The History of the Foreign Policy of Great Britain

Front matter

THE HISTOKY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN HISTORICAL' WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR. CONSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS (Murray), Second Edition, 1872. WORTHIES OE ALL SOULS ; Eour Centuries of English History Illustrated from the College Archives (Hacmillan), 1874. PARLIAMENT AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (Seeley), 1875. IMPERIAL ENGLAND (Cassell & Co.), 1880. OXFORD UNIVERSITY DURING THE COMMON- WEALTH {Visitors' Register, Camden Society), 1881. LIFE OF ADMIRAL LORD HAWKE (W. H. Allen), 1883; Second Edition, 1896. WICLIF'S PLACE IN HISTORY (Isbister), New Edition, 1884. THE FAMILY OF BROCAS OF BEAUREPAIRE AND ROCHE COURT (LONGMANS), 1886 (now sold by QUARITCH). MEMOIR OF WILLIAM GROCYN, THE "FATHER OF THE NEW LEARNING" (OXFORD HISTORICAL SOCIETY, No. XVI.), 1890. HISTORY OF THE CINQUE PORTS, with Maps (Historical Towns Series, Longmans), Fourth Edition, 1S95.

COMMENTARIES ON THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND from the Earliest Times to 1865 (Wm. Blackwood & Sons), 1893. THE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF OHEAT BRITAIN BY MONTAGU BURROWS chichele professor of modern history in the university of oxford, and fellow of all souls ; CAPTAIN, r.n. ; F.S.A., etc. "OFFICIER DE L'lNSTRUCTION PUBLIOUE," FRANCE NEW EDITION, REVISED WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS EDINBURGH AND LONDON MDCCCXCVII All Rights reserved PBEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION The favour with which this Course of Lectures has been received has encouraged the author to bring out a Second Edition at a lower price. The principles of British Foreign Policy, the history of which has been traced in these pages, have been most remarkably elucidated by events since the First Edition was published — more than a year ago. It is hoped that in this more ac cessible form a still wider circle of readers may now take an interest in the subject. M. B. September, 1897.

Preface

TO THE FIRST EDITION The field of English history has been of late so vastly enlarged that it has become necessary to supply the public with numerous supplementary works dealing with its special departments. The present volume, commenced some years ago, at tempts to trace one of these continuous threads in the warp of the history, and to draw it out, as far as possible, distinct from the general story of the nation. This, from the nature of the case, can only be an imperfect process. While presupposing on the part of the reader a considerable knowledge of history, it was yet found impossible to elucidate the continuous progress of British policy without reviewing the course and connection of many events which surrounded and shaped that progress, and which lie within the provinces of Domestic or Foreign History.

If, then, certain chapters should seem to suggest the more fitting title of a " History of England with special relation to its foreign policy," it cannot be helped. But the method has its advantages. To quote treaties, protocols, and

PREFACE.

TO THE FIRST EDITION. VIII despatches except by way of the briefest reference, to discuss technical rules of the law and comity of nations, would be to invade the frontiers of Inter national Law and Diplomatics. By the general reader the march of Foreign Policy will be more clearly discerned in the light of the history which he knows than in the darkness of the sciences of which he is ignorant. The main purpose of this work has been to show the continuity, the continuous development, of British Foreign Policy. Now and again distorted, or even reversed, by dynastic interests, by careless diplomacy, by erratic statesmanship, by ecclesias tical dissensions, by foreign rivalry, by stress of circumstance, it has always reverted — as it ever will revert — to the course prescribed by nature and approved by experience.

England, this " precious gem set in the silver sea," held a post of vantage unparalleled among the nations. " True to her self" and to her natural destinies, she has endured and prospered. This fortress-isle of Britain, safely intrenched by stormy seas, confronting the broadest face of the Continent, and, later on, almost sur rounding it with her fleets, was, and was not, a part of Europe according as she willed. First appearing in the dawn of history as the mysterious Ultima Thule, planted somewhere out in the Western Ocean, she grew to observe more and more closely from her watch-tower the strife of the Continent, and, as her expanding interests

PREFACE.

TO THE FIRST EDITION. IX dictated, to interfere as a belligerent, an ally, or an arbiter. Yet deeply implicated as she became in the Balance of Power in Europe, she never lost sight of her strong position as an extra-Conti nental Power, — a position which, as her navy, her commerce, and her colonies grew, expanded into that of a world-wide maritime empire. The de velopment, the oscillation, and the reconciliation of these two principles of national policy form the chief elements of the present work. On certain points the author has necessarily repeated views already published in his " Commen taries on the History of England." Moreover, a few pages have been transferred from two of the author's books : from " Imperial England,'' which has long been out of print, and from the " Life of Admiral Lord Hawke," which is about to appear in a cheaper edition, without the introductory matter from which the extracts are made.

CONTENTS. CHAP. PAOE I. THE PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE AND DURING THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH . . . 1 Early foundations — The four invasions — An indelible mark — Necessity of a standing Navy and of Continental alliances — Early kings were Continental potentates — English Navy best of the time — The Flemish Alliance — Rise of "Balance of Power" — England the first consolidated State — Cause of the adoption of the system by Henry VII. — Henry VIII. and Elizabeth extend it — For her a necessary policy — Her motives and means of action — The effects of her Foreign Policy. II. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE STUARTS AND CROMWELL 14 The Stuarts reverse Elizabeth's policy — The causes of this reversal — The ideas of Henri IV. and Sully — Balance held by France — Charles I. adopts his father's errors — Cromwell supports France instead of Spain — The Dutch wars — " The Honour of the Flag " — The Barbary Pirates — The restored Stuarts pensioned by France — French attempt to ruin both Dutch and British — Holland ceases to be a Great Power. ■25 III.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER WILLIAM III. . Tudor Balance resumed by William III. — The national service performed by the Whigs — The "Deliverer" — Fine conduct of the English people — Unity of the British Isles recovered — Ireland— Scotland — William secures the Channel — His headship of tho Allies — The Partition Treaties and the Mediterranean — Louis XIV. grasps at the Spanish, and then at the British, Empire — And so ruined France — Great Britain accepts the challenge — The state of the Continent at William's death — The Balance loses its dominant religious character — The German States near the Rhine — The Allies of Great Britain — The Balance had proved its usefulness. CONTENTS. IV. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLIER PART OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 42 Marlborough at the head of the Allies — Tranquillity of Ireland — Union with Scotland — The Dutch portion of the Allies — Success of Marlborough's early campaigns — War of the Spanish Succession — Systematic defence of the Mediter ranean — Failure of the Allies in Spain — Capture of Gibraltar — Its importance compared with that of the battle of Blen heim — Effect of capture on France and Spain — George I. undervalued it : the English people never did. — Spanish siege of Gibraltar — British control of the Mediterranean — Spain and Great Britain in the West Indies — The British Colonies in America — Their relations to the mother country — Treaties between Great Britain and Spain — Spain exercises the "Right of Search" — A highly complicated history — "Jenkins' ear" no fable.

V. THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1739 58 Walpole's peace-policy — Blockade of Porto Bello — Catas trophe of Hosier's fleet — Secret Treaty between France and Spain — France under Cardinal Fleury — Great Britain with draws from Continental affairs — High spirit of the British Colonists — Walpole takes no notice of the Spanish " Right of Search " — Systematic smuggling — Change from quasi-free to restricted trade — The Assiento — Working of the new system — Hopelessness of improving the system — Incessant insults from Spain — War becomes necessary — The "Patriots" in Parliament — Petitions — Walpole begins to give way — His disgraceful conduct — Attacked on all sides — Address to the Crown — Walpole's final blunders — The statesmen and poets who roused the country — He declares war — Is forced to resign — Burke's statements accounted for— Gloom of the succeeding period — Provocation on the part of France — The war was just and necessary.

VI. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE WARS WHICH FOUNDED THE EMPIRE —1739-1763 .... 87 Recapitulation of previous history of subject — Ships, colonies, and commerce — Dangers besetting Great Britain and her Colonies— Deplorable state of the Royal Navy — Efficiency of the Navy, the keystone of the national success — The Army could not as yet keep step with the Navy — George II. and Hawke — Alliance with the Low Countries — Hanover and Holland— Melancholy prospects— The Rebellion of 1745 —Ireland under Lord Chesterfield — Militia organised at last CONTENTS. XIII — Pitt and George II. at the crisis — Anson and Hawke — Pitt's failures at first — Prussia and Frederick the Great — Pitt's relation to the officers in command — A "nation of shopkeepers" — The Treaties of the period — International law — British American Colonies first object of attack — Con tinued during the Peace after 171S — Also upon India, Africa, and the West Indies — A French America — Nova Scotia — British outwitted by France and Spain — Who attempt to close the Mediterranean — British government of her Colonies — The Seven Years' War and its effects.

VII, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE CLOSE OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR TO THE OPENING OF THE FRENCH-REVOLUTION WAR — 1763-1789 . . . 11") The Peace of Paris in 1763 — Changed relations with the American Colonies — Principles involved — Revolt of the Colonies — European allies of the Colonists — Views of George III. — Peace of Versailles in 1783 — Effects of the war — The Armed Neutrality — The rise of Russia — Relations between Great Britain and Turkey — Plots of the Empress Catherine and the Emperor Joseph II. — Frederick the Great interposes — Turkey saved by Pitt — Pitt's Foreign Policy — Portugal — Position of Britain before the great war — Ex plicit call to resume the old position in Europe — Modern attacks on this policy — History coloured by Reform-Bill politics. VIII.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE FRENCH-REVO- LUTION war— 1793-1800 136 Pitt's views on the French Revolution — War forced by the French — Pitt forced to accept — It could not be evaded — The old Foreign Policy renewed — Naval Supremacy — Descents on French coasts — Foreign subsidies — British Credit — Law was king — Efficiency of Navy — French Navy demoralised— The Armed Neutrality again — Failures in Holland — Military superiority of France — British army slowly improved — Pitt's war-policy unfairly treated — Condi tion of Ireland— Torn by factions— Rebellion of 1798— The Union— India — The Colonies— Patriotism of the Old Whigs —Scotland— The British Allies— The policy of Subsidies- Condition of the European States — War a question of finance — Posterity was to pay the balance — Pitt's futile attempt to make peace— British Allies conquered —Mutinies in Royal Navy— Battle of Camperdown— Napoleon in Egypt Nelson and Sidney Smith — Napoleon's coup d'etat — He turns on Austria and Russia— British refuse peace — The Netherlands.

CONTENTS. ix. british foreign policy during the napoleonic war— 1800-1807 165 Napoleon as First Consul — His reforms — His fresh vic tories — The Armed Neutrality again — Acceptance of some of its principles — Peace of Amiens — Napoleon's acts during the Peace — Prepares to invade England — The "Detenus" — Rupture of the Peace — Europe required certain lessons — British preparations for defence — Efficiency of the naval defence — Pitt resumes office — Napoleon's strategy — British resume their old strategy — Napoleon's first plan — Disposi tion of the British fleets — Nelson's defective blockade of Toulon — Napoleon's second plan — His third plan — His final plan — French and British strategy compared — Villeneuve escapes — Nelson in pursuit — His foresight — Calder's action — Villeneuve loses his chance — Nelson's strategy — Trafalgar — A new era in the war — Motives of Napoleon's policy — Austerlitz and Pitt — British commerce — Mahan's treatment of the subject — Hard but necessary fate of neutrals — Depots for British goods — Growth of British resources — They desire peace — But resolve to fight it out — Struggle was not with French people, but with Napoleon.

X. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE NAPOLEONIC WAR (continued)— 1807-1808 198 System of Subsidies broken up — How to supply its place ? — Failure of Pitt's successors — Abolition of the Slave-trade — English responsibilities for slavery — Canning's training under Pitt — His special merit — Napoleon and Spain — The "Spanish ulcer" — Canning's Peninsular policy the outcome of his popular sympathies — Seizure 'of the Danish fleet — Defence of that act — The state of the Baltic — The "Conti nental System" — French seizure of Portugal — British "Orders in Council " — Their concentration of trade— Effect of French policy on the Continent — Seizure of Spain — Canning accepts the challenge — His reasons — The secret of his power. XI. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE NAPOLEONIC war (continued) — 1808-1814 219 Sir Arthur Wellesley succeeds Canning as representa tive of Great Britain, after a period of discontent — Torres Vedras — Revival of European spirit — Gloomy prospects of the French— The resistance of Russia, which suffers under Continental System — Tempted by the war in Spain — Austria and Prussia — Invasion of Russia — Wellington's advance The Russian strategy — The catastrophe — Rising of Europe CONTENTS.

XV 239 — The War of Liberation — The Truce fatal to Napoleon- Allies defeated at Dresden — Napoleon defeated at Leipsic — Rising of the West Germans— Diplomatic difficulties— Allies press on — Wellington at Vittoria and in France— The Allies cross the Rhine. XII. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1814 TO 1827 Napoleon's Abdication — The Bourbons — The new Charter — Talleyrand — The Czar Alexander I. — Dismemberment of France prevented — Napoleon's escape — Advances to Paris — His strategy — Disadvantages on both sides — British made fewest mistakes — Battle of Waterloo — The final Abdication — St. Helena — Estimate of the two generals — The Congress of Vienna — Moderation of the Allies — The Kingdom of the Netherlands — The Treaty of Vienna — Continuity of British Foreign Policy — Its course inevitable — The American War of 1812 — Its causes — Foresight of the American Government — Results — The " Holy Alliance " — Canning's return to office — Oppression of Spain, Greece, Italy, and Poland — Reac tionary Congresses — Canning deals with Spain and Portugal — And then with Greece — Congress of Verona — Battle of Navarino.

XIII. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1827 . . . 261 The Turks in Europe — Virtual Protectorate of Great Britain — The "Eastern Question" — Troubles in the Peninsula — Separation of Belgium and Holland — Final services of Talleyrand — Palmerston pursues Canning's policy — Question of Intervention — The "Spanish Legion" — Triumph of Constitutionalism — The Slave-trade abolished — The state of Italy — Austrian influence — Secret Societies — Pio Nono and Garibaldi — Victor Emmanuel — Louis Napoleon — Palmerston and Cavour — French intervene — They annex Savoy and Nice — Garibaldi in Sicily and Naples — Victor Emmanuel "King of Italy" — Palmerston's policy truly British — Defence of it — Poland, Switzerland, Portugal — Egyptian invasion of Turkey — Attitude of French and British towards Turkey — Crimean War— Beaconsfield and the "Eastern Question" — Russia and Great Britain in the East — Pacific rivalry of the Powers in Africa — British Colonies — The British in Egypt — Conclusion. INDEX THE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Chapter I. The Principles Of British Foreign Policy Before And During The

REIGN OF ELIZABETH. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain has no doubt become more plainly visible, less interrupted, more easy to follow, since the Middle Ages, but we are apt to lose sight of the fact that its origin lies in the circumstances of the Norman Conquest. Its gradual Early development has not been due to the ambition oftions.' particular dynasties or sovereigns, the incitement of ministers, the passions of the people, or the growth of colonies, but to the necessities of self-defence. Every part of British Foreign Policy is, indeed, reducible to the one fundamental fact that Great Britain is an island, and, we may add, an island which lies so close to Ireland that it has been proved impossible to consider them as separate countries. Again, an unfortunate delusion prevails that the modern attitude of Great Britain towards other nations is a thing of yesterday.

That is the con- A The four invasions. sequence of too narrow a view of English history. The reigns of the four Stuart kings form such a contrast to the reigns which followed that we are apt to forget the policy of their predecessors. It is not till we have learnt to regard the conduct of the Stuarts as exceptional, as a contrast to what went before as well as to what followed after, as a gran rifiuto, an apostasy from the English traditions, that we can take in the whole sweep of history. Henry VII., Henry VIII., and Elizabeth, under the new circum stances of their times, fairly represent those tradi tions, those laws, those unwritten laws from which the Stuarts diverged. But this introductory sketch requires that we should ascend higher still, to the Normans and Plantagenets. The problem which presented itself as primary and elementary to the conquerors from beyond the sea, and all the more when they began to amalga mate with the already mixed race which they had conquered, was how to prevent any such catastrophe from occurring again.

Four invasions of Britain had been successful. The Romans had conquered the original Celtic settlers ; the Anglo-Saxons had conquered the Romanised Britons ; the Danes the Anglo-Saxons ; the Normans the Danes and English. For more than a thousand years the British Isles had been a prey to one invader after another. The dividing sea formed rather an advantage to the attack than to the defence. With a sparse popula tion and often a feeble government, no one could tell where the enemy would make the assault, and the organisation of a navy sufficient for the patrol of the seas was rare indeed. The resistance of the islanders was generally stubborn, and even heroic, but in each of the four cases the defenders were overborne. These conquests had left in the mind of every An indelible man, woman, and child in the island an indelible m' mark ; for the misery which had ensued in each case was terrible — terrible not only from individual suffering, but from the changes in laws, language, and land-tenure which accompanied it.

Hence, after the Norman Conquest, we see that a common danger to conquerors and conquered alike united them in measures of defence and political order much more quickly than might have been expected ; and the main principles of national defence which have been handed down from those times became a fixed policv. They were two in number. A stand- Necessity of a, standing naval force must be organised under the Crown ; ing navy , n . , °. . , . , , . ' and Con ana alliances must be maintained with the neightmentai bouring Continental Powers which were opposed to the enemies of England. The last of these two political doctrines resolved itself for many centuries into the requirement that the coasts extending opposite to the south-eastern shores of England should be, if not in the hands of the English sovereign, at least in the hands of friends.

These are still fundamental principles. The Nor- Early kings 1 A Til Continental man and Plantagenet monarchs represented the last potentates. requirement in their own persons. The territories they possessed in the land of the Franks, which was then a congeries of practically independent States, added to their insular possessions, gave them at first a decided superiority over the French kings, but of course forced them into almost incessant hostility with the growing monarchy. Thus the kings of France came to be the hereditary enemies of the English navy best of its time. English ; and, as they incorporated more and more of their own feudal States, developed in their turn a superiority which at last settled the question. But it was a long process. For three centuries an almost independent Aquitaine and a scarcely less independent Brittany grievously blocked the way of the French monarchs.

The English left the matter to their kings, who were overweighted in the conflict, till parliamen tary government brought the people generally to a different view of their obligations. Periods of fluc tuation, owing very much to the varying character of the kings on both sides, marked these centuries ; but the above principles of defence, though now and then sorely tried, answered their purpose. The expedition of Louis, Prince Royal of France, was rather the effect of a political alliance with an Eng lish party than a national invasion; and though in Richard II.'s feeble reign sundry coast towns were burnt, no invasion of England took place either then or ever since. The navy may seem to us to have been insignificant, but it was better than that of other nations. The " Royal Navy of the Cinque Ports" was permanently at the disposal of the Crown ; and when need arose it was supplemented by the king's ships.

And, further, the intimate English relations with Flanders which had begun before the Conquest, as well as the far less intimate relations with Brittany, supplied the want of direct power which the earlier hold upon Normandy had given. For neither Normandy nor Picardy had sufficiently good ports or length of sea board to be very dangerous enemies, while the Low Countries were inhabited by races of much the same nationality as the English, and were closely united by the bonds of trade and commerce. The custo- The Flemish mers of the English occupied the great Flemish towns, and were generally superior to their feudal lords, who were supported by the French. So the basis of a very useful alliance was always at hand. The French were peculiarly vulnerable on the Flemish frontier, and when Edward III. enforced the ancient right of the English to the Sovereignty of the Seas, his claim was acknowledged as a matter of course by the people of the Low Countries and of Brittany.

Thus, as the centuries rolled on, whatever alliances were made with the Emperor, with Spain, or with other Continental Powers, were made against France. This was a very simple Foreign Policy. It was dictated by the necessity of keeping Eng land free from invasion, and by the difficulties involved in the retention of the provinces which came to England with the Normans and Plantagenets. By the middle of the fifteenth century Rise of these provinces had been torn away from England power. and united to France. The Plantagenet dynasty was worn out ; and it was reserved for a stronger family to formulate the system of Balance of Power, which was to place the protection of England on a more civilised basis. The new system could not of course be formed until its materials had come into existence.

The fifteenth century witnessed the arrival of France, Spain, and Germany at a position of unity analogous to that which England herself attained about this time. The conquest of Wales, the lordship of Ire land, and the diplomatic management of Scotland, due to the sense of the Edwardian failures to Consolida tion of States. conquer that country, gave a certain solidarity to the Island-State. Spain was consolidated by the union of Castile and Aragon, France by the ab sorption of Gascony, Provence, and Brittany, and Germany by the measures of Maximilian. Each of these States now started on a fresh career, and the Foreign Policy of England came to be summed up in the doctrine that it was her business to balance them one against the other, and so provide for her defence by diplomacy instead of war.

For this pur pose she must be united at home and strong on the sea. Hence the development of the Royal Navy. We need not stop here to register the part played by the principle of Balance in the earlier history of the world, the remarkable exemplification of it in the ancient States of Greece, the necessary abeyance of it during the many centuries of the Roman Empire, or the smaller adumbrations of the principle in the Middle Ages by the policy of the Popes, who learnt to look for the safety of the Papal States in balancing their German enemy by the Sicilian Normans, or other Italian States, or France. Nor in mentioning the adoption of the principle by Henry VII. and his son, must we for a moment compare the steady, practical application of it by Elizabeth with the tentative and shifting policy of her father and grandfather.

Nevertheless that policy led the way to Elizabeth's successful diplomacy ; and we must notice the work of each before we come to the Stuarts, who broke through the Tudor traditions. The chief difference between her combinations and those of her predecessors is to be found in the changes made by the Continental Reformation, which were only beginning to show themselves to wards the end of Henry VIII.'s reign ; but the real cause of the cause of the system attaining its extraordinary dethe^ystem velopment in Europe is to be found in the advent ° of the Emperor Charles V. to power. Universal empire could only be warded off by State-combinations. The meaning of the term Balance of Power is really Self-Defence ; it is not too much to say that it has been the saving of Europe. When it had done its work the term fell into disrepute.

It was open to abuse, and was abused ; but it has been succeeded by an international system of much the same sort under a different name, by International Law, by the " Concert of Europe," by arrangements made at Congresses for the smaller by the greater Powers, and to some extent, though still but feebly, by arbitration. Henry VII. s experiences before he came to the throne had taught him the necessary statesmanship for the work which lay before him at the very time when the consolidation of States was achieved or being achieved, and was producing its national effects. To his training in exile, to his long residence in France, and to his wise choice of ministers Henry vn. must be attributed his adoption of the policy ofopportunitv. Balance which had indeed been initiated by France and Spain.

The collapse of Brittany about that time, and the Yorkist hostility of Flanders to Henry as a Lancastrian, had broken up the ancient, well accustomed barriers of England against France ; for by the aid afforded on either side of Calais, the in vasion of France by that route had been, and was part of, the political defence of England. Very soon afterwards, however, came the diversion of French u enterprise (1494) in the direction of Italy, and the struggle in that peninsula between the three consolidated nations, Spain, France, and Germany. Henry VIE seized the opportunity, and definitely commenced the Balance of Power, which Elizabeth, surely not unconsciously, as some have said, but deliberately, advanced to the dignity of a system. A few words on the method of working that system under the Tudors will display the gradually unfolding Foreign Policy of England before the Stuarts departed from it, and by so doing helped to destroy their family.

Henry VII.'s Foreign Policy is often described as a mere outcome of his ambition to secure his dynasty by forming the closest possible alliance with Spain, which was the rising Power of the world. No doubt that country was alive from head to foot ; the expulsion of the Moors and the discovery of America seemed to point her out as the leader of the nations, and her conquest of South Italy gave her the command of the Mediterranean. This is quite true as far as it goes, but it is much more important to note that Henry regarded that great Power as the best means of making up for the loss which England had sustained by the unification of France. This was the efficient cause of his policy. The ancestral enemy which had expelled the English from their hereditary possessions in Aquitaine, and now exhibited itself as a compact France, was to be kept in check by Spain in the south ; and the coasts of the Netherlands, which were now divided between Germany and France, were to be kept secure by balancing these Powers against each other in the north.