Extracts from the Writings of Eminent Authors: moral, historical and poetical ... Third edition, greatly enlarged

Preface

From tbe title of the book, it requires no preface — Selections — — — i ~^rz^.zi :: F— :---- A _:::::; I: ij J-riA z.i:n sary to descant on the great advantage of hating comprised in two volumes soch a number of extracts from the works of some of die wisest and most eminent men the world has pro duced. The Selecter may venture to praise, as the only part she has in the book is trouble, and the gratification of circu- We are all fond of knowledge and information, if we can have it without trouble. Let any one look over the Table of Contents, and see the vast number of books that hare been extracted from; and he will find how much labour will be saved, and how much "lr3w""t%f»i will be gained by the T-rsses;::-: :: s_; - i : : :k. The Selecter also feels fuUy assured, that any one whose taste it may soit, will not regret die purchase of it. a PAGE 1 19 'J.'.', 21 A :■?- 40 53 .'il 99 102 103 105 106 127 128 Ui. 130 'A. 144 151 153 159 1«5 1C7 C ONTENTS 01 VOL. I. Fortune (opinion of the ancients concerning it) The fear and love of God are not the only springs to human actions State of the world compared to a wheel Equality Envy, malice, hatred, caases of melancholy Madness and folly of man Melancholy in disposition, improperly so called Queen Dido discovers to her sister her passion for Æneas Love, (melancholy,) symptoms of it Cicero on old age Love A letter Opinions of St. Preux Good and evil Evil of being in love Beauty Danton Napoleon Cromwell Parting of Hector and Andromache Athens K/>rae Waterloo Bonaparte Voltaire and Gibbon VI CONTENTS.

PAGE 168 Voltaire ib. Gibbon Rousseau 169 Critique on " Don Juan" 171 Metella's tomb 172 Reflections : — The Palatine Hill, Rome The dying gladiator 174 176 178 The Coliseum of Rome The Pantheon of Rome Love ib. 179 Time 182 St. Peter's at Rome 183 Death of young Princess Charlotte 184 An accusation 186 Fame 188 Greek children at play 191 On good taste in the affairs of life ib. On self-examining . 215 The moralists. Philocles to Palemon 227 Sorrow and heaviness of heart 245 Rooted opinion 246 Covetousness ib. Humility 247 Patience and contentment ib. The contrast. Humility and Pride ii. Pride 249 Distress 251 Imposture . 252 Evils ib. Contentment 253 Religion ti. ii. Wisdom the bubble of man Virtue and vice 254 Oppression, the source of discontent 255 Insolence boundless in base minds ib.

Curiosity wove in the frame of man Pleasures of observation and study 256 Shame and disgrace — men seldom able to encounter 257 Contentment 258 Frailty ii. Shandy's reflections on death 259 Forgiveness, the most refined virtue CONTENTS. VII PAGE Solitude, the nurse of wisdom Man's life 260 261 On time ib. Regulation of spirit ib. Just judgment of the world 262 Openness and candour in our opinion* Selfishness and meanness ib. 263 Difference in men ii. Man, reflections upon him 264 Not to be too hasty in our opinions Affected honesty . ii. 265 Affected piety ii. ii. Affected sanctity Ostentatious generosity 266 An author asking a subscription to his work Not to judge an author's writings by his life Age ..... ii. ii. 267 Age and youth Dependence Riches 268 ii. 269 Comparison between riches and understanding Truth .... 271 272 Ridicule Rebellion Indolence Knowledge Discontent ib. ii. ii. 273 ii.

A mind in sorrow Marriage . 274 276 Curiosity 281 Remarks on private life Disquisition upon greatness 284 287 He who studies philosophy learns to die Love .... 290 304 Changeableness and inconstancy of men Fortune .... 306 307 Why man does not love to know and observe himself Of the inconstancy of our actions . 314 315 Virtue only to be courted for its own sake 321 That we are not to judge of man's happiness before his death Of idleness ...... 322 325 Of solitude CONTENTS. PAGE 330 337 il. 342 346 350 355 357 358 363 368 400 401 407 415 418 Voltaire's Tales A mind in despair On the soul Toleration, and on the maxim that it is impossible philosophers should be of prejudice to human society Of suicide Virtue is better than learning An address to the Deity We do not know what the soul is Of vain-glory ; being the substance of a conversation with a Chinese On the conduct of the understanding Of ideas in general and their original.

All ideas come from sensation or reflection ...... Of perception Of retention Of discerning, and other operations of the mind Useful to know the extent of our comprehension Cohesion of the solid parts in body as hard to be conceived as thinking in the soul ..... &c. FORTUNE, (OPINION OF THE ANCIENTS CONCERNING.) If I were to collect all that they have said on this subject, I should be obliged to write a whole book on that head. I only propose to glean a few ears in this spacious field. It may be affirmed, that no hypothesis is better established in the writings of the ancients, than that human industry and prudence have a much less share in events than our good or ill fortune ; or, in other words, an unforeseen concourse or disposition of circumstances not in the least degree depending upon us.

" Among these, indeed, the actions of virtue are great, but those of fortune much greater." Pliny speaks thus, after having related several events ; he lays down a little further the same maxim, though somewhat more obscurely. " The times in which each person's virtues happen to appear are of very great importance." Though Quintus Curtius should not ex pressly tell us, that Alexander's conquests were less owing to valour than to fortune, his history alone would have sufficiently declared it. Cornelius Nepos affirms, that in the division of military glory, fortune has always the greatest share. " The soldier justly claims some share with the general, but fortune much more than either, since her assistance may truly be said B to be of greater consequence than his conduct." You may see in M. Spanheim ', what Livy, Diodorus Siculus, and others, have acknowledged concerning this emperor, either in express words, or by declaring, that we ought not to judge of personal merit by the success of actions, which is entirely subject to fortune, but by the means that are used.

Scarcely any one of the poets has expressed himself so nervously on this subject as Juvenal : — 'Tis fate that flings tbe dice ; and as she flings, Of kings makes pedants, and of pedants kings. What made Ventidius rise, and Tullius great, But their kind stars, and hidden power of fate ! Juvenal also says, " for one lucky hour is of more conse quence to a soldier, than a recommendation to Mars either from his mistress or his mother." The sentiment of princes being here of greater force than that of a poet ; I shall cite the answer of Dionysius the younger, when he was asked this question by Philip, king of Macedon : " Wherefore did you not maintain yourself in the kingdom which your father left you ?" " Do not be surprised at that," replied he, " for my father, who left me all his other effects, did not leave me the fortune by which he acquired them."

I might subjoin to these quotations the thoughts of several modern authors, but shall content myself with a passage in Montaigne. " It is commonly observable in human actions, that fortune, in order to convince us of the great power she bears over all things, and of the pleasure she takes in checking our presumption, not being able to make fools wise, she makes them fortunate in spite of virtue ; and she is most inclined to favour those executions, where the design is more especially her own. Hence, we daily see the most simple amon» us defeat the greatest enterprises, both public and private. And as Siranncz the Persian answered those, who were very much surprised at the ill success of his affairs, considering that his 1 Spanheim sur les Cæsars de Julien, p. 428. designs were so well laid, ' that he alone was master of his designs, but as to the success that was in the breast of fortune ;' so these may answer in the same manner, but in a different sense, that the greatest part of the affairs of the world are done of themselves. ' Fata viam inveniunt.' ' Fate finds the way.' The event frequently authorizes a very foolish conduct.

Our interposition is only a thing of course, and more commonly in consideration of custom and example than reason. When I have been astonished at the greatness of an action, and upon inquiry of those who have accomplished it, have been let into their motives and management, I have found their counsels very common, and the most vulgar and customary are perhaps also the most secure, and best adapted to practice, if not for show. Good luck and ill luck are, in my opinion, two sovereign powers. It is ridiculous to think, that human prudence is able to act the same part as fortune will do ; and his enterprise is very vain, who presumes to secure both the causes and consequences, and lead, as it were by the hand, the pro gress of his undertaking ; even more particularly in martial councils." Notwithstanding all the authorities just now cited, it is certain, that several good writers have maintained, that every one is the author of his own fortune, and is either miserable or happy as he acts imprudently.

It is also to be found, as cited from an ancient poet, in a discourse attributed to Sallust, and Cornelius Nepos alleges it twice in the life of Pomponius Atticus. Those who have exclaimed so much against Theo phrastus for praising the maxim, that fortune, not wisdom, is the directress of life, have come very near to Plautus' assertion ; and what shall we say of M. De Chilliere, who in his book of the fortune of persons of quality, maintains, that our good or ill fortune depends on our conduct? and although M. De Silhon says, that fortune is a phantom which religion hath abolished, and whose insertion was not useless, since the un happy and imprudent attribute to her the causes of their misery, and the effects of their ill conduct, yet I do not b reckon him to be one of the favourers of Plautus' maxims ; for he did not pretend, that, in order to succeed in our under takings, it is sufficient to comport ourselves in them according to the rules of prudence, and to have a good cause.

He owns a prosperity and adversity, dispensed by the providence of God, without any necessary regard to our intentions and measures. There appeared some time ago a very good book, entitled, " Reflections on what is called Good or 111 Luck in Lotteries V The author is undoubtedly of Plautus' opinion, or, to speak more plainly, he does not believe that the fortunate lots run for or against certain persons, with any sort of distinction. It is not, therefore, a general opinion, that there is some unknown cause which favours or crosses certain persons, without any regard to their good or ill qualities, or the measures they take to attain their ends. But we must own, that the greatest number of suffrages is for the affirmative ; however, as that is no manner of proof of the truth of the opinion, I wish that some able pen would examine the subject to the bottom, and discuss what could be said on each side.

In the mean time I will here offer a few reflections. I observe, first of all, that we ought not to imagine that the Pagans represented fortune as a being, which blindly distributed good and evil, without knowing what she did. They called her blind, I own ; but that was not in order to deprive her absolutely of all knowledge ; it was only to signify, that she did not act with just discernment. So we may say, a prince is blind in the distribution of his favours, when he bestows and takes them away by caprice, and without any respect to the merits of his subjects. We do not pretend to say, that he does good or ill to such or such, without know ing that he gives or takes away the respective place from the respective person. We only mean, that he doth not govern himself according to the rules of reason and justice, and that he is determined rashly, by the instigation of his inconstant pas sions.

This is the idea which the heathens formed of fortune. 2 Printed at Amsterdam, 1696. They were all persuaded, except a few philosophers, that the divine nature was a sort of being divided into several individuals. They attributed to every god a large share of power, but did not exempt them from the imperfections of our nature ; they believed them susceptible of anger, jealousy, literally speaking ; they made no scruple to affirm, in their most serious writings, that a malignant and secret envy of the gods opposed their prosperity. They more particularly attributed to the goddess, which they called Fortune, a conduct which was rash, inconstant, and capricious. They did not believe, that she wanted either eyes, or ears, or thought : it was for this reason, that an infinite number of temples were built to her, and that she was worshipped in a particular manner, in order to prevent the ill effects of her caprice.

Those philosophers who acknowledged the unity of the Deity, called that divine being Fortune ; when they considered it only as a distributer of good and evil things, which did not conform itself in the least to what we call merit, constancy, or reason. But the wisest of them always owned, that she never acted contrary to absolute justice, or without good reasons, which she understood well. After all, God himself says, " that his ways are not our ways, and his thoughts are not our thoughts." My second reflection is, tbat under the gospel dispensation, we attribute to earthly benefits, all the defects which the Pagans ascribed to the goddess Fortune. We say, that the possession of them is no sign of merit, that they are very fleeting and perishable, and that they miserably deceive those who rely on them, &c. It is easy to observe the reason for this diversity of language.

The Christians acknowledged only one God, and by that word, they un derstood a nature infinitely perfect, which governs all things, and dispenses all events ; but the Pagans lavished the name of God into an infinity of limited beings, imperfect, full of faults and vicious passions. For this reason, they made no scruple to charge on them the irregularities of human life, when they could not discover the cause amongst the free actions of men. The Christians, on the contrary, impute to the creature whatb ever infirmity they meet in the universe, and ascribe to the nature of the benefit, what the Pagans placed to the account of the benefactor. In the third place, I contend, that it can scarcely be denied, that there are fortunate and unfortunate people ; that is, according to the Pagan language, that there are some people that are made the sport of fortune, in the whole course of their affairs, whilst there are others whose way she smooths, and takes care to show them numberless instances of her favour.

Merchandise, gaming, and the court, have always furnished examples of these two things ; but nothing so manifestly confirms this as the military life. It is there fortune rules more than any where else : our Timoleon, Alexander, Sylla, Cæsar, and several other ancient warriors, have acknowledged it in the most authentic manner ; and the moderns confess it also, both in their memoirs and conversa tions. I have been told by a person of quality, that the con stable Wrangel assured him, that nothing was more rash than to hazard a battle which was liable to be lost by a thousand unforeseen accidents ; though, at the same time, the most exact measures have been taken, which the most consummate military prudence can suggest. Girard, secretary to the duke of Epernon, has shown, in a long life he has written of that famous favourite, so many happy events, independent of precaution, that it is hardly possible to deny the truth of the popular opinion, concerning the fortune of some people.

" After this," says the historian, " we ought not to wonder, if the duke never complained of fortune in the adversity of his old age. On the contrary, some of his friends once talking on that subject, he told them, that he should be very ungrate ful for the benefits with which fortune had constantly favoured him for above sixty years, if he should be disgusted at her leaving him for the small time he had then to live ; that he had scarcely ever observed an entire life fortunate, even when much shorter than his ; and that in the inconstant state of human affairs, it was no small advantage, that his disgraces were reserved for a time, when he was hardly any longer capable of relishing prosperity." My fourth reflection is, that it is very false, that what we call good fortune depends only on prudence ; and that what we name ill fortune is only the result of imprudence.

I freely own that the assertion of the author above cited does not appear to me well grounded. It is not true, that the winning gamester always plays better than the loser. It is not true, that the merchant who grows rich always surpasses in the knowledge of trade, or industry and circumspection, those who do not grow rich. No person is ignorant, that in those games which depend on chance, there is somewhat which contributes more to losing or winning, than whatever depends upon the skill of the gamester. There are days when a man wins large sums : this is not owing to his playing with greater application, or with a more ignorant gamester ; but he has a good game ; the very cards are dealt him which he wants, or the dice turns up according to his wishes. On other days he experiences quite the contrary.

In the very same sitting he finds sometimes the turn of fortune, he is lucky in the beginning, and unlucky at the end ; he loses in the last hour more than he won in all the foregoing. There are men, who immediately after they begin to play, perceive their good or ill luck, and finding that the day does not favour them, they are so wise as not to push any further, and give up in good time. Not that they distrust their address and capacity, but they distrust what doth not depend on their skill. This somewhat is not so apparent in trade ; it is nevertheless certain, that persons of mean capacity, and of very little judgment, sometimes gain immense sums by such sort of dealings, as those of better understandings, and greater experience, would not run the hazard of engaging in. It may be affirmed in general, that those who acquire the most riches by trade, are neither more intelligent, nor more industrious, than several others whose gain is less considerable.

The latter, therefore, are not so much the favourites of fortune as the former. Consequently, there is a good or ill fortune in human life, independent on prudence or imprudence. I do b4 not believe the author I am at present examining will deny this, as far as relates to play and commerce ; he only had in view the fortune which people of quality make in the service of their prince. If he only intended to advise a gentleman to choose the prudent part, I have nothing to say against his opinion ; but he goes much further ; he would persuade us, that those who succeed owe their advancement to their wise conduct only, and those who do not make their fortune, ought to impute it to their imprudence. This is what I cannot believe. And I will allow him to call it wise conduct, what ever a man does to conform himself to the present circumstances, as to be a braggadocio, a debauchee, a wag, a buffoon, whenever it is the certain way to please ; or to pretend to be mad, when without it he cannot escape imminent danger.

David, and Brutus, and several others, have been the better of such a conduct. I allow every thing to be called imprudence, which is contrary to the humour of the present times, as to be a very honest man in a depraved court, where there is nothing to be got by any but rascals. Notwithstanding all this, I cannot help maintaining my assertion, that the rise and fall of great men are not commonly the effects of mere prudence or imprudence. Chance, precarious accidents, and fortune, justly claim a large share. Some occurrences, which we neither con trived or foresaw, discover the way, and make us hasten our pace. A caprice, a jealousy, which it was impossible to foresee, stops us short all of a sudden, and throws us entirely out of the way. The better to refute M. De Chilliere, I must add here a fifth reflection.

We must not affirm, that all events being connected with a determinate cause, fortune is a chimerical being, and so, that we are no otherwise fortunate or unfortunate, but as we foresee, or do not foresee, the chain of natural causes and effects. To show the nullity of this objection, I will sup pose a fact not only very possible, but which may also be proved by some examples. A prince causes a town to be besieged in the middle of winter : if rain, snow, or ice, come upon him, he is not likely to take it ; but if the weather be dry, and the cold moderate, he will take it. Then follow several successive weeks of fine weather ; no rain, no snow : the siege advances daily, and the town capitulates before the frost comes. An other prince besieges a place in the middle of summer, and is likely to take it, if the season keeps its ordinary course ; but it rains hard for several days ; if the nights are cold, if this occasions several distempers in the camp, he will not be able to take it.

There happens a reverse of seasons, the summer is cold and rainy, the trenches advance but slowly, the army grows weaker daily by the diseases which this unseasonable weather produces, he finds himself forced to raise the siege. Can you possibly ascribe the happy success of the first siege to prudence, or the ill success of the second to imprudence ? This would be asserting two absurdities ; for, in the first case, there was no foreseeing the fine weather, nor the ill weather in the latter ; and, consequently, there was no prudence in attempting the first siege, nor imprudence in undertaking the latter. It is, therefore, purely owing to good fortune, that the first suc ceeded, as it is to be ascribed to ill luck the latter miscarried. I know very well, that if men could foresee rain and fair weather, it would have been an act of imprudence to have formed the latter siege.

The ill success in that case would have been a great fault, and not a misfortune; but human foresight does not extend so far, and if we be ignorant that the summer will prove rainy, it is not owing to imprudence. There are a hun dred fortuitous accidents we can no more foresee, than these that are equally capable of disappointing the best concerted military enterprises. Now, as some generals are much more frequently perplexed with these cross occurrences than others, we may reasonably acquiesce in the popular opinion, that there are fortunate and unfortunate generals. But we must not hence infer, that the fortunate are always, or almost always, as prudent as the unfortunate. On the contrary, we must believe, that the latter sometimes surpass the former, both in prudence and valour. Consult Forstuerus, in his notes on a passage of b Tacitus, wherein that historian assures us, that all human affairs are a continual sport.

This commentator will give several illustrious examples, which prove, that the best-concerted designs in this world are confounded by an invisible force, which human prudence cannot guard against ; this is particularly observable in the conclaves. And as for those who pretend, that every person is the author of his own fortune, you may find that solidly and amply confuted in a book of Don Lanceloti. Observe carefully what I am going to say. Princes com monly judge of things by the success. A general stands very well in their favour, who succeeds in a military enterprise ; but if the contrary happen, he forfeits their esteem and friendship. Even when they are sensible, that the victory was barely a piece of good fortune, and the defeat was not in the least owing to any fault of the general's, they are always more disposed to prefer the victor than the vanquished ; for with them, to be fortunate is a recommendatory character ; as on the other side, an unfortunate, though shining merit, is but a disagreeable quality.

Since, therefore, battles are lost and won by unforeseen accidents, it is clear, that misfortunes happen inde pendently on imprudence, and that some make their fortune independently on prudence. A lucky rashness, you will tell me, doth not deserve the name of temerity ; for since it has succeeded, it is a sign that it was proper to produce its wished for effect. Now, wherein does prudence consist ? Is it not in making use of proper means to accomplish our designs ? My answer is, that to act prudently, we ought to know that the means we use are proportioned to the end. A rash fortunate man is unacquainted with this proportion ; he is hurried on by an im petuous fury ; there appears nothing in his conduct but what is to be met with in the rash unfortunate ; and, therefore, the success of the enterprise ought not to be ascribed to prudence but to fortune.

Observe also another thing; that it is no manner of imprudence not to be cautioned against those things which human capacity cannot discover, and, consequently, if a person does not succeed at court, or if he lose the fortune he has already made, it is not always to be attributed to imprudence. Is it possible for him to discover all the caprices, dis gusts, jealousies that arise in the mind either of a monarch, or his mistress, or favourites 1 Can he discover all the grievances of false friends, obviate their calumnies, and prevent their lies and false reports, which wound without threatening ? This was the confession of a great minister, whose genius was not less than his authority : " In the post which you are in," said Cardinal Richelieu to M. De Fabert, who was Marshal of France, " it is easy for you to know your friends from your enemies.

No disguise can conceal them from your discernment ; but with respect to mine, in the post which I hold, I cannot penetrate into their sentiments ; they all speak to me in the same language. They all make the same earnest court to me, and those who would ruin me give me the same marks of amity, as those who are sincerely attached to my interest." Berginer, in the satire already cited, tells us : " Most fickle is the favour of the great, Unsteady, whimsical, and strange to treat, When men can be enough upon their guard ; Some lose her by caressing her too hard ; Some by dependence, some by insolence, Some by too much or little violence ; Some by presumption, some by self-denial ; In short, she'll balk your skill in every trial. Brittle as glass itself, she quickly broke, Nor can the wisest ward the fatal stroke."

Let us then take it for granted, that the prudence of man is not the sole or even the principal cause of his fortune. There are some fortunate people, whose conduct is very imprudent ; and others unfortunate, though their conduct is prudent. The difficulty is to know what this fortune is which favours some people and persecutes others, without regard to their merit or the measures they take. To recur to God. is not to remove the difficulty : for acknowledging him as the general cause of b6 all things, it will be asked whether he directs immediately, and by particular acts of his will, all those unforeseen occurrences which cause the designs of one man to succeed, and confound the enterprises of another. If you answer in the affirmative, you will bring all the philosophers, especially the Cartosians, on your back, who will maintain that you attribute a conduct to the Supreme Being, which is inconsistent with an infinite agent.

We ought, they will tell you, to establish a few general laws, and by this means produce an infinite variety of events, without recurring every moment to exceptions or particular acts, which must needs be miracles, though we should not call them so, because they would be frequent. You may, indeed, reply to them, that the occurrences favourable to the fortunate, and contrary to the unfortunate, are a natural consequence of general laws ; but they will not easily believe you. You will never be able to persuade one, that chance can produce what I am going to say. Let a hundred tickets, well sealed, be arranged in order on the table ; let ten of them be blanks, and ten of them marked with the letter A, and write a sentence on all the rest ; then let ten men be called in, and one of them directed to take up the 1, the 15, the 21, the 47, the 68, the 80, the 83, the 90, and the 99.