XIII. PLATO

The belief in human immortality, construed in a theological or philosophical sense, had at this time hardly penetrated to circles of ordinary lay folk. Socrates himself, when it came to such inquiries into the unknowable, never claimed to provide an answer that differed from that which would be given by the majority of his fellow citizens out of the accumulated wisdom of their ancestors. Where in the pages of Plato he is allowed to give undisguised expression to his natural and homely vigour--in the Apology--he shows little anticipation of an immortal life of the soul. Death, he thinks, either brings complete unconsciousness to men, like a dreamless sleep, or else it means the transition of the soul to another life in the realm of the Souls--a realm which, to judge by his allusions, has much more resemblance to the Homeric Hades than to any of the visionary countries imagined by theologians or theologically minded poets.[1\13] Both possibilities he accepts with complete equanimity, trusting in the righteousness of the controlling gods,[2\13] and he looks no further. How should he know with certainty where everyone was ignorant?[3\13]

With a like absence of concern it is possible that the majority of the cultured (who were just beginning to separate themselves from the rest of the community) left unsettled the problem of the Unknown.[4\13] Plato assures us that it was in his time a widespread belief of the populace that the outgoing soul-breath of the dying was caught up by the winds--especially if its exit took place in stormy weather--and was dispersed, blown away, into nothing.[5\13] In other ways, too, we may suppose that the orthodox Greek, when death approached, allowed his fancy to picture what might await his soul on the other side of death's threshold.[6\13] But it is certain that the belief in an unending life of the soul--a life with no end because it had no beginning--was not among these thoughts. Plato himself lets us see how strange such a conception was even to those who were capable of following and understanding a philosophical discussion. Towards the end of the long dialogue upon the best kind of State his Sokrates asks Glaukon with apparent irrelevance "are you not aware that {464} our soul is immortal and never perishes?" Whereupon, we are told, Glaukon looked at him in astonishment and said, "No, in truth, of that I was not aware: can you then assert any such thing?"[7\13]

The idea that the soul of man may be everlasting and imperishable seemed thus a paradoxical freak to one who was no adept in the theological doctrine of the soul. If in later times the case was altered, no one contributed more effectually or more permanently to bring that change about than the great thinker and poet who established the theological conception of personal immortality in the very heart of philosophy and then gave back the idea strengthened and made more profound to its parent theology, while he himself extended the influence of that idea far beyond the bounds of school or sect by the far-reaching power of his own unaging writings which belong, not to the schoolroom, but to the greatest achievements of literature whether of Greece or of mankind. It is beyond calculation what power has been wielded since their first appearance by the Platonic dialogues in the confirmation, dissemination, and precise definition of the belief in immortality--a power that with all its alteration in the passage of the centuries has maintained itself unbroken into our own times.

§ 2

Plato had not always given his assent to the belief in immortality. At any rate, it must have remained very much in the background of his thoughts and his belief in the days when he still regarded the world from the point of view of a slightly more developed Socraticism. Not only at that period (in the Apology) does he make his Sokrates go to his death without the most distant approach to a belief in the undying vitality of his soul, but also in the first sketch of his Ideal State--a sketch made while the influence of the Socratic view of life still prevailed with him--the belief in immortality is omitted and even excluded.[8\12] It seems as if Plato did not reach the higher conception of the nature and value of the soul, its origin and destiny reaching out beyond all temporal limitation, until the great change which came over his philosophy had been completed. The world of ever-changing Appearance manifesting itself to the senses in perpetual flux and efflux--this in its inessential, unseizable unreality he abandoned to the criticisms of Herakleitos. But above it, in accordance with his own deepest longings and, as it seemed, implied as its real object by the Socratic search itself after {465} conceptual knowledge, stood a world of unchangeable Being without beginning or end, to which all the appearances of this lower world owed such reality as they possessed. "Being" itself, the totality of the Ideas, remained uncontaminated with "Becoming" and passing away; remained the highest goal and supreme aim standing high above all that aspired to it, or felt a longing for its complete and unlimited fullness.[9\13] This everlasting reality holds itself aloof from the stream of appearance and is not to be grasped within that stream; it is not manifested in the deceitful ever-changing perception of the senses, nor yet in the Opinion that is based upon them; it can only be apprehended, without any assistance from the senses, by the pure intuition of the Reason.[10\13] This world of everlasting self-identical Being exists outside the thought and knowledge of man, but it first reveals itself to man in the activity of his own thinking;[11\13] and at the same time there is revealed to him a higher power than the mere capacity to abstract the unsubstantial general conceptions from the multiplicity of experience--a power that is the highest capacity of the soul, enabling it to voyage out beyond all experience and with infallible knowledge[12\13] to soar of its own independent power upwards to a transcendental world of permanent and essential reality. The highest capacity that belongs to man, the soul of his soul, is not enclosed within this world that surrounds his senses in its restless flood. Like the objects that are the last goal of its study the soul itself is raised to where it can for the first time find a form of activity worthy of its natural powers. It achieves a new distinction, a priestlike dignity, as an intermediary between the two worlds to both of which it belongs.

The soul is a pure spiritual essence; it contains nothing within it that is material, nothing of the "place" where Becoming is shaped into a distant resemblance to Being.[13\13] It is incorporeal and belongs to the realm of the "invisible", which in this immaterialist doctrine counts as the most real of all, more real than the most solid matter.[14\13] It is not one of the Ideas; on the contrary it seems to partake in one of the Ideas--that of Life--only as other appearances share in their Ideas.[15\13] But it stands nearer to the whole world of the everlasting Ideas than anything else that is not itself an Idea; of all the things in the world it is "most like" to the Idea.[16\13]

But it has also a share in Becoming. It cannot simply remain with the Ideas in unaltered other-world transcendence. It has its origin indeed in that other world beyond Appearance. It was from the beginning, uncreated[17\13] like the Ideas and like {466} the Soul of the World to which it is akin.[18\13] It is "older than the body"[19\13] to which it must link itself; it does not come into being at the same time as the body, but is only drawn down from its spiritual state of being into the realm of matter and becoming. In the Phaedrus this "fall into birth" appears as the necessary result of an intellectual "fall" which takes place within the soul itself.[20\13] In the Timaeus, however, with its study of the general life of the whole world-organism, the animation of the living creature has now to be explained as arising out of the plan--not from a failure of the plan--of the Creator.[21\13] The soul thus seems to be destined from the beginning to give life to a body. It is not only the knowing and thinking element in a world of inanimate things, it is also the source of all movement. Itself in motion from the beginning it bestows the power of movement upon the body with which it is associated; without it, there would be no movement in the world, and no life either.[22\13]

But though enclosed within the body it remains a stranger to the body. On its side it has no need of the body and is not conditioned by it. It remains independently associated with it as its mistress and leader.[23\13] Even in their united existence there is a great gulf fixed between the soul and all that is not soul;[24\13] body and soul never fuse into one, however closely they may be bound up with each other. And yet the body and its impulses have the power to influence profoundly the immortal being that dwells within it. By its union with the body the soul can be made unclean; "diseases" such as folly and unrestrained passion come to it from the body.[25\13] It is not beyond the reach of change like the Ideas, to which it is akin without being of their nature; on the contrary, it can degenerate entirely. The evil influences of the body penetrate to its inmost being; even in its everlasting, immaterial, spiritual nature it can derive something "corporeal"[26\13] from such a sinister partnership.

It is bound to the body by influences of a lower kind which attach themselves to the pure power of knowledge that alone is proper to it. At the outset of his speculations Plato, like other thinkers before him,[27\13] had thought of the different capacities of the soul, alternately in conflict or alliance with each other, as "parts" of unequal rank and value, bound up together within the soul of man.[28\13] Even in the previous life of the soul, in the other world, the reasoning power of the soul is, according to the Phaedrus, already coupled with "Temper" and "Desire"; it is these in fact which drag down the soul into the realm of the material; and the three parts still {467} remain indissolubly united in the everlasting life which awaits the soul after its release from the body.

But in proportion as the philosopher extends and elevates his conception of the soul, and as he becomes more convinced of its eternal destiny and vocation to a life of unending blessedness in a realm of unchangeable being, the more impossible does it seem to him that this candidate for immortality in the realm of the everlasting Forms can be a composite amalgam of elements capable of being resolved again by division and analysis[29\13]--that the reasoning faculty can be for ever united with Effort and Desire, which perpetually threaten to drag it downwards into materiality. The soul in its true and original nature is now for him simple and indivisible.[30\13] Only with its enclosure in the body does the everlasting, thinking soul, whose tendency is towards the eternal, acquire impulses and desires[31\13] that have their origin in the body and belong to the body,[32\13] that only adhere to the soul during the period of its earthly life, that with their separation from their immortal associate will pass away, since they are themselves mortal and such as perish with the body.

The soul, to which sense-perception,[33\13] feeling, emotion, and desire are only added from outside, is in its own imperishable nature nothing but pure capacity of thought and knowledge--with which indeed the power to will that which is conceived in thought, seems to be directly associated. It is destined for the "other" world, for the intuition and undistorted reflection in its consciousness of the immaterial essences. Banished to this earth amid the restless change and alteration of all being, and not uninfluenced by the forces of bodily life, it must endure a brief exile here.[34\13] Not unscathed does it leave behind it, in death, its ill-assorted companion, the body.[35\13] Then it goes into an intermediate region of bodiless existence in which it must do penance for the misdeeds of its life on earth, and free itself from their effects.[36\13] After that it is driven away once more into a body and transported to a fresh life upon earth, the character of which it chooses for itself in accordance with the special nature that it had evolved in its earlier incarnation upon earth.[37\13] Though no organic connexion exists between them, yet there is a certain "symmetry"[38\13] between the individual soul and the body that is lent to it.

Thus, the soul lives through a series of earthly lives[39\13] of the most varied character; it may even sink so low as the animals in the course of its incarnations.[40\13] Its own merits, the success or failure of its conflict with the passions and desires of the {468} body, decide whether or not its lives shall lead it upwards to a nobler type of existence. Its task is plain: it must free itself from its impure companions, sensual Lust and the darkening of the powers of Reason. If it can succeed in this it will find once more the "way upwards"[41\13] which at last leads it into complete immunity from renewed incarnation and brings it home again into the kingdom of everlasting untroubled Being.

§ 3

It is evident that in what he thus, clothing philosophy in the language of poetry, says of the origin, destiny, and character of the soul, which though beyond time is yet placed within time, and though beyond space is yet the cause of all movement within space--that in all this Plato is following in the track of the theologians of earlier times. Only in the poetry and speculative thought of theologi, not in any physiologists' doctrine, did he find the conception, imaginatively expressed and pointing in the direction which he also followed, of a multiplicity of independent souls whose existence had been from all time and was not first begun in the material world with the creation of a living organism; of souls enclosed in the corporeal as though in a foreign, hostile element, which survive their association with the body, passing through many such bodies and yet preserving themselves intact after the destruction of each of those bodies, immortal, endless (for they are without beginning),[42\13] and alive from the very beginning of Time. The souls, moreover, have life as distinct, complete, and indivisible personalities, not as mere dependent emanations of a simple common Source of all life.

The theory of the eternity and indestructibility of the individual souls, of the personal immortality of the souls, is difficult to reconcile with more specifically Platonic doctrine--with the doctrine of the Ideas.[43\13] And yet it is undeniable that from the moment that he first adopted this theory--and adopted it, too, precisely in connexion with the philosophy of the Ideas--he adhered to it steadfastly and without deviating from its essential meaning. The process by which he arrived at it is not to be found in the "proofs" by which he attempts in the Phaedo to establish the truth of the soul's immortality in which he himself already believed. Those proofs in reality do not prove what they are intended to prove (and what considered as a fact of experience is unproved and as an axiom necessary to thought is beyond proof); they cannot therefore be the reasons that led the philosopher to {469} hold his conviction. He has in fact borrowed this article of his faith from the creeds which already contained it. He himself scarcely conceals the fact. As authority for the main outlines of the soul's history as given by himself he refers us almost apologetically, and as though excusing himself for not providing a philosophical proof, to the theologi and priests of the mysteries.[44\13] And he himself becomes the philosophical poet, completely and without concealment, when in imitation of the poetry of edification he, too, gives a picture of the soul's sojourn in an intermediate station of its pilgrimage or describes the stages of its earthly existence[45\13] that lead the soul down even to the animal.

For such mythological expressions of the inexpressible the philosopher himself claims no more than symbolical truth.[46\13] He is fully in earnest, however, with the fundamental conception of the soul as an independent substance that enters from beyond space and time into the material and perceptible world, and into external conjunction with the body, not into organic union with it; that maintains itself as a being of spiritual essence in the midst of the flux and decay of the material world, though at the same time its pure brightness is overshadowed through this conjunction and must purify itself from the effects; that can disentangle itself,[47\13] even to the extent of complete severance from the embrace of the material and the perceptible. All that is essential in this conception he derives from the theologians, but he brings it into close relationship with his own philosophy which depends upon a conviction of the absolute opposition between Being and Becoming, and upon the dualistic division of the world into matter and mind--a dualism that applies also to the relations of soul and body and throughout the whole realm of Appearance. The soul which stands half-way between the unity and unchangeability of Being and the ever-varying multiplicity of matter has in this realm of fragmentary and subordinate validity, into which it is temporarily exiled, the power to reflect the Ideas and represent them in its own consciousness clear and unfalsified. The soul in its complete independence of sense-perception and of concepts derived from the senses is alone able to pursue the "Quest of Reality".[48\13] In this pursuit the body with which it is associated is nothing but a hindrance and a serious one. The soul has a hard struggle against the tendencies of the body in spite of its independence and aloofness. Just as, in the creation of the universe, matter, though not a cause is at least a subordinate cause which by its influence and exigencies gives {470} various hindrances[49\13] to the "Mind" that shapes and orders the world, so, too, the soul finds in this ephemeral and inconstant Matter, with its stirring and tumultuous unrest, a serious obstacle to its own proper activity. This is the evil, or the cause of evil,[50\13] which must be overthrown in order that the mind may win its way to freedom and final rest and security in the realm of pure Being. Plato often speaks of the katharsis, the purification, after which man must strive.[51\13] He takes both the word and the idea from the theologians, but he gives it a higher meaning while yet preserving unmistakably the analogy with the katharsis of the theologi and mystery-priests. It is not the pollution which comes from contact with sinister daimones and from all that belongs to them, that is to be avoided, but rather the dulling of the power of knowledge and of willing what is known (regarded as a simultaneously created power) due to the world of the senses and its fierce impulses.[52\13] Man's effort must be directed not so much to ritual purity, as to the preservation of his knowledge of the eternal from eclipse through the deceptive illusions of the senses; towards the concentration and gathering together of the soul within itself;[53\13] its withdrawal from contact with the ephemeral as the source of pollution and debasement.

Thus, even in this philosophic reinterpretation of ritual abstinence in terms of a spiritual release and emancipation, the effort after "purity" retains its religious sense. The world of the Ideas, the world of pure Being, to which only the pure soul can attain,[54\13] is a world of divinity. The "Good" as the highest of the Ideas, the loftiest pattern, the supreme aim to which all Being and Becoming tend, which is at the same time more than all the Ideas--the first cause of all Being and all knowledge--is also God.[55\13] The soul for which, in its desire and longing for the full being of the Idea, the knowledge of the "Good" is the "supreme science",[56\13] enters hereby into the closest communion with God. The "turning away" of the soul from the many-coloured image to the sun of the highest Idea, is itself[57\13] a turning towards the divine, towards the luminous source of all Being and Knowing.

Thus exalted, philosophic inquiry turns to enthousiasmos.[58\13] The way which leads upwards from the lower levels of Becoming to Being, is discovered by means of dialectic, which in its "comprehensive view"[59\13] is able to unite the distracted ever-moving flood of multifarious Appearance into the ever-enduring unity of the Idea which is reflected in Appearance. Dialectic travels through the whole range of the Ideas, graduated one above the other, till it reaches the last and {471} most universal of the Ideas. In its upward course it passes by an effort of sheer logic through the whole edifice of the highest concepts.[60\13] Plato is the most subtle of dialecticians; he almost carries subtlety to excess in his eager pursuit of every intricacy of logic--and of paralogism. But he combined to a remarkable degree the cold exactitude of the logician with the enthusiastic intensity of the seer; and his dialectic, after its patient upward march step by step from concept to concept, at last soars to its final goal in a single tremendous flight, in which the longed-for realm of the Ideas reveals itself in a moment of immediate vision. So the Bacchant in his ecstasy saw divinity suddenly plain, and so too in the nights consecrated by the mysteries the epoptês beheld the vision of the Goddesses in the torch-lit glare of Eleusis.[61\13]

To this loftiest height whence a view is obtained of "colourless, formless Being, beyond the reach of every contact", inaccessible to sense-perception, it is dialectic that shows the way; and dialectic now becomes a way of salvation in which the soul finds once more its own divine nature and its divine home. The soul is closely akin to godhead and like it[62\13]--it is itself something divine. The reason in the soul is divine,[63\13] and comprehends everlasting Being immediately by its power of thought. "If the eye were not sunlike, it could never see the sun";[64\13] if the mind were not akin by nature to the good,[65\13] the highest of the Ideas, it could never comprehend the Good, the Beautiful, and all that is perfect and eternal. In its power of recognizing the eternal the soul bears within itself the surest proof that it is itself eternal.[66\13]

The "purification" by means of which the soul gets rid of[67\13] the defacement that has overtaken it during its earthly life reveals again the divine in man. Even on earth the philosopher is thus rendered immortal and godlike.[68\13] As long as he can continue in a state of pure intellectual knowledge and comprehension of the everlasting, for so long is he living, already in this life, "in the Islands of the Blest."[69\13] By expelling all traces of the corruptible and the mortal in and about himself, he is more and more to "become like God";[70\13] so that when it is at last set free from this earthly existence, his soul may enter into the divine, the invisible, the pure, the eternally self-identical, and as a disembodied mind remain for ever with that which is its kin.[70a\13] At this point, language that can only make use of physical imagery becomes totally inadequate.[71\13] A goal is set before the soul that lies outside all physical nature, beyond time and space, without past or future, an ever-present now.[72\13] {472}

The soul can escape out of time and space and find its home in eternity, without at the same time losing its own self in the General and Universal that stands above time and space. We must not inquire what sort of personality and individual distinctness can yet remain with the soul when it has cast off all effort, desire, sense-perception, and everything related to the world of change and multiplicity, to become once more a pure mirror of the eternal. Nor must we ask how it is possible to think of a spirit removed above space and time and all the multiplicity of matter and yet personal and separate in its personality.[73\13] For Plato the Souls live on as they had been in the beginning--individual beings conscious of themselves in a time that has no end and is beyond all time. He teaches a personal immortality.

§ 4

There is an "other-worldly" tone in this philosophy, and its doctrine of the soul. Far beyond the world in which life has placed man lies the realm of pure Being, the good, the perfect, and the unspoilt. To reach that realm at last, to free the mind from the unrest and illusion of the senses, to be rid of the desires and emotions that would "nail"[74\13] it down here below, to sever its connexion[75\13] with the body and bodily things--that is the soul's highest duty. The only reason why it is banished into this world is that it may all the more completely separate itself from the world. To die--to be dead inwardly to all that is visible, material, physical--that is the goal and the fruit of philosophy.[76\13] "To be ready and fit to die" is the hall-mark of the complete philosopher. For such, philosophy is the deliverer that frees him for all time from the body[77\13]--from its desires, its restlessness, its wild passions[78\13]--and gives him back again to the eternal and its silence.

To be pure, to be free from evil, to die already in this temporal world--these are the oft-repeated exhortations which the philosopher addresses to the immortal soul. Ascetic morality here again demands from man what is essentially a quite negative proceeding. But this denial of the world is only a step leading on to the most supremely positive behaviour. Katharsis is only the gateway to philosophy; and it is philosophy which teaches man how to reach what alone is positive, the only true and unconditional Being; instructs him how to reach the clear and perfect understanding of the only permanent good and how to merge himself utterly in that good.[79\13] The soul of the thinker yearns after Reality;[80\13] {473} death is for it not merely the annihilation of the chains of the body that impede it, but a very positive "acquisition of intellectual knowledge"[81\13] to which it is urged on by its proper nature--which is therefore also a fulfilment of its proper task. So the turning aside from the physical and the ephemeral is at the same time and without transition a turning towards the eternal and the divine. The flight from the things of this world is in itself an entry into that other world, and a becoming like to the divine.[82\13]

But the true realities are not to be found in this world. To grasp them plainly in its thought--to recover the untroubled vision of its spiritual eye--the soul must divest itself entirely of all the stress and distraction of the earthly. For this mundane world, the mirage that encompasses the senses, the philosopher has nothing but denial. Because it gives no foothold for true knowledge the whole world of Becoming has no independent value for his science. The apprehension of that which is never more than relative, which simultaneously manifests contrary qualities in itself, can only serve as stimulus and invitation to the search for what is absolute.[83\12] In this realm of doubtful shadows the soul finds nothing but obscure reminders of that which it had once beheld plainly. The beauty of the physical world which is apprehended by the noblest of the senses, the eye, serves indeed to recall to the soul's memory the Beautiful-in-itself, of which that other is but a pale copy, and to disclose to the soul what is really its own property, what it had brought with it ready made from an earlier existence beyond the bounds of all matter.[84\13] But the observation of beauty here below must lead beyond itself at once and conduct the mind out of the world of mere appearance to the pure forms of the Ideal world. The process of Becoming tells us nothing about the nature of Being; the thinker learns nothing from this source--in fact he learns no new knowledge or wisdom of any kind in this world; he only recovers what he had before and always possessed in latent form.[85\13] The treasure, however, lies beyond the limits of this world. He must turn away his gaze from the shadow-figures upon the wall of the cave of this world, and direct it towards the sun of eternity.[86\13] He is placed in this world of perpetual change; to it his senses and his understanding are directly referred; and yet he must disdain and rise superior to, and flee from, all that this world offers, giving himself up immediately and entirely to the unseen, and taking flight from this world to that where he will become like God, and be purified and justified by the power and might of his knowledge.[87\13] {474}

Earthly life as it actually is will remain strange to him, and he a stranger in earthly life,[88\13] despised as a fool for his inaptitude in earthly affairs by the great majority of those who are so versed in such things.[89\13] He has something higher to think about--the salvation of his own soul. He will not live for the community, but for himself, and his real task.[90\13] Human interests seem to him hardly worth troubling about,[91\13] the state itself hopelessly corrupt, founded as it is upon deception and passion and injustice. At the same time, he himself of course would be the real statesman,[92\13] the leader who could guide his fellow citizens to their true salvation--acting not as the servant of their lusts, but as a doctor who gives help to the sick.[93\13] It is "not ships and harbours and walls and taxes and such trivialities"[94\13] that he would give the city, but justice and health and everything else which after this life can stand before the stern judgment of the other world.[95\13] This would be the best mode of life,[96\13] and he could show them the way to it; no worldly power or greatness can do as much--none of the great statesmen of the past, Themistokles, Kimon, and Perikles, understood anything of all this; all their efforts were nothing but blind error and wandering.[97\13]

At the climax of his life and of his philosophical development Plato completed an ideal picture of the State, drawn in accordance with the principles and the requirements of his own philosophy. It rests upon a broad foundation--the multitude of its inhabitants divided strictly into classes that in themselves and their manner of life are to display, like a beacon that can be seen afar, the virtue of Justice. At one period this had seemed to include all that was necessary for the completion of the ideal State; but now, far above that level, pointing upwards into the lofty aether above the earth, a final consummation reveals itself to him, to which all mere mundane things serve but as support and furtherance. A small minority of the citizens, the philosophers, form this last pinnacle of the building. Here on earth and in this state that is organized in conformity with justice, they will serve the state, as in duty bound and not for their own satisfaction, and take part in government.[98\13] As soon as duty is fulfilled they will return to the supramundane contemplation which is the aim and content of their whole life's activity. To provide a place where these contemplatives may live, where they may be educated for their vocation, the highest there is; to allow dialectic as a form of living to take its place in the activity of worldly civilization as an object of men's effort[99\13]--to bring about all this the Ideal State is built up step by step. The {475} bourgeois social virtues and their firm establishment and interconnexion, which had once seemed the real and sufficient reason for the erection of the whole edifice of the state--seen from this elevation, these no longer retain their independent importance. "The so-called virtues" all pale before the highest capacity of the soul, which is the mystic beholding of the eternal.[100\13] The chief mission of the perfect wise man is no longer to fulfil his obligations to the others that stand without. To make his own inner life fit and ready for self-emancipation is now his real and immediate task. Mysticism aims at a personal salvation such as the individual can only obtain for himself. Good works are no longer necessary when the mind has no further connexion with earthly life and conduct. When it comes to dealing with practical earthly affairs he who possesses the highest virtue will have all these others added unto him.[101\13] Virtue belongs to him; it is his real condition of being; but the particular virtues he will rarely need to use.

This lofty pinnacle is accessible to but a few. God alone and a small[102\13] company of mortals are able to approach in pure thought to the everlasting Reality, the sole object of certain, plain and unchanging Knowledge. The majority of men can never become philosophers.[103\13] And yet, according to this philosophy, the crown of all life belongs to the philosopher. This is no religion for the poor in spirit. Science--the supreme knowledge of the highest Being--is a pre-condition of salvation. To know God is to become like God.[104\13] It is easy to see why such a message of salvation could not attract a wider community of believers. It could not have done so without being false to its own nature. To a few lofty spirits among mankind, it offers a reward that beckons from eternity. Freedom from life in the corruptible body is the prize it offers; that and a never-ending union with true Reality--a return to what is everlasting and divine. A symbol of what the philosopher has achieved after his death will be provided by the community by whom the departed will be honoured as a Daimon.[105\13]

Such then is the ideal vision of a civilization in which the belief in the soul's immortality and its vocation to an everlasting life in the kingdom of the gods was held with profound and serious conviction. The belief in immortality here becomes the corner-stone of a building, the architect of which regards all earthly things as only valid for the moment, and therefore of profound unimportance. For him only the Heaven of the spiritual world with its everlasting laws and {476} patterns seriously matters. He discards without a regret the whole of Greek culture as it had expressed itself in state and society, custom and art--an art that will last as long as humanity itself. He demands an aristocracy, and an aristocracy measured by a standard of what is the "best" that was quite beyond the reach of any possible human society even though it were as deeply impregnated with aristocratic ideas as Greek society always was. And the final aim and ideal sought by this organization of life on earth was to be the superseding of all earthly life . . .

The mind of Plato, equally ready to receive as to give, was not likely to become immobilized for ever in a mystic rapture of vision. Even when he had finished the Republic he did not cease to reshape his system at many points and in many directions, while some special problems were taken up again for further and repeated study. Even a second sketch of a political system was left behind by him in which he sought to lay down rules for the guidance of life among the multitude who are still regarded as completely shut out from the realm of the everlasting Forms. To this end the highest aims of human endeavour are almost left out of sight and practical rules for reaching the attainable "better" are supplied for the benefit of the majority. He had learnt resignation at many points. Nevertheless, the profound conviction of all his thoughts remained unchanged; the claims that he put before the world and mankind remained essentially the same. For this reason after generations have not been mistaken in seeing in him the priestly man of wisdom, who with warning finger points the immortal spirit of man on its way from this feeble world upwards to the everlasting life.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

[1\13: Pl., Ap. c. 32 f. (40 C ff.).]

[2\13: Ap. 41 C D.]

[3\13: Ap. 29 A B, 37 B.]

[4\13: Xen. Cyrop. 8, 7, 17, makes the dying Kyros justify his faith that the soul survives the body rather on the lines of popular belief and the cult of souls than from would-be-philosophical considerations (§ 20; see above, chap. v, n. 178). In spite of this he allows the question to remain undecided--as though of little importance--whether, in fact, the soul then leaves the body and lives on or whether ~me/nousa hê psuchê\ en tô=| sô/mati sunapothnê/skei~, § 21. In either eventuality he will after death ~mêde\n e/ti kako\n pathei=n~, § 27.--Arist., SE. xvii, p. 176b, 16, ~po/teron phthartê\ ê\ atha/natos hê psuchê\ tô=n zô/|ôn, ou diô/ristai toi=s polloi=s~--in this question they ~amphidoxou=si~.]

[5\13: Pl., Phd. 70 A, 77 B, 80 D. This belief of the ~polloi/~ and ~pai=des~ looks indeed much more like a piece of superstition than a denial of the continued life of the ~psuchê/~ (in which light Pl. represents it). We have already met with the soul as a wind-spirit more than once: when it leaves the body the other wind-spirits carry it off and away with themselves (cf. above, chap. i, n. 10), esp. when a high wind is blowing (cf. the German popular belief that when a man hangs himself a storm arises: Grimm, p. 635: cf. Mannhardt, Germ. Myth. 270 n. In other words, the "furious host", the personified storm-spirits--Grimm, p. 632; cf. Append. vii--come and carry away with them the poor unquiet soul).]

[6\13: Cf. Pl. Rp. 330 D E. There is more about these matters in the speech against Aristogeiton, [D.] 25, 52-3. In spite of the popular form in which it is put such an opinion is not to be claimed at once as a popular and generally held belief: the author of this speech is a follower of Orpheus, a fact which he himself betrays in § 11.]

[7\13: Pl. Rp. 608 D.]

[8\13: It is probable that in the ~Politei/a~ two essentially distinct stages of Platonic doctrine are found side by side with only an external bond of union, and that in particular what is said in Bk. v, 471 C ff., to the end of Bk. vii about the ~philo/sophoi~, their education and position in the state (and outside politics), is an extraneous addition to the completed picture of the ~kalli/polis~ which is given in Bks. ii--v, 471 C: an afterthought not originally included in the plan of the whole book and not anticipated in the beginning of it. This seems to me to emerge unmistakably from a careful and unprejudiced study of the whole work and to have been completely demonstrated by Krohn and Pfleiderer. That Plato himself regarded the first sketch of an ideal state as a separate work (which may even have been actually published separately: Gellius, 14, 3, 3), is shown by the beginning of the Timaeus. Here--with the implication of quite a different staging of the dialogue and a different introduction from what we now read in Rp., Bk. i, c. 1--ii, c. 9--we have an exact recapitulation of the subject of the inquiry in the ~Politei/a~ from ii, 10, 367 E, to v, 460 C, with the definite statement (19 AB) that thus far and no farther had the discussion gone "yesterday". The stages in which the whole work was composed seem then to be divisible as follows: (1) Sketch of the state of the {478} ~phu/lakes~ (in brief) embodied in a dialogue between Sokrates, Kriton, Timaios, Hermokrates, and another companion: in subject matter agreeing (apart from the introduction) substantially with Rp. ii, 10, 367 E, to v, 460 C. (2) Continuation of this sketch in the story of ancient Athens and the people of Atlantis. Its completion is transferred elsewhere because in the meantime the ~Politei/a~ itself has been extended and into the empty framework of the ~Ti/m.~ thus left available the account of the creation of the world given by Timaios is very loosely inserted: the frame-narratives of the ~Ti/maios~ and ~Kriti/as~ never being completed. (3) Continuation of the first sketch (still virtually along the lines originally laid down) in Rp. v, 460 D-471 C (in which 466 E ff. is a brief account of the behaviour of the state in time of war--a substitute for the longer and more detailed statement on the same subject in Tim. 20 B f.), and in viii, ix (the greater part), and x, second half (608 C ff.). (4) Finally the whole work receives its crown and completion in a section that was, however, not foreseen in the older parts of the design, for it disturbs part of that original design's independence and validity and does more than merely supplement it--the introduction of the ~philo/sophoi~ and their special type of "virtue", v, 471 C-vii fin.; ix, 580 D-588 A; x, part 1 (to 608 B).--Then came the final editing of the whole: insertion of the new introduction, i, 1-ii, 9 (not necessarily left until the completion of the whole; necessary bringing into harmony of the divergent elements by a few excisions, qualifications, etc.; and probably a literary revision and polishing of the whole book.--The whole thus finally produced reveals its origin clearly enough in the outgrowing of a first plan and its replacement by a second that has naturally suggested itself in the course of the author's own continued development. At the same time Plato could claim that the whole edifice, in spite of much extension and rebuilding in a different style of architecture, should be considered as a unity in the form in which he finally left it (as a noteworthy monument, too, of his own alteration of view). He himself in the sublimest moments of his mystic flight in Bks. vi and vii in no sense rejects the groundwork of the ~kalli/polis~ of ii-v (though not, indeed, designed originally as such), but merely reduces it to the position of a substructure which remains a necessary and sole foundation even for the mystic pinnacle and preserves its absolute validity for the great majority of the citizens who inhabit the ~kalli/polis~ (for the ~philo/sophoi~ are still regarded as very few in number) for whom it is a school for the exhibition of political virtue.--In the first sketch, then, there is no trace of a doctrine of immortality that can be properly so called, and the popular belief in a continued life of the soul after death has for Plato, at this stage at least, no serious weight or importance. The ~phu/lakes~ are not to trouble about what may follow death (iii, 1 ff.); the main purpose in view is to show that ~dikaiosu/nê~ is its own reward, and the rewards which are anticipated for it after death are only ironically alluded to (ii, 363 CD; cf. 366 AB); Sokrates means to do without such hopes (366 E ff.). The ~athanasi/a psuchê=s~ is only introduced as a paradox in x, 608 D (in the continuation of the first sketch) for which proof is sought; whereupon the importance of the question as to what may await the soul after death emerges (614 A ff.) as well as the necessity of taking thought not for this short life but ~hupe\r tou= ha/pantos chro/non~ (608 C), of which nothing had been said or could have been said in iii-v. Finally in vi-vii the indestructibility of the soul is implied in its sublimest form. It is evident that Plato's own views on these matters had undergone changes in the course of time, and that these {479} changes are reflected in the various strata of the ~Politei/a~ even after its final editing. (Cf. Krohn, Platon. Staat, p. 265; Pfleiderer, Platon. Frage, p. 23 f., 35 ff., 1888.)]

[9\13: The Appearance ~bou/letai, ore/getai, prothumei=tai ei=nai~ what its Idea is: Phd. 74 D, 75 AB. The Ideas are thus teleological causes like the divine ~nou=s~ of Aristotle which, unmoved itself, ~kinei= hôs erô/menon~ (just as matter has a desire for form, potentiality for actuality). Plato it is true did not keep to this method of illustrating rather than explaining the relation between the Appearance and the unmoved Idea.]

[10\13: ~noê/sei meta\ lo/gou perilêpto/n~, Tim. 27 D. ~hou= ou/pot' a\n a/llô| epila/boio ê\ tô=| tê=s dianoi/as logismô=|~, Phd. 79 A. ~autê\ di' hautê=s hê psuchê\ ta\ koina\ phai/netai peri\ pa/ntôn episkopei=n~, Tht. 185 D.]

[11\13: The prius in the case of man is really the perception of his own mental activity in ~no/êsis meta\ lo/gou~ as being a process essentially different from ~do/xa met' aisthê/seôs alo/gou~. It is inference from the former alone that leads to the conclusion that the ~noou/mena~ exist: Tim. 51 B-52 A. It is the Ideas that we grasp in abstract thought: ~autê\ hê ousi/a hê=s lo/gon di/domen kai\ erôtô=ntes kai\ apokrino/menoi~, Phd. 78 D.]

[12\13: The ~epistê/mê~ which ~dialektikê/~ alone can give (Rp. 533 DE is ~anama/rtêtos~ (Rp. 477 E.]

[13\13: Of the three ~ei/dê~ or ~ge/nê~--the ~o/n~, the ~gigno/menon~ and the ~en hô=| gi/gnetai~ (the ~chô/ra~) of Tim. 48 E f., 52 ABD)--the third at any rate is quite foreign to the soul. Like the World-Soul (Tim. 35 A, along with which it is "mixed" (41 D), the individual soul also is a middle term between the ~a/meres~ of the Idea and the ~kata\ ta\ sô/mata meristo/n~, having a share in both.]

[14\13: True, unalterable Being belongs only to the ~aeide/s~ and therefore also to the soul: Phd. 79 A f.]

[15\13: Phd. c. 54-6 (105 B-107 B).]

[17\13: ~age/nêton~, Phdr. c. 24, 245 D (~aï/dios~ simply, Rp. 611 B). The creation of the souls in Tim. is only intended to represent the origin of the spiritual from the ~dêmiourgo/s~ (not the coming into being of the soul in time): see Siebeck, Ges. d. Psychol. i, 1, 275 ff. Still, it remains impossible to say whether Plato whenever he speaks of the pre-existence of the soul always means that the soul existed without beginning.]

[18\13: As to the relation of the individual soul to the soul of the universe, neither the mythical account in Timaeus nor the briefer allusion in Phileb. 30 A allows us to conclude that the soul of our body is "taken from" the soul of the ~sô=ma tou= panto/s~. In reality the fiction of a "World-Soul" is intended to serve quite other purposes than the derivation of the individual soul from a single common source.]

[19\13: Tim. 34 C; Lg. 891 A-896 C.]

[20\13: Acc. to the account in Phdr. 246 C, the soul suffers its downfall into the earthly existence if ~ho tê=s ka/kês hi/ppos~, i.e. the ~epithumi/a~ in the soul, tends towards the earth--247 B. It must, therefore, be the result of the preponderance of the appetitive impulses. This, however, can only happen if the ~logistiko/n~ of the soul has become too weak to drive the soul-chariot any longer as its duty was. Hence the supporting wings, i.e. the ~no/êsis~, of the soul-horse fall off. It is thus a weakening of the cognitive part of the soul that causes its downfall into materiality (just as it is the measure of their capacity for knowledge that determines {480} the character of the ~ensôma/tôsis~ of the souls, and their return to the ~to/pos huperoura/nios~ is equally determined by their recovery of the purer form of knowledge: 248 C ff., 249 AC). Thus it is not, as in Empedokles, a religio-moral transgression that leads to the incarnation of the souls, but a failure of intellect, an intellectual fall in sin.]

[21\13: The soul is, acc. to the account in Tim., created in order that by animating and governing a body, it may complete the sum of creation: without the ~zô=|a~ the ~ourano/s~ (the universe) would be ~atelê/s~, Tim. 41 B ff. Acc. to this teleological motivation of the being and the ~ensôma/tôsis~ of the soul, this latter, the ~ensôma/tôsis~, would have belonged to the original plan of the ~dêmiourgo/s~ and there would be no purpose in the creation of the souls (by the ~dêmiourgo/s~ and the inferior gods) unless they were destined to the animation of the ~zô=|a~ and conjunction with ~sô/mata~. But it is obviously inconsistent with all this that the object of the soul's endeavour should be to separate itself as soon as possible and as completely as possible from the body and everything material in order to get back again to immaterial life without any body--42 BD. This is a relic of the original theological view of the relation between body and soul. In Phd. (and usually in Plato) it displays itself unconcealed; but it was far too closely bound up with the whole of Plato's ethic and metaphysics not to make its illicit appearance even when as in Tim. he wished to keep the physiological side to the fore.]

[22\13: Phdr. 245 C-246 A. The soul is ~to\ hauto\ kinou=n~, and indeed continually, ~aeiki/nêton~, it is ~toi=s a/llois ho/sa kinei=tai pêgê\ kai\ archê\ kinê/seôs~ (the body only seems to move itself, but it is really the soul within which moves it--246 C). If the soul were to perish, ~pa=s ourano\s pa=sa/ te ge/nesis~ would be at a standstill. The conception of the "soul" as the ~aeiki/nêton~ was already well and long established in Plato's time (see above, chap. xii, n. 150). In the form in which he introduces it here (as a proof of the imperishability of the soul) he may have modelled his conception on that of Alkmaion (Arist., An. 405a, 29): see Hirzel, Hermes, xi, 244. But Plato here and throughout Phdr. is speaking of the individual soul (~psuchê/~ collective singular). So too in Lg. 894 E ff., 896 A ff. (~lo/gos~ of the soul: ~hê duname/nê autê\ hautê\n kinei=n ki/nêsis~. It is the ~aiti/a~ and the issue of all movement in the world, the source of life; for life belongs to that which ~auto/ hauto\ kinei=~ 895 C.) As distinguished from the ~psuchê\ enoikou=sa en ha/pasi toi=s kinoume/nois~ we do not hear of the (double World-Soul until 896 E. There is in fact ~ki/nêsis~ in plenty in the world besides that of the animated organisms.]

[23\13: Phd. 93 B (c. 43) and often.]

[24\13: ~psuchê/~ on the one side, ~pa=n to\ a/psuchon~ on the other. Phdr. 246 B and so generally.]

[25\13: Tim. 86 B ff. (c. 41).--In brief: ~kako\s hekô\n oudei/s, dia\ de\ ponêra\n he/xin tina\ tou= sô/matos kai\ apai/deuton trophê\n~ (education of the soul) ~ho kako\s gi/gnetai kako/s~, 86 E.]

[26\13: ~to\ sômatoeide\s ho\ tê=| psuchê=| hê homili/a te kai\ xunousi/a tou= sô/matos . . . enepoi/êse xu/mphuton ktl.~ Phd. 81 C, 83 D.]

[27\13: Pythagoreans, see above (chap. xi, n. 55); hardly Demokritos (Dox., p. 390, 14). The trichotomy can exist very well side by side with the dichotomy (which also appears) into ~logistiko/n~ and ~alo/gistikon~, the last being simply divided again into ~thumo/s~ and ~epithumi/a~.]

[28\13: In the first sketch of the Republic (ii-v). Here it is admittedly bound up with the three classes or castes of the state, but it has not been invented for the benefit of these classes. On the contrary, the {481} trichotomy of the soul is original and the division of the citizen body into three parts is derived and explained from it; cf. 435 E.--The view that Plato was never quite serious about the threefold division of the soul but always spoke of it as something semi-mythical or as a temporarily adopted hypothesis, will not appear plausible on an unprejudiced study of the passages in the Platonic writings that deal with the threefold division of the soul.]

[29\13: Rp. x, 611 A-E (c. 11), shows clearly that the reason which made Plato abandon his conception (given in the first sketch of the Rep. and still maintained in the Phaedrus) of the natural trichotomy of the soul into parts or divisions was the consideration of its immortality and vocation to intercourse with the ~thei=on kai\ atha/naton kai\ aei\ o/n~.--The emotions and passions by which the soul is "fettered" ~hupo\ tou= sô/matos~, explain its tendency to clothe itself in another body after death, Phd. 83 C ff. If the emotions and passions were indissolubly linked to the soul the latter could never escape from the cycle of rebirths.--On the other hand, if only the ~logistiko/n~, as the only independently existing side of the soul, goes into the place of judgment in the other world there would seem to be no reason that should tempt this simple uncompounded soul to renewed ~ensôma/tôsis~, a process which implies materiality and desire. (This difficulty troubled Plotinos too.) Plato takes into view the possibility of an inner corruption of the pure and undivided intellectual soul which makes a future state of punishment and purgatory possible and intelligible and explains the existence (until a complete return to purity is achieved) of a tendency or constraint to renewed ~ensôma/tôsis~ even without a permanent association with the ~thumoeide/s~ and the ~epithumêtiko/n~.]

[30\13: ~tê=| alêthesta/tê| phu/sei~ the soul is ~monoeide/s~, Rep. x, c. 11 (611 B, 612 A). Hence it is ~to\ para/pan adia/lutos ê\ eggu/s ti tou/tou~, Phd. 80 B.]

[31\13: The intellect-soul ~atha/naton archê\n thnêtou= zô/|ou~ is the creation of the ~dêmiourgo/s~; the other faculties of the soul, ~thumo/s~, ~epithumi/a~ (and ~ai/sthêsis~ therewith), ~psuchê=s ho/son thnêto\n~ (Tim. 61 C), are all added to the soul at the moment of its union with the body by the subordinate deities: Tim. 41 D-44 D; 69 A-70 D (c. 14, 15, 31). The same idea appears in Rp. x, 611 BC. ~to\ aeigene\s me/ros tê=s psuchê=s~ is distinguished from the ~zôogene/s~: Polit. 309 C.]

[32\13: ~to\ sô=ma kai\ hai= tou/tou epithumi/ai~, Phd. 66 C. The soul moved by passion suffers ~hupo\ sô/matos~, 83 CD. In death the soul is ~kathara\ pa/ntôn tô=n peri\ to\ sô=ma kakô=n kai\ epithumiô=n~, Crat. 404 A.]

[33\13: Tim. 43 C. It is only as a result of this violent and contradictory excitement through the physical perception of Becoming that the soul becomes ~a/nous~ (which is **originally foreign to it) ~ho/tan eis sô=ma endethê=| thnêto/n~, 44 A. (It will in time become ~e/mphrôn~ once more and can become wise, 44 BC. In the case of the animals, which can be inhabited by the same soul, it will remain always ~a/phrôn~--one may suppose.)]

[34\13: ~. . . smikro\n chro/non, oude\n me\n ou=n pro\s to\n ha/panta (chro/non)~. Rp. 498 D.]

[35\13: In accordance with popular thought (but obviously also in perfect seriousness and without any special concession) death is regarded as ~tê=s psuchê=s apo\ tou= sô/matos apallagê/~, Phd. 64 C; Gorg. 524 B. Hence, it usually happens that the soul ~mêde/pote eis Ha/idou katharô=s aphike/sthai, all' aei\ tou= sô/matos anaple/a exie/nai~, Phd. 83 D. (--~aei\~, i.e. with the exception of the few complete ~philo/sophoi~ that do not need further purification in Hades, and this is, in fact, the doctrine of the Phd. itself; cf. 114 C, 80 E, 81 A.)]

[36\13: Purgatory, punishment and rewards in the other world: Gorg. {482} 523 ff.: Rp. x, c. 13 ff., 614 A ff. (vision of Er, son of Armenios in the continuation of the first version of the ~politei/a~); Phd. 110 B-114 C. We must not here go into the details of the individual myths in which it is still perhaps possible to distinguish what parts Plato has taken out of ancient poetry and popular legend and what comes from theological and particularly Orphic doctrinal poetry--or even (Rp. x) from Oriental fables--and how much he has added independently on his own account. (A few remarks will be found in G. Ettig, Acherunt., Leipz. Stud. xiii, 305 ff.; cf. also Döring, Arch. Ges. Phil. 1393, p. 475 ff.; Dieterich, Nekyia, 112 ff.) He usually distinguishes three classes among the souls (only apparently two in Phdr. 249 A): those who are affected with curable faults, the hopelessly and incurable guilty (who are condemned to eternal punishment in Tartaros without rebirth: Gorg. 525 C ff.; Rp. 615 D; Phd. 113 E); and, thirdly the ~hosi/ôs bebiôko/tes, di/kaioi kai\ ho/sioi~. This is the system of Gorg. 525 BC, 526 C; Rp. 615 BC. (With these come also the ~a/ôroi~, 615 C, who neither deserve punishment nor reward--of them Er said ~a/lla, ouk a/xia mnê/mês~. Perhaps older theologians had already concerned themselves with these, not being satisfied with the fate assigned by popular mythology to the ~a/ôroi~--see Append. vii--it would have been a natural subject for the professional attention of these Schoolmen of popular superstition.) In Phd. 113 D ff. the question is even more minutely dealt with. Here we have (1) ~hoi me/sôs bebiôko/tes~ (che visser' senz' infamia e senza lode), (2) ~hoi ania/tôs e/chontes~, (3) ~hoi ia/sima hêmartêko/tes~, (4) ~hoi diaphero/ntôs hosi/ôs bebiôko/tes~, and (5) the élite of these ~ho/sioi~, the real philosophers, ~hoi philosophi/a| hikanô=s kathera/menoi~--these are not born again. To the other classes are assigned their appropriate purgation, reward or punishment. Here classes 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the three classes of Rp. and Gorg. (which may perhaps be modelled on the divisions popularized by older theological poetry--see above, chap. xii, n. 62). Novelties are the ~me/sôs bebiôko/tes~ and the true philosophers. For these last the abode upon the ~maka/rôn nê=soi~ (Gorg. 526 C), or, what comes to the same thing, upon the surface of the earth (Phd. 114 BC), is no longer sufficient. They go ~es maka/rôn tina\s eudaimoni/as~ (115 D), which means that they are really freed entirely from temporal existence and enter into the unchanging "Now" of eternity. (As far as the complete escape of the ~philo/sophoi~ is concerned the account in Rp. x, c. 13 [614 A-615 C] does not contradict that of Phd. The only reason why this is not mentioned in Rp. is that these absolutely enfranchized souls could not appear upon the ~leimô/n~ there mentioned: 614 E.)--Of these various accounts that of Phd. seems to be the latest. In Lg. there is yet another indefinite allusion to the necessity of undergoing a judgment after death: 904 C ff.]

[37\13: Choice of their new state of life by the souls in the other world, Rp. 617 E ff.; Phdr. 249 B. The purpose of this arrangement is made clear by Rp. 617 E; ~aiti/a helome/nou; theo\s anai/tios~ (cf. Tim. 42 D). It is, in fact, a theodicy and at the same time secures the complete responsibility of every man for his own character and deeds (cf. 619 C). There is no idea of founding a determinist theory upon it.--The choice is guided by the special character of the soul (which it has developed in its previous life) and its tendencies (cf. Phd. 81 E; Lg. 904 BC). For the same reason there is no choice on the occasion of the soul's first ~ensôma/tôsis~ (Tim. 41 E): after that, in later births, a definite descent in well-marked stages in peius, can be observed, each conditioned by the degree of corruption attaching to the soul (Tim. 42 B ff.). {483} All of which can very well co-exist with a choice of its own fate by the soul conditioned by its own nature.]

[38\13: ~xummetri/a~, Tim. 87 D.]

[39\13: At least three (as in Pi., O. ii, 75 ff.), acc. to Phdr. 249 A. Between each two births there is an intervening period of 1,000 years (Rp. 615 A; Phdr. 249 AB). This cuts away the ground from such myths as that of the various "lives" of Pythagoras (see Append. x).]

[40\13: Incarnation in animals, Phdr. 249 B; Rp. 618 A, 620 ff.; Phd. 81 E; Tim. 42 BC. That this part was any less seriously meant than any other part of his doctrine of metempsychosis is not in the least suggested by Plato himself. Acc. to Tim. 91 D-92 B, all the animals have souls that had once inhabited the bodies of men (see Procl., in Rp. ii, 332 Kroll; he is trying to harmonize Tim. and Phdr.). In fact, the idea that a man's soul might inhabit an animal was precisely the great difficulty in Plato's doctrine of the soul. If, as is said in Phdr. 249 BC, a real animal-soul cannot enter into a human body because it does not possess ~no/êsis~ or the power of "dialectic" which constitutes the essential part of the human soul's activity, how can a real human soul enter into an animal's body when it is obvious that as an animal it can make no use of its ~no/êsis~? (For this very reason many Platonists--those who were not satisfied with ingenious or artificial interpretations: cf. Sallust., de Dis 20; Procl., in Tim. 329 DE--denied the entrance of the human soul into animals; cf. Aug. CD. X, 30, and partic. Nemes., p. 116 Matth. Lucr. iii, 760, already seems to have such Platonists in mind.) The ~logistiko/n~ of the soul seems to be absent from animals or to be present but undeveloped as in children: Rp. iv, 441 A B (or does it remain permanently bound in ~aphrosu/nê~? see above, this chap., n. 33. Just such a theory put forward by exponents of ~metempsu/chôsis~ who would make the ~psuchê/~ always the same but not always equally active, is attacked by Alex. Aphr., de An., p. 27 Br.). But acc. to the later doctrine of Plato the ~logistiko/n~ comprises the whole contents of the soul before it enters a body; if the animals do not possess it then they do not strictly speaking possess a soul (~thumo/s~ and ~epithumi/a~ in themselves are not the soul; they are only added to the soul when it first enters into a body). It seems certain that Plato adopted the view that the soul migrates into the bodies of animals from the theologians and Pythagoreans, while he still believed that the soul was not pure power of thought but also (as still in Phdr.) included ~thumo/s~ and ~epithumi/a~ in itself. Later, because it was difficult to do without the migration-theory of the soul on account of its ethical importance, he allowed the idea to remain side by side with his reorganized and sublimated doctrine of the soul. (On the other hand, metempsychosis into plants--which are certainly also ~zô=|a~, though they only have to ~to\ epithumêtiko/n~, Tim. 77 B--was never adopted by him from Empedokles; cf. Procl., in Rp. ii, 333 Kr., and for the same reason: this idea was unimportant and indifferent from an ethical point of view.)]

[41\13: ~tê\n eis to\n noêto\n to/pon tê=s psuchê=s a/nodon~, Rp. 517 B.]

[42\13: ~epeidê\ de\ age/nêto/n esti, kai\ adia/phthoron auto\ anagkê ei=nai~, Phdr. 245 D--the ancient argument from the fact that the individual soul (and of this Plato is speaking) has no beginning to the conclusion that its life can have no end.]

[43\13: This much may be conceded to Teichmüller's observations. "The individual, and the individual soul, is not an independent principle but only a resultant of the compounding of the Idea and the principle of Becoming"--though this is not how Plato regards the {484} matter; hence in Plato--"the individual is not eternal (i.e. not necessarily), and the eternal Principles are not individual", Stud. z. Ges. d. Begr., p. 115, 142 (1874). But all that Teichmüller has to say under this head is in reality only a criticism of the Platonic doctrine of the soul and does not help us to determine what exactly that doctrine was. Plato speaks always of the immortality, i.e. the eternity, of the individual soul; nowhere does he confine indestructibility to the "common nature" of the soul; and this fact is not even remotely explained by appealing as Teichmüller does to an alleged "orthodoxy" to which Plato is supposed to be accommodating his words. If from no other passage we should be obliged to conclude definitely from Rp. 611 A that Plato believed in the existence of a plurality of souls and in their indestructibility: ~aei\ a\n ei=en hai autai/ (psuchai/). ou/te ga\r a/n pou ela/ttous ge/nointo mêdemia=s apollume/nês, ou/te hau= plei/ous~. Here the predicate of the first sentence is indubitably ~ei=en~ only; it is affirmed that always the same souls will exist, not that ~hai autai\ ei=en~ ("the souls are always the same ones") as Teichmüller supposes, Platon. Frage, 7 ff., and it is asserted with all possible plainness that the plurality of individual souls, of which a definite number exist, is indestructible.]

[44\13: E.g. appeal made to ~teletai/, palaioi\ lo/goi en aporrê/tois lego/menoi~, and particularly to Orphic doctrine, in those places where he is speaking of the inward difference between the soul and all that is corporeal, of the soul's "death" in earthly life, of its enclosure in the ~sô=ma~ as its ~sê=ma~ in punishment of its misdeeds--of punishment and purification after death in ~Ha/idês~, of the migration of the soul, its imperishability, dwelling of the pure in the neighbourhood of the gods (Phd. 61 BC, 63 C, 70 C, 81 A, 107 D ff.; Gorg. 493 A; Crat. 400 BC; Men. 81 A; Lg. 870 DE, 872 E). This also is the origin of the tendency to compare the highest philosophical activity, or the beholding of the Ideas before all time, with the ~epoptei=ai~ of the mysteries: Phdr. 250 B; cf. Lob., Agl. 128.]

[45\13: Nine (an ancient sacred number) stages from the ~philo/sophos~ downwards to the ~tu/rannos~, Phdr. 248 DE.]

[46\13: This is frequently stated in individual myths; cf. also Phd. 85 CD.]

[47\13: Phdr. 250 C (~o/streon~): Rp. 611 CD (Glaukos).]

[48\13: ~tê\n tou= o/ntos thê/ran~, Phd. 66 C (~ho/tan autê\ kath' hautê\n pragmateu/êtai hê psuchê\ peri\ ta\ o/nta~, Tht. 187 A. ~autê=| tê=| psuchê=| theate/on auta\ ta\ pra/gmata~, Phd. 66 D).]

[49\13: ~xunai/tia~, Tim. 46 C ff. ~nou=s kai\ ana/gkê~, 47 E ff. (~ho theo/s~ is ~pollô=n anai/tios~, namely ~tô=n kakô=n~, Rp. 379 AC).]

[50\13: The ~sô=ma~ with which the soul is bound up is a ~kako/n~, Phd. 66 B (~desmoi/~ of the soul, 67 D). The ~kaka/~ in the world are regularly said to come from matter until in Lg., side by side with the ~**euerge/tis psuchê/~ of the world, there appears an evil World-Soul that works evil.]

[51\13: Particularly in Phd., ~kathareu/ein--ka/tharsis--hoi philosophi/a| hikanô=s kathêra/menoi~ in contrast with the ~aka/thartoi psuchai/~, 67 A ff., 69 BC, 80 E, 82 D, 108 B, 114 C. Katharsis of the soul through dialectic Soph. 230 C ff. Express allusion to the analogous requirement of ~ka/tharsis~ by ~hoi ta\s teleta\s hêmi=n katastê/santes~, Phd. 69 C.]

[52\13: ~ka/tharsis ei=nai tou=to xumbai/nei, to\ chôri/zein ho/ ti ma/lista apo\ tou= sô/matos tê\n psuchê\n kai\ ethi/sai autê\n kath' hautê\n pantacho/then ek tou= sô/matos sunagei/resthai/ te kai\ hathroi/zesthai, kai\ oikei=n kata\ to\ dunato\n kai\ en tô=| nu=n paro/nti kai\ en tô=| e/peita mo/nên kath' hautê=n, ekluome/nên hô/sper ek desmô=n ek tou= sô/matos~, Phd. 67 C. Thus ~dikaiosu/nê~ and {485} ~andrei/a~, and more particularly ~phro/nêsis~, are ~katharmo/s tis~, 69 BC. ~lu/sis te kai\ katharmo/s~ of ~philosophi/a~, 82 D.]

[53\13: ~philosophi/a~ teaches the soul ~eis hautê\n xulle/gesthai kai\ hathroi/zesthai~ and to ~anachôrei=n~ from the ~apa/tê~ of the senses ~ho/son mê\ ana/gkê autoi=s chrê=sthai~, Phd. 83 A.--~ea\n kathara\ hê psuchê\ apalla/ttêtai . . . pheu/gousa to\ sô=ma kai\ sunêthroisme/nê autê\ eis hautê/n~, 80 E, 76 C.]

[54\13: ~. . . katharoi\ apallatto/menoi tê=s tou= sô/matos aphrosu/nês . . . gnôso/metha di' hêmô=n autô=n pa=n to\ eilikrine/s, mê\ katharô=| ga\r katharou= epha/ptesthai mê\ ou themito\n ê=|~, Phd. 67 AB.]

[55\13: For the ~agatho/n, hê tou= agathou= ide/a, aiti/a~ both of ~alê/theia~ and of ~epistê/mê~ but identical with neither (they are only ~agathoeidê=~) and ~e/ti meizo/nôs timête/on~--cause of the ~gignôsko/mena~ and not only of ~gignô/skesthai~, of both ~ei=nai~ and ~ousi/a, ouk ousi/as o/ntos tou= agathou= all' e/ti epe/keina tê=s ousi/as presbei/a| kai\ duna/mei hupere/chontos~--see Rp. vi, c. 19 (508 A ff.), 517 BC. Here ~to\ agatho/n~, as the reason and active cause of all Being is itself placed beyond and above Being (as it is regularly with the Neoplatonics) and identified with Godhead (the ~thei=os nou=s~, Phil. 22 C); this last is, however, in Tim. set side by side with the Ideas, of which ~to\ agatho/n~ is now the highest.]

[56\13: ~hê tou= agathou= ide/a me/giston ma/thêma~, Rp. 505 A.]

[57\13: The ~periagôgê/~ of the soul, Rp. vii init.]

[58\13: The philosopher, ~exista/menos tô=n anthrôpi/nôn spoudasma/tôn kai\ pro\s tô=| thei/ô| gigno/menos, enthousia/zôn le/lêthe tou\s pollou/s~, Phdr. 249 D.]

[59\13: ~ho ga\r sunoptiko\s dialektiko/s~, Rp. 537 C. ~eis mi/an ide/an sunorô=nta a/gein ta\ pollachê=| diesparme/na~ (and again ~kat' ei/dê te/mnein~ what is unified)--this is the business of the ~dialektiko/s~, Phdr. 265 D. ~ek pollô=n aisthê/seôn eis he\n logismô=| xunairou/menon (ie/nai~, Phdr. 249 B.]

[60\13: Gradual ascent of dialectic upwards to ~auto\ ho\ e/stin agatho/n~, Rp. 532 A f., 511 BC, 534 B ff. to ~auto\ to\ kalo/n~, Smp. c. 28-9 (211 B). Its aim is ~epanagôgê\ tou= belti/stou en psuchê=| pro\s tou= ari/stou en toi=s ou=si the/an~, Rp. 532 C.]

[61\13: The philosophic ~erôtiko/s~ at the end of the dialectic ascent ~exai/phnês kato/psetai/ ti thaumasto\n tê\n phu/sin kalo/n ktl.~, Smp. 210 E--exactly as in the ~te/lea kai\ epoptika\ mustê/ria~, 210 A. ~holo/klêra kai\ hapla= kai\ eudai/mona pha/smata muoumenoi/ te kai\ epopteu/ontes en augê=| kathara=|~, Phdr. 250 C.--it is a visionary and a suddenly acquired apprehension of the world-order, not one obtained in discursive thought. We may compare the way in which Plotinos, with a recollection of such Platonic passages, describes the arrival of ~e/kstasis--ho/tan hê psuchê\ exai/phnês phô=s la/bê| ktl.~ (5, 3, 17; cf. 5, 5, 17).]

[62\13: The soul ~e/oike tô=| thei/ô|~, Phd. 80 A. It is ~xuggenê\s tô=| te thei/ô| kai\ athana/tô| kai\ tô=| aei\ o/nti~, Rp. 611 E--~sugge/neia thei/a~ of men; Lg. 899 D. The eternal and immortal is, as such, divine. The real Ego of man, the ~atha/naton, psuchê\ eponomazo/menon~, after death goes ~para\ theou\s a/llous~, Lg. 959 B.]

[63\13: The ~thei=on, athana/tois homô/numon~, part of the soul is ~atha/natos archê\ thnêtou= zô/|ou~, Tim. 41 C, 42 E. The ~phro/nêsis~ of the soul (its "wing" Phdr. 246 D) ~tô=| thei/ô| e/oiken~, Alc.^1 133 C.--In Tim. 90 A C this ~kuriô/taton tê=s psuchê=s ei=dos~ is actually called the ~dai/môn~ which man has ~xu/noikon en hautô=|~.]

[64\13: The eye is ~hêlioeide/staton tô=n peri\ ta\s aisthê/seis orga/nôn~, Rp. 508 B.--Goethe is alluding either to these words or to the phrase of Plotinos taken from them, 1, 6 (~peri\ tou= kalou=~), 9.]

[65\13: ~epistê/mê kai\ alê/theia~ are both ~agathoeidê=~, Rp. 509 A--the soul something ~theoeide/s~, Phd. 95 C.] {486}

[66\13: From the ~philosophi/a~ of the soul and from the question ~hô=n ha/ptetai kai\ hoi/ôn ephi/etai homiliô=n~ its real nature can be discerned as one which is ~xuggenê\s tô=| thei/ô| kai\ athana/tô| kai\ tô=| aei\ o/nti~, Rp. 611 DE; Phd. 79 D. With the ~xuggene/s~ of the soul we achieve contact with the ~o/ntôs o/n~, Rp. 490 B. If the Ideas are everlasting, so must our soul be, Phd. 76 DE. By its power of ~phronei=n atha/nata kai\ thei=a~ the ~anthrôpi/nê phu/sis~ has itself a share ~kath' ho/son ende/chetai~ (i.e. with ~nou=s~) in ~athanasi/a~, Tim. 90 BC. This thinking "part" of the soul ~pro\s tê\n en ouranô=| xugge/neian apo\ gê=s hêma=s ai/rei, hôs o/ntas phuto\n ouk e/ggeion all' oura/nion~, Tim. 90 A.]

[67\13: ~lu/ein tê\n psuchê\n~ from the body and from sense-perception, Phd. 83 AB, 65 A, 67 D. ~lu/sis~ and ~katharmo/s~ of the soul by ~philosophi/a~, Phd. 82 D. ~lu/sis kai\ i/asis tô=n desmô=n~ (of the body) ~kai\ tê=s aphrosu/nês~, Rp. 515 C.]

[68\13: ~thei=os eis to\ dunato\n anthrô/pô| gi/gnetai~--said of the true philosopher, Rp. 500 D; ~atha/natos~, Smp. 212 A. The ~philo/sophos~ is perpetually in contact with the ~o\n aei\~ and the ~thei=on~, which last is with difficulty recognizable by the eyes of ~tê=s tô=n pollô=n psuchê=s~, Soph. 254 A.--~kai/ moi dokei= theo\s me\n~ (as e.g. Empedokles called himself) ~anê\r oudamô=s ei=nai, thei=os mê/n; pa/ntas ga\r egô\ tou\s philoso/phous toiou/tous prosagoreu/ô~ Soph. 216 B (where ~thei=os~ is used in quite a different sense from that it has in other passages where Plato speaks of ~chrêsmô|doi\ kai\ theoma/nteis~ as ~thei=oi~, Men. 99 C, and of the insight and virtue of the unphilosophic as coming ~thei/a| moi/ra| a/neu nou=~).]

[69\13: Rp. 519 C, 540 B.--~tê=s tou= o/ntos the/as, hoi/an hêdonê\n e/chei, adu/naton a/llô| gegeu=sthai plê\n tô=| philoso/phô|~, Rp. 582 C (cf. Phileb.).]

[70\13: The flight ~enthe/nde ekei=se~ produces ~homoi/ôsin theô=| kata\ to\ dunato\n~, Tht. 176 B. ~homoiou=sthai theô=|~, Rp. 613 A (~to\ katanooume/nô| to\ katanoou=n exomoiô=sai~, Tim. 90 D).]

[70a\13: The soul that has through philosophy become completely "pure" is withdrawn from the cycle of Rebirth and from the whole material world. Even as early as Phdr. the souls of the ~philosophê/santes~ after a third ~ensôma/tôsis~ are exempt for the remainder of the ~peri/odos~ of 10,000 years, while the real and unwavering (~aei/~) philosopher remains for ever free from the body. That at least must be the meaning of 248 C-249 A. The subject is then treated in more detail in Phd.: Release of the ~philosophi/a| hikanô=s kathêra/menoi~ for ever from life in the body (~a/neu sôma/tôn zô=si to\ para/pan eis to\n e/peita chro/non~, 114 C)--entry of the pure soul to its kin (~eis to\ xuggene/s~, 84 B) and its like (~eis to\ ho/moion autê=|, to\ aeide/s~, 81 A), and ~eis theô=n ge/nos~, 82 B--and to the ~tou= thei/ou te kai\ katharou= kai\ monoeidou=s xunousi/a~, 83 E. Still more mythologically expressed--Tim. 42 BD (~ho tô=n kakô=n katharo\s to/pos~ Tht. 177 A). Throughout we have the release theory of the theologians re-expressed in a philosophical and more elevated manner (Orphic: ~memuême/noi~, Phd. 81).]

[71\13: ~. . . ou rha/|dion dêlô=sai . . .~ , Phd. 114 C.]

[72\13: To the ~aï/dios ousi/a, to\ e/sti mo/non kata\ to\n alêthê= lo/gon prosê/kei~ Tim. 37 E.]

[73\13: It is true that not until it becomes associated with the body does the soul, by obtaining ~ai/sthêsis~, ~epithumi/a~, ~thumo/s~, and all the other faculties that bring it into touch with Becoming and Changing, obtain what can strictly be called its individual personality. The perfectly adequate comprehension in thought of the ever-Unchanging by the bodiless and free soul would have no individualized content. We must not, however, (with Teichm., Pl. Fr. 40), conclude from this that Plato knew nothing of an immortality of the individual and of {487} individuality. He did not distinctly raise the question of the seat and origin of individuality in the soul. He is content to suppose that a plurality of individual souls was living before their entanglement with Becoming, and to conclude from this that in eternity, too, after their last escape from ~ge/nesis~, the same number of individual souls will still be living. Numerical distinctness (which affects in a scarcely intelligible manner the spaceless and immaterial) has to do duty with him for qualitative distinctness which would alone be able to account for the self-consciousness of this plurality. Acc. to the picture given in Tim. c. 14 (41 D ff.) the souls created by the ~dêmiourgo/s~ are evidently all alike (hence also is ~ge/nesis prô/tê tetagme/nê mi/a pa=sin~, 41 E), and only when they are in the ~sô=ma~, and bound up with mortal portions of soul, do they react in different ways to what affects them from without--and so become different. (This is so, however, in the pre-existent period, too, acc. to Phd.: but in that account ~thumo/s~ and ~epithumi/a~ are also bound up with the soul in pre-existence.) The influence of the lower soul-partners and of the ~trophê\ paideu/seôs~ (Tim. 44 B) makes the ~logistika/~ also of the souls differ among themselves. This acquired individual characterization, the fruit of differing ~paidei/a kai\ trophê/~--something quite the reverse of the "common nature" of "soul" in general which Teichmüller supposes to be meant here: Stud. 143--is taken with it by the soul to the place of judgment, i.e. Hades, Phd. 107 D. When, however, by the best ~trophê\ paideu/seôs~ it has become completely pure and free from all the trammels of the physical and perishable and departs into bodiless existence in the ~aeide/s~--then in truth all individual distinctness has been dissolved out of it. Still, it must endure for ever as a self-conscious personality; for that this is what Plato meant cannot be doubted.]

[74\13: Phd. 83 D.]

[75\13: ~chôri/zein ho/ti ma/lista apo\ tou= sô/matos tê\n psuchê\n~, Phd. 67 C. ~anachôrei=n~, 83 (quite in the manner of genuine mysticism--it is the "separateness" of the man who is to behold god, of which Eckhart speaks).]

[76\13: Phd. 64 A ff., 67 E.]

[77\13: Phd. 114 C.]

[78\13: ~tou= sô/matos pto/êsis kai\ mani/a~, Crat. 404 A.]

[79\13: ~tô=| xuggenei= plêsia/sas kai\ migei\s tô=| o/nti o/ntôs~, Rp. 490 B.]

[80\13: The soul ~eô=sa chai/rein to\ sô=ma kai\ kath' ho/son du/natai ou koinônou=sa ore/getai tou= o/ntos~, Phd. 65 C. In the same way the Appearance yearns after the Idea; see above, this chap., n. 9.]

[81\13: ~tê=s phronê/seôs ktê=sis~, Phd. 65 A ff.]

[82\13: ~peira=sthai chrê= enthe/nde ekei=se pheu/gein ho/ti ta/chista. phugê\ de homoi/ôsis theô=| kata\ to\ dunato/n~, Tht. 176 AB.]

[83\13: Rp. 523 A-524 D.]

[84\13: Beyond all other things it is the ~ka/llos~ of the world of Appearance that awakes the memory of that which has once been seen in the world of Ideas: Phdr. 250 B, 250 D ff.; Smp. c. 28 ff. (210 A ff.). Plato gives a peculiar reason for this, but in reality it is due to a vigorous re-emergence of the fundamental artistic sense--the aesthetic element in his philosophic speculation and enthusiasm--which the thinker had so violently suppressed in obedience to his theory that the ~aisthê/seis~ and all the arts are merely imitations of deceptive imitations of the only true Reality.]

[85\13: Not ~ma/thêsis~--only ~ana/mnêsis~, Phdr. 249 BC; Men. c. 14 ff. (80 D ff.); Phd. c. 18 ff. (72 E ff.). (This theory occurs regularly in Plato in close connexion with the theory of the soul's migrations; {488} and it appears that he did as a matter of fact derive it from the anticipations and suggestions of earlier teachers of metempsychosis: see above, chap. xi, n. 96.)]

[86\13: Rp. vii init.]

[87\13: ~homoi/ôsis de\ theô=| di/kaion kai\ ho/sion meta\ phronê/seôs gene/sthai~, Tht. 176 B.]

[88\13: ~eis agora\n ouk i/sasi tê\n hodo/n ktl.~, Tht. 173 D ff.]

[89\13: Tht. 172 C-177 C. The philosopher is unskilled in the life of the everyday world and its arts, and is quite indifferent towards them. Commonplace people, if he is at any time drawn into the affairs of the market place or the law courts, regard him as ~euê/thês, ano/êtos, geloi=os~. Sometimes ~do/xan para/schoint' a\n (hoi o/ntôs philo/sophoi) hôs panta/pasin e/chontes manikô=s~, Soph. 216 D; Rp. 517 A--passages from the later writing of Plato. Even as early as Phdr. 249 D ~exista/menos tô=n anthrôpi/nôn spoudasma/tôn kai\ pro\s tô=| thei/ô| gigno/menos nouthetei=tai hupo\ tô=n pollô=n hôs parakinô=n ktl.~]

[90\13: ~idiôteu/ein alla\ mê\ dêmosieu/ein~ is the injunction made to the philosopher, Ap. 32 A; at least, in ~po/leis~ as they are, Rp. 520 B. After death comes the reward ~andro\s philoso/phou ta\ hautou= pra/xantos kai\ ou polupragmonê/santos en tô=| bi/ô|~, Gorg. 526 C. ~hô/sper eis thêri/a a/nthrôpos empesô/n~ the true philosopher will ~hêsuchi/an e/chein kai\ ta\ hautou= pra/ttein~, Rp. 496 D.]

[91\13: ~ta\ tô=n anthrô/pôn pra/gmata mega/lês me\n spoudê=s ouk a/xia~, Lg. 803 B.]

[92\13: Gorg. 521 D. ~ho hôs alêthô=s kubernêtiko/s~, Rp. 488 E (cf. also Men. 99 E, 100 A).]

[93\13: Not ~dia/konos kai\ epithumiô=n paraskeuastê/s~ but rather an ~iatro/s~, Gorg. 518 C, 521 A; cf. 464 B ff.]

[94\13: Gorg. 519 A. All these worldly matters seem to him ~phluari/ai~: just as all the Appearances in the world of Becoming are for him but ~phluari/ai~, Rp. 515 D.]

[95\13: Gorg. c. 78 ff. (522 B ff.).]

[96\13: ~hou=tos ho tro/pos a/ristos tou= bi/ou~, Gorg. 527 E--(this is the real subject of the Gorg., viz. ~ho/ntina chrê\ tro/pon zê=n~, 500 C, and not the nature of ~rhêtorikê/~--and it is this which gives its special emotional tone to the dialogue).]

[97\13: Gorg. 515 C ff., 519 A ff. Summary: ~oude/na hêmei=s i/smen a/ndra agatho\n gegono/ta ta\ politika\ en tê=|de tê=| po/lei~, 517 A.]

[98\13: ~ouch hôs kalo/n ti all' hôs anagkai=on pra/ttontes~, Rp. 540 B.]

[99\13: It is now the ~skopo\s en tô=| bi/ô|~--inaccessible to the ~apai/deutoi--hou= stochazome/nous dei= ha/panta pra/ttein~, Rp. 519 C.]

[100\13: The ~a/llai aretai\ kalou/menai~ (even including ~sophi/a~ regarded as practical shrewdness: Rp. 428 B ff.) as ~eggu\s ou=sai tô=n tou= sô/matos~ become of secondary importance compared with the virtue of ~phro/nêsis~, i.e. of dialectic and the contemplation of the Ideas, Rp. 518 DE. This alone is ~theio/teron~, something ~mei=zon~ than those bourgeois virtues, Rp. 504 D--philosophy stands high above ~dêmotikê/ te kai\ politikê\ aretê/, ex e/thous te kai\ meletê=s gegonui=a a/neu philosophi/as te kai\ nou=~, Phd. 82 BC.--This, too, rightly understood, is the real point of the inquiry in Meno. Explicitly, indeed, the dialogue only concerns itself with that ~aretê/~ which is commonly so regarded and is based on ~alêthê\s do/xa~, coming into existence by instinct (~thei/a moi=ra~); which, however, to the philosopher is not ~aretê/~ in the proper sense of the word; that name he would only give to ~epistê/mê~, the only sort of knowledge that can be learnt and acquired as a permanent possession, depending as it does upon the doctrine of Ideas. To ~epistê/mê~ he this time only makes distant allusion.] {489}

[101\13: Rp. vii, c. 15 (535 A, 536 D); cf. vi, c. 2, 5 (485 B, 487 B; 489 D, 490 E.]

[102\13: ~kai\ tou= me\n (do/xês alêthou=s) pa/nta a/ndra mete/chein phate/on, nou= de\ theou/s, anthrô/pôn de\ ge/nos brachu/ ti~, Tim. 51 E.]

[103\13: ~philo/sophon plê=thos adu/naton ei=nai~, Rp. 494 A. ~phu/seis~ of a completely philosophical kind, ~pa=s hêmi=n homologê/sei oliga/kis en anthrô/pois phu/esthai kai\ oli/gas~, Rp. 491 B.]

[104\13: "That into which I sink myself--that becomes one with me: when I think on Him I am as God that is the Fount of Being"--the true mystic note. For the mystics, knowledge of an object is real oneness with the thing known; knowledge of God is union with God.]

[105\13: Rp. 540 B.]

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I. PHILOSOPHY

Plato and the Platonic account of the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul closes a period. It marks the end of that theological and spiritualist movement to the force and significance of which nothing bears clearer witness than the fact that it could have such a conclusion. After this point its development ceases--at least it disappears from the surface of Greek life: like one of those Asiatic torrents with which the ancients were familiar it buries itself underground for a long stretch of its course, only to reappear eventually, with all the greater effect, far away from the place of its origin. Even Plato's own school almost immediately after the death of its master and directing spirit turned its attention in a direction quite other than that which he had given it.[1\14] To have retained the Platonic outlook would have made his pupils even more isolated in their very different age than Plato himself had been in his own.

Greece entered upon a new and final phase of her development. The ominous breakdown of the older political fabric at the end of the fourth century might have seemed likely to put an end to the natural vitality of the Greek peoples. With the conquest of the East by Macedonians and Greeks, however, new tasks were set before that people and with the new task they acquired new faculties. The polis, indeed, the purest expression of Greek constructive ability, could not be restored to life. Such of the old and narrow city-republics as had not perished completely in that stormy period only languished in a stagnant peace. Rare, indeed, are the exceptions in which (as particularly in Rhodos) a more vigorous and independent life asserted itself. The new and swollen cities of the Macedonian Empire, with their motley populations drawn from many nationalities, could not make good the loss. The Leagues in which Greece seemed to be making an effort to find a political organization of a wider compass soon broke down under the effects of inward {491} corruption and external violence. Even in its deepest and most essential character the old national spirit of Greece, which had drawn its strength from its clear-cut individuality, seemed to be suffering damage through the unlimited extension eastwards and westwards of Greek life. It did not cease to be an immeasurable advantage to be a Greek, but a Greek now meant anyone who had a share in the one thing that still distinguished and characterized the Greeks, namely, Greek culture--and Greek culture was no longer confined to a single nation. It was no fault of this Greek humanism that not a single one of the vast populations of the East (and in the West at last Rome stood alone) was able to make their own this culture so generously offered to the whole world, so that there, too, all should become Greek who were capable of becoming free human beings. Nevertheless, from all countries and nationalities uncounted multitudes of individuals entered into the circle of this extended Hellenism. The way was open for all who could live without the need of a way of life and thinking modelled strictly upon national lines: for the culture which now united all Greeks and Greek communities was based upon science--and science knows nothing of national frontiers.

The science which could thus present itself as the guiding principle of such a large and heterogeneous mass of cultured people, must at any rate have reached a condition of stability if not of completely rounded finality. After all the stir and controversy of the previous centuries it had at last arrived at a period of contented enjoyment of its own resources: the long drawn-out struggle, the restless years of search were now held to have borne fruit. In philosophy at least there was a distinct slackening of the insatiable zeal and boldness of individual thinkers in posing new questions and wresting answers or in seeking for fresh solutions to old problems. A few great systems, formulated in accordance with the fixed tenets of the various schools of thought, still offered a refuge to those who demanded fixity and definition in their opinions; for centuries they kept up their special traditions without serious alteration until they, too, fell in pieces at last. A greater measure of independence and variety was displayed by the special sciences which since they had now been completely released for the first time from the leading-strings of philosophy proceeded to develop freely in accordance with their own principles. Art, too, was by no means devoid as yet of originality and attractiveness, and in spite of the overwhelming achievements of the past refused to be driven {492} into a position of subservience and imitation. But it was no longer, in conjunction with the peculiar customs and manners of a people, the mistress and dispenser of wisdom and knowledge of the world. Art becomes a plaything and an incidental diversion: it is science that determines the general character and content of culture. But this scientifically minded culture shares in the natural temper of all science. Science has its feet firmly planted in life itself: it keeps men's minds actively employed in this world; it has small temptation to leave the firm ground of what is knowable and can never be too well known, to voyage out into the region of the intangible which can never be a subject of scientific inquiry. A cool rationalism, a calm adherence to the intelligible and thinkable, without any leanings to the gloomy terrors of a mysterious world of the unknown--such is the temper that marks the science and culture of the Hellenistic age and marks it more distinctively than any other period of Greek culture. Such mysticism as was still vigorous and effective kept itself timidly in the background at this time; in the everyday world it is rather the direct contrary of mysticism that we are made aware of; the unlovely results of the prevailing rationalism, a bleak reasonableness, a knowing and prosaic common sense such as stares dully at us from the pages of Polybios' History as the point of view of the narrator himself and of those of whom he writes. It was no age of heroes or of the heroic. A weaker and more delicate generation holds the field. The breakdown of political life and the disappearance of its obligations made it more possible than it had ever been before for the individual to lead his own life in his own way.[2\14] And he makes the most of his freedom, his culture, the treasures of an inward, private life enriched with all the brilliance and charm of an old and perfected civilization. All the past had thought and laboured on his behalf; he is not idle, but he is busy without ever being in a hurry, enjoying his heritage and taking his ease in the cooling sunlight of the long drawn-out autumn of Greek life. And he is little concerned to inquire what may follow when this brilliant, many-coloured world that surrounds him shall have vanished from his gaze. This world is all in all to him. The hope or fear of immortality has little effect upon the educated people of the age.[3\14] Philosophy to which in one form or another they are all more or less closely attached teaches them according to its particular mood to cherish that hope or calmly to set it to one side: in none of the popular sects {493} had the doctrine of the eternity or imperishable nature of the soul any serious significance as the central doctrine of a system. Natural science ruled the day, while theology remained in the background and could only obtain a doubtful hearing (if it was even listened to at all) for its proclamation of the divine origin and everlasting life of the souls.

§ 2

At the outset of this period, and illuminating a long stretch of it with the light of his genius, stands the figure of Aristotle. In what this master di color' che sanno had to say of the soul's nature and destiny two voices are distinctly audible. The soul, he instructs us, is that which in a living and organic physical body brings the potentially existing to actual existence. It is the form to the body's matter, the culmination of the capacities of independent life residing in the particular body. Bodiless and immaterial itself, it is not the outcome of the mixture of the various parts of the body; it is the cause, not the resultant, of the vital functions of its body which exists for the soul's benefit as its "instrument".[4\14] It dwells within a natural organism and though it is itself unmoved it moves that organism as the source of its growth and nourishment, of its desires and locomotion, of its feeling and perceiving; while in the higher organisms it acts as the combination of all these faces. It is as little to be thought of as separate from the body--its own body--as the power of vision is in separation from the eye or as its shape from the moulded waxen image.[5\14] Theoretically, indeed, it is possible to distinguish between body and soul, but actually and in the animated organism they cannot be distinguished. When the living creature dies the matter of which it was composed loses it special adaptation to a purposeful organism, and this adaptation was its life; without it there can be no independent "Substance" (~ousi/a~).[6\14] The Form, the functional power of the once living organism, its "soul", has no longer any independent existence.

This is the voice of Aristotle the physicist when he is speaking from the standpoint of a physical doctrine which includes the study of the soul "in so far as it occurs not without matter".[7\14] Aristotle the metaphysician takes us further. In the soul of man, besides the vital powers of the organized individual, there lives a spiritual being of more than natural character and origin, the "Mind"--"that in us which thinks and conceives".[8\14] This thinking mind is not bound to the body and its life.[9\14] It does not come into being with the creation of the human organism which is completed by the addition of Mind. It has no beginning and was uncreated from eternity:[10\14] it enters into man at his creation "from without".[11\14] Even while it lives within the body it remains unmingled with the body and its powers and uninfluenced by them.[12\14] Enclosed within itself it lives its separate life as something quite other than the "soul" (of which it is nevertheless called a "part"[13\14]) and separated from it by a gulf. Comparable with the God of Aristotle's world it transcends what might be called its "little world",[14\14] the living human organism. It influences that organism without being influenced in turn. It is akin to God; it is called the "divine" in man.[15\14] Its activity is the same as that of God.[16\14] God--pure substance, unlimited, highest, everlasting actuality--is absolute and perpetually operant thinking.[17\14] All practical activity, doing and creating, is far removed from God.[18\14] So, too, the "Mind" is entirely occupied in thinking (though here there is some alternation perhaps between the potential and the actual).[19\14] It grasps, in an intuition of the intellect that is beyond failure and error,[20\14] the "unmediated" first principles, the first and highest concepts, immediately certain and not deducible from still higher concepts, from which all knowledge and philosophy is derived.[21\14]

In its association with the body and its "soul" this thinking Reason lives as "the ruling"[22\14] element over both--not, however, as the "realization" of this particular individual creature. The Mind is indeed said to be that which the individual man "is",[23\14] and without the addition of Mind the man could not exist, but the special and personal character belonging to the individual is not to be found in this reasoning Mind.[24\14] Mind is totally devoid of distinguishable qualities and is identical in every case where it appears; it is invariably foreign to the separate and individual character of the man to whom it is added, and hardly seems to be his peculiar property.

When death occurs the thinking "Mind" is not involved in the destruction which overtakes the human organism with which it was associated. Death does not affect it. Like everything that is without beginning it is indestructible.[25\14] It returns again to its separate existence. Like the great World-Mind, God, and in company with it--for it has not sprung from God and does not merge again into God--the individual Mind of man continues in unending life.[26\14] It {495} disappears now into impenetrable darkness. The separate existence of the Mind is beyond not merely our perception but our conceiving as well--persisting for itself alone, Mind has no mental activity, no memory and no consciousness; indeed, it is impossible to say what special qualities or activity can be attributed to it beyond the simple predicate of existence, of being.[27\14]

In the doctrine of this thinking Mind which is associated with the human soul "from without" and never merges into it, of its pre-existence from eternity, its kinship with God and its imperishable life after its separation from the human organism--in all this Aristotle preserves a mythological element taken from the dogmatic teaching of Plato.

There was a time when he had been a complete Platonist precisely in his doctrine of the soul. In his youth, like other members of the Academy, he had yielded[28\14] to the fascination of clothing in artistic and perfected language brilliant fantasies about the origin, nature, and destiny of the soul--the divine daimon[29\14] inhabiting the mortal frame of man. Later, however, it seemed inconceivable to him that "any soul may inhabit any body".[30\14] He could only conceive of the "soul" of the individual man as a realization of the life of this entirely distinct and physical organism, to which it is indissolubly bound as the purpose and form of the particular instrument. All the vital powers as well as appetite, perception, memory, and reflective thought, appeared to him merely as the modes of activity manifested by the animated body which is itself unthinkable apart from its "soul". And yet he still preserved a relic of the old dualistic opposition between the body and the independent substantial soul--the same conception of the soul, in fact, as that which Plato had himself, in the later period of his philosophical development, alone retained. This was as the contemplative Mind which is occupied in apprehending the highest truths in intellectual intuition; and this mind is, according to Aristotle, not to be included in the "soul", but to be separated from it as a special being that has descended from the heights of divinity and has been coupled with the soul from without and for its limited period of life. The origin of this conception of a reduplicated soul is plain: it is derived from memories of Plato and beyond that from theological doctrine which was itself in the last resort but a spiritualized restatement of primeval popular fancies of the psyche that dwells in the living body. But though he took over the doctrine he did not take over the special sense that {496} the theologians had given to it: he omitted both the conclusions they drew and the exhortations they based upon it. We hear no more of the "purification" of the divine Mind within mankind. It has nothing impure or evil in it nor can any breath of pollution affect it from without. The effort towards the "other world" of purity, the denial and rejection of its earthly partner the living body, are foreign to the "Mind" of Aristotle.[31\14] It has no impulse to "deliverance" or self-emancipation; it knows of no peculiar task that points beyond this world. The presence of this "separable" Mind in the living man is an assured fact, and nothing more: no purpose in life is deducible from it. The fact itself seemed to be evident from the power that man possesses of grasping immediately a highest form of knowledge that is beyond demonstration, not as the result of the mental activity of his soul, for the apprehension is prior to the soul, but by means of a higher spiritual faculty, a special intellectual being that seemed to proclaim its presence and existence within man in this way. It is thus by way of a theory of knowledge not of a theological doctrine that we arrive at the distinction between "Mind" and "Soul". But the doctrine thus reasserted was in reality nothing but the old doctrine of the theologians. This "Mind", too, seems to the thinker to be a being akin to God. The pure contemplative existence, a life consisting in the contemplation of the final objects of intuition is counted as a privilege of the divine and of all divine beings, as the true purpose of vital energy and of its manifestation; and in the description of this state the sober reserve of his lecture style seems to be uplifted and almost illuminated with the warmth and brilliance imparted by a genuine glow of personal experience.[32\14] This pure activity of contemplation, finding its deepest satisfaction in itself, belongs to the divine in man--to the Mind; its whole life lies in this. This activity, however, the Mind performs and finishes in this life, while it is united with the body and the body's "soul". There is nothing left that can be thought of as forming the content of the life and activity of the Mind in its separate existence after the completion of its period of life on earth. Mind and the man with whom it is associated can hardly have a very urgent desire for that emancipation in "another world" which is thus left blank and without content for our thought. The thought of immortality cast in this form could no longer possess any real value or ethical significance for man.[33\14] It arises from a logical deduction, from metaphysical considerations, not {497} from a demand of the spirit. It lacks not only the distinctness that might have appealed to the senses and given direction to the imagination, but the power (or the intention) of playing a leading part in the conduct or direction of life on this earth. There is no inspiration in this doctrine--not even for the philosopher, though it was to him and his activity and his efforts that the picture and panegyric of "Mind", the philosopher in man, had really referred.

It was quite possible to abide by the teaching and philosophy of Aristotle, directed as it was to the observation and interpretation of the things of this world, while abandoning the advanced post of the doctrine of Mind--that Being which has sunk to the level of this world from the other world of divinity, which separates itself, with the death of man, once more to everlasting divine life though hardly to a continuation of individual existence. On this point in particular free discussion of the master's teaching maintained itself in his school: some, and by no means the weakest, of Aristotle's successors denied altogether and in every form the doctrine of immortality.[34\14]

§ 3

The dogmatic teaching of the Stoics on the subject of the human soul is closely bound up with the materialistic pantheism by means of which they explained all the phenomena of life, of being and becoming upon earth. God is All, and divinity is nothing outside this "all", which forms the world: the Universe is God. God is thus not only the matter but the form, the life and the power of the world. Divinity is the original matter, the etherial Fire, the fiery "breath" which maintains itself or changes and in innumerable metamorphoses creates the world. God is also what supplies a purpose to this world and is the purposeful force--the reason and law of the world. The universal deity which is thus at once matter, mind, and formative principle sends out from itself at varying periods the multiplicity of Appearance and then again at another time takes back the multifarious and the divided into the fiery unity of its own breath of life. Thus, in everything that has shape, in everything that lives and moves, the content and the unifying form is God: he is and works as their "state" in inorganic things, as "nature" in plants, as "irrational soul" in the other living things, as rational and thinking soul in man.[35\14] {498}

The soul of man, thus endowed with reason, is a fragment of the divine,[36\14] and is itself divine like everything else in the world but in a purer sense than all other things. It has remained closer to the first and original essence of the divine, conceived as "creative fire" (~pu=r technikô/n~), than the earthly fire which has lost much of its original purity and refinement. It is closer[37\14] than the lower matter that in all its changeful forms degenerates progressively as it gets farther and farther away from the divine fire by gradual loss of the tension (~to/nos~) that had once been living and active in the primeval fire; closer even than the material of its own body in which it dwells and rules. As something essentially distinct from the body, then, the individual soul comes into being among the elements of its body when that body is conceived, and it develops its full nature after the birth of the individual.[38\14] But even in its individual, separate existence it remains incompletely detached from the universal life that is present in it; it remains subject to the "universal Law" of the world, which is God, and fast bound by "fate", the "destiny" (~peprôme/nê, heimarme/ne~) which decrees the course of their existence for the totality of all Life and the individual lives.[39\14] Nevertheless, the soul has its special gifts and special task--it is capable of self-determination and is responsible for its own decisions and acts. Though it is a pure emanation from the universal Reason and bound down to no irrational elements, it has the power of irrational choice and can resolve upon what is evil. Though they have all sprung from one and the same original source the individual souls are of very different character, intellect, and propensity of will. Unreason in thought, will, and conduct is common in the world; those who have real insight are few; in fact, the Wise Man, the man who keeps his own will in complete harmony with the universal and divine direction of the world, is but a picture of imaginary perfection, naturæ humanæ exemplar, never fully and perfectly realized in actual life.

Ethical interests demanded the freedom and independence of the moral personality and its will, which can only fulfil the requirements of duty by self-mastery and the overthrow of base impulses; but this independence was in conflict with the essential principles of Stoic metaphysics. The Stoics taught that the world (and the soul included in it) is only the necessary self-development of a single and absolute Being that excludes all independent and separate multiplicity. Nor could they recognize any principle of Evil, an anti-rational principle answering to the purity of divine power, working {499} evil and suggesting it, and making the individual capable of wilful disobedience to the laws of all-embracing divinity. Pure pantheism, uniting God and the world in indissoluble unity, cannot imagine a real conflict between humanity and divinity; it cannot postulate a principle of Evil through the overthrow of which a lost unity with God is to be restored. Pantheism makes no claims of an ethical or religious kind. The ingenuity of the Stoic doctors was exercised in vain in the attempt to find a way out of this dilemma.[40\14]

From the very origin of the school two tendencies were discernible in the teaching of the Stoa, derived as that teaching was from such different sources. On the one hand, the ethical doctrine of the Cynics, to whom the Stoics owed the greater part of their practical teaching, threw the individual back upon his own resources and made everything depend upon the determination of his own will. It thus pointed in the direction of the most self-sufficient individualism--to an ethical atomism. The physical doctrine derived from Herakleitos, on the other hand, merged the individual completely into the omnipotence and omnipresence of the All-One; and therefore, as its ethical counterpart, demanded that this relation of the individual to the universal Logos of the world should find expression in a life lived completely ex ductu rationis, in unconditional abandonment of the individual will to the Universal Mind that is the World and God.[41\14] In actual fact it was Cynicism that had the profounder influence in ethical matters. The universal Law and order of the world, embracing both universe and individual in its absolute decrees, threw its net too widely to be able to answer closely enough to the needs of narrow and individual existence. No practical ethics could possibly unite this distant and final aim with the individual man in a single nexus of ordered self-determination. The intermediate link between the universe and its laws, on the one hand, and the individual with his private will, on the other, had formerly been the Greek polis with its law and custom. But it was a cosmopolitan age, and for the Stoics as well as for the Cynics before them the city-state had lost most of its educative force. The individual saw himself more and more left to his own devices and forced to depend upon his own strength--his life had to be ordered on self-erected standards and guided by self-found rules. Individualism, which gave its tone to the age more decisively than in any past period of Greek life, began to win a footing even in this pantheistic system. The "Wise Man" who is a law to himself in perfect {500} self-determination,[42\14] and feels himself bound only to those like himself,[43\14] is individualism's fairest flower.

But the soul, thus elevated to a height where it was capable of much that was impossible for or only incompletely within the reach of its weaker sisters, began more and more to seem like something rather different from a mere dependent offshoot of the One divine power that is the same everywhere. It is, in fact, regarded as an independent, divine, and self-enclosed creature in those passages where in Stoic literature, as in the older literature of the theologians, the soul is called a "daimon"--the daimon dwelling within the individual man, and given to him as his associate.[44\14] Death, too, is regarded by this professedly monist system as a separation of soul from body[45\14] in accordance with what was really a naive or a conscious spiritualism. In death, then, this soul-essence whose independence had been so marked even in life, does not perish with the body--it does not even lose itself again in the One from which it had taken its origin. An infinitely extended individual life is indeed not attributed to the individual souls: only God, the one Soul of the World, is eternally indestructible.[46\14] But the souls which have arisen by separation from the one and all-embracing divinity, survive the destruction of their bodies: until the final dissolution, in the Conflagration that will make an end of the present period of world-history, they persist in their independent life; either all of them (as was the older teaching of the school) or, as Chrysippos, the master of Stoic orthodoxy, taught the souls of the "Wise" only, while the others have been lost in the general life of the Whole some time previously.[47\14] The stronger ethical personality is held together in itself for a longer time.[48\14]

From the point of view of physical science and materialist doctrine[49\14] it was also hard to see why the soul, composed of pure fire-breath, which even in life had held the body together and had not been held together by the body,[50\14] should disappear at once when that body was disintegrated. As it had once held the body together, so it might well and all the more easily hold itself together now. Its lightness carries it upwards into the pure air under the moon, where it is fed by the breath that rises upwards and where there is nothing that can put an end to it.[51\14] An "underworld" region like that of popular imagination and theological teaching, was expressly denied by the Stoics.[52\14] Their imagination preferred to exercise itself in an imaginary extension of life in the Aether, which was their region of {501} the souls;[53\14] but as a rule it appears that such flights of fancy were avoided. The life of the souls after death--that of the wise as well as of the unwise--remained indistinct and without content[54\14] in the imagination of those whose life was still upon earth.

Thus, the doctrine of the soul-personality and its continued existence (never simply expanded into personal immortality), which was in reality not required by the metaphysical principles of Stoicism, and could indeed hardly be reconciled with them, had in fact no serious significance for the general intention and substance of Stoicism--least of all for Stoic ethics and conduct of life. The philosophy of Stoicism is directed to the study of life, not of death. In this life on earth and only here can the purpose of human endeavour--the reproduction of divine wisdom and virtue in the human spirit--be fulfilled in manful contest with contrary impulses, fulfilled, that is, in so far as such a thing is possible for lonely and isolated fragments of divinity.[55\14]

But virtue is sufficient in itself for the attainment of happiness--a happiness which loses nothing through the brevity of its duration and to which nothing would be added by the prolongation of its span.[56\14] Nothing in the doctrine of Stoicism points man, or the Wise Man, to another world beyond the life of the body and outside this earthly theatre of conflict and duty, for the fulfilment of his being and his task.

§ 4

The limited doctrine of immortality which, as we have seen, was not an essential part of the teaching of Stoicism, began to be called in question as soon as the rigid dogmatism of the school was subjected to the too-searching criticism of other schools of thought. In the clash of opinions Stoicism began to be doubtful of the absolute validity of its own teaching. The boundaries of orthodox doctrine once so firmly drawn now became more fluid; exchange and even compromise became common. Panaitios, the first writer among the pedantic professors of Stoicism to achieve a wider popularity for his writings, became the teacher and friend of those aristocratic Romans who found in Greek philosophy the impulse to a humanism that the barren soil of Rome could never have produced unaided. And Panaitios differed in more than one point from the strict orthodoxy of the older Stoicism. For him the soul is formed of two distinct elements[57\14]--it is no longer simple and undivided, but {502} compounded of "Nature" and "Soul" (in the narrower sense).[58\14] In death these two elements separate and change into other forms. The soul having had its origin at a particular point in past time now perishes in time. Being capable of grief and subject to the destructive influence of the emotions it falls a victim at last to its own pains. Panaitios, while remaining a Stoic, taught the dissolution of the soul, its death and simultaneous destruction with the death of the body.[59\14]

His pupil Poseidonios, who as a writer possessed an even greater influence than Panaitios with the great majority of cultivated readers who belonged to no special school of thought, returned to the older Stoic doctrine of the simple and undivided nature of the soul as fiery breath. He distinguished three faculties but not three separate and independent elements in the human soul, and as a consequence of this view had no further need to believe in the dissolution of the soul into its component parts at death. He also denied the origin of the individual soul in time, from which the doctrine of its destruction in time had seemed to follow by a logical necessity. He returned to the old theological idea of the pre-existence of the soul, its life since the beginning of the created world; and could therefore go on to assert its continued existence after death--at least till the time of the next destruction of the World at the hands of omnipotent Fire.[60\14]

It was not an inward and private necessity that led to this transformation of the old teaching of the School. Doubts and criticisms levelled at it from outside--from the Sceptics in particular--had necessitated the change. While some gave up the struggle, others sought refuge in a re-arrangement of the figures of the dialectical game and by the introduction of fresh characters.[61\14] Immortality might be abandoned to criticism or reaffirmed in either case with equal indifference. The Platonic and poetic version of Stoicism provided by Poseidonios may have found a wider response among the readers of a highly cultivated society who felt the need of a doctrine of immortality more as a satisfaction to the artistic fancy than from any deeper or more temperamental causes. Cicero, the most eloquent representative of the Hellenized Roman culture of the time, may perhaps give us a picture of the refined and æsthetic partiality with which these ideas were taken up. In the Dream of Scipio and the first book of the Tusculans, he gives an account, mainly based on Poseidonios, of the belief then held of a continued life of the soul in the divine element of the Aether.[62\14] {503}

§ 5

Stoicism had a long and vigorous life. More than ever during the first and second centuries of our era did it fulfil its real task of acting as a practical guide to conduct, not as a mere museum of dead erudition. It made good its claim to provide its adherents with the autonomous freedom and independence of a mind at peace with itself, whose virtue was proof against the tribulation and failure of life, and not corrupted by its plenty. It was not always blind imitation of a literary fashion or the love of displaying virtuous paradoxes that attracted the noblest of the higher Roman aristocracy to the doctrines of Stoicism. Not a few of them guided their lives in accordance with its principles and even died for their convictions. Not entirely "without tragic emotion", as the Stoic Emperor would prefer it, but at any rate with conscious and deliberate purpose--not in mere unreasoning **stubbornness[63\14]--did these Stoic martyrs go to their death. Nor was it the unquestioned certainty of a continued life in a higher existence that made them so ready to give up life upon this earth.[64\14] Each in the special manner dictated to him by his own temperament and the circumstances of his life, they still speak to us, these leaders of Roman Stoicism--Seneca the philosophic director of the world's conscience, Marcus Aurelius the Emperor, and those instructors and patterns of the aspiring youth of Rome, Musonius and Epictetus. The eager and unswerving effort of these wise men to educate themselves to the attainment of freedom and peace, of purity and goodness of heart, wins our admiration--not least in the case of Seneca in whom the struggle for self-mastery and philosophic calm must have been a continual war with his own too-receptive and imaginative nature. But just as they looked for no supernatural helper and redeemer but trusted to the power of their own spirit for the assurance of success, so they required no promise of a future crowning of their labours in an after-life of the soul. The whole scope of their endeavour lies within the limits of this world. The old Stoic belief in the continued life of the individual soul until the annihilation of all separate creation in the World Conflagration[65\14] is regarded at the best as one possibility among many[66\14]--it is perhaps but a "beautiful dream".[67\14] But whether death is a transition to another form of being or a complete termination of individual life--to the wise man it is equally welcome, for he measures the value of life not by the number {504} of its years but by the richness of its content. At bottom Seneca is inclined to the view that death is the end of all things for man, after which "everlasting peace" awaits the restless spirit.[68\14]

The Stoic Emperor is uncertain whether death is a dissipation of the elements of the soul (as the atomists teach) or whether the mind survives in a conscious or an unconscious existence that must yet disappear eventually in the life of the Whole. All things are in perpetual flux--so the Law of the universe has willed it--nor shall the human personality maintain itself untouched and unchanged. But even supposing that death is a "putting out" of his small individual candle, the wise man is not afraid: to the melancholy that is the prevailing mood of his gentle, pure, and high-strung character Death, the annihilator, seems to beckon like a friend.[69\14]

The tougher spirit of the Phrygian slave and freedman needed no conviction of personal survival to enable him to face the battle of earthly life with courage and intrepidity. What has been made must be unmade: without hesitation and without regret the wise man gives himself up to the laws of the rationally-ordered universe in which the present must make way for the future--not indeed to be lost entirely, but to be changed and to merge its individuality, its unimportant self in new manifestations of the creative stuff of Life. The Whole does not perish, but its parts change and alter their relations among themselves.[70\14] The pantheistic principles of the school which had been taken over from Herakleitos and which made it permanently inconceivable that the diminutive individual spark of life could achieve a lasting separation from the central fiery mass, had become a settled conviction. The passionate abandonment of the personal, short-lived self to the everlasting Whole and One had become a fixed habit of mind. No longer did it seem intolerable that the individual existence should pass away after a brief span of life; it was possible to remain a Stoic and yet assert expressly, like Cornutus the teacher of Persius, that with the death of its body there is an end, too, of the individual soul.[71\14]

§ 6

The atomist doctrine renewed by Epicurus demanded in the most emphatic manner of its adherents that they should abandon the belief in personal survival.

For the atomist the soul is corporeal, a compound made {505} up of the most mobile of the atoms which form the plastic elements of air and fire. It occupies all parts of the body, and is held together by the body, while at the same time, and in spite of this, holding itself in essential distinctness from the body.[72\14] Epicurus also speaks of the "Soul" as a special and enduring substance within the body, a "part" of the corporeal, not a mere "harmony" resulting from the association of the parts of the body.[73\14] He even speaks of two parts or modes of manifestation in the "soul"; the irrational, which holds the whole body in its sway as its vital force, and the rational, situated in the breast, which exercises will and intelligence and is the last and most essential source of life in living things, without the undivided presence of which death occurs.[74\14] Anima and animus (as Lucretius calls them), distinct but not separable from one another,[75\14] come into being in the embryo of man and grow to maturity, old age and decay, together with the body.[76\14] If death occurs it means that the atoms belonging to the body are separated and the soul-atoms withdrawn--even before the final dissolution of the body, the separable "soul" disappears. No longer held together by the body, it is blown away in the wind, it disappears "like smoke" in the air.[77\14] The soul, this soul that had animated the individual man, is no more.[78\14] The material elements of which it was composed are indestructible; it is quite possible that they may at some future time combine together with the life-stuff to produce new life and consciousness of exactly the same kind as had once been joined together in the living man. But, if so, it will be a new creature that thus comes into being: the original man has been annihilated by death; there is no bond of continuous consciousness uniting him with the fresh creation.[79\14] The vital forces of the world are continuous, undiminished, indestructible, but in the formation of the individual living creature they are only lent temporarily, for this occasion and for a brief period, after which they are withdrawn for ever from the particular creature. Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu.

After his death the individual is unaffected by the fate of his inanimate body;[80\14] nor should he be troubled by the thought of what may happen to the atoms of his soul. Death does not concern him at all; for he only is when death is not; where death is, he is no longer there.[81\14] Sensation and consciousness have left him at the dissolution of body and soul; what he cannot possibly feel affects him no longer. Epicurean maxims are never tired of driving home {506} this proposition: death is nothing to us.[82\14] From every possible direction, from abstract principle and practical experience in actual life, Lucretius labours to demonstrate the truth of this view[83\14] as ardently as other philosophers seek to prove its opposite. Physical science has no more valuable service to render than that of convincing us of its truth.[84\14] Just as the wisdom of Epicurus has no other purpose than to protect man, of all creatures the one most sensitive to pain, from distress and anguish--and even pleasure is but the removal of pain--so more particularly, in putting an end to the fear of death and the craving after unceasing life, it serves this finite life itself,[85\14] that is committed to us once and for all and never repeated.[86\14] If a man has once succeeded in realizing that he will cease to be in the moment of death's coming, he will neither be oppressed with terror at the threatened loss of self-consciousness nor will the terrors of eternity[87\14] or the fabulous monsters of the spirit-world below the earth[88\14] darken his existence by casting their dark shadow over all his life.[89\14] He will devote himself to life without repining, neither fearing death nor seeking it.[90\14]

He alone--the ideal Wise Man of the Epicurean faith--will know how to live as the true artist of his own life;[91\14] he will not waste the precious time in vain preparations for the future,[92\14] but will cram every moment to the full so that his brief span of existence will have all that a long life could give. Long life, in fact, even life without an end, would not make him any happier or any richer. What life has to offer it has already offered--anything further must only be a repetition of what has gone before: eadem sunt omnia semper.[93\14] The Wise Man has no reason even to look for an eternity of life.[94\14] In his own personality, in this present "now", he possesses all the conditions necessary to happiness. The very transience of this supreme happiness to which mortality can attain makes it seem the more valuable to him. To the development and the enjoyment of this, the only life that belongs to him he will devote himself exclusively. In ethical matters, too, the atomist doctrine holds good. There is no such thing in nature as an essential community of human beings--still less of humanity--there are only individuals.[95\14] In associations entered into by free and unforced choice the individual may attach himself to the individual as one friend to another; but the political societies that men have invented and set up among themselves have no obligations for the Wise Man. He is himself the centre and indeed the whole circumference of the world surrounding {507} him. State and society are valuable, and indeed only exist for the protection of the individual and to make it possible for him under their enfolding care to develop his own personality in freedom.[96\14] The individual, on the other hand, does not exist for the state, but for himself. "It is no longer necessary to save the Hellenes or to win crowns of victory from them in contests of wisdom."[97\14] Such is the decision reached with a sigh of relief by a civilization that has attained the highest point of its development and is now overcome by a lassitude in which it no longer sets itself new tasks, but takes its ease as age may be permitted to do. In its lassitude it no longer hopes, and in all honesty no longer cares, to extend the period of its existence beyond the limits of this earthly life. Calm and untroubled it sees this life, dear though it may once have been, fade away, taking its leave and sinking into nothingness without a struggle.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

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Part I

[1\14: At first the philosophy of Plato's old age lived on in spirit in the Academy. Just as his pupils carried on his Pythagorean speculations about numbers, reduced his imaginative suggestions as to a daimonic nature intermediate between that of God and man to pedantic system, and elaborated the theological strain in his thought to a gloomy and burdensome deisidaimonia (witness esp. the Epinomis of Philippos of Opos and in addition all that we know of Xenokrates' speculations)--so too they retained and respected for a time the Platonic doctrine of the soul and the ascetic tendency in his ethical teaching. For Philippos of Opos the aim of all human endeavour is a final and blessed emancipation from this world (which, however, is only possible for a few of those who are, in his special manner, "wise"--973 C ff., 992 C). He is a mystic for whom this earth and its life fall away into nothing: all serious interest is confined to the contemplation of divine things such as are revealed in mathematics and astronomy. Again, the Platonic doctrine of the soul, in its mystic and world-renouncing sense, lies at the bottom of the fabulous narratives of Herakleides Pontikos (in the ~A/baris, Empedo/timos~, etc.). This, too, accounts for the youthful attempts in this direction of Aristotle himself (in the ~Eu/dêmos~ and probably also in the ~Protreptiko/s~). This side of his doctrine was as it seems systematized from the standpoint of the latest stage of Platonism by Xenokrates in particular. It may be merely accident that we do not hear very reliably of anything indicating an ascetic tendency or an "other-worldly" effort after **emancipation of the soul in connexion with Xenokrates. Krantor (in his much-read book ~peri\ pe/nthous~) was already capable of employing the Platonic doctrine of the soul and the imaginative fancies that could be attached to it simply as a literary adornment. And before him his teacher Polemon betrays a turning aside from the true Platonic mysticism. With Arkesilaos the last vestige of this whole type of thought disappears completely.]

[2\14: ~toi=s eleuthe/rois hê/kista e/xestin ho/ ti e/tuche poiei=n, alla pa/nta ê\ ta\ plei=sta te/taktai~, Arist., Meta. 1075a, 19 (in maxima fortuna minima licentia est, Sall., C. 51, 13). Freedom in this sense indeed was a thing of the past.]

[3\14: Not that such hopes or fears were entirely absent. The reader will remember the case of Kleombrotos of Ambrakia (Call., Ep. 25), who by reading the Phaedo of Plato (and completely misunderstanding the meaning of the prophet, as not unfrequently happens) was led to seek an immediate entrance into the life of the other world by a violent break with this one--and committed suicide. This is an isolated example of a mood to which Epiktetos bears witness as common in his own much later time--the desire felt by many young men of ardent temperament to escape from the distracted life of humanity and return as quickly as possible to the universal life of God by the destruction of their own individual existence: Epict. 1, 9, 11 ff. But in the earlier period such violent manifestations of other-worldly fanaticism were of rare occurrence. Hedonism was {509} capable of leading to the same result as we may see from the ~Apokarterô=n~ of Hegesias the Cyrenaic, called ~ho peisitha/natos~, whom Cicero mentions together with this same Kleombrotos: TD. i, 83-4.]

[4\14: ~to\ sô=ma/ pôs tê=s psuchê=s he/neken (ge/gonei)~, as ~ho pri/ôn tê=s pri/seôs he/neka~--and not vice versa: PA. 1, 5, 645b, 19.]

[5\14: The ~psuchê/~ is related to the body as ~o/psis~ is to the eye, i.e. as the effective power residing in the ~o/rganon~ (not like ~ho/rasis~, the individual act of vision). It is the ~prô/tê entele/cheia~ of its body de An. ii, 1, 412a, 27. There is no ~su/nthesis~ of ~sô=ma~ and ~psuchê/~: they are simply "together" like the wax and the ball formed out of the wax: Top. 151a, 20 ff.; GA. 729b, 9 ff.; de An. 412b, 7.]

[6\14: ~apelthou/sês gou=n (tê=s psuchê=s) ou/keti zô=|o/n estin, oude\ tô=n mori/ôn oude\n to\ auto\ lei/petai, plê\n tô=| schê/mati mo/non katha/per ta\ mutheuo/mena lithou=sthai~, PA. 641a, 18.]

[7\14: Meta. 1026a, 5: ~peri\ psuchê=s eni/as theôrê=sai tou= phusikou=, ho/sê mê\ a/neu tê=s hulê=s esti/n.--oude\ ga\r pa=sa psuchê\ phu/sis, alla/ ti mo/rion autê=s~, PA. 641b, 9. The subject of ~to\ kechôrisme/non~ of the soul is studied by ~ho prô=tos philo/sophos~: de An. 403b, 16.]

[8\14: ~le/gô de\ nou=n, hô=| dianoei=tai kai\ hupolamba/nei hê psuchê/~, de An. 429a, 23.]

[9\14: The ~nou=s~ and its ~theôrêtikê\ du/namis e/oike psuchê=s ge/nos he/teron ei=nai kai\ tou=to mo/non ende/chetai chôri/zesthai, katha/per to\ aï/dion tou= phthartou=, ta\ de\ loipa\ mo/ria tê=s psuchê=s ouk e/sti chôrista/ ktl.~, de An. 413b, 25.]

[10\14: There can be no doubt that Aristotle's opinion was that ~nou=s~ was uncreated and existed without beginning from eternity: see Zeller, Sitzb. Berl. Ak. 1882, p. 1033 ff.]

[11\14: ~thu/rathen epeise/rchetai~ into the man as he is being made, GA. 736b, 28; cf. ~ho thu/rathen nou=s~, 744b, 21.]

[12\14: ~nou=s~ is ~apathê/s, amigê/s, ou me/miktai tô=| sô/mati~--it has no physical ~o/rganon~, de An. iii, 4. ~oude\n autou= (tou= nou=) tê=| energei/a| koinônei= sômatikê\ ene/rgeia~, GA. 736b, 28.]

[13\14: ~mo/rion tê=s psychê=s~, de An. 429a, 10 ff. ~psuchê\ ouch ho/lê, all' hê noêtikê/~, 429a, 28. ~hê psuchê\ . . . mê\ pa=sa all' ho nou=s~, Meta. 1070a, 26.]

[14\14: The ~zô=|on~ a ~mikro\s ko/smos~, Phys. 252b, 26.]

[15\14: ~nou=s, theio/tero/n ti kai\ apathe/s~, de An. 408b, 29.--~to\n nou=n thei=on ei=nai mo/non~, GA. 736b, 28 (737a, 10). ~ei/te thei=on ho/n ei/te tô=n en hêmi=n to\ thei/otaton~, EN. 1177a, 15. ~nou=s~ is ~to\ suggene/staton~ to the gods, 1179a, 26.--~to\ anthrô/pôn ge/nos ê\ mo/non mete/chei tou= thei/ou tô=n hêmi=n gnôri/môn zô/|ôn ê\ ma/lista pa/ntôn~, PA. 656a, 7.]

[16\14: ~e/rgon tou= theiota/tou to\ noei=n kai\ phronei=n~, PA. 686a, 28.]

[17\14: Meta. ~L~ 7, 9.]

[18\14: EN. 1178b, 7-22; Cael. 292b, 4 ff.]

[19\14: So too ~epikalu/ptetai ho nou=s eni/ote pa/thei ê\ no/sô| ê\ hu/pnô|~, de An. 429a, 7.]

[20\14: ~thigga/nein~ is the term often applied to the activity of ~nou=s~, i.e. a simple and indivisible act of apperceiving the ~asu/ntheta~. This act not being composite (of subject and predicate), like judgment, leaves no room for error: the act simply occurs or does not occur--~alêthe/s~ or ~pseu=dos~ does not enter into the question with it. Meta. 1051b, 16-26 (~thigei=n~, 24-5), 1027b, 21.]

[21\15: ~ta\ alêthê= kai\ prô=ta kai\ a/mesa kai\ gnôrimô/tera kai\ pro/tera kai\ ai/tia tou= sumpera/smatos~, An. Po. i, 2, This ~ame/sôn epistê/mê anapo/deiktos~ (72b, 19) belong to ~nou=s~. There is only a ~nou=s~--not an ~epistê/mê~ (as being a ~he/xis apodeiktikê/~, EN. 1139b, 31)--~tô=n archô=n, tê=s archê=s tou= epistêtou=~, EN. vi, 6. Thus also ~nou=s~ is ~epistê/mês archê/~, An. Po. 100b, 5-17. ~tô=n akinê/tôn ho/rôn kai\ prô/tôn nou=s esti\ kai\ ou lo/gos~, EN. 1143b, 1 (cf. MM. 1197a, 20 ff.).] {510}

[22\14: ~to\ ku/rion~, EN. 1178a, 3, and frequently. ~nou=s dokei= archei=n kai\ hêgei=sthai~, 1177a, 14. It rules esp. over ~o/rexis~ (as ~hê psuchê/~ does over the ~sô=ma~), Pol. 1254b, 5 (cf. EN. 1102b, 29 ff.).]

[23\14: A man is called ~egkratê/s~ or ~akratê/s, tô=| katei=n to\n nou=n ê\ mê/; hôs tou/tou heka/stou o/ntos~, EN. 1168b, 35. ~do/xeie d' a/n kai\ ei=nai he/kastos tou=to (nou=s)~, 1178a, 2. ~tô=| anthrô/pô| dê\ (kra/tiston kai\ ê/diston) ho kata\ to\n nou=n bi/os, ei/per tou=to ma/lista a/nthrôpos~ (here only in so far as the possession of ~nou=s~ distinguishes men in general from the other ~zô=|a~), 1178a, 6.]

[24\14: Cicero makes a distinction of this kind between ratio and animus. Off. i, 107 (after Panaetius): intellegendum est, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo quod omnes participes sumus rationis . . . ; altera autem quae proprie singulis est tributa.]

[25\14: ~ha/panta ta\ gino/mena kai\ phtheiro/mena phai/netai~, Cael. 279b, 20. ~to\ geno/menon ana/gkê te/los labei=n~, Ph. 203b, 8. But ~ha/pan to\ aei\ o/n haplôs a/phtharton. homoi/ôs de\ kai\ age/nêton~, Cael. 281b, 25. ~ei to\ age/nêton a/phtharton kai\ to\ a/phtharton age/nêton, ana/gkê kai\ to\ "aï/dion" hekate/rô| akolouthei=n, kai\ ei/te ti age/nêton, aï/dion, ei/te ti a/phtharton, aï/dion ktl.~, Cael. 282a, 31 ff. Thus too ~nou=s~ (~apathê/s~) as uncreated is everlasting and imperishable (see Zeller, Sitzb. B. Ak. 1882, p. 1044 f.). It belongs to the imperishable ~ousi/ai~, which as such are ~ti/miai kai\ thei=ai~, PA. 644b, 22 ff.]

[26\14: ~ho nou=s hupome/nei~ at the separation, Meta. 1070a, 25-6. More strictly this applies to the ~nou=s apathê/s (poiêtiko/s)~. While the ~nou=s pathêtiko/s~ (whose relation to the ~nou=s poiêtiko/s~ remains most obscure) is ~phtharto/s~, we hear of the ~nou=s poiêtiko/s~ that it is ~chôristhei\s mo/non tou=to ho/per eti/, kai\ tou=to mo/non atha/naton kai\ aï/dion~, de An. 430a, 10-25.]

[27\14: de An. 408b, 18 ff.: ~nou=s ou phthei/retai~, nor ~hupo\ tê=s en tô=| gê/ra| amaurô/seôs . . . to\ noei=n kai\ to\ theôrei=n marai/netai~ (in old age) ~a/llou tinos e/sô phtheirome/nou~ (? nothing perishes within ~to\ noei=n~--read ~en hô=|~ as in l. 23 and understand: ~a/llou tino\s en hô=| to\ noei=n = ho nou=s, e/nesti~, i.e. the whole living man), ~auto\ de\ apathe/s estin~ (just as ~nou=s~ is always ~analloi/ôton~, even its ~no/êsis~ is no ~ki/nêsis~, and the ~lê=psis tê=s epistê/mês~ makes no ~alloi/ôsis~ for it: de An. 407a, 32; Ph. 247a, 28; b, 1 ff.; 20 ff.), ~to\ de\ dianoei=sthai~ (thinking and judging) ~kai\ philei=n ê\ misei=n ouk e/stin ekei/nou pa/thê, alla\ tou=de tou= e/chontos ekei=no, hê=| ekei=no e/chei. dio\ kai\ tou/tou phtheirome/nou ou/te mnêmoneu/ei ou/te philei=, ou ga\r ekei/nou ê=n, alla\ tou= koi/nou~ (that which had once been associated with the ~nou=s~), ~ho\ apo/lôlen; ho de\ nou=s i/sôs theio/tero/n ti kai\ apathe/s estin~. In its separate existence ~nou=s~ has no memory--this at least is meant by ~ou mnêmoneu/omen~, de An. 430a, 23, however we may be inclined to interpret the rest of the sentence.]

[28\14: Particularly in the ~Eu/dêmos~ (frr. 31-40 [37-44]), probably also in the ~Protreptiko/s~.]

[29\14: For this must be the meaning of fr. 36 = 44 (~Eu/d.~)--the ~dai/môn~ is the soul itself; cf. 35 [41].]

[30\14: de An. 407b, 13-26; 414a, 19-27.--And yet it must be admitted that the ~nou=s~ of Aristotle is itself a ~tucho/n~ within another ~tucho/n~--not indeed as a separate entity with any qualities set in a fortuitous vessel of perhaps discordant qualities that do not fit it (which acc. to the ~Puthago/reios mu=thos~ was true of the ~psuchê/~ in the ~sô=ma~)--but at any rate set within an animated individual with quite definite qualities as a stranger, itself devoid of all definite quality and therefore not capable of having a character specially fitting that individual in which it is placed. Thus, after all, the Aristotelian ~mu=thos~ about the ~nou=s~ betrays its origin from the ~mu=thoi~ of old theology.] {511}

[31\14: It is only as an argumentum ad hominem that the view is suggested on one occasion, that ~be/ltion tô=| nô=| mê\ meta\ sô/matos ei=nai (katha/per ei/ôthe/ te le/gesthai kai\ polloi=s sundokei=)~, de An. 407b, 4.]

[32\14: EN. x, 7-9.--~dokei= hê philosophi/a thaumasta\s hêdona\s e/chein kathario/têti kai\ tô=| bebai/ô|. eu/logon de\ toi=s eido/si tô=n zêtou/ntôn hêdi/ô tê\n diagôgê\n ei=nai~, 1177a, 26. The ~sopho/s~ requires no ~su/nergoi~ (as the ~sô/phrôn~ and the ~andrei=os~ do, and is ~autarke/statos~ in himself. The activity of ~nou=s~ is the most valuable as being ~theôrêtikê/~ and because ~par' hautê\n oude/nos ephi/etai te/lous~. A sufficiently long life of the theoretic activity of ~nou=s~ is ~telei/a eudaimoni/a anthrô/pou~--indeed, this is no longer an ~anthrô/pinos bi/os~, but rather ~krei/ttôn ê\ kat' a/nthrôpon~--a ~thei=os bi/os~ as ~nou=s thei=o/n ti en anthrô/pô| hupa/rchei~. Therefore man must not ~anthrô/pina phronei=n~ but ~eph' ho/son ende/chetai athanati/zein~ (be immortal already in this life) ~kai\ pa/nta poiei=n pro\s to\ zê=n kata\ to\ kra/tiston tô=n en hautô=|~ (1177b, 31 ff.). This ~telei/a eudaimoni/a~, as a ~theôrêtikê\ ene/rgeia~, brings the thinkers near to the gods whose life does not consist in ~pra/ttein~ (not even virtuous) or ~poiei=n~ but in pure ~theôri/a~, and this can be so with the life of man (alone among the ~zô=|a~) ~eph' ho/son homoi/ôma/ ti tê=s toiau/tês (theôrêtikê=s) energei/as hupa/rchei~ (1178b, 7-32). Nowhere do we meet with so much as the shadow of an idea that the ~eudaimoni/a~ of the ~theôrêtiko\s bi/os~ can only become ~telei/a~ in "another" world, or is conceivable as existing elsewhere than in the life on earth. The only condition for ~telei/a eudaimoni/a~ that is made is ~mê=kos bi/ou te/leion~ (1177b, 25)--nothing lying outside or beyond this life. The ~theôrêtiko\s bi/os~ has its complete and final development here upon earth.--~te/leios bi/os~ is mentioned as necessary for the obtaining of ~eudaimoni/a~, EN. 1100a, 5; 1101a, 16. But ~eudaimoni/a~ is completely confined within the limits of earthly life: to call a dead man ~eudai/mona~ would be ~pantelô=s a/topon~, for he lacks the ~ene/rgeia~ which is the essence of ~eudaimoni/a~--only a mere shadow of sensation can belong to the ~kekmêko/tes~ (almost the Homeric conception) 1100a, 11-29; 1101a, 22-b, 9.--Since it is impossible for the individual to enjoy an unending permanence and share in ~to\ aei\ kai\ thei=on~, it follows that the continuation of the individual after death consists only in the continuance of the ~ei/dos~--not of the ~auto/~ (which perishes) but only of the ~hoi=on auto/~ which persists in the series of creatures propagated on earth: de An. 415a, 28-b, 7; GA. 731a, 24-b, 1. (Borrowed from the observations of Plato, Smp. 206 C-207 A; cf. also Lg. 721 C, 773 E; Philo, Incor. Mund. 8, ii, p. 495 M., after Kritolaos.) It was much easier for Aristotle to take this conception seriously than it was for Plato with his particular outlook: only for the passing requirements of his dialogue does Plato adopt the Herakleitean view and expand it: see above, chap. xi, n. 16.]

[33\14: ~oi=mai de\ tou= ginô/skein ta\ o/nta kai\ phronei=n aphairethe/ntos ou bi/on alla\ chro/non ei=nai tê\n athanasi/an~, Plu., Is. et Os. i, fin., p. 351 E. Origen (Cels. iii, 80, p. 359 Lom.) draws a clear distinction between the ~athanasi/a tê=s psuchê=s~ of Platonic doctrine and the Stoic ~epidiamonê\ tê=s psuchê=s~ on the one hand--and this Aristotelian doctrine of the ~tou= nou= athanasi/a: hoi peisthe/ntes peri\ tou= thu/rathen nou= hôs athana/tou (thana/tou~ Edd.) ~kai\ mo/nou (kainou=~ Edd.) ~diagôgê\n (= bi/on) e/xontos~ (--this is how the passage should be read).]

[34\14: Theophrastos discussed (by the method of ~apori/ai~ fashionable with the school) the obscurities and difficulties inherent in the doctrine of ~nou=s~, particularly of the reduplicated ~nou=s~, the ~poiêtiko/s~ and the ~pathêtiko/s~. True to his character, however, he adheres to the fixed dogma of his school of the ~nou=s chôristo/s~ which ~e/xôthen ô\n kai\ hô/sper {512} epi/thetos~ is ~ho/môs su/mphutos~ with man and being ~age/nnêtos~ is also ~a/phthartos~: Frag. 53b, p. 226 ff.; 53, p. 176 Wim. (~theôri/a~ belongs to ~nou=s, thigo/nti kai\ hoi=on hapsame/nô|~, and is therefore without ~apa/tê~, fr. 12, § 26. The ~nou=s~ is ~krei=tto/n ti me/ros [tê=s psychê=s] kai\ theio/teron~, fr. 53. To the ~nou=s~ and its ~theôri/a~ we must suppose the ~kata\ du/namin homoiou=sthai theô=|~ to refer--for this is the teaching of Thphr. also: Jul., Or. vi, p. 185 A.) Nowhere is there any indication that for him the immortality of ~nou=s~ had the slightest importance for this life and its conduct. Nor has it any in the ethical doctrine of the very theologically inclined Eudemos. Here the aim of life--the ~aretê\ te/leios~ which is ~kalolagathi/a~--is said to be ~hê tou= theou= theôri/a~ which is carried on by the ~nou=s, to\ en êmi=n thei=on~, 1248a, 27; in this process it is best ~hê/kista aistha/nesthai tou= a/llou me/rous tê=s psuchê=s~, 1249b, 22. For the sake of ~to\ gnôri/zein~ man wishes ~zê=n aei\~, 1245a, 9--but upon earth and in the body: there is no thought of the other world. (This would have been quite natural and to be expected of this semi-theological thinker who, e.g. speaks quite seriously of the separability of ~nou=s~ from the ~lo/gos~--the ~a/llo me/ros tê=s psuchê=s~--in bodily life and of its higher intuition in enthousiasmos and veracious dreaming: 1214a, 23; 1225a, 28; 1248a, 40.)--To this first generation of Peripatetics belong also Aristoxenos and Dikaiarchos who did not recognize any peculiar substance of the "soul" apart from the "harmony" brought about by the mixture of bodily material. Dik. ~anê/|rêke tê\n ho/lên hupo/stasin tê=s psuchê=s~: Atticus ap. Eus., PE. xv, 810 A. Aristox. and Dik. nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt Cic. TD. 1, 51: 21; 41, etc.; Dik. (in the ~Lesbiakoi\ lo/goi~) expressly controverted the doctrine of immortality, TD. i, 77. (It remains very remarkable that Dik. who naturally knew nothing of a separabilis animus, TD. i, 21, nevertheless, believed not merely in mantic dreams--that would be just intelligible, ~e/chei ga/r tina lo/gon~, Arist., P. Nat. 462b ff.--but also in the prophetic power of ~enthousiasmo/s~, Cic., Div. i, 5; 113; Dox. 416a, which invariably presupposes the dogma of a special substance of the "soul" and its separability from the body.)--Straton "the naturalist" (d. 270), for whom the soul is an undivided force, inseparable from the body and the ~aisthê/seis~, gave up completely the belief in the ~nou=s chôristo/s~ of Aristotle: he cannot possibly have held any doctrine of immortality in any form or under any limitations.--Then follows the period of pure scholarship when the Peripatetic school almost gave up philosophy. With the return to the study of the master's writings (from the time of Aristonikos) they gained a new lease of life. The problems of the parts of the soul, the relation of ~nou=s~ to the soul (and to the ~nou=s pathêtiko/s~) were discussed once more. It became more and more common, however, to set aside the ~nou=s thu/rathen epeisiô/n~ (cf. the definition of the soul given by Andronikos ap. Galen ~p. t. tê=s psuchê=s êthô=n~, iv, 782 f., K.; Themist., de An. ii, 56, 11; 59, 6 Sp.). This meant the denial of immortality (which belonged to ~nou=s~ only): e.g. by Boëthos: Simp., de An. p. 247, 24 ff. Hayd. [Sto. Vet. iii, 267 Arn.]. A different view again, and one which even went beyond Aristotle, was held by Kratippos, the contemporary of Boëthos: Cic., Div. i, 70; cf. 5; 113. Alexander of Aphrodisias the great ~exêgêtê/s~ absolutely banished the ~nou=s poiêtiko/s~ from the human soul. (This is the divine ~nou=s~, which is perpetually ~nou=s~ and ~noêto\n energei/a|~, and that, too, already ~pro\ tou= noei=sthai~ by the ~huliko\s nou=s~ of man. It enters into the latter ~thu/rathen~--though not locally, for it is incapable of change of place, p. 113, 18 f.--with the individual act of ~noei=n~ by the ~nou=s huliko/s~, but it never becomes a ~mo/rion kai\ du/nami/s tis tê=s {513} hêmete/ras psuchê=s~: Alex. de An., p. 107-9; p. 90 Br.). For him ~nou=s~ is ~chôristo/s~ and ~atha/natos, apathê/s~, etc., whereas the human soul exactly like the ~ei=dos~ of its ~sô=ma~ from which it is ~achôristo/s~ perishes at death together with its ~nou=s huliko/s~, completely: ~sumphthei/retai tô=| sô/mati~, de An., p. 21, 22 f.; p. 90, 16 f. The individual soul thus perishes: the imperishable ~nou=s~ had not communicated itself to the individual.--The indestructibility of the individual ~nou=s~ of man (and this was indubitably what Aristotle himself taught), a doctrine derived not from experience but from pure logical inference, had in reality no serious significance for the general teaching of the Peripatetics so long as they preserved their independence. Finally, indeed, they too were swallowed up in the ferment of Neoplatonism.]

[35\14: ~he/xis, phu/sis, a/logos psuchê/, psuchê\ lo/gon e/chousa kai\ dia/noian~, Plu., Virt. Mor. 451 BC and A. Through all these and all things in which these are--~diê/kei ho nou=s~, D.L. vii, 138 f. [ii, p. 192 Arn.].]

[36\14: Our soul an ~apo/spasma~ of the ~e/mpsuchos ko/smos~, D.L. vii, 143 [ii, 191 Arn.]. We often find the soul of man called an ~apo/spasma tou= theou= (Dio/s), thei/a apo/moira, apo/rroia~ (see Gataker on M. Ant., pp. 48, 211; Ed. 1652)--and often even ~theo/s~ (see Bonhöffer, Epiktet u. d. Stoa, p. 76 f.).]

[37\14: ~(hê psuchê\) araio/teron pneu=ma tê=s phu/seôs kai\ leptome/resteron . . . ~ Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Stoic. Rep. 41, p. 1052 F [ii, 222 Arn.]. "Nature" is ~pneu=ma~ that has become moist, soul the same ~pneu=ma~ which has remained dry (Galen, iv, 783 f. K. [p. 218 Arn.]).]

[38\14: The ~bre/phos~ is created as a ~phu/ton~, and only afterwards becomes a ~zô=|on~ by ~peri/psuxis~ (derivation of ~psuchê/~ hence!). Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Stoic. Rep. 1052 F [p. 222 Arn.]. Thus comes ~ek phu/seôs psuchê/~, Plu., Prim. Frig. ii, p. 946 C.]

[39\14: It would almost be possible to employ the semi-Stoic language of Philo to describe the soul as conceived by this Stoic Pantheism: ~tê=s thei/as psuchê=s apo/spasma ou diaireto/n (te/mnetai ga\r oude\n tou= thei/ou kat' apa/rtêsin, alla\ mo/non ektei/netai)~, Q. Det. Pot. Insid., 24, i, p. 209 M. But in orthodox Stoic doctrine the idea prevails that the individual ~apospa/smata~ are completely detached from the universal ~thei=on~--but at the same time without denial of ultimate connexion with the "All" and the "One".]

[40\14: Acc. to the older Stoical doctrine as systematized by Chrysippos the soul is absolutely simple and unified, having sprung from the universal Reason of God which contains no ~a/logon~. Its impulses (~hormai/~) must on this view be rational just as much as its willed decisions (~kri/seis~): it is affected from without by ~phu/sis~, which, being itself a development of the highest reason, God, can only be good and rational. It is quite impossible to conceive how, on the principles of the older Stoicism, erroneous judgment or excessive and evil impulses could arise. ~hê tê=s kaki/as ge/nesis~ is rendered unintelligible as Poseidonios maintains in opposition to the subtle observations of Chrysipp. on this head (see Schmekel, Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, p. 327 ff.).]

[41\14: ~akolou/thôs tê=| phu/sei zê=n~ (but our ~phu/seis~ are ~me/rê tê=s tou= ho/lou~), i.e. in harmony with the ~koi/nos no/mos ho/sper esti\n ho ortho\s lo/gos ho dia\ pa/ntôn ercho/menos, ho auto\s ô\n tô=| Dii/, kathêgemo/ni tou/tô| tê=s tô=n ho/lôn dioikê/seôs o/nti~, Chrysipp. ap. D.L. vii, 87-8 [iii, 3 Arn.]. This obedience to the rational order and governance of the world--the deum sequere, Sen., VB. 15, 5; Ep. 16, 5; ~he/pesthai theoi=s~, Epict. i, 12, 5, etc.--is more often regarded as a passive attitude of self-abandonment adopted consciously and with ~sugkata/thesis: chrô= moi loipo\n eis ho\ a\n the/lê|s. homognômonô= soi, so/s eimi ktl.~, Epict. ii, 16, 42. ~the/le gi/nesthai ta\ {514} gino/mena hôs gi/netai, kai\ euroê/seis~ (this sounds very like "make God's will your own will"), Ench. 8. Much the same idea occurs already in the lines of Kleanthes ~a/gou de/ m' hô= Zeu= kai\ su/ g' hê Peprôme/nê ktl.~ [i, 118 Arn.]. But such "affirmation of the universe", understood in the full pantheistic sense (cf. Kleanthes ~tê\n koinê\n mo/nên ekde/chetai phu/sin hê=| dei= akolouthei=n, ouke/ti de\ kai\ tê\n epi\ me/rous~, D.L. vii, 89 [i, 126 Arn.]), could not lead to an ethical teaching of active character and concrete substance.]

[42\14: The ~sopho/s~ is ~eleu/theros; ei=nai ga\r tê\n eleutheri/an exousi/an autopragi/as~, D.L. vii, 121. Laws and constitutions do not apply to him: Cic., Ac. Pri. ii, 136.]

[43\14: Enemies and strangers are ~mê\ spoudai=oi~ to one another--~poli=tai kai\ phi/loi kai\ oikei=oi hoi spoudai=oi mo/non~. Zeno, ~en tê=| Politei/a|~, ap. D.L. vii, 32-3 [i, 54 Arn.].]

[44\14: ~ho par' heka/stô| dai/môn~ which one must keep in harmony ~pro\s tê\n tou= tô=n ho/lôn dioikêtou= bou/lêsin~, D.L. vii, 88, after Chrysipp. [iii, 4 Arn.]. In the later Stoic literature, the only part of it which has come down to us, we often hear of this ~dai/môn~ of the individual--sacer intra nos spiritus (Sen., Epict., M. Ant.: see Bonhöffer, Epiktet, 83). It is generally spoken of in language that seems to regard it as something separable from the man or his soul, including the ~hêgemoniko/n~; Zeus ~pare/stêsen epi/tropon heka/stô| to\n heka/stou dai/mona kai\ pare/dôke phula/ssein auto\n autô=| ktl.~, Epict. i, 14, 12. ~ho dai/môn o\n heka/stô| prosta/tên kai\ hêgemo/na ho Zeu\s e/dôken~, M. Ant. v, 27. ~ana/krinon to\ daimo/nion~, Epict. iii, 22, 53 (one can ask questions of it, as Sokrates did of his ~daimo/nion~, as something other and different from oneself). This ~dai/môn~ then does not seem to be simply identifiable with the "soul" of man like the daimon in man of which the theologians speak. It is conceived and spoken of in language that suggests rather the "protecting spirit" of a man as known to popular belief (cf. now Usener, Götternamen, 294 ff.). ~ha/panti dai/môn andri\ sumpari/statai euthu\s genome/nô| mustagôgo\s tou= bi/ou~, Menand. 550 K. (where the idea of two daimonic partners in the life of man is already rejected: Eukleides Socr. had spoken of such, cf. Censor., DN. iii, 3, and in a different way again Phocyl., fr. 15). Plato himself speaks (with a ~le/getai~) of the ~dai/môn ho/sper zô=nta eilê/chei~ (and guides the departed soul into Hades): Phd. 107 D. The idea, however, must have been much older: it appears fairly clearly expressed in Pindar's words, O. xiii, 28 ~(Zeu= pa/têr), Xeno/phôntos eu/thune dai/monos ou=ron~, where the transition to the meaning "fate" for the word ~dai/môn~ has not yet been completed. Later (with the Tragedians and other poets) this use became very common, but even then still presupposes the belief in such personal daimonic partners in the life of man: the use would have been quite impossible otherwise. (~dai/môn = po/tmos~, Pi., P. v, 121 f., and already in Thgn. 161, 163. When Herakleitos says ~ê=thos anthrô/pô| dai/môn~, fr. 121 By., 119 D. he uses ~dai/môn~ in the sense of fortune in life. The word means both ~ê=thos~ and condition of life at the same time in Pl., Rp. 617 E, ~ouch huma=s dai/môn lê/xetai, all' humei=s dai/mona hairê/sesthe~, where the derivation of the metaphorical use of the word ~dai/môn~ from a belief in a special daimon belonging to the individual man can still be seen plainly. See also [Lys.] Epit. (2), 78. But the metaphorical use comes as early as ~Th~ 166, ~pa/ros toi dai/mona dô/sô = po/tmon ephê/sô~.)--The personal existence of the daimon is still far removed from all danger of such abstraction in a very remarkable case: in Halikarnassos Poseidonios and his ~e/kgonoi~ decide that on the first day of the month they will offer ~Dai/moni agathô=| Poseidôni/ou . . . krio/n~ (Gr. Ins. in Br. Mus. {515} iv, 1, n. 896, p. 70, l. 35. The inscr. seems to date from the third century B.C.). Here then offering is made to the ~agatho\s dai/môn~ (see above, chap. v, n. 133) of the living, just as offering was made on birthdays, and at other times also, to the genius of Romans; ~ag. d.~ is here clearly equivalent to genius. Apollo whose advice had been sought at his oracle had expressly enjoined (ib., l. 9) ~. . . tima=n kai\ hila/skesthai kai\ agatho\n dai/mona Poseidôni/ou kai\ Go/rgidos~ (the latter, P.'s mother, seems to have been already dead: l. 34).--This special ~dai/môn~ attached to individuals with whom it can be contrasted (as Brutus can be with his ~dai/môn kako/s~: Plu., Brut. 36) is distinct from the individual's ~psuchê/~, though it is natural to suppose that it may have arisen from the projection of the ~psuchê/~--conceived as very independent--outside the man himself, in which it would again resemble the Roman genius. (The daimonic ~phu/lakes~ of Hesiod [cf. above, p. 67 ff.], belong to quite a different range of ideas.) At any rate the Stoics had this analogous popular conception in mind when they spoke of the ~par' heka/stô| dai/môn~ as something different from the man himself and his ~hêgemoniko/n~. They use it, however, only as a figure of speech. The ~dai/môn~ of the individual really means for them "the original, ideal personality as contrasted with the empirical personality" (as Bonhöffer very rightly puts it: Epikt. 84)--the character the man already is ideally but must become actually (~ge/noi' hoi=os essi/ . . .~). Thus the ~dai/môn~ is distinct from the ~psuchê/ (dia/noia)~ and yet identical with it. It is a semi-allegorical play upon the idea of the ~dai/môn~ as individual genius and at the same time as crown or summit of the human personality--just as Plato had used the word already incidentally, Tim. 90 A. Finally--for the Stoics did not seriously wish to establish the existence of an independent protecting deity that enters man from without and rules over him--the ~hêgemoniko/n~ is the same as the ~dai/môn~. Thus in M. Ant. iv, 27, the ~dai/môn~ is completely identical with the ~apo/spasma Dio/s~, and the ~heka/stou nou=s kai\ lo/gos~ (cf. also iii, 3 fin.; ii, 13; 17; iii, 7, ~to\n heautou= nou=n kai\ dai/mona~). The fact, however, that this ~apo/spasma tou= theou=~ can be called a ~dai/môn~ bears witness to a tendency to conceive the soul-spirit as something independent and more cut off and separated from the common and original source of divinity than was possible for Stoic pantheism of the stricter sort (to which the terms ~apo/spasma, apo/rroia tou= theou=~ were more apt). A decided approximation was thus made to the theological idea of the "soul" as an individual daimon which persists in its separate existence. To this view Poseidonios went over completely: he regards the individual ~dai/môn~ that lives in man as ~suggenê\s ô\n tô=| to\n ho/lon ko/smon dioikou=nti~ (Pos. ap. Gal. v, 469), and no longer as the dependent ~apo/spasma~ of the latter, but as one of many independent and individually characterized spirits that have lived from all time in the air and enter into man at birth. (See Bonhöffer, Epikt. 79-80, and also Schmekel, Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, 249 ff., 256.)]

[45\14: ~ho tha/natos esti chôrismo\s psuchê=s apo\ sô/matos . . .~ Chrysipp. ap. Nemes., NH., p. 81 Matth.; Zeno and Chrysipp. ap. Tert., An. 5 [ii, 219 Arn.].]

[46\14: Everything comes into being and perishes, including the gods, ~ho de\ Zeu\s mo/nos aï/dio/s esti~, Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Sto. Rep. 38, p. 1052 A; Comm. Not. 31, p. 1075 A ff. [ii, 309 Arn.].--~epidiamonê\~ but not ~athanasi/a~ of the human soul [ib., 223].]

[47\14: ~Klea/nthês me\n ou=n pa/sas (ta\s psucha\s) epidiame/nein (le/gei) me/chri tê=s ekpurô/seôs, Chru/sippos de\ ta\s tô=n sophô=n mo/non~, D.L. vii, 157. {516} A statement often repeated without mention of the two authorities: Arius Did. ap. Eus., PE. 15, 20, 6, p. 822 **A-C (the ~psuchai\ tô=n aphro/nôn kai\ alo/gôn **zô/|ôn~ perish immediately with the death of the body, C) and others [ii, 223 Arn.]. Chrysippos' doctrine comes also in Tac., Agr. 46, si ut sapientibus placet non cum corpore extinguuntur magnae animae (~hai mega/lai psuchai/~, Plu., Def. Or. 18, p. 419 f.); cf. omnium quidem animos immortalis esse sed fortium bonorumque divinos, Cic., Leg. ii, 27, not quite accurately put.]

[48\14: The ~astheneste/ra psuchê/ (hau/tê de/ esti tô=n apaideu/tôn)~ perishes sooner, ~hê de\ ischurote/ra, hoi=a esti\ peri\ tou\s sophou/s~ remains ~me/chri tê=s ekpurô/seôs~, [Plu.] Plac. Phil., 4, 7 ap. Dox. 393a.]

[49\14: The predominance of the materialistic point of view is remarkable in those Stoici who acc. to Seneca, Ep. 57, 7, existimant animum hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber (which reminds us of the popular belief that the soul of one who has died in a high wind ~euthu\s diapephu/sêtai kai\ apo/lôlen~, Pl., Phd. 70 A, 80 D, see above, chap. xiii, n. 5).]

[50\14: ~ou ta\ sô/mata ta\s psucha\s sune/chei all' hai psuchai\ ta\ sô/mata, hô/sper kai\ hê ko/lla kai\ heautê\n kai\ ta\ ekto\s kratei=~, Poseidon. ap. Ach. Tat., Isag., p. 133 E Petav., borrowed from Arist. (de An. 1, 5, 411b, 7), but a thoroughly Stoic idea as contrasted with Epicurean doctrine (see Heinze, Xenokrates, 100 f.).]

[51\14: S.E., M. ix, 71-3. The naive but quite plain statements go back to Poseid. as has often been pointed out (e.g. by Corssen, de Pos. Rhod., p. 45, 1878, and others). So, too, do the similar remarks in Cic., TD. i, 42. Poseid. does not appear to be uttering heterodox opinions in this case, so far as we can see.]

[52\14: ~--kai\ ga\r oude\ ta\s psucha\s e/nestin huponoê=sai ka/tô pherome/nas. leptomerei=s ga\r ou=sai eis tou\s a/nô ma=llon to/pous kouphophorou=sin~, S.E., M. ix, 71. This physical reason was in itself enough to make it impossible for the Stoics to believe in a subterranean region of the souls: ~oudei\s Ha/idês, oud' Ache/rôn, oude\ Kôkuto/s ktl.~, Epict. iii, 13, 15. It is the regular Stoic doctrine: see Bonhöffer, Epikt. 56 f.; cf. Cic., TD. i, 36 f.; Sen., C. ad Marc. 19, 4. When Stoics speak occasionally of inferi or ~ha/|dês~ as the abode of the souls, they are only using metaphorical language. When the word is not a mere conventionalism, they mean the regions nearer the earth, the cloud regions and lower levels of the air, ~ho pachumere/statos kai\ prosgeio/tatos aê/r~ (Corn., ND. 5, p. 4, 17 L; other exx. in Heinze, Xenokr. 147, 2). Here the "unwise" souls (the moister, less buoyant ones) are supposed to remain after death (circa terram as Tert., An. 54 says, alluding to Stoic doctrine--and this is obviously where the inferi mentioned at the end of the same chapter are situated). This ~aê/r~ (distinguished from the higher regions of the air) = ~ha/|dês~, must have been what Zeno referred to when he spoke of the loca tenebrosa where the souls of the unwise have to expiate their folly (quoted and varied by Lact., Inst. 7, 7, 13, in a Platonic sense [i, 40 Arn.]).]

[53\14: Abode of the souls in the air: S. E., M. ix, 73; Cic., TD. i, 42-3, both probably after Poseid. Cf. sapientum animas in supernis mansionibus **collocant (Stoici), Tert., An., 54. Generally: ~eis to\n ae/ra methi/stasthai~ said of the departed souls, M. Ant. iv, 21. ~en tô=| perie/chonti . . . diame/nein ta\s tô=n apothano/ntôn psucha/s~, Ar. Did. ap. Eus., PE. xv, 822 A [ii, 225 Arn.]. (Gradual ascent to ever higher regions, Sen., C. ad Marc. 25, 1--hardly orthodox Stoic doctrine.--The conception may possibly belong to the older Stoicism, and may underlie the opinion of Chrysipp.: ~sphairoeidei=s~--as fiery ~mete/ôra--ta\s psucha\s {517} meta\ tha/naton gi/nesthai~, ap. Eust., Il. 1288, 10 f. [224 Arn.]. Poseid. seems to have worked it out further, probably making use also of Pythagorean and Platonic fancies to which he was distinctly inclined. The Pythagoreans had fancies about the souls hovering in the air (see above, chap. xi, n. 35), of the sun and moon as places where the souls lived (chap. x, n. 76). Acc. to Poseid. the souls inhabit ~to\n hupo\ selê/nên to/pon~ (S.E., M. ix, 73) as suitable for divine but not perfect creatures. It is the souls who are meant when people speak of ~dai/mones~ (S.E. § 74), or ~hê/rôes~ (Stoic in this use D.L. vi, 151 [ii, 320 Arn.]); cf. heroes et lares et genii, Varro using Stoic language (ap. Aug., CD. vii, 6, p. 282, 14 Domb.). The whole air is full of them: Pos. ap. Cic., Div. i, 64. Something very similar given as Pythag. doctrine by Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; see above, chap. xi, n. 35. But Poseidonios (esp. if he is really the source of the Ciceronian Somn. Scip.) seems to have emulated more particularly the imaginative efforts of Herakleides Pont. and his story of Empedotimos' vision (see above, chap. ix, n. 111). Herakl. contributed largely to popularizing the idea that the souls inhabit the air and giving it shape; the interest with which his fancies were studied is shown by the quotations from his book so common from Varro down to Proclus and Damascius. He must have been led to make the souls, on being freed from the body, float upwards (and occupy the stars or the moon--which are inhabitable heavenly bodies: Dox. 343, 7 ff.; 356a, 10) by the view--just as the Stoics after him were--that the soul is an ~aithe/rion sô=ma~ (Philop.)--~phôtoeidê/s~, a lumen, Tert., An. 9. In this he is following an idea that had been common in the fifth century (held by Xenophanes, Epicharmos, Eurip.: see above, p. 436 ff.), and had even attained popular vogue. This idea from the very first led to the conclusion that the soul, when ready for it, enters ~eis to\n ho/moion aithe/ra~ and ascends to the upper regions (of the aether). Herakleides carried this idea further and embellished it with philosophical and astronomical fancies. (On another occasion he seems to have denied substance and consistency to individual "souls": Plu., Mor. v, p. 699 Wytt.--a view to which his doctrine of the ~o/gkoi~ might easily have led him.) Poseidonios then took up this idea of Herakl. In this way, or at least not uninfluenced by this semi-philosophical literature, the belief in the abode of the "souls" in the aether attained the popularity that grave inscriptions witness for it (see below, ch. xiv, 2, n. 135).]

[54\14: Cicero, following Poseid., imagines a blissful observation of the earth and the stars by the souls in the air: TD. i, 44-7 (cf. Sen., C. ad Marc. 25, 1-2); and similarly in Somn. Sci.; in both cases the idea certainly comes from Herakl. Pont.]

[55\14: ~apo/spasma tou= theou=~ [i, 36 Arn.].]

[56\14: A frequently repeated Stoic dogma (stated with particular fullness by Senec., Ep. 93): see Gataker on M. Ant. (iii, 7), p. 108-9. The happiness of the (Stoic) wise man does not require ~mê=kos bi/ou te/leiou~ as Aristot. had maintained (see above, n. 32). In this point Stoic and Epicurean doctrine fully agreed: magni artificis est clusisse totum in exiguo: tantum sapienti sua, quantum deo omnis aetas patet (Sen., Ep. 53, 11, and see below, n. 92).]

[57\14: Acc. to Panaitios there are duo genera in the soul which he calls inflammata anima (Cic., TD. i, 42). It is at any rate very probable that Panaitios (and Boëthos--roughly contemporary with Pan.: see Comparetti, Ind. Stoic., p. 78 f.--acc. to Macr., in S. Scip. 1, 14, 20) regarded the soul as compounded of two elements, aer et ignis, not {518} as a single and uncompounded ~pneu=ma e/nthermon~ as the older Stoa had taught (see Schmekel, Philos. d. mittl. Stoa, 324 f.).]

[58\14: ~phu/sis~ and ~psuchê/~: Pan. ap. Nemes., NH., p. 212 Matth. This clearly shows a tendency to a psychological dualism: Zeller, Stoics and Epicureans, p. 542 f. What further suggestions were made by Pan. about the division of the soul remains very problematical. The only more precise statement is Cicero's, TD. i, 80 (speaking of Pan.), aegritudines iras libidinesque semotas a mente et disclusas putat.]

[59\14: Panaitios denied not merely the immortality but even the ~diamonê/~ of the soul after death: Cic., TD. i, 78-9. Two reasons are there given: everything that has come into being (like the soul of man at birth) must also perish--the Aristotelian principle: see above, n. 25; what can feel pain (as the soul does) must become diseased and what is diseased must eventually perish. (Here the **destruction of the soul from its own inward decay is asserted--not from the effect of external force at the world conflagration, the periodic occurrence of which Pan. at least called in question.) Acc. to Schmekel (mittl. Stoa, p. 309) it follows from Cic., TD. i, 42, that Panaitios also added a third argument: that the soul being composite must suffer the dissolution of its parts in death which change into other elements. This does not indeed at all follow from the passage, but such a view would almost have been inevitable with Panaitios' doctrine of the soul and had already been suggested by Karneades in his polemic against the indestructibility of the divine and of every ~zô=|on~--an argument to which Pan. on the whole yielded.]

[60\14: Poseidonios distinguished in the human soul not three parts but three ~duna/meis mia=s ousi/as ek tê=s kardi/as hormôme/nês~ (Gal. v, 515), namely, the Platonic three, the ~logistiko/n, thumoeide/s, epithumêtiko/n~ (Gal. v, 476). The last two are the ~duna/meis a/logoi~ (they only give ~phantasi/ai~ the special forms taken by their impulses: Gal. v, 474, 399). The ~pa/thê~ are not judgments nor the consequences of judgment but the motions (~kinê/seis~) of these ~duna/meis a/logoi~ (Gal. v, 429; cf. 378). In this way alone is it possible to understand how passion or wrong-doing can arise in man; it is because soul is not (as Chrysipp. had taught) pure reasoning power (cf. also Gal. iv, 820). There exists then in man an ~a/logon kai\ kako/daimon kai\ a/theon~ in addition to the ~dai/môn suggenê\s tô=| to\n ho/lon ko/smon dioikou=nti~: Gal. v, 469 f. How, indeed, this is possible when the soul is a single ~ousi/a~ and in its nature nothing but divine ~pneu=ma~ it is difficult to say.--Pos. too was quite ignorant of an evil principle in the world, not the divine or contrary to the divine principle. The ethical teaching of Stoicism had always contained a dualism which is here transferred to the physical doctrine where it was originally unknown. From the time of Pos. there is an ever growing tendency to emphasize the contrast (which was, however, always familiar to the older Stoics as well) between "soul" and "body", the inutilis caro ac fluida, Pos. ap. Sen., Ep. 92, 10. In view of this contrast the "soul" too is no longer said to come into being with the body or with the physical conception of the individual (cf. ~gegone/nai tê\n psuchê\n kai\ metageneste/ran ei=nai [tou= sô/matos]~, Chrysipp. ap. Plu., Sto. Rep. 1053 D [ii, 222 Arn.]), but rather to have been living before that, in the separate life of the divine. It is nowhere expressly or authoritatively stated that Poseidonios held the "pre-existence" of the "soul"; but that view has been rightly attributed to him, fitting in as it does with his other ideas, and because it is often introduced and taken for granted in those passages where {519} Cicero or Seneca are following Pos. (see Corssen, de Pos. Rhod., p. 25 ff. But we may not read the doctrine of pre-existence into S.E., M. ix, 71, as Heinze, Xenok. 134, 2, does). If the soul-~dai/môn~ was in existence before its incarnation it can presumably only enter the body with the conception of the individual life ~thu/rathen~, tractus extrinsecus as Cic. puts it, Div. ii, 119; a passage obviously related (as Bonhöffer, Epikt. 79 remarks) to the statement in Div. i, 64, where he is speaking of the immortales animi of which the air is full--and there Pos. is mentioned by name as the authority. From its pre-existent life in the air the "soul" enters into man. The multitude of individual bodiless souls--not only the one impersonal soul-substance of the world--were thus living before their ~ensôma/tôsis~, and the Stoic pantheism thus turns into a rather questionable "pandaemonism". On the other hand, Poseidonios in opposition to his teacher, Panaitios, adheres to the doctrine of the periodic extinction of all life in the one Soul of the World, the original Fire: cf. Dox. 388a, 18; b, 19. Holding this view he cannot very well have put the origin of each of the individual soul-daimones before the beginning of the particular world-period in which they live. Nor can the survival of the souls after their separation from the body be prolonged beyond the next ~ekpu/rôsis~ (which makes Cicero's immortales animi inexact: Div. i, 64, after Pos.). Thus, although the survival which Panaitios had denied is reaffirmed it does not go beyond the qualified doctrine of immortality which the older Stoics had held. At the same time Pos. could hold, with Chrysipp. and other Stoics, that there was a ~periodikê\ paliggenesi/a~ (M. Ant. xi, 1) after the world-conflagration and even that each individual man of the previous world-period would be restored again in precisely the same place (Chrysipp. ap. Lact., Inst. 7, 23, 3, etc.; ii, 189 Arn.; cf. the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasy: above, chap. x, n. 47). But this would not amount to an ~athanasi/a~ for the individual: the individual life has been interrupted and is separated from its ~apokata/stasis~ by a long interval of time.--There is no satisfactory reason for assigning to Pos. the belief in a series of ~metensômatô/seis~ of the soul--as Heinze does, Xen. 132 ff.--though such an idea would not have been hard to arrive at, even while holding fast to the doctrine of the final ~ekpu/rôsis~. But the dubious accounts given by many ~doxogra/phoi~ of Stoic teaching on the question of the ~metaggismo\s psuchô=n~ need not necessarily refer to Poseidonios: nor are we bound to draw this conclusion because they reappear in Plutarch. Plu. does indeed here and there follow Poseidonios, but he never hesitates to add Platonic ideas or fancies of his own invention, a fact which makes it most risky to attempt to fix an exact source for any particular detail in his variegated mosaic.]

[61\14: Schmekel (Phil. d. mittl. Stoa, 1892) maintains convincingly that Panaitios was led to his view of the nature and fate of the soul chiefly by the polemic of Karneades against the dogmatic philosophers and particularly the Stoics. It is less certain that Poseidonios and his heterodox views are influenced by respect for Karneades. It is certain, however, that Pos. differs from Chrysipp., and still more from Panaitios. There is thus an indirect connexion between him and Karneades, to whose criticisms Panaitios had in the most essential points given way.]

[62\14: That Pos. is being used in the first book of Tusc. Disp. is admitted on all hands (as to the extent of that use conjecture may indeed be various). It is at least very possible in the case of Somn. Scip. (see Corssen, Pos. 40 ff.).--The attraction of such theories of immortality {520} remained an aesthetic one with Cicero (and probably among all the cultured of his age and social circle). Where he is not speaking rhetorically or in pursuance of a literary pose--in his letters esp.--he shows no trace of the conviction that he defends at other times with so much ardour (see Boissier, Rel. rom. d'Aug. aux Ant. i, 58 f.).]

[63\14: ~ou kata\ psilê\n para/taxin, alla\ lelogisme/nôs kai\ semnô=s~ though not always quite ~atragô/|dôs~ (M. Ant. xi, 3).]

[64\14: Julius Kanus when condemned to death by Gaius only attempts to enquire whether there is any truth in the belief in immortality: Sen., Tr. An. 14, 8-9. De natura animae et dissociatione spiritus corporisque inquirebat Thrasea Paetus, before his execution, with his instructor Demetrius the Cynic: Tac., A. xvi, 34. They have no firm conviction in these matters that might serve to explain or account for their heroism (Cato reads the Phaedo before his suicide: Plu., Cat. min. 68, 70).]

[65\14: nos quoque felices animae et aeterna sortitae says the soul of her father to Marcia: Sen., C. ad Marc. 26, 7, in antiqua elementa vertemur at the ~ekpu/rôsis~.]

[66\14: Sen., Ep. 88, 34.]

[67\14: bellum somnium, Sen., Ep. 102, 2.]

[68\14: Where Seneca admits more positive conceptions of a life after death he never goes beyond a fortasse, si modo vera sapientium fama est (Ep. 63, 16); a deliberate concession to the consensus hominum (Ep. 117, 6) or the opiniones magnorum virorum rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium (Ep. 102, 3). Following the conventional style of consolatory discourses he gives such expressions a more vivid turn in the Consolationes: e.g. Marc. 25, 1 ff.; Helv. 11, 7; Polyb. 9, 8. But even there the idea of personal immortality hardly seems to be taken seriously. In the same pieces death is commended simply as putting an end to all pain, and, in fact, to all sensation: Marc. 19, 4-5. In death we become again as we were before being born, Marc. 19, 5; cf. Ep. 54, 4, mors est non esse, id quale sit iam scio. hoc erit post me quod ante me fuit; and Ep. 77, 11, non eris: nec fuisti. So that whether death is a finis or a transitus, (Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 65, 24), it is equally welcome to the wise man who has made the most of his life, however short it may have been. Whether he goes then to the gods or whether on the other hand nothing is left of the mortal creature after death aeque magnum animum habebit (Ep. 93, 10); cf. nunquam magis divinum est (pectus humanum) quam ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat, et scit in hoc natum hominem ut vita defungeretur cet., (Ep. 120, 14); ipsum perire non est magnum, anima in expedito est habenda (QN. 6, 32, 5); to be ready is everything.--Of the old Stoic dogmas the only one that seems to remain certain for Seneca is that of ~paliggenesi/a~ at the new creation of the world, Ep. 36, 10-11: mors intermittit vitam, non eripit: venit iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies; but that is not in any way a consolation: multi recusarent nisi oblitos reduceret. Consciousness ceases with the coming of death in this world-period.]

[69\14: It is very rarely that the utterances of the Emperor on the subject of what happens after death resemble those of a convinced Stoic of the old school. The souls are all parts of the one ~noera\ psuchê/~ of the world which though extended over so many individual souls yet remains a unity (ix, 8; xii, 30). After death the individual soul will survive for a period in the air until it is merged into the universal soul ~eis to\n tô=n ho/lôn spermatiko\n lo/gon~ (iv, 21). This implies the survival of the personal self for an undefined period, but it is {521} not a fixed conviction of M. Ant. As a rule he allows the choice between ~sbe/sis ê\ meta/stasis~, i.e. immediate extinction and merging of the individual soul (Panait.) or its removal into a temporary abode of the souls in the air (~hai eis to\n ae/ra methista/menai psuchai/~, iv, 21; cf. v, 53). Or else the choice is between ~sbe/sis, meta/stasis~ (both in agreement with the Stoic doctrine of the ~he/nôsis~ of the soul) or ~skedasmo/s~ of the soul-elements, in case the atomists are right (vii, 32; viii, 25; vi, 24)--a dilemma which really comes down to ~skedasmo/s~ or ~sbe/sis (= lêphthê=nai eis tou\s ko/smou spermatikou\s lo/gous~); and ~meta/stasis~ falls out. This is probably the meaning also of x, 7: ~ê/toi skedasmo\s stoichei/ôn ê\ tropê/~ (in which ~to\ pneumatiko/n~ disappears ~eis to\ aerô=des~) and ~tropê/~ only of the last ~pneumatiko/n~ that man preserves in himself: for here (at the end of the chapter) the identity of the individual soul with itself is given up in the Herakleitean manner (see above, p. 370). Sometimes the choice is presented between ~anaisthêsi/a~ or ~he/teros bi/os~ after death (iii, 3) or ~ai/sthêsis heteroi/a~ in an ~alloi=on zô=|on~ (viii, 58). This is no allusion to metempsychosis (in which the envelope into which the soul goes is another but its ~ai/sthêsis~ does not become ~heteroi/a~): it means the turning of the soul-pneuma, exhaled in death, to new forms of life united to the previous forms by no identity of soul-personality. In this case we can indeed say ~tou= zê=n ou pau/sê|~: but there can be no idea of the survival of the personal ego. ~hê tô=n ho/lôn phu/sis~ exchanges and redistributes its elements; all things are changing (viii, 6; ix, 28). The Emperor never seriously thinks of the survival of personality; he seeks rather to inquire why things are as they are; but he never doubts that as a matter of fact even the noblest of mankind must also "go out" completely with death (xii, 5). Everything changes and one thing perishes to make way for another (xii, 21); and so each man must say to himself ~met' ou polu\ oudei\s oudamou= e/sê|~ (xii, 21; viii, 5). The wise man will say it with calmness: his soul is ~he/toimos ea\n ê/dê apoluthê=nai de/ê| tou= sô/matos . . .~ xi, 3. Living among men to whom his way of thought is strange (~en tê=| diaphôni/a| tê=s sumbiô/seôs~) he sighs at times ~tha=tton e/lthois, ô= tha/nate . . .~ ix, 3; cf. Bonhöffer, Epikt. u. d. Stoa, 59 ff.]

[70\14: I shall die without resisting God ~eidô\s ho/ti to\ geno/menon kai\ phtharê=nai dei=. ou ga/r eimi aiô\n all' a/nthrôpos, me/ros tô=n pa/ntôn hôs hô/ra hême/ras; enstê=nai/ me dei= hôs tê\n hô/ran kai\ parelthei=n hôs hô/ran~, Epictet. ii, 5, 13. The present must make way for the future ~hi/n' hê peri/odos anu/êtai tou= ko/smou~, ii, 17-18; iv, 1, 106. Death brings with it not complete destruction, ~ouk apô/leian~, but ~tô=n prote/rôn eis he/tera metabola/s~, iii, 24, 91-4. But the personality of the now living individual does indeed perish completely in death.--Cf. Bonhöffer, Epiktet, 65 f.; cf. also the same author's Ethik des Epiktet, p. 26 ff., 52 (1894).]

[71\14: Cornutus ap. Stob., Ecl. i, 383, 24-384, 2 W.]

[72\14: The ~psuchê/~ a ~sô=ma~ (the only ~asô/maton~ is empty space which is merely a passage way for the ~sô/mata~), D.L, x, 67 [p. 21 Us.]. It is a ~sô=ma leptomere/s, par' ho/lon to\ a/throisma~ (i.e. of atoms to a body) ~paresparme/non, prosemphere/staton de\ pneu/mati thermou= tina kra=sin e/chonti~, D.L. x, 63. Cf. Lucr. iii, 126 ff.; more precise is iii, 231-46. It is the ~a/throisma~ which ~tê\n psuchê\n stega/zei~, D.L. x, 64. vas quasi constitit eius, Lucr. iii, 440, 555.]

[73\14: Lucr. iii, 94 ff., 117 ff.]

[74\14: The ~a/logon ho\ en tô=| loipô=| pare/spartai sô/mati, to\ de\ logiko\n en tô=| thô/raki~, Sch. D.L. x, 67 (p. 21 Us.), fr. 312, 313 Us. anima and animus, Lucr. iii, 136 ff. The anima, though it is diminished {522} when the man loses his limbs (in which it inheres), yet allows him to remain alive. The animus, however, vitai claustra coercens, must not be diminished otherwise the anima escapes as well and the man dies: Lucr. iii, 396 ff. The animus with its perceptions is more independent of anima and corpus than they are of it: Lucr. iii, 145 ff.]

[75\14: Lucr. iii, 421-4.]

[76\14: Lucr. iii, 445 ff.]

[77\14: The soul ~diaspei/retai, luome/nou tou= ho/lou athroi/smatos~ and cannot retain any ~ai/sthêsis~ apart from its ~a/throisma~, D L. x, 65-6. The winds disperse it: Lucr. iii, 506 ff. ~kapnou= di/kên ski/dnatai~, Epicur. fr. 337. ceu fumus, Lucr. iii, 446-583.]

[78\14: radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit, Lucr. iii, 877.]

[79\14: Lucr. iii, 854-60; 847-53.]

[80\14: ~oude\ taphê=s phrontiei=n (to\n sopho/n)~ fr. 578. Cf. Lucr. iii, 870 ff. The way in which the body, deserted by its soul, is buried or disposed of is of no consequence: Phld., Mort., p. 41-2 Mekl.]

[81\14: D.L. x, 124-5.]

[82\14: ~ho tha/natos oude\n pro\s hêma=s, to\ ga\r dialuthe\n anaisthêtei=, to\ de\ anaisthêtou=n oude\n pro\s hêma=s~, Ep., Sent. ii; D.L. x, 139 (p. 71 Us.). Frequently repeated: see Usen., p. 391 f.]

[83\14: dolor and morbus, leti fabricator uterque, affect the soul too, Lucr. iii, 459 ff., 470 ff., 484 ff. Nothing that can be broken up into parts can be eternal; 640 ff., 667 ff. The chief argument: quod cum corpore nascitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est, Ep., fr. 336. (They are identical in part with the arguments which Karneades directed against the theory of the eternity and indestructibility of the highest ~zô=|on~, God. Karn. must have got them from Epicurus.)]

[84\14: Cf. Ep., Sent. xi, p. 73 f. Us.]

[85\14: To be able to see ~mêde\n pro\s hêma=s ei=nai to\n tha/naton, apo/lauston poiei= to\ tê=s zô|ê=s thnêto/n, ouk a/peiron protithei=sa chro/non alla\ to\n tê=s athanasi/as aphelome/nê po/thon~, D.L. x, 123; cf. Metrod. (?), ed. Körte, p. 588, col. xvi.]

[86\14: ~gego/namen ha/pax, di\s de\ ouk e/sti gene/sthai ktl.~ hence carpe diem! fr. 204; see also fr. 490-4. Metrod. fr. 53 K.]

[87\14: D.L. x, 81.]

[88\14: Against the fear of torment and punishment in the underworld: fr. 340-1, cf. Lucr. iii, 1011 ff. (torments such as those fabled of Hades exist in this world: iii, 978 ff.). Cf. the letter of the Epicurean Diogenes, Rh. Mus. 47, 428 ~. . . phobou=mai ga\r oude\n~ (sc. ~to\n tha/naton) dia\ tou\s Tituou\s kai\ tou\s Tanta/lous hou\s anagra/phousin en Ha/idou tine/s, oude\ phri/ttô tê\n mu/dêsin (mê/dêsin~ the stone) ~ktl.~]

[89\14: metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo, omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam esse voluptatem liquidam puramque reliquit, Lucr. iii, 37 ff.]

[90\14: D.L. x, 126. ridiculum est currere ad mortem taedio vitae, fr. 496.]

[91\14: artifex vitae, Sen. Ep. 90, 27.]

[92\14: ~--su\ de\ tê=s au/rion ouk ô\n ku/rios anaba/llê| to\n kairo/n; ho de\ pa/ntôn bi/os mellêsmô=| parapo/llutai . . .~ fr. 204.]

[93\14: Negat Epicurus ne diuturnitatem quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis quam si sit illa sempiterna, Cic., Fin. ii, 87; cf. Ep., Sent. xix (p. 75 Us.). ~chro/non ou to\n mê/kiston alla\ to\n hê/diston karpi/zetai (ho sopho/s)~: D.L. x, 126.--quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido, Lucr. iii, 1077. eadem sunt omnia semper, 945.] {523}

[94\14: ~hê dia/noia . . . to\n pantelê= bi/on pareskeu/asen kai\ oude\n e/ti tou= apei/rou chro/nou prosedeê/thê~, Sent. xx (p. 75 Us.).]

[95\14: ~ouk e/sti phusikê\ koinôni/a toi=s logikoi=s pro\s allê/lous~.--sibi quemque consulere, fr. 523. Aloofness from ~tai=s tô=n plêthô=n archai=s~ frr. 554, 552, 9.]

[96\14: ~hoi no/moi cha/rin tô=n sophô=n kei=ntai, ouch ho/pôs mê\ adikô=sin, all' ho/pôs mê\ adikô=ntai~, fr. 530.]

[97\14: ~ouke/ti dei= sô/|zein tou\s He/llênas, oud' epi\ sophi/a| stepha/nôn par' autoi=s tugcha/nein . . .~ Metrod. fr. 41.]

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XIII. PLATO…

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XIII. PLATO

I. PHILOSOPHY

Part I