The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862 ... With an introduction by John C. Ropes

Introduction

BY JOHN C. ROPES MEMBER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY, AND THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS; AUTHOR OF " THE ARMY UNDER POPE," IN THE SCRIBNBR SERIES OF " CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR,*1 " THE FIRST NAPOLEON," BTC. BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY ÆfjE RibrtsiOE {litsi, Æanibriogt Copyright, 1892, By ELIZABETH P. ALLAN. Alljrightsj-eserved. JA« Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., TJ. S A. Printed by H. 0. Houghton and Company. AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT. The concluding chapter of this book was the author's last work on earth, and it cheered his dying hours to know that his task was accomplished. There remained, however, much to he done, to prepare the manuscript for publication, and I wish to record, within these covers, my gratitude to Colonel Allan's friend and successor, Mr. Duncan C. Lyle, of McDonogh, Maryland, without whose generous and painstaking help it could hardly have been done ; and to Mr. John C. Ropes, of Boston, who, amid the pressing activities of a busy life, gave such kind and valuable assistance. ELIZABETH P. ALLAN.

INTRODUCTION.

. It is a matter for sincere congratulation that this contribu tion to the history of our Civil War is to become the property of the American public. Colonel Allan was a man of rare gifts, and his abilities as a military critic were of a high order. His opportunities of observing the events of which he treats were also exceptionally good. He was from the beginning of the war almost constantly at the headquarters of Lieutenant- General Jackson ; and in January, 1863, he received the com mission of Chief of Ordnance of the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, which that distinguished officer commanded. He participated in the brilliant achievements in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 ; he took part in the engagements which initiated the successful movement against McClellan's communications in the early summer of that year ; he shared in the daring and skillful operations which Jackson conducted against General Pope in the month of August; he witnessed the capture of Harper's Ferry; he was in the thick of the fight on the bloody day of Antietam ; he was present at the successful maintenance of the lines of Fredericksburg.

It would not be possible to imagine a position in the Confederate army which would have given to an officer a more varied experience, or have familiarized him with more important and decisive actions. And all these opportunities for acquaintance with the great operations of war were improved to the full, for Colonel Allan was possessed of a

INTRODUCTION.

. VI remarkably sound judgment on military matters, a cool and clear head, and a tenacious memory. When we add to these gifts that of a singularly strong love of truth, it is plain that we have attributed to him the principal qualities that go to make a sound and impartial historian. That we have not exaggerated Colonel Allan's qualifications as a writer on the civil war is sufficiently evident from the favor with which his two previous works — that on the campaign of Chancellors ville,1 and that on Stonewall Jackson's campaign in the Shen andoah Valley 2 — were received by the public, — ■ North as well as South. Colonel Allan, as is well known, undertook to write the entire history of the Army of Northern Virginia, but, unfortu nately, he did not live to carry his narrative beyond the close of the year 1862.

It is this portion of his projected work which is now placed before us. It bears on its face the marks of the great labor and conscientious research which the author lavished upon it. The period treated is one of the most inter esting in the whole war, — so far as the operations in the east are concerned. The year 1862 has begun. The North, 1 The Battle-Fields of Virginia : Chancellorsville : Embracing the Op erations of the Army of Northern Virginia from the First Battle of Freder icksburg to the Death of Lieutenant-General Jackson. By Jed. Hotchkiss, late Captain and Topographical Engineer, Second Corps, A. N. V., and William Allan, late Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Ordnance, Second Corps, A. N. V. Illustrated by five maps and a full length portrait of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson.

New York : D. Van Nostrand, 192 Broadway. London: Triibner & Co. 1867. 2 History of the Campaign of General T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, from November 4, 1861, to June 17, 1862. by William Allan, formerly Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Ordnance Officer, Second Corps, A. N. V. With full maps of the region and of the battlefields, by Jed. Hotchkiss, formerly Captain and Topographical Engineer, Second Corps, A. N. V. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1880.

INTRODUCTION.

. VII amazed and aroused by the defeat of Bull Run, has exerted its strength in earnest. Powerful armies, well equipped and com manded, are placed at the disposal of the National government. Adequate arrangements are made to transport these forces by water to the immediate neighborhood of the Confed erate capital. Nothing is wanting in the way of preparation, — the Northern army is fully supplied with everything that can be required in the field. On the other side but little has been done to meet the impending blow. The Confederate forces in Virginia, greatly inferior in numbers aud equipment, are utterly unable to cope with their adversaries, if the latter use their superiority with the skill and determination that may reasonably be expected. But the Confederate authorities and people were at last awakened to the sense of their unprotected situation ; the for midable forces which the Federals had collected were frittered away by misdirection and inefficiency ; and the year 1862 closed not only without disaster to the Confederate cause in the East, but with a victory, — that of Fredericksburg, — which raised the confidence of the South to the highest pitch, and filled the Northern people with discouragement and mortifica tion.

To relate this story, doing justice to both parties, is the task attempted by Colonel Allan in the volume now before us. It will not be expected that all his statements will be accepted by the Northern public ; allowance must always be made, even when considering the views of the most judicial minds, for the bias which inevitably results from adopting heartily and earnestly one side in a great conflict of opinion and of arms. But the Northern reader will find in the pages before us an im partial spirit, and a love of the exact truth, characterizing the entire performance of the work. To the military reader especially, these chapters will be of value. Colonel Allan, it is true, was not a graduate of West Point, but he had confessedly a great natural aptitude for mil-

INTRODUCTION.

. itary operations ; and he was placed for four years in the best of schools, — that of the actual practice of war, performed under the eye and direction of able, educated, and accom plished officers. The observations with which the author sums up his views of the various campaigns described in this vol ume possess great weight, and deserve the most careful consid eration. Colonel Allan had many friends and admirers in the North. For some years before his death he had been an active mem ber of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts. He had made several visits to Boston for the purpose, among other things, of reading papers before the society. Three of these essays were on the battles — or, rather, I should say, on the campaigns and battles — of Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg ; and they were among the most valuable papers that the society has received.

Probably the volume before us contains the substance of the first two papers, but it is likely that they will all appear at some future time among the publi cations of the society. In these essays, as also in a lecture which he delivered in Boston in 1886 before the Lowell Insti tute, at the request of the Military Historical Society, his fair ness, as well as his ability, was universally recognized and commended. It is, therefore, not without reason that we welcome this book. Written as it is by an officer whose opportunities of observation were so extensive, whose capacity for military criticism has been so long attested and admired, and whose impartiality has received such abundant recognition, we cannot doubt that this narrative of the operations in Virginia during the year 1862 will be cordially received as an important and permanent addition to the best histories of the Civil War.

JOHN C. ROPES. CONTENTS. Chapter Page I. The Situation in Virginia in 1861 . . 1 II. McClellan's Plans for 1862 4 III. Siege of Yorktown 7 IV. Williamsburg and Eltham's Landing . . . .16 V. McClellan's Advance towards Richmond ... 27 VI. The Action at Hanover Court House . . . .31 VII. Seven Pines : the First Day 36 VIII. Seven Pines : the Second Day 51 IX. General Lee in Command ...... 58 X. McClellan on the Chickahominy ..... 65 XI. Jackson joins Lee . 70 XII. The Seven Days' Battles : Mechanicsville ... 75 XIII. The Seven Days' Battles : Gaines's Mill (Cold Harbor) 85 XIV. The Seven Days' Battles : McClellan retreats to the James ......... 95 XV. The Seven Days' Battles: Savage's Station . . . 101 XVI. The Seven Days' Battles : Frazier's Farm . . 106 XVII. The Seven Days' Battles : Malvern Hill . . .122 XVIII.

McClellan retreats to Harrison's Landing (Westover) 139 XIX. Results of the Seven Days' Battles .... 143 XX. Pope's Campaign 151 XXI. Cedar Run 165 XXII. The Rappahannock 181 XXIII. The Problem before Lee 197 XXIV. Jackson marches on Manassas Junction . . . 202 XXV. Pope's Situation 206 XXVI. Jackson at Manassas 213 XXVII. Pope's " Pursuit " of Jackson 221 XXVIII. The Battle of Gainesville X CONTENTS. XXIX. Thoroughfare Gap 236 XXX. General Pope's Efforts to concentrate his Army . 239 XXXI. Groveton 244 XXXII. The Second Manassas 262 XXXIII. Lee's (Counter) Attack 285 XXXIV. The Second Manassas. — Numbers. — Losses. — Results 305 XXXV. Chantilly (Ox Hill) 3U XXXVI. Review of the Campaign 319 XXXVII. The Invasion of Maryland 322 XXXVIII. Harper's Ferry 329 XXXIX. The South Mountain Passes 342 XL.

McClellan approaches Sharpsburg 362 XLI. The Battlefield. — Dispositions of Both the Armies . 372 XLII. Sharpsburg. — Hooker's Attack 383 XLIII. Sharpsburg. —Mansfield's Attack .... 391 XLIV. Sharpsburg. — Sedgwick's Attack . . . .399 XLV. Sharpsburg. — The Attacks of French and Richardson. — The " Bloody Lane " 410 XLVI. Sharpsburg. — Review of the Battle on the Left and Centre 421 XL VII. Sharpsburg. — Burnside's Attack .... 425 XL VIII. Review of the Campaign and Battle .... 438 XLIX. Lee recrosses the Potomac ..... 445 L. Lee and McClellan 448 LI. Burnside moves toward Fredericksburo- . . . 459 LII. Fredericksburg. — The Federals cross the Rappahannock 466 LIII. Fredericksburg. — Franklin's Attack . . . .475 LIV. Fredericksburg. — The Assault on Marye's Hill . 492 LV. Fredericksburg. — Burnside recrosses the River . . 510 LVI. Fredericksburg.— Review of the Battle ... 516 Index

Chapter I. The Situation In Virginia In

1861. The operations of the Federal and Confederate armies in Virginia in 1862 were the most considerable and important that had up to that time been witnessed in America. The year was filled with active movements, and crowded with notable events. The desultory operations of the summer and fall of 1861 had been but preliminary to the great contest of the succeed ing year. They had accomplished little except in Virginia. In Missouri the successes of Price had been neutralized by the strong force which the Federal administration threw into the State ; in Kentucky nothing of importance had been done ; but in Virginia the great victory of the Confederates at Manassas, July 21, 1861, had paralyzed the Union forces there for the remainder of the year, and given the Richmond government an opportunity to consolidate its strength and organize its resources.

Without this respite it is difficult to see how the South could have maintained itself through another year. The hostile sections had a common border of one thousand miles, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the western limit of Missouri ; and all along this line preparations were making for war. This border is separated into three natural divisions : 1. That extending from the Atlantic to the Alleghanies. 2. That from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi. 3. That west of the latter river. In each of these divisions vast invading armies were gathering on the part of the North, and flotillas of gunboats were building on the great rivers to cooperate. The main energies of the Union government were absorbed in these preparations along the border for a simultaneous advance in overwhelming force upon Confederate territory ; but at the same time measures to enforce the blockade of Southern ports were actively pushed, and formidable expeditions against points on the Southern coast were prepared.

The most important of these were : that against the coast of North Carolina ; that against the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia ; and that against New Orleans. Our concern, however, is with the chief scene of military operations, which was in Virginia, on the eastern division of the border. Here, about the capitals of the two contending sections, situated but little more than one hundred miles apart, was the heart and centre of the struggle. Here the great est efforts of the two belligerents were put forth. Here the largest and best equipped armies were set in the field. To this point were the ablest leaders drawn. Here, as chief prizes, were Richmond and Washington, the possession of either of which by the hostile party, it was believed, would give a decisive advantage in the contest.

For many months the Federal and Confederate armies in Virginia had been preparing for a life and death struggle. The complete rout of the Federal army at Manassas July 21, 1861, had caused the government at Washington to put forth its best efforts to create and equip a force that should be able to crush all opposition. General McClellan, whose successful campaign against the Confederates in West Virginia, as well as his previous standing, had made him, for the time, the most prominent of the Federal officers, was called to Washington and put in command. Men and supplies were gathered with out stint. McClellan devoted all his talents and energies to the conversion of his mob of raw recruits into a great army, thoroughly organized, drilled, and equipped. Cautious, even to an extreme, he steadily refused to risk any important operations until this work should be accomplished.

Six months of arduous THE SITUATION IN VIRGINIA IN 1861. labor placed him at the head of a finely supplied and disci plined army of about 200,000 men present for duty.1 Nor were the Confederates less busy during the long period of comparative quiet that followed the first battle of Manassas. With them, too, a mass of untrained volunteers had to be turned into steady and disciplined soldiers. A work of greater difficulty was to equip and supply the army thus formed. The Confederates had not merely to obtain supplies of all kinds, but to create the establishments needed to manufacture them ; they had to organize not merely an army, but a government. An immense territory, exposed both on the land and on the water side, had to be defended at many points. The subdivi sion of men and means thus necessitated rendered the Confed erates everywhere too weak to assume the aggressive.

General J. E. Johnston at the close of the year 1861 had but 57,337 men with which to oppose McClellan.2 This able officer, during the fall and winter, maintained so bold an attitude with his inferior force as to prevent McClellan from advancing. The firmness with which Johnston held on to the blockade of the lower Potomac by means of shore batteries, the formidable front he showed at Centreville, and the interruption of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, kept up in the breasts of the Federal administration the feeling of being on the defensive long after the necessity for such a state of things had ceased. 1 McClellan's force present for duty March 1 was by his official return 193,142. (McClellan's report.) In the spring of 1862, according to General Webb, he had 158,000 for field operations, besides some 55,000 in detach ments, guarding Washington, Manassas, Warrenton, the Shenandoah Val ley, and the line of the Potomac.

See Webb's Peninsula Campaign, p. 8. 2 Johnston's Narrative, p. 84. Johnston's force present for duty at the end of February was 47,306. (Webb, p. 26.)

Chapter II. Mcclellan's Plans For

1862. With the new year the plans and preparations for the cam paign of 1862 were urged forward with increased activity. The Federal government soon became impatient for the for ward movement of its vast armaments. Public opinion in the North demanded a prompt use of the great accumulations of men and material that had been made for the purpose of " crushing the rebellion." * The Federal commander-in-chief began to be criticised as too slow and cautious. This officer, charged with the direction of military operations over a vast field, found it impossible to move his armies as fast as the popu lace required. Preparations were hastened in the West more rapidly than in the East, and in January the expeditions were set forward which in the succeeding month at Forts Henry and Donelson wrested the control of the Tennessee and Cumber land rivers from the Confederates, and thus brought about the loss of Kentucky and a large part of Tennessee, with the fall of Columbus, Nashville, and Island No. 10.

Meantime the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Gen eral McClellan in person, lay along the Potomac in front of Washington, hindered from a forward movement by the weather, the roads, and by McClellan's unwillingness to adopt that line of advance, and prevented from selecting a new scene of operations by the hesitancy with which President 1 President Lincoln, on January 27, issued the following order : " That the twenty-second day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Munfords ville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico be ready to move on that day." . .

MCCLELLAN'S PLANS FOR 1862. Lincoln yielded assent to the commander's plan of campaign. The objective point of the Federal campaign in the East was the capture of Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy and seat of the most important arsenal and manufactories for the supply of the Southern armies. General McClellan deemed an advance directly against the army in front of him unadvis able, because it would yield his opponent all the advantages of defensive positions of his own selection, and would draw the Federal army into the interior of Virginia, away from its base and the reach of water transportation, and render it dependent upon a single line of railroad for supplies. This was the longest, and McClellan thought it the most difficult, way of attacking Richmond. He proposed, instead, a transfer of the Army of the Potomac to the waters of the lower Chesapeake, and an advance thence against the Confederate capital.

By means of the rivers of that region, all of which could be con trolled by the Federal navy, he could place his army within a few miles of Richmond, and establish a base of supplies near at hand and on deep water. The plan he first suggested was to move his army to Urbana on the Rappahannock, and to advance thence by way of West Point to Richmond. In this way he would turn the Confederate position at Manassas completely, and by rapid movements might place his army between the Confederates and their capital. The unexpected withdrawal of Johnston from Manassas to the line of the Rappahannock checkmated this plan and finally caused its abandonment. McClellan's second plan was to transfer his army to Fortress Monroe, and march thence up the Peninsula, between the York and the James, while the Federal gunboats controlled the rivers and protected his flanks.

The Federal Cabinet hesitated for a time to approve these plans. To them they seemed to uncover Washington. The vivid impression made upon the minds of President Lincoln and his advisers by the first battle of Ma nassas had not been effaced, and they were unwilling to place the great Federal army where it would not be directly in the path of a Confederate force advancing from the interior of Virginia. They yielded, at last, to McClellan's urgent repre sentations, but in doing so required as conditions : 1. That THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. Washington should be garrisoned and covered by sufficient forces to make it perfectly secure ; 2. That the lower Potomac should be freed from Confederate batteries ; and 3. That the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad should be reopened and pro tected.1 McClellan undertook to comply with these conditions, and prepared to transfer his army to the lower Chesapeake.

Meantime General Johnston was preparing to retire behind the Rappahannock as soon as the Federal army gave signs of a forward movement. His bold front, with less than 50,000 men, had given him control of Northern Virginia for supplies ; had kept the Federal army, three times as numerous, on the defensive ; and had so imposed upon McClellan, that the lat ter estimated the Confederate numbers at over 100,000 men in his front, at a time when they were really about 40,000. It was necessary that the Confederates should be ready to meet McClellan, whether he advanced from Washington towards Gordonsville, or by way of Fredericksburg, or by the lower Chesapeake. Johnston expected him to move by the Freder icksburg route.2 Behind the Rappahannock the Confederates would be in position for any contingency.

At the first signs of activity, therefore, among the Federal tnxvps on his right, Gen eral Johnston began to retreat, and by the 11th of March had reached his new fine. This retreat caused McClellan to give up his design of landing at Urbana. The Confederates in their new position were too near at hand to permit the Federal army to establish itself without opposition on the lower Rappa hannock, and the passing of Johnston's flank by a rapid move from Urbana on Richmond was no longer practicable. Hence McClellan turned to his alternative line of operations by way of the Peninsida between the York and James rivers. 1 See McClellan's report, War Records, Ser. I. vol. v. p. 50. 2 See Johnston's Narrative, pp. 101, 102.

Chapter III. Siege Of Yorktown

After the retreat of the Confederates, McClellan's plans were pushed with more vigor, and by the end of March the mass of the Federal troops had been transferred to Fortress Monroe. As the Federal plans were gradually revealed to the Confederates, dispositions were made to meet them. General Johnston retired first behind the Rapidan, and when, early in April, there was no longer room to doubt the destination of the Federal forces, the mass of his army was ordered to the Peninsula, where General Magruder with 11,000 men 1 was meanwhile delaying, with admirable energy and skill, the ad vance of McClellan. Magruder, finding that his most advanced line, extending across the Peninsula from the mouth of the Warwick by Young's Mill to Harwood's Mill and Ship Point, required more force than he had at command, had selected, as a second position, a line extending from Yorktown by way of the War wick River to Minor's farm and thence to Mulberry Island Point.

He garrisoned Gloucester Point on the north bank of the York, and thus disputed the passage of that river at its narrowest part. Magruder thus describes his position : 2 " Warwick River rises very near York River and about one and a half miles to the right of Yorktown. Yorktown and re doubts Nos. 4 and 5, united by long curtains and flanked by rifle-pits, form the left of the line, until at the commencement of the military road it reaches Warwick River, here a sluggish aud boggy stream, twenty or thirty yards wide, and running through a dense wood fringed by swamps. Along this river 1 War Records, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 405. 2 Ib. p. 406. are five dams — one at Wynne's Mill, one at Lee's Mill, and three constructed by myself. The effect of these dams is to back up the water along the course of the river, so that for nearly three fourths of its distance its passage is impracticable for either artillery or infantry.

Each of these dams is protected by artillery and extensive earthworks for infantry." He says : " Keeping only small bodies of troops at Harwood's and Young's Mills and at Ship Point, I distributed my remaining forces along the Warwick line, embracing a front, from Yorktown to Minor's farm, of twelve miles, and from the latter place to Mulberry Island Point of one and a half miles. I was compelled to place at Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island fixed garrisons amounting to 6000 men, my whole force being 11,000, so that it will be seen that the balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was defended by about 5000 men." 1 With such thoroughness and skill did Magruder avail him self of the means placed by nature and art within his reach, that he completely checked the advance of the Federal army.

General McClellan, preceded by a large part of his army, reached Fortress Monroe April 2, and on the 3d ordered such of his troops as were ready to move toward Yorktown next day. He states that the force thus set forward was " in all about 58,000 men, and 100 guns beside the divi sion artillery."2 The Federal army moved forward in two columns, the right one, under Heintzelman, to Harwood's Mill, the left under Keyes to Young's Mill, which positions were occupied without serious opposition. On the 5th of May Keyes was ordered forward by way of Warwick Court House to the Halfway House between Williamsburg and York town,3 while Heintzelman was to move directly on the lat ter place. Keyes advanced but a short distance from War wick Court House, when he found himself in front of the 1 War Records, Ser.

I. vol. xi. part i. p. 405. 2 McClellan's report, Ib. p. 7. * McClellan seems to have been ignorant of the Confederate position across the Peninsula, and to have expected serious resistance only at the Yjorktown end of Magruder's line. Warwick River and Magruder's works at Lee's Mill. He attempted to make an attack, but was easily checked, finding the position " unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River and incapable of being carried by assault." 1 Heintzel man was also brought to a halt by the works at the Yorktown end of the line.2 Thus, on April 6, the Federal army of over 80,000 men at hand or hastening to join it 3 was brought to a complete standstill by Magruder with his 11,000 men behind the Warwick. McClellan says : " I made on the 6th and 7th close personal reconnoissances of the right and left of the enemy's positions, which with information acquired already convinced me that it was best to prepare for an assault by the preliminary employment of heavy guns and some siege operations.

Instant assault would have been simple folly." 4 Time was all important to the Confederates for the transfer of Johnston's army from the Rapidan and Rappahannock to the Peninsula : Magruder had gained it. The Confederates could not leave their position on the upper rivers until sure that no attack was to be made upon them there, and this gave the Federals the opportunity to concentrate on the Peninsula and advance against Magruder before he could be reinforced. Had McClellan's penetration and determination been equal to his adversary's boldness and skill, the Confederate position at Yorktown must have been quietly turned or carried, and the Federal army would have reached the Chickahominy without serious opposition. But for ten days McClellan remained in 1 McClellan's report, War Records, Ser.

I. vol. xi. part i. p. 10. 2 Magruder says : " He attacked us with a furious cannonading and musketry, which was responded to with effect by our batteries and troops of the line. His skirmishers were also well thrown forward on this and the succeeding day and energetically felt our whole line, but were everywhere repulsed by the steadiness of our troops. . . . Every preparation was made in anticipation of another attack by the enemy ; the men slept in the trenches under arms, but to my utter surprise he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault." (Magruder's report, Ib. p. 406.) 8 McClellan says on April 7 that his entire force for duty was 85,000, of which 53,000 had joined him. See his telegram of that date to Presi dent Lincoln in McClellan's report, Ib. p. 11. 4 McClellan's report, Ib. p. 11.

McClellan has been severely criticised for his course on this occasion, and certainly with reason. front of Magruder, without making any serious demonstration, engaged in bringing up troops and guns and in preparing his siege works. The Federal commander's hesitation was in creased by the fact that McDowell's corps had been detached from his army, April 4, and kept in front of Washington.1 The naval force, too, intended to cooperate with him, was so fully occupied in blockading the mouth of the James River against the formidable Confederate ironclad, the Virginia (or Merrimac),2 as not to be able to undertake the reduction of 1 McDowell's corps consisted of 33,548 men (McClellan's return April 1), and at the last moment it was detained in front of Washington because of the apprehension of the Federal administration that the capital was not sufficiently defended by the troops left by McClellan.