From Gettysburg to the Rapidan. The Army of the Potomac, etc

Preface

. The contents of this volume were intended to form the first part of Vol. XII. of the Scribner Campaigns of the Civil War. But they were necessarily excluded from that volume by its bulk. The brevity that characterizes Volume XII. will also be found in this narrative, for I have had no time to change its character. Properly, its publi cation should have preceded that of Vol. XII. The information needed for the preparation of these chapters was fuller and more readily obtained than that required for Vol. XII. I am under obligations to the Secretary of War for making accessible to me all the papers of his Department relating to the War, and to Genl. Drum, Adjt.-Genl. ; and to Col. Scott, in charge of the preparation of the " Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies," for publication, and to the gentlemen having charge of the sub offices of the Adjt.-Genl's Department. A. A. Humphreys. June, 1883. V CONTENTS.

Chapter I. Page

General Lee retreats from Gettysburg and crosses the potomac at wllliamsport, intrenching his position to cover the cross- ING — General Meade follows in pursuit by his left flank — Finds Lee covered by intrenchments too strong to attack without careful examination ; but his reconnoissance in force is too late to prevent the crossing — while covering washington, meade forces lee to abandon the shenandoah valley, with its large food supplies, and to take position between the rappahannock and the rapidan. . i

Chapter II. The Movement To Centreville

— MEADE ADVANCES AGAINST. LEE, WHO IS FORCED TO WITHDRAW BE- YOND THE RAPIDAN 12

Chapter III

General Meade crosses the Rapidan, expecting to surprise General Lee, and encounter his forces in detail — the plan is frustrated by the failure of the third corps to unite with CONTENTS. VIII PAGE the Second and Sixth Corps on the morning of the second day at robertson's tavern — meade advances to mine run — makes dispositions to attack lee, but finding him too strongly posted and intrenched, withdraws to his former position on the rapidan. ... 49

Chapter IV

The Army of the Potomac makes a demonstration against Lee on the Rapidan to aid General Butler's proposed attack on Richmond, but only spoils its own chance for surprising Lee in his winter quarters — Kilpatrick's attempt to capture Richmond and release the prisoners of Libby and other Military Prisons. . . 71 Appendix 81 LIST OF MAPS. Gettysburg to the Rapidan. Mine Run. Virginia, between Washington and Richmond. The maps are placed at the end of this volume. FROM JULY, 1863, TO MARCH, 1864.

Chapter I

General Lee retreats from Gettysburg and crosses the Potomac at Williamsport, intrenching his position to cover the crossing — General Meade follows in pursuit by his left flank — Finds Lee covered by intrenchments too strong to attack without careful examination ; but his reconnoissance in force is too late to prevent the crossing — While covering Washington, Meade forces Lee to abandon the Shenandoah Valley, with its large food supplies, and to take position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. The evening of the 3d of July closed the fighting at Gettysburg. The 4th and part of the 5th were occupied by the Army of the Potomac in attend ing to the wounded and burying the dead. A field return of the army on the 5th of July showed that its seven infantry corps had, on an average, the numbers usually found in a division, four of them having about 5>ooo enlisted men each, the total of the seven amounting to 47,087 enlisted men armed and equipped.

On the night of the 4th of July the Army of Northern Virginia began its retreat, leaving behind a large number of its wounded. Preparations for this were begun on the night of the 3d, and con tinued during the 4th, the trains being sent forward. Their route was by way of the Fairfield Pass, through the Blue Mountains to Hagerstown and Williamsport on the Potomac, the shortest road from Gettysburg to that place, where there is a good ford except in flood-stages of the river, and in the close vicinity of which, at Falling Waters, General Lee had had a ponton bridge. A part of the trains moved by way of the Cashtown Pass, north of the Fairfield, guarded by General Imbo den's brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry. As soon in the morning of the 5th as it was as certained that Lee was in retreat, Major-General Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Corps, 11,000 strong — the strongest corps in the Army — was or dered in pursuit on the Fairfield road, taking a brigade of cavalry with him ; a brigade of cavalry was also dispatched on the Cashtown road to harass that column.

Buford, commanding the First Cavalry Division, was sent by way of Frederick to endeavor to capture or destroy the enemy's trains at Williamsport ; and Kilpatrick, commanding the Third Cavalry Division, by way of the Monterey Pass (south of the Fairfield Pass) to intercept the trains and harass the retreating force. The Fair field and Cashtown passes were known to afford naturally strong positions, and it was stated they had been intrenched so that a small force could hold a large one in check some time. This information concerning the Fairfield Pass, which is midway between Gettysburg and Hagerstown, LEE RETREATS TOWARD VIRGINIA. 3 being about 15 miles from each, was confirmed by General Sedgwick on the morning of the 6th, at which time he also reportea that the main body of the enemy was in tho vicinity of the pass, and that an engagement might be had with them.

This information led to holding the First and Third Corps ready to move to Fairfield Pass, and to suspending the flank movement through Mid dletown and South Mountain toward Hagerstown and Williamsport, which had already been com menced by the other corps of the army ; for General Meade had concluded that, considering the delays he might meet with in the passes, he could follow the enemy more rapidly by the flank route than by direct pursuit. In the afternoon General Sedg wick reported that, although the pass was a strong one, he could take it, but that it would involve delay and waste of time to endeavor to push the enemy further on that road. Accordingly, on the morning of the 7th, the whole army moved by the flank routes through the Catoctin Mountains by the Hamburg and High Knob passes, and by way of Frederick.

The heavy rains of the night of the 7th and all day of the 8th caused delays in these passes, and the army was not concentrated at Mid dletown until the morning of the 9th. By the evening of that day it had passed the Blue Ridge and halted for the night with its right at Boons boro' and its left at Rohrersville, on the roads leading to Hagerstown and to Williamsport, and from twelve to fifteen miles from them. A brigade of cavalry, supported by one of infantry, had been left to follow the enemy through the Fair field Pass. General French, with a division of 6,500 men, joined the Army of the Potomac on the 8th, and was assigned to the command of the Third Corps, his division uniting with it. In the meantime General Kilpatrick had, on the 5th, broken into and destroyed a part of the enemy's trains, and afterward had encountered their cavalry.

Late in the afternoon of the 6th he had attacked the enemy at Hagerstown, while Buford attacked at Williamsport, but both without success, the enemy's cavalry being there in force, together with some infantry. The leading troops of the Army of Northern Virginia arrived at Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 6th, the rear of the army reaching there on the morning of the 7th. The Potomac was found to be much swollen from the heavy rains that had fallen almost incessantly from the 1st of July. The Williamsport ford was too deep to be used, and the ponton bridge had been partially destroyed by a cavalry detachment sent for the purpose by General French from Frederick during the battle of Gettysburg. The Confederate Army took up a good position selected to cover these two crossing places, the right resting on the river near Downsville, and the left in the vicinity of Hagerstown, covering the road from that place to Williamsport.

Owing to the proximity of Conococheague, Creek — which, LEE CROSSES THE POTOMAC. 5 coming from the north, empties into the Potomac at Williamsport — and the stone fences of the roads leading to it from the left, through a very open and comparatively level country, a movement against that flank could be readily met. The position taken by Lee ran along a range of h'gh ground, and was strongly intrenched. The crossing-places were also suitably prepared for covering the passage of the river. Part of the ponton bridge was recovered, boats were built, and every preparation made for reestablishing the bridge as speedily as possible. The road Lee had taken from Gettysburg to Williamsport was about half the length of the route taken by the Army of the Potomac, and Lee had the advantage, always possessed by the army that withdraws under the cover of night, of gaining several hours.

On the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th of July, the cavalry of the two armies had spirited engagements that preceded the advance of the infantry columns of the Army of the Potomac. By the night of the 10th of July the Twelfth, Second, Fifth, and Third Corps of that army were across Antietam Creek, and in front of the enemy's right ; the Sixth, Eleventh, and First Corps were near Funkstown and Hagerstown on the pike from Frederick. On the nth of July all the corps were thrown forward, and sent out strong reconnoissances to feel the enemy and ascertain how he was posted ; and on the 1 2th these were continued close up to the enemy's position, and Funkstown and Hagerstown were occupied by the Sixth and Eleventh Corps. General W. F. Smith, with a force of four or five thousand men, who had just entered the service temporarily, joined the army on the nth and was posted at Boonsboro.

General Meade, with the Chief of Staff and the Chief Engineer, had examined the enemy's position and intrenchments as closely as practicable soon after coming up with him. Wherever seen, the position was naturally strong, and was strongly intrenched ; it presented no vulnerable points, but much of it was concealed from view. As already described, its flanks were secure and could not be turned. In this condition of affairs General Meade determined on the evening of the 12th to move forward the next morning, make a reconnoissance in force, supported by the whole army, feel the enemy, and attack him where weakest if it should give any promise of success. In view of an attack upon the enemy, some in trenchments had been thrown up, as, in the contin gency of a repulse and serious loss, they would be useful.

The corps commanders were sent for on the evening of the 12th to ascertain what further information they had obtained, to give them in structions for the next day's operation, and to afford them an opportunity for a full understanding with each other concerning it. But their opinion was found to be so adverse to the proposed operation, that General Meade postponed it until he could examine the position of the enemy more closely. LEE CROSSES THE POTOMAC. 7 That examination, so far as it was practicable, was made on the 13th, and the order for the reconnois sance in force to be made on the morning of the 14th was issued, and suitable preparations made for it. On advancing, it was found that the enemy had withdrawn on the night of the 13th, crossing the river chiefly on the ponton bridge, Ewell's Corps using the ford.

The advance was continued to the river, but the infantry of the Army of the Potomac was unable to overtake the enemy. Buford's and Kilpatrick's divisions of cavalry overtook and at tacked the rear guard at Falling Waters, and brought back two guns, three battle-flags and many prison ers, a large part of whom were, doubtless, stragglers. A careful survey of the intrenched position of the enemy was made, and showed that an assault upon it would have resulted disastrously to us. Nevertheless, General Meade was, at the time, greatly blamed for not attacking it,* and he was also criticised for not following Lee more rapidly, probably with the idea that by doing so Lee would have been overtaken before he had intrenched or before his intrenchments were formidable. Possibly a prompt, vigorous, direct pursuit by the whole army on the morning of the 5th of July by the Cashtown and Fairfield passes would have brought on a general engagement before the Army of Northern Virginia had taken up the position covering the crossing-places of the Potomac ; but * On the other hand, General Burnside was severely criticised for attacking at Marye Heights, Fredericksburg, where the intrenchments were not more formidable than those of Williamsport. probably it could not have reached Hagerstown be fore the evening of the 7th, and Lee would have had the few hours needed to make his intrenchments too strong for successful attack.* The other criticism adverted to was probably materially modified before the war closed.

On the 14th of July Gregg's division of cavalry was sent across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry on a reconnoissance, and on the 15th moved to Shep herdstown, in the vicinity of which on the 16th it was attacked by General Fitzhugh, Lee with his own and Chambliss's brigades supported by Jen kins's, but maintained its position. The fighting ceased at night, and Gregg fell back to Harper's Ferry unmolested, his rear leaving Shepherdstown at daylight on the 17th. On the 15th of July Lee marched to the vicinity of Bunker Hill, where his army remained several days. In view of the question of supplies, the Army of the Potomac marched on the flank of the enemy, crossing the Potomac on the 17th and 18th at Harper's Ferry and a few miles below, at Berlin, on ponton bridges, and, moving up Loudoun Valley, occupied the passes through the Blue Ridge with cavalry and infantry, while it covered the piked roads leading from the position of Lee's army through Snicker's Gap and Leesburg to Washing ton, and through Ashby's Gap and Aldie to the * A column sent through the Cashtown Pass would have opened the Fairfield Pass at once.

The distance from Gettysburg to Hagerstown by the Catoctin Pass is not less than forty miles. LEE ABANDONS THE VALLEY. 9 same point. Buford's cavalry division was sent, on the 21st, to occupy Manassas Gap and watch Chester Gap, and was followed by the Third, Fifth, and Second Corps, which entered Manassas Gap on the 23d. When Lee recrossed the Potomac he had intended to move into the well-cultivated farming region of Loudoun County, but the Shenandoah was then im passable, and these dispositions of the Army of the Potomac not only cut him off from Loudoun, but made him apprehend being cut off from the railroad to Richmond. He therefore ordered General Longstreet on the 19th to move to Culpeper Court House by way of Front Royal. Longstreet moved on the 20th, and succeeded in passing through Chester Gap without interruption on the 22d, followed by Hill, and arrived at the Court House on the 24th.

General Ewell had been sent on the 21st to capture a force under General Kelly that was protect ing the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Mar tinsburg ; but General Kelly eluded him. Follow ing Longstreet and Hill, Ewell, with Rhodes's and Johnson's divisions, passed through Front Royal on the 2jd, and entered Chester Gap, which, in its western portion, is close to and but little separated from Manassas Gap. Here, in the afternoon, he found Wright's brigade of Anderson's division, Hill's corps, which had been left to hold the pass until he (Ewell) should come up, and at once sup ported it with Rhodes's division ; for he also found there the head of the column, composed of the 1* Third, Fifth, and Second Corps advancing through the gap. A brief, spirited encounter between the advanced forces of the opposing columns ensued, the Excelsior brigade, General Spinola commanding, charging and driving its opponent back upon its main force, inflicting a severe loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

General Ewell, finding so strong a force in his front, fell back to Front Royal, and the next morn ing moved up the south fork of the Shenandoah to Luray, crossing the Blue Ridge by Thornton's Gap, and going to Madison Court House. General Early, who was following far in the rear, was obliged to move up the north fork to join Ewell. The Army of the Potomac moved to the Rap pahannock River, where it was directed from Washington to take up a threatening position, but not to advance against Lee, who was in position in the vicinity of Culpeper Court House, between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. On the 1st of August General Buford, on a re connoisance with his cavalry division, advanced to Brandy Station (between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan), driving in the enemy's cavalry, Hampton's brigade, until they were supported by infantry.

Subsequent to this, Lee withdrew his infantry to the south bank of the Rapidan — a bet ter position for his purposes than that along the Rappahannock or at Culpeper Court House. By the middle of August a considerable number of troops had been withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac for duty elsewhere. MEADE AT CULPEPER. 11 It having been ascertained * that General Long street's Corps had been withdrawn from the Army of Northern Virginia and sent West, except Pick ett's division, which remained on the south side of James River, the cavalry and the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac were thrown across the Rappahannock on the 13th of September, and drove the enemy's cavalry over the Rapidan, the crossing places of which were found to be well intrenched. The army followed, and took position about Culpeper Court House, the Second and Sixth Corps being thrown forward near the railroad crossing of the Rapidan.

Buford was sent on a reconnoisance to the upper Rapidan, and a movement by the right flank to cross that river was about being made, when it was suspended by orders from Washington, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac and sent West. * By Col. George H. Sharpe, Chief of the Secret Service Depart ment of the Army of the Potomac.

Chapter II

The movement to Centreville — Meade advances against Lee, who is forced to withdraw beyond the Rapidan. By the 9th of October some of the troops sent away in the summer were returned to the army, and a good many recruits had been sent to it, so that the subject of a movement by the right flank was resumed. On the afternoon of the 7th a signal despatch from General Stuart to General Fitzhugh Lee was read by our signal officer on Pony Mountain, direct ing him to draw three days' hard bread and bacon, which indicated a movement of some kind, sup posed to be a cavalry operation on our right ; and Prince's division of the Third Corps was ordered to James City to support Kilpatrick's cavalry divi sion. On the 8th General Sedgwick reported indi cations of a movement of the enemy on our right. On the 9th General Meade and myself rode to Cedar Mountain to have a better look at the country in the direction of a certain pass through Southwest Mountain, having in view the movement by the right flank.

Soon after we reached the mountain information was received from the Sixth Corps pickets that there was infantry among the troops moving on our right, and before we left the mountain columns of infantry, as well as calvary, 1 j were seen by us across the upper Rapidan, moving in the direction of Madison Court House. General Pleasonton, commanding the Cavalry Corps, was strongly impressed with the idea that the Confederate Government intended to abandon Virginia, and that this movement on our right was a feint, under cover of which the Army of Northern Virginia was to be withdrawn from the Rapidan to Richmond, so that the Confederate authorities could abandon that city under its protection. General Lee, in his report of this operation, states that it was made with the design of bringing on an en gagement with the Army of the Potomac, and that his " army crossed the Rapidan on the 9th instant and advanced by way of Madison Court House," that his " progress was necessarily slow, as the march •was by circuitous and concealed roads, in order to avoid the observation of the enemy."

As yet, how ever (on the evening of the 9th), the character and object of the movement were undeveloped, and in this state of uncertainty, while Kilpatrick was or dered to watch the movements of the enemy in the direction of the roads from Madison Court House to Woodville, and Thornton and Chester gaps, and Warrenton, as well as to Culpeper Court House, Buford was ordered, on the evening of the 9th, to cross the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, move up that river, and follow the enemy to Orange Court House. General Newton, commanding the First Corps, was directed to cross at Morton's Ford when Buford arrived there, and Sedgwick to cross at the fords in his front simultaneously with Newton ; and Sykes, commanding the Fifth Corps, to unite with them, and as preliminary to it, to mass his corps near them, screened from observation.

They were all informed that the movements ordered were based upon the supposition that the enemy was retiring from the Rapidan, though that might prove to be erroneous, and it might be found that he was really moving to turn our right flank. General Benham, commanding the Engineer Brigade, was ordered to Washington to procure a bridge equipage sufficient to build two bridges across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. When the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rap pahannock in September, a position in front of Culpeper Court House was selected to betaken up in the event of the Army of Northern Virginia ad vancing to Culpeper Court House to bring on an engagement. The right of this position covered the Sperryville pike ; the left extended across the direct road to James City and Madison Court House.

On the morning of the ioth the Third and Second Corps occupied the right of the position, and the three infantry corps on the Rapidan were advised to be ready to occupy the left. During the day the information received from General Kilpatrick, whose cavalry were active in forcing a disclosure of the true character of the movement, rendered it certain that Lee's army was moving on our right, either to advance directly upon Culpeper Court House or toward Warrenton, or to the Valley of the Shenandoah, by Thornton and Chester gaps. The three infantry corps on the Rapidan were therefore ordered to move up as soon as it was dark, and take position on the left of the Second Corps. But by night it was ascertained that Lee's army was moving toward Woodville, some fifteen miles north-west of Culpeper Court House, and General Davies, of Kilpatrick's cavalry division, reported that the head of the enemy's column was already on Hazel River, in the vicinity of Turkey hole Mountain.* This evinced a design on his part not to advance upon Culpeper Court House, but to turn our right, and by placing himself on our lines of communication with Washington (the Warren ton pike and the railroad), to bring on an engagement in a position selected by himself, or, perhaps, again to enter the Shenandoah Valley.

Respecting these designs, it is to be observed that General Lee states in his report that "when the movement of the army from the Rapidan com menced, General Imboden was instructed to ad vance down the valley [of the Shenandoah] and guard the gaps of the mountains on our left." This would have been an entirely useless operation on the part of General Imboden if the object of Gen eral Lee's movement was merely to bring on an en gagement at Culpeper Court House. As General Lee was already as near to Warren ton as we were, General Meade decided to move at * The advance to the vicinity of Turkey-hole Mountain may have been merely preliminary to the movement to Culpeper Court House by the Sperryville pike, but it had every appearance of a movement around our right flank. The shortest and quickest advance to the Court House for Lee's army was by the road leading directly to it from James City. once to the vicinity of that town and attack Lee while crossing the Rappahannock at the Waterloo and Sulphur Springs crossings.

The movement of the troops began from the vicinity of Culpeper Court House at 3 o'clock in the morning of the nth of October, and by night the army was across the Rappahannock, extending from Freeman's Ford to Kelly's Ford, and covering the railroad. The trains preceded the movement. The cavalry — Buford's and Kilpatrick's divisions, with one brigade of Gregg's division, under General Pleasonton, supported by the Third and Fifth Corps — covered the movement, Pleasonton having a sharp engage ment with the whole of the enemy's cavalry — Fitzhugh Lee's and Hampton's divisions, under General Stuart. To return to General Buford, who crossed the Rapidan at Germanrra Ford early on the 10th and moved up to Morton's Ford by night. General Fitzhugh Lee, with his division of cavalry and a detachment of infantry, had remained to hold the Confederate lines south of the Rapidan, while General Stuart, with Hampton's division, moved on the right flank of Lee's army.

On the morning of the nth General Buford received orders to re cross the Rapidan and move to the Rappahannock River. Crossing at Morton's Ford, he was at tacked by Lee's division, supported by the in fantry detachment, which attack he repulsed, as he did a second attack near Stevensburg, where he remained to cover the withdrawal of a wagon train, and then slowly withdrew, followed by the enemy to Brandy Station, where he joined General Pleasonton, and took part in the engagement with General Stuart. The presence of this infantry detachment with General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry gave rise, I think, to the unfortunate misapprehen sion, on the part of the commanders of the rear guard of the Army of the Potomac, that General Lee had moved his whole army to Culpeper Court House. General Lee says that his main body arrived near that place on the nth of October, but he does not specify where they halted that night, and all the information I have obtained goes to show that no part of their main infantry columns came nearer to it than the 'direct roads from Madison Court House and James City to War renton ; that is, from five to ten miles distant.

General Gregg, with his cavalry division, was sent on the nth to the vicinity of the Sulphur Springs, on the Rappahannock, to watch the roads Lee would take leading to Warrenton and to the Shenandoah Valley by Chester and Thornton gaps through Sperryville and Little Washington. It was enjoined upon him that it was informa tion of Lee's movements solely that he was sent after, and that it was important that any he obtained should be received at headquarters at the earliest moment. General Meade states that upon the arrival of the rear guard on the evening of the nth, the representations of General Pleasonton, commanding its cavalry, and General Sykes, com manding its infantry, gave him the impression that General Lee had moved to Culpeper Court House with his whole army to attack there, and that he then occupied that place.

This led to a suspension of the movement toward Warrenton the next morning. Up to midday of the I2th no information of any kind concerning the enemy had been received, and under the belief that Lee must be in his rear at Culpeper Court House, General Meade, between twelve and one o'clock in the afternoon, ordered the Fifth, Sixth, and Second Corps, with Buford's cavalry, back to that place with a view to give Lee battle. As they approached it toward sunset the cavalry had some skirmishing with small parties of the enemy's cavalry, but Lee's army was not there, nor was any information concerning it gained. Near ten o'clock at night a dispatch was received by me from General Gregg, stating that about noon he had encountered the head of Lee's army on the west bank of the Rappahannock moving to Warrenton by way of the Sulphur Springs and Waterloo crossings ; that, after a per sistent resistance (which was well managed) he had been driven across the Rappahannock River and forced back six or eight miles from the roads to Warrenton, and that Lee's army had been cross ing the river for several hours.

Its leading troops were, therefore, within a few miles of Warrenton. No sound of this engagement had reached us, although there had been heavy artillery-fire. Shortly after this information was received by General Meade, the pickets of the Third Corps farthest up the river began to be driven in. The army was at once got in motion, and by ten o'clock on the night of the 13th of October the right of the Third Corps was at Greenwich, some two miles from the Warrenton pike at Buckland Mills ; the Second Corps at Auburn ; the Fifth Corps at Cat lett's; the Sixth Corps on the railroad between Catlett's and Bristoe stations, and the First Corps near Bristoe Station. Kilpatrick's cavalry division was on the Warrenton pike at New Baltimore in contact with that of the enemy, supported, it was said, by their infantry.