Account of the origin, progress and consequences of the late discontents of the army on the Madras establishment

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<fr& ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND CONSEQUENCES, OF THE LATE DISCONTENTS OF THE ARMY OK THE Madras /Establishment. Who can be wise, amaz'd, temp'rate and furious, Loyal and neutral, in a moment > Macbj rr . kmisjmu PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, IN THE STRAND. 1810, AN ACCOUNT, &c. The whole of the knowledge, which the public at present possesses, of the late unhappy occurrences on the coast of Coromandel, is derived from a few detached documents, that have been occasionally submitted through the medium of the ordinary news papers. Some official accounts, in respect to the events themselves, and the causes which produced them, might have been expected from the Court of Directors for the affairs of the East India Company, or the Commissioners of the Board of Con troul, if it had not been generally known, that authentic information, even on the most important subjects, very rarely finds its way to this country until public interest has abated, or has devised for itself other means of satisfaction.

The circumstance is notorious ; the causes of it might be easily developed, if it were our business to investigate them ; but we shall content our selves, at the present, with barely noticing the fact. u It may be supposed, without any affec tation of charity, that the constituted authorities, immediately named, have not yet received any details from India, explana tory of recent transactions. A contrary supposition would involve them in the cen sure of reserving communications to them selves, which, if disclosed, might remove the anxiety so universally felt at this moment, directly or relatively, in the bosom of every family in the United King doms. In the absence of official accounts, such private information as may be pro cured, so that it bear the mark of truth or probability about it, and communicate par ticulars hitherto unknown, cannot be un acceptable to those who take an interest in the prosperity of our Indian affairs.

It has been our endeavour to select from every accessible source, and to arrange in a con nected form, the substance of the intelligence received by respectable individuals, having relation to the objects under our observation. Whether we have succeeded in our search after materials, or have made a proper use of them, when obtained, must depend on the impression made on the reader by the perusal of the ensuing pages.

Letter I

Madras, 15th June, 1809. Dear Sir, The great discontents which have prevailed in every class of the community under the Madras Government, during the last twelve months, have, doubtless, produced numerous complaints from individuals in the various departments of society, and these complaints, passing through the several channels, formed by curiosity or private friendship, will necessarily awaken the attention of, and excite considerable interest among, that part of the community, who are connected, either by political, or personal relations, with the individuals immediately concerned. A detailed nar rative of the whole events would therefore be, to many, highly interesting. When a community are obedient, respectful, and happy, it may be presumed that ability, experience, and virtue, form a part of the characters of those who rule • but if distrust and dissatisfaction prevail ; if dissensions appear in every branch of the community ; and that the body of Societj b is unanimous only in the want of respect to those exercising the administration, it will be, by some, imagined that such administration is weak, ill-advised, and corrupt.

When such appearances exist, an investigation of the cause of them becomes interesting to every well-wisher of his country; and it is therefore desirable, that some of those, who have witnessed the whole scene, should exhibit a faithful account of the transactions to the public ; in order that posterity may benefit by the information ; and that the advisers, the instigators, and the actors, in those transactions, may obtain a due reward of praise, if the measures be justifiable, or of blame, if they shall be found to be in direct violation of every duty to their God, and to their Country. Leaving to other hands the history of the persecution of the Madras civil servants, and of the bonafdecredltorsoi: the Nabob of the Car natic, together with the details of the interference with the proceedings in the Supreme Court of Judicature, and the secret mission of a civil servant, to collect evidence ; these notes shall be confined to those occurrences, which have borne directly upon the feelings of the military branch of the service, and have produced an agitation in the minds of officers, which cannot be contemplated without the most serious alarm.

In order to convey an adequate idea of the measures which have progressively led to the present melancholy crisis, it will be necessary to review the subject from a period anterior to the departure of Lieutenant - general Macdowall from Madras. About March, 1808, Sir G. H. Barlow, Governor of Madras, formed the intention of abolishing the allowance for camp-equipage, which had heretofore been supplied on contract by officers commanding native corps. In the adoption of this measure, the opinion of General Macdowall, the Commander in Chief, was not consulted ; but as he was directed by Government to have the necessary orders prepared, Lieut. Colonel Capper, the Adjutant General, in this way, became acquainted with the circumstance. This officer had various oppor tunities of being acquainted with the general feeling of the army, and he considered it to be important, that a measure, which would materially affect the respectability of a large portion of the officers, should be introduced under circumstancesaslittle odious as possible.

With these sentiments, and with the sanction of the Commander in Chief, he waited on Sir G. Barlow, told him that the proposed measure could not fail to be highly disagreeable, and as the officers had recently suffered many serious privations, he urged the expediency of modifying the system in any way that might accomplish the views of economy entertained by the Government, and at the same time might avoid doing violence to the feelings of the officers. Sir G. Barlow said, that economy was his only object, and that if equal saving could be produced in any other way, he did not see any objection against its adoption. He gave to Colonel Capper the plan as proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, with instructions to return it with his remarks, in a few days. Colonel Capper accordingly delivered in to Sir George Barlow his remaiks, with the original plan, in four days : but orders had already been issued, directing that the regulations should be framed.

The remarks, given in by Colonel Capper, stated generally, that the plan of Lieutenant Colonel Munro had not been submitted to the Military Board, or to any of the staff officers of experience, who might be able to correct any errors that might have crept into the production of an individual. They also noticed, that Lieu tenant Colonel Munro had insinuated a charge of the most serious nature against the officers who had commanded Native bat tallions ; for Lieutenant. Colonel Munro's plan contains a passage, purporting, that the experience of six years, and an observation of the practical effects of the contract system, suggested the observation, that the contract induced the officers commanding corps to keep back the discipline of their men, in order that they might not be fit for field service ; and that the contract might therefore be more advantageous.

The remarks of Lieutenant Colonel Capper further suggested the outline of a plan of reduction, which promised an annual saving of above 1,50,000 pagodas. However, Sir G. Barlow took no notice of the remarks, and the regulations, abolishing the contract, were published. In the course of communication among the officers this subject became one of primary importance, as materially affecting the relative situations of officers commanding corps, and deeply involving the general respectability of the service. All the dis tinctions, which separated the commandant from the subordinate officer, had nearly been removed, and the convulsion among the Natives, in 1806, which was marked by the catastrophe of Veil ore, seemed to require that the situation of the European commandant should be maintained rather more distinctly than before.

The loss of that consequence, which attached to the supply of camp equipage, was therefore considered in itself to be degrading, and the discussion of the subject produced several circumstances, that tended to throw an additional degree of odium upon the mode that had been adopted for the abolition of the contract. Among those the following were the most prominent. First. That Lieutenant Colonel Munro, an officer of shorter service, and less experience, than any who had been on the gene ral staff of the Madras army for several years, had procured the Commander in Chief to recommend to Government a plan respecting the chief object of the equip ment of troops in the field ; which plan was not submitted to the Military Board, by whom all subjects of that description were, according to the orders of the Court of Directors, and the usuage of the service, to be discussed and maturely digested, previous to their coming before Government.

This plan was proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, the youngest staff officer, and approved by a Commander in Chief, who had never seen the tents of a corps pitched in India for any other purpose than that of muster; and who, consequently, could not form any judgment of his own. Secondly. That this plan, thus surrep titiously forwarded, contained an insinuation against the commanding officers of corps in the service, to which Lieutenant Colonel Munro belonged; implying, that the con duct of some, or all, who had held the contract during the six years, gave cause for the observation, that they were capable of keeping back the discipline of their men, in order to derive a pecuniary benefit. The most attentive consideration of the subject did not produce any argument to prove, that the insinuation was by any means necessary to produce the conclusion which the plan proposed ; or that the infe rence intended to be drawn, would be the less direct (as suggested by the Judge Advocate General) if a compliment instead of an accusation had been conveyed.

The argument would have been equally strong, if it had been stated, (as is the case) that, although the experience of six years of the practical effects of the contract afforded a flattering exception, still the general prin ciples that controul human actions, render it true in abstract, that, " By granting the " allowance in peace and war, for the equip " ment of native corps, while the expen " ses, incidental to that charge, are una " voidably much greater in war than in " peace, it places the interest and duty of " officers, commanding native corps, in " direct opposition to one another. It " makes it their interest, &c." But this maxim is brought in as an inference, not from general principles, but from an atten tive observation of the practical effects of the system of contract, and is expressly stated to be one of those discoveries which gave Lieutenant Colonel Munro means of forming a better judgment on the subject, than could be formed in the year 1801-2 by General Stewart or Colonel Agnew.

The insinuation does not appear to have crept in through inadvertence ; it is deliberately introduced into the body of a memoir, the composition of which is manifestly studied, and the clandestine manner in which it was transmitted to the higher authorities (never havinobeen laid before the members of the Military Board, and it having been pur posely omitted from the records of the office of the Commander in Chiefs Secretary) seemed to corroborate the opinion, that the obvious meaning of the insinuation was apparent to its author. Shortly after the promulgation of the order, abolishing the tent contract, Lieu tenant General Macdowall received letters, from almost all the officers commanding native corps, representing in terms, adapted to the feelings of each, the stigma which was considered to attach to them indivi dually, seeing that the contract had been abolished for reasons, as set forth in the plan of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, and appealing to the personal experience of the Commander in Chief, and to his authority, for redress against a charge of so serious a nature.

To these letters, Lieutenant Gene ral Macdowall returned replies, purporting, that the discussion of the subject had taken place before he came to the command — that the orders on the subject had been prepared without his previous opinion respecting them, and that, as the matter was so far advanced, he deemed it inexpedient to agitate it. This occurred about July or August, and it was then expected that Lieutenant Colonel Munro, if he did not wish the stigma to remain against the officers of the army, would have addressed the Govern ment, or the Commander in Chief, dis avowing the intention imputed to his words, and desiring that such disavowal might be published for the satisfaction of those who felt injured. But, on the contrary, no such public disavowal has ever been made, nor was explanation of any kind given, until after charges had been forwarded against Lieutenant Colonel Munro, and after a sense of mutual danger had united in the same interest, not only those who signed the charges, but all who dis approved of Lieutenant Colonel Munro's conduct.

His usurpation of the duties of every department had occasioned much complaint, and as the Government gave unqualified support to him, and communi cated only with him, the army gradually confederated together. The officers commanding corps, finding that no steps were taken to remove the obnoxious insinuations, and considering, that while they remained, an indelible disgrace was cast upon their characters, prepared charges against Lieutenant Colonel Munro, hoping, by a public investigation of the merits of the case, to establish a complete refutation of the stigma cast on them. These charges were forwarded to General Mac dowall, with a letter ; the charges having been previously signed by a large proportion of officers commanding corps, and the letter by three ; viz. Lieutenant Colonels Sentleger, Rumley, and Martin.

The charges were referred to the Judge Advocate General,* who stated objec tions against the manner and matter of the charges. These objections were, by order of the Commander in Chief, communicated to the officers who had sent in the charges. This opinion of Lieutenant Colonel Leith having been circulated with much industry all over India, it may be proper to examine it. The following remarks will shew, that his assumed principle is perfectly * Lieutenant Colonel Leith, erroneous, and consequently that his whole argument, both as it regards the law of libel and the impunity of official persons, falls to the ground. The Judge Advocate General states, " the following is under " stood to be the offensive passage : — " Thirdly, by granting the same allowance " in peace and war, &c." And again he says, " It is to be considered in what capa " city the words were spoken ; they were " given as a general principle for establish " ing certain laws for the government of a " community If these sentences, as quoted, were expressive of matter of fact, — in short, if they were true, the conclusion which Lieutenant Colonel Leith has drawn would be decisive of the question ; but the fact is otherwise.

The offensive part of Lieutenant Colo nel Munro's paper should be stated thus : " Six years experience of the practical " effects of the existing system of the " camp equipage equipment of the Native " army, has afforded means of forming a " judgment relative to its advantages and " efficiency, which were not possessed by " the persons who proposed its introduc- " tion, and an attentive examination of its " operation during that period of time, has " suggested the following observations « regarding it. " First, — The existing system, &c. " Secondly, — That system incurs an ex " pense, &c. Thirdly, — By granting the " same allowance in peace and war for the " equipment of Native corps, while the " expenses, incidental to that charge, are " unavoidably much greater in war than " in peace; it places the interest and duty " of officers, commanding Native corps, in " direct opposition to one another : it " makes it their interest that their corps " should not be in a state of efficiency fit " for field service ; and, therefore, fur " nishes strong inducements to neglect their " most important duties."

Now, notwithstanding the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, every man, capable of simple apprehension, must per ceive, that the author of the paragraph above, correctly quoted, intended to express, that the subject of this third observation, as well as of the other observations, (six in number) was discovered by him through means that could not be in the possession of the persons who proposed the introduction of the contract system in the year 1801-2. The observation is not introduced as a general maxim ; it is expressed as applicable to some practical illustration of the crimes specified, that had occurred within the six years to which the introduction alludes. And, indeed, one can hardly suppose, that the imagination of any individual would spontaneously suggest a crime so base, as that of an officer keeping back 1000 soldiers from doing the duty of his country, for the sake of a pecuniary advantage, which, under any system of corruption, could not be great.

If Lieut. -Colonels Leith and Munro conceive the officers of the army to be capable of a crime, so heinous against their country, against the character of their pro fession, and against every principle of honor and honesty, it may be considered fortunate for those gentlemen, that their intercourse, with the officers of the army, is very limited. They must, while in their company, be under perpetual apprehension of meeting the comparatively trifling crime of theft. This exposition must, in every reason able mind, remove the impressions which Colonel Leith' s opinion is of itself calculated to produce. For the palpable error, in the premises which he lays down, renders perfectly inapplicable to the present case all the very able and elaborate argument which he has introduced. This error is considered to be purely unintentional ; for, although Colonel Leith got an* addition to his income of 350 pagodas per month, about this period, it neAer has, nor can it ever be in sinuated, that he had any view towards such a reward, while discharging a duty, for which he already received a liberal monthly salary.

To impute to every man every crime that it is possible for him to commit, may, in Colonel Leith's opinion, be a good general principle ; but the public must become better versed in the law, than they are at present, before they cease to consider it as a most diabolical one. The subject of the charges against Lieutenant Colonel Munro, at, this period, excited an uncommon degree of interest among the officers of the establishment. The Commander in Chief declared his opinion, that a court martial appeared to him to be the best mode of bringing it to issue, and even recommended to Lieutenant Colo nel Munro, that he should not avoid it; c particularly as the officers of H. M. service, the engineers, and the artillery, who were all free! from any personal interest in the contract, were sufficiently numerous for the purpose.

However, Lieutenant Colonel Munro did avoid a court martial ; and it was generally believed, that he did so under a perfect assurance, that, upon the departure of General Macdowall for Europe, the Go vernment would, in a most decided man ner, evince their marked displeasure against all who had adopted the unfavourable im pressions that prevailed respecting Lieu tenant Colonel Munro. That number was evidently very extensive, for the Quarter Master General was nowuniversally shunned. It also was generally believed, that the Judge Advocate General had recommended an immediate attack on Lieutenant Colonels Sentleger, Martin, and Rumley, and had offered to guarantee their dismissal frem the service, if they were brought to trial upon charges that he would prefer, and if he were to conduct the trial.

These reports did not appear as the vague productions of idlers : thev were circulated by those who wished to intimidate the officers, that had sent in the charges ; and, though subsequent transactions authorize the belief, that there was foundation for them, whether correct, or not, they produced the effect of uniting in one interest all who imputed blame to Lieutenant Colonel Munro, and this description comprised the whole army, with very few exceptions. The union was every day strengthened by a variety of circumstances. The conduct of government towards the Commander in Chief hurt the feelings of all military men, already in a state of irritation from a sense of mutual danger. Pru dence and self-preservation oblige even the most moderate men to make common cause, when they have reason to apprehend persecution.

The heads of all the departments, except the Quarter Master General's, became cyphers, and the military patronage was thrown into a channel, through which few" could hope to benefit, unless at the expense of every feeling of pride and of honor. Lieutenant Colonel Martin, who had, a few months before, procured permission to proceed to Europe, came to Madras in December. No particular notice was taken of him by the Government, and he accordingly took his passage on board the ship Lady Jane Dundas, with the intention c of embarking on the 29th of January, as the ship was expected to sail on that day. But in the night, between the 28th and 29th of January, he received a letter from the Secretary of Government, withdrawing his leave, and prohibiting him from embark ing. For this extraordinary measure no rea son was assigned ; neither did Colonel Mar tin, or his friends, suppose that any existed, except the fulfilment of the report that had formerly been circulated, namely, that the absence of General Macdowall, who was to sail on the 29th of January, would now leave Colonel Martin, &c. at the disposal of the Judge Advocate General, and that Colonel Martin was detained to become the first victim to the general cause.

This opinion seems to be fully justified by circumstances ; but be that as it may, it was circulated through the army with astonishing rapidity, and produced a very strong sensation, as the danger, which awaited .Colonel Martin, was, before he came to the Presidency, considered to be common to all, and his detention was viewed as the signal for commencing the punishment of those, who had presumed to differ from Colonel Munro. The line was already completely drawn. Colonel Munro, supported by the Judge Advocate General and the government on one side, resolved to overcome the odium that attached to the character of an individual, and to enforce their resolution by the exemplary punishment of those officers, who, from public motives, had stood forward to check, by constitutional means, what to all appeared to be a great arrogance and presumption.

On the other side, the whole of the army, with few exceptions, determined to give every support in their power to those officers, which the circumstances of their situation would admit of. The nearer approach of danger operated to strengthen those bonds of . union that had been formed throughout the army ; and from a report, which at this time obtained general currency, and belief, namely, that Colonel Munro's party had expressed their confidence of being able to follow up the most rigorous measures towards the officers of the Company's army, in consequence of a jealousy which had for some time been judiciously promoted between them and the officers of H. M. service. No incident, during the unhappy ferment, had occasioned more irritation than this. The abominable principle produced an abhorrence towards its supposed authors, that was hardly restrained by the imperious sense of public duty.

The accounts of Colonel Martin's de tention, and the two orders of General M^dowri1. dated the 25th and2Sth January,* reached the out-stations of the army at the same time, aud vyere received with a degree of solicit : sde, commensurate to the warmth of the feelings that had already been excited. It v. as known to every part of the army, that General Macdowall had experienced the mortification of receiving almost daily insults to his character, as Commander in Chief, and representative of the principal military authority. -j- Instances occurred of troops marching,* under orders issued by Government, in communication with the Quarter Master General, without the know ledge of the Commander in Chief, until the monthly returns, or some accidental circum stances gave him notice of the movements.

On one occasiom a party of troops were embailced at Madras for foreign service, and the Commander in Chief was kept in such perfect ignorance of the object, and intention of this measure, that the first inti- * Appendix B and C. f Appendix E. matron he received of it was from a visitor, who casually mentioned, that he had in the morning seen the troops embark. This fact is stronger than a volume of metaphysical arguments, which may be set up in excuse for it. It was also generally known, that in the month of December a large force was collected, and ordered to march to the fron tiers of Travancore, without any intimation of the circumstance being communicated, either privately or officially, to the Com mander in Chief, or to the Adjutant General. This occasion was used, as an opportunity, or so deemed and understood, to fulfil the threat, that had been held out against the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, one of the three officers who had signed the letter, accompanying the charges against Lieutenant Colonel Munro.

Colonel Sentle ger was directed to remain at Trichinopoly with the strength of one troop, (including the s»ck) and the remainder of his regiment (6th cavalry) was detached along with the other troops from the Southern division ordered to Travancore : the whole placed under the command of an officer, junior to the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel Sentle ger, who, in consequence, remonstrated against the very great injustice done to his character, and applied for a court martial. On learning this, the Government appointed Colonel Sentleger to command the force ; thus anticipating the subject of his application, which necessarily met with some delay by going through the Commander in Chief. Frequent references, from the various divisions of the army to head quarters, discovered also to the Commander in Chief and to the officers of the army, that Lieu tenant Colonel Munro was in the habit of sending orders, in his own name, to the subordinate officers in the Quarter Master General's department, and requiring reports, &c. for the information of Government without any reference, or allusion, to the Commander in Chief, as the authority under which all military orders should be issued, or as the channel of communication between the Government and the army.

This extraordinary proceeding induced General Macdowall to enter on an examination of the subject, for the purpose of ascertaining the relative situations of himself and his staff, with respect to the Government. He found recorded, in the Adjutant General's office, a letter from Earl Cornwallis, Governor General and Commander in Chief in India, defining the relative situation of Adjutant General. From this letter, bearing date 1789> the following are extracts: " I have, therefore, no difficulty in " giving a decision on the subject of your " reference, that general orders to the " whole of the troops employed under the " Presidency of Fort St. George, should " be distributed from one source only." " The regular authority under which ** all military orders should be issued, is " either that of the officer who may be " appointed Commander in Chief by the " Court of Directors, or that of the Go " vernment itself, if circumstances should " render it expedient for the Board to " exercise avowedly the functions of that " officer."

" Before I conclude this letter, I must " express my wish that it should be recol " lected by the civil and military depart " ments at Madras, that the Adjutant " General of the Company's troops on " that Establishment, cannot, without the " greatest irregularity, (unless, as I have " already mentioned, the functions of the " Commander in Chief should be exercised " by the Board) have any direct commu " nication with the civil government." In the year 1800, the Commander in Chief at Madras referred to this letter, in a communication which he made to the Adju tant General, and stated as follows : " By the clear definition, by Marquis " Cornwallis, of the duty of Adjutant " General, he cannot be at liberty to act " officially, but under the immediate orders " of the officer commanding the army in " chief for the time being, who alone is the " instrument by which Government is to " govern and control the army ; much less " can you be at liberty, as Adjutant Gene " ral, so prepare, or communicate, to any " person, or publish to the army, or any " part of it, any orders, or regulations, for " the better government of the army, &c. " carrying into execution all such intentions " of Government as fall to be attended to, " or executed by officers or soldiers of the " army, which have not been previously " issued to you for such purpose, by the " officer commanding the army in chief."