Essay on Instinct, and its physical and moral relations

Front matter

ESSAY ON INSTINCT, AND ITS PHYSICAL AND MORAL RELATIONS. By THOMAS HANCOCK, M.D. For Reason raise o'er Instinct, as you can ; In this 'tis God directs, in that 'tis man. 1'opf. A man's nature runs either to herbs or weeds: therefore lit him seasonably water the one, and destroy the other. Eaiox. Ji-onDon: TOISTEU AND PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM PHILLIPS, GEORGE isARD LOMBARD STREET; SOLD ALSO BV HATCHARD AX D SON, Pl( CVDILLY ; AND BY W. & C. I AIT, EDINBURGH. 1824.

Preface

. A concise view of the following argument was communicated, about two years since., to a Literary Society. Whether it appeared novel, or the subject was in itself interesting, a request was soon after conveyed to me, that it might be given to the public. In considering the subject, it was obvious, that it not only admitted of copious illustrations, but that it involved many abstract discussions more adapted to the closet than to the Lecture-room. Accordingly, some of my leisure has since been employed in making such an arrangement of facts, illustrations, and reasonings, as, I am in duced to think*, will present a more clear and consistent view than was contained in the original discourses. I am, notwithstanding, fully aware, that, in its present state, it is not with out many imperfections ; and yet they appear Preface.

IV to be such, as it is scarcely in my power to remedy. To do justice to an argument of this nature, I need not say, that the most patient thought and undivided attention would be necessary. But the time of professional men, whilst engaged in public duties, in this city, is seldom at their own command : or if any portion be at their command, it is that which the wearied mind claims for its repose rather than for active thought. The consequence has been, that I have had many interruptions to any regular plan of study. So that, instead of being able to follow up some of my reasonings closely and methodically, I have often had to lament that they were broken ; and subsequently, found it no easy task to resume them. Being, also, under the necessity of seizing opportunities, as they offered, and of writing, often, in a hurried and desultory manner, 1 fear that I have been led occasionally into some repetitions.

Hence, it is possible, that arguments may have been left incomplete, and the same thing may have been expressed over again in different terms. However this may be, when an author comes before the public, urged by whatever motive, he must naturally expect, that his work will be esti- Preface. V mated according to what it is, and not according to contingencies, which might have tended to make it more or less perfect. In so far as illustrations from Natural His tory were necessary to my purpose, I have not scrupled to avail myself freely of the scientific labours of others — I trust, however, with pro per acknowledgments. And, though I con sider the speculations in the First Part as but secondary,, and introductory to those in the Second, I am aware, that there is a class of readers who will give them the preference.

I have therefore studied to make the former more interesting to this class, by a greater number of quotations than I should have other wise thought necessary. One object it has been my study to pursue, and that is, the inculcation in the minds of my younger frieuds, (to whom principally the out line was addressed) of, what I consider, right opinions, or at least, such opinions as agree with the fundamental principles of Revealed Religion. Aud as an inquiry of this nature could not well be prosecuted without some thing of what is called metaphysical discussion, wherever I have had occasion to tread upon this uncertain ground, I have endeavoured to Preface. VI clear my path by using phrases easily under stood, and avoiding questions too intricate, and subtleties too refined. As I do not wish to anticipate any of my conclusions, I forbear to enter into a general view of the principles it is my object to support : For believing the subject to be con nected in a chain of reasoning, however loosely in some parts, I have the less reluctance in re questing my reader to follow it, with what patience he may be able to exercise, to the end.

I do not flatter myself that the view I have taken is original ; yet I think it, on the whole, important. Neither do I flatter myself, that the inferences I have drawn will be g-enerallv re ceived; though I believe them to be founded in Truth. For, some of them seem to be op posed to great authorities ; but I have satis faction in thinking that they are not opposed to the greater authority of Scripture. In reference therefore to the authors with whom I differ — and I am not alone in differing from them — I can feelingly apply the often quoted saying, — Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, sed magis arnica Veritas. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Part I. Of The Physical Relations Of Instinct

PAGE Introductory Remarks 1 CHAP. I. General view of different writers opinions ON THE SUBJECT: THE ARRANGE- MENT proposed. Instinct contrasted with Reason 7 Sect 1. General view of different writers opinions. 8ec ib. 2. Instinct contrasted with Reason 14 CHAP. II. Examples of Instinct in the works of animal8, and the care of their young, and choice of food remarks on the adaptation of structure to climate, and of habit and disposition to struc- TURE 17 Sect. 1. Examples of Instinct in the works of Animals and care of their young . . . ib. 2. Of Instinct in Animals in their choice of food Table of Contents. VIII PAGE Sect. 3. Os the adaptation of structure lo climate "' 4. Adaptation of Habit and Disposition to structure, 8?c 32 CHAP. III. Of the Instincts in Man 40 CHAP. IV. Of certain actions in the lower animals, in some degree distinguishable from the operation of Instinct 52 Sect.

I. Of the effects of Human Intercourse on the lower Animals ib. 2. Of the perfection of the natural Senses, as distinguishable from Instinct ... . 63 3. Of the migrations of Animals 70 4. Of the power of Reasoning in Animals 77 CHAP. V. Of the accommodating power of Instinct, and inferences from the facts 102 CHAP. VI. Of THE ASCENDING SCALE OF INSTINCTIVE OR Unconscious Motions — comprising inanimate, VEGETABLE, AND ANIMAL MO- TIONS 112 Sect. 1. Of inanimate and vegetable motions. . . ib. 2. Of animal motions 123 3. Of the connected chain of functions in vegetable, muscular, and nervous systems 131 CHAP. VII. On the Zoological Lectures of Wm. Lawrence, F.R.S Table os Contents. IX CHAP. VIII. PAGE Recapitulation — the perfection of Instinct IN ITS PHYSICAL OPERATIONS, AND THE IMPERFECTION OF HUMAN REASON. . . . 162 Sect. 1.

Recapitulation ib- 2. Perfection os Instinct 168 3. Imperfection of Reason 173 CHAP. IX. Of Reason, and the extremes of opinion respecting it its extent or uses, and limitation or insufficiency 177 Sect. 1. Of Reason, and the extremes of opinion respecting it ib. 2. Uses of Reason ISO 3. Limitation of Reason 182

Part II Of The Moral Relations Of Instinct

CHAP. I. Of the opinions of Philosophers on the subject of a divine intelligence in the Human Mind 199 Sect. I. Authorities in support of the view now taken w. 2. Of the testimonies in favour of such a principle analogous to Instinct and superior to Reason 205 3 On the enlarged use of the word Reason Table os Contents. X CHAP. II. page Of the nature of the Mental Faculties, and the primary elements of reason- ING and Moral Feeling 228 Sect. 1. Of the nature of the Mental Faculties, ib. 2. Of the primary elements of Reasoning 235 3. Of the primary elements of Moral Feeling 244 CHAP. III. On the System of Locke 256 CHAP. IV. Of the analogy between Mental Principles and Seeds, and between Education and Culture 277 Sect. 1. Of the analogy between Mental Principles and Seeds ib. 2. Of the office and effect of Education compared with Culture 290 3.

Illustrations of the same subject 29H CHAP. V. Of First Principles and Innate Ideas ... 311 CHAP. VI. Of the Seeds of Vice and Virtue, and of Benevolence and Self-love 333 Sect. 1. Of the Seeds of Vice ib. 2. Of the Seed of Virtue 339 3. Of Benevolence and Self-Love 359 CHAP. VII. Of Conscience and its significations — including remarks on the reasonings of Locke on Innate Moral Principles 364 Sect. 1. Of its comprehensive signification ib. 2. Of its limited signification Table ps Contents. XI PAGE Sect. 3. On the reasonings of Locke on Innate Moral Principles 3S3 4. Cotiscience always includes the notion of a Moral Principle 396 CHAP. VIII. Of the true source of Moral Sentiments, and of the various opinions respecting a Moral Principle 407 Sect. 1. Of Moral Feeling, the source of Truth ib. 2.

Moral Truth is not unfolded with universal clearness 415 3. Of the Diversity of Religious Notions among mankind 419 4. Illustrations of the foregoing reasonings 429 5. Of the various opinions concerning the nature of the Moral Principle 441 CHAP. IX. Of the Divine Spirit in the Soul 450 Sect. 1 . Introductory re-marks to. 2. Of the Seed of Divine Truth 453 3. Of its cultivation 461 4. This influence is not under human confront 472 5. Of Wisdom, Divine and Human, F'dlh, Enthusiasm, Revelation 479 6. Of Christ 5J1

PART I. OF THE PHYSICAL RELATIONS OF INSTINCT.

Man is especially distinguished from the lower animals by the consciousness of a Supreme Ruler of the world, and by the dominion he is enabled to exercise over the earth and its productions. He is distin guished also by the restless and insatiable desire of knowledge, the capacity to attain it, and the power to perpetuate it from one generation to another. But, notwithstanding so wide a barrier separates him from the brute, yet the national and intellectual varieties among mankind are so great as, on a superficial view, almost to constitute specific distinctions ; and to establish as near an affinity, in point of intelli gence, between the lowest of these and the most sa gacious brute, as between the most enlightened and ignorant of the human family. As one man differs so widely from another, we may also distinguish the wise man from the simple by the consistency of his conduct, and by the use he is accustomed to make of his ac quired knowledge.

Now, the departments of human knowledge are various like the motives which actuate different persons in the pursuit. Some individuals have a natural in- A clination to one subject of inquiry, and some to another. Some seek after knowledge for gain ; some for estimation in the world ; some from a restless and unprofitable spirit of curiosity without limit, and almost without object ; some that they may become expert in disputation ; some from pride and ostenta tion ; few, as is well observed by Lord Bacon, that they may employ the gift of reason for the benefit of the human family, and for the glory of Him who gave it. " As if," adds the same illustrious author, in that strong and figurative language for which his writings are so remarkable, adapting his metaphor to the different motives and characters of men — " as if there was sought in knowledge a couch whereon to rest a searching and restless spirit ; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect ; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon ; or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention ; or a shop for profit and sale ; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator, and the relief of man's estate."* But, as knowledge is thus various, and may be re ceived into minds so variously constituted and affected ; how important is it that we duly consider the objects of intellectual improvement we may individually pro pose to ourselves, and the motives by which we are actuated in the search !

We may admit the saying of Locke, that " this life is a scene of vanity," and perhaps may bring our- * Advancement of Learning, book, i. selves to comprehend the acknowledgment of Grotius, one of the most illustrious scholars of his age, and a man of exemplary piety, that "he had consumed much of his life in laboriously doing nothing." — We may have dipped so far into philosophy as to be persuaded of this truth, that the greatest attainments in natural knowledge are immeasureably insignificant, when compared with the proper business of life ; and unspeakably vain, when inflating the proud mind to search into the counsels of omniscience We may have been instructed, also, by the experience of the wisest and best, how little, after all our inquiries, can be known. Yet the advances which have been made in the sciences, strictly so called, viewed abstractedly as evidences of the unassisted powers of Man, of his superiority to the Brute, and his relation to some higher sphere of existence, while they ennoble human genius, urge us to lament its misapplication.

But even in the sciences, (where demonstration, as in Mathematics, and analysis and synthesis, as in Chemistry, prove the proposition and the law,) we must still come to something which is not revealed, — some link in the chain of natural causes, where the philosophic inquirer must rest, and infer an agency whose mode of working is unknown. When Sir Isaac Newton had discovered that it was by the law of gravitation the planetary motions were to be explained, he doubtless saw it would be a vain speculation to inquire in what manner this gravitating principle or law acted; whether by an electrical a æther, or impalpable aerial fluid, or by some other subtile medium. And, in the same way, we may reasonably conclude that it will ever be fruitless to inquire whether, in the human body, a nervous fluid or a mere vibration convevs the impulse of the will to the voluntary muscles, or the impression of the senses to the brain.

The profoundest researches of the physiologist cannot explain how a man performs the simple act of raising his arm, nor how the eye and ear transmit their respective sensations to the mind. In every department of human knowledge, there fore, there is a point where inquiry must rest; and where it becomes the true philosopher to contemplate in awful humility the wonders of Almighty Power, adoring in silent reverence that infinite wisdom, which has only unlocked, as it were, to man, the ves tibule of the great Temple, that contains thousands of Nature's secrets yet unopened, and thousands more, perhaps, never to be revealed. Now, in this view, it must be considered highly incumbent upon all, who prosecute physical or moral inquiries, to direct them in the plain and simple path of observation, which may lead to profitable results; and equally incumbent to avoid the giddy heights of speculation, where the mind is too much disposed to look down upon the laborious inquirer, and to in dulge in vain conceits of superior intelligence.

For, hence arise the evils of a wild untutored imagination. that roving faculty of the mind, which is to be found any where but at home. It is ready to grasp at the notions of others, calling them its own ; and to grasp at its own phantoms, calling them realities. How necessary that it should be bridled, and brought within the limits of sober and legitimate investi gation ! We may take it for granted, that knowledge, which is so readily gleaned from others, does not properly constitute mental improvement. The cultivation ofthe mind, in order that it may bring forth good fruit, requires a steady persevering labour. It is true, indeed, that some soils, from a kind of native luxuriance, produce abundantly, with but little out ward aid: but, in these as much labour is often re quired to check an extravagant growth, and to root up the weed, as in ground which is less fertile, to manure and water in its season.

Knowledge must be conveyed to the mind, as food to the body, if it be intended for profit, by healthy digestion and assimilation of the materials to our actual substance. It is by reflection and meditation upon the truths afforded by others, that we make them our own ; and this observation applies to our moral and religious, as it does to our intellectual, advancement. Hence it is that the man who can boast little else than a capacious memory, though his mind may be stored with the records of past ages, is often ex tremely deficient in the faculty of Reason, and in common discretion, when placed in the embarrassing concerns of life : while he who may want this prompt recollection of the past, but is notwithstanding pos sessed of a sound discriminating judgment, and can recur in every emergency to a counsellor placed in his own bosom, — who troubles himself little in con sidering how others would act in similar circum stances, will frequently extricate himself from diffi culties, by which the other would be overwhelmed.

So much, therefore, does it behove every one to labour for his own supplies, whether physical or moral; and so great is the distinction between that which is received from without, and that which is produced within, — between the observations of others and our own, — between that which makes the heart better, and that which only fills the head, — in a word, between wisdom and knowledge. Cowper has very accurately marked the distinction. " Knowledge and wisdom, far from being one, Have ofttimes no connection. Knowledge dwells In heads replete with thoughts of other men, Wisdom in minds attentive to their own. Knowledge, a rude unprofitable mass, .. The mere material with which Wisdom builds, 'Till smooth'd and squared and fitted to its place, Does but encumber whom it seems to enrich : Knowledge is proud that he has learned so much, Wisdom is humble that he knows no more." Task, Book 6.

Chapter I. General View Of Different Writers Opinions On The Subject

: THE ARRANGE- MENT PROPOSED. INSTINCT CONTRASTED WITH REASON. -~ »♦» Sfct. I. General view of different Writers opinions on the Subject : the Arrangement proposed. In surveying the diversified classes of phenomena, which are presented to the view in the wide field of Natural History, none appear more interesting than the acts ofthe Brute creation. It is natural therefore to compare these acts, which have generally been supposed to result from a peculiar principle, named Instinct, with the operations of Human Reason. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that very con fused notions exist upon this subject, not only in the works ofthe learned, but in the minds of the multitude; some referring the actions of the Brute exclusively to Instinct, and the actions of Man exclusively to Reason ; some considering the boundaries of these principles perfectly distinct, yet too nice to be ascer tained; and others, of no mean authority, asserting, that there is no difference between them, — one set General view of the Subject. 8 of writers classing Reason among the Instincts, and another set maintaining that every act of the lower animals is an act of Reason, such, in kind, as it is exhibited in Man.

Now, we may observe, that ob scurity, in a greater or less degree, has been cast over every subject, when men have stepped beyond the proper business of philosophy in explaining causes or hidden operations, and establishing specific distinctions often depending on words, instead of classifying or arranging facts. Without pretend ing that I shall be able to throw any new light upon so intricate a subject, in which, it is obvious, there is a great deal that is never likely to be understood ; I shall endeavour to distinguish and classify the phenomena in question, according to the most im partial view I may be qualified to take, and the best means of information within my reach. The arrangement, therefore, which I propose to myself in the elucidation of the subject, will comprise the following considerations : viz. 1st. How far Rea son appears to differ from Instinct. 2ndly.

How far the actions of some Brutes may be entitled to the appellation of Reasoning. And 3rdly, how far the perfect Instinct ofthe lower animals bears an analogy to that most exalted principle in Man, by which we are taught to believe, that his nature is capable of being dignified. I shall, therefore, bring forward some facts and illustrations from Natural History, in order to show, that there is a power which operates in the physical economy of brute animals with consummate wisdom ; not only adapting the structure to their peculiar habits, and to the climate, element, and situation in which they are designed to live; but directing them with wonderful precision in the choice of food, and in the care and preserva tion of their offspring, by many complicated la bours. I shall endeavour to point out the difference in effect, between this power and the variable and inconstant operations of human Reason ; and shall consider the evidence we have of Reasoning in the lower animals, and of Instinct in Man.

In looking downwards from man, and surveying what may be called his physical relation to the in ferior works of creation, I shall notice the analogy that appears to subsist between the operations of instinct, and the laws of brute and organized matter, exhibited in gravitation and in the unconscious motions of vegetable and animal life. We shall thus have grounds for considering, how far man seems to an swer the end and design of his existence, as a rational being, compared with the inferior orders of animated nature, which are accounted irrational or governed by instinct. But in looking upwards from man, and surveying his higher and moral, or, as they may be termed, his spiritual relations, we shall consider, if Reason is so inadequate to procure the present happiness of man, and preserve order and harmony in the world, what means and power it possesses to procure an intimate knowledge of the Creator, and the final reward of eternal happiness.

If it should indeed be found to be insufficient, it might be fair to inquire what principle it is, by whose operation and influence man is brought to a nearer acquaintance with his Maker, instructed in his duties, and enabled to perform them. For most of the facts I am to produce, relative to the instinct of animals, I shall be indebted to several writers on Natural History and Physiology. Des Cartes, with some other philosophers, imagined that all the actions of the lower animals might be explained by the simple laws of mechanism. Hence he considers them as machines wholly devoid of life and sentiment, like a clock or orrery, but so curious ly constructed by the Creator, that the mere impres sions of light, sound, and other external agents on their organs of sense, produced a series of motions in them, and caused them to execute those various operations which had before been ascribed to an internal principle of life.

Buffon partly adopts the opinion of Des Cartes, but admits the brute animals to have life, and the faculty of distinguishing between pleasure and pain, together with a strong inclination to the one, and aversion to the other. By these inclinations and aver sions he undertakes to account for all, even the most striking operations of animals. Other philosophers, as Helvetius and Darwin, have endeavoured to show that most of the actions of brutes were performed by a process of reasoning analogous to that in man.* * Rees Cyclop. Art. Instinct. In a new system of Natural History of Animals, published at Edinburgh in 1791, it is laid down that " the laws of analogical reasoning do not justify the opinion, that the brutes act, on any occasion, absolutely without design." And, on the other hand, it has been maintained by Smellie, in his Philosophy of Natural History; " that between reason and in stinct there is no difference, and that the reasoning faculty is itself the necessary result of instinct."

Some have considered that a material structure, or simple arrangement of organs, endowed with the principle of life, or living organic structures possessing vital properties, give rise to all the phenomena of which we see the brutes to be capable; and that it is not necessary to have recourse to a principle which they affirm to be mysterious and inexplicable like that of Instinct : and others, as I before stated, in attempting to raise the dignity of human nature far above the brute, without giving themselves any trouble to analyse their respective actions, have thought to establish the grand distinction, by assign ing exclusively to man the faculty of Reason, and ex clusively to the brute, the blind or unerring principle of Instinct. We may perhaps find that all these philosophers have pushed their conclusions too far, by attempting to generalise too much ; and while we are almost compelled to smile at some of their notions, we cannot but believe that some of them erred in seeking to mark distinctions between the structure and nature ofthe human and the brute animal, without knowing much, if any thing, more, either of one or the other, than was to be learned by their respective actions.

For, the principle in matter by which a stone falls to the ground, and the principle in mind, by which a living organized intelligent being thinks and acts, as in man, are equally unknown. Consequently, all the principles or modifications of action, between these extremes, in minerals, vegetables, insects, reptiles, fishes, birds and beasts, are entirely hidden from our keenest search. So that Gravitation, Crystallization, Vegetation, Irritability, Sensation, Instinct, &c. are words used to denote certain effects, the causes of which we are ignorant. It is therefore vain to agitate metaphysical questions about diversities or similitudes, which depend more upon our own words than upon any clear knowledge we can have ofthe things we define ; as, whether brutes differ from man in degree or in kind, whether there be an essential distinction between the rational and animal nature, and whether a being capable of subduing all, is only raised a single step above one or two ofthe higher species of brutes ; — inquiries better fitted for scholastic exercises, (about which much may be said, and but little can be known,) than for the improvement of knowledge.

The observations of Smellie on this point, though he has drawn conclusions on others which can scarcely be admitted, are worth our attention. " It cannot," says he, "escape observation that all the sagacity and laborious industry exerted in the various instances of animal architecture, have one uniform tendency. They are all designed for the multiplication, protection, and nourishment of off spring. But many of them are so artful, and require such persevering labour, that the human mind is be wildered when it attempts to account for them. Recourse has been had by Des Cartes, Buffon, and other philosophers, to conformation of body and mechanical impulse. Their reasonings, however, though often ingenious, involve the subject in tenfold obscurity. We can hardly suppose that the animals actually foresee what is to happen, because, at first, they have not had even the aid of experience; and particularly in some of the insect tribes the parents are dead, before the young are produced.

Pure in stincts of this kind, therefore, must be referred to another source. In a chain of reasoning concerning the operations of nature, such is the constitution of our minds, that we are under the necessity of resort ing to an ultimate cause. What that cause is, it is the highest presumption in man to define. But, though we must for ever remain ignorant of the cause, we are enabled to trace, and even to under stand, partially, some of the effects ; and from these effects we perceive the most consummate wisdom, the most elegant and perfect contrivances, to accomplish the multifarious and wonderful intentions of nature. In contemplating the operations of animals, from man down to the seemingly most contemptible insect, Instinct contrasted with Reason. we are necessarily compelled to refer them to pure instinct, or original qualities of mind, variegated by nature according as the necessities, preservation, and continuation of the different species require.

Let any man try to proceed a step farther, and, however he may deceive himself, and flatter his own vanity, he must find at last that he is clouded in obscurity, and that men who have a more correct and unpreju diced mode of thinking, will brand him with absurdity, and acting in direct opposition to the constitution and frame ofthe human mind." * Sect. II. Instinct contrasted with Reason. On surveying the actions of Men and Brutes, there seem to be sufficient logical grounds for making two grand distinctions ; the one, comprising those actions which appear to be done blindly or without premedi tation and without experience ; and the other, those which are done with forethought by combining means to accomplish ends, which are often the result of individual or social experience and instruction.

These general facts seem to be so obvious, that they lead us at once to call them by different names, and to conclude that they arise from different pro- * See Philos. of Nat. Hist. vol. ii. p. 118. Instinct contrasted with Reason. 15 pensities or faculties : and the words Instinct and Reason come up as nearly to the view of the case as any others we could employ. Hence, while Reason acts with intelligence and design, (variably indeed and inconstantly,) profiting by experience, comparing motives, balancing probabilities, looking forward to the future and adapting itself to every change of circumstance; Instinct operates with uniformity in all individuals ofthe same species, and performs its office with unerring certainty, prior to all experience. It is proper for me here to remark, that the word Reason is used in senses which are extremely dif ferent ; sometimes to express the whole of those powers which elevate man above the brutes, and constitute what is called his rational nature; more especially, perhaps, his intellectual powers ; and sometimes to express the power of deduction or argu mentation.