Britain alone, of all the European nations, continued throughout to maintain an invincible hostility against the despotism which had now over- A spread the rest of Europe, crushing with her fleets, wherever they met with it, the naval strength of her enemy, and the ships of Spain had recently shared with those of France in the total defeat inflicted by Nelson at Trafalgar. Rendered thus safe within her own borders from assaults by the destruction of every fleet but her own, Britain was relentless in her determination to reduce Napoleon's intolerable power ; but great as her strength was, she had as yet taken little effective part in the war elsewhere than at sea.

If the short campaign in Egypt, where General Abercrombie had the glory of first leading British soldiers to victory over the self-styled invincibles of Napoleon, and the brilliant affair of Maida, are excepted, the whole period from 1793 down to the beginning of the Peninsular War, presents no record of deeds adding to the military renown of Britain. Her efforts hitherto had been, as it were, merely defensive, and her armies either rested idly on her own shores, or were scattered in detachments among her colonies, being only occasionally called upon to bear a part in some petty expedition, generally as unpro fitable as the means were insignificant and inadequate. The extreme subserviency of Spain failed to conciliate the rapacious despot, and, in furtherance of his design to add the Peninsula to his dominions, Napoleon asserted that the frontier of France on the Spanish side required to be thoroughly assured, and this could only be done by placing a prince of his own choosing on the throne of Spain.

In complete disregard of national rights, and without even the decency of a pretext of quarrel, he overran the country with his soldiers. The Prince- Regent of Portugal, after having temporised so far as to assume a hostile attitude towards her ancient ally and friend Britain, and having even sought to conciliate France by confiscating the property of English citizens resident in the country, retired with his court and family to his provinces in Brazil, there to wait till the advent of happier times ; while the King of Spain was compelled to resign his crown, which Napoleon placed upon the head of his brother Joseph, thus rendering the Peninsula a mere appendage to France. Napoleon lived to acknowledge that the seizure of the country and the gift of its crown to his brother were fatal mistakes.

An empire founded as Napoleon's had been could have no secure foundation, and one serious error in policy THE LANDING AT MONDEGO BAY. 3 might easily provoke a storm which all the power and skill of its head could not repress ; and such an example was now furnished by the Emperor of the French. At a time when he had the prospect of again being engaged in deadly strife with Northern Europe, Napoleon made the Spaniards his enemies, and prepared for his most persistent foe, the British Government, an advan tageous field to fight out a quarrel which promised to have no termination but the ruin of one or other of the combatants. Both Spain and Portugal offered what resistance they could by continuous insurrectionary movements, but these availed little against the hosts of French troops poured into the country.

The contest, however, was soon to enter upon a new phase. The threat of invasion of England by Napoleon, followed up as it was by the assemblage of large bodies of troops and of trans ports along the coasts of France in preparation for a descent upon the shores of Britain, had infused a military spirit into the British people to which they had long been strangers, and this military spirit the Government of the day soon turned to account by giving every encouragement to the enrolment of volunteers, who, along with the militia, proved invaluable nurseries for the line. The hostility of Britain having hitherto been chiefly mani fested at sea, and by contributions of money to the military powers opposed to France, she now at length resolved to take a more prominent share in the strife, and the Peninsula became the chosen scene of operations.

Though possessing by the beginning of January 1808 a regular army under the British standard of nearly 300,000 men of all arms, exclusive of foreign mercenaries, her earliest efforts were on a moderate scale. A little army of 10,000 men was landed at Mondego Bay in Portugal, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was destined after a few years of arduous war to banish the French from the Peninsula, and to gain a military reputation equal to, if not exceeding, that of Napoleon himself. Without serious difficulty Portugal was wrested from the in vaders, and victory almost continually followed upon the efforts of the Allies. The first successful conflict took place at Roliga, which, considering the small number actually engaged, was one of the most sanguinary conflicts in modern warfare, and this was almost immediately followed by the more decisive victory of the British arms at Vimiero.

These early successes in the first Peninsular campaign proved the truth of the opinion Sir Arthur Wellesley had formed, that the thin red line of British soldiers could withstand the terrible columns by which the French troops generally cleft their way through ail that ventured to oppose them ; and from Vimiero onwards to Waterloo the thin line of Britain was able to throw back with great slaughter the massed columns of France. The British army landed at Mondego Bay in Portugal in the beginning of August 1808, and Sir Arthur Wellesley at once repaired to Montemor Velho to confer with Don Bernardim Freire, the Portuguese commander-in-chief. The latter proposed that the troops of the two nations should relinquish all communication with the coast, and throwing themselves into the heart of Beira, commence an offensive campaign ; he promised ample stores of provisions ; but Sir Arthur having already discovered the weakness of the insurrection, placed no reliance on those promises.

He supplied Freire with 5000 stand of arms and ammunition, but refused to separate from his ships ; and seeing clearly that the insurgents were unable to give any real assistance, he resolved to act with reference to the probability of their deserting him in danger. The Portuguese general, disappointed at this refusal, reluctantly consented to join the British army, but he pressed Sir Arthur to hasten to Leria, lest a large magazine, filled, as he affirmed, with provisions for the use of the British army, should fall into the enemy's hands. After this the two generals separated, and the necessary preparations for a march being completed, the advanced guard of the English army quitted the banks of the Mondego on the 9th, taking the road to Leria. On the ioth Sir Arthur Wellesley followed with the main body, and thus com menced the First Campaign in Portugal.

Sir Arthur's plan embraced these principal objects : — To hold on by the sea-coast, as well for the sake of his supplies as to avoid the drain upon his weak army ; to keep his troops in a mass, that he might strike an important blow • and to strike that blow as near PORTUGUESE PATRIOTS. 5 Lisbon as possible, that the affairs of Portugal might be quickly brought to a crisis. He possessed very good military surveys of the ground in the immediate neighbourhood of Lisbon, and he was anxious to carry on his operations in a part of the country where he could avail himself of this resource ; but the utter inexperience of his commissariat staff and the want of cavalry rendered his movements slow, and obliged him to be extremely circumspect. Marshal Junot (Duke of Abrantes), who was at this time in Lisbon in command of the French forces in Portugal, no sooner heard of the advance of the British than he dispatched a corps under General Loison to form a junction with General De Laborde near Leria, but the British general's first movement cut the line of communication between the two French generals, and obliged Laborde to risk an action.

As the hostile troops approached each other, the Portuguese chiefs became alarmed; notwithstanding the confident language of their public manifestos and the bombastic style of their con versation, an internal conviction that a French army was invincible pervaded all ranks of the patriots. The leaders, aware of their own deficiency, and incredulous of the courage of the English soldiers, dreaded the being committed in a decisive contest, be cause a defeat (which they expected) would deprive them of all hope to make terms with the victors, whereas by keeping 5000 or 6000 men together, they could at any time secure themselves by a capitulation. Sir Arthur Wellesley appealed to the honour and patriotism of Freire, and warmly admonished him that he was going to forfeit all pretension to either by permitting the British army to fight without his assistance; but this argument had no effect upon Don Bernardim.

He parried the imputations against his spirit and zeal by pretending that his intention was to operate independently on the line of the Tagus ; and after some further discussion, Sir Arthur, as a last effort, changed his tone of rebuke to one of conciliation, and recommended to him not to risk his troops by an isolated march, but to keep in the rear of the British, and wait for the result of the first battle. This advice was so agreeable to Freire, that, at the solicitation of Colonel Trant, a military agent, he consented to leave 1400 infantry and 250 cavalry under the immediate command of the English general. The defection of the native force was a serious evil. It shed an injurious moral influence, and deprived Sir Arthur of the aid of troops whose means of gaining intelligence and whose local knowledge might have compensated for his want of cavalry.

Nevertheless, continuing his own march, his advanced guard entered Caldas the 15th, and that day also Junot reluctantly quitted Lisbon, with a reserve composed of 2000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 10 pieces of artillery, carrying with him his grand pare of ammunition, and a military chest containing ,£40,000. General Travot was left at Lisbon with above 7000 men, of which number two battalions were formed of stragglers and convalescents. He occupied both sides of the Tagus, distributing 2000 men in Palmela, the Bugio fort, and on the heights of Almada, in order to protect the shipping from the insurgents of the Alemtejo, who, under the orders of the Monteiro Mor, were gathering at Setuval. A thousand French he kept on board the vessels of war, to guard the Spanish prisoners and the spare powder ; with 2400 he garrisoned the citadel and supported the police.

A thousand were distributed in the forts of Belem, St. Julians, Cascaes, and Ericeia (the last-named place is situated to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, and commands a small harbour a few miles west of Mafra), and a thousand were at Santarem, protecting a large depot of stores ; thus nearly one half of the French army was by Junot's combinations rendered inactive, and those in the field were divided into three parts, without any certain point of junction in advance, yet each too weak singly to sustain an action. The Duke of Abrantes seemed to forget that he was merely the chief of an advanced corps, whose safety depended upon activity and concentration. The French reserve was transported to Villa Franca by water, from whence it was to march to Otta ; but the rope ferryboat of Saccavem being removed by the natives, it cost twenty-four hours to throw a bridge across the creek at that place.

On the 17th the troops were on their march, when Junot hastily recalled them to Villa Franca. This retrograde movement was occasioned by a report that the English had landed near the capital. When the falsehood of this rumour became known, the reserve resumed the road to Otta under the command of General Thiebault, Junot himself pushing forward to Alcoentre, where he found ROLICA. 7 Loison, and assumed the personal direction of that general's division. During this time, Sir Arthur Wellesley was pressing Laborde, whose situation was becoming truly embarrassing. Loison was at Alcoentre, and the reserve was at Villa Franca ; that is, one and two marches distant from Rolica. If he retired upon Torres Vedras, his communication with Loison would be lost. To fall back on Montachique was to expose the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra.

To march upon Alcoentre and unite with Loison was to open the shortest road to Lisbon (that of Montachique) for the British army ; and to remain at Rolica, it was necessary to fight three times his own force. Animated, however, by the danger, encouraged by the local advantages of his position, and justly confident in his own talents, Laborde resolved to abide his enemy's assault, in the feeble hope that Loison might arrive during the action. Rolicja. Sir Arthur Wellesley attacked upon the 17th August. Early in the morning of that day, a dense mass, consisting of 13,480 infantry, 470 cavalry, and 18 guns, issued from Obidos, and soon afterwards broke into three distinct columns of battle. The left, commanded by Lieutenant-General Ferguson, was composed of his own and Major-General Bowe's brigades of infantry, reinforced by 250 riflemen, 40 cavalry, and 6 guns, forming a total of 4900 combatants.

They marched by the crests of the hills adjoining the Sierra de Baragueda, being destined to turn the right flank of Laborde's position, and to oppose the efforts of Loison, if that general should appear during the action. The column of the right, under Colonel Trant, composed of 1000 Portuguese infantry and 50 horse of the same nation, moved by the village of St. Amias, with the intention of turning the left flank of the French. The centre column, 9000 in number with 12 guns, was commanded by Sir Arthur in per son, and marched straight against the enemy by the village of Mahmed. It was composed of Generals Hill's, Nightingale's, Catlin Craufurd's, and Fane's brigades of British infantry, 400 cavalry, 250 of which were Portuguese, and 400 light troops of the same nation. As this column advanced, General Fane's brigade, extending to its left, drove back the French skirmishers, and connected the march of Ferguson's division with the centre.

When the latter approached the elevated plain upon which Laborde was posted, General Hill, who moved upon the right of the main road, being supported by the cavalry and covered by the fire of his light troops, pushed forward rapidly to the attack. On his left General Nightingale displayed a line of infantry, preceded by the fire of nine guns. Craufurd's brigade and the remaining pieces of artillery formed a reserve. At this moment Fane's riflemen crowned the nearest hills on the right flank of the French ; the Portuguese troops showed the head of a column beyond St. Amias upon the enemy's left, and General Ferguson was seen descending from the higher grounds in the rear of Fane. Laborde's position appeared desperate ; but, with the coolness and dexterity of a practised warrior, he evaded the danger, and, covered by his excellent cavalry, fell back rapidly to the heights of Zambugeira.

A fresh disposition of the English became indispensable to dislodge him from that formidable and well chosen post. Colonel Trant continued his march, and turned the left of the new field of battle. Ferguson and Fane being united, were directed to penetrate by the mountains, and outflank the French right. Generals Hill and Nightingale advanced against the front, which was of singular strength, and only to be approached by narrow paths winding through deep ravines. A swarm of skirmishers, starting forward, plunged into the passes, and spread ing to the right and left, won their way with extreme difficulty among the rocks and tangled evergreens that overspread the steep ascent ; with still greater difficulty the supporting columns followed, and their formation was soon disordered in the confined and rugged passes.

The hollows echoed with a continued roll of musketry ; the shouts of the advancing troops were loudly answered by the enemy, and the curling smoke that broke out from the sides of the mountain marking the progress of the assailants showed how stoutly the defence was maintained. Laborde, watching anxiously for the arrival of Loison, gradually slackened his hold on the left, but clung tenaciously to the right, in the hope of yet effecting a junction with that general. The ROLICA. 9 ardour of the 9th and 29th regiments, who led the attack, favoured this skilful conduct. They pressed forward with such vigour, as to force the two strongest passes and reach the plain above, long before the flank movements of Ferguson and Trant had shaken the credit of the position ; the 29th first arrived in disorder at the top ; ere they could form, a French battalion came forward at a rapid pace, poured in their fire, and breaking gallantly through the midst of the English regiment, slew the colonel and many others, and made the major and fifty or sixty men prisoners.

But the 29th were not to be overthrown. They rallied, and being joined by the 9th, the colonel of which also fell in this bitter fight, maintained their dangerous footing. General Laborde, who brought every arm into action at the proper time and place, made repeated efforts to destroy these regiments before they could be supported ; failing in that, he yet gained time to withdraw his left wing and to rally it upon the centre and right ; but the English troops were gathering thickly on the upper ground, and General Ferguson, who had at first taken an erroneous direction towards the centre, now regained the true line, and was rapidly passing the right flank of the position. The French general, seeing that the day was lost, commenced a retreat by alternate masses, protecting his movements by vigorous charges of cavalry.

At the village of Zam bugeira he made another desperate stand, but the English troops bore on him too heavily to be resisted, and thus disputing the ground, he fell back to the Quinta de Bugagliera ; there he halted until his detachments on the side of Segura had rejoined him, and then taking to the narrow pass of Runa, he marched all night to gain the position of Montachique, leaving three guns on the field of battle, and the road to Torres Vedras open for the victors. The loss of the French was 600 killed and wounded; among the latter was Laborde himself. The British also suffered con siderably ; two lieutenant-colonels and nearly 500 men being killed, taken, or wounded ; and as not more than 4000 men were actually engaged, this hard-fought action was very honourable to both sides. The firing ceased a little after four o'clock, and Sir Arthur getting intelligence that Loison's division was only five miles distant, took up a position for the night in an oblique line to that which he had just forced, his left resting upon a height near the field of battle, and his right covering the road to Lourinham.

Believing that Loison and Laborde had effected their junction, and that both were retiring to Montachique, he resolved to march the next morning to Torres Vedras ; but before nightfall he was informed that General Anstruther's and General Acland's divisions, accompanied by a large fleet of store-ships, were off the coast, the dangerous nature of which rendered it necessary to provide for their safety by a quick disembarkation. He therefore changed his plans, and resolved to seek for some convenient post, that, being in advance of his present position, would likewise enable him to cover the landing of these reinforcements. The vigour of Laborde's defence had also an influence upon this occasion ; before an enemy so bold and skilful no precaution could be neglected with impunity. Sir Arthur marched to Lourinham, and Junot at the same time quitting Cereal with Loison's division, crossed the line of Laborde's retreat, and pushed for Torres Vedras, which he reached in the evening of the same day.

Being joined on the 19th by Laborde, and on the 20th by his reserve, Junot reorganised his army, and prepared for a decisive battle. The day on which the combat of Rolica was fought the in surgents attacked Abrantcs, and the feeble garrison being ill com manded, gave way, and was destroyed. Sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position on the 19th August at Vimiero, a village near the sea-coast, and from thence sent a detachment to cover the march of General Anstruther's brigade, which had, with great difficulty and some loss, been that morning landed on an open sandy beach called the Bay of Maceira. The French cavalry scoured the neighbouring country, carried off some of the women from the rear of the camp, and hemmed the army round so closely that no information of Junot's position could be obtained.

In the night of the 20th, General Acland's brigade was also dis embarked, and this reinforcement increased the army to 16,000 fighting men, with 18 pieces of artillery, exclusive of Trant's Portuguese and of two British regiments under General Beresford, which were with the fleet at the mouth of the Tagus. Estimating Junot's whole force at 18,000 men, Sir Arthur VIMIERO. 11 Wellesley judged that, after providing for the security of Lisbon, the French general could not bring more than 14,000 into the field ; he designed, therefore, not only to strike the first blow, but to follow it up, so as to prevent the enemy from rallying and renewing the campaign upon the frontier. In this view he had, before quitting the Mondego, written to Sir Harry Burrard, giving an exact statement of his own proceedings and intentions, and recommending that Sir John Moore, with his division, should dis embark at the Mondego, and march without delay to Santarem, by which he would protect the left of the army, block the line of the Tagus, and at the same time threaten the French communication between Lisbon and Elvas, and that without danger, because Junot would be forced to defend Lisbon against the coast army, or if, relinquishing the capital, he endeavoured to make way to Almeida by Santarem, the ground there was so strong that Sir John Moore might easily maintain it against any efforts.

More over, the Marquis of Valladeres commanded 3000 men at Guarda, and General Freire, with 5000 men, was at Leria, and might be persuaded to support the British at Santarem. The distance from Vimiero to Torres Vedras was about nine miles ; but although the number and activity of the French cavalry completely shrouded Junot's position, it was known to be strong, and very difficult of approach, by reason of a long defile through which the army must penetrate in order to reach the crest of the mountain. There was, however, a road leading between the sea coast and Torres Vedras, which, turning Junot's position, opened a way to Mafra. Sir Arthur possessed very exact military surveys of the country through which that road led, and he projected, by a forced march on the 21st, to turn the position of Torres Vedras, and to gain Mafra with a strong advanced guard, while the main body, seizing some advantageous heights a few miles short of that town, would be in a position to intercept the French line of march to Montachique.

The army was reorganised during the 20th in eight brigades of infantry and four weak squadrons of cavalry, and every preparation was made for the next day's enterprise ; but at that critical period of the campaign the Ministerial arrangements, which provided three commanders-in-chief, began to work. Sir Harry Burrard arrived in a frigate off the Bay of Maceira, and Sir Arthur was checked in the midst of his operations on the eve of a decisive battle. Having repaired on board the frigate, he made his report of the situation of affairs, and renewed his former recommendation relative to the disposal of Sir John Moore's troops ; but Burrard, who had previously resolved to bring the latter down to Maceira, condemned this project, and forbade any offensive movement until the whole army should be concentrated ; whereupon Sir Arthur returned to his camp.

The ground occupied by the army, although very extensive, and not very clearly defined as a position, was by no means weak. The village of Vimiero, situated in a valley through which the little river of Maceira flows, contained the pare and commissariat stores. The cavalry and the Portuguese were on a small plain close behind the village, and immediately in its front a rugged isolated height with a flat top commanded all the ground to the southward and eastward for a considerable distance. On the night of the 20th, about twelve o'clock, Sir Arthur was aroused by a German officer of dragoons, who galloped into the camp, and with some consternation reported that Junot, at the head of 20,000 men, was coming on to the attack, and distant but one hour's march. The general, doubting the accuracy of this information, merely sent out some patrols, and warned the piquets and guards to be upon the alert.