The Franco-German War of 1870-71 ... Translation revised by Archibald Forbes. With a map, notes and orders of battle

Front matter

THE Franco-German War OK I870-7I It _ Field-Marshal COUNT HELMUTH VON MOLTKE TRANSLATION REVISED BY ARCHIBALD FORBES WITH A MAP, NOTES, AND ORDERS OF BATTLE LONDON JAMES R. OSGOOD, McILVAINE & CO- 45, Albemarle Street, W. 1893 [All righli reserved] NOTE. The translation has been thoroughly revised for the sense as well as in regard to technical military terms and expressions. To the name of every German general officer mentioned in the text has been affixed, within brackets, his specific command, a liberty which the reader will perhaps not resent, since the interpolation is intended to facilitate his clearer understanding of a narrative condensed by the author with extreme severity. In further aid of elucidation there has been occa sionally inserted, also within brackets, a date, a figure, or a word.

A few footnotes will be found, which may perhaps be excused as not wholly irrelevant. In the Appendix have been inserted the " Orders of Battle " of both sides, as in the first period of the war. A. F. PBEFACE. Field-Marshal von Moltke began this history of the War of 1870-1 in the spring of the year 1887, and during his residence at Creisau he worked at it for about three hours every morning. On his return to Berlin in the autumn of that year, the work was not quite finished, but he completed it by January, 1888, at Berlin, placed it in my hands, and never again alluded to the subject. The origin of the book was as "follows. I had several times entreated him, but in vain, to make use of his leisure hours at Creisau in noting down some of his rich store of reminiscences. He always objected, in the same words : " Everything official that I have had occasion to write, or that is worth remembering, is to be seen in the Archives of the Staff Corps.

My personal experiences had better be buried with me." He had a dislike to memoirs in general, which he was at no pains to conceal, saying that they only served to gratify the writer's vanity, and often contributed to distort im portant historical events by the subjective views of an individual, and the intrusion of trivial details. It might easily happen that a particular character which in history stood forth in noble simplicity should be hideously disfigured by the narrative of some per sonal experiences, and the ideal halo which had sur rounded it be destroyed. And highly characteristic of Moltke's magnanimity are the words he once uttered on such an occasion, and which I noted at the time : " Whatever is published in a military history is always dressed for effect : yet it is a duty of piety and patriot ism never to impair the prestige which identifies the glory of our Army with personages of lofty position."

Part I

?AGS Preparations for War ........ 2 Combat of Weissenburg (4th August) . . . . .12 Battle of Worth (6th August) 14 Battle of Spicheren (6th August) ...... 19 Right-wheel of the German Aimy ...... 26 Battle of Colonibey-Nouilly (14th August) .... 29 Battle of Vionville— Mars la Tour (16th August) ... 34 Battle of Gravelotte— St. Privat (18th August) ... 49 New Distribution of the Army ...... 64 The Army of Chalons 66 Battle of Beaumont (30th August) 76 Battle of Sedan (1st September) ...... 87 PAKT II. Sortie from Metz (26th August) 102 Battle of Noisseville (31st August) ..... 106 Change of Government in Paris . . . . .. .114 Eetreat of General Vinoy 116 March on Paris of lllrd Army and the Army of the Meuse . 119 Investment of Paris (19th September) 124 First Negotiations for Peace 129 Reduction of Toul (23rd September) 130 Reduction of Strasburg (28th September) . . . .131 Operations round Paris to 15th October 139 Action of Artenay (10th October) 145 Engagement at Orleans (11th October) 146 Reduction of Soissons (15th October) 149 Storming of Chateaudun (18th October) . . . . .151 Sortie against Malmaison (21st October) .... 153 Storming of Le Bourget (30th October) 156 Sortie from Metz against Bellevue (7th October) . . .

Contents

X PAGE Capitulation of Metz (27th October) 165 New Distribution of the Army . . . . • . 16u Operations of the XlVth Corps in the South-Bast (October) . 166 Reduction of Schlettstadt (24th October) . . . .172 Reduction of Breisach (10th November) 174 Reduction of Verdun (itth November) . . . . .175 Advance of 1st and Ilnd Armies (up to mid-November) . .177 Engagement at Coulmiers (9th November) . . . .181 Operations of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg . . . 187 Situation of Ilnd Army (second half of November) . . .189 Battle of Beaune la Rolande (28th November) . . .192 Advance of the Army of the Loire to the relief of Paris . .197 Battle of Loigny — Poupry (2nd December) .... 199 Paris in November ........ 204 Attempt of the Army of Paris to break out (30th November and 2nd December) 207 Advance of the 1st Army in November . . . . .216 Battle of Amiens (17th November) 217 Reduction of La Fere (27th November) 221 Reduction of Thionville (24th November) . . . .222 Investment of Belfort in November ..... 223 Battle of Orleans (3rd and 4th December) .... 224 Offensive Operations South, East, and West .... 233 Fightingof the GrandDuke of Mecklenburg(7th-10th December) 235 Interruption of important offensive operations in December . 245 The XlVth Corps in December 250 The 1st Army in December ....... 252 Reduction of Mezieres (1st January, 1871) .... 257 Paris in December ........ 259 Combat of Le Bourget (21st December) .... 261 Bombardment of Mont-Avron (27th December) . . 264 The Army of the East under General Bourbaki . . . 266 Advance of the Ilnd Army to Le Mans ..... 269 Battle in front of Le Mans (10th-l 2th January) . . . 284 Occurrences northward of Paris during January . . . 303 Battle of Bapaume (3rd January) ..... 305 Fighting on the Lower Seine (4th January) . . . 308 Reduction of Peronne (9th January) .... 310 Battle of St. Quentin (19th January) 316 Occurrences in the South-Eastern Seat of Warup to 17th January 324 Siege of Belfort 324 Transfer of the French Army of the East to the South- Eastern Seat of War (end of December) . . . 328 Action of Villersexel (9th January) . . . . 331 Battle on the Lisaine (15th-17th January) .... 338 The Artillery Attack on Paris (January, 1871) . . .

Contents. XI PAGE Battle of Mont Valerien (19th January). .... 355 Prosecution of the Artillery Attack on Paris to the Armistice 361 Operations of the Army of the South under General von Manteuffel 366 General Hann von Weyhern's March on Dijon . . . 390 Occupation of the Departments of the Doubs, Jura, and C6te d'Or . 391 Prosecution of the Siege of Belfort ...... 393 The Armistice 399 The Homeward March of the German Army .... 406

Appendix

. On the pretended Council of War in the Wars of King William I. 413 " Orders of Battle " of the French and German Armies in the first period of the war THE FEANCO-GEEMAN WAE.

PART I.

The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small armies of professional soldiers went to war to conquer a city, or a province, and then sought winter quarters or made peace. The wars of the present day call whole nations to arms ; there is scarcely a family that has not had to bewail lost ones. The entire financial resources of the State are appropriated to military purposes, and the seasons of the year have no influence on the un ceasing progress of hostilities. As long as nations exist distinct one from the other there will be quarrels that can only be settled by force of arms ; but, in the interests of humanity, it is to be hoped that wars will become the less frequent, as they become the more terrible. Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of monarchs which endangers peace ; but the impulses of a nation, its dissatisfaction with its internal conditions, the strife of parties and the intrigues of their leaders.

A declaration of war, so serious in its consequences, is more easily carried by a large assembly, of which no one of the members bears the sole responsibility, than by a single individual, however lofty his position ; and a peace-loving sovereign is less rare than a parliament composed of wise men. The great wars of recent times have been declared against the wish and will of the reigning powers. Now-a-days the Bourse possesses so great influence that it is able to have armies called into the field merely to protect its interests. Mexico B and Egypt have had European armies of occupation inflicted upon them simply to satisfy the demands of the haute finance. To-day the question is not so much whether a nation is strong enough to make war, as whether its Government is powerful enough to prevent war.

For example, united Germany has hitherto used her strength only to maintain European peace ; while the Aveakness of a neighbouring Government continues to involve the gravest risk of war. It was, indeed, from such a condition of relations that the war of 1870-71 originated. A Napoleon on the throne of France was bound to justify his preten sions by political and military successes. Only temporarily was the French nation contented by the victories of its arms in remote fields of war ; the triumphs of the Prussian armies excited jealousy, they were regarded as arrogant, as a challenge ; and the French demanded revenge for Sadowa. The liberal spirit of the epoch set itself against the autocratic Government of the Emperor ; he was forced to make concessions, his internal authority Avas weakened, and one day the nation was informed by its representatives that it desired war with Germany.

Preparations for War. The wars carried on by France beyond seas, essentially on behalf of financial interests, had consumed immense sums and had undermined the discipline of the army. Her army was by no means in thorough preparedness for a great war, but, in the temper of the nation, the Spanish succession question furnished an opportune pretext on which to go to war. The French Reserves were called out on July 15th, and, as if the opportunity for a rupture was on no account to be let slip, only four days later the French declaration of war was presented at Berlin. One Division of the French Army was ordered to the Spanish frontier as a corps of observation ; only such troops as were absolutely necessary were left in Algiers and in Civita Vecchia ; Paris and Lyons were sufficiently garrisoned.

The entire remainder of the army : 332 battalions, 220 squadrons, 924 guns, in all about 300,000 men, formed the Army of the Rhine, which, divided into eight Corps, was, at any rate in the first instance, to be under the sole direction of a central head. The Emperor himself was the fitting person to undertake this weighty duty, pending whose arrival Marshal Bazaine was to command the gathering forces. It is very probable that the French reckoned on the old dissensions of the German races. Not that they dared to look forward to the South Germans as allies, but they hoped to paralyze their offensive by an early victory, perhaps even to win them over to their side. It was true that Prussia by herself was still a mighty antagonist, and that her armed forces were of superior strength ; but peradventure this advantage might be counterbalanced by rapidity of action.

The French plan of campaign was indeed based on the delivery of sudden unexpected attacks. The powerful fleet of war-ships and transports was to be utilized to land a considerable force in Northern Prussia, which should there engage a part of the Prussian troops, while the main body of the German army, it was assumed, would await the first French attack behind the strong defensive line of the Rhine. A French force was to cross the Rhine promptly, at and below Strasburg, thus avoiding the great German fortresses ; its function being, at the very outset of the campaign, to cut off the South-German army charged with the defence of the Black Forest, and prevent it from effecting a junction with the North Germans. In the execution of this plan it was imperative that the b main body of the French army should be massed in Alsace.

Railway accommodation, however, was so inadequate that in the first instance it was only possible to transport 100,000 men to Strasburg ; 150,000 had to leave the railway at Metz, and remain there till they could be moved forward. Fifty thousand men in the Chalons camp were intended to serve as supports, and 115 battalions were destined for field service as soon as the National Guard should relieve them in the interior. The various Corps were distributed as follows : — Imperial Guard, General Bourbaki — Nancy. 1st Corps, Marshal MacMahon — Strasburg. Ilnd Corps, General Frossard — St. Avoid. IIIrd Corps, Marshal Bazaine — Metz. IVth Corps, General Ladmirault — Thionville. Vth Corps, General Failly — Bitsch. Vlth Corps, Marshal Canrobert — Chalons. Vllth Corps, General Felix Douay — Belfort.

Thus while there were but two Corps in Alsace, there were five on the Moselle ; and, so early as the day of the declaration of war, one of the latter, the Ilnd Corps, had been pushed forward close to the German frontier, about St. Avoid and Forbach. General Frossard, its commander, was, however, under strict injunctions to commit himself to no serious undertaking. The regiments had been hurried away from their peace stations before the arrival of their complement of men, and without waiting for their equipments. Mean while the called-out reservists accumulated in the depots, overflowed the railway stations and choked the traffic. Their transmission to their destinations was at a standstill, for it was often unknown at the depots where the regiments to which the reservists were to be sent were for the time encamped.

When at length they joined they were destitute of the most necessary articles of equipment. The Corps and Divisions lacked trains, hospitals and nearly the whole of the personnel of their administration. No magazines had been esta blished in advance, and the troops were to depend on the stores in the fortresses. These were in a neglected state, for in the assured expectation that the armies would be almost immediately launched into the enemy's country they had received little attention. It was of a piece with this that the French Staff-officers had been provided with maps of Germany, but not of their own country. The Ministry of War in Paris was over whelmed with claims, protestations, and expostulations, till finally it was left to the troops to help themselves as best they could. " On se debrouiller a," was the hope of the authorities.

When the Emperor arrived at Metz eight days after the declaration of war, the forces were not yet up to their strength, and even the precise whereabouts of whole bodies of troops was for the time unknown. He ordered the advance of the army, but his Marshals pro tested that its internal plight was so unsatisfactory as to make this impossible for the time. The general con viction was gradually impressing itself on the French, that instead of continuing to aim at invasion of the enemy's country, their exertions would have to be con fined to the defence of their own territory. A strong German army was reported to be assembling between Mayence and Coblentz ; and instead of reinforcements being sent forward from Metz to Strasburg, much heavier ones would have to be ordered from the Rhine to the Saar.

The determination to invade South Germany was already abandoned ; the fleet sailed, but without carrying a force to be landed on the north German coast. Germany had been surprised by the declaration of war, but she was not unprepared. That was a possibility which had been foreseen. After the withdrawal of Austria from the German connection, Prussia had taken upon itself the sole leadership, and had gradually formed closer relations with the South-German States. The idea of national unification had been revived, and found an echo in the patriotic sentiments of the entire people. The mobilization machinery of the North-German army had been elaborated from year to year, in accord with the changing conditions, by the combined exertions of the War Ministry and the General Staff. Every branch of the administration throughout the country had been kept informed of all it needed to know in this relation.

The Berlin authorities had also come to a confidential understanding with the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the South-German States on all important points. The principle was established that Prussian assistance was not to be reckoned on for the defence of any particular point, such as the Black Forest ; and that South Germany would be best protected by an offensive movement into Alsace from the middle Rhine, to be effectively supported by a large army massed there. That the Governments of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden and Hesse, to all appearance uncovering their own territories, were ready to place their contingents under the command of King William, proved their entire confidence in the Prussian leadership. This understanding enabled the preparations Avhich it entailed to be proceeded with.

The train and march tables were worked out for each body of troops, with the most minute directions as to the respective starting points, the day and hour of departure, the duration of the journey, the refreshment stations, and points of detrainment. In the locality of concentration cantonments were assigned to each Corps and Division, and magazines were established with due regard to the most convenient sites ; and thus, when the stroke of war inevitably impended, there was required only the Royal signature to start the whole mighty movement in its smooth, swift course. Nothing needed to be changed in the directions originally given ; it sufficed to follow the plans previously thought out and prepared. The aggregated mobile forces were formed into three separate Armies, on the basis of an elaborate tabular statement drawn up by the Chief of the Prussian General Staff.

The 1st Army, under the command of General von Steinmetz, consisted of, in the first instance, only the Vllth and VHIth Corps, with one Division of cavalry; 60,000 men all told. It was ordered to assemble at Wittlich and form the right wing. The Ilnd Army, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, consisted of the IIIrd, IVth, Xth, and Guard Corps, with two Divisions of cavalry. As sembling in the vicinity of Homburg and Neunkirchen, it was to form the centre, with a strength of 134,000 men. The IIIrd Army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, consisted of the Vth and Xlth Prussian, and the 1st and Ilnd Bavarian Corps, the Wurtemberg and Baden Field Divisions, with one Divi sion of cavalry. Its approximate strength was 130,000 men ; it was to constitute the left wing, and to concentrate about Landau and Rastatt.

The IXth Corps, consisting of the 18th and the Hesse Divisions, was along with the Xllth Royal Saxon Corps to form a reserve of 60,000 men in front of Mayence, for the reinforcement of the Ilnd Army to a strength of 194,000 men. The three Armies numbered together 384,000 men. There still remained the 1st, Ilnd, and Vlth Corps, numbering 100,000 men ; but they were not at first included, as railway transport for them was not available for three weeks to come. The 17th Division and certain bodies of Landwehr troops were detailed to defend the coasts. It is apparent that numerically the German armies were considerably superior to the French. Inclusive of the garrisons and reserves about one million of men and over 200,000 horses were on the ration list. On the night of July 16th the Royal order for mobilization was issued, and when his Majesty arrived in Mayence fourteen days later, he found 300,000 men assembled on the Rhine and beyond.

The plan of campaign submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, and accepted by the King, proves that officer to have had his eye fixed, from the first, upon the capture of the enemy's capital, the posses sion of which is of more importance in France than in other countries. On the way thither the hostile forces were to be driven as persistently as possible back from the fertile southern provinces into the more confined background to the north. But beyond everything the plan of campaign was based on the resolve to attack the enemy at once, wherever found, and keep the German forces always so compact that this could be done with the advantage of superior numbers. The specific dispositions for the accomplishment of those objects were left to be adopted on the spot ; the advance to the frontier was alone pre-arranged in every detail.

It is a delusion to imagine that a plan of campaign can be laid down far ahead and fulfilled with exacti tude. The first collision with the enemy creates a new situation in accordance with its result. Some things intended will have become impracticable ; others, which originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of an army can do is to form a correct estimate of the circumstances, to decide for the best for the moment, and carry out his purpose unflinchingly. The advance of the French troops to the frontier, while as yet imperfectly mobilized, which was an ex tremely hazardous measure in itself, was evidently with the intent of utilizing the temporary advantage of having a superior force at immediate disposition by taking at unawares the German armies in the act of developing their advance-movements.

But, notwithstanding, the German commanders did not deviate from their purpose of promptly effecting this first advance in front of the Rhine. The railway transport of the Corps of the Ilnd and IIIrd Armies, however, ended at the Rhine ; thence the troops marched on foot into the cantonments prepared on the left bank of the river. They moved in echelon, advancing only so many at a time as would make room for the body in rear, in the first instance to the line Bingen-Diirk heim-Landau. The farther advance towards the frontier was :_ot to be undertaken until the Divisions and Corps Avere all assembled, and provided AA-ith the necessary trains ; and then they were to march forward in a state of readiness to confront the enemy at any moment. The massing of the 1st Army appeared to be less threatened, because its route was protected by neutral territory, and Avas covered by the garrisons of Treves, Saarlouis and Saarbriicken, the German out posts on the Saar.

The 1st Army, 50,000 strong, was concentrated at Wadern, in the first days of August. The Ilnd Army, Avhich meanwhile had been increased to a strength of 194,000 men, had pushed forward its cantonments to Alsenz-Giinnstadt, at the farther base of the Haardt Mountains, a position Avhich had been thoroughly in spected by an officer of the General Staff, and where the troops might confidently aAvait an attack. The 5th and 6th cavalry Divisions Avere reconnoitring the country in front. The IIIrd Army Avas still assembling on both banks of the Rhine. The French so far had made no serious attempt at Saarbriicken ; Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel, Avith one battalion and three squadrons, Avas able successfully to withstand their petty attacks. It had meanAvhile been observed that the hostile forces were moving farther to the right, toAvards Forbach and Bitsch.

This seemed to indicate that the tAvo French Corps known to be about Belfort and Strasburg, might purpose crossing the Rhine and marching through the Black Forest. It seemed therefore all the more important that the IIIrd Army should be set in motion as early as possible, for one thing to protect the right bank of the Upper Rhine by an advance on the left ; for another, to cover the left flank of the Ilnd Army during its advance. A telegraphic order to that effect was despatched on the evening of July 30th, but the Head-quarters of the IIIrd Army wished to wait for the arrival of the Vlth Corps and of the trains. Whereupon, regardless of this delay, the Ilnd Army was put in march towards the Saar, where the French were beginning to be active. The time had gone by when they might have taken advantage of their over-hasty mobilization ; the in efficient condition of the troops had paralyzed every attempt at activity.

France had been long waiting for the news of a victory, and something had to be done to appease public impatience. So, in order to do some thing, it was resolved (as is usual in such circumstances) to undertake a reconnoissance in force, and, it may be added, with the usual result. On August 2nd three entire Army Corps were set in motion against three battalions, four squadrons, and one battery in Saarbriicken. The Emperor himself and the Prince Imperial shared in the enterprise. The IIIrd Corps advanced on Volklingen, the Vth through Saargemlind, the Ilnd on Saarbriicken. Saarbriicken was evacuated after a gallant defence and repeated counter-strokes, but the French did not press across the Saar ; convinced, possibly, that they had wasted their strength in a stroke in the air, and had nowhere gained any insight into the dispositions of the enemy.

The French military chiefs now hesitated for a long Avhile betAveen conflicting resolutions. Orders were given and recalled on the strength of mere ru mours. The left wing Avas reinforced because 40,000 Prussians Avere supposed to have marched through Treves, the Guard received contradictory orders, and the bare apparition of a small German force about Lorrach in the Black Forest occasioned the order that the Vllth Corps must remain in Alsace. Thus the French forces were straggled over the Avide area between the Nied and the Upper Rhine, while the Germans were advancing in compact masses towards the Saar. This scattered state of their forces finally induced the French leaders to divide them into two separate Armies. Marshal MacMahon took command, but only provisionally, of the 1st, Vllth, and Vth Corps, of which the latter had therefore to draw in to him from Bitsch.

The other Corps remained under Marshal Bazaine, with the exception of the Imperial Guard, the command of Avhich the Emperor reserved to himself. It had noAv become a pressing necessity to protect the left Aving of the advancing Ilnd German Army against the French forces in Alsace, and the IIIrd Army was therefore ordered to cross the frontier on August 4th, without waiting any longer for its trains. The 1st Army, forming the right wing, was in complete readi ness near Wadern and Losheim, three or four days' march nearer to the Saar than the Ilnd Army in the centre. It received the order to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Tholey and there halt for the present. For one thing, this army, the Aveakest of the three, could not be exposed single-handed to an encounter with the enemy's main force ; and for another, it was available to serve as an offensive flank in case the Ilnd Army should meet the enemy on emerging from the forest zone of the Palatinate.

In the execution of this order, the 1st Army had so extended its cantonments southward that they trenched on the line of march of the Ilnd Army, and it had to evacuate the quarters about Ottweiler in favour of the latter. This involved a difficulty, as all the Arillages to the north Avere full, and as room had also to be found for the 1st Corps, now advancing by Birkenfeld. General von Steinmetz therefore decided to inarch his whole army in the direction of Saarlouis and Saarbriicken. The Ilnd Army, on August 4th, stood assembled ready for action, andireceived orders to deploy on the farther side of the forest zone of Kaiserslautern. Combat of Weissenbueg. (August 4th.) On this day the Corps of the IIIrd Army, consisting of 128 battalions, 102 squadrons, and 80 batteries, which had been assembled in bivouac behind the Klings bach, crossed the French frontier, marching on a broad front to reach the Lauter between Weissenburg and Lauterburg.

This stream affords an exceptionally strong defensive position, but on August 4th only one weak Division and a cavalry brigade of the 1st French Corps covered this point, the main body of that Corps being still on the march towards the Palatinate. Early in the morning the Bavarians forming the right Aving encountered a lively resistance before the walls of Weissenburg, Avhich were too strong to be stormed. But very soon after the two Prussian Corps crossed the Lauter lower down. General von Bose led forward the Xlth Corps (which he commanded) with intent to turn the French right flank on the Geisberg, Avhile General A^on Kirchbach, Avith the Vth Corps (which he commanded) advanced against the enemy's front. Thirty field-guns were meanwhile massed against the railway station of Weissenburg.

It and subsequently the town were taken, after a blooily struggle. So early as ten o'clock General Douay had ordered a retreat, which was seriously threatened by the movement against the Geisburg ; and the chateau of that name, a very defensible building, Avas most obstinately defended to enable the French to retire. The Grena- Combat of Weissenburg. 13 diers of the King's Regiment No. 7 in vain as sailed it by storm, suffering heavy loss ; nor did its defenders surrender until, with the greatest difficulty, artillery had been dragged up on to the height. The French Division, Avhich had been attacked by three German Corps, effected a retreat after an obsti nate struggle, though in great disorder, haAring suffered much loss. Its gallant Commander had been killed. The Germans had to beAvail a proportionately consider able loss ; their casualties were 91 officers and 1460 men.