The Battlefields of Thessaly. With personal experiences in Turkey and Greece, etc

Front matter

THE BATTLEFIELDS OF THESSALY. [Frontispiece. CAMPAIGNING IN THESSALY E. A. B ELLIS. ELIA THE BATTLEFIELDS OF THESSALY. WITH PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN TURKEY AND GREECE. BY SIR ELLIS ASHMEAD BARTLETT, M.P. WITH PORTRAITS AND MAPS. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1897. LONDON : PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS. TO THE OTTOMAN ARMY, THAT GALLANT, HIGHLY DISCIPLINED, PATIENT, AND INDOMITABLE SOLDIERY, WHOSE COURAGE AND FORTITUDE HAVE SO OFTEN SAVED THEIR COUNTRY PROM THE ASSAULTS OP ITS ENEMIES, I DEDICATE THIS WORK. PBEEACE. ■ ♦■ This book is intended mainly as a narrative of my own and my son's personal experiences during the campaign in Thessaly, and our subsequent visit to Athens and Constantinople. In Thessaly we saw the Turkish soldiers fight in several battles, and were with the army constantly, both on the march and in camp.

We learned from thorough experience to appreciate not only the courage and tenacity, but also the admirable discipline, good conduct, and kindly nature of the Ottoman troops. We traversed Thessaly from the Melouna Pass to Valestinos, and admired the majestic mass of Olympus with its snow-clad heights, the beauties of the Peneius, the exquisite scenery of Tempe, the luxuriant cornfields of the rich plains, and the graceful background of mountains that everywhere relieves the Thessalian landscape. We were received with great consideration and kindness by the Mushir Edhem Pasha and

Preface

.1 VIII by all his staff, as well as by many Ottoman officers of humbler station. The uniform courtesy and hospitality of the Turks of all ranks make it a pleasure to visit the Ottoman Army. Of the Greeks, of course, we saw less, but our involuntary visit to their warships was most interesting. It enabled us to make the acquaintance of some agreeable Greek officers, to see the glories of Athens, and to hear the views of the King of Greece. Our treatment by the Greeks gave no cause of complaint. In one respect our experience was probably unique. During a condition of actual warfare, and within a period of three days, we were given audiences by both the Sovereigns of the two combatants — the Sultan and the King of Greece. We also met and conversed with the Prime Ministers and leading statesmen of the two countries.

All that we saw and heard during our brief but eventful experiences in Thessaly, at Athens and Constantinople, confirmed me in the con viction that the traditional policy of England towards the Ottoman Empire is the right and the necessary policy. The substitution of a policy of hostility for one of friendship towards

PREFACE.

. IX the chief independent Mussulman Power of the world has brought nothing but mischief to British interests, as well as to the peoples whose cause has been espoused by England. This has been the unfortunate result both in Europe and Asia, and, above all, in India. A policy of friendship towards the Ottoman Empire is absolutely necessary for this country. It was the policy of Lord Beaconsfield ; it is based on the eternal necessities of strategy, race, and politics ; and, if the gravest disasters are to be averted, it will have to be resumed. I have to express my obligation to Lieu tenant Crookshank, of the Engineers, who helped me in the preparation of the plans ; to Mr. Clive Bigham's excellent work, "With the Turkish Army in Thessaly ; " and also to the correspondents of the Standard, Daily Neios, and Reuter's Agency, whose letters I have been allowed to use.

The bulk of this work was written two months ago, but its issue has been delayed by various causes, which I regret. E. A. B. August, 1897. b CONTENTS. CHAPTER PAGE I. — True Significance of the War . . . 1 II. — Causes of the War. . . . .11 III. — The Position of Austria . . . .45 IV. — Our Journey to the Front ... 74 Y. — Edhem Pasha and Melouna ... 90 VI.- — From Melouna to Larissa . . .111 VII.— Review of the War 124 VIII.— Second Period of the War . . .159 IX.— First Battle of Valestinos . . .180 X. — Valestinos, Pharsalos, and Domokos . . 216 XL— The War in Epirus . . . .248 XII. — The Vale of Tempe and our Capture . .261 XIII. — Our Capture and the Admiral . . . 277 XIV. — At the Piræus and Athens . . . 303 XV— The King of Greece . . . .310 XVI.— Constantinople 320 XVIL — The Sultan, his Character and Court . . 331 XVIIL— Conclusion 352

Appendix

PAGE I. — Greek Corruption and Favouritism . . 363 II. — A Colossal Tragedy — Extermination of Turks 368 III.— The Massacre of Offlanlick . . .382 IV.— Good Conduct of Turkish Soldiers . . 385 V.— The Second Battle of Valestinos . . 388 VI.— The Battle of Pharsalos . . . .397 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Campaigning in Thessaly — Ellis, Elia, and E. A. B. ... . . . Frontispiece Edhem Pasha ..... to face page 90 Ghazi Osman Pasha . . . . „ „ 92 Sketch Map of the battles of Melouna and Mati-Deliler, April 18th and 23rd . „ „ 102 Von Grumbkoff Pasha . . . ,, ,, 168 Map showing positions of the Turkish and Greek forces on 25th April, 1897, at the capture of Larissa . . . . „ „ 180 Sketch Map of first battle of Valestinos, April 30th „ 186 Sketch Map of battle of Domokos, May 17th „ „ 216 Map showing positions of the Turkish and Greek forces on 20th May, 1897 . . „ „ 246 Munir Pasha „ „ 340 Izzet Bey . . . . . . „ „ 344 Grand Vizier, Halil Rifaat Pasha . . „ „ 352 C * THE BATTLEFIELDS OF THESSALY.

Chapter I

The war between Turkey and Greece has not been on a large scale. The contest has been one-sided and by no means severe. The num bers of men engaged have been moderate, and the losses have not been heavy. The fighting was limited to a period of one month. It has resulted in the Greeks being driven out of Thessaly, and the whole of that rich province falling into Turkish occupation. The fighting in Epirus was of little consequence. Both sides occupied at the close much the same positions as at the beginning. So far then the Turco-Greek War of 1897 has seemed to be of small importance, both as regards its character and its im mediate results. Yet the real significance of the recent struggle in Thessaly and its political consequences are infinitely more important and B more far-reaching than the actual fighting would import.

It is part of a great development of that eternal Eastern Question which has such profound interest and gravity for England. It marks a striking, possibly a decisive stage in the history of the Ottoman Empire, and in the grouping of the Great Powers. It has exercised a most remarkable influence upon the feeling and conduct of the millions of the world's population who profess the Mussulman faith, and in whom recent events in Turkey have aroused a feeling of union and cohesion long unknown to Islam. The sentiment of growing solidarity among Mahometans has received in spiration and vigour from the triumphs of the Turkish arms in Thessaly. How important and how serious for England and for the Empire of England the future course of this Islamic revival may be, the most superficial consideration of our position in India will show.

In that wonderful fabric of wise and beneficent dominion over many alien races and creeds, more than 60,000,000 of the most sterling and most war like of the Queen's subjects are devoted to the Mussulman faith. The remarkable sovereign who holds the north-western gates of India — Chap. I.] MUSSULMAN SOLIDARITY. 3 the avenues by which all the great conquerors of India have approached its fertile plains — the Amir Abdurrahman, is also a devoted Moslem. Another important result of the war in Thessaly and its accompanying events has been the prominence which the war has given to the keen rivalry between Russia and Germany for the military alliance of Turkey. This war also marks the serious decline — it might almost be said the total loss — of British influence at Constantinople. Germany has had the good sense to secure the friendship of Turkey by protecting the Turkish power, while we have been recklessly reviling everything Turkish.

Russia is jealous of German predominance at Constantinople, which Russian statesmen had come Lo regard as their own special preserve. Germany has secured the support, in case of European war, of the splendid Ottoman army ; and that alliance means that the German monarchies have got the balance of military force on their side as against their great rivals, the Franco-Russian league. The value of the Turkish fighting power, and the importance of Mussulman good-will to us are undeniable. It is for these reasons, and, B in addition, because of the immense value to this country of the Ottoman Empire as the guardian of Constantinople and the Straits, that the writer of this book has persistently maintained the necessity of careful accuracy and moderation in criticising the conduct of the Sovereign and Government of Turkey.

The Sultan is not only the master of many valiant legions, he is also the Caliph of Islam. Justice towards the Turkish people and towards the Mussulman religion is not merely right morally, it is absolutely expedient and necessary for the British people, who rule so vast a Mussul man dominion. Unhappily a large section of the politicians and of the Press of this country, not limited to the Radical party, have thrown considerations of prudence, not less than of accuracy, to the winds, and have indulged in a violence of language and a recklessness of abuse towards the Sultan and his ministers and officers which are without precedent. When I condemn " sham sentiment and atrocity-mongering," I do not refer to suitable and well-considered reprobation of the evil deeds that were done in Armenia during the last three months of 1895.

The most violent denunciations and the most Chap. I.] 5 SHAM SENTIMENT. vituperative epithets were indulged in during the ten months after December, 1894, and were based upon journalistic fictions regarding the Sassun revolt and its repression. These stories either had no existence whatever in reality, or rested on the most slender basis of fact. By atrocity-mongering and sham sentiment, I mean two things : first, the charge against a nation or power of atrocities which do not exist ; and secondly, the use of the atrocity cry for party purposes in this country. For nine months the Sultan, the Turkish Government, the Turkish army, and the Turkish people were vilified and attacked in England for alleged atrocities in the suppression of the Sassun revolt, which never had any existence at all.

There was a revolt in Armenia, and it was suppressed at the cost of 262 lives, or, as the most exaggerated stories put it, at the cost of five or six hundred lives. This was ex aggerated into atrocities of the worst kind, by which were said to have been sacrificed some 30,000 Armenian lives. These horrible atrocities never existed ; the stories were absolute fiction, and they were paid for by that Great Power whose object is to destroy the Ottoman Empire, and by destroying that empire to deal a deadly blow at the dominion of England. Terrible deeds were done in Asia Minor, but they were done at a later period, and they were largely caused by the agitation got up in England. This sham sentiment caused injury to Turkey, great injury to the Armenians, and much injury to England herself and to British interests.

It is this false and injurious atrocity-mongering that should be condemned. I deeply deplore the terrible events which took place in Asia Minor at the end of 1895. When I had the opportunity of speaking to the Sultan in January last, I ventured to impress upon His Majesty the disastrous effect that these evil deeds had upon this country, and urged him to use the severest means to prevent their recurrence. The Sultan then detailed to me the careful measures he had already taken with this object, which measures, he felt assured, would bring about the desired result of peace and security. This intemperate abuse of the Sultan and his representatives, long before there was any practical ground for such charges, created a very bitter feeling of indignation not only in official circles in the Ottoman Empire, but also through out the mass of the Mussulman population.

It Chap. I.] PROVOCATIONS OF MUSSULMANS. 7 strengthened the conviction, which had been spreading among the Turkish people, that there was a wide-spread conspiracy among the Chris tian Powers, which England then appeared to lead, for the overthrow of Turkish rule and for the destruction of the Mussulman faith. This sentiment was inflamed by the deliberate provo cations of the Armenian revolutionary con spirators, who sought to attain their political independence by provoking bloody reprisals. The unfortunate blunders of our Ambassador at Constantinople, his marked subservience to Russia and to France, and his very impractic able and, as regards the dominant Mussulman element, his exasperating scheme of reforms, promulgated in August, 1895, added fuel to the flames, always so ready to burst forth.

Whatever may be thought of the Turkish character or of the Mussulman religion, it is contrary to human nature to expect a proud and dominant race and creed to give up the ascendency of centuries without a struggle. The spark was applied by the rash and injurious Armenian emeute in Constantinople on September 30, 1895. Then 2000 armed Armenians tried to force their way to the Porte. They murdered the police officer who sought by peaceful remonstrance to stop them, and also shot over a score of his men. This outrage in the capital of the Empire, directed, as it was believed, against their Sove reign, the Caliph of their faith, had an electric effect upon the whole Mahometan inhabitants of Asia Minor. It started those terrible reprisals which during the next three months of 1895 caused so much slaughter and misery to the Armenian population.

The Eastern Question, so far as England is concerned, consists of two main factors. First, there is the humanitarian factor. This factor is due to the tremendous danger of arousing, or letting loose, the religious and race antagonisms that underlie the sentiment of the heterogeneous populations of the Ottoman Empire. This peril has always been present to the mind of English statesmen in the past, and has not, until lately, been overlooked even by the mass of politicians. The second factor is the supreme importance of Constantinople and the Straits to the European balance of power, and especially to the Eastern power and naval supremacy of England. Russia in control of Constantinople and the Dardanelles would mean the speedy loss to England of her naval supremacy in the Mediter ranean. With the loss of naval supremacy Chap. I.] REASONS FOR GOING TO THE WAR. 9 would go, of course, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and probably Malta as well.

The possession of Constantinople by Russia would mean the control by Russia of the matchless fighting material of the Turkish army, a force against which, if directed by European officers, we could not for long hope to defend India. Both these all-important factors have been for the past three years absolutely ignored by the Radical party in this country, and what is more serious, by a considerable portion of the Unionist party as well. When the opportunity offered during the Easter recess of visiting the scene of the war that was imminent between Turkey and Greece, I seized it with eagerness. My reasons were four-fold. I wished to see the real condition of the Ottoman army, its fighting power and organisation, and the generalship of its officers. I was anxious to see how the Turkish soldiers conducted themselves in an enemy's country, and towards a beaten foe.

I had also a strong desire to do anything in my power to shorten the struggle and to make peace between two countries and two races, which in my opinion were bound by every consideration of self-interest to be friends and not enemies. The fourth reason — and one which weighed even more with me than the others — was the supreme wish to be able the better, from the knowledge and experience gained during the campaign, to promote at home the old and necessary policy of friendship towards the Ottoman Empire. The policy of friendly pressure towards Turkey, instead of hostile coercion, has always been advocated by me. This has been the traditional policy of English statesmen. The hostile coercion, which has been so much in vogue during the past three years, has done no good to any race or interest in Turkey.

Rather has it caused infinite mischief — much disaster and suffering in Turkey, much alienation between England and Turkey, and much loss of prestige and influence to this country. Chap. IL] 11

Chapter II. Causes Of The War

The real cause of the war between Greece and Turkey is not easy to find. It cannot be assigned, as most Turkish difficulties are assigned by our Turcophobes, to misgovernment, or to some form of malignity at Constantinople. It may be attributed with much show of reason to the ambition and vanity of the Greek race, and especially of the political leaders at Athens. Probably no country has a vainer or more reckless body of politicians at its head than the modern Hellenic kingdom. To their character a writer disposed to be very Phil-Hellenic has recently borne remarkable witness. The estimate in which Mr. Bennet Burleigh, the famous war correspondent, holds the Greeks is quoted below. Mr. Burleigh was with the Greeks throughout the campaign and he began his experiences with a considerable prejudice in favour of the Hellenic cause.

His disillusion ment seems to have been complete. The follow- CAUSES OF THE WAR. [Chap. II. ing extract is taken from his article in the Fortnightly Review of July this year : — In a wide and varied experience I have never known a people whose public affairs and business intercourse were so flagrantly conducted upon a basis of systematised delusion. The races that to-day inhabit Hellas, speaking generally, have all the faults and few of the good qualities of the old Greek. Their chicanery, as much as their inveterate indo lence, have cramped the commerce and retarded the progress of the country. English merchants and traders declare that it is almost impossible to do business with the Greeks, so corrupt is the administration of the customs, and so frail is the commercial morality of the people.

With few, if any, exceptions, the foreign journalists who recently proceeded to Greece were at the outset favourably disposed to the Greek cause. The plausible Greek, however, got found out, and those who wished to bless, found that truth required they should ban. It was not only that they detested the utter incompetence, vapouring, and cowardice of the great majority of the Greek officers, or that they saw the army was without organisation, and the whole official class astoundingly unscrupulous ; but that the ordinary native, even with the land in the direst stress of war, neglected no opportunity to trick and cheat. Preferably, strangers were his prey — that many of them were volunteers come to give of their means and to fight for Greece, made no difference. The indictment is black, but nevertheless, if needs be, capable of proof.

Nor is. half told of the causes which provoked the disgust of foreigners. The small mean nesses of a people may be overlooked, but the callous treat ment of volunteers, the cowardly abandonment of women and children and wounded on repeated occasions to the enemy, deserved to be recalled against the Greeks, and particularly Chap. IL] THE MODERN GREEK. 13 their military chiefs. To maltreat prisoners, leading them haltered and bound with ropes through the streets, to alter and destroy letters and telegrams, so that only garbled and false information should get abroad, are practices not commonly employed by the officials of civilised governments. Yet these things were frequently done before and during the war. Another interesting and, in its way, remarkable verdict upon the condition of modern Greece and the character of the Greek people will be found in Appendix I. at the end of this volume.* The Greeks are intensely jealous as well as vain, and any increase of Slav power in the Balkan Peninsula at once arouses keen resent ment.

The Greeks have never forgotten that theirs was the Empire of the East for eleven centuries. To the glories of Byzantium and Constantinople the modern Greeks always recur. The creation of a great and independent Bulgaria in 1878, the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria in 1885, and the enlargement of Servia and Montenegro, each and all aroused Greek jealousy and ambition. Nor is this unnatural, for the Greeks are the only non-Slav race in * Appendix I. Extracts from Mr. E. J. Dillon's article in the Contemporary Review for July, 1897. [Chap. II. 14 CAUSES OF THE WAR. South-Eastern Europe, except the Turks, and the Slav torrent is as great a peril to the Hellenes as it is to the Ottomans. It is a curious illustration of the irony of fate that the most prominent champion of modern Greece in this country should have borne the principal part in dashing for ever the hopes of an Hellenic restoration in South -Eastern Europe.

The creation of the vigorous and practical, though brutal, Bulgarians into a great independent State, stretching right across the Balkan Penin sula, has effectually shut out Hellenic power from those countries. Pan-Bulgaria is an effective and deadly barrier to a restoration of the Byzantine Empire. Mr. Gladstone's agitation and influence led to the creation of Pan-Bulgaria. So inimical are Bulgarians to the Hellenic race that it is far more probable that Macedonia will become Bulgarian than Greek, if it ever ceases to be Turk. Greece was, therefore, early in the field. A training camp for 12,000 men was established at Thebes by the Greek Government in July, 1896 ; every effort was made from Athens, unofficially and officially, to stir up troubles in Crete, and the Ethnike Hetairia was allowed and encouraged to pour rifles and agitators into the island.

Chap. IL] GREEK ADVANTAGES. 15 When it became clear that the whole of the Great Powers formally, and the majority of them genuinely, desired peace and wished to avert a Cretan crisis, the Greeks only became more urgent and active in their revolutionary propaganda. The Cretan ChristiaDS were ex cited in every possible way to attack, outrage, and drive into exile their Mussulman neighbours. Europe was openly defied. A regular policy of chantage was adopted by Greece towards the European Powers. Greece evidently hoped to drive the Great Powers, by playing on their unconcealed dread of a general war, into con ceding her unreasonable demands. The declaration by the Powers of autonomy for Crete, and its acceptance by the Sultan, brought matters to a climax. The last thing that the Greeks desire for Crete is autonomy.

They wish Crete to become Greek, not autonomous. They fear that if the Cretans once taste the delights of self government, their Pan-Hellenic tendencies will vanish. Greece invaded Crete, believing that the Great Powers would let her annex the island rather than risk a European war. Foiled in this piratical attempt by the union and firm ness of the Great Powers, and by the extreme [Chap. II. 16 CAUSES OF THE WAR. moderation of Turkey, Greece decided to precipitate a collision on the Thessalian border. Greece had been for some time in a very bad way. The country is for the most part poor and badly governed. The Greeks have never been an imperial race. They have never possessed the genius or arts of sound adminis tration. Brilliant in poetry, in eloquence, in the fine arts, in every kind of intellectual subtlety, they have always been lacking in the real governing power.

Athens at its most splendid epoch was a country of 30,000 free men, who lived by the forced industry of 100,000 slaves. And Athens was but one of a dozen small Grecian states, always living in bitter hostility to each other. The Greek of to day resembles in his bad qualities the Greek of the Periclean era, without the intellectual and artistic brilliance which almost redeemed the vices of that golden age. Greece has been bankrupt for some years. Her creditors have been docked of three-fourths of their due. The foreign loans have been spent in arming Greece and in corruption among the needy journalists and lawyers who fill her legis lature. This latter class abounds in Greece, where men much prefer to live on agitation, Chap. IL] GREEK AGITATION IN CRETE. 17 rather than on honest work. Crete is a rich island which has been very lightly taxed under the much abused Turk.

The Greeks desired to annex Crete, which they regard as a milch cow, to be milked and bled for the benefit of Greece. The Cretans could hardly be expected to realise the real motive of their so-called friends in the midst of insurrection and rapine, when passions are heated and bloodshed prevails. There is little doubt, however, they will thoroughly understand if Crete gets autonomy and things settle down into peace and order. Hence the intense desire of the Greeks to get hold of Crete at once, while the rancour between Christian and Mussulman was keen, and while the war fever was raging. The moment Greece heard in August, 1896, that the Sultan had conceded autonomy to Crete on the guarantee of the Great Powers, that moment agitators and rifles were poured from Greece into Crete in order to stir, up strife.

The Cretans were at first highly pleased and satisfied with the concessions of the Turkish Government. Then came the needy lawyers and journalists and professional bandits from Greece, who promised the Cretan Christians the lands and houses of their Mussulman neighbours, c [Chap. H. 18 CAUSES OF THE WAR. and commenced a campaign of outrage and murder against the Mussulmans, in order to provoke retaliation and excite civil war. In vain had the Austrian Government, which fore saw what was coming, proposed to the other Powers the establishment of a naval cordon round Crete in order to keep out the arms and the agitators. Great Britain very inadvisedly declined to join in this most wise proposal of prevention. The persistence of the Great Powers and the moderation of Turkey would probably, in the long run, have overcome the mischievous efforts of the agitators, but as a last throw of the revolutionary dice, the Greek Govern ment sent over Colonel Vassos and his four thousand men, who acted as firebrands through out the island.

Colonel Vassos landed on February 15th, 1897. A perfect deluge of blood and fire was at once inaugurated. Every where the Christian insurgents rose and fell upon their defenceless Mussulman neighbours, plundering, outraging, and in many cases mas sacring them. The barbarous and bloody work in Sitia, where over a thousand Mussulmans were murdered, is but a specimen of what came from the invasion of these Greek fili- Chap. IL] 19 CRETAN HORRORS. busters. Hundreds of wretched Mussulmans were butchered in the villages. Many were burned alive in their mosques. Women and children were outraged and mutilated. In fact, the worst of the Armenian horrors were paralleled by these Christian warriors. The whole Mussulman population of Crete is now crowded together in a few coast towns, where they have suffered and still suffer extreme misery and starvation.

Upon the effect of Colonel Vassos' invasion, and upon the sufferings of the Mussulman inhabitants, Mr. George Curzon said in the House of Commons on May 7th, 1897 : The interior of the island of Crete at the present moment is in the occupation of a large number of Cretans, who are in the occupation of the villages and the enjoyment of the possessions and crops of the unhappy Mussulmans who have been turned out. They are leading a fife of armed idleness, wandering up and down the mountains, exchanging shots with everybody whom they meet, and, I am sorry to say, killing every Mohammedan of either sex who falls within their range. Near the towns these Christian Insurgents are engaged, in spite of reiterated warnings, in attacks upon the blockhouses and the outposts of the positions, and in cutting off the water supply, and otherwise endeavouring to starve the people within the walls.

These Insurgents are, to a large extent, led by Greek officers, the ranks are filled with Greek Volunteers, the only Artillery they appear to possess arc Greek cannon. In the recent interview which the Admirals C [Chap. II. 20 CAUSES OF THE WAR. had with the eight Insurgent Chiefs, five of them were found to be Greek lawyers, and a sixth was a Greek doctor. The Leader of the Opposition, in the last debate in this House on Cretan affairs, told us we were trying to starve and bombard the Cretan people into the acceptance of autonomy. The phrase was one which fell very glibly from the lips of the right hon. gentleman, but it is absolutely destitute of any foundation in fact. What are the facts as to the alleged starvation caused by the blockade, of which the right hon. gentleman is so much in dread ?

The reports we have received from persons who have been moving freely about among the Insurgents in the interior assure us that the canteens and eating houses are doing a roaring trade ; that food is everywhere abundant ; that now the crops are about to be gathered there will be no lack of provisions ; and that in the interior the Christians will not only have their own crops, but those of the evicted Mussulmans as well. These facts which I have narrated to the House represent a faithful picture of society as it at present exists in that Island. Now I turn to what is passing in the towns, and here I will deal with the topic raised by two or three preceding speakers of the continuance of the Turkish troops in the Island May I put before the House what the facts are with regard to the coast towns and the Turkish troops in them ?