The Campaign of 1870-71. Operations of the German Engineers and 'Technical Troops' during the Franco-German War of 1870-71. ... Translated from the German by ... G. Graham. ... With ... Maps

Front matter

OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN ENGINEERS AND "TECHNICAL TROOPS" DURING THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870-71. LIST OF MILITARY WORKS PUBLISHED BY HENRY S. KING & CO. THE OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST ARMY UNDER GEN. VON MANTEUFFEL. By Col. Count H. von Wartensleben. Trans. by Col. C. H. von Wright, gs. THE OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST ARMY UNDER GEN. VON GOEBEN. By Major von Schell. Trans. by Col. C. H. von Wright. Four Maps. gs. THE OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST ARMY UNDER GEN. VON STEINMETZ. By Major von Schell. Trans. by Captain E. O. Hollist. ios. 6d. THE OPERATIONS OF THE BAVARIAN ARMY CORPS. By Capt. Hugo Helvig. Trans. by Capt. G. S. Schwabe. With 5 large Maps. 2 vols. 24J. THE OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMIES IN FRANCE, FROM SEDAN TO THE END OF THE WAR OF 1870-71. With large Official Map. By Major W. Blume. Trans. by Major E. M. Jones, gs. jtt THE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH ARMY IN JANUARY !Æb FEBRUARY, 1871.

By Count H. VON Wartensleben. Trans. by Col. CiK^oN Wright. 6s. * THE GERMAN ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLES NEAR METZ. By Capt. Hoffbauer. Trans. by Capt. E. O. Hollist. Map and Plans. 21s. THE ARMY OF THE NORTH-GERMAN CONFEDERATION. A Brief Description of its Organization. By a Prussian General. Trans. by Col. Edward Newdigate. 5*. TACTICAL DEDUCTIONS FROM THE WAR OF 1870-71. By Capt. A. von Boguslawski. Second Edition. Trans. Jpj Col. Lumley Graham, ys. HASTY INTRENCHMENTS. By Col.' A. Brialmont. Trans. by Lieut. A. Empson, R.A. 9 Plates. 6s. ' ■' *j STUDIES IN LEADING TROOPS. By Col. von Verdy Du Vernois. Trans. by Lieut. H. J. T. Hildyard. ys. CAVALRY FIELD DUTY. By Maj. -Gen. von Mirus. Trans. by Capt. F. S. Russell. Cloth limp. ys. 6d. RUSSIA'S ADVANCE EASTWARD. Based on the Official Reports of Lieut. Hugo Stumm.

Trans. by Capt. C. E. H. Vincent. With Map. 6s. THE VOLUNTEER, THE MILITIAMAN, AND THE REGULAR SOLDIER. By a Public School Boy. y. AUSTRIAN CAVALRY EXERCISE. From an Abridged Edition compiled by Capt. Illia Woinovits, on the Tactical Regulations of the Austrian Army, prefaced by a General Sketch of the Organization, &c, of the Cavalry. Trans. by Capt. W. S. Cooke. ys. VICTORIES AND DEFEATS. An Attempt to explain the Causes which have led to them. By Col. R. P. Anderson, i+j. THE FRONTAL ATTACK OF INFANTRY. By Capt. Laymann. Trans. by Col. Edward Newdigate. Limp cloth. 2s. 6d. ELEMENTARY MILITARY GEOGRAPHY, RECONNOITRING, AND SKETCHING. By Lieut. C E. H. Vincent, zs. 6d. STUDIES IN THE NEW INFANTRY TACTICS. Parts I. and II. By Maj. W. von Scherff. Trans. by Col. Lumley Graham, ys. 6d. HENRY S. KING & Co.. 65 Cornhill, and 12 Paternoster Row, London.

Part I

page Introduction. — Organization of the German Corps of Engineers, and " Technical Troops." . . . i Chap. I. — Operations of the First and Second Armies up to the Passage across the Moselle. The First Army. ...... 5 Battle of Courcelles on the 14th of August. ... 9 Reconnaissance of Thionville. .... 9 Bombardment of the East Forts of Metz on the 17 th of August. 12 The Second Army. . . . . . .12 Chap. II. — Passage of the Moselle. At Pont-a-Mousson. . . . . . .17 At Champey (3s miles north of Pont-a-Mousson). . . 17 At La Lobe (2^ miles below Champey). . . . 18 At the Farm of Ponce" (2000 paces southward of Champey). iS At La Lobe Poste. . . . . . .19 At Arry. . . . • . . . 19 At Corny. . . . . . . .19 Chap. III. — Operations on the Left Bank of the Moselle. Battle of Mars-la-Tour. . . . . .21 Expedition against Toul. ..... 23 The Battle of Gravelotte. - . . . . - 25 Chap. IV. — Operations of the Army of the Meuse up to the Battle of Sedan. . . . • .29 The iv.

Army Corps. . . • ■ ■ 31 Chap. V. — Operations of the Third Army up to the Battle of Sedan. „..•■•• 33 The Battle of Weissenburg. . . . ■ -35 Battle of Woerth. . . • • • ■ 36 Advance on the Vosges Mountains. . Contents. VI PAGE Second Bombardment of Phalsburg. 43 Second Bombardment of Toul. . ' . • ■ 44 Advance from the Moselle on Sedan. 45 Chap. VI. — The Battle of Sedan. .... 49 The Army of the Meuse. . _ . . • • 49 The Third Army. . . . . . .50 Capitulation of Sedan, and Surrender of the Army and Fortress. 5 1 Chap. VII. — Advance of the Third Army and of the Army of the Meuse up to the Investment of Paris. . . 53 The Army of the Meuse. . . . . . • 55 The Third Army. . ... . . .56

Part II. Investment Of Metz

Chap. I. — General Description of the Position and Ground. 6i General Description of the Fortifications. The Town and Advanced Works. . . . . 65 On the Left Bank of the Moselle. . . . 67 On the Right Bank of the Moselle. ... 67 Works thrown up by the French, and Positions of the Army of the Rhine. ...... 70 Chap. II. — General Description of the Investment. . 72 First Period of the Investment. . . . . 73 On the Left Bank of the Moselle. . . . .78 On the Right Bank of the Moselle. . . . 78 Second Period of the Investment. .... 90 Third Period of the Investment. . . . . 9S Chap. III. — Detail of the Works of the Investment. . 105 I. The Position from the Moselle at Vaux to the Ravine of Chatel. Description of the Ground. . . . .105 Occupation by the Troops. . . . . 107 Defensive Works. . . . . . .107 II.

Position from the Ravine of Chatel to Norroy. Description of the Ground. . . . T T -, Occupation. . . .. .114 Works of Defence. . . . . .114 Position on the Plateau Amanvillers-Plappeville. 114 Position from Saulny to Norroy. . . . . 1 1 c On the Plateau Plappeville-Amanvillers. . . T 1 7 Between Saulny and Norroy. . . . ITg Contents. VII PAGE III. Position at Feves, Seme'court, Maizieres, and Amelange. Description of the Ground. Occupation. ..... Defences. ii9 1 19 120 120 IV. The Line from Malroy to Charly. . V. From Failly to Servigny and Montoy. Description of the Positions. 124 124 124 Position of Malroy-Charly. Occupation. Defensive Works. i25 12S Position of Failly-Servigny- Montoy. Occupation. Works of Defence. 128 128 VI. Position from Coincy to Ars-Laquenexy. VII. From Mercy-le-Haut to Marly. i3i J31 Description of the Ground. i3i Position on the Line from Coincy to Ars-Laquenexy.

Occupation. ..... Works of Defence. .... 132 132 Position from Mercy-le-Haut to Marly. Occupation. . Works of Defence. 137 138 VIII. Position on the Left Bank of the Seille. Description of the Ground. Occupation. Works of Defence. 142 142 I43 143 Final Remarks. 148 Summary showing the Positions occupied by the Army investing Metz in the middle of October 1870. 153

Part III. Operations Of The First Army From The Capitu- Lation Of

METZ TO THE ARMISTICE. Chap. I. — Sieges and Bombardments of the Ardennes Fortresses. I. Siege of Thionville. General Description. . . . . .161 Events prior to the Siege. . . . .163 The Siege. . . . . . -165 Tabular Statement of Batteries constructed during the Siege. Contents. VIII I'AGE II. Siege of Montmedy. General Position and State of the Defences. Events prior to the Siege. 173 174 The Siege. ...-•• Tabular Statement of Batteries constructed during the Siege. i75 i So III. Siege of Mezieres. i8i General Position and Description of Ground. Incidents prior to the Siege. 1 83 Siege Operations. . Tabular Statement of Batteries constructed during the Siege. 189 194 IV. Coup-de-Main against Rocroi. i95 Chap. II. — Operations of the First Army in the north-west of France. I. Siege of Verdun.

General Description. Incidents prior to the Siege. Preparations for the Siege. i99 20I 203 II. Siege of La Fere. General Description of the Fortress. The Siege. 206 207 Tabular Statement of Batteries constructed during the Siege. III. Operations of the First Army prior to the Siege of Rouen. IV. The Taking of Rouen, and Occupation of the Town till the Conclusion of Peace. 2IO 211 The Right Bank of the Seine. The Left Bank of the Seine. 2l6 217 V. Measures for the Protection of Rouen on the Left Bank of the River. ...... 222 VI. Expeditions on the Right Bank of the Seine. 228 VII. Operations of the First Army on the Somme from the beginning of December till the end of the Campaign. Battle of Hallue. 230 Bombardment of Peronne. General Description of the Fortress. Investment and Bombardment of Peronne. 234 235 Battle of Bapaume. 238 Defences of the line of the Somme, and Final Operations of the First Army. 240 Final Remarks. 244 Appendix. — Summary of the Detachments of Technical Troops embodied during the Campaign of 1870-71. THE OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN ENGINEERS AND 'TECHNICAL TROOPS.'*

Introduction

. ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND 'TECHNICAL TROOPS.' THE Prussian Corps of Engineers in July 1870 consisted altogether of about 440 officers, some of whom were appointed to the Staff, Fortifications, Military Schools, etc., and some to service with the Pioneer battalions. On a general average each officer got a change of employment every three or four years. The existing 12 Pioneer battalions were so organized, that each battalion in time of peace consisted of four companies, viz. : — 1 Pontoon-company, 2 Sapper-companies, and 1 Miner-company, in which the technical instruction was carried on with a view to their special duties, and accordingly the ist company was principally exercised in forming military bridges, while the other three companies were especially instructed in siege-works, so that only a short time could be devoted to the general duties of Pioneers and Miners.

Besides these 12 Pioneer battalions a cadre was maintained on the peace establishment for the Torpedo detachment. On the order to mobilize, the officers of the Engineer corps, as well as the Landwehr Pioneer officers, were distributed among * There is no equivalent in the English service for technische Truppen. These troops are trained in technical Engineer duties, although incorporated with the battalions of the Guards, Line, and Landwehr. — (Translator s Note.) A the different armies and bodies of troops, and those detachments of technical troops, which are given more in detail in the Appendix, were mobilized. The Pioneer battalion of the Guards furnished 3 Field companies, besides the Reserve company, and together with No. 4 Pioneer battalion made up the 12 Telegraph divisions. Each line battalion furnished 1 reserve company as well as 3 Field Pioneer and 3 Garrison Pioneer companies.

The ratio of the different sections in the service companies was arranged by the interchange of the men, so that in the Pontoon company there were 8 corporal's sections (Korporal-sehaften) of Pontoneers, 3 of Sappers and 1 of Miners ; in the Sapper com panies, 10 sections of Sappers, 1 of Pontoneers, and I of Miners. The garrison Pioneer companies were, as far as practicable, to be made up according to their special duties : thus the 1st (Pontoon) company was to have an establishment of 100 Pontoneers, 75 Sappers, and 25 Miners ; the 2d (Sappers) company to have 175 Sappers and 25 Miners ; finally, the 3d (Miners) company was to have 200 Miners. However, many changes had to be made. The cadres of the garrison companies were principally sup plied from No. 4 (Miners) company, which was broken up by the mobilization.

The greater part of the men belonged to the Landwehr. The total establishment, exclusive of reserves, was as follows : — 36 Field Pioneer companies. 33 Garrison Pioneer companies. 7 Field-Telegraph detachments. 5 Etappen Field-Telegraph detachments. 5 Railway Field-Telegraph detachments. I torpedo detachment. 1 Balloon detachment. 1 Field Photographic detachment. General total, 89 companies and detachments, with 12 Pontoon columns. 12 Light field bridge-trains (Birago's materials). 12 Entrenching-tool trains. Simultaneously with the mobilization, orders were issued for the immediate arming of the following coast fortresses : — Stralsund, Swinemunde, Memel, Dantzig (including Neufuhr- Introduction. 3 vvasser and Weichselmunde), Pillau, the works at Rugen, Friedrichs ort, Sonderburg, Diippel, the fortresses on the Elbe and mouth of the Weser, Wilhelmshaven.

The following inland fortresses were armed : — Magdeburg, Minden, Wesel, Cologne, Coblentz, Mayence, Saar louis, and Rastadt (conjointly with Baden). Preparations were also made for the eventual arming of the Silesian fortresses of Glatz and Neisse, but this was never fully completed. As a great part of the officers doing duty on the fortifications had to be ordered off to the different staffs and newly formed bodies of troops, there remained behind in the fortresses only a small number of officers, who however zealously devoted them selves to duties which in a successful war could bring but small reward, but which would have been of the utmost importance had the tide of success swept in the other direction. The Bavarian Engineer Corps. — The organization of the tech nical troops was so far different from the Prussian system, that the field Pioneers were, even in time of peace, completely separated from the garrison Pioneers.

The field Engineer regiment consisted, in peace-time, of 6 companies, whose education in field duties was throughout uniform. In time of mobilization it was composed (not counting 2 reserve companies) of 2 field Engineer divisions of 3 companies, of whom the two first were intended chiefly for the Pioneer service, and the third for the Pontoon service. The Pontoon companies had, however, a considerable deficiency in men, so that, as a rule, they had to apply for the assistance of the other companies in the construction of large bridges. Moreover, the field Engineer regiment furnished 2 field Tele graph detachments and 1 Etappen Telegraph detachment, as well as a railway company. The four garrison Engineer companies, which were distributed among the different fortresses in peace-time, were, at the beginning or during the course of the campaign, formed into 1 Etappen Engineer company, 1 independent garrison Engineer company, and 1 garrison Engineer division of 2 companies.

Accordingly, exclusive of reserved troops, the total number mobilized were 14 companies and sections, with 6 sets of bridge equipment, 7 Pioneer and 3 Sapper and Miner equipments. The distribution of the officers and detachments can be seen in the Appendix, and it only remains here to note that the Infantry Pioneers belonging to each Infantry regiment of a division might have been formed into companies, and could then, if required, have been employed on large technical works under the Engineer officers attached to the division. All the Bavarian fortresses were armed at the beginning of the mobilization, viz., Ingoldstadt, Germersheim, Landau, and Ulm (the latter with aid of Wurtemberg). The Kingdom of Saxony possessed in peace-time i Pioneer battalion, which, in all important respects, was organized on the Prussian system, and which, at the mobilization, supplied i Reserve and 3 Field companies.

The Kingdom of Wurtemberg furnished for the campaign, on mobilization, 2 field Pioneer companies, i garrison Engineer com pany, i field Telegraph detachment, and i Bridge-train (Birago's pattern). The Grand Duchy of Baden (on the Prussian model)/ furnished \ Pontoon column (Kolonne), I Field Pioneer company, I garrison Pioneer company, I Light Field Bridge-train, and I Entrenching tool column. The Grand Duchy of Hesse furnished I Pioneer company, with Light Field Bridge-train. There were thus, exclusive of reserves — 88 Field and Garrison Pioneer companies. 1 6 Telegraph detachments. 6 Railway detachments. 3 Special detachments. Total available, 113 These were independent bodies of technical troops, with about 525 waggons, which, among other things, were loaded with material for about 4500 paces of bridge-way, with about 30,000 entrenching tools, and 585 miles (English*) of telegraph wires. * 4^ English miles = I German mile nearly. All distances given in this translation are to be understood as being English measure ment.- — ( Translator's note. )

Chapter I. Operations Of The First And Second Armies Up To The

PASSAGE ACROSS THE MOSELLE. The First A rmy. THE First Army formed the right wing of the German forces. At the commencement of the operations, this army consisted of the VII. and VIII. Army Corps, and the 3d Division of Cavalry. At the beginning of August it was reinforced by the I. Army Corps and the 1st Division of Cavalry. The army had originally got orders to march on the line from Merzig to Saarlouis. The VII. Army Corps was to assemble on the 3d of August at Merzig and Beckingen, and the mass of the VIII. Corps in the neighbourhood of Saarlouis. Both corps were to cross over to the left bank of the Saar with a portion of the troops. The fortress of Saarlouis was to have been completely armed and provided with a war-garrison of 6000 men, and would then have served as a point of support to the army, so that the latter would have been in a position to offer resist ance even to very superior forces until the arrival of the Second Army.

The VII. Army Corps had crossed the Eifel mountains by forced marches, concentrating about Trier on the 31st July, so that the greater part of the Corps reached the position assigned to them on the Saar by the 3d of August. On this day the 1st Field Pioneer company constructed a bridge near Mettlach, which was used for crossing the river by a portion of the two divisions. During the advance the VII. Corps had the whole course of the Moselle, from Coblenz to Trier, reconnoitred by the Engineer Staff, in order to be able to make preparations for such passages across the river as might become necessary. The ist Field Pioneer company had got ready a bridge for the passage of the 14th Division of Infantry at Schweig (100 metres in length), out of improvised materials. A similar bridge was laid at Bemcastel by the pioneers of the VII.

Corps. The First Army had, however, in the meantime got orders not to cross the line from Saarburg to Wadern, and the army accordingly assembled on the 3d of August in the line from Wadern to Losheim, and on the same day portions of the Second Army reached Alzey. On the 4th of August the army took up the position from Lebach by Ottweiler to Tholey, and sent out strong reconnoitring parties to the front, past Saarlouis, on the roads to Thionville, Metz, and St. Avoid. As, however, in the meantime the road to St. Wendel, Ottweiler, and Neunkirchen was given up to the Second Army, the First concentrated N.w. of Saarbriick, and commenced their advance towards the line of the Saar on the 6th of August. The vil. Army Corps got orders to advance on the Lebach road, and to push out advanced guards in the directions of Saar briick and Volklingen, while the Vin.

Corps moved on until west of Sulzbach. The 3d Division of Cavalry covered the right wing, and the I. Army Corps concentrated near Lebach. The 14th Division of Infantry advancing on Saarbriick came about noon into collision with the retiring enemy, and moved therefore at once on to the attack. The enemy, however, brought up considerable reinforcements, and made a most obstinate resistance on the top of the Galgen-Hiigel, so that the action came to a stand-still until the arrival of portions of the II. and III. Corps ot the Second Army, when the enemy was forced to give up all his positions. The 13th Division of Infantry had meantime, in accordance with orders from the General commanding the VII. Army Corps, crossed the Saar at Volklingen, where the massive bridge had been left intact, and had advanced against the strongly fortified position of the enemy, at the same time threatening his line of retreat.

At the approach of dark the conflict was broken off on the part of the 13th Division, who occupied Forbach on the following morn ing, and took possession of the abandoned camp of the French. At Forbach, besides a considerable amount of stores, an unhorsed pontoon-train of 42 waggons was captured. On the 7th of August the First Army concentrated at Forbach and Saarbriick. The VIII. Corps took up a position near Spicheren, Etzling, and Behren. On the 8th of August information was received that the enemy would take the offensive, and accordingly the defences were strength ened by forming emplacements for batteries on the north of Spicheren, placing abattis on the borders of the Spicheren woods, and entrenching the village of Etzling. These works were executed by the ist and 3d Field Pioneer companies of the VII.

Army Corps in the course of the 8th of August ; but not completed, as the enemy continued their retreat in the direction of Saargemunde. The First Army made use of the road from Volklingen through Ludweiler on their advance to St. Avoid, while the Second Army moved forward on the Forbach road. On the 9th of August it became known that the enemy had abandoned St. Avoid, and had retired with the bulk of his forces as far as the French Nied. As it appeared not improbable that the enemy intended to defend the line of the Nied, arrangements were made for drawing the armies closer together. Accordingly the First Army was con centrated at Boulay, Marange, and Bouckeborn, while the two divisions of Cavalry were pushed forward as far as Fouligny and Bettange. The right wing of the Second Army was at Faulkemont, and had orders to remain in a position intended to be prepared for defence until the proposed wheel to the right should have been completed.

In the meantime, the news that had arrived at the principal headquarters on the 12th of August made it appear as beyond doubt that the main forces of the enemy were in retreat on Metz. In consequence, the First Army continued on the 13th of August its advance against Metz ; the I. Army Corps moving towards Courcelles, Chaussy, and Landonvilliers ; the vil. Corps towards Courcelles and Pange. Both Corps pushed their advanced guards over the French Nied. The VII. Corps remained in reserve, while the ist Division of Cavalry maintained the connexion with the Second Army. The 3d Division of Cavalry had instructions, if possible, to cross the Moselle below Metz. The Second Army intended on the same day to push forward the 5th Division of Cavalry up to the road between Metz and Verdun. As for the proposed passage of the 3d Division of Cavalry over the Moselle, it is to be remarked that there are no permanent bridges between Metz and Thionville.

According to the reconnaissances made by Captain von der Groeben, of the Engineers, the river was crossed by ferry-boats drawn by ropes, with good roads leading to them on both banks at the following places, viz. :— Hauconcourt, Hagondange, Blettange, and Illange. It had also been ascertained by the reconnaissance that a passage in force across the Moselle, especially at Blettange, would be comparatively easy, as the heights on the right bank offered excellent, commanding positions for artillery, and on the left bank there was ready to hand an enclosure surrounded by high walls which could be used as a bridge-head. As the 3d Division of Cavalry moved on to the Moselle, it turned out that all the rope-ferries had been removed ; accordingly a few men crossed the river in a boat at Rauconcourt, and found no enemies' troops there.

As no bridge equipment was at the disposal of the Division, and as, besides, a passage across the Moselle north of Metz in force would probably not have met the intentions of the higher authorities, the 3d Cavalry Division had to give it up. Nor could the proposed destruction of the railroad between Metz and Thionville be executed, as the enemy had assembled there in such force, that a surprise seemed highly improbable. As soon as the First Army had reached the French Nied, a greater number of passages across the river, here about 25 paces broad, were at once provided. The Pioneers of the I. Army Corps threw 4 bridges across in the neighbourhood of Les Etangs, while the vn. Corps, with its three Pioneer companies, provided 5 bridges out of extem porized materials at Pange and Courcelles, so that, including the existing bridges not destroyed by the enemy in front of the First Army, there were altogether 15 bridges available, which would have been sufficient for all emergencies.

As decided on the 13th of August at headquarters, the First Army was to remain in its position on the French Nied on the 14th of August, and observe the enemy by advanced guards pushed well to the front. Two corps of the Second Army (the III. and IX.), moved up to the heights of Pagny and Buchy respectively, with instruc tions to support the First Army in case of an attack by the enemy; while the main body of the Second Army was to continue its advance on the Moselle in the direction of Pont-a-Mousson and Marbach. Battle of Courcelles on the \\th of August. As it was announced from all sides on the afternoon of the 14th of August that the enemy had begun to cross over to the left bank of the Moselle with his main body, and (apparently to secure his retreat) had attacked the advanced guard of the I. Army Corps, the VII.

Corps advanced to the attack of the retreating enemy, and induced him again to show a front. A desperate fight ensued, which finished only with the approach of darkness, after the enemy had retreated into prepared positions under the guns of Forts Julien and Les Bottes. The 3d Division of Cavalry had covered the right wing of the I. Army Corps, while the ist Division of Cavalry, as well as the 18th Division of Infantry, had shown on the left wing of the vil. Corps. As regards the technical troops, a detachment of the ist Field Pioneer company of the I. Army Corps (Lieut. Zarnke), as also the 2d and 3d Field Pioneer companies of the vn. Corps (Capts. Goetze and Cleinow), came into action. The first-named detach ment fought in combination with the 44th Regiment of Infantry on the right wing of the army, which towards evening the enemy sought to overwhelm with superior forces.

The contest only ceased with the approach of darkness, after the repulse of the enemy's attack. The 2d and 3d Field Pioneer companies of the vn. Army Corps, which at the commencement of the action were formed into a half battalion by Captain Goetze, and had followed the 13th Division of Infantry up to La Planchette, were here brought up to the support of the hard-pressed infantry in the first line of battle, and on the night of the 14th of August took over the out-post duties of the 13th Division of Infantry on the field of battle they had won. Reconnaissance of Thionville. While the main body of the First Army was engaged before Metz, an expedition against the fortress of Thionville was undertaken by a portion of it. On the 13th of August patrols of the 3d Division of Cavalry had ridden up to the gates of the bridge-head of Thionville, and had brought such reports of the numbers and condition of the garrison of the fortress that the General commanding the First Army had considered a coup-de-main against the fortress as feasible.

The statements of a man of the Prussian Cavalry Reserve, who at the outbreak of the war had been forced to take part in the work of the arming of the fortress, confirmed the General commanding in his view that it might easily be taken. These statements referred specially to the insufficient defensive power of the ill-guarded works on the left bank of the Moselle, as also to the facilities for crossing that river above the fortress by means of an easy ford. Accordingly, the 31st Brigade of Infantry, under the command of General Count Gneisenau, was commissioned to execute this coup-de-main. He was reinforced by a light field battery, one squadron, and the 3d Field Pioneer company of the vm. Army Corps (Captain Richter). Major von Giese of the Engineer Staff of the First Army, who many years before had reconnoitred the fortress, was placed at the disposal of the Commandant of the detachment.

The Brigade was marched off on the 13th of August on the road between Boulay and Thionville, and had orders to push forward on the evening of the 14th into the neighbourhood of the town ; during the night to take up a covered position, and on the following morning early to make an attempt at taking the place by surprise. The brigade carried out the advance against Thionville as ordered, observing all requisite measures for keeping the operations a secret. Arrangements were made for a portion of the infantry, with the artillery and cavalry, to take up a position in reserve on the right bank of the Moselle, opposite the bridge-head; while three columns of assault, each with a Pioneer detachment at its head, were directed respectively against the fortifications of the town, the Moselle gorge and the railway station on the south side of the fortress, where they were to destroy the communication with Metz.

The Pioneers were furnished with the necessary scaling-ladders, petards, etc. The ist column, after crossing the ford, was to break the telegraph wires leading towards Metz, and then to make the railway impassable for a long time, by destroying the bridges leading over the little Miihlbach. The 2d column got instructions to cross the ford and force their way through the Metz gate. To carry this out, it would have been necessary to remove a barrier-gate in the Place d'Armes of the covered way, as well as the sally port-gates of the counter guard, of the ravelin, and enceinte ; also to demolish two drawbridges, — an undertaking which, with the insufficient means available, could not have had a prospect of success, unless the enemy were entirely taken by surprise. The 3d column, after crossing the ford, was to reach the gorge of the fortress by the tow-path on the left bank of the Moselle, and scale the gorge walls.