XVI. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS
The crime of conspiracy is recognized, in various forms, in nearly every legal system. The Anglo-American doctrine of conspiracy, despite technical differences, is analogous in purpose to the Soviet notion of a “criminal gang” and the French association de malfaiteurs. German law, both before and after the Nazi seizure of power, also contained a similar concept. The fundamentals of the doctrine, common to most systems of law, are reflected in Article 6 of the Charter, which declares it a crime to participate in “the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy” to plan or wage aggressive war, to commit War Crimes, or to commit Crimes against Humanity. Count I of the Indictment charges the existence of such a conspiracy on the part of the defendants, acting together with divers other persons.
The essence of conspiracy is the joining together of persons to pursue unlawful ends, by legal or illegal means, or to pursue lawful ends by illegal means. A conspiracy may exist even though the ends or means employed by the conspirators might have been perfectly legal if carried out by one person acting alone. The gravamen of the crime is association and acting in concert for the purpose of formulating and executing a common plan involving criminal ends or means.
Participation in a common plan or conspiracy results in vicarious liability, in the sense that each member of the conspiracy is liable for the acts of every other conspirator, even though he may have actually committed no criminal acts himself. He still may be adjudged criminal for mere participation in a common plan to pursue a common criminal purpose, regardless of disparities in the functions performed by individual conspirators.
Nevertheless, in order to prove the participation of a certain person in a conspiracy, his own acts must be considered. The roles played by the various members of the Nazi conspiracy are necessarily different. The following sections sketch in rough outline the parts played by each of the 22 defendants (excepting Sauckel and Speer who are discussed in Chapter X) and the former defendant and co-conspirator, Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, in the conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace, War Crimes against Humanity, as alleged in Count I of the Indictment. These sections are by no means exhaustive but merely indicate the general lines of a particular defendant’s participation. Further and more detailed discussion of the parts played by the conspirators in particular phases of the conspiracy will be found under the pertinent subject matter in the preceding chapters.
1. HERMANN WILHELM GOERING
For more than two decades Hermann Goering played one of the foremost roles amongst the Nazi conspirators. He, who called himself the most faithful paladin of the Fuehrer, was a key figure within the conspiracy, participating in nearly all phases of the conspiratorial activities. He took part in the Munich Beer Hall putsch of 1923; he promoted Hitler’s rise to power in 1933; he founded the Gestapo in 1933 and the concentration camps in 1934; and he created the German Luftwaffe, making it an instrument for aggressive war and using it to destroy other countries. As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and chairman of the Ministerial Council for Defense, Goering became the Czar of German economy and administration and eventually the executive manager of the entire conspiracy.
The following list, the correctness of which has been certified by Goering and his attorney (2836-PS) is a partial statement of positions and offices held by him from 1922 to 1945:
1. Party member (1922-1945).
2. Supreme Leader of the SA (1923—November 1923).
3. Member of the Reichstag (1928).
4. President of the Reichstag (1932).
5. Prussian Minister of the Interior (1933-34).
6. Prussian Prime Minister (1933-45).
7. Prussian Chief of Secret State Police (1933-36).
8. Prussian Chief of State Council (1933-36).
9. Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan (1936-45).
10. Reichsminister for Air (1933-45).
11. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (1935-45).
12. President of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the Reich (1939-45).
13. Member of the Secret Cabinet Council (1938-45).
14. Reichsmarschall (1939-45).
15. Successor Designate to Hitler (1939-45).
16. Head of Reichswerke Hermann Goering (1938-45).
17. Head of Gestapo in Prussia (1933-34).
Goering was a member of and assisted in the Nazi conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, in the following ways:
A. CRIMES AGAINST PEACE.
(1) Acquisition and Consolidation of Power in Germany.
(a) Before 1933. Soon after joining the Party, Goering in 1923 was placed in command of the entire SA (2168-PS). In November 1923, he took part in the ill-fated attempt at Munich to gain control of the German State by force. In the encounter with the police, Goering was wounded and fled from Germany. (2532-PS)
After his return, Goering became more than a commander of street fighters. He was designated Hitler’s first political assistant.
“The movement was conducted by the Fuehrer from Munich. But one man has to act for him in Berlin, while Gauleiter Goebbels stirs up the masses and makes them ripe for National Socialism, a man on whom he could rely unconditionally to the same extent as if he acted himself. And thus, Hermann Goering became the political deputy of Adolf Hitler.” (3252-PS)
Goering’s official biographer, the Ministerial Dirgent Gritzbach, tells of his dealings with the Bruening government, his attempts to “break down the barrier” around the Reich President, von Hindenburg, and of his “coup” as Reichstag President in September 1932 in procuring a vote of nonconfidence against the Papen government just before the Reichstag could be dissolved (3252-PS). Goering says in his own book, Aufbau einer Nation:
“The moment was unforgettable for me who have gone back and forth as representative so often between the Kaiserhof and the Wilhelmstrasse during the past year, when I hurried out to my car and could report to the questioning masses as the first one: ‘Hitler has become Reich Chancellor.’” (3251-PS)
Goebbels also gave him full measure of credit:
“‘This is surely Goering’s happiest hour’ wrote Dr. Goebbels in his book Von Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, and, quoting from it, said: that ‘Goering prepared diplomatically and politically in a long lasting all hard struggle the basis for Hitler’s rise.” (3252-PS)
In a letter written in 1935, Hitler summarized Goering’s contributions as follows:
“My dear Goering: When in November 1923 the Party tried for the first time to conquer the power of the State, you as Commander of the SA created within an extraordinarily short time that instrument with which I could bear that struggle. Highest necessity had forced us to act, but a wise providence at that time denied that success. After receiving a grave wound you again entered the ranks as soon as circumstances permitted as my most loyal comrade in the battle for power. You contributed essentially to creating the basis for the 30th of January. Therefore, at the end of a year of the National Socialist Revolution, I desire to thank you whole-heartedly, my dear Party Comrade Goering, for the great values which you have for the National Socialist Revolution and consequently, for the German people. In cordial friendship and grateful appreciation.
Yours, Adolf Hitler.” (3259-PS)
Goering himself has boasted:
“Numerous titles and honors have been bestowed on me during the past months, and still no title and no decoration could make me so proud, as the designation, given to me by the German people: ‘The most faithful paladin of our Fuehrer.’ In that, my relationship to the Fuehrer finds expression. I followed him for over a decade with unreserved faith, and I will follow him with the same unconditional faith until my end.” (3251-PS)
(b) Prussia, 1933-36. Immediately after the 30th of January 1933, Goering was awarded the key post of acting Prussian Minister of the Interior, and shortly thereafter, that of Minister President of Prussia. In these capacities, he proceeded promptly to establish a regime of terror in Prussia designed to suppress all opposition to the Nazi program.
His chief tool was the Prussian police, which remained under his jurisdiction until 1936. As early as February 1933, he ordered the entire police forces to render unqualified assistance to the para-military organizations supporting the new government, such as the SA and the SS, and to crush all political opponents with firearms, if necessary, regardless of the consequences. (Directive of 10 February 1933, Ministerialblatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung 1933, p. 148; Directive of 17 February 1933, id, p. 169). Goering has frequently and proudly acknowledged his own personal responsibility for the crimes committed pursuant to orders of this character:
“I declared at that time before thousands of fellow Germans, each bullet which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now is my bullet. If one calls this murder, then I have murdered; I ordered all this, I back it up. I assume the responsibility, and I am not afraid to do so.” (2324-PS; 3252-PS.)
Soon after he became Prussian Minister President, Goering began to develop the Gestapo, or Secret State Police. To quote from his own book:
“The most important thing for me was first, to get the instrument of power of the protective police and political police firmly in my hand. Here I undertook the first sweeping changes of personnel. Of the 32 available colonels of the protective police, I dismissed 22. Hundreds of officers and thousands of sergeants followed them in the course of the next months. New forces were procured, and everywhere, these forces were taken out of the large reserve pool of the SA and the SS.
“For weeks, I personally worked on this transformation, and finally I created alone and from my own conviction and own thought the ‘Secret State Police Office’. That instrument, feared so much by the enemies of the state, which above all has contributed so much, that today a Communist or Marxist danger in Germany or Prussia is hardly worth talking about anymore.” (3251-PS)
In a public address delivered on 11 December 1934, Goering boasted:
“We were firmly determined after assumption of power to hit the Communists so that in Germany they would never recover from our blow. For that we do not require a Reichstag fire. That has been one of the most important points on our program. In the former Weimar Constitution the destruction of Communism was unthinkable. For the execution of these measures we needed the instrument of a through and through reliable, and of the highest degree powerful, police force. I have created this instrument through the reorganization of the field police (Landespolizei) and the formation of a Secret State Police. These organizations will constitute a means for implanting fear in all enemies of the State, which a State needs if it wishes to defend itself for always”. (3440-PS)
On 26 April 1933 Goering signed the first law officially establishing the Secret State Police in Prussia (2104-PS). On 30 November 1933, Goering signed a law naming himself, as Prime Minister, Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police (2105-PS). He continued in this position until sometime in 1936, when Himmler secured control of all police in the Reich.
Men and women taken into custody by the Gestapo were thrown, without judicial or other form of trial, into concentration camps, which had been established in Prussia as early as the spring of 1933. (3252-PS; L-83.)
As explained by Goering in his own book:
“Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly. It cannot be forgotten, that at the moment of our rise to power, according to the official election figures of March 1933, six million people still confess their sympathy for Marxism. * * * Therefore the concentration camps have been created, where we have first confined thousands of Communists and Social Democrat functionaries. * * *” (2344-PS)
On 10 February 1936, Goering, as Prussian Minister President, signed a further basic law on the Prussian Secret State Police. Article 7 of this law provided:
“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to the review of the administrative courts”. (2107-PS)
Thus it was made quite clear by Goering’s own law that those imprisoned in concentration camps without trial of any kind were to have no recourse to any court. On the same day Goering signed a decree for the execution of the foregoing law, which further acknowledged his responsibility for Prussian concentration camps. Its provisions included the following:
“Art. 2 * * * (4) The Secret State Police Bureau administers the state concentration camps.” (2108-PS)
The range of police terrorism under Goering’s leadership was almost limitless. A glance at a few of his police directives in these early days will indicate the extent and thoroughness with which every dissident voice was silenced:
Directive of 22 June 1933 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 731): Ordered all officials to watch the statements of employees of the Prussian civil service and to denounce to Goering those who made critical remarks (“Miesmacher”); failure to do so regarded as proof of hostile attitude.
Directive of 23 June 1933 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 749): Suppressed all activities of the Social Democratic Party, including meetings and press, and ordered confiscation of its property.
Directive of 30 June 1933 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 793): Ordered the Gestapo authorities to report to the Labor Trustees on political attitudes of workers, particularly in cases of criticism of the regime.
Directive of 15 January 1934 (Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 137): Ordered the Gestapo and frontier police to keep track of and to watch emigres, particularly political emigres and Jews, residing in neighboring countries, and ordered them arrested and put into concentration camps if they returned to Germany.
After the elimination of the forces of the opposition, the Nazis felt it necessary to dispose of nonconformists within their own ranks. During the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934, many people were murdered who had nothing to do with the internal SA revolt but were just “not liked very well” (2950-PS). Goering’s role in this bloody affair was related less than two weeks later by Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag:
“Meanwhile Minister President Goering had previously received my instructions that in case of a purge, he was to take analogous measures at once in Berlin and in Prussia. With an iron fist he beat down the attack on the National Socialist State before it could develop.” (3442-PS)
(c) The Reich, 1933-39. Meanwhile, in the central Reich government, Goering occupied a series of the highest and most influential positions. The broad powers which devolved upon him made him, under Hitler, the Chief Executive of the Nazi State.
With the accession to power, Goering retained the somewhat empty title of Reichstag President but was also appointed Minister Without Portfolio and became a cabinet member. When in an early meeting (15 March 1933) the cabinet discussed the pending Enabling Act (which gave the Cabinet plenary powers of legislation) he offered the suggestion that the required two-thirds majority might be obtained simply by refusing admittance to the Social Democratic delegates (2962-PS). He became Reich Air Minister in May 1933 (2089-PS). In his capacity as Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, he sat as a member of and the Fuehrer’s deputy on the Reich Defense Council, which was established by the secret law of 21 May 1933 and continued by the secret law of 4 September 1938 (2261-PS; 2194-PS). This Council was a war planning group whose purpose was “to plan preparations and decrees in case of war which later on were published by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich.” (2986-PS)
In 1936, Goering was made Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and acquired plenary legislative and administrative powers over all German economic life. (1862-PS)
Goering was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council established in 1938 to act as “an advisory board in the direction of foreign policy” (2031-PS).
The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, created in 1939, took over, in effect, all the legislative powers of the Cabinet which had not been reserved to Hitler’s personal control or to Goering as the Delegate for the Four-Year Plan. Goering became the Chairman of this Council. (2018-PS)
Finally, as the invading Nazi armies marched into Poland, Hitler announced the designation of Goering as successor designate, the heir apparent of the “New Order.”
(d) Economic Preparation for War, 1933-1939.
In April 1936, Goering was appointed Coordinator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange and empowered to supervise all State and Party activities in these fields (2827-PS). In this capacity he convened the War Minister, the Minister of Economics, the Reich Finance Minister, the President of the Reichsbank, and the Prussian Finance Minister to discuss inter-agency problems connected with war mobilization. At a meeting of this group on 12 May 1936, when the question of the prohibitive cost of synthetic raw material substitutes arose, Goering said:
“If we have war tomorrow, we must help ourselves by substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all. If that is the case, then we must be ready to create the prerequisites for that in peace.” (1301-PS)
At a subsequent meeting of the same men on 27 May 1936, Goering suggested a program of plant construction for the production of synthetic substitutes but warned against the financial strain involved in excessive overexpansion. He opposed any limitations dictated by orthodox financial policy and stated:
“All measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war.
“Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in
On the Nurnberg Party Day in the fall of 1936, Hitler proclaimed the establishment of the Four-Year Plan, a comprehensive program of national self-sufficiency, and announced the appointment of Goering as “Plenipotentiary” in charge. In October, a decree was promulgated which implemented this announcement and provided for the execution of the plan. (1862-PS)
It is clear from Goering’s own statements in an interrogation on 25 June 1945 that the purpose of the Plan was to place Germany on a war footing economically:
“Goering: ‘My job was to organize the German economy and my energy was put to work to get things started and carried through * * *. My main task was to secure the food supply for Germany for many years ahead and to make Germany self-sufficient. The most important items were iron, petroleum and rubber. * * * The industry only wanted to have very high grade Swedish iron for business reasons. There was danger that during the war Germany would not be able to get iron from Sweden and there would be no iron.’
Interrogator: ‘What war are you talking about? This is 1936 you’re speaking of.’
Goering: ‘Any possibility of war. Perhaps with Russia, or in case there was war with anyone at any time and anywhere.’”
When asked the reasons why the Four-Year Plan lost importance in 1942, Goering explained that his preoccupation with the Air Force did not allow him the necessary concentration on the affairs of the Four-Year Plan, and stated:
“The main task of the Four-Year Plan had been accomplished. This task was to get Germany ready.”
These answers confirm the comment Goering made in 1936, that his chief task as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan was “to put the whole economy on a war footing within four years.” (EC-408) As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, Goering was virtually the economic dictator for Germany with control over all other interested Reich agencies. He was the “boss of the economy,” and all important decisions had to be referred to him.
Two important conferences show clearly how Goering inspired and directed the preparation of the German economy for aggressive war. On 8 July 1938 he addressed a number of leading German aircraft manufacturers, explained the political situation, and laid the groundwork for a vast increase in aircraft production. After stating that war with Czechoslovakia was imminent and boasting that the German air force was already superior in quality and quantity to the English, he continued:
“If Germany wins the war, she will be the greatest power in the world, dominating the world market, and Germany will be a rich nation. For this goal, risks must be taken. The only thing that matters is increased output regarding quantity and quality. Even if the manufacturers know that their present policies may mean their bankruptcy within three years, they will have to do it all the same * * * I want you to be perfectly resolved, today already, how you will run your business when war comes. The earlier the manufacturers make their preparations for mobilization today, the less danger there will be of work being held up. It must be determined for every worker whether he is essential for production upon outbreak of war, and measures must be taken to secure his deferment in case of mobilization. (3441-PS). An executive will be put in charge to work on nothing but the complete preparation of each plant for mobilization day.” (R-140)
A few weeks after the Munich agreement, on 14 October 1938, another conference was held in Goering’s office. He began with the statement that Hitler had instructed him to organize a gigantic armament program which would make insignificant all previous achievements. He indicated that he had been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air force five times as large, to increase the speed of Army and Navy armament, and to concentrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and heavy tanks. He then proposed a specific program designed to accomplish these ends. (1301-PS)
(e) Military Mobilization for War. In his dual role as Reich Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, it was Goering’s function to develop the Luftwaffe to practical war strength. As early as March 1935 Goering frankly announced to the world that he was in the process of building a true military air force:
“After the German government expressed willingness to help, it became necessary to make a clear demarcation within German aviation, namely in this respect: which air force will be able to be made available? This situation brought about the decision as to those of the German aviation who will in future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark this separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders became officers.” (2292-PS)
Two months later, in a speech to 1,000 Air Force officers, Goering spoke in a still bolder vein:
“I repeat: I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour should strike, shall burst upon the foe like a chorus of revenge. The enemy must have a feeling of being lost already before even having fought. * * *”
In the same year, he signed his name to the Conscription Law which provided for compulsory military service and constituted an act of defiance on the part of Nazi Germany in violation of the Versailles Treaty. (1654-PS)
Goering’s statements during this period left no doubt in the minds of Allied diplomats that Germany was engaged in full mobilization of air power for an impending war.
“Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time . . . High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so.” (2385-PS)
(2) The Launching of Aggressive War. Goering was the central figure in the preparation of Germany for military aggression. In German economic development and military growth he held the key positions throughout the prewar period. Although he held no official position in the field of foreign affairs, Goering also figured prominently in all of the major phases of Nazi international aggression between 1937 and 1941. As “No. 2 Nazi” he was a leading participant in every major plan of territorial aggrandizement or offensive military strategy.
Goering was the prompter and director of the diplomatic tragi-comedy leading to the Austrian Anschluss. In the middle of November 1937, Mr. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France, reported the following conversation with Goering:
“I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government at the present time was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject: He said, ‘There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli’.” (L-151)
When the time came, on 11 March 1938, Goering was in complete command. Throughout the afternoon and evening of that day he directed by telephone the activities of Seyss-Inquart, also of Keppler, Ullrich, and the other Nazi operatives in Vienna. (2949-PS); (the pertinent portions of these telephone conversations have already been referred to in Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)
In the late afternoon Goering gave the following order to Seyss-Inquart:
“Now, remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed in and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist.” (2949-PS)
Early the same evening he dictated to Seyss-Inquart the telegram which the latter was to send to Berlin requesting the Nazi Government to send German troops to “prevent bloodshed”. Two days later he was able to call Ribbentrop in London and say:
“Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely over-shadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I merely want to talk about political things. Well, this story we have given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip.” (2949-PS)
Goering played a similarly important role in the attack on Czechoslovakia. In March of 1938, at the time of the Anschluss with Austria, he had given a solemn assurance to the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin that the developments in Austria would in no way have a detrimental influence on the relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and had emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the part of Germany to improve these mutual relations. In this connection, Goering used the expression: “Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort. (I give you my word of honor)” (TC-27). On the other hand, in his address to German airplane manufacturers on 8 July 1938, he made his private views on this subject clear:
“Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Rumanian oil wells, etc. Moreover, since there are democratic countries on the one hand, and authoritarian ones on the other, there is enough inflammable matter in the world anyway. When, how and where this inflammable matter will explode, no one among us can say. It may happen within some months, but it may also take some years. At present, the situation is this that Czechoslovakia has promised the Sudeten Germans to meet them half way. I am convinced that they will satisfy no more than some of their unimportant demands. Such action on their part would probably suit our policy best, since in this case we could put the entire responsibility on England because she has engaged herself so deeply in this business.” (R-140)
On 14 October 1938, shortly after the Munich agreement, Goering gave his views on the Czechoslovakian question at a conference in the Air Ministry:
“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler.” (1301-PS)
Meanwhile, he was deceiving the representatives of the puppet Slovakian government to the same end:
“The Field Marshal considers that the Slovak negotiations toward independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.” (2801-PS)
In the following year, with the rape of Czechoslovakia complete Goering frankly stated what Germany’s purpose had been throughout the whole affair:
“In a rather long statement the field marshal explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons to increase the German War potential by exploitation of the industry there.” (R-133)
Goering was also a moving force in the later crimes against the peace. As the successor designate to Hitler, as Chief of the Air Forces, and as economic czar of Greater Germany, he was a party to all the planning for military operations of the Nazi forces in the East and the West. In the Polish affair, for example, it was Goering who in 1935 gave assurances to the Polish government that “there should be not the slightest fear in Poland that on the German side it (the German-Polish alliance) would not be continued in the future.” Yet, four years later, Goering helped formulate plans for the invasion of Polish territory.
With regard to the attack upon the Soviet Union, plans for the ruthless exploitation of Russian territory were made months in advance of the opening of hostilities. Goering was placed in charge of this army of spoliation, whose mission was that of “seizing raw materials and taking over all important concerns.” (1317-PS; 1157-PS.)
These specific instances cover only a small part of Goering’s activities in the field of aggressive war. There follows a partial list of additional documents which demonstrate Goering’s knowledge of and continued participation in the Nazi war program. They deal either with conferences on the highest war-planning levels which he attended, or with secret orders communicated to him outlining in advance the official plans for the execution of the successive acts of aggression.
Meetings and Conferences Attended:
Conference in Reichskanzlei, 5 November 1937, to outline the necessity for expanding German foreign policy; plans discussed for the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia. (386-PS)
Entry in Jodl diary, 10 March 1938, referring to meeting attended by Goering and others at which the preparation of “Case Otto” and the mobilization of the army and the air force were ordered. (1780-PS)
Top secret conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939, the subject of which was indoctrination on the political situation and foreign aims. (L-79)
Meeting with Hitler, 22 August 1939, attended by commanders of the armed forces at which immediate plans for Polish invasion were discussed. (L-3; 798-PS; 1014-PS)
Hitler’s speech to all military commanders on 23 November 1939, regarding the invasion of the low countries. (789-PS)
Meetings of 8 February 1941 and 27 March 1941, at which Hitler outlined the prospective operations against Yugoslavia and Greece. (1746-PS)
Orders and Other Directives Received:
Directive of Blomberg to the armed forces containing plans for military operations in the event that sanctions were applied against German withdrawal from League of Nations. (C-140)
Top secret directive of Blomberg of 2 May 1935, with plans for operation “Schulung” (the reoccupation of the Rhineland). (C-139)
Top secret letter from Blomberg dated 24 June 1935, enclosing copy of secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and decision of Reich Cabinet of the same date. (2261-PS)
Order of Blomberg of 2 March 1936, giving the operational basis for the Rhineland occupation. (C-159)
Directives from Hitler and Keitel April to August 1939 on preparation and invasion of Poland. (C-120)
Operational file, “Fall Weiss,” the code name for the Polish operation. (C-126)
Directive from GAF, dated 25 August 1938, regarding the acquisition of bases in the low countries. (375-PS)
Directive No. 6 for the conduct of the war, dated 9 October 1939, signed by Hitler, and orders of Keitel, dated 15 November 1939, on the plans for “Fall Gelb”, (operation in the West). (C-62)
Orders of the Supreme Command from 7 November 1939 to 9 May 1940, regarding the opening of the invasion in the West. (C-72)
Order of Hitler No. 8, 20 November 1939, for the execution of “Fall Gelb”. (440-PS)
Operational plans signed by Keitel on 28 November 1939, on action near the French-Belgium borders. (C-10)
Entries in Jodl diaries from 1 February to 26 May 1940 confirming plans for invasion of the West. (1809-PS)
OKW orders, 27 January 1940, signed by Keitel on preparation for “Fall Weseruebung” (Invasion of Norway and Denmark). (C-63)
Fuehrer order of 1 March 1940 for the execution of “Fall Weseruebung.” (C-174)
Most secret order from Hitler’s headquarters, dated 19 February 1941, on plans for the invasion of Greece. (C-59)
Top secret operational order on “Case Barbarossa” (invasion of the Soviet Union), dated 13 March 1941, signed by Keitel. (447-PS)
Time table for “Case Barbarossa,” signed by Keitel. (C-39)
Top secret memorandum of 29 October 1940, signed by Falkenstein, Luftwaffe liaison officer with OKW, discussing need for the seizure of air bases in the event of future war with the United States. (376-PS)
Basic order No. 24, dated 5 March 1941, signed by Keitel, regarding German collaboration with Japan. (C-75)
B. WAR CRIMES.
(1) Forced Labor, Deportation, and Enslavement of Residents of Occupied Territories.
The slave labor program of the Nazi conspirators had two criminal purposes. The first was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine by forcing residents of occupied countries to work in Germany, often directly in the German armament industry, and the second was to destroy or weaken the peoples of the occupied territories. Millions of foreign workers were taken to Germany, for the most part under pressure and generally by physical force. These workers were forced to labor under conditions of undescribable brutality and degredation, and often they were used in factories and industries devoted exclusively to the production of munitions of war. (See Chapter X on The Slave Labor Program.)
Goering was at all times implicated in the slave labor program. Recruitment and allocation of manpower and determination of working conditions were included in his jurisdiction as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, and from its beginning a part of the Four-Year Plan Office was devoted to such work. (1862-PS; 2827-PS.)
The defendant Goering was present at a meeting in Hitler’s study on 23 May 1939 at which Hitler, after declaring his intention to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity, said:
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. * * * The population of non-German areas will perform no military service and will be available as a source of labor.” (L-79)
Soon after the fall of Poland, Goering as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, began the enslavement of large numbers of Poles. On 25 January 1940, the defendant Frank, then Governor General of Poland, reported to Goering as follows:
“For the execution of the task of systematically placing the economic strength of the Generalgouvernement, within the framework of the Four-Year Plan, in the service of the German defense industry, I give the following
DIRECTIVES
“1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to carry on a long-term economic policy in the Generalgouvernement. Rather, it is necessary so to steer the economy of the Generalgouvernement that it will, in the shortest possible time, accomplish results representing the maximum that can be gotten out of the economic strength of the Generalgouvernement for immediate strengthening of our capacity for defense. * * *
“2. (g) Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich—among them at least 7500 000 [sic] agricultural workers of which at least 50% must be women—in order to guarantee agricultural production in the Reich and as a replacement for industrial workers lacking in the Reich. * * *” (1375-PS)
That orders for this enormous number of workers originated with the defendant Goering is clear from the following statement in Frank’s Diary for 10 May 1940:
“Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the Compulsory Labor Service of the Poles. Upon the demands from the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude had developed which, according to individual reports, was spreading very much, and which might produce difficulties everywhere. General Fieldmarshal Goering some time ago pointed out in his long speech the necessity to deport into the Reich a million workers. The supply so far was 160,000. However, great difficulties had to be overcome. Therefore it would be advisable to consult the district and town chiefs in the execution of the compulsion, so that one could be sure from the start that this action would be reasonably successful. The arrest of young Poles when leaving church service or the cinema would bring about an increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he had no objections at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best method for this, however, would be the organization of a raid, and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the street and to question him what he was doing, where he was working, etc.” (2233-A-PS)
Goering was also responsible for the harsh treatment given these workers when they reached Germany. On 8 March 1940, as Plenipotentiary of the Four-Year Plan and as Chairman of the Cabinet Counsel for the Defense of the Reich, he issued a directive to the Supreme Reich authorities, entitled: “Treatment of male and female civilian workers of Polish Nationality in the Reich.” In this directive Goering provided in part:
“The mass employment of male and female civilian workers of Polish nationality in the Reich necessitates a comprehensive ruling on treatment of these workers.
“The following orders are to be executed at once:
* * * * * *
“4. The blameless conduct of the Poles is to be assured by special regulations. The legal and administrative regulations, necessary for this, will be issued by the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police at the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
“6. Attention is drawn to the explanations enclosed as appendix.” (R-148)
Attached to this directive, and also dated 8 March 1940, were a series of regulations issued by Himmler, as Reichfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. These regulations provided for stringent measures and discrimination against Polish workers in the Reich. In a covering Express Letter addressed to all State Police district-offices and State Police offices, also dated 8 March 1940, Himmler made clear what was intended in order to secure “blameless conduct”. He stated:
“The steps to be taken to combat insubordination and noncompliance with the duty to work, must be decided according to the severity of the case and to the spirit of resistance of the offender. It is of most importance that they be taken immediately after the offense is committed so that they have a decisive effect. In accordance with my instructions in the appended decrees, especially severe measures must be taken during the first eight weeks, in order to bring home to the workers of Polish nationality from the outset the consequences of noncompliance with the orders issued. * * *
“In general, in all cases where a warning, by the State Police or a short imprisonment is not sufficient to induce the worker to fulfill his duties, application is to be made for his transfer to a labor training camp, and an opinion given on what treatment he should receive there. The treatment in the labor training camps will have to be in accordance with, the severity of the offense. It is suitable, e.g., to make obstinate shirkers work in the stone-quarries of the Mauthausen camp. By a special decree, to the heads of SS-Deathshead Units and concentration camps, I have ordered that the treatment of these persons under protective custody be undertaken in a concentration camp.
“Extraordinarily serious cases have to be reported to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD who, after examination, make the decision on a special treatment of the workers of Polish nationality in question.” (R-148)
On 29 January 1942 the Division for the Employment of Labor in the Four-Year Plan Office issued a circular, signed by Dr. Mansfeld, the General Delegate for Labor Employment in the Four-Year Plan Office, and addressed to various civilian and military authorities in the occupied territories, explaining the various means to be used to force workers to go to Germany. The circular provides in part:
“Subject: Increased mobilization of man-power for the German Reich from the occupied territories and preparations for mobilization by force.
“On the one hand, the labor shortage which was rendered more acute by the draft for the Wehrmacht, and on the other hand, the increased scope of the armament problem in the German Reich, render it necessary that manpower for service in the Reich be recruited from the occupied territories to a much greater extent than heretofore, in order to relieve the shortage of labor. Therefore, any and all methods must be adopted which make possible the transportation, without exception and delay, for employment in the German Reich, of manpower in the occupied territories which is unemployed or which can be released for use in Germany after most careful screening.
“This mobilization shall first of all, as heretofore, be carried out on a voluntary basis. For this reason, the recruiting effort for employment in the German Reich must be strengthened considerably. But if satisfactory results are to be obtained, the German authorities, who are functioning in the occupied territories, must be able to exert any pressure necessary to support the voluntary recruiting of labor for employment in Germany. Accordingly, to the extent that may be necessary, the regulations in force in the occupied territories in regard to shift in employment and withdrawal of support upon refusal to work, must be tightened. Supplementary regulations concerning shift in employment must above all insure that older personnel who are freed must be exchanged for younger personnel to make up for it, so that the latter may be made available for the Reich. A far-reaching decrease in the amount of relief granted by Public Welfare must also be effected in order to induce laborers to accept employment in the Reich. Unemployment relief must be set so low that the amount in comparison with the average wages in the Reich and the possibilities there for sending remittances home may serve as an inducement to accept employment in the Reich. When refusal to accept work in the Reich is not justified, the compensation must be reduced to an amount barely enough for subsistence, or even be cancelled. In this connection, partial withdrawal of ration cards and assignment to particularly heavy obligatory labor may be considered.
“However, all misgivings must give way before the necessity of supplying the deficit in manpower caused by excessive draft calls into the Armed Forces, in order to avoid detriment to the armament industry. For this purpose the forcible mobilization of workers from the occupied territories cannot be disregarded, in case the voluntary recruiting is unsuccessful. The mere possibility of mobilization by force will, in many cases, make recruiting easier.
“Therefore, I ask you immediately to take any measures in your district which will promote the employment of workers in the German Reich on a voluntary basis. I herewith request you to prepare for publication regulations applying to forced mobilization of laborers from your territory for Germany, so that they may be decreed at once, in case recruiting on a voluntary basis will not have the desired result, that is relief of the manpower shortage in the Reich. I request you to inform me of the measures taken by you.” (1183-PS)
On 21 March 1942, Hitler promulgated a decree appointing Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for Man Power. This decree provided in part:
“In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited [erwerben] abroad and of prisoners of war, should be subject to a uniform control, directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized manpower in the Greater German Reich, including the Protectorate, and in the General Government and in the occupied territories, should be mobilized.
“Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out this task within the framework of the Four-Year Plan, as plenipotentiary general, for the employment of manpower. In that capacity he will be directly responsible to the Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan.” (1666-PS)
On 27 March 1942, Goering, as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, issued a decree in pursuance of the Fuehrer’s decree of 21 March 1942. This decree provided:
“In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I, 179), I decree as follows:
“1. My manpower sections (Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz) are hereby abolished (circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/ St M. Dev. 265). Their duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, regulations for labor conditions (Arbeitsbedingungen)) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me.
“2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) employed in the Reich Territory, having regard to the requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.
“3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of the Four-Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, or existing laws required to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me.
“4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the higher Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and their associated organisms and also the Reich Protector, the General Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil administrations. In the case of ordinances and instructions of fundamental importance a report is to be submitted to me in advance.” (1666-PS)
Since Sauckel was an authority of the Four-Year Plan, it is clear that Goering remains responsible for the war crimes committed by Sauckel as Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower. (See Chapter X on The Slave Labor Program.)
(2) Employment of Prisoners of War in War Industry. The Nazi conspirators ordered prisoners of war to work under dangerous conditions, and in the manufacturing and transportation of arms or munitions, in violation of the Laws of War and of Articles 31 and 32 of the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 on Prisoners of War. (See Chapter X on The Illegal Use of Prisoners of War.)
Goering had a part in these crimes. At a conference on 7 November 1941, the subject of which was the employment of Russians, including Russian prisoners of war, it appears from a memorandum signed by Koerner, State Secretary to the defendant Goering as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, that Goering gave the following directives for use of Russians as laborers:
“I. The stronger labor reserves in the zone of the interior are also decisive for the war.
“The Russian workers have proved their productive capacity during the development of the huge Russian industry. Therefore it must be made available to the Reich from now on. Objections against this order of the Fuehrer are of the secondary nature. The disadvantages which can be created by the Arbeitseinsatz have to be reduced to a minimum: the task especially of counter-intelligence and security police.
“II. The Russian in the zone of operations.
“He is to be employed particularly in building roads and railroads, in clearing work, clearing of mines and in building airports. The German construction battalions have to be dissolved to a great extent (Example: Air Forces!); the German skilled workers belong to the war industry; it is not their task to shovel and to break stones, the Russian is there for that.”
* * * * * *
“IV. _The Russian in the Reich territory including the Protectorate._
“The number of the employed depends on the requirement. By determining the requirement, it is to be considered that workers of other states who produce little and eat much are to be shipped out of the Reich and that in the future the German woman should come less into the foreground in the labor process. Beside the Russian prisoners of war, free Russian workers should also be used.
“A. The Russian Prisoner of War.
“1. The selection has to take place already in the collecting camps, beyond the Reich border. The profession and physical condition are decisive. At the same time screening as to nationality and according to the requirements of the security police and counter-intelligence must take place.
“2. The transportation has to be organized just as the selection and not improvised. The prisoners are to be forwarded rapidly. Their feeding should be orderly and their guarding unconditionally secured.
“3. Officers are to be excluded from the work as much as possible, commissars as a matter of principle.
“4. The Russian belongs in first line to the following work places (in order of priorities):
Mining.
Railroad maintenance (including repair shops and construction of vehicles).
War industry (tanks, artillery pieces, airplane parts).
Agriculture.
Building industry.
Large scale workshops (shoe shops!)
Special units for urgent, occasional and emergency work.
* * * * * *
“B. The Free Russian Worker.
Employment and treatment, will not be handled in practice differently than for Russian prisoners of war. In both categories, particularly good production can be acknowledged by a limited distribution of luxury items. Sufficient, adequate nourishment is also the main thing for the free workers.” (1193-PS)
In a set of top secret notes on what was apparently the same conference, the following appears:
“NOTES
On outlines layed down by the Reichsmarschall in the meeting of 7 November 1941 in the Reich Ministry for Air (RLM)
“SUBJECT: Employment of laborers in war industries.
“The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.
“Directives for employment:
“Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into armament industry (Rue-wirtschaft) “Serbs: Preferably agriculture. “Poles: If feasible no individual employment achievement of Russian armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly linework, a great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled workers.
“Readiness of Russians in the operational area to work is strong. In the Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as free labor. In Krivoy Rog, large numbers of workers are available due to the destruction of the factories. * * *
“Some points as to general Arbeitseinsatz
“Rather employ PW’s than unsuitable foreign workers. Seize Poles, Dutchmen, etc. if necessary as PW’s and employ them as such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong action.” (1206-PS)
In a secret letter from the Reichsminister of Labor to the Presidents of the Regional Labor Exchange Offices, the following appears:
“Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be taken from among the French PW’s not yet employed in the armament industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting therefrom will be filled by Soviet PW’s. The transfer of the above-named French PW’s is to be accomplished by 1 October.” (3005-PS)
(3) Looting and Destruction of Works of Art. The Nazi conspirators planned and organized the cultural impoverishment of every country in Europe: the plunder of works of art by the Government General in occupied Poland and the activities of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg are outstanding examples. (See Chapter XIV on the Plunder of Art Treasures.)
Goering was continuously connected with these activities. In October 1939 he requested a Dr. Kajetan Muehlmann to undertake immediately the “securing” of all Polish art treasures. In an affidavit, Dr. Muehlmann states:
“I was the special deputy of the Governor General of Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the General Government, October 1939 to September 1943.
“Goering, in his function as chairman of the Reich Defense Council, had commissioned me with this duty.
“I confirm, that it was the official policy of the Governor General, Hans Frank, to take into custody all important art treasures, which belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections and the Church. I confirm, that the art treasures, mentioned, were actually confiscated, and it is clear to me, that they would not have remained in Poland in case of a German victory, but that they would have been used to complement German artistic property.” (3042-PS)
Indicative of the continued interest taken by Goering in these operations, it appears from Dr. Muehlmann’s report that at one time 31 valuable sketches by the artist Albrecht Durer were taken from a Polish collection and personally handed to the defendant Goering, who took them to the Fuehrer’s headquarters. (1709-PS)
The part played by Goering in looting of art by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg has been shown in Chapter XIV. On 5 November 1940 Goering issued an order under his own signature directed to the Chief of the Military Administration Paris, and to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, as follows:
“In conveying the measures taken until now, for the securing of Jewish art property by the Chief of the Military Administration Paris and the special service staff Rosenberg (the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 2 f 28.14. W.Z.Nr 3812/40 g), the art objects brought to the Louvre will be disposed of in the following way:
“1. Those art objects about which the Fuehrer has reserved for himself the decision as to their use.
“2. Those art objects which serve to the completion of the Reich Marshal’s collection.
“3. Those art objects and library stocks the use of which seem useful to the establishing of the higher institutes of learning and which come within the jurisdiction of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
“4. Those art objects that are suited to be sent to German museums, of all these art objects a systematic inventory will be made by the special purpose staff Rosenberg; they will then be packed and shipped to Germany with the assistance of the Luftwaffe.” (141-PS)
In view of the high priority afforded by the foregoing order to the completion of Goering’s own collection, it is not surprising to find that he continued to aid the operations of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. Thus, on 1 May 1941, Goering issued an order to all Party, State, and Wehrmacht Services, under his own signature, requesting them—
“* * * to give all possible support and assistance to the Chief of Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s staffs. * * * The above-mentioned persons are requested to report to us on their work, particularly on any difficulties that might arise.” (1117-PS)
By 30 May 1942, Goering was able to boast of the assistance which he had rendered to the work of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. In a letter to Rosenberg, of that date, he stated:
“* * * On the other hand I also support personally the work of your Einsatzstab wherever I can do so, and a great part of the seized cultural goods can be accounted for because I was able to assist the Einsatzstab with my organization.” (1015-I-PS)
(4) Germanization and Spoliation. With respect to Poland the Nazi conspirators’ plans for Germanization and spoliation commenced with the incorporation of the four western provinces of Poland into the German Reich. In the remaining portions occupied by Germany they set up the Government General. The Nazis planned to Germanize the so-called incorporated territories ruthlessly by deporting Polish intelligentsia, Jews, and dissident elements to the Government General, for eventual elimination; by confiscating Polish property, particularly farms; by sending those so deprived of their property to Germany as laborers; and by importing German settlers. It was specifically planned to exploit the people and material resources of the territory within the Government General by taking whatever was needed to strengthen the Nazi war machine, thus impoverishing this region and reducing it to a vassal state. (See Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation.)
Goering, together with Hitler, Lammers, Frick, and Hess, signed the decree purporting to incorporate certain parts of Polish territory into the Reich. (Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Organization and Administration of the Eastern Territories, 8 October 1939, 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 2042.)
Purporting to act by virtue of section 8 of the foregoing decree, Goering, as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, signed an order concerning the introduction of the Four-Year Plan in the Eastern Territories. (Order concerning the Introduction of the Four-Year Plan in the Eastern Territories, 30 October 1939, 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 2125.)
Goering in a directive dated 19 October 1939 stated:
“In the meeting of October 13th, I have given detailed instructions for the economical administration of the occupied territories. I will repeat them here in short: 1. The task for the economic treatment of the various administrative regions is different depending on whether a country is involved which will be incorporated politically into the German Reich or whether we deal with the Government General, which, in all probability, will not be made a part of Germany.
“In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system at the earliest possible time. On the other hand there must be removed from the territories of the Government General all raw materials, scrap materials, machines, etc., which are of use for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked existence of the population must be transferred to Germany, unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time and would make it more practical to exploit those enterprises by giving them German orders to be executed at their present location.” (EC-410)
Goering acted as chairman of a meeting on 12 February 1940 to discuss “questions concerning the East,” attended also by Himmler and Frank. From the minutes of this meeting it appears:
“By way of introduction, the General Field Marshal explained that the strengthening of the war potential of the Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to be taken in the East.” (EC-305).
The hand of Goering may also be found in the remainder of the Nazi plans for Poland. It was he, for example, who signed, with Hitler and Keitel, the secret decree which entrusted Himmler with the task of executing the Germanization program (686-PS). Similarly, it was Goering who, by virtue of his powers as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, issued a decree concerning confiscations in the incorporated eastern territories. This decree applied to “property of citizens of the former Polish State within the territory of the Greater German Reich, including the incorporated Eastern Territories”, and provided in part:
“SECTION 1. (1) The property of citizens of the former Polish State within the territory of the Greater German Reich, including the incorporated Eastern territories, shall be subject to sequestration, trustee administration, and confiscation in accordance with the following provisions.
“(2) Subsection 1 shall not apply to the property of persons who, in accordance with Section 6 of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor relating to the organization and administration of the Eastern Territories of October 8, 1935 (RGBl, I, p. 2042), have acquired German nationality. The agency having jurisdiction in accordance with Section 12 may allow further exemptions.
* * * * * *
“SECTION 2. (2) Sequestration shall be ordered in connection with the property of:
a. Jews.
b. Persons who have fled or are not merely temporarily absent.
“(2) Sequestration may be ordered:
a. If the property is required for the public welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the strengthening of Germanism.
b. If the owners or other title holders immigrated into the territory of the German Reich as it was then delimited, after October 1, 1918.
* * * * * *
SECTION 9. (1) Sequestrated property may be confiscated by the competent agency (Section 12) for the benefit of the German Reich if the public welfare, particularly the defense of the Reich, or the strengthening of Germanism, so requires.” (1665-PS).
The spoliation of Soviet territory and resources and the barbarous treatment inflicted on Soviet citizens were the result of plans long made and carefully drawn up by the Nazis before they launched their aggressive war on the Soviet Union. The Nazis planned to destroy the industrial potential of the northern regions occupied by their armies and to administer the production of food in the south and southeast, which normally produced a surplus of food, in such a way that the population of the northern region would inevitably be reduced to starvation because of diversion of such surplus food to the German Reich. The Nazis also planned to incorporate Galicia and all the Baltic countries into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an area north of the Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district around Baku into German colonies. Their plans were to Germanize or destroy. (See Chapter XIII on Germanization and Spoliation.)
By 29 April 1941, seven weeks prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, it appears that Hitler had entrusted Goering with the over-all direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration. It further appears that Goering had set up an economic staff and subsidiary authorities to carry out this function. (1157-PS)
The form of organization thus created by Goering and the duties of its various sections appear more clearly in a set of directives “for the operation of the economy in the newly occupied territories” issued by Goering, as Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich in July 1941. By the terms of these directives, it is stated “The Orders of the Reich Marshal cover all economic fields, including nutrition and agriculture. They are to be executed by the subordinate economic offices.” An “Economic Staff, East” was charged with the execution of orders transmitted to it from higher authority. One subdivision of this staff, entitled “Group La”, was charged with the following functions: “Nutrition and Agriculture, the economy of all agricultural products, provision of supplies for the Army, in cooperation with the Army groups concerned.” (EC-472; 1743-PS.)
As appears from the foregoing documents, it was a subdivision of the economic organization set by Goering, the Economic Staff, East, Agricultural Group, which rendered a top secret report on 23 May 1941, containing a set of policy directives for the exploitation of Soviet agriculture. These directives contemplated abandonment of all industry in the food deficit regions, with certain exceptions, and the diversion of food from the food surplus regions to German needs, even though millions of people would inevitably die of starvation as a result. (EC-126)
Minutes of a meeting at Hitler’s Headquarters on 16 July 1941, kept by Bormann, disclose Hitler’s announcement that the Nazis never intended to leave the countries then being occupied by their Armies. The Fuehrer further declared that although the rest of the world was to be deceived on this point, nevertheless, “this need not prevent us taking all necessary measures—shooting, desettling, etc.—and we shall take them,” and he discussed making the Crimea and other parts of Russia into German colonies. Goering was present and participated in this conference. (L-221)
As a final illustration, it appears from a memorandum dated 16 September 1941 that Goering presided over a meeting of German military officials concerned with the “better exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food economy” and that in discussing this topic, Goering said:
“It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is needed.
“First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the German non-military population follows and only then comes the population of the occupied territories.
“In the occupied territories on principle only those people are to be supplied with an adequate amount of food who work for us. Even if one wanted to feed all the other inhabitants, one could not do it in the newly occupied eastern areas. It is, therefore, wrong to funnel off food supplies for this purpose, if it is done at the expense of the Army and necessitates increased supplies from home.” (EC-3)
C. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.
(1) Murder, Extermination, Enslavement, Deportation, and other Inhumane Acts Committed against Civilian Populations before and during the War. In 1936, Himmler became Chief of the German Police. Goering was thereafter able to devote his attention chiefly to the tasks of creating the German Air Force and preparing the nation economically for aggressive war. As was inevitable from his position, however, Goering continued to be concerned from time to time with the institutions of his creation, such as the Gestapo and the concentration camps. For example, on 14 February 1944, he sent the following teletype to Himmler:
“I received your request to form another squadron of air force group for special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7) and ordered examination by the air force operational staff [Luftwaffenfuerungstab]. At the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a number of concentration camp [K Z—] convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of this kind concentration camp [K Z—] convicts can be especially well concentrated at work and in the camp. Such installations are necessary in order to secure production of the now fully developed most modern airplanes. The Fuehrer upon his visit in Insterburg has attached great value to these airplanes. Intermediate negotiations have already been held between my and your departments. I would be especially grateful for your support in carrying out this task.” (1584-I-PS)
On 9 March 1944 Himmler replied to the foregoing teletype as follows:
“Most honored Reichsmarshal:
“Following my teletype letter of the 18 February 1944 I herewith transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
“This survey indicates that at the present time about 36,000 prisoners are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total of 90,000 prisoners is contemplated.
“The production is being discussed, established and executed between the Reich Ministry of Aviation and the chief of my Economic-Administrative Main Office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl respectively.
“We assist with all forces at our disposal.”
There follows a report on the use of concentration camp prisoners in the aviation industry. (1584-III-PS)
In Chapter XI on Concentration Camps and Chapter XV, section 5, on the SS, reference is made to medical experiments performed on humans at the concentration camp in Dachau. On 20 May 1942, Field Marshal Milch, Secretary of State and Deputy to Goering as Air Minister, wrote to SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff the following letter:
“Dear Wolffy:
“In reference to your telegram of 12 May our sanitary inspector reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However, the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to perils at high seas, would be important. These have been prepared in immediate agreement with the proper offices; Major (M.C.) Weltz will be charged with the execution and Capt. (M.C.) Rascher will be made available until further orders in addition to his duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A change of these measures does not appear necessary, and an enlargement of the task is not considered pressing at this time.
“The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.
“I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation.
“I remain with best wishes for you and in good comradeship and with
Heil Hitler! Always yours /s/ E. Milch” (343-PS).
That Milch kept informed of the progress of the experiments may be seen from the following letter which he sent to Himmler on 31 August 1942:
“Dear Mr. Himmler:
“I thank you very much for your letter of the 25 Aug. I have read with great interest the reports of Dr. Rascher and Dr. Romberg. I am informed about the current experiments. I shall ask the two gentlemen to give a lecture combined with the showing of motion pictures to my men in the near future.
“Hoping that it will be possible for me to see you at the occasion of my next visit to Headquarters I remain with best regards and
Heil Hitler! /s/ yours E. Milch” (343-PS).
Thus it is clear that the highest circles in the Air Ministry, of which Goering was the head, were interested in these experiments.
(2) Persecution of the Jews. As was to be expected from his position as Number 2 Nazi, Goering took an active part in the waging of the Nazi program of persecution, the ultimate purpose of which was the extermination of all Jews. To quote from Goering’s own book:
“The solution of the Jewish question has not yet been reached. Whatever has happened so far has been done in a state of necessity, in the interest of our own people; it was a reaction against the ruin which this race has brought upon us.” (3461-PS)
In 1935, Goering, as President of the Reichstag, in a speech urging that body to pass the Nurnberg race laws, said:
“God has created the races. He did not want equality and therefore we energetically reject any attempt to falsify the concept of race purity by making it equivalent with racial equality. * * * This equality does not exist. We have never accepted such an idea and therefore we must reject it in our laws likewise and must accept that purity of race which nature and providence have destined for us.” (3458-PS)
Again, on 26 March 1938, Goering said in a speech in Vienna:
“I must direct a serious word to the City of Vienna. Today Vienna cannot rightly claim to be a German City. One cannot speak of a German City in which 300,000 Jews live. This city has an important German mission in the field of culture as well as in economics. For neither of these can we make use of the Jews.” (3460-PS)
In the late fall of 1938, using as an excuse the murder of von Rath, Secretary of the German Legation in Paris, the Nazi conspirators, acting within the frame-work of economic preparation for aggressive war, began the complete elimination of Jews from economic life, preparatory to their physical annihilation. Goering as head of the Four-Year Plan, was in active charge of this phase of the persecutions. The first step in his campaign was a law requiring registration of all Jewish-owned property. In April 1938 Goering and Frick signed such a law (1406-PS). Armed with the information thus secured, the Nazi conspirators were fully prepared to take the next step. The killing of von Rath in Paris on 9 November 1938 was made the pretext for widespread “spontaneous” riots, which included the looting and burning of many Jewish synagogues, homes, and shops, all of which were carefully organized and supervised by the Nazi conspirators. Goering was fully informed of measures taken. (3051-PS; 3058-PS)
Immediately after these riots, on 12 November 1938, Goering acted as Chairman of a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Air, on the “Jewish question,” attended by Funk, Goebbels, Heydrich, and others (1816-PS). Goering made the purpose of the meeting clear at the outset. He said:
“Today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received a letter written on the Fuehrer’s orders by the Stabsleiter of the Fuehrer’s deputy, Bormann, requesting that the ‘Jewish Question be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another. And yesterday, once again did the Fuehrer request by ‘phone for me to take coordinated action in the matter’.
“Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from an economic angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a number of legal measures shall have to be taken which fall into the sphere of the Minister for Justice and into that of the Minister of the Interior; and certain propaganda measures shall have to be taken care of by the office of the Minister for Propaganda. The Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economic Affairs shall take care of problems falling into their respective resorts.” (1816-PS)
Goering then said that it was not sufficient to have demonstrations and to burn down Jewish property. In such cases the real loss usually fell on German insurance companies. He continued:
“I should not want to leave any doubt, gentlemen, as to the aim of today’s meeting. We have not come together merely to talk again but to make decisions, and I implore the competent agencies to take all measures for elimination of the Jews from German economy and to submit them to me, as far as it is necessary.
“The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew from German economy, is first, the Jew being ejected from the economy transfers his property to the State. He will be compensated. The compensation is to be listed in the debit ledger and shall bring a certain percentage of interest. The Jew shall have to live out of this interest. It is a foregone conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it is to be done quickly, cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in Berlin. That way, we would never finish * * *.
“It is my lot, so that the damage will not be greater than the profit, which we are striving for.
“It is obvious, gentlemen, that the Jewish stores are for the people, and not the stores. Therefore, we must begin here, according to the rules previously laid down.
“The Minister for Economic Affairs shall announce which stores he’ll want to close altogether. These stores are excluded from aryanizing at once. Their stocks are to be made available for sale in other stores; what cannot be sold, shall be processed through the “Winterhilfe” or taken care of otherwise. However, the sales values of these articles shall always be considered, since the State is not to suffer but should profit through this transformation. For the Chain and Department stores—I speak now only of that, which can be seen, certain categories have to be established, according to the importance of the various branches.
“The trustee of the State will estimate the value of the property and decide what amount the Jew shall receive. Naturally, this amount is to be set as low as possible. The representative of the State shall then turn the establishment over to the “Arian” proprietor, that is, the property shall be sold according to its real value.
“There begins the difficulties. It is easily understood that strong attempt will be made to get all these stores to Party members and to let them have some kind of compensations. I have witnessed terrible things in the past; little chauffeurs of Gauleiters have profited so much by these transactions that they have now about half a million. You, gentlemen, know it. Is that correct?” (1816-PS)
Specific measures to effect the “Arianization” of Jewish businesses were then discussed. A representative of German insurance companies was called in to assist in solving the difficulties created by the fact that most of the Jewish stores and other property destroyed in the rioting were in fact insured, in some cases ultimately by foreign insurance companies. All present were agreed that it would be unfortunate to pass a law which would have the effect of allowing foreign insurance companies to escape from liability, and that moreover, so far as the insurance companies were concerned, they had made a bargain and should stand by it. The defendant Goering then suggested a solution:
“Goering: No. I don’t even dream of refunding the insurance companies the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs to the State. That’s quite clear. That would indeed be a present for the insurance companies. You make a wonderful Petidum there. You’ll fulfill your obligations, you may count on that.” (1816-PS)
It is impossible here to quote further from the extensive discussion of all phases of persecution of the Jews which took place at this meeting. It is sufficient to point out that on the same day Goering, over his own signature, promulgated three decrees putting into effect the most important matters decided at the meeting. In the first of these decrees, a collective fine of 1,000,000,000 RM was placed on all German Jews (1412-PS). The second decree, entitled “A Decree on Elimination of Jews from German Economic Life”, barred Jews from trades and crafts (2875-PS). The third decree took care of the insurance question raised in the morning’s meeting, by providing that insurance due to Jews for various losses sustained by them was to be collected by the State.
For other examples, the energetic manner in which Goering took part in driving the Jews from economic life at this period, see: 069-PS; 1208-PS.
As the German armies moved into other countries, the anti-Jewish laws were extended, often in a more stringent form, to the occupied territories. Many of the decrees were not signed by Goering himself, but were issued on the basis of decrees signed by Goering and introducing the Four-Year Plan in the occupied territories. For example, reference is made to the:
Order Concerning the Introduction of the Four-Year Plan in the Eastern Territories, 30 October 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 2125.
Nevertheless, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan, or as Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense, Goering himself signed several anti-Jewish decrees for occupied territories, including the following:
1939 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1703, Verordnung ueber die Ammeldung der Vermoegens von Juden in den sudetendeutschen Gebieten, 2 December 1938 (Order concerning the registration of the property of Jews in the Sudeten German territories), which was the preliminary for sequestration of such property,
1939 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 702, Verordnung ueber die Einfuehrung der Luftschutzgesetzes in den sudetendeutschen Gebieten, 31 March 1939 (Order concerning the introduction of the Air Defense Law in the Sudeten German territories), discriminating against Jews,
1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, I, p. 1270, Verordnung ueber die Behandlung von Vermoegen der Angehoerigen des ehemaligen polnischen Staates, 17 September 1940 (Order concerning treatment of property of nationals of the former Polish State), by which the property of Polish Jews was confiscated,
1940 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1547, Kriegsachschaeden Verordnung (War Damages Law), 30 November 1940, also discriminating against Jews, and
1941 Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 759, Decree regarding Administration of Criminal Law against Poles and Jews in the Incorporated Eastern Territories, 4 December 1941, which introduced especially stringent penal laws for Jews.
During the later years of the war, the program of the Nazi conspirators for the complete physical annihilation of all Jews in Europe achieved its full fury. While the execution of this program was for the most part handled by the SS and the Security Police, Goering remains implicated in the final phases of the Nazi “Solution” of the Jewish problem. On 31 July 1941, he wrote the following letter to the conspirator Heydrich:
“Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at—through furtherance of emigration and evacuation, a solution of the Jewish problem, as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.
“Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to cooperate with you.
“I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an overall plan concerning the organizational, factual and material measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired solution of the Jewish question.” (710-PS)
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO HERMANN WILHELM GOERING
│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 6 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 57 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ 069-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 │ │ │January 1939, enclosing order of 28 │ │ │December 1938, concerning decisions on│ │ │Jewish question. (USA 589) │ III │ 116 │ │ │ *141-PS │Goering Order, 5 November 1940, │ │ │concerning seizure of Jewish art │ │ │treasures. (USA 368) │ III │ 188 │ │ │ *343-PS │Letter from Milch, Chief of the │ │ │Personal Staff, to Himmler, 31 August │ │ │1942, and letter from Milch to Wolff, │ │ │20 May 1942. (USA 463) │ III │ 266 │ │ │ *375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │ │report of Intelligence Division, │ │ │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August │ │ │1938. (USA 84) │ III │ 280 │ │ │ *376-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by Major │ │ │Falkenstein, 29 October 1940, │ │ │concerning current military questions,│ │ │including question of occupation of │ │ │Atlantic Islands referring to the │ │ │United States. (USA 161) │ III │ 288 │ │ │ *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in │ │ │the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 │ │ │November 1937, signed by Hitler’s │ │ │adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 │ │ │November 1937. (USA 25) │ III │ 295 │ │ │ *440-PS │Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 │ │ │November 1939, for the conduct of the │ │ │war. (GB 107) │ III │ 397 │ │ │ *447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │ │No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March │ │ │1941, concerning Directives for │ │ │special areas. (USA 135) │ III │ 409 │ │ │ *638-PS │Extract from minutes of Dr. Joel, 6 │ │ │October 1942, concerning Special │ │ │Purpose Group for Commando activities.│ │ │(USA 788) │ III │ 452 │ │ │ 686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │ │Chancellor to strengthen German │ │ │Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by │ │ │Hitler, Goering, Lammers and Keitel. │ │ │(USA 305) │ III │ 496 │ │ │ *710-PS │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 │ │ │July 1941, concerning solution of │ │ │Jewish question. (USA 509) │ III │ 525 │ │ │ *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference,│ │ │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme│ │ │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 │ │ │ *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │ │Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, │ │ │22 August 1939. (USA 29) │ III │ 581 │ │ │ *1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to │ │ │Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August 1939. │ │ │(USA 30) │ III │ 665 │ │ │ *1015-I-PS │Letter from Goering to Rosenberg, 30 │ │ │May 1942. (USA 385) │ III │ 670 │ │ │ *1117-PS │Goering Order, 1 May 1941, concerning │ │ │establishment of Einsatzstab Rosenberg│ │ │in all Occupied Territories. (USA 384)│ III │ 793 │ │ │ *1157-PS │Report on conference, 29 April 1941, │ │ │concerning top secret plan for │ │ │Economic exploitation of Soviet Areas │ │ │(Oldenburg Plan). (USA 141) │ III │ 811 │ │ │ *1183-PS │Letter of Commissioner for Four-Year │ │ │Plan, 29 January 1942, concerning │ │ │increased mobilization of manpower │ │ │from Occupied Territories and │ │ │preparation for mobilization by force.│ │ │(USA 585) │ III │ 830 │ │ │ 1188-PS │Decree of Fuehrer concerning economy │ │ │in newly Occupied Eastern Territories,│ │ │20 May 1941, and attached comment. │ III │ 832 │ │ │ 1193-PS │Letter, 14 November 1941, transmitting│ │ │report of conference of 7 November │ │ │1941 about employment of Soviet │ │ │Russians. (USA 785) │ III │ 834 │ │ │ *1206-PS │Notes of Goering’s remarks at the Air │ │ │Ministry, 7 November 1941, concerning │ │ │employment of laborers in war │ │ │industries. (USA 215) │ III │ 841 │ │ │ *1208-PS │Goering Order, 10 December 1938, │ │ │concerning Jewish question. (USA 590) │ III │ 845 │ │ │ *1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament│ │ │including minutes of conference with │ │ │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 │ │ │October 1938, concerning acceleration │ │ │of rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868 │ │ │ *1317-PS │Top secret notes taken by Hamann of a │ │ │discussion of the economic │ │ │exploitation of Russia, presided over │ │ │by General Thomas, 28 February 1941. │ │ │(USA 140) │ III │ 911 │ │ │ *1375-PS │Letter from Frank to Goering, 25 │ │ │January 1940. (USA 172) │ III │ 925 │ │ │ 1406-PS │Decree for reporting of Jewish-owned │ │ │property, 26 April 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 414. │ III │ 1001 │ │ │ 1412-PS │Decree relating to payment of fine by │ │ │Jews of German nationality, 12 │ │ │November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ │Part I, p. 1579. │ IV │ 6 │ │ │ *1584-I-PS │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14 │ │ │February 1944, concerning formation of│ │ │7th Airforce Group economy in newly │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories, 20 May │ │ │1941, and attached comment. │ III │ 832 │ │ │ 1584-III-PS │Correspondence between Himmler and │ │ │Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning use │ │ │of concentration camp inmates in │ │ │aircraft industry. (USA 457) │ IV │ 118 │ │ │ **1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │ │universal military conscription. 1935 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ IV │ 163 │ │ │ 1665-PS │Order concerning treatment of property│ │ │of Nationals of the former Polish │ │ │State, 17 September 1940. 1940 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1270. │ IV │ 173 │ │ │ *1666-PS │Decree appointing Sauckel General │ │ │Plenipotentiary for Manpower, 21 March│ │ │1942 and decree of Goering conferring │ │ │certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March │ │ │1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │pp. 179-180. (USA 208) │ IV │ 182 │ │ │ *1709-PS │Report of Special Delegate for art │ │ │seizures, July 1943. (USA 378) │ IV │ 211 │ │ │ *1742-PS │Directives to Army Commands from │ │ │Goering, 26 October 1942, concerning │ │ │combatting of partisan activities. │ │ │(USA 789) │ IV │ 262 │ │ │ *1743-PS │Guiding principles for the economic │ │ │operations in the newly occupied │ │ │Eastern territories, June 1941. (USA │ │ │587) │ IV │ 263 │ │ │ *1746-PS │Conference between German and │ │ │Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; │ │ │speech by Hitler to German High │ │ │Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27│ │ │March 1941; plan for invasion of │ │ │Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272 │ │ │ 1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │ │(USA 72) │ IV │ 360 │ │ │ *1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February │ │ │1940 to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377 │ │ │ *1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │ │The Jewish Question, under the │ │ │Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, │ │ │12 November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425 │ │ │ 1862-PS │Ordinance for execution of Four Year │ │ │Plan, 18 October 1936. 1936 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 887. │ IV │ 499 │ │ │ *2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │ │Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │ │30 August 1939. 1939 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │ │(GB 250) │ IV │ 650 │ │ │ *2031-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │ │Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB│ │ │217) │ IV │ 654 │ │ │ 2089-PS │Decree relating to Reich Air Ministry,│ │ │5 May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 241. │ IV │ 719 │ │ │ 2104-PS │Law on organization of Secret State │ │ │Police office, 26 April 1933. 1933 │ │ │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122. │ IV │ 730 │ │ │ 2105-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 30 │ │ │November 1933. 1933 Preussische │ │ │Gesetzsammlung, p. 413. │ IV │ 731 │ │ │ 2107-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 10 │ │ │February 1936. 1936 Preussische │ │ │Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22. │ IV │ 732 │ │ │ 2108-PS │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │ │ │State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936│ │ │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.│ IV │ 732 │ │ │ 2168-PS │Book by SA Sturmfuehrer Dr. Ernst │ │ │Bayer, entitled “The SA”, depicting │ │ │the history, work, aim and │ │ │organization of the SA. (USA 411) │ IV │ 772 │ │ │ *2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │ │Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │ │Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │ │enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │ │Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843 │ │ │ *2233-A-PS │Frank Diary, │ │ │Abteilungsleitersitzungen, 1939-1940. │ │ │Minutes of conferences, December and │ │ │May 1940. (USA 173) │ IV │ 883 │ │ │ *2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │ │Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │ │copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │ │1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │ │Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │ │for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 │ │ │ *2292-PS │Interview of Goering by representative│ │ │of London Daily Mail, concerning the │ │ │German Air Force, from German report │ │ │in The Archive, March 1935, p. 1830. │ │ │(USA 52) │ IV │ 995 │ │ │ *2324-PS │Extracts from Reconstruction of a │ │ │Nation, by Hermann Goering, 1934. (USA│ │ │233) │ IV │ 1033 │ │ │ 2344-PS │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering,│ │ │1934, p. 89. │ IV │ 1065 │ │ │ *2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │ │August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23 │ │ │ 2523-PS │Account of conversations between │ │ │Goering and Bunjes. (USA 783) │ V │ 258 │ │ │ 2532-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, by Gerd │ │ │Ruehle. │ V │ 268 │ │ │ *2801-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │ │Goering and Slovak Minister Durkansky │ │ │(probably late fall or early winter │ │ │1938-39). (USA 109) │ V │ 442 │ │ │ *2827-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, │ │ │concerning Four Years Plan, pp. │ │ │250-253. (USA 577) │ V │ 474 │ │ │ *2836-PS │Affidavit of offices and positions │ │ │held by Goering. (USA 4) │ V │ 503 │ │ │ 2875-PS │Decree on exclusion of Jews from │ │ │German economic life, 12 November │ │ │1938. │ V │ 536 │ │ │ *2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from │ │ │Air Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA │ │ │76) │ V │ 628 │ │ │ *2950-PS │Affidavit of Frick, 19 November 1945. │ │ │(USA 448) │ V │ 654 │ │ │ *2962-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │ │15 March 1933. (USA 578) │ V │ 669 │ │ │ *2986-PS │Affidavit of the defendant, Wilhelm │ │ │Frick, 19 November 1945. (USA 409) │ V │ 688 │ │ │ *3005-PS │Letter from Reich Labor Ministry to │ │ │Presidents of Regional Labor Offices, │ │ │26 August 1941, concerning use of │ │ │Russian PWs. (USA 213) │ V │ 727 │ │ │ *3042-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Kajetan Muehlmann, 19│ │ │November 1945. (USA 375) │ V │ 754 │ │ │ **3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │ │train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │ │execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │ │entries from diary of Admiral Canaris.│ │ │(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered │ │ │in evidence.) │ V │ 766 │ │ │ 3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to│ │ │all stations of State Police, 10 │ │ │November 1938, on measures against │ │ │Jews, and one order from Heydrich on │ │ │termination of protest actions. (USA │ │ │240) │ V │ 797 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *3058-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 │ │ │November 1938, reporting action │ │ │against the Jews. (USA 508) │ V │ 854 │ │ │ 3251-PS │Extracts from Reconstruction of a │ │ │Nation by Hermann Goering. │ V │ 956 │ │ │ *3252-PS │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│ │ │Man and His Work, by Eric Gritzbach, │ │ │1937. (USA 424) │ V │ 957 │ │ │ *3259-PS │Extract from book Hermann Goering, The│ │ │Man and His work, by Eric Gritzbach, │ │ │p. 69. (USA 424) │ V │ 1007 │ │ │ 3440-PS │Speech of Goering entitled The Victory│ │ │over Communism in Germany, published │ │ │in The Archive, November-December │ │ │1934, pp. 1153-4. │ VI │ 150 │ │ │ *3441-PS │Speech by Goering, published in │ │ │Speeches and Papers, 1939, p. 242. │ │ │(USA 437) │ VI │ 150 │ │ │ *3442-PS │Hitler’s address to the Reichstag, 13 │ │ │July 1934, published in The Archive, │ │ │Vols. 4-6, p. 505. (USA 576) │ VI │ 151 │ │ │ *3458-PS │Speech by Hermann Goering on 15 │ │ │September 1935, from The Third Reich. │ │ │(USA 588) │ VI │ 158 │ │ │ *3460-PS │Speech by Goering, from Hermann │ │ │Goering Speeches and Papers. (USA 437)│ VI │ 160 │ │ │ 3461-PS │Excerpt from Hermann Goering: │ │ │Reconstruction of a Nation. │ VI │ 160 │ │ │ *3471-PS │Letter from Keppler to Bodenschatz, 21│ │ │February 1938, with enclosures noting │ │ │activity of Leopold as leader of │ │ │Austrian Nazis and possible │ │ │appointment of Klausner as his │ │ │successor. (USA 583) │ VI │ 195 │ │ │ *3472-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 9 │ │ │February 1938, requesting that Leopold│ │ │be forbidden to negotiate with │ │ │Schuschnigg except with approval of │ │ │Reich authorities. (USA 582) │ VI │ 196 │ │ │ *3473-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6 │ │ │January 1938, giving details of Nazi │ │ │intrigue in Austria. (USA 581) │ VI │ 197 │ │ │ *3474-PS │Manuscript notes by Bodenschatz on │ │ │conference of German Air Forces │ │ │leaders, 2 December 1936. (USA 580) │ VI │ 199 │ │ │ *3568-PS │Letter from SS Main Office, 25 July │ │ │1942, concerning enrollment into SS of│ │ │Reichsminister Albert Speer. (USA 575)│ VI │ 256 │ │ │ *3740-PS │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 6 March │ │ │1946. (USA 779) │ VI │ 635 │ │ │ 3766-PS │Report prepared by the German Army in │ │ │France 1942 concerning removal of │ │ │French art objects through the German │ │ │Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg │ │ │in France. │ VI │ 646 │ │ │ 3775-PS │Letter from Goering to his │ │ │brother-in-law, 21 November 1940, │ │ │concerning bomb destruction in │ │ │England. │ VI │ 652 │ │ │ 3786-PS │Stenographic transcript of a meeting │ │ │in the Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 │ │ │January 1945. (USA 787) │ VI │ 655 │ │ │ *3787-PS │Report of the Second Meeting of the │ │ │Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. │ │ │(USA 782) │ VI │ 718 │ │ │ *C-10 │OKW directive, 28 November 1939, │ │ │signed by Keitel, subject: Employment │ │ │of 7th Flieger Division. (GB 108) │ VI │ 817 │ │ │ *C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │ │Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138)│ VI │ 857 │ │ │ *C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for │ │ │execution of operation “Marita”, 19 │ │ │February 1941. (GB 121) │ VI │ 879 │ │ │ *C-62 │Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war,│ │ │signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939; │ │ │directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 │ │ │on Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106) │ VI │ 880 │ │ │ *C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB │ │ │87) │ VI │ 883 │ │ │ *C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West,│ │ │November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893 │ │ │ *C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, │ │ │signed Keitel, 5 March 1941, │ │ │concerning collaboration with Japan. │ │ │(USA 151) │ VI │ 906 │ │ │ *C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 │ │ │for “Fall Weiss”, operation against │ │ │Poland. (GB 41) │ VI │ 916 │ │ │ *C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall │ │ │Weiss” and directions for secret │ │ │mobilization. (GB 45) │ VI │ 932 │ │ │ *C-139 │Directive for operation “Schulung” │ │ │signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA │ │ │53) │ VI │ 951 │ │ │ C-140 │Directive for preparations in event of│ │ │sanctions, 25 October 1935, signed by │ │ │Blomberg. (USA 51) │ VI │ 952 │ │ │ *C-159 │Order for Rhineland occupation signed │ │ │by Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54) │ VI │ 974 │ │ │ *C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │ │“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003 │ │ │ *D-729 │Notes on conversation between Goering │ │ │and Mussolini on 23 October 1942. (GB │ │ │281) │ VII │ 177 │ │ │ *D-730 │Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 │ │ │December 1945. (GB 279) │ VII │ 177 │ │ │ *D-731 │Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 │ │ │December 1945. (GB 278) │ VII │ 183 │ │ │ *D-769 │Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, │ │ │21 September 1940, relative to │ │ │application of capital punishment in │ │ │connection with Railway strike in │ │ │Holland. (GB 304) │ VII │ 229 │ │ │ *D-775 │Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers, (GB 308) │ VII │ 232 │ │ │ *D-776 │Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15│ │ │June 1944, to German Foreign Office at│ │ │Salzburg, concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309) │ VII │ 233 │ │ │ *D-777 │Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from│ │ │OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of │ │ │Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310) │ VII │ 234 │ │ │ D-779 │Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of │ │ │OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding │ │ │treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312) │ VII │ 235 │ │ │ *D-780 │Draft of communication from Ambassador│ │ │Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 │ │ │June 1944, on treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313) │ VII │ 236 │ │ │ *D-781 │Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding │ │ │treatment of Allied │ │ │“Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314) │ VII │ 239 │ │ │ *D-783 │Note of a telephone communication, 26 │ │ │June 1944, with regard to treatment of│ │ │“Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316) │ VII │ 240 │ │ │ *D-785 │Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of │ │ │“Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning │ │ │“Terror”-flyers. (GB 318) │ VII │ 241 │ │ │ *EC-3 │Letter of Liaison Staff at Supreme │ │ │Headquarters, Armament Procurement │ │ │Office directed to General Thomas, │ │ │Chief of Wi Rue Amt, Berlin, 25 │ │ │November 1941. (USA 318) │ VII │ 242 │ │ │ *EC-126 │Economic Policy Directive for Economic│ │ │Organization, East, Agricultural │ │ │Group, 23 May 1941. (USA 316) │ VII │ 295 │ │ │ *EC-286 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │ │Goering, March-April 1937, concerning │ │ │price control. (USA 833) │ VII │ 380 │ │ │ *EC-305 │Minutes of meeting on 12 February │ │ │1940, under Chairmanship of Goering │ │ │concerning labor supply in the East. │ │ │(USA 303) │ VII │ 402 │ │ │ EC-317 │Order of Goering, 7 September 1943, │ │ │concerning evacuation of harvest crops│ │ │and destruction of means of production│ │ │in agricultural and food economy in │ │ │parts of Occupied Eastern Territories.│ │ │(USA 786) │ VII │ 405 │ │ │ *EC-408 │Memorandum report about the Four Year │ │ │Plan and preparation of the war │ │ │economy, 30 December 1936. (USA 579) │ VII │ 465 │ │ │ *EC-410 │Appendix to Goering’s directive of 19 │ │ │October 1939 concerning the economic │ │ │administration of Occupied │ │ │Territories. (USA 298) │ VII │ 466 │ │ │ *EC-472 │Directives of Reich Marshal Goering │ │ │concerning economic organization of │ │ │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │ │315) │ VII │ 539 │ │ │ **L-3 │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme │ │ │Commander and Commanding Generals, │ │ │Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28)│ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ VII │ 752 │ │ │ *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May │ │ │1939,”Indoctrination on the political │ │ │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 │ │ │ *L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July│ │ │1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859 │ │ │ *L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to │ │ │State Department, 23 November 1937, │ │ │regarding his visit to Warsaw. (USA │ │ │70) │ VII │ 894 │ │ │ *L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 │ │ │July 1941, concerning treatment of │ │ │Eastern populations and territories. │ │ │(USA 317) │ VII │ 1086 │ │ │ R-133 │Notes on conference with Goering in │ │ │Westerland on 25 July 1939, signed │ │ │Mueller, dated Berlin 27 July 1939. │ │ │(USA 124) │ VIII │ 202 │ │ │ *R-140 │Secret letter from Goering’s adjutant,│ │ │Major Conrath, 11 July 1938, enclosing│ │ │transcript of Goering’s speech of 8 │ │ │July to representatives of aircraft │ │ │industry. (USA 160) │ VIII │ 221 │ │ │ R-148 │Letter from Goering to Supreme Reich │ │ │authorities, 8 March 1940, concerning │ │ │treatment of male and female civilian │ │ │workers of Polish nationality; also │ │ │letters, orders, and memoranda │ │ │relating thereto. │ VIII │ 251 │ │ │ *TC-27 │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, │ │ │11 and 12 March 1938, as reported by │ │ │M. Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister │ │ │to London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21)│ VIII │ 377 │ │ │ Statement IX │My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to│ │ │the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, │ │ │fall 1945. │ VIII │ 707 │ │ │ *Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770 │ │ │ *Chart No. 10 │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion│ │ │1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) │ VIII │ 779
2. RUDOLF HESS
A. POSITIONS HELD BY HESS.
(1) Between 1919 and 1941, Hess held the following positions:
(a) Member of the Nazi Party, 1920-1941 (3191-PS).
(b) Deputy to the Fuehrer, 21 April 1933 to 10 May 1941 (3196-PS).
(c) Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1 December 1933—10 May 1941 (3178-PS).
(d) Member of the Reichstag, 5 March 1933—10 May 1941 (3192-PS).
(e) Member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, 30 August 1930—10 May 1941 (2018-PS).
(f) Member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 4 February 1938—10 May 1941 (1377-PS).
(g) Successor Designate to the Fuehrer, after Goering, 1 September 1939—10 May 1941 (3190-PS).
(h) General in the SS (3198-PS).
(i) Private Secretary and A. d. C. to Hitler, 1925-1932 (3192-PS).
(j) Head of the Central Political Committee of the N.S.D.A.P., appointed 15 December 1932 (3132-PS).
(k) Reichsleiter of the N.S.D.A.P. (Member of the Party Directorate) (3198-PS).
(l) Member of the Reichs Defense Council (2261-PS).
B. PROMOTION OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS’ ACCESSION TO POWER.
The Nazi Party was the conspiracy’s main instrument of control. As its directing head, Hess used this instrument vigorously to advance the purposes of the conspiracy. He thus played a decisive part in the preparation and execution of its criminal designs.
Hess began his conspiratorial activities immediately upon the termination of World War I by joining militaristic and nationalistic organizations. He became a member of the Thule Society and of the Free Corps Epp. In June 1920 he joined the Nazi Party, receiving membership card No. 16 (3191-PS; 3347-PS).
By 1923 Hess was an SA leader and head of the Nazi University Organization in Munich. He took part in the Nazi Putsch of 8-9 November 1923. As a result he was tried and convicted on a charge of high treason (3132-PS). He spent 7½ months of his 18 months’ sentence with Hitler at the Landsberg Fortress (3191-PS). There Hitler dictated Mein Kampf to him (3132-PS).
After their release, Hess remained extremely close to Hitler. In 1925, he became officially his private secretary and A. d. C. (3192-PS).
During the Party crisis which resulted from the sudden resignation of Gregor Strasser, head of the Party’s Political Organization, in December 1932, Hitler called on Hess to take charge of the newly formed Central Political Committee of the Party, in order to restore its strength and unity (3132-PS).
Shortly thereafter, Hess took part in the decisive negotiations which brought the Nazi conspirators into power on 30 January 1933 (3132-PS).
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL OVER GERMANY.
Upon the conspirators’ accession to power, Hess was appointed Deputy to the Fuehrer of the NSDAP (3196-PS). His broad powers and responsibilities in that position were officially described as follows:
“All the threads of the Party work are gathered together by the Deputy of the Fuehrer. He gives the final word on all intra-Party plans and all questions vital for the existence of the German people. The Deputy of the Fuehrer gives the directives required for all the Party work, in order to maintain the unity, determination and striking power of the N.S.D.A.P. as the bearer of the National-Socialist philosophy.” (3163-PS; Chart Number 15).
Through Hess the Conspirators established the control of the Party over the State. As a first step he obtained a seat in the Cabinet, which had in effect become the sole legislative organ of the Reich (2001-PS; 2426-PS; 1395-PS). As a Cabinet Minister, Hess signed the laws which further strengthened the political power of the Nazi Party. Among these enactments were the law of 1 August 1944 consolidating the positions of Chief of State and Leader of the Party (2003-PS); and the law of 20 December 1934 against treacherous attacks on Party and State (1393-PS).
Through a long series of decrees Hess obtained control over every aspect of public and private life in Germany, in order to subvert it to the aims of the conspiracy, as represented by the Party.
(1) Hess gained control over all legislation.
A Hitler Decree of 27 July 1934 provided for Hess’s participation in the drafting of all legislation (D-138). In a circular to Cabinet members on 9 October 1939, Hess stated that he would in the future veto every bill which reached him too late to allow him enough time for its thorough study from the Party point of view (D-139). A letter from Chief of the Reich Chancellery Lammers, on 12 April 1938, announced a supplementary decree extending Hess’s participation, especially with regard to the drafting of laws affecting individual States (D-140; see 1942-PS).
(2) Hess gained control over all government appointments, including those of the judiciary and university teachers.
A decree of 24 September 1935 provided for the consultation of Hess in the appointment of Reich and State civil servants (3180-PS). A decree of 10 July 1937 provided for the participation of the Fuehrer’s Deputy in the appointment of Reich and State civil servants (3184-PS). A decree of 14 October 1936, signed by Hess, regulated the status of Reich and State civil servants (3183-PS). A further decree of 3 April 1936 provided for Hess’s participation in the appointment of Labor Service officials (3182-PS).
(3) Hess gained control over Local Government Administration.
This control was effected through the German Municipality Act of 30 January 1935 provided for the participation of Party delegates (2008-PS).
(4) Hess gained control over the administration of annexed territories.
Thus, the Ordinance of 10 June 1939 provided for Hess’s participation in the administration of Austria (Reichsgesetzblatt 1939, Part I, p. 995) while another Ordinance of the same date provided for Hess’s participation in the administration of the Sudetenland (Reichsgesetzblatt 1939, Part I, p. 997).
(5) Hess, in his capacity as Deputy Leader of the Party, gained control over the German Youth.
An order of 10 July 1934 set up a University Commission of the NSDAP under Hess; an Order of 18 July 1934 placed the NS German Student League directly under Hess; and an Order of 14 November 1934 delegated to the Student League exclusive jurisdiction over the political and ideological education of German students (3132-PS). A Hess Decree of 3 June 1936 established the NS Aid Fund for the Struggle in the Universities (3203-PS; see also 3132-PS and 1392-PS).
The success of this entire program of legislation was described by Hitler as follows:
“In this Reich everybody who has a responsible position is a National Socialist * * * Every institution of this Reich is under the orders of the supreme political leadership * * * The Party leads the Reich (_2715-P_S; see 1774-PS and 3163-PS).
In order to enable the conspirators to buttress their power through the armed terror of the SA and SS, Hess, while not actually in control of these Party formations, nevertheless gave them active support. Thus, he was instrumental in establishing the Hitler Grant (a large fund contributed annually by heavy German industry under the chairmanship of Krupp) and in directing part thereof to the support of the SA and SS (D-151).
When several SA men were convicted for mistreatment of inmates of the Hohnstein concentration camp, two members of the jury which had voted the conviction were expelled from the party (784-PS).
Finally, when Himmler, Reich Leader of the SS, organized the SD, Hess issued an order establishing the SD as the sole political information service of the Nazi Party, its functions to be exercised through the SS (3385-PS).
Hess also sought to destroy the influence of the independent churches among the German people, in order to wipe out every opposition to the aims of the conspirators. Thus, Hess’s Chief of Staff, Bormann, issued numerous orders and communications from Hess’s office against the independent churches. Among these were the Secret Order of 27 July 1938 making clergymen ineligible for party offices (113-PS); the Party Directive of 14 July 1939 making the clergy and theology students ineligible for Party membership (840-PS); the letter of 22 February 1940 discussing ways and means of eliminating religious instruction from the schools (098-PS); the report of 25 April on the progressive substitution of National Socialist mottoes in place of morning prayers in the schools (070-PS); the letter to Rosenberg of 17 January 1940 concerning the undesirability of religious literature for members of the Wehrmacht (101-PS); the instructions of 8 March 1940 against the further issuance of newsprint to confessional newspapers (089-PS); and the letter to the Minister of the Interior, in May 1938, agreeing to the invalidation of the Concordat between Austria and the Holy See (675-PS; 838-PS and 107-PS).
D. PREPARATION FOR WAR.
Hess was one of the members of the conspiracy who professed as early as 1933 the aim of complete world domination (2385-PS).
In pursuance of that aim Hess threw the power of the Party which he directed, behind the war preparations of the conspiracy. Hess himself described the Party, in this connection, as the mechanism with which to “organize and direct offensively and defensively the spiritual and political strength of the people” (2426-PS).
Hess’s tasks in the preparations for aggressive wars fell mainly into the fields of military preparedness, political planning, and fifth-column activities.
(1) Rearmament. Even before 1933 Hess took a personal interest in the secret military training program of the uniformed Party organizations (1143-PS).
After the conspirators had come to power, Hess was one of those who echoed the cry of “guns for butter” in his speeches (2426-PS).
Hess signed the law which reintroduced universal military conscription in Germany on 16 March 1935 (1654-PS). Hess admitted that signing this law was no mere formality for him, but rather the realization of one of his most important aims, when he declared in a speech to Army officers in 1937:
“When I spoke about conscription after the 16th of March 1935, in what used to be the most radical industrial plant of Munich * * * to thousands and thousands of the same workers who but a few years before had been singing the Internationale, I was interrupted again and again by such applause and cheers as I would never have believed possible. That was the most beautiful and at the same time the most moving demonstration of my life (3124-PS).
When the Nazi conspirators were ready to launch their aggressive wars in the fall of 1938, Hess and the Party agencies under his control cooperated with the Army High Command in the mobilization of the German Army (388-PS, Item 32).
(2) Political Planning for War. When the Reich Defense Council was reorganized in September 1938, Hess became one of its members with the express assignment of assuring “the political direction of the nation” (2261-PS).
Hess was also made a member of the Ministers’ Council for the Defense of the Reich upon its creation in 1939. Here he continued to exercise an important war-planning function with the specific task of “guaranteeing the unity between Party and State” within that body (2018-PS; 2608-PS).
Hess’s functions in the field of political planning for war were not limited to the domestic sphere. He was also a member of the Secret Cabinet Council formed to advise Hitler on foreign policy planning (1377-PS; 3189-PS).
(3) Fifth Column Activities. Hess’ most important contribution to the conspirators’ preparations for aggressive war lay in his organization of the German fifth-columns abroad through the Foreign Organization (Auslands Organisation (AO)) of the Nazi Party and its various affiliated semi-official organizations. Through these channels Hess succeeded in building up conspiratorial shock-troops in foreign countries, composed of citizens of these countries who were of German “racial stock.” These foreign citizens were incited by Hess to acts of treason against their country in furtherance of the plans of the conspiracy. It was the subversive activities of these fifth-column groups which prepared the way for the conspirators’ destruction of independence of many countries. Principal among these were Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
As his chief instrument in this conspiratorial campaign Hess created the Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party on 3 October 1933. This office was placed directly under Hess, who from then on was known to take the greatest personal interest in its rapid development and expansion (3258-PS; 3401-PS; 3254-PS).
The Foreign Organization extended its activities not only to German citizens living abroad but to all persons allegedly of German ancestry regardless of their foreign citizenship. In the early years after the conspirators’ rise to power and up to 1937 this aim was openly admitted by the responsible heads of the Foreign Organization (3258-PS).
Hess announced that it was the task of the Foreign Organization to organize all persons of the German race who lived abroad and to turn them into active Nazi supporters, thus making them subservient to the purposes of the conspiracy. In his speech at the 1937 Congress of the Foreign Organization, Hess declared:
“You stand before me as a slice of the great German racial community, the racial community which extends beyond the borders of our Reich, for National Socialism has not only at home created a national community transcending all classes and groups in a way previously unknown, but it has also included German racial comrades [Volks-Genossen] in foreign countries. It has made them conscious and proud members of this racial community! * * *
“Under the leadership of the Foreign Organization, Germandom abroad is also becoming more and more filled with the National Socialist spirit. The Foreign Organization, of the NSDAP has brought together the Germans out there, who even long after the seizure of power were disunited and split by class differences, and joined them with Adolf Hitler’s Reich. The National Socialist care for Germandom abroad is maintaining an enormous number of Germans for the nation, who otherwise would be absorbed as cultural fertilizer for other nations” (3258-PS).
The same principle was expressed bluntly by Gauleiter Ernst Bohle, head of the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP directly under Hess from 1933 to 1945, who stated in his address at the Nurnberg Party Congress of 1936:
“The Fuehrer had to come in order to hammer into all of us the fact that the German cannot choose and may not choose whether or not he will be German but that he was sent into this world by God as a German, that God thereby had laid upon him as a German duties of which he cannot divest himself without committing treason to Providence. Therefore we believe and we know that the German everywhere is a German—whether he lives in the Reich or in Japan, in France or in China or anywhere else in the world. Not countries or continents, not climate or environments but blood and race determine the world of ideas of the German.” (3258-PS).
Hess was also in control of all other semi-official organizations associated with the Foreign Organization in fifth-column work among foreign citizens of German ancestry, for the purpose of gaining foreign support for the conspiracy. Thus, by a Secret Circular of 3 February 1939, Hess ordered the consolidation of the undercover activities of all organizations active in the foreign field, subject to the central direction of SS Gruppenfuehrer Werner Lorenz, head of the Volks-deutsche Mittelstelle (Central Agency for Racial Germans) (837-PS).
The two most important of these semi-official agencies were the VDA (League for Germandom Abroad) and the DAI (German Foreign Institute). The VDA was a vast world-wide organization giving financial support to various activities of German groups abroad without regard to their nationality. Its large funds were collected in Germany with the aid of the Nazi Government (3258-PS). The aim of the activities of the VDA was to establish a great German world empire of 100,000,000 inhabitants, containing all persons of German “racial stock” everywhere, including millions of American citizens (3258-PS). The DAI was a world-wide information intelligence and propaganda service (3258-PS).
Hess repeatedly stressed the importance of using Germans abroad for spreading Nazi propaganda (3124-PS).
The DAI also based its activities on the proposition that all persons of German ancestry belonged to the Nazi German Reich, though they held citizenship in foreign countries. This was stated by Nazi Minister-President Mergenthaler of Wuerttemberg in his address at the 1933 annual meeting of the DAI:
“The liberalist ideology which has been overcome dealt with the formal concept of the citizen. We have gotten rid of that. Today the blood-united German racial comrade stands in the center. That is the new foundation upon which we must build * * *. Hence I want to impress on the DAI: Join us therefore in taking care that the spirit of National Socialism also becomes alive among the German racial comrades in foreign countries so that streams of energy may emanate from it.” (3258-PS).
At the annual meeting held by the DAI in 1937, Frick restated in his address the fundamental aim of this organization: to unite every person of German “racial stock” under the control of the Nazi conspirators.
“* * * the new Germany has recognized that its attention and devotion to the welfare of the millions of Germans who have not the fortune to owe political allegiance to Germany, but who are condemned to live abroad, are not merely a matter of natural sympathy and solidarity but are in a higher degree dictated by the strong political and economic interests of the Reich.” (3258-PS).
It is noteworthy that the DAI was closely affiliated with the German-American Bund, a subversive Nazi organization in the United States. The DAI’s official periodical, “Germandom Abroad” (Deutschtum im Ausland), was edited during the war by Walter Kappe, former press chief of the Bund (3258-PS). Walter Kappe and Fritz Gissibl, another former leader in the Bund, established on the premises of the DAI in Stuttgart an organization called “Comradeship U. S. A.” The purpose of this “Comradeship U. S. A.” was to maintain during the war an organization for all Nazi Party members who had been active in the Bund in the United States (3258-PS). Even before the outbreak of the war, in the spring of 1939, Walter Kappe had undertaken to collect a complete archive of Nazi activities in the U. S. on behalf of the DAI and the Nazi Party (3258-PS).
The success of this world-wide fifth column directed by Hess is now a matter of historical record. Hess himself guided the subversive foreign groups which he had created until the day when the conspirators were ready to annex the countries which they had undermined.
Thus, the annexation of Austria was principally due to the efforts of the Nazi Party’s work within that country under the orders of Hess. As early as 1934 Hess had appointed Reinthaler leader of the Nazi peasants in Austria, and thus placed him in a position to take over the leadership of the Nazi Fifth Column in Austria (812-PS). Hess took a major part in the negotiations carried on by Seyss-Inquart and other members of the conspiracy in preparation of the Anschluss (3254-PS; 3425-PS). When on 12 March 1938 Germany invaded Austria, Hess, accompanied by Himmler, was the first member of the conspiracy to arrive in Vienna at noon on the same day (L-292). The next day Hess signed the decree by which the conspirators destroyed the independence of Austria (2307-PS; 3075-PS).
Once the conspirators had achieved their aim, Hess did not hesitate to admit publicly that he had approved of the steps which led to the final subjection of Austria. On 24 July 1938 he addressed a meeting held on the fourth anniversary of the assassination of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss by members of the 89th SS Regiment. He devoted the larger part of his speech to a justification of that assassination (L-273).
When the conspirators turned their attention to their next victim, Czechoslovakia, Hess was again in the forefront directing the German fifth-column in the Sudetenland. In his speech at the annual meeting of the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP on 28 August 1938, Hess declared that Nazi Germany was giving full backing to the demands of the Sudeten German agitators. What such support meant in fact became very clear when Hess pointed to the success of the Nazi policy in Austria (3258-PS). All through the summer of 1938 Hess was engaged in consultations with Karl H. Frank and Konrad Henlein, leaders of the Nazi Sudeten German Party (3061-PS).
A few months later Hess could mark up another success for his fifth-column. When the Munich Agreement forced Czechoslovakia to surrender the Sudeten territory to Germany, Hess went to Reichenberg, the capital of that district, as Hitler’s representative in order to accept the official incorporation of the Sudeten German Party into the Nazi Party on 5 November 1938. In his address on that occasion he emphasized repeatedly that the Nazi conspirators had been ready to go to war for the possession of the Sudetenland (3204-PS).
Hess also put his signature to the Act of 14 April 1939 setting up the government of the Sudetenland as an integral part of the Reich (3076-PS).
Later during the same year, after the conspirators had loosed their first aggressive war, Hess signed the laws incorporating first Danzig and then a large portion of Poland into the Reich (3077-PS; see also Decree 8 October 1939 (RGBl 1939, Part I, p. 2042); Decree of 12 October 1939, Part I, p. 2077).
When in July 1941 the Nazi conspirators occupied Greece, the members of the local Nazi Party were ready to take over as an auxiliary Army service (3258-PS).
Thus, wherever the conspirators sent their invading armies Hess’ fifth-column had prepared the soil.
E. PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.
Hess, as Deputy Leader of the Nazi Party, had the task of realizing its “ideological” program (3200-PS).
One of the demands of this conspiratorial program was the destruction of so-called inferior racial stock. Persons who suffered from hereditary insanity or other hereditary diseases were considered useless to the Nazi community. They were therefore to be killed or at least to be prevented from procreating their kind.
In order to carry out this plan Hess established a special Racial Policy Division on his Staff under Dr. Walter Gross, by his order of 17 November 1933. This Division was to “participate with the competent government agencies in all race and population measures” (3322-PS; 3163-PS). In addition, other agencies of the Nazi Party, under Hess, actively cooperated in the administration of this criminal program (D-181; 842-PS; 1969-PS).
In 1937 Hess publicly claimed credit for having used his Party organization in order to gain the nation’s approval for compulsory sterilization (3124-PS; 3067-PS).
More important still in the Nazi program were the persecution and extermination of religious and racial minorities. Hess vigorously propagated the doctrine of the superiority of the German race with which the conspirators sought to justify these persecutions (3124-PS).
The Nurnberg Laws, which constituted the legal basis of this campaign, were the work of the Party. This was solemnly announced by Hitler in the peroration of the address in which he announced these laws to the Reichstag in Nurnberg 15 September 1935:
“I now propose to the Reichstag the acceptance of those laws which Party member Goering will read to you.
“The first and second laws fulfill the program of the National Socialist Party in one important respect, and thereby pay a debt of gratitude to the Movement under whose symbol Germany has regained her freedom.
“The second law constitutes an attempt to solve by legislation a problem, the final solution of which, if it should again fail, will then have to be referred by law to the National Socialist Party. All three laws are backed by the National Socialist Party and with it and behind it by the German Nation.
“I ask you to accept these laws.” (3419-PS).
Hess, along with Frick, was placed in charge of the administration of the Nurnberg Laws and of the issuance of ordnances and regulations thereunder (1416-PS; 3179-PS; 1417-PS; 2124-PS).
With the launching of their aggressive wars, the Nazi conspirators embarked on the execution of their plan to exterminate the non-German populations which fell into their hands. This plan, especially insofar as it concerned the Jews, had been bluntly revealed by Hitler well in advance in his address to the Reichstag on 30 January 1939:
“If inter-national finance-Jewry inside and outside Europe should succeed in throwing the nations into another World War, the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and thus the victory of Jewry, but the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe!” (3418-PS).
In support of this campaign, which was continued by his co-conspirators after his flight to Scotland, Hess issued an order through his Party Chancery on behalf of the SS, which had been put in charge of the extermination program. In this order, Hess demanded the support of all Party members for the recruiting drive of the SS Army Corps (Waffen SS). Hess added that these SS formations were scheduled for service in the Eastern occupied areas, where their “special training in race matters” could be used to best advantage (3245-PS).
By a series of further legislative and administrative measures, Hess participated in the establishment of a special regime in Poland which deprived the inhabitants of that country of their legal protection, and thus initiated their wholesale extermination (R-139; R-96; R-141).
In pursuance of the same policy Hess signed the decree which forced certain groups of Polish citizens to surrender their original national allegiance and to accept German citizenship (Decree of 24 October 1939, RGBl 1939, Part I, p. 2077).
Hess also signed the decree establishing the German Racial Register, under which Allied nationals of German stock were registered and then compelled to accept German nationality and to remove to German territory (2917-PS).
Hess also used Party channels in order to incite the German people to violations of the rules of war. Thus, he ordered that the population be instructed to seize Allied parachutists or to “liquidate them” (062-PS).
Hess also issued instructions to enforce Hitler’s orders prohibiting the reconstruction of the city of Warsaw or of any of Poland’s destroyed industries (EC-411).
On 10 May 1941, Hess flew to Scotland for the purpose of seeking an end to the war with England, and support for Germany’s demands against Russia. Upon his arrival, he was incarcerated and thus forcibly eliminated from further participation in the crimes of the conspiracy (D-614).
F. CONCLUSION.
Of all the members of the Nazi conspiracy, Hess was closest to Hitler from the first. As Hitler’s secretary and A. d. C., as his Deputy, and finally as his Second Successor Designate, Hess was at all times his direct representative in all Party matters. Thus, the conspiracy’s most powerful instrument of political action rested in his hands.
Hess used this power to penetrate and dominate the German government administration with National Socialist functionaries; to control legislation and education; and to persecute all independent groups, especially the churches and the Jews.
Being responsible for the political direction and control of the German people, through the Party, Hess played a decisive role in preparing the nation for war. He furthered the secret rearmament of the Party’s military formations; he signed the Conscription Law of 1935; he sat on the Reichs Defense Council, the inner Cabinet in which the heads of the conspiracy blue-printed the administrative, economic, and political preparation of their aggressive wars.
Hess, above, all, was responsible for the creation and direction of the Nazi fifth-column, in which foreign citizens of German extraction joined under the Nazi banner to weaken and undermine those countries which the Nazi conspirators had determined to subjugate.
All through the years from 1920 to 1941 Hess remained the most faithful and relentless executor of Hitler’s aims and designs. This complete devotion to the success of the conspiracy was climaxed by his flight to Scotland in an attempt to end the war with England and to receive English support for Germany’s demands against Russia, which he had helped to prepare.
The share of Hess’ participation in the Nazi conspiracy is as great as that of the Party which he directed. The Party’s crimes are his.
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO RUDOLF HESS
│ │ │ Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page │ │ │ │Charter of the International Military │ │ │ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5 │International Military Tribunal, │ │ │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │ │ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 58 │ ———— │ │ │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ │document indicates that the document │ │ │was received in evidence at the │ │ │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ │before a document number indicates │ │ │that the document was referred to │ │ │during the trial but was not formally │ │ │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ │given in parentheses following the │ │ │description of the document. The USA │ │ │series number, given in parentheses │ │ │following the description of the │ │ │document, is the official exhibit │ │ │number assigned by the court. │ │ │ ———— │ │ *062-PS │Top secret Hess directive of 13 March │ │ │1940, concerning behavior in case of │ │ │landings of enemy planes or │ │ │parachutists. (USA 696) │ III │ 107 │ │ │ 070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg,│ │ │25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │ │National Socialist mottos for morning │ │ │prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118 │ │ │ *089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │ │March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │ │issue further newsprint to │ │ │confessional newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147 │ │ │ *098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │ │February 1940, urging creation of │ │ │National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │ │provide moral foundation for NS │ │ │religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152 │ │ │ *101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │ │Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940,│ │ │concerning undesirability of religious│ │ │literature for members of the │ │ │Wehrmacht. (USA 361) │ III │ 160 │ │ │ *107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 │ │ │June 1938, enclosing directions │ │ │prohibiting participation of │ │ │Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious │ │ │celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162 │ │ │ *113-PS │Secret Order issued by Hess’ Office │ │ │signed Bormann, 27 July 1938, making │ │ │clergymen ineligible for Party │ │ │offices. (USA 683) │ III │ 164 │ │ │ *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan│ │ │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), │ │ │kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 │ │ │ 675-PS │Letter from Hess’ office to Minister │ │ │of Interior, signed Bormann, 25 August│ │ │1938, agreeing to invalidation of │ │ │Concordat between Austria and Holy │ │ │See. │ III │ 482 │ │ │ 784-PS │Letters from Minister of Justice to │ │ │Hess and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June │ │ │1935, concerning penal proceedings │ │ │against merchant and SA leader and 22 │ │ │companions because of inflicting │ │ │bodily injury on duty. (USA 732) │ III │ 559 │ │ │ *812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │ │22 August 1939 and report from │ │ │Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │ │Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │ │events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │ │1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586 │ │ │ *837-PS │Secret circular by Hess, 3 February │ │ │1939, concerning National League of │ │ │Germans abroad and the German Eastern │ │ │League. (GB 265) │ III │ 603 │ │ │ *838-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed │ │ │Bormann, 3 June 1939, referring to │ │ │Hitler’s Decree of 6 March 1939 which │ │ │precluded Christian Scientists from │ │ │joining the Party. (USA 684) │ III │ 605 │ │ │ *840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │ │clergy and theology students │ │ │ineligible for Party membership. (USA │ │ │355) │ III │ 606 │ │ │ 842-PS │Correspondence between Party │ │ │officials, 30 December 1940, │ │ │concerning killing of the insane. │ III │ 609 │ │ │ *1143-PS │Letter from Schickendanz to Rosenberg,│ │ │20 October 1932, for personal │ │ │transmission to Hess concerning │ │ │organization of Air Force. (USA 40) │ III │ 806 │ │ │ 1377-PS │Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet │ │ │Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. │ III │ 931 │ │ │ 1392-PS │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December │ │ │1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 993. │ III │ 972 │ │ │ 1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against │ │ │State and Party, and for the │ │ │Protection of Party Uniforms, 20 │ │ │December 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ │Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973 │ │ │ *1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │ │State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │ │(GB 252) │ III │ 978 │ │ │ 1416-PS │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September │ │ │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 1146. │ IV │ 7 │ │ │ *1417-PS │First regulation to the Reichs │ │ │Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935. │ │ │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │1333. (GB 258) │ IV │ 8 │ │ │ **1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │ │universal military conscription. 1935 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │ │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ │evidence.) │ IV │ 163 │ │ │ *1774-PS │Extracts from Organizational Law of │ │ │the Greater German Reich by Ernst │ │ │Rudolf Huber. (GB 246) │ IV │ 349 │ │ │ *1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │ │Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │ │1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499 │ │ │ 1942-PS │Hess’ participation in legislative │ │ │process, published in Legal │ │ │Regulations and Legal Problems of the │ │ │Movement, by Dr. O. Gauweiler, p. 20. │ IV │ 584 │ │ │ 1969-PS │Correspondence of party officials, │ │ │concerning killing of insane. │ IV │ 602 │ │ │ 2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │ │and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638 │ │ │ 2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │ │the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639 │ │ │ 2008-PS │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │ │ │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 49. │ IV │ 643 │ │ │ *2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │ │Ministerial Council for Reich Defense,│ │ │30 August 1939. 1939 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. │ │ │(GB 250) │ IV │ 650 │ │ │ *2124-PS │Decree introducing the Nurnberg Racial│ │ │Laws into Austria, 20 May 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 594. (GB│ │ │259) │ IV │ 755 │ │ │ *2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air │ │ │Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by │ │ │copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May │ │ │1935 and copy of Decision of Reich │ │ │Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council │ │ │for defense of the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 │ │ │ *2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │ │German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │ │133) │ IV │ 997 │ │ │ *2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30│ │ │August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23 │ │ │ *2426-PS │Extracts from Speeches, by Hess. (GB │ │ │253) │ V │ 90 │ │ │ *2608-PS │Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The│ │ │Administration in Wartime”. (USA 714) │ V │ 327 │ │ │ 2715-PS │Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on │ │ │20 February 1938, published in The │ │ │Archive, February 1938, Vol. 47, pp. │ │ │1441-1442. (USA 331) │ V │ 376 │ │ │ *2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │ │Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │ │Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │ │program for Sudeten agitation, 29 │ │ │March 1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422 │ │ │ 2917-PS │Decree concerning German people’s list│ │ │and German nationality in the │ │ │incorporated Eastern Territories of 4 │ │ │March 1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ │Part I, p. 118. │ V │ 587 │ │ │ *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ │picture composed of captured German │ │ │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 │ │ │ *3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │ │Czechoslovak Report entitled “German │ │ │Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” │ │ │(document 998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857 │ │ │ 3067-PS │Law for the prevention of offspring │ │ │with Hereditary diseases, 14 July │ │ │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 529. │ V │ 880 │ │ │ 3075-PS │Law for the building up of │ │ │administration in Ostmark, 14 April │ │ │1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 777. │ V │ 884 │ │ │ 3076-PS │Law for building up of administrations│ │ │in Reich Gau Sudetenland, 14 April │ │ │1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ │p. 780. │ V │ 889 │ │ │ 3077-PS │Law regarding reunion of Free City of │ │ │Danzig with German Reich of 1 │ │ │September 1939. 1939 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1547. │ V │ 891 │ │ │ 3124-PS │Extracts from Rudolf Hess—Speeches. │ │ │(GB 253) │ V │ 902 │ │ │ 3132-PS │Extracts from Dates of the History of │ │ │the NSDAP, 1939. │ V │ 906 │ │ │ 3163-PS │The Deputy of the Fuehrer—Rudolf Hess,│ │ │published in National Socialist │ │ │Yearbook, 1941, pp. 219-22. │ V │ 914 │ │ │ *3178-PS │Law to Secure the Unity of Party and │ │ │State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │ │(GB 248) │ V │ 916 │ │ │ 3179-PS │Law for the Protection of German Blood│ │ │and Honor of 15 September 1935. 1935 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1146. │ V │ 916 │ │ │ 3180-PS │Decree providing for the participation│ │ │of the Fuehrer’s Deputy in appointment│ │ │of officials, 24 September 1935. 1935 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1203. │ V │ 918 │ │ │ 3182-PS │Decree concerning participation of │ │ │Deputy Fuehrer in the appointment of │ │ │Labor Service Leaders and Heads of │ │ │departments of Reich, 3 April 1936. │ │ │1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │373. │ V │ 918 │ │ │ 3183-PS │Reich Regulations for enlistment, │ │ │employment and promotion of Reich and │ │ │Provincial officials, 14 October 1936.│ │ │1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, p. 893. │ V │ 919 │ │ │ 3184-PS │Order of Fuehrer and Reichchancellor │ │ │concerning appointment of Civil │ │ │Servants and termination of employment│ │ │as Civil Servants of 10 July 1937. │ │ │1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ │769. │ V │ 921 │ │ │ 3189-PS │Greater Germany, published in │ │ │Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI,│ │ │Part 1, pp. 4-5. (GB 249) │ V │ 922 │ │ │ 3190-PS │The Development of the Reich, │ │ │published in Documents of German │ │ │Politics, Vol. VII, Part 1, p. 264. │ V │ 923 │ │ │ 3191-PS │Extracts from German Fuehrer │ │ │Dictionary, 1934-1935, p. 25, │ │ │concerning Hess. │ V │ 923 │ │ │ 3192-PS │Extract concerning Hess from The │ │ │German Reichstag, p. 180. │ V │ 924 │ │ │ 3196-PS │Hitler decree of 21 April 1933, │ │ │published in National Socialist Party │ │ │Correspondence, 27 April 1933, p. 1. │ V │ 924 │ │ │ 3197-PS │First decree for execution of Sudeten │ │ │Gau Law of 10 June 1939. 1939 │ │ │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 997. │ V │ 924 │ │ │ 3198-PS │Official Party News, 26 September │ │ │1933, published in National Socialist │ │ │Party Correspondence. │ V │ 927 │ │ │ 3200-PS │Extract concerning Hess as Deputy │ │ │Fuehrer from National Socialist │ │ │Yearbook, 1939, pp. 188-189. │ V │ 927 │ │ │ 3203-PS │Hess decree of 3 June 1936 │ │ │establishing the NS Aid Fund for the │ │ │Struggle in the Universities, reported│ │ │in The Third Reich, 1937, Vol. IV, p. │ │ │360. │ V │ 927 │ │ │ 3204-PS │Ceremonial Initiation of Sudeten │ │ │German Party into NSDAP by Rudolf │ │ │Hess, published in Voelkischer │ │ │Beobachter, 7 November 1938, p. 5. │ V │ 928 │ │ │ *3245-PS │Order of 21 February 1940, concerning │ │ │recruiting for Waffen SS, published in│ │ │Decrees, Regulations, Announcements, │ │ │Vol. III, p. 354. (GB 267) │ V │ 946 │ │ │ 3254-PS │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by │ │ │Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA │ │ │704) │ V │ 961 │ │ │ *3258-PS │Extracts from National Socialism Basic│ │ │Principles, Their Application by the │ │ │Nazi Party’s Foreign Organization, and│ │ │the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi │ │ │Aims, by U. S. Government Printing │ │ │Office, Washington, 1943. (GB 262) │ V │ 997 │ │ │ 3322-PS │Office for Racial Policies of NSDAP, │ │ │from Organization Book of NSDAP, 1940,│ │ │p. 330. │ VI │ 38 │ │ │ 3347-PS │Seniority List of the SS, of NSDAP, as│ │ │of 1 December 1936. │ VI │ 78 │ │ │ *3385-PS │Hess Order of 14 December 1938 │ │ │concerning position of the SD within │ │ │the Party, from Decrees, Regulations, │ │ │Announcements, Vol. IV, Part I, p. │ │ │231. (GB 257) │ VI │ 104 │ │ │ *3401-PS │National Socialism and German │ │ │Nationalism Abroad, from Voelkischer │ │ │Beobachter, 24 May 1934, p. 2. (GB │ │ │263) │ VI │ 120 │ │ │ 3418-PS │Destruction of the Jewish race, from │ │ │The Archive, January 1939, p. 1605. │ VI │ 121 │ │ │ 3419-PS │Extract from The Party Congress of │ │ │Freedom, 1936, pp. 258-259. │ VI │ 122 │ │ │ *3425-PS │Voluntary statement made by │ │ │Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, │ │ │10 December 1945. (USA 701) │ VI │ 124 │ │ │ *3796-PS │Letter of Canaris enclosing a report, │ │ │25 October 1939, concerning the │ │ │activities of Auslands organization. │ │ │(GB 286) │ VI │ 732 │ │ │ 3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │ │Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. │ │ │(USA 790) │ VI │ 752 │ │ │ *D-138 │Decree of 27 July 1934, providing for │ │ │participation of Fuehrer’s deputy in │ │ │the drafting of all legislation. (USA │ │ │403) │ VI │ 1055 │ │ │ *D-139 │Letter from Hess to Goebbels, 9 │ │ │October 1934, concerning participation│ │ │in legislation of the Reich. (USA 404)│ VI │ 1056 │ │ │ *D-140 │Letter from Lammers to Reich │ │ │Ministers, 12 April 1938. (USA 405) │ VI │ 1057 │ │ │ *D-151 │Krupp, Schacht and Hess correspondence│ │ │in 1933 regarding the Hitler Fund. (GB│ │ │256; USA 831) │ VI │ 1060 │ │ │ *D-181 │Circular from Gauleiter of South │ │ │Westphalia, 21 January 1937, │ │ │concerning Hereditary Health Law. (GB │ │ │528) │ VI │ 1073 │ │ │ D-614 │Statement of British Secretary of │ │ │State for Foreign Affairs in │ │ │Parliament on 22 September 1943. │ VII │ 94 │ │ │ *EC-411 │Order by Hess concerning the │ │ │reconstruction of certain industrial │ │ │enterprises in Poland, 20 November │ │ │1939. (USA 299) │ VII │ 469 │ │ │ *L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │ │Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │ │1938, concerning anniversary of │ │ │assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │ │(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094 │ │ │ *L-292 │Telegram of American Consul General in│ │ │Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March│ │ │1938, concerning propaganda dropped │ │ │over Vienna. (USA 78) │ VII │ 1098 │ │ │ M-102 │Extract from National Zeitung, 27 │ │ │April 1942, concerning Hess. (GB 254) │ VIII │ 32 │ │ │ M-103 │Speech by Hess to representatives of │ │ │Foreign Chamber of Commerce, from │ │ │Voelkischer Beobachter, 30 June 1934. │ VIII │ 33 │ │ │ *M-104 │Speech by Hess at inauguration of new │ │ │Adolf Hitler Hall at Hof, from │ │ │Frankfurter Zeitung, 13 October 1936. │ │ │(GB 260) │ VIII │ 33 │ │ │ *M-105 │Speech by Hess at meeting of Reich │ │ │Chamber of Labour at Messerschmitt │ │ │Works, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 2 │ │ │May 1941. (GB 261) │ VIII │ 34 │ │ │ *M-107 │Speech by Hess at 7th Annual Meeting │ │ │of Foreign Organization of NSDAP, from│ │ │Voelkischer Beobachter, 28 August │ │ │1939. (GB 266) │ VIII │ 35 │ │ │ M-108 │Speech by Hess broadcast on Fuehrer’s │ │ │birthday, 20 April 1941. │ VIII │ 37 │ │ │ *M-116 │Report of interview with Hess by Wing │ │ │Commander the Duke of Hamilton, 11 May│ │ │1941. (GB 269) │ VIII │ 37 │ │ │ *M-117 │Record of interview with Hess, 13 May │ │ │1941. (GB 270) │ VIII │ 40 │ │ │ *M-118 │Record of interview with Hess, 14 May │ │ │1941. (GB 271) │ VIII │ 43 │ │ │ *M-119 │Record of conversation with Hess, 15 │ │ │May 1941. (GB 272) │ VIII │ 45 │ │ │ M-120 │“The VDA and the Nazi Party”, │ │ │extracted from German Basic Handbook, │ │ │Part III, Chap. IV. │ VIII │ 46 │ │ │ M-121 │“German Foreign Institute”, extracted │ │ │from German Basic Handbook, Part III, │ │ │Chap. IV. │ VIII │ 47 │ │ │ *M-122 │“The Problem of German Minorities”, │ │ │from German Basic Handbook, Part III, │ │ │Chap. IV. (GB 264) │ VIII │ 48 │ │ │ R-96 │Correspondence of Minister of Justice │ │ │in preparation of the discriminatory │ │ │decree of 4 December 1941 regarding │ │ │criminal justice against Poles and │ │ │Jews in annexed Eastern Territories. │ │ │(GB 268) │ VIII │ 72 │ │ │ R-139 │Correspondence between Hess’ office │ │ │and the Ministry of Justice concerning│ │ │civil law in Eastern Territories. │ VIII │ 209 │ │ │ R-141 │Minutes of conference directed by │ │ │Hess’ assistants, 20 February 1941, │ │ │concerning racial problems in Armed │ │ │Forces. │ VIII │ 236 │ │ │ Affidavit F │Affidavit of Josef Dietrich, 20-21 │ │ │November 1945. │ VIII │ 631 │ │ │ *Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770 │ │ │ *Chart No. 15 │Staff of the Fuehrer’s Deputy. │ │(3201-PS; GB 251) │ End of VIII
3. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
A. POSITIONS HELD BY RIBBENTROP.
According to Ribbentrop’s own certified statement (2829-PS), he became a member of the Nazi Party in 1932, but according to the semi-official statement in “Das Archiv,” he had gone to work for the Party before that time by extending his business connections to political circles. Having joined the service of the Party in 1930 at the time of the final struggle for power in the Reich, “Ribbentrop played an important if not strikingly obvious part in the bringing about of the decisive meetings between the representatives of the President of the Reich and the heads of the NSDAP, who had prepared the entry of Nazis into power on 30-1-1933. Those meetings as well as those between Hitler and von Papen took place in Ribbentrop’s house in Berlin Dahlen.” (D-472).
Ribbentrop was therefore present and active at the inception of the Nazi seizure of power. In that first period he was advisor to the Party on questions of foreign affairs. His title was first, “Collaborator to the Fuehrer on matters of Foreign Policy.” He later became Representative in Matters of Foreign Policy on the Staff of the Deputy.
This was followed by membership in the Nazi Reichstag in November 1933.
On 24 April 1934 after Germany had left the disarmament conference, he was appointed Delegate of the Reich Government in matters of Disarmament. In this capacity he visited London and other foreign capitals. He was then given a more important and imposing title, the German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, and it was in that capacity that he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.
In March 1936, after the Nazi Government had reoccupied the Rhineland zone, which had been demilitarized in accordance with the terms of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, and the matter was brought before the Council of the League of Nations, Ribbentrop addressed the Council in defense of Germany’s action.
On 11 August 1936 he was appointed Ambassador in London, and occupied that position for a period of some eighteen months. His activities while holding that position are not highly relevant to the issues, but during that period, in his capacity which he still had as German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, he signed the original Anticomintern Pact with Japan in November 1936, and also the additional pact by which Italy joined it in 1937.
Finally, on 24 February 1938, Ribbentrop was appointed Foreign Minister in place of von Neurath, and simultaneously was made a member of the Secret Cabinet Council (Geheimer Kabinettsrat) established by decree of Hitler of the same date (1337-PS).
Ribbentrop became an Oberfuehrer in the SS, was subsequently promoted to SS Gruppenfuehrer in 1938, and later became Obergruppenfuehrer. There is no question of any honorary rank. The SS went into his ancestry in detail in order to deal with the law relating to that subject. Ribbentrop was also permitted to adopt “von” as a prefix before his last name (D-636).
These activities of Ribbentrop in the earlier part of his career show in themselves that he assisted willing and deliberately in bringing the Nazis into power, and in the earlier stage of their obtaining control of the German State.
B. RIBBENTROP’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO LAUNCH AND WAGE WARS OF AGGRESSION.
(1) The Austrian Anschluss. Ribbentrop was present at a meeting at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and von Papen met the Austrian Chancellor von Schuschnigg and his foreign minister, Guido Schmidt. The official German account of that interview is contained in 2461-PS. What appears to be the truthful account of that interview is contained in Jodl’s diary, the entries for 11 and 12 February 1938 (1780-PS).
On 11 February Jodl wrote:
“In the evening, and on 12 February, General Keitel with General von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzburg. Schuschnigg, together with R. G. Schmidt, are again being put under the heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.” (1780-PS)
The 13 February entry reads:
“In the afternoon, General Keitel asks Admiral Canaris and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
“14 February:
“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrived. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and initiates the different measures.
“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.” (1780-PS)
The next step was the telephone conversation which took place between Goering and Ribbentrop on 13 March 1938, when Ribbentrop was still in London. Goering was passing on the false statement that there was no ultimatum to Austria. The facts of the ultimatum were explained by the earlier telephone conversations between Goering and Vienna. But Goering then passed the falsehood on to Ribbentrop in London in order that he might placate and reassure political circles in London (2949-PS).
The third step was taken by Ribbentrop after his return from London. Although he had been appointed Foreign Minister in February, he had gone back to London to clear up his business at the embassy. Although he was still in London until after the Anschluss had actually occurred, his name appears as a signatory of the law making Austria a province of the German Reich (2307-PS).
(2) Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia furnishes a typical example of aggression in its various aspects. To summarize the outstanding features briefly: First, there was the necessity of stirring up trouble inside the country against which aggression was planned.
Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, helped in the stirring up of the Sudeten Germans under Henlein, who was in frequent contact with the German Foreign Office (3060-PS; 2789-PS; 3059-PS). These documents demonstrate how the Foreign Office stirred up the Sudeten-German movement so that it would act in accordance with the Government of the Reich.
Later on, Ribbentrop was present on 28 May 1938 at the conference at which Hitler gave instructions to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia (388-PS; 2360-PS). In a speech in January 1939 Hitler proclaimed that aggression was to take place against Czechoslovakia (2360-PS):
“On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner.”
* * * * * *
“On 28 May I gave the order for the preparation of military steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October.” (2360-PS)
The important point is that 28 May was the date when the Fall Gruen for Czechoslovakia was the subject of orders, and that it was thereafter put into effect, to come to fruition at the beginning of October.
That was the second stage: To lay well in advance the plans of aggression.
The third stage was to see that neighboring states were not likely to cause trouble. Hence, on 18 July 1938, Ribbentrop had a conversation with the Italian Ambassador, Attolico, at which the attack on Czechoslovakia was discussed (2800-PS). Further discussions along the same lines followed (2791-PS; 2792-PS). The effect of these documents is, that it was made clear to the Italian Government that the German Government was going to move against Czechoslovakia.
The other interested country was Hungary, for Hungary had certain territorial desires with regard to parts of the Czechoslovakian Republic. Accordingly on 23 and 25 August Ribbentrop was present at the discussions and had discussions himself with the Hungarian politicians Imredi and Kanya (2796-PS; 2797-PS). These documents indicate that Ribbentrop endeavored to get assurances of Hungarian help, and that the Hungarian Government at the time was not too ready to commit itself to action, although it was ready enough with sympathy.
Contacts had been established with the Sudeten Germans, for theirs was the long-term grievance that had to be exploited. But the next stage was to have a short-term grievance and to stir up trouble, preferably at the fountainhead. Therefore, between 16 and 24 September, the German Foreign Office, of which Ribbentrop was the head, was engaged in stirring up trouble in Prague (2858-PS; 2855-PS; 2854-PS; 2853-PS; and 2856-PS). An example of the type of these activities is the communication of 19 September from the Foreign Office to the German Embassy in Prague (2858-PS):
“Please inform Deputy Kundt at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy tomorrow.” (2858-PS)
Another of these documents deals with questions of arrest and the action to be taken against any Czechs in Germany in order to make the position more difficult (2855-PS).
That was the contribution which Ribbentrop made to the pre-Munich crisis, which culminated in the Munich agreement of 29 September 1938 (TC-23).
A significant aspect of Nazi plotting with regard to Czechoslovakia, which shows the sort of action and advice which the Wehrmacht expected from the Foreign Office, is contained in a long document putting forward an almost infinite variety of breaches of International Law, which were likely to arise or might have arisen from the action in regard to Czechoslovakia (C-2). On all these points the opinion of the Foreign Office was sought, with a view to explanation and justification. That, of course, remained a hypothetical question because at that time no war resulted.
The second stage of the acquisition of Czechoslovakia occurred when, having obtained the Sudetenland, the Nazis arranged a crisis in Czechoslovakia which would be an excuse for taking the rest. This action is important as constituting the first time that the German Government disregarded its own commitment that its desires did not go beyond the return of German blood to the Reich. On that point, again, Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March, as events were moving to a climax, he sent a telegram to the German Minister in Prague, his subordinate, telling him to
“make a point of not being available if the Czech Government wants to get in touch with you in the next few days.” (2815-PS).
At the same time Ribbentrop attended a conference in Berlin with Hitler and a delegation of pro-Nazi Slovaks. Tiso, one of the heads of the pro-Nazi Slovaks, was directed to declare an independent Slovak State in order to assist in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia (2802-PS). A previous meeting along the same lines had been held a month before (2790-PS). Thus, Ribbentrop was assisting in the task, again, of fomenting internal trouble.
On 14 March 1939, the following day, Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin. Ribbentrop was at this meeting, at which pressure and threats were used to obtain the aged President’s consent to hand over the Czechoslovak State to Hitler (2798-PS; 3061-PS).
That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The following week Ribbentrop signed a treaty with Slovakia, Article II of which granted the German Government the right to construct military posts and installations, and to keep them garrisoned within Slovakia (1439-PS). Thus, after swallowing Bohemia and Moravia as an independent state, Ribbentrop obtained military control over Slovakia.
(3) Lithuania. An interesting point concerning the Northern Baltic shows how difficult it was for Ribbentrop to keep his hands out of the internal affairs of other countries, even when it did not seem a very important matter. On 3 April 1939 Germany had occupied the Memeland (TC-53-A). It would have appeared, as far as the Baltic States were concerned, that the position was satisfactory to the Nazis but in fact Ribbentrop was acting in close concert with Heydrich, in stirring up trouble in Lithuania with a group of pro-Nazi people called the Woldemaras Supporters (2953-PS; 2952-PS). Heydrich was passing to Ribbentrop a request for financial support for this group:
“Dear Party Comrade v. Ribbentrop,
“Enclosed please find a further report about the ‘Woldemaras Supporters.’ As already mentioned in the previous report, the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ are still asking for help from the Reich. I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial support, brought up again by the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ set forth on page 4, para 2 of the enclosed report and to make a definite decision.
“The request of the ‘Woldemaras Supporters’ for financial support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms should not, however, be made, under any circumstances.” (2953-PS)
At the end of a fuller report on the same matter (2952-PS) there is added in handwriting,
“I support small regular payments, e.g. 2,000 to 3,000 marks quarterly.” (2952-PS).
It is signed “W”, who was the Secretary of State. Such was the extraordinary interference, even with comparatively unimportant countries.
(4) Poland. In the aggression against Poland, there were several periods. The first was what might be called the Munich period, up to the end of September 1938, and at that time no language the Nazis could use was too good for Poland. Examples of German assurances and reassurances to Poland during this period are Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 20 February 1938 (2357-PS), the secret Foreign Office memorandum of 26 August 1938 (TC-76), and the conversation between M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, and Ribbentrop (TC-73, No. 40). A final illustration of this technique is Hitler’s speech at the Sportzpalast on 26 September 1938, in which he said that this was the end of his territorial problems in Europe and expressed an almost violent affection for the Poles (TC-73, No. 42).
The next stage occupied the period between Munich and the rape of Prague. With part of the German plan for Czechoslovakia having been accomplished and parts still remaining to be done, there was a slight change towards Poland but still a friendly atmosphere. In a conversation with M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, on 24 October 1938, Ribbentrop put forward very peaceful suggestions for the settlement of the Danzig issue (TC-73, No. 44). The Polish reply, of 31 October 1938, stated that it was unacceptable that Danzig should return to the Reich, but made suggestions of a bilateral agreement (TC-73, No. 45). Between these dates the German Government had made its preparations to occupy Danzig by surprise (C-137).
But although these preparations were made, still some two months later, on 5 January 1939, Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, a new solution (TC-73, No. 48).
Ribbentrop saw M. Beck on the next day and said that there was to be no violent solution of the Danzig issue, but a further building up of friendly relations (TC-73, No. 49). Not content with that, Ribbentrop went to Warsaw on 25 January to talk of the continued progress and consolidation of friendly relations (2530-PS). That was capped by Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 30 January 1939, in the same tone (TC-73, No. 57). That was the second stage—the mention of Danzig in honeyed words, because the rape of Prague had not yet been attained.
Then, in the meeting at the Reichschancellery on 23 May 1939, Hitler made it quite clear, and so stated, that Danzig had nothing to do with the real Polish question (L-79). “I have to deal with Poland because I want lebensraum in the East”—that is the effect of Hitler’s words at that time: that Danzig was merely an excuse.
The extent to which Ribbentrop had adopted this attitude of mind of Hitler at this time is shown in the introduction to Count Ciano’s Diary (2987-PS):
“In the Summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claim against Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any intentions of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite these denials I remained in doubt; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to sit down at the table, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. ‘Well, Ribbentrop,’ I asked him, while we were walking in the garden, ‘What do you want? The Corridor, or Danzig?’ ‘Not any more’, and he stared at me through those cold Musee Grevin eyes, ‘We want war.’” (2987-PS).
That extraordinary declaration closely corroborates Hitler’s statement at his Chancellery conference on 23 May—that it was no longer a question of Danzig or the Corridor, but a question of war to achieve lebensraum in the East (L-79).
It should be recalled in this connection that “Fall Weiss”, the plan for operations against Poland, is dated 3 and 11 April 1939, thus showing that preparations were already in hand (C-120). Another entry in Count Ciano’s Diary during the summer of 1939 makes this point quite clear:
“I have collected in the conference records verbal transcripts of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. I shall only note some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times about German intentions toward Poland not to feel embarrassment now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do.
“The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded, they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction.
“Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this doesn’t shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this view carries in German opinion.
“The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear conscience. He has not.” (2987-PS)
The next stage in the German plan consisted of sharp pressure over the claim for Danzig, commencing immediately after Czechoslovakia had been formally dealt with on 15 March 1939. The first sharp raising of the claim was on 21 March (TC-73, No. 61).
An interesting sidelight during the last days before the war concerns the return of Herr von Dirksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of St. James, to Berlin on 18 August 1939. When interrogated (after capture) regarding the significance of this event, Ribbentrop expressed a complete absence of recollection of ever having seen the German Ambassador to England after his return. Ribbentrop thought he would have remembered him if he had seen him, and therefore he accepted the probability that he did not see him (D-490). Thus when it was well known that war with Poland would involve England and France, either Ribbentrop was not sufficiently interested in opinion in London to take the trouble to see his ambassador, or else, as he rather suggests, he had appointed so weak and ordinary a career diplomat to London that his opinion was not taken into account, either by himself or by Hitler. In either case, Ribbentrop was completely uninterested in anything which his Ambassador might have to tell him as to opinion in London or the possibility of war. It is putting the matter with great moderation to say that in the last days before 1 September 1939, Ribbentrop did whatever he could to avoid peace with Poland and to avoid anything which might hinder the encouraging of the war which he and the Nazis wanted. He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would involve Great Britain and France. (See also Section 8 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Poland.)
M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador at Berlin, summarized all these events leading up to the war in his report of 10 October 1939 (TC-73, No. 147).
(5) Norway and Denmark. On 31 May 1939, Ribbentrop, on behalf of Germany, signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark which provided that:
“The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no circumstances go to war or employ force of any other kind against one another.” (TC-24)
And on 7 April 1940 the German armed forces invaded Denmark at the same time they invaded Norway.
Ribbentrop was fully involved in the earlier preparations for the aggression against Norway. Along with Rosenberg, Ribbentrop assisted Quisling in his early activities. A letter from Rosenberg to Ribbentrop on 24 February states:
“Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop:
“Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed report to Privy Councillor von Gruendherr who will address you on this subject. We agreed the other day that 2-300,000 RM would be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns out that Privy Councillor Gruendherr states that the second instalment can be made available only after eight days. But as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request you to make it possible that this second instalment is given to him at once. With a longer absence of Reichsamtsleiter P. M. Scheidt also the connection with your representatives would be broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be very unfavorable.
“Therefore I trust that it is in everybody’s interest, if P. M. Scheidt goes back immediately.” (957-PS)
In a report to Hitler on the Quisling activities, Rosenberg outlined Ribbentrop’s part in the preparation of the Norwegian operation:
“* * * Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from the Reich in currency, Quisling had also been promised a shipment of material for immediate use in Norway, such as coal and sugar. Additional help was promised. These shipments were to be conducted under cover of a new trade company, to be established in Germany or through especially selected existing firms, while Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygaardsvold Government, as for instance, the Minister of Supply and Commerce, and had been assured permission for the import of coal. At the same time, the coal transports were to serve possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch Quisling’s political action in Oslo with German help. It was Quisling’s plan to send a number of selected, particularly reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as area and language specialists to German Special Troops, who were to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of his leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and to prevent all military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately following this political action and upon official request of Quisling to the Government of the German Reich, the military occupation of Norway was to take place. All military preparations were to be completed previously. Though this plan contained the great advantage of surprise, it also contained a great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure. For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment, while at the same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians were concerned.
“In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal Goering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in the Office of the Four Year Plan, only of the intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin. Further details were discussed in a conference between Secretary Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz, and Hagelin. Since Wohlthat received no further instructions from the General Field Marshal, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop—after a consultation with Reichsleiter Rosenberg—consented to expedite these shipments through his office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Fuehrer it was also arranged to pay Quisling ten thousand English pounds per month for three months, commencing on the 15 of March, to support his work”. (004-PS)
This sum was paid through Scheidt.
In a letter to Ribbentrop dated 3 April 1940, Keitel wrote:
“Dear Herr von Ribbentrop:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by command of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at your disposal for the political preparation of this operation, is on the contrary, very much shorter. I believe myself therefore to be acting in accordance with your own ideas in transmitting to you herewith, not only these wishes of the Wehrmacht which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons, but also if I include a series of requests which certainly concern the Wehrmacht only indirectly but which are, however, of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task * * *.” (D-629)
Keitel then proceeds to ask that the Foreign Office get in touch with certain commanders. The important point is Keitel’s clear admission to Ribbentrop that the military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been long in preparation. It is interesting to connect this letter with the official Biography of Ribbentrop, in the Archives, which makes a point of mentioning the invasion of Norway and Denmark (D-472):
“With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on the 9 of April 1940, only a few hours before the landing of British troops in these territories, the battle began against the Western Powers.” (D-472)
It is clear that whoever else had knowledge or whoever else was ignorant, Ribbentrop had been thoroughly involved in the Quisling plottings and knew at least a week before the invasion started that the Wehrmacht and Keitel had been long in preparation for this act of aggression. (See also Section 9 of Chapter IX on Aggression against Norway and Denmark.)
(6) The Low Countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The facts as to the aggression against these countries, during the period when Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister, are discussed in Section 10 of Chapter IX. Special attention should be called, however, to the statement made by Ribbentrop 10 May 1940 to representatives of the foreign press with regard to the reasons for the German invasion of the Low Countries. These reasons demonstrated to be false in Section 10 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against The Low Countries.
(7) Greece and Yugoslavia. At a meeting in Salzburg in August 1939, at which von Ribbentrop participated, Hitler announced that the Axis had decided to liquidate certain neutrals (1871-PS):
“* * * Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done, if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul he [the Fuehrer] suggested, particularly in consideration of Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the western democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria, which is in a sense a natural ally of Italy and Germany. * * * At the moment when there would be a turn to the worse for Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis.” (1871-PS)
That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals.
Then, as early as September 1940 Ribbentrop reviewed the war situation with Mussolini. Ribbentrop emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece and Yugoslavia, and that Italy could count on German support. Ribbentrop went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack on Gibraltar and Germany’s participation therein. He added that he was expecting to sign the Protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country into the war, on his return to Berlin (1842-PS). Ribbentrop then gave Mussolini a free hand with Greece and Yugoslavia:
“With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be certain of Germany’s sympathetic assistance.
“But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway, etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.” (1842-PS)
Several months later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in which Ribbentrop participated, the Greek operation was discussed. Hitler stated that the German troops in Rumania were for use in the planned campaign against Greece (C-134). Count Ciano, who attended that meeting as Italian Foreign Minister, recalls his impression of that meeting in his diary entry for 20/21 January:
“The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its ending before 1942.” (2987-PS)
Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, three weeks later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese to enter the war, Ribbentrop took a more optimistic line. On 13 February 1941 he saw Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador. In the course of their conversation Ribbentrop gave an optimistic account of the military situation and the position of Bulgaria and Turkey (1834-PS).
In the course of his efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis, Ribbentrop addressed a note, (2450-PS) on 25 March 1941, to Prime Minister Cvetkovitch, which contained this assurance:
“The Axis-Power Governments during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through the Yugoslav state or territory.” (2450-PS)
Shortly thereafter, there occurred the coup d’etat in Yugoslavia, when General Simovitch took over the Government. Two days after Ribbentrop’s assurance (2450-PS), at a meeting on 27 March 1941 at which Ribbentrop was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of Belgrade by the German Air Force (1746-PS).
After the invasion of Yugoslavia Ribbentrop was one of the persons directed by Hitler with the drawing of the boundaries for the partition and division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that action provided:
“* * * If the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office [Ribbentrop], the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan [Goering], and the Reich Minister of the Interior [Frick].” (1195-PS)
(8) The U.S.S.R. On 23 August 1939 Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet non-aggression Pact (TC-25). The first point at which Ribbentrop seems to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet Union was just after 20 April 1941, when Rosenberg and Ribbentrop met or communicated to consider problems expected to arise in the Eastern occupied territory. Ribbentrop appointed his Counsellor, Grosskopf, to be his liaison man with Rosenberg and also assigned a Consul General, Braeutigam, who had many years experience in the USSR, as a collaborator with Rosenberg (1039-PS).
The following month, on 18 May 1941, the German Foreign Office prepared a declaration setting forth operational zones in the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic and Black Seas to be used by the German Navy and Air Force in the coming invasion of the Soviet Union:
“The Foreign Office has prepared for use in Barbarossa the attached draft of a declaration of operational zones. The Foreign Office has, however, reserved its decision as to the date when the declaration will be issued, as well as discussion of particulars.” (C-77)
Thus, it is clear that Ribbentrop was again fully involved in the preparation for this act of aggression. Finally, on 22 June 1941, Ribbentrop announced to the world that the German armies were invading the USSR (3054-PS).
How untrue were the reasons given by Ribbentrop is shown by the report of his own Ambassador in Moscow on 7 June 1941, who said that everything was being done by the Russians to avoid a conflict.
(9) Instigation of Japanese Aggression. On 25 November 1936, as a result of negotiations of Ribbentrop as Ambassador at Large, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (2508-PS). The recital states the purpose of the agreement as follows:
“The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist Internationale known as the Comintern is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist Internationale in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating in the defense against Communist subversive activities; having agreed as follows * * *.” (2508-PS)
There then follow the effective terms of the agreement under which Germany and Japan are to act together for five years. It is signed on behalf of Germany by Ribbentrop (2508-PS).
On 27 September 1940 Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about a full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a new order in Europe and East Asia (2643-PS).
On 13 February 1941—some four months later—Ribbentrop was urging the Japanese to attack British possessions in the Far East (1834-PS).
Then, in April 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka, representing Japan, at which Ribbentrop was present, Hitler promised that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese aggression in the Pacific (1881-PS).
The development of Ribbentrop’s views is indicated by the minutes of another conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister (1882-PS):
“* * * Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.
“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty * * *.” (1882-PS)
That was on 5 April 1941.
Within a month after the German armies invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging Ott, his ambassador in Tokyo, to do his utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia (2896-PS; 2897-PS).
A message, intercepted, which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on 29 November 1941, a week before the attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor, reports the coaxings of Ribbentrop:
“Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.
“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.
“‘As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded successfully because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.
“‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan and herself.’” (D-656).
Then the Japanese Ambassador replied:
“‘I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?’
“Ribbentrop: ‘Roosevelt’s a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do.’” (D-656).
The Japanese Ambassador thereupon concludes:
“Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler’s recent speech, as well as that of Ribbentrop’s, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.” (D-656).