With the Turkish Army in Thessaly ... With illustrations and maps

Preface

This book was written directly after the con clusion of the armistice between Turkey and Greece, and before the publication of any official papers on the military operations. It only professes to be a rough sketch, and cannot lay claim to absolute accuracy of figures, though these, for the most part, are probably correct. The writer would take this opportunity of ex pressing his sense of the courtesy and assistance shown him by the Imperial military and civil authorities throughout the time he spent in Turkey, and also of thanking the management of the Times for allowinghim to make use of telegrams and letters sent by him from the seat of war and published in the columns of that journal. C. C. B. White's, June 25, 1897. CONTENTS

Appendix

SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS 1 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Field-Marshal Edhem Pasha Frontispiece Frontier North of Meteora To face page 14 Turkish Field Battery in Line „ 22 Elassona „ 28 11 Greek Advance on Karya „ 38 •ii Greeks below Milona „ 46 The Battle of Mati „ 53 it Green Mosque and Bridge of Larissa ... „ 61 The Battle of Velestino „ 72 j> Velestino „ 85 ji The Road to the South „ 101 Turkish Field Battery in Action „ MAPS To face page Position of Greek and Turkish Forces on April i . . . 41 „ 25 . . . 6o n j> „ „ „ May 4 . . . 76 )J !J !) „ IO . . . 90 5? 5) :i 51 „ 20 ... IO9 )> » 1) )1 Map of Balkan Peninsula at end PLANS Battle of Milona 44 First Battle of Velestino 70 Battle of Domoko

Chapter I The Causes Of The War

Early in March it became patent to the general public of Europe that the Cretan question had ceased to have a merely local significance. The landing of Greek troops under Colonel- Vassos had not only succeeded in fanning the flame of insurrection in that island into a serious revo lution, but it had for the moment stultified the projects of reform laid down by the ambassadors, and had provided the admirals with an extremely difficult and hazardous task. But this was by no means all. It was evident that hostile preparations on a much wider scale were contemplated, if indeed they had not been made, in the Balkan Peninsula, and that the Hellenic Government were determined to use all the means in their power to provoke a conflict on the Macedonian and Albanian frontiers, B and it was more than hinted that they would be materially aided by the disaffection said to exist in those provinces.

On the other hand, the Sultan's friends insisted that he had a fair and reasonable casus belli, and though quite willing to use diplomacy to its break ing strain, and thereby to emphasise their modera tion, they relied confidently on a military force, their knowledge of which presumably justified their hopes. Acting, therefore, on advice which professed to be more technical than political, the Porte com menced to mobilise the Army Corps in Macedonia, and ordered the division at Janina to be brought up to war strength, the alleged justification being that the presence of raw levies and bands of brigands in Thessaly necessitated precautionary measures of a defensive character. Once, however, that the ball had been set rolling, its rapid increase in size and speed proved that the Turkish Government intended to be ready for all eventualities, whether in their own or their neighbour's territories ; and the concentration of troops in Northern Greece, pushed forward with apparently equal celerity, left no doubt as to the desires if not the intentions of the Cabinet at Athens.

By the middle of March we were informed that there were no less than 50,000 soldiers round Elassona, the town which Edhem Pasha, the " commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces in Macedonia," had selected for his I THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 3 headquarters. Half this number were said to be at Janina, the capital of Albania. The Greeks were reported to be massing at Larissa and Trikkala in Thessaly, and at Arta in Epirus, and were estimated as likely to reach nearly the same figure. Their fleet was arming, and encouragement in the shape of cheap sympathy and in the more solid form of material assistance was being furnished from all parts of Europe ; Turkey also was taking her navy in hand, and was receiving more slowly and less spontaneously similar help. In the meantime the warships of the six Great Powers were blockading Crete, though without any remarkable success, and European statecraft was devoting itself to preventing if possible the out break of hostilities.

If it had only had to deal with constituted governments this endeavour might not have been abortive, but there was an element which was incapable of control, and which shortly eluded all restraints and brought on the war — I mean the Ethnike Etairia. This was a Secret Society scattered all over Greece and the Levant, and comprising among its members officers and soldiers, politicians and diplo mats, and working on the impressionable populace of Athens by all the sentiment, oratory, and mystifica tion which generally appeal to a Southern race in a very marked degree. It had a reputation for wealth and influence, probably true, and for ability and organisation, certainly false, and its good will B was thought so vital to the King's Government that it was allowed to have forces of its own in the field.

It had been established two years before with the avowed object of recovering to Greece the provinces of Macedonia and Epirus, and its agents had been disseminated over those parts of Turkey. After its apparent success in Crete, it was encouraged to try and force the hand of the Cabinet with regard to Turkey ; but when it found itself likely to meet with opposition it cut the Gordian knot by raiding with its own troops across the frontier, with the inevit able result of a declaration of war. It has now sunk into well-merited disrepute and obscurity, with the record of having been no less distinguished in the history of Greece for folly than for criminal meddling and incompetence. The Hellenic population of Macedonia, and for that matter the Turkish population of Thessaly, are factors that need hardly be taken into account.

Both were, to the best of my belief, quite contented and happy with their lot, and were far more occupied with the prospects of the harvests than with the autonomy of Crete. Any idea of insurrection that may have been fomented by Greek agents in Macedonia was at once knocked on the head by the visible and overwhelming presence of the Ottoman troops, and as we know never took any tangible form. In Epirus there was certainly some discontent and even mutiny among the Albanians, but to appreciate I THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 5 the value of this one has to understand the Albanian character, in which private plunder and personal vendettas hold far more central and important posi tions than any dynastic, religious, or racial consid erations. The Turks to some extent know how to make use of these subjects of theirs, but are far too wise to rely on them, and are generally more exercised with excusing their conduct to Europe than with suppressing the anarchy that appears indigenous to the soil.

Macedonia then was quiet, Albania in its normal state, Constantinople nervous, while Thessaly and the major part of Greece, though really contented, were ready to follow the lead of Athens. That city, from the temperament of its populace, the ephemeral eclat of Crete, and the machinations of a number of dema gogues and political societies, was noisy and belli cose. The European Powers were dilatory, due perhaps to the fact that they were not as united as they appeared to be, and one or two of them may have surmised a possible accession of influence or prestige from a war. Roughly speaking, this was the situation in March, a time when the snows begin to melt, when the climate in South-eastern Europe is most temperate, and when the mountain passes, the rivers, and the roads become practicable for the passage of large bodies of troops, and for their guns and baggage.

In another two or three months a sultry summer would begin, water would get scarcer, and there would be the crops to look after, a very important item at any rate to the Greeks. If, there fore, there was to be a fight it must be at once, and this was no less realised by the parties concerned than by the onlookers ; accordingly every nerve was strained by the generals to prepare rapidly for war, while diplomacy more irresolutely did its best to preserve peace. Everybody was aware that active hostilities between Turkey and Greece might mean very serious complications throughout Europe, and possibly a much greater and more disastrous war, and indeed it was only because of the laudably correct attitude maintained by the Balkan States and the very strong line taken by the Great Powers that such a war was averted.

Still there was a feeling that the air needed to be cleared and the contumacy of Greece to be chastised, while both the belligerents, despite their declarations to the contrary, evidently desired to try each other's strength, or at any rate to prove their own. This is all that I would say about the political situation — a series of platitudes which seem necessary before dealing with the war itself. In the succeeding chapters I shall endeavour to describe the campaign in Macedonia and Thessaly as I saw it, only alluding to the course of events in Epirus when obliged to do so. It is, of course, extremely difficult to avoid sym pathising with the troops one accompanies, and most battles can be looked at from two points of view. I THE CAUSES OF THE WAR I 7 can therefore only promise to give an unprejudiced account of the war to the best of my ability, leaving the reader to judge of its actual fairness.

On March 18th, being in London on a short holiday from St. Petersburg, I was asked by the management of the Times to go out for them as Special Correspondent with the Turkish army. I obtained the necessary permission from my superiors at the War and Foreign Offices, and left next day, with such kit as I could collect in twenty-four hours, and on March 22nd I arrived at Salonika.

Chapter II The Base Of Operations

Salonika, the ancient Thessalonika, lies at the head of the Thermaean Gulf, at the north-western corner of the trident of Chalcidice. It has a population of some 160,000, three quarters of whom are Jews, the remainder being Mussalmans and Greeks. It is the chief town of the vilayet of the same name, and also the headquarters of the 3rd Army Corps, which, until latterly, radiated from Monastir. Built on the slope of a wooded hill, with a fine white stone quay and several beautiful old Roman arch ways, it hardly needs the glittering blue waters of the Aegean Sea, stretching away across the gulf to snow-capped Olympus and pointed Ossa, to give it that extraordinary fascination which the Byzantine cities of the Mediterranean always appear to possess. When I got there the weather was already warm, and promised to become hot very shortly, and in deed in less than a month the thermometer continually marked over 900.

Fearing the effects of the heat, the Turks were particularly occupying CHAP. II THE BASE OF OPERATIONS 9 themselves with extending and increasing their hospital arrangements, as the last time that troops had been concentrated in southern Macedonia there had been an epidemic of typhus, and the plain of Elassona was notoriously insalubrious in summer. Accordingly one of the first places I visited was the large military hospital outside the town, where there were then four hundred beds. They were not, of course, all full, but preparations were being made on a large scale to supplement the existing accommodation, for the place was to serve as the general medical depot of the army. It is an establishment that would compare favourably with anything of the kind in Europe, the wards, the doctors, and the system being all of the very best ; for the Turk is inherently clean, and he is capable of having organisation drilled into him, both of which virtues are not to be despised.

This hospital, however, was a sort of show place, and the temporary arrangements with divisional headquarters and in the field, which I saw later, did not come up to the same standard. Indeed they very often left much to be desired, and there is no doubt that but for the mag nificent undertaking of Sir Edgar Vincent, who sent out the Red Crescent, under the auspices of the Ottoman Bank, many of the wounded, who, as it was, quickly recovered, would have died, or at any rate have suffered permanently from the effects of their injuries. But at the time that I saw the Salonika Military Hospital I was more occupied with endeavouring to discover what proportion of the troops passing through on their way to the front had fallen sick and been left behind, and I was astonished to find how small that proportion was, not "5 per cent.

The great mass had come hundreds of miles from the interior of Asia Minor, travelling either by road or in cattle trucks ; they had then had a sea voyage of one or two days, and finally more road and more train with very little rest in between. It showed at once that the general stamina was very sound, due, no doubt, to the remarkably healthy life the peasants lead in the provinces, and perhaps to their abstemiousness, for their physical wants are very small, bread and water — the latter frequently far from clean — being sufficient to support the majority. As, however, the men were fed extraordinarily well throughout the campaign, getting meat, rice, and soup every day, as well as tobacco, the clean bill of health that distinguished the army is easily explained. Malingering did not appear to exist, and men would often go on for a long time without reporting themselves sick — natural enough in a war.

Most of the patients at Salonika were suffering from gastric diseases, with a certain pro portion of ophthalmia, but syphilis was almost nil — I think only about one per cent. The doctors were evidently well up to their work, and appeared to have a good practical knowledge of medicine, thouo-h their surgery is not, as a rule, so successful. The THE BASE OF OPERATIONS i s assistants were kind and handy, and the stores plentiful. A larger medical staff, and a better organised system of hospital transport, and espe cially of field ambulances, are the chief real needs. The idea of the thing and the way to do it are already understood — il ny a que les hommes qui manquent. Every one prefers to fight, and that is why all the technical services in Turkey are as yet in their infancy. There is, however, no reason why the German system should not be as well applied to these as it has been to the combatant arms, and no doubt after the experiences of this year this will be done.

But on the whole there was very little fault to find. The other main feature of interest in Salonika was the railway and the concentration of troops. The single line from Constantinople, by Dedeagatch to Salonika, had only been working some ten months, and the rolling stock was very limited. With the utmost strain the Austrian company could not manage to run more than five trains a day. Yet, during the whole of the month that the mobili sation went on, this extra service was kept up without any material delay in the passenger traffic, and with only one accident, which resulted in a block of thirty-six hours. The men were put in big empty vans or in cattle trucks, forty to a waggon. Each van could take eight horses or four field guns. A train averaged twenty waggons, and could therefore transport a battalion without its pack animals.

Accordingly it took about a week to send a division down the line, while the same distance by march route would have taken ten or twelve days. Alto gether it was a most creditable performance, and, like the hospital arrangements, gave one a good first impression of the way operations were to be conducted. Let us now glance at the Greek base. The Greek base was theoretically the sea, and practi cally the line of seaports extending along the coasts of the Aegean, for Volo, Halmyros, and Lamia, or rather Stalida, all served as military depots, where troops and supplies were landed either in their advance or retreat. The lines of communication were thus always comparatively short, and not exposed to flank attacks in the same way as the Turkish provision routes from Salonika to Elassona and Larissa.

The Piraeus served as a naval base, but in no case did Athens directly furnish the land army with supplies, the transport being carried on entirely by sea. It will thus be seen that the whole essence of the Turkish plan of advance should have been a pro minent and disproportionately strong left wing, with which to achieve the first principle of strategy by driving the enemy away from his base or cutting his lines of communication. This, however, was never realised, or at any rate successfully applied, and accordingly the Greeks were continually able to fall back on a seaport, take to their ships, and reform THE BASE OF OPERATIONS II 13 further south with a fresh and securer base. This however is somewhat premature, and will be discussed later. I had excellent opportunities of seeing what was going on, thanks entirely to the unceasing kindness of Mr. Blunt, C.B., our Consul-General.

Starting life as Lord Lucan's interpreter in the Crimean War, he has been wherever anything of interest has taken place in Turkey for the last forty years, and his untiring energy and unique knowledge of the country fit him peculiarly well for the important position he occupies at present. Mr. Blunt intro duced me to the Field-Marshal commanding at Salonika, Kiazim Pasha, and also to the Vali, Riza Pasha, both of whom helped me in every way they could, and were as hospitable as they were kind. At first there was some considerable difficulty in getting leave to go up to the front, but at last, by dint of telegraphing to London and Constantinople, an Irade was obtained and I was informed that I could go to Elassona, but that my telegrams would be subject to the military censorship and that I must consider myself under military law.

This was a natural and inevitable condition, and I accepted at once. I had got an excellent dragoman, Herman Charry by name, a Pole, who seemed able to talk every language under the sun, and I trusted to get tinohorses and grooms at Elassona. As for clothes I was rather badly off, having left everything in St. Petersburg, but before I came out I had ransacked my younger brother's wardrobe, whose absence at Oxford precluded any practical enforcement of his objections. A Norfolk jacket, two pairs of riding breeches, some boots and shirts, a saddle and a revolver comprised my kit — a fez, a necessity, I bought, and also such tinned things as I could get in Salonika. Finally, I took as much gold as I could carry in a waistbelt, in Turkish liras, and set out on March 31st in one of the Imperial torpedo boats called the Nusret, to cross the gulf to Katerina.

This boat had been most kindly lent to me by Kiazim Pasha, and as we steamed away in the early morning making about twelve knots, the captain pointed out the Kara Boyun headland where earthworks for siege guns had been erected, and whence started the line of submarine torpedoes that pro tected the entrance to the roadstead. We had a fairly rough passage and got to Katerina at nine o'clock. Here the Kaimakam very kindly supplied us with horses and an escort of Zaptiehs. A Cir cassian lieutenant of cavalry was travelling with me, and we at once set off on horseback across the northern shoulder of Mount Olympus to ride the forty miles to Elassona. The country was magni ficent, great wooded valleys covered with pine trees and below broad stretches of greensward along the banks of rushing streams.

The peasants were for the most part Vlaks, of the Roumanian stock, dressed in blue jackets and white skirts. They were nearly all occupied in building up the bridges and remaking t- >t ,» [To/ace p. 14. j Frontier North of Meteora, THE BASE OF OPERATIONS 15 the roads, which were not in very good condition. Such of them as could talk Turkish seemed perfectly happy and contented, and told me that there was more trade and more transport going on than had been known for ten years, and that they were well and regularly paid for their beasts and their labour. We passed one or two Greek villages, where the inhabitants were more silent and a little frightened, but they seemed to be utterly lacking in any idea or desire of an Hellenic rising. There were compara tively few troops on the road, as it was not a main artery to the front, though at Katerina there were large grain, biscuit and sandal stores, and two or three thousand recruits being drilled.

We got to Elassona late that evening, and were hospitably lodged and entertained by the Governor. From what I had seen coming down to Salonika from the Servian frontier at Ristovatz, by Uskub and the Vardar, and from the state of the country between Katerina and Elassona, and finally from what I heard from other correspondents coming in along the ordinary route by Kalaveria or Sorovitch and Serfije, I came to the conclusion that any chance of an insurrection in Macedonia was exceedingly remote, and that even should it take place it would be promptly and effectually put down. The real interest lay in front and not behind, and within three weeks the Turks were over the frontier and nearly all the activity was transferred to Thessaly.

Chapter III The Army In The Field

The Turco-Greek frontier is about 200 miles long. Starting from the Aegean Sea, just south of latitude 40°, it runs west thirty miles to Elassona, dips twenty to the south, and going another twenty to the west returns to its original latitude near Diskata. From here it continues west again thirty miles more to Metzovo, where it turns south west and at Kalarites due south, until it reaches the Ambracian Gulf at Arta. This entire boundary laid down in 1881 follows the water parting of a high range of hills, the passes being for the most part in the hands of the Turks. The line is almost equally divided by the great Pindus range of mountains that runs north and south and cuts it at Metzovo. The eastern portion of the Turkish territory is called Macedonia, the western Albania, the most southerly part of the latter, between the frontier and the Ionian Sea, being Epirus.

Thessaly consists of the three Greek provinces of in THE ARMY IN THE FIELD 17 Larissa, Trikkala, and Arta, the second being the largest and the last by far the smallest, and their southern frontier, slightly north of latitude 390, marks the limit of the Ottoman dominions prior to 1 88 1. The Turkish population has migrated to a very large extent, much more so than the Greeks have from Macedonia and Epirus. It will be seen, probably much quicker from the map than from my description, that a sort of wedge with a broad head goes down into Greek territory between Larissa and Trikkala — its area being about 400 square miles and consisting of three plains, Elassona to the north, Domenik to the west, and Damasi to the south. In this wedge the great mass of the Turkish force was concentrated, as being able to meet an attack from either flank.

It will now be necessary to give a few details about the strength of the army, but they shall be made as short as possible. The figures are the actual and not the nominal ones. 4 Companies make 1 Battalion or 750 men 4 Battalions ,, 1 Regiment „ 3,000 „ 2 Regiments „ 1 Brigade „ 6,000 „ 2 Brigades (at 6,000) 1 Squadron (at 120) I . . . , , jo \ >make 1 Division or 12,^00 3 Batteries (at 6 guns and 80 men) I ,J Non-combatants (say 140) ' Roughly, however, one may reckon the fighting strength of a division at not much over 10,000 men — the remainder being employed for transport, c i8 supply, baggage, and as camp and quarter guards and depot troops. Besides the above infantry units a cavalry regiment consists of five squadrons or 1,000 sabres and an artillery battalion of three batteries. I shall, how ever, limit myself as much as possible to the words battalion, battery, squadron, brigade, and division.

At the beginning of April the troops in Macedonia were disposed as follows : — ist Division, commanded by Hairi Pasha at Domenik 2nd „ „ Nechat Pasha „ Skumpa 3rd „ ,, Memdoukh Pasha „ Elassona 4th „ „ Haidar Pasha „ Elassona 5th „ „ Hakki Pasha „ Diskata 6th „ „ Hamdi Pasha „ Leptokarya An Independent Brigade, commanded by Mahomet Pasha at Elassona The Cavalry Division (15 squadrons), Suleyman Pasha, at Ormanli and the Corps Artillery (12 batteries), Riza Pasha, at Elassona. The 7th Division, under Husni Pasha, arrived at Elassona on May 4th, and an additional brigade also arrived at Diskata about the same time. The 8th Division, which never took part in the fighting, was not concentrated at Elassona before the 20th May. Besides all these there were two strong divisions of 15,000 men apiece in Epirus, one at Janina and the other at Luros, under Ahmed Hifsi and Mustafa Pashas respectively, the former being in chief com mand.

These had their own corps cavalry and artillery. There was, however, no real co-operation THE ARMY IN THE FIELD Ill 19 between the two armies until after the battle of Domoko, when the forces in Epirus had also been put under Edhem Pasha. During nearly all the campaign his command merely extended from the Aegean Sea to Metzovo, while everything west of that was directed from Janina. The general strategetical idea, to use a very ponderous phrase, was as follows : — The base of operations was Salonika and the railway line running thence by Kalaveria and Sorovitch to Monastir. Elassona was the headquarters of the eastern and Janina of the western army. Katerina, Kalaveria, Sorovitch, and Serfije all served as depots for recruits and matdriel of the former force, though on a comparatively small scale, as everything was pushed forward at once.

Edhem's plan was to concentrate the great mass of his troops in the wedge, and merely to protect his wings with a sufficient force to guard against any flank attack. In any case he could easily move reinforcements to the right or left, while from the position he held between Larissa and Trikkala the Greek centre was seriously threatened. It was true that his lines of communication were not particularly well supplied with stationary troops to repel an attack from the sea, but there was a continual movement along them, and the Turks relied on the lack of numbers in the Hellenic army which would render any landing on a large scale impossible. South of Elassona lay two divisions, c and round it two and a half more. The cavalry was at Ormanli, a village ten miles to the north, and the 5th and 6th Divisions were thirty miles or so to the east and west.

The passes themselves were not held in any very great force, though the garrisons of the various blockhouses had been doubled ; but all the available artillery positions had been armed with mountain or field guns, and though no regular system of outposts was adopted, single battalions were scattered along the reverse slopes of the mountains within a mile or two of the frontier. The troops were under canvas, and, excepting two battalions in barracks, only divisional staffs lived in towns or villages. All transport and com missariat centred from Elassona, except those of the 5th and 6th Divisions, which drew direct from the railway. The organisation struck me as distinctly good. Each battalion, squadron, and battery had its own pack animals which brought food forward day by day, fatigue parties being detailed from each unit for this service.

There were small hospitals at Lepto karya and Diskata, and a large one at Elassona. Water was brought in in skins from the springs, and the men were not allowed to drink from the river that runs through the town. Every man carried his own ammunition, never less than a hundred cartridges, and one rarely saw a soldier, whatever his employment, without his rifle on his back. Cooking, repairing, and armoury were HI THE ARMY IN THE FIELD 21 all done in battalions, and in some ways the self supporting elements were much better developed in the smaller units than in divisions. Divisional commanders rarely made proper use of their cavalry and artillery, and the employment of the technical arms they possessed, such as sappers, telegraphists, &c, was invariably directed from the army headquarters. In fact, the German system has not as yet grown much beyond the battalion.