Chapter V
Progress of the changes in the Navigation Laws—Reciprocity Treaties—Austria, July 1838—Zollverein States, August 1841—Russia, 1843—Various anomalies, &c., then in existence—Curious effects of Registry Laws, as regarded individuals or corporate bodies—Ship Equador—Decision of the Queen’s Bench, December 1846—Further details: owner to reside in the United Kingdom—Naturalisation of goods brought to Europe—Waste of capital caused thereby; and obstructions to trade—Story of the cochineal—But the Navigation Laws not always to blame—Special views of the Canadians—Montreal, its shipping and trade—Navigation of the St. Lawrence—Free-trade with the United States desired by the farmers of Canada—Negotiations proposed—Canadians urge the abolition of Protection—Views of Western Canada—Canadians, really, only for partial Free-trade—Improvements of their internal navigation—Welland Canal—Cost of freight the real question—Loss to Canada by New York line—General summary of results as to Canada—West Indians for Free-trade as well as Canadians—Divergent views of capitalists at home—Liverpool and Manchester opposed.
[Sidenote: Progress of the changes in the Navigation Laws.]
[Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaties.]
[Sidenote: Austria, July 1838.]
The first instance of privileges being granted to ships of certain countries to import goods from ports in other countries was in the case of Austrian ships. The 4th clause of the treaty of 1838 between Austria and England provided, that all Austrian vessels from ports of the Danube, as far as Galatz inclusive, should, with their cargoes, be admitted into the ports of the United Kingdom and into all possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, exactly in the same manner as if the said vessels had come direct from ports strictly Austrian, with all the privileges and immunities granted under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce. In August 1840, an Act was passed to give effect to this treaty, the 3rd clause of which, running as follows, was very important:—“And whereas, by the application of steam power[55] to inland navigation, and the facility thereby afforded of ascending rivers in suitable vessels with imported goods, new prospects of commercial adventure are opened up to many States situate wholly or chiefly in the interior of Europe, and whose most convenient ports are not within their own dominions; and, consequently, the trade of this country with such States might be greatly extended if the ships of such States were permitted to use, for the purposes of such trade, some ports of other States, in like manner as if such ports were within their own dominions; and, accordingly, treaties of commerce and navigation beneficial to the shipping and trade of this country might be made with such States if Her Majesty were enabled to carry such treaties into effect. Be it therefore enacted, notwithstanding the Navigation Act, that it shall be lawful for Her Majesty from time to time to declare, by the Order in Council, to be published as aforesaid, that any port or ports to be named in such order, being the most convenient port or ports for shipping the produce of any State, to be also named in such order, shall, although not situated within the dominions of such State, be port or ports for the use of such State in the trade of such ships with all ports of the British dominions, &c., in as full and ample a manner as if such port or ports were within the dominions of such State, &c.; and so long as such order shall be declared to be in force, it shall be lawful to import, &c., any goods in the ships of such State, which, by the laws in force at the time of such importation, might then be imported in such ships from a port of the country to which they belonged, and so to import such goods upon the like terms as the same could there be imported from the national ports of such ships.” Subsequently to this Act, several Conventions of Navigation, to some of which I have already briefly referred, were carried out, whereby the privileges just described were granted to various other nations.
[Sidenote: Zollverein States, August 1841.]
[Sidenote: Russia, 1843.]
The first was with Prussia, on behalf of the Zollverein States,[56] whereby the mouths of the Meuse, Elbe, Weser, and Ems, and those of all the navigable rivers between the Elbe and the Meuse were made free; thus offering means of communication between the sea and the territory of any of the Zollverein States thus opened as ports for ships of the Zollverein, so far as relates to trade with the United Kingdom or the British possessions. A little later, in 1843, a similar treaty was made with Russia, by which Russian vessels, arriving from the mouth of the Vistula or Niemen, or any other river, the outlet of any navigable stream, having its source in Russia and passing through the Czar’s dominions, were admitted, as if coming from Russian or Finnish ports. With Oldenburg there was also a treaty relating to the Elbe, Ems, Weser, and Meuse, and also with Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Lastly, like arrangements were made with Hanover, giving very nearly the same privileges as those to Mecklenburg-Schwerin. At a later period, orders were given to allow the same indulgence to ships of Oldenburg, the Hanse Towns, and Holland, as had been given to Hanover; so that, at this time, England had relaxed her Navigation Laws to the extent of calling ports, places not geographically belonging to Austria, Russia, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, the Zollverein, Hanover, or the Hanse Towns; a concession of vast importance, especially as regarded the import of corn.
[Sidenote: Various anomalies, &c., then in existence.]
In fact, the Navigation Laws, as they stood in 1847, were full of anomalies, and were altogether unsuited for the state of things at which nations had now arrived. The 7th clause of the Act 7 & 8 Vict., cap. 88, directed, that “no goods shall be exported from the United Kingdom to any British possession in Asia, Africa, or America, nor to the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, or Sark, except in British ships.” Goods, the produce of colonies in Asia, Africa, and America, could, however, be brought in vessels of any flag to the Channel Islands, but, from these, they must be brought in a British ship; and there was also the further anomaly, as we have shown, of United States vessels being allowed to clear out with produce and manufactures of the United Kingdom to the East Indies.
[Sidenote: Curious effects of the Registry Laws]
[Sidenote: as regarded individuals or corporate bodies.]
Power was then, also, granted to the Queen in Council to allow any foreign nation to trade with British colonies; and this privilege was granted to a considerable number. To some it was accorded without restriction; to others, such as France and Spain, who were rivals, restricted powers were given; while the privilege, granted to the United States of trading with British colonies, was afterwards accorded to Columbia, Rio de la Plata (including the States since formed), Mexico, Hayti, Chili, France to a limited extent, and the Spanish Colonies; and, further, all countries within what were called the limits of the East India Company’s Charter, that is, all foreign countries west of Cape Horn, and east of the Cape of Good Hope, had liberty to trade with the British possessions within the same limits. (Order in Council, 16 July, 1827.) French ships under this order were, however, only allowed to import into British colonies such goods, the produce of France, as were enumerated in the table annexed to the order (Orders, 1 June, 1826; 16 Dec., 1826), this order not including wine, the staple of France, a distinction deliberately adopted and confirmed. But, besides these perplexing anomalies, and others to which I shall presently call attention, the execution of the Navigation Law, as it was in 1847, was full of difficulties arising from the Registry Law, and the naturalisation of goods brought to Europe, &c. With respect to the Registry Law, there was a clause (the 13th) of the Navigation Act which stated “that no ship shall be admitted to be a British ship unless duly registered;” and that this might be properly done, the owner had to declare “that no foreigner has any right, share, or interest in the ship.” The following remarkable case will show how completely the spirit of this old law was neutralised in the case of Joint-Stock Companies.
[Sidenote: Ship Equador.]
[Sidenote: Decision of Queen’s Bench, December 1846.]
An application was made to the Collector at Liverpool for the registry of a ship called the Equador, belonging to the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. In the first instance, the Company required registry as a Joint-Stock Company, and three members, who had been duly elected and appointed trustees, attended at the Custom-House, Liverpool, to subscribe the requisite declaration of registry, in conformity with the provisions of the 13th and 36th sections of the Act 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 89 (the Registry Act). By the 13th section, the trustees of a Joint-Stock Company, in common with all other owners of British ships (excepting those owned by corporate bodies), were required to declare “that no foreigner, directly or indirectly, hath any share or part interest in the said ship or vessel.” The trustees in question stated that they could not make that declaration, because, in point of fact, foreigners did hold shares in that ship, and also in the other vessels belonging to the said Company; and they requested the Collector and Controller at Liverpool to expunge from the declaration the words above recited; but those officers, having no legal authority to comply with this request, refused to make this alteration. The Company then addressed the Board of Customs, requesting that they would direct their officers at Liverpool to expunge from the declaration the words above recited; but the Board, acting under advice, refused compliance with the request. The Company’s secretary then demanded registry on behalf of the Company as a “corporate body,” and claimed to make the declaration, contained in the 13th section of the Act aforesaid, which applies to corporate bodies. That declaration does not, like the other declaration, exclude foreign interest; and if, in the first instance, the Company had claimed registry as a corporate body, the probability is, that it would have been granted as a matter of course, without raising the question of foreign interest. But the Collector and Controller at Liverpool, with a full knowledge that foreigners were proprietors of the vessel, and adverting to the 13th and other sections of the Registry Act, refused registry; and the Commissioners of Customs, acting upon their solicitor’s opinion, supported the Liverpool officers in their refusal to grant the registry. The Company then moved for a mandamus in the Court of Queen’s Bench; and, after the usual proceedings in such cases, it was decided by the Court that as the Company applied for registration in its corporate capacity, the Court could not take notice of its constituent members, whether they were actually foreigners or not; or, in other words, that an English Incorporated Company was a British subject for the purposes of the Registry Act.
[Sidenote: Further details: owner to reside in the United Kingdom.]
The result of this remarkable decision was that foreigners, when incorporated, could own a ship, but not individually. In an extreme case, a ship might, ultimately, become the sole property of foreigners exclusively, and yet be entitled to be registered as a British ship, as a corporate body remains permanently. So that the law created the curious anomaly that a foreigner could not have a share in a British vessel, but might be the owner of all the shares of a corporate body which owned, for instance, the Great Eastern. Another difficulty arose with reference to the residence in or out of England of the owner of a ship. The Free-trade party contended that if a foreigner were disposed to come here and build a ship, there was no disadvantage either to British shipbuilders or British shipowners, or British sailors, especially as he could hold all the shares of a ship. On the other hand, it was contended that this was an extreme case, not likely often to occur, and the principle, if acted upon, of allowing individual ownership, might give considerable power to foreigners to the prejudice of British subjects; in fact, that the violation of this principle went to the very basis of the Navigation Law, which it would destroy. To such a point was real British ownership carried out, that, as the Act required owners of British ships to reside in the United Kingdom, the owner of a British registered ship, if he resided at Paris,[57] would lose his privileges as such.
Other difficulties arose from the indefinite character of the law: thus, gin could be brought into England, but brandy could not, in any foreign ships. American vessels could not bring corn from Holland; while, on the other hand, American corn landed in Holland could not be brought to England in a Bremen ship; and these difficulties were, in the case of corn, considerably increased by the difficulty of pronouncing upon the actual origin of the corn, as none but the most experienced dealers in grain could decide such a question, and, even with them, it must often have been mere guess work. A case occurred in which timber from Memel was sent to British North America, and, afterwards, brought to England at the low differential duty then existing. The law, at that time, permitted the produce of British possessions abroad to be imported, without its being described as the produce of those possessions; a tolerated evasion, it is clear, of the Navigation Law. But in the case of a ship arriving from Hayti, bringing a cargo of Haytian produce, the master described his ship as a Swedish ship, there being, in point of fact, no Haytian ships. In this case, the goods were liable to forfeiture; but they were allowed to be warehoused for exportation, and the vessel was permitted to depart. A Swedish ship was clearly inadmissible under the 16th Section of the Navigation Act.
[Sidenote: Naturalisation of goods brought to Europe.]
Perhaps one of the greatest absurdities attending the practical working of the Navigation Law was that which related to the “naturalisation” of goods, the produce of Asia, Africa, and America, which, when once landed in Europe, were, by this Act, not admissible into the ports of Great Britain, even in British ships, for home consumption.
Two remarkable cases came under my own experience, so curiously illustrative of the laxity and stringency of the law respectively, as to deserve especial notice. In the first case, thirty-five casks of annatto, the produce of Cayenne, a French colony, were in course of transit in a French ship to Bordeaux. This valuable dye could have been brought direct from Cayenne in a British ship for home consumption to England; but, if once brought from the French colony in a French ship, and landed in Europe, it was clearly inadmissible under the clause, “that goods, the produce of Asia, Africa, and America, shall not be imported from Europe into the United Kingdom to be used therein.”
The value of annatto is apt to fluctuate suddenly from very low to enormously high prices, just as the fashion for the colour varies. Annatto on this occasion rose to a high price; and a London agent, knowing that thirty-five casks of it were on their way to Europe, set his wits to work to bring this French colonial produce into a port in England, in spite of the Navigation Laws. The agent was thoroughly acquainted with every branch of the law, and asked himself what constituted a landing in Europe? Having satisfied himself on this point, he arranged with an eminent house at Bordeaux to purchase the annatto for arrival, land the cotton, which constituted the chief part of the cargo, and charter a small vessel, and send on the annatto to London in this British ship. This was done; and, when the vessel was on the point of arrival, he sought the Commissioners of Customs, and frankly avowed his proceedings. Mr. Dean, one of the chief officers, admitted that, many years previously, especially during the war in 1810, similar transhipments had been allowed, under the authority of the officers of the Crown,—a mere transhipment, and certain formalities performed at the French Customs, not being “a landing in Europe,”—and the thirty-five casks of annatto were admitted at a profit to the partners of nearly 3000_l._[58]
[Sidenote: Waste of capital caused thereby,]
In the second case, the rigour of the law led to the greatest absurdity. About the year 1839, the price of coffee was very high in the London market, while large quantities of the finest Java and Dutch colonial coffee were warehoused in store in Amsterdam. This produce was clearly inadmissible under the clause already quoted, having been, beyond all dispute, “landed in Europe.” In what way could this coffee be brought into the London market in the teeth of the existing stringent Navigation Laws? The same agent, who represented one of the oldest Dutch houses, contracted to deliver a cargo of Dutch coffee at a given price at a distant period. He then chartered a British ship, which he sent to Amsterdam, took in a cargo of coffee, and the ship thus laden with Dutch colonial produce was sent to the Cape of Good Hope. At that colony the coffee was landed, or, at all events, was supposed to be landed, fresh papers were made out, and the coffee consigned to London as “naturalised” produce, and, coming direct from a British colony in a British ship, was, of course, admissible for home consumption. To despatch many thousand tons of coffee and other produce half across the globe from Europe, for no other purpose than to be brought back again, in order to comply with the rigorous provisions of the old Navigation Laws, which, in point of fact, were nullified as regards goods, while the shipowners alone reaped the advantage of this useless and protracted voyage, was surely a climax of absurdity! Nevertheless, it is within my own personal experience that a large amount of business was transacted in this way, all the expenses incurred being, in an economical point of view, a total waste of capital.
[Sidenote: and obstructions to trade.]
[Sidenote: Story of the cochineal.]
Again, on the part of the old law, the want of adaptability to the changing conditions of different markets was often a serious difficulty. Thus, it often happened that the state of these markets in different parts of the world presented favourable mercantile prospects; but no suitable vessel could be found to carry the goods to the market where they were required. For instance, hostilities being about to break out between France and the United States in 1834, the price of French brandy rose enormously in America, while, at the same time, the large quantities of that article then in England rendered it unsaleable in the London market. At the time there was not an American vessel to be chartered in the Thames, and the American Navigation Laws precluded the brandy from being carried in a British vessel. On the other hand, palm-oil, at times, could not be brought from the United States, there being no British vessel available for charter on the spot. In such cases, the merchants complained in their letters in doleful terms, “I have lost my commission, and some British vessel the freight.” Instances of such occurrences were multiplied from all parts of the world. Much was said at the time about the difficulty of bringing cochineal from the Canary Islands, where the cactus, on which it feeds, had recently been cultivated for this purpose. Though it might be absurd to raise such complaints, as the smallest possible inconvenience resulted from the state of the law as it affected this particular article, the principle applied to the whole colonial system; and, as Spain refused to allow British ships to carry British goods to the Canaries, it was urged that our colonial system ought to be altered, so as to induce Spain to modify hers. Cochineal produced in the Canaries, and landed at Cadiz in Europe, like other articles, had to be sent elsewhere out of Europe to be naturalised, in order to come in for home consumption.
[Sidenote: But the Navigation Laws not always to blame.]
Perhaps, practically, these anomalies did not, to any large extent, occasion impediments to business beyond retarding its extension, because every merchant was so well acquainted with the provisions of the Navigation Laws (which were as much studied for their evasion as otherwise), that less inconvenience resulted[59] than might have been expected. The law, however, assumed so many complex forms with time, new discoveries, treaty obligations, and perpetual minor alterations, that, irrespectively of the advantages or disadvantages of a total change, arguments could be raised for a complete abrogation of every existing Act, if it were only to commence anew and remodel the law, so as to avoid the habitual and vexatious discussions and disputes with the Customs to which the system gave rise.
[Sidenote: Special views of the Canadians.]
As regarded the operation of the Navigation Laws with reference to Canada, it was far more complicated than even that between the mother-country, her colonies in the West Indies, and the United States. While some of the shipowners of England had, as we have seen, gone so far as even to demand protection against the shipping of English colonists, the Canadians were busily occupied with efforts in an entirely opposite direction. They were not inclined, by a system of protection, to force their trade in any particular channel: for, so far as regarded the carrying-trade of the North-Western American States, the Canadians obviously could only secure its passage through their territory by holding out superior advantages in the way of cheapness of transit. For this purpose they had already done everything that great enterprise and expenditure could accomplish. They succeeded as far as possible; and, at length, possessed a line of communication at once more rapid and more cheap from the interior to the sea than any existing in the United States. The whole question then was confined to the comparative advantages of shipment from Quebec or Montreal, or from New York. If those ports could be nearly equalised in respect to freights to England, Canada would succeed in her object; if the disparity continued as it did then, all her efforts would have been unavailing.
[Sidenote: Montreal, its shipping and trade.]
It was, generally, represented that the high rate of freight between Montreal and the United Kingdom was owing to the limited number of ships employed in the import trade of Canada. In the spring and latter end of the summer, ships, composing what was called the spring and fall fleet, arrived; and, so long as they were in port wanting freight, the rate was comparatively moderate; but in the interval, being the middle of summer, when most of the western produce arrived for shipment, an inferior class of ships only were at hand, which delivered their cargoes in bad condition, and, at the same time, charged exorbitant rates, according to the quantity of produce for shipment. The rate of freight is said to have fluctuated in Montreal in one and the same season between 3_s._ 6_d._ and 7_s._ 6_d._ per barrel; and it is stated that the higher rate, from 6_s._ to 7_s._ 6_d._ per barrel, had been paid in Montreal, while freights were offered in foreign ships at New York as low as 1_s._ and 1_s._ 6_d._ per barrel; indeed, at this time, an offer of 1_s._ 6_d._ per barrel extra would have brought any number of ships round from the American sea-ports, but the Navigation Laws interposed. It was clearly seen that such fluctuations in the rates of freight, together with the employment of inferior vessels, could not have occurred were the Canadian merchants able to select in the American ports such ships as were seeking freight to Europe.
During the temporary suspension of the Navigation Laws in 1847, twenty-two ships arrived from Bremen at the port of Montreal laden with emigrants intended for the United States, that route being chosen as easier and cheaper. These ships on their return took cargoes for the United Kingdom; and it was evident that, if the same facilities were continued, the great German emigration to the United States would to some extent pass through Canada. This was but one instance of many which might be reasonably expected, if foreign vessels could resort to the Canadian ports. These ships were well fitted for the carriage of wheat and flour; and the competition produced by their presence would not only tend to reduce the freight from Canada to an equality with those from the States, but the good condition of the cargoes delivered would be assured; the shippers would, in this way, be saved from the use of inferior vessels, the damage caused by which was thought not to be over-estimated at an average of five per cent. on such shipments.
[Sidenote: Navigation of the St. Lawrence.]
Again: the American merchants of the West were anxious to avail themselves of the facilities afforded by the River St. Lawrence. Thus, if their vessels were permitted to come down to Montreal and Quebec, there to meet American or foreign ships to take their cargoes on freight to Europe or elsewhere, it was naturally thought that an extensive and profitable commerce through Canada would immediately follow; the lower ports, by these means, at once assuming the position, as commercial depôts, to which their geographical position on that great river outlet of Northern America seemed to entitle them.
[Sidenote: Free-trade with the United States desired by the farmers of Canada.]
Connected with this important subject of the free navigation of the St. Lawrence west of Quebec, which the Americans were desirous of procuring, a corresponding desire prevailed on the part of the Canadian farmers to avail themselves of the American home market, whenever it offered superior prices to those derived from exportation to Europe. The price of wheat and flour in the Eastern States, required for home consumption, was often much higher than the price in Canada for exportation, and when this happened, it would obviously have been greatly to the advantage of the Canadian agriculturist if he could have exported his produce to the United States. This he was prevented from doing by a protective duty of a quarter of a dollar per bushel upon wheat. Efforts had been made in the United States to abolish this duty; but the advocates of its abolition were constantly defeated by the Protection cries of the American farmers, or by a difficulty as to the “most favoured” nation-clause in treaties with Foreign Powers, the more so, as a relaxation in favour of Canada was, naturally, capable of extension to any or all nations with whom the United States had such treaties subsisting. Here is a clear instance how commercial treaties, even of a liberal character, become as much “entangling alliances” as the political conventions of “amity and friendship” have so frequently been. Indeed, the “favoured” nation-clause, however well intended and beneficial in the highest degree in certain cases, has often been a source of dispute to those States who either have accepted or enforced it, and, even more so, to those countries which have been compelled to adopt it. The interests of great nations vary so much at different periods that inflexible rules in politics or commerce must frequently operate very prejudicially, and cannot be maintained with entire consistency for the true interests of the commonwealth.
[Sidenote: Negotiations proposed.]
It was thought that if the free navigation of the St. Lawrence were offered to the American Government in return for the abolition of the protecting duty, one measure to be co-existent with the other, Congress would be inclined to abolish the protective duty; while the abolition, being a matter of reciprocal arrangement, all difficulty arising from the commercial relations of the United States with foreign countries might thus be avoided.
[Sidenote: Canadians urge the abolition of Protection.]
The more advanced section of the Free-trade party of Canada pressed this proposal on the executive government, together with the abolition of all protection conferred by the Navigation Laws, which it was asserted was, after all, purely nominal, and only to secure other advantages. They pronounced the so-called Protection to be in its effects upon Canada practically mischievous, contending that, if the trade was nearer from Canadian waters to the canals and ports of the United States, British shipowners would have to compete with foreigners in the ports of that country; that, if they could do this successfully there, they could do so in the Canadian ports; but if not, under existing circumstances, the trade of Canada could not afford to maintain a mere legal monopoly: moreover, if the supposed Protection only led to the desertion of the cities and sea-ports of Canada, without subserving the interests of British shipowners, it was hoped that useless restrictions, irreconcilable with the withdrawal of protective duties in the United States in favour of Canadian produce, would be at once removed.
[Sidenote: Views of Western Canada.]
The Canadians could not indeed fail to perceive, when the question was raised in the mother-country, that a great portion of the exportable produce of Western Canada, probably by far the greater part, was at that very moment on its way to ports in the United States; that little was expected at Montreal; that the canals constructed on the St. Lawrence were almost idle; that importing ships coming to Montreal were without their usual full freight; that the principal importations into Western Canada were effected through the United States; and that the trade of the city of Montreal was in consequence rapidly decreasing. On the other hand, they observed the greatly-increasing consumption and importation into their country of articles formerly imported wholly through that port. Hence they inferred, that the opening of Canadian sea-ports to vessels of all nations, with permission to send colonial produce to England in any vessels, as well as the opening the River St. Lawrence above Quebec to Americans, would probably restore trade to its original channel, and increase the commerce and revenues of Canada beyond precedent.
[Sidenote: Canadians really only for partial Free-trade.]
Such were the hopes entertained by the Canadians of a modification in the restrictive system. But even the boldest of their Free-traders shrunk for a time from the notion of an unconditional surrender of the natural advantages the navigation of the St. Lawrence conferred upon Canada. Hence they proposed to themselves to reserve their full rights, and confined their advocacy to such changes in the law relating to navigating the St. Lawrence above Quebec as would enable them to make terms with the Americans. They had then no idea of throwing open to foreigners generally the use of their great rivers without an ample equivalent: they contented themselves with asking for powers from the Imperial Legislature to enable them to negotiate from time to time on the subject, and to make the navigation of the river a matter of treaty and regulation; preserving their own sovereignty, with power to resume the exclusive use of it at the conclusion of any agreement.
[Sidenote: Improvements of their internal navigation.]
Hitherto the enterprise and energies of the colonies had been almost exclusively directed to the important objects of improving the internal navigation of the St. Lawrence from Lake Erie to Quebec, so as to place it in such a state of cheapness and efficiency as would make that route more advantageous as a port of embarkation for a sea voyage than any route through the United States.
[Sidenote: Welland Canal.]
In the case of the Welland Canal, Canadians could not fail to perceive that the passage of American vessels down and up had contributed to render it profitable. Indeed, the Welland Canal was used extensively by American vessels, as it was a short communication between the two great lakes, and, at the same time, admitted of the passage of large vessels, which, instead of entering the American Erie Canal at Buffalo, proceeded down Lake Ontario to Oswego, where goods are transferred to the canal-boats for transport to New York. In this way a large portion of the revenue from the Welland Canal was derived from the American trade, arising from the free navigation of a part of the internal waters of Canada, and thus Western Canada enjoyed the benefit of a navigation supported to a considerable extent by foreign commerce.
[Sidenote: Cost of freight the real question.]
It was observed, further, that, if products from the Western States could be transported to the sea more cheaply through Canada than through America, the Canadian route would of course be preferred, and thus the Canadian canals would engross the carrying trade of the North-Western States of America. But if, on the other hand, the advantage of the perfect inland navigation was more than counterbalanced by the rates of freight from Quebec and Montreal to Europe, the people of Western Canada, having no protection in the English markets by using the Canadian lines of communication, would send the whole of their produce by way of New York, and import such articles of foreign consumption as they required by the same route.
So long as the colony enjoyed Protection in the British market no injury to its commerce could arise, because the extent of the protection was generally sufficient to prevent the owners from divesting the Canadian produce of its British character, and it could not become available for the home market of America, unless on the payment of a heavy duty. Even with regard to American produce, the provision in the old Corn Law giving to American wheat and flour the same protection as Canadian if exported through Canada, with the payment of 3_s._ per quarter duty in the province, was, at most times, a sufficient inducement for many Americans to make shipments to Montreal, as well as for the Canadians to make purchases in the United States. When, however, by the repeal of the Corn Laws all protection was removed, the question became one of mere cheapness of transport; and taking an average of the preceding four years, the difference in freight was no less than 3_s._ per barrel of flour in favour of New York over Montreal.[60] Even when the benefits enjoyed by Canada in her internal navigation, estimated at 1_s._ 6_d._ per barrel, were deducted, there would still remain in favour of New York, 1_s._ 6_d._ on each barrel of flour—an advantage quite sufficient to turn the whole export trade into that channel.
[Sidenote: Loss to Canada by New York line.]
As the United States then admitted the transit of Canadian produce through their territory, the loss it encountered at New York arose from the necessity of complying with the Navigation Laws, which forbade its being imported into England in foreign ships (8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88, sect. 4). At the same time, it must, also, be noticed that, as freight in British ships from New York to England was no higher than the freight in American ships, this restriction, confessedly, had no appreciable influence on the question of transmission through Canada or the United States.
For some time, previously, the import trade of Western Canada, which, by means of protecting duties in favour of British ships and British goods, was forced to come by the St. Lawrence, had been changing its direction, and Montreal, which supplied the whole western country, was becoming deserted by the western merchants. The new Customs Law of that province, while it equalised duties, enabled the consumer to purchase in the cheapest market, and, thus, vastly increased the evil to former importing cities; hence, a very large proportion of the export trade also of Canada had now taken the direction of New York. There was, therefore, naturally a serious apprehension, lest the great public works of the St. Lawrence would cease to be useful and profitable, and, that the commercial connection so many years existing between Western and Eastern Canada would thus be altogether cut off.
It has been unnecessary to refer to the export trade in timber from Canada, as this stood on exceptional grounds. Indeed, a general opinion prevailed that the export of timber from Quebec would probably be carried on, under any circumstances, in British ships specially employed in that branch of trade.
[Sidenote: General summary of results as to Canada.]
From these important considerations it was concluded:—
1st. That, as Canada then enjoyed but a remnant of Protection in England, she ought to be released from any restrictions for the benefit of the shipowner.
2nd. That, without the free navigation of the St. Lawrence and a repeal of the Navigation Laws so far as British North American Colonies were concerned, there was reason to apprehend that New York would become the emporium of the trade of Canada, and further, that, thus, a community of interests, commercial and political, would be created with the United States.
3rd. That, in such a case, the repeal of these laws would not materially injure the British shipowner, the question simply being whether competition for trade should take place in the harbours of the United States or in the River St. Lawrence.
Lastly, That the repeal of these laws would have a tendency to perpetuate, and not to destroy, the relations existing between Canada and the mother-country.
[Sidenote: West Indians for Free-trade as well as Canadians.]
[Sidenote: Divergent views of capitalists at home.]
For these reasons, an organisation of merchants in Montreal, and in various towns in Canada, who had leagued themselves as Free-traders and had been very active in disseminating their views, as well as in enforcing them, with all the influence they could command, on the colonial Governor, and on the English Executive and both Houses of Parliament, now demanded the total repeal of the British Navigation Laws. They did not, however, stand alone in their desire for unrestricted navigation. The West Indies, as soon as they found that the British Parliament had taken away the protection afforded to them by the differential duties, were as loud in their complaints as the Canadians, the more so, as having been deprived of all protection on their sugars by Lord John Russell’s Equalization Act of 1847, it became indispensable to get their produce conveyed to market at the cheapest possible rate of freight, so as to compete, with any chance of success, with their foreign rivals. They therefore denounced the Navigation Laws in no measured terms; and when Montreal petitioned that its corn should be admitted into the ports of Great Britain in ships of any nation their merchants thought proper to charter, the West Indians preferred the same request, in order to secure the lowest cost of transport for their sugar. While, therefore, the colonists were urging the adoption of the principle of an entire free trade with the colonies, many capitalists of England, and, especially, the shipowners, viewed with great alarm the total abandonment of what was known as our “colonial system,” and declared their apprehension that such a change would throw the carrying trade into the hands of the United States. Clinging to Protection, they said, in their memorials to Parliament, “that the only remaining thing connected with our whole important and most magnificent colonial system, which enabled us to baffle the efforts of the whole world united against us, was that part of the system under which the produce of the colonies was obliged to be brought to this country in British ships.” These alarmists declared that such a relaxation as the colonists now demanded would ruin them inevitably. Regarding every concession which had been made to the Americans during the preceding half century, having as it had for its object increased intercourse with the West Indies, as a pernicious policy, tending to injure British colonies and to encourage American trade, they alleged that the protection of the colonies had not been carried far enough; that British shipowners could not exist without Protection; that the uncertainty prevailing with respect to the Navigation Laws was productive of injury to the country, as no persons would embark capital in shipping; and, further, that, as regarded the West Indies, it was not the general wish of the colonists that the Navigation Laws should be repealed.
[Sidenote: Views of Manchester and Liverpool.]
In this controversy, the important cities of Manchester and Liverpool each took also a very different view. The great Free-traders of the former desired the unconditional repeal of the Navigation Laws, feeling convinced that their cotton and corn would then be brought to them at cheaper rates, and that they would be able to deliver to much greater advantage in distant markets the products of their manufacturers; but the shipowners of Liverpool, almost as a body (though there were a few important exceptions), were exceedingly adverse to any material change in these laws, as they regarded with great and natural jealousy the then triumphant progress of American shipping.
FOOTNOTES:
[55] I give this clause at length, because it is about the first step towards a change in our Navigation Laws, which had become necessary to render them practicable, after steam had been introduced for the propulsion of our ships. This mighty instrument of civilisation, about which I shall have a great deal to say hereafter, drove itself through numerous Acts of Parliament, and showed how vain were legislative measures when opposed to the progress of science.
[56] The Zollverein States are, Prussia at the head: Anhalt-Bernburg, Anhalt-Dessau, Anhalt-Kothen, Baden, Bavaria, Brunswick, Frankfort, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Homburg, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Lippe-Detmold, Luxemburg with Limburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Nassau, Oldenburg and Kniphausen, Reuss (Old line), Reuss (New line), Saxony, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Weimar, Eisenach, Schwarzburg, Rudolfstadt-Schwarzburg, Sonderhausen, Waldeck, Wurtemburg. The Zollverein embraces an area of 131,615 geographical square miles, with a population of 28½ millions, being 63·08 per cent. of the whole area of Germany as it then existed, and 64·35 per cent. of its population. The several States entered voluntarily into the regulation.
[57] An exception existed for a person who resided abroad in a foreign factory.
[58] The opinion of the Attorney- and the Solicitor-General were taken upon the point, and they admitted the article for consumption.
[59] Merchants were sometimes, however, misled. An American, who had a smart U.S. brig, once showed a friend of mine his invoice of a cargo of Peruvian cotton, which had reached Gibraltar from Peru. Counting his profits on a sale in England, where he had ordered her to come, he was wofully disappointed when told of the unlucky third section, which forbade its importation. The fortune he had counted upon realising melted away at once.
[60] Mr. Burton of Montreal, a merchant of great experience, gave it in evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons of 1844 that the difference of rates were as follows:—
Per barrel. Per barrel. In 1844, from Montreal, 4_s._ 6_d._ From New York, 1_s._ 8_d._ In 1845, ” 4_s._ 8_d._ ” ” 2_s._ 0_d._ In 1846, ” 5_s._ 1½_d._ ” ” 2_s._ 6½_d._ In 1847, ” 6_s._ 0_d._ ” ” 2_s._ 0_d._ ------------ ------------ Average 5_s._ 1_d._ 2_s._ 1_d._ ------------ ------------
Chapter VI
Witnesses examined by Mr. Ricardo’s Committee: Mr. J. S. Lefevre, Mr. Macgregor, Mr. G. R. Porter—Their extreme views not conclusive to the Committee—Evidence adduced by the shipowners—Ships built more cheaply abroad—Evidence of Mr. G. F. Young, and his general conclusions—Mr. Richmond’s evidence—Asserts that shipping is a losing trade—Replies to the charges against shipowners—Views as to captains of merchant ships—Praises their nautical skill and capacity—His character of common seamen—Attacks Mr. Porter—Offers valuable details of ship-building—Is prepared to go all lengths in favour of Protection—His jealousy of the Northern Powers—Evidence of Mr. Braysher, Collector of Customs in London—General effect of the Navigation Laws on the Customs—With the Northern Ports and America—Difficulty about “manufactured” articles—Anomalies of the coasting and internal trade—Committee’s last meeting, July 17—General dissatisfaction with the results of the inquiry—Commercial panic and distress of 1847—Suspension of Bank Charter Act.
[Sidenote: Witnesses examined by Mr. Ricardo’s Committee.]
Having now laid before my readers the substance of the state of the Navigation Laws at the time of the appointment of Mr. Ricardo’s Committee in February 1847, I shall proceed to state generally the principal facts put forth by the leading witnesses on the side of the Free-traders and of the Protectionists respectively.
[Sidenote: Mr. J. S. Lefevre.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Macgregor.]
On the side of the former, Mr. John S. Lefevre, Mr. Macgregor, and Mr. G. R. Porter, officers of the Board of Trade, and decidedly inclined to the total repeal of the Navigation Laws, were the chief witnesses brought forward to make out a case against the existing system. Of these, the first—a distinguished mathematician as well as a lawyer of sound learning—was eminently fitted to work out, calmly and dispassionately, the intricate points connected with the complex system then prevalent. The other two were strong partisans. Mr. Macgregor, a somewhat superficial person, gave the most off-hand answers to questions, though profoundly ignorant of their tendency, therein committing the most egregious blunders, and urging many inaccuracies about the Reciprocity Treaties, their effect on commerce, and the injury Great Britain had sustained through her ancient Navigation Laws. On the question of the maritime relations between this country and the United States, Mr. Macgregor gave evidence, also, at great length, a considerable portion of which was, however, erroneous as to matters of fact, while many of his conclusions were fallacious.
[Sidenote: Mr. G. R. Porter.]
Mr. G. R. Porter, Secretary of the Statistical Department, and well known as entertaining the strongest convictions that the Navigation Laws were as injurious to the shipowners themselves as they had been to the nation, was an industrious hard-working man, but he was at the same time committed by many previous publications to the most extreme opinions on Free-trade: of real practical commerce he had no experience. Mr. Porter had, however, studied the whole question with care, and, while enthusiastic in favour of an entire change, and sanguine with regard to the beneficial results to follow from the repeal of these laws, he gave strong and valid reasons for his bold opinions. Their repeal, he showed, would tend, materially, to develop and increase the warehousing system of Great Britain, making it, in fact, a vast depôt for supplying the wants of the people of all nations. Not that the existing laws presented any impediment to warehousing goods, but that facilities would be afforded for making advances on foreign produce by the removal of restrictions. In answer to numerous and varied questions from those members of the Committee who were opposed to his views, he gave a clear and decided opinion that the trade of England had not been benefited in any one of its branches, shipowning included, by the Navigation Laws: and he could not for a moment admit that these laws had operated beneficially even for the “encouragement of a commercial marine.” He rested his arguments on the economical principle that the shipping trade of this country, as a trade, could be conducted on no other principles than those whereby trade, generally, was carried on; he contended that no more ships would be built than it was expected would be required, so as to yield a profit to the persons who built them; that, in the long run, there could be no larger amount of profit derived from shipowning than from any other trade, as other persons would, of course, come in to share the profit with the existing shipowners; and that, unless shipping yielded the ordinary rate of profit to be derived from the commerce of the country, deficiencies in shipping from losses would not be, from time to time, supplied. It was well known, he remarked, that the trade of the country had gone on increasing; that, from year to year, more ships had been built; and, further, that, though shipowners had certainly been at times loud in their complaints and fears as to their future prospects, they had still continually added to the amount of their tonnage. Mr. Porter then put in the strongest light the groundless fears they had so long entertained by quoting their Report for 1833,[61] wherein they state that “the long-continued and still existing depression of the shipping interest, the partial production, and great aggravation of distress caused by continual changes in our navigation system; the utter impossibility of the successful maintenance of an unrestricted competition with foreign navigation; the gross injustice of the imposition of peculiar and exclusive burdens on maritime commerce for purposes purely national, while exposed to that competition; the declining quality and estimation of British tonnage; the embarrassment, decay, and ruin of the British shipowner, may now be viewed as incontrovertible positions.” In reply to this desponding statement, Mr. Porter directed attention to the official returns, showing that in 1833 the amount of British tonnage on the register was 2,634,577 tons, whereas in 1846 it was no less than 3,817,112 tons, an increase of 1,182,535 tons. So that, to the melancholy “facts” of the shipowners in 1833, Mr. Porter opposed his prosperous “figures” of 1846. Such discordant views could not by any means be reconciled; but shipowners of all countries and in all ages have ever had the most evil forebodings on the subject of the withdrawal of protection.
Mr. Porter did not fail to hold out the threat that Prussia, at the head of the Zollverein States of Germany, would still further carry out its restrictive principles, and impose differential duties on foreign shipping; and that Hamburg and Bremen were, at that time, deliberating whether they should join the Zollverein under one flag, as far as concerned shipping. He, nevertheless, expressed the most sanguine hopes that, when foreign nations discovered beyond all doubt, that England was advancing in the path of Free-trade, they would gladly follow her example, and that commerce throughout the whole of Europe and the world would be unshackled.
It appeared, further, from his evidence, that Mr. Porter was for a complete abrogation of the English Navigation Laws, without any reservations as to reciprocity, and that, from the general conviction that these restrictive laws were rather injurious than beneficial to us, independently of the policy of other nations.
[Sidenote: Their extreme views not conclusive to the Committee.]
It cannot, however, be said that, in 1847, the repeal party had succeeded in convincing the majority of even the Committee of the soundness of their opinions. The shipowners, as a body, endeavoured to controvert, and with considerable show of success for the time, the theories propounded by the Free-trade party, so strenuously supported by the officers of the Board of Trade. The cold imperturbable evidence of Mr. (now Sir) John Shaw Lefevre, who was intimately connected with the Free-trade party, contrasted strikingly with the impetuosity of such men as Mr. Macgregor, and even with the testimony of Mr. Porter.
[Sidenote: Evidence adduced by the shipowners.]
The shipowners, on the other hand, put forward their most practical and intelligent witnesses[62] to prove that the repeal of the Navigation Laws would cause an immediate depreciation of thirty per cent. in the value of their property, and of shipping, generally, throughout the United Kingdom; that, if the British shipowner were deprived of his privileges, already greatly curtailed by the system of reciprocity, it would be decidedly to his advantage to invest his capital in foreign ships, and to navigate them by foreign seamen: Englishmen, they alleged, would own, in conjunction with foreigners (if possible), foreign ships, in order to secure the privileges still attaching to foreign flags, since British ships would still be excluded from many foreign ports, even though the Navigation Laws were abrogated. It was shown, as they conceived incontestably, that a ship could be built at Dantzig at a much less cost than in England,[63] and that, if the foreign trade were thrown open without restriction, no one would think of building British ships; the result being, that a great number of persons dependent on shipping—shipwrights and others—must be thrown out of employment, with great general distress ensuing. The difficulty of manning the Royal Navy, under such untoward circumstances (a standard argument), was, of course, dwelt on with great force as an unmitigated national evil. It was further urged, that the relaxation of the laws, so far as to allow Asiatic and African produce to be admitted to Great Britain for home consumption from ports in Europe, in all bottoms, must deprive the British shipowner of his most valuable privilege, and destroy the very essence of the ancient law.
[Sidenote: Ships built more cheaply abroad.]
The argument, that these laws ought to be abrogated in the interests of the consumer was met by the counter-assertion, that any difference of freight, if such indeed existed, would make no appreciable difference in the price of consumable articles. Even the excessively high freight of 8_s._ per barrel from the United States, which had been paid on an emergency, would, they held, amount to only one halfpenny per pound on the flour, so that when freight was reduced to its usual rate, a very slight increase of value was the consequence. The witnesses against repeal spoke of various other articles[64] in a similar manner, arguing that the reduction would be so small that it could never reach the consumer.
[Sidenote: Evidence of Mr. G. F. Young,]
Of all the witnesses examined before the Committee, no one was more opposed to the repeal than Mr. George Frederick Young, a shipbuilder and shipowner in the port of London. He was quite as strong a partisan in favour of leaving things as they were as Mr. Ricardo and Mr. Porter were in favour of Free-trade. He would admit no further innovations of any kind, contending, that, even the reciprocity system had been in the highest degree detrimental to the interests of the British shipowners: indeed, he asserted that if the Navigation Laws were repealed, it would be seen that the interests of the merchants would be quite as much compromised as those of shipowners, as it was under the operation of these laws that importations were so largely directed into the emporium of England. He apprehended that this repeal would substitute certain conveniently-located foreign ports as depôts for imported produce for the supply of England, in lieu of British ports. He fortified this opinion by elaborate calculations, showing an enormous difference in the warehousing charges at Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, leading, as he apprehended, to this inevitable conclusion, that a British merchant would find it more to his interest to establish depôts at those places, than to import commodities for the supply of his own country, to be lodged in the St. Katherine or West India Docks, or in other similar establishments.
With regard to the subject of the Whale Fisheries, and the way in which they might be affected by a repeal of the Navigation Laws, Mr. Young pointed out that the trade of the northern and southern fisheries had been for many years past a declining one: but this decline, he said, though in a great degree traceable to other causes, received an accelerated impetus from the course pursued by the Legislature in discouraging these trades, while the Americans, on the other hand, had received from their Legislature every possible support. So far as regards the relative cost of navigating British ships, Mr. Young brought forward a mass of figures[65] for the purpose of showing that the difference in every case was in favour of foreign shipowners, but more especially in the case of those of the United States, Holland, the Hanse Towns, Sweden, and Prussia.
[Sidenote: and his general conclusions.]
By the various reciprocity treaties Mr. Young considered the Navigation Laws were virtually repealed with regard to those countries with whom we had concluded such conventions: but, while maintaining that these treaties had proved highly prejudicial to Great Britain, he did not recommend a retrograde policy; and we gladly admit that, whatever opinions might be entertained of the ardent Protectionist principles he propounded, his political adversaries bore full testimony to the ability with which he advocated his cause during the days he was under examination, and to the large amount of practical knowledge he brought to bear on the subject. He displayed, too, great tact, and, I must add, great patriotism, viewing the contemplated change in the light he did, when he wound up his evidence by asserting, unequivocally, that the Navigation Laws were framed for the paramount and political purpose of assisting in the defence of this country, as well as for encouraging maritime commerce; that these objects, in his judgment, could never have been obtained and maintained without these great Acts; and that he fully and completely declared his concurrence in the opinion given by Adam Smith, which we have already quoted. “I have no hesitation in declaring,” remarked Mr. Young, in concluding his evidence, “my perfect conviction, that it has been, through the operation of our navigation system entirely, that the maritime power of this country has been raised to its present height, that the country has been defended, and all the evils which would have resulted from its being made the seat of war have been providentially averted.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Richmond’s evidence.]
[Sidenote: Asserts that shipping is a losing trade.]
As considerable uneasiness had been felt by those who advocated the policy of Protection with reference to the competition which might be anticipated from the shipping of the three Hanse Towns—Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg—although on inquiry it was shown that the whole tonnage of sea-going ships belonging to these ports was only about 150,000 tons register, it is advisable here to refer to the testimony of Mr. William Richmond, who was deputed by the shipowners of the borough of Tynemouth to appear before the Committee.[66] This gentleman had been a shipowner for nearly fifty years, and, at his advanced age, was reluctant to appear: but zeal for a cause to which he had devoted great energy during a long life, together with the importance of the subject, induced him to come forward to rescue, so far as he could, the shipowners from “impending destruction.” It is unnecessary, however, here to follow him through his elaborate history of the Navigation Laws, but, as an exponent of the views of many shipowners in the north of England, the points he urged most strongly ought not to be overlooked. Strange, however, to say, his first contention was that, for the preceding twenty-five years, the shipping trade had been a losing one, those employed in the Baltic during the whole of that time having made no money whatever. When, naturally, he was asked to explain how it had come to pass that a losing trade should be so long maintained, Mr. Richmond entered into details, which, though not satisfying the Committee as to the whole force of his assertion, threw considerable light on the actual state of the merchant shipping at that period.[67]
[Sidenote: Replies to charges against the ship owners.]
It had been charged against shipowners, as we have seen,[68] that their ships were unseaworthy, while the masters had been condemned in no measured terms. These accusations he indignantly repelled; his explanation as to the permanence of a losing trade being substantially this—that a distinct class of men existed who were shipowners, and not merchants, whose fathers had been shipowners for successive generations, and had left them ships as their only inheritance; and that, as they could not readily divest themselves of this property, and had no means of buying ships of an improved description fit to compete with vessels of more modern date,[69] their commercial career generally ended with the Gazette.
[Sidenote: Views as to captains of merchant ships.]
With regard to the qualifications of captains of merchant vessels, Mr. Richmond said that sixty years ago, when he went to sea, very young in life, it was customary for respectable and even wealthy people, in the maritime districts, to send their children to sea: indeed, no matter whether they were shipowners or merchants, agriculturists or manufacturers, one of the family was sent to sea, because it was considered a line in which there was a fair chance of prospering. “But no respectable people send their children to sea now,” he exclaimed, “as it is a profession which, in all probability, would lead them to beggary.”
[Sidenote: Praises their nautical skill and capacity.]
In nautical skill, Mr. Richmond held the British captain of the present day fully equal to the captain of former days; while he, also, thought, that the ruder the man, on his admission into the hardy profession he was to adopt, the more advantageous it might be to him, at least in the discharge of the rougher part of his professional duties. In the pursuit of freights abroad, on the “seeking system,” these captains, he admitted, might be inferior to some continental captains; but the business of chartering a ship belonged more strictly to the shipbroker; the captain, in his opinion, being in a relation not unlike that of the driver of a coach.
[Sidenote: His character of common seamen.]
With regard to British seamen, he considered that they, like all other classes, had become more temperate of late years, but were always less a spirit-drinking people than the Germans. The bad accommodation for the common sailor on board merchant ships might destroy his comforts, but not his morals; and honourable testimony had been given by an American captain,[70] that he would prefer the English seaman to any in the world, even to Americans. Every person, he thought, must concur with him in the opinion that our seamen were, what they had ever been, “a danger-defying, skilful, thoughtless, improvident, and perhaps a turbulent race:” and Mr. Richmond appealed confidently to Admiral Dundas, who sat on the Committee, whether he would not rather go into action with 100 British seamen than 200 seamen of any other nation?
[Sidenote: Attacks Mr. Porter.]
It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the elaborate and curious tables[71] Mr. Richmond prepared to show that there were as many ships as formerly, and that their increase had kept pace with the population between 1816 and 1846. Having explained these tables, he then, in no very measured terms, charged Mr. Porter with “cushioning,” or covering up for an unfair comparison, the merchant navies of surrounding nations, and especially that of the United States. He accused that gentleman distinctly of giving unfairly all the ships engaged in the foreign, coasting, and colonial trade of England, in his return of British tonnage; while the ships of the United States, engaged in the foreign trade only, were given in that of the American tonnage. By these means, an attempt was made to prove that a large mass of tonnage of foreign nations was “cushioned” up, or kept out of sight of the English people, because it would alarm them, if they were to see such an immense tonnage of foreign vessels rising around them, “as the day would come when they would knock at our doors.”
[Sidenote: Offers valuable details of ship-building.]
Elaborate tables of the prices of articles used in ship-building, furnished by Mr. Richmond, on the authority of the most competent persons engaged in the respective branches of this trade, will be found in his evidence; and, here it may be desirable, as a record of facts, to give an extract from a communication from the principal agent of Lloyd’s, which Mr. Richmond read to the Committee, in reply to a query with reference to the cost of new first-class ships, as it appears that sales were effected at the prices therein named.[72]
The price per ton declined 1_l._ per ton, according to the years for which the vessel was classed; and according to the North Country Club Rules, 3_l._ 10_s._ per ton may be added to these prices for a Baltic outfit—that is, for a ship when ready for a Baltic voyage. As a corollary to these prices, which were, indeed, much lower than the London rates (bad as well as good ships being built in Sunderland), a list was given of the shipbuilders who had failed in Sunderland within the short period from 1841 down to 1847. The list comprised no less than 40 names—a melancholy catalogue—many of them were men whose fathers and grandfathers had moved in good circles: yet these men had all failed owing to the depression of business then prevalent.
[Sidenote: Is prepared to go all lengths in favour of Protection.]
On the question of Reciprocity, about which there was, subsequently, so much discussion, Mr. Richmond declared, that there could be no prosperity in England till the Reciprocity Treaties, as well as all the Orders in Council enforcing them, were totally repealed. He looked with extreme jealousy at the beautiful and well-appointed ships frequenting Newcastle from Russian and Swedish Finland: but, he saw that no fairer class of merchant ships came to any port; their dimensions, their rigging, everything about them was admirable; while their commanders and officers inspired respect from their general competency. Their log-books were beautifully kept in English: and, from the education the younger population, who were destined for the sea, received, no better disciplined nor more orderly or sedate crews could be seen than on board these ships.
[Sidenote: His jealousy of the Northern Powers.]
No doubt, these northern maritime countries could be regarded in no other light than that of formidable rivals. Therefore Mr. Richmond and his fellow-shipowners saw with alarm any efforts made to throw open the trade of the Empire, as the increasing success of these foreign rivals must obviously dispossess English shipowners of an immense portion of the carrying trade. Mr. Richmond, therefore, demanded, that not only the Reciprocity Treaties should be annulled, but that the law of Charles II. should be adopted, which enacted that “no goods or commodities whatsoever of the growth, production, or manufacture of Africa, Asia, or America, or of any part thereof, or which are described, or laid down, in the usual maps or cards of those places, be imported into England, Ireland, or Wales, the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, or the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, in any other ship or ships, but in such as do truly, and without fraud, belong only to the people of England,” &c.
Such were the extreme views promulgated by many of the advocates of Protection. Indeed, the majority of the shipowners, especially of the eastern ports, would not have hesitated to retaliate on the vessels of the northern nations with hostile tonnage duties. Nor was their feeling less hostile against France, though the trade with that country was insignificant except for the conveyance of coals; as, in all the French contracts, it was stipulated that coal should be transported thither in either French or English vessels. The extreme Protectionists asserted that the Spaniards and Italians were monopolising a large portion of the trade from Liverpool; and that American merchants, in sending an order for goods to be executed in England, “gave special orders that they should be shipped on board an American liner.”
[Sidenote: Evidence of Mr. Braysher, Collector of Customs in London.]
As, however, the object of this work is rather to show the practical working of the old Navigation Laws than to dwell on the political opinions propounded in this controversy, it is desirable to allude to the evidence given by Mr. Braysher, at that time the Collector of Customs in London,[73] who stated that in the discharge of his duties it was requisite to see that the Navigation Act was duly enforced.
[Sidenote: General effect of the Navigation Laws on the Customs.]
[Sidenote: With the Northern ports,]
Some curious results were developed in the course of his evidence with regard to the working of these laws. Thus the second clause of the Act relating to the trade between Europe and England gave certain privileges in the carrying of twenty-nine “enumerated” articles, all of which, with two exceptions, were raw materials, and, therefore, only importable from Europe in British ships. The intention of the law had been, originally, to permit the importation of raw materials only; and, till recently, all manufactured goods were either positively or virtually prohibited by the imposition of the high duties. It appeared, however, that butter and cheese, and also the spirit named geneva, could be imported in foreign ships, but no advantage was taken of this privilege. The timber trade differed, as that article could be imported in a ship of the country where it grew, or in a ship of the country from which it was usually brought, but this privilege, with these exceptions, was given entirely to British vessels. Nevertheless, British ships did not generally bring timber from the Baltic ports to England; while in the unprotected trade of butter and cheese, which was considerable, British shipowners, by means of steamers, monopolised the chief part of it.[74] The inference from these circumstances was drawn that Protection had very little to do in controlling the course of this trade. Russia was, however, an exception, as the vast proportion of that trade was carried on by British ships; and this, necessarily, arose from the provisions of the second clause of the Navigation Act, because tallow, hemp, flax and pitch, the chief produce of Russia, could only be brought in British or Russian ships; and, as there was not a sufficient Russian mercantile marine to maintain the trade, a virtual monopoly of it fell to British ships, partly through the Navigation Law and partly through the relative circumstances of the merchant marine of the two countries.
[Sidenote: and America.]
Much stress was laid on the fact that goods, the produce of “America,” could not be brought from Europe; thus, by this clause, American cotton once landed at Havre[76] could not be brought over for the consumption of the manufacturers, whatever demand might exist for the article. It was, however, proved that this clause was framed long prior to the American independence, and, hence, had no special reference to cotton, nor, indeed, any political tendency.
[Sidenote: Difficulty about “manufactured” articles.]
It appeared, however, unquestionable, taking the two Navigation Laws together, the American Law and that of England, so far as the trade between the United States and Great Britain was concerned, that we had decidedly the worst of it. Again: the fifth clause of the Navigation Act was the cause of much question at the Customs, and occasioned great inconvenience; this clause ran thus: that all “manufactured” goods shall be deemed to be the produce of the country of which they are the “manufacture.” Thus, coffee imported at Hamburg from its place of growth in Asia or America was roasted and ground there; but, when merchants attempted to bring it into England as a manufactured article, the claim was refused by the law officers of the Crown. Again, mahogany, cut into veneers, was at first not allowed to be a manufactured article; but this decision was afterwards reversed, and veneers were deemed manufactures. In like manner, ostrich feathers, brought from Africa and manufactured in France, offered a very doubtful case, and was, in fact, left undecided, though the impression was, on the whole, adverse to their admission. Refined sugar was deemed a manufacture; and, thus, while raw sugar, the growth of Brazil or Cuba, could not come in from Holland, it could, when refined, be imported. A recent Act required that refined sugar should not only be the produce, but the growth of the country from which it was imported, thereby causing a new difficulty, and showing that the law discouraged the refining of sugar in Holland, and discouraged it at the place of growth.
[Sidenote: Anomalies of coasting and internal trade.]
Again: it was shown that, from the earliest period, foreign ships which could not carry goods from London to Plymouth, could, nevertheless, carry passengers, as such a trade was not considered by the Customs authorities to be trading coastwise. Nay, it further appeared that foreign vessels could have engaged in the internal trade of the country, there being no legal impediment to prevent a Dutch vessel from plying, either with goods or passengers, between London and Gravesend. The like principle might have prevailed on any of the rivers of the kingdom; but a foreign vessel would not have been allowed to carry goods from one port to another. The interdiction against foreign vessels carrying “passengers” was only inserted for the first time in the 8 & 9 Vict., cap. 88 (1845), and, previously to this period, there was no law to prevent a foreign steamer carrying passengers between two English ports; while, even in 1847, a vessel built in Norway could have plied in the Thames. Foreigners, however, either were ignorant of the law, or did not avail themselves of it, considering it a barren advantage.
With Mr. Braysher’s evidence may be brought to a close the extracts necessary to be given from the mass of conflicting statements and documents laid before Mr. Ricardo’s Committee, and I may now proceed with the general history of the measures pursued and subsequently adopted.
[Sidenote: Committee’s last meeting, July 17.]
[Sidenote: General dissatisfaction with the results of the inquiry.]
On the 17th of July, the Committee of the House of Commons held its last sitting; and as a dissolution of Parliament was impending, the Committee, after having published four successive reports, strictly confined to the minutes of the evidence taken before them, came to the conclusion of closing the inquiry. The Protectionist shipowners complained that this abrupt termination of the inquiry was brought about with the view of suppressing the evidence of Mr. D. C. Aylwin, an intelligent merchant connected with the Calcutta trade, who was in attendance to give counter-testimony to many of the Free-trade witnesses. It was also patent that, during the investigation, while twenty-five witnesses had been examined in favour of the repeal of the Navigation Laws, on the other hand, for their defence and maintenance, only nine persons had been called to give their testimony. It was therefore urged that the proceedings of the Committee and the abrupt termination of the inquiry were anything but fair, the more so that no practical results had been obtained, though the evidence procured was, ultimately, of considerable importance.
Thus ended this important inquiry in a manner scarcely satisfactory to either party; nor was the investigation again revived in the committee-rooms of the House of Commons, the scene of the contest being transferred elsewhere. On the 23rd July, 1847, Parliament was dissolved; and at the subsequent general election the Free-trade party was triumphant everywhere, Mr. Cardwell gaining his election at Liverpool, while Mr. Cobden was returned in his absence for the West Riding of Yorkshire, as well as for Stockport; Mr. C. P. Villiers, on whose motion the Corn Laws had been repealed, being also doubly returned for South Lancashire and Wolverhampton, both these elections affording thereby unmistakable evidences of the feeling of the country in favour of unfettered commerce. With so great an accession of strength to the Whig Government, further progress in Free-trade measures became inevitable, and the greatest uneasiness prevailed among shipowners as to their future destiny.
[Sidenote: Commercial panic]
Though events of a calamitous character to general commerce intervened, the shipping interest escaped, and, indeed, flourished. Beyond the large quantities of corn necessary to import, so as to meet the urgent wants of the famishing people of Ireland, it was found by the end of December, 1846, that the deficiency of grain in France, Belgium, and Germany, as well as in the south of Europe, was greater than had been apprehended, and, consequently, prices rose throughout the Continent, the average reaching 75_s._ per quarter in England.[77] Suddenly, large quantities of shipping were again required to execute orders received from France and Belgium for purchases made at advanced prices. The alarm lest the scarcity should still further increase became general; and, in consequence of this, together with apprehensions for the home crops, the average price of wheat rose in May (29th), 1847, to 102_s._ 5_d._[78] Such prices naturally led to great speculation; while the efforts made to bring corn from the most distant regions gave an enormous impulse to the carrying trade, both in Europe and elsewhere.[79]
[Sidenote: and distress of 1847.]
[Sidenote: Suspension of Bank Charter Act.]
But a frightful reaction soon followed. Corn was poured into the ports of Great Britain from all parts of the world with astonishing rapidity. The docks of Liverpool exhibited a quantity of flour that, perhaps, had never been, at any previous period or in any country, imported by merchant vessels to one market. Prices fell to 56_s._ per quarter for wheat, and heavy commercial disasters ensued. Money advanced in value; in August and December the pressure for it increased to a panic. The Bank rate of interest rose to 10 per cent.; and the discount of the best paper became almost impossible. Numerous failures followed; and as representations were made that the credit of the country itself was seriously threatened, Government, on the 25th October, reluctantly stepped forward to arrest further disasters, and took upon themselves the responsibility of risking the violation of the provisions of the Bank Charter Act of 1844; Lord Russell, as First Lord of the Treasury, and Sir Charles Wood, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, advising the Bank to enlarge the amount of its discounts and advances to a minimum of 8 per cent., promising if any infringement of the law should result that Government would secure a Bill of indemnity for the Bank on the meeting of Parliament.
The measures taken by Government produced a salutary effect on commercial circles; and as no actual infringement of the Bank Act of 1844 had occurred, Ministers, considering the purpose they had in view by their letter of October 25th fully answered, intimated that it was unnecessary any longer to continue in force this letter of relief and indemnity.
FOOTNOTES:
[61] See ‘Report of the London Shipowners’ Society, 1833.’
[62] The chief of these was Mr. G. F. Young, who, it must be admitted, made out a very startling, and, at the time, apparently a very strong case against repeal, or even reciprocity; while Mr. Richmond, Mr. W. Philippe, Mr. W. Imrie of Liverpool, Mr. Duncan Dunbar, Mr. J. Macqueen, and others, brought forward an immense array of facts in support of their allegations.
[63] It was stated that a vessel built in Dantzig, according to the following detailed specification, would cost 10_l._ 17_s._ 6_d._ per ton, and in the United States 12_l._ per ton; but that a similar vessel could not be produced in any part of Great Britain under 15_l._ per ton. Say 757 tons, and first class: length on deck, 140 feet; length of keel, 129 feet; breadth of beam, 32 feet; depth of hold, 22 feet; height of ’tween decks laid, 7 feet; the frame to be of oak; bottom planking to the bilge, elm; topsides, wales, &c., pine; ceiling, pine; to have a top-gallant forecastle, fitted for the accommodation of the crew; round house aft, fitted for the accommodation of the captain and officers; the deck otherwise flush; single bulwarks and monkey-rail; patent windlass; caboose fitted with cooking stove; small capstan in the forecastle; a small capstan abaft the mainmast; three anchors; two chain cables of 120 fathoms each; masts, spars, studding-sail booms, and spare spars complete; patent fids and tressels; roller blocks; one long boat; one cutter; one gig with oars, &c., complete, copper fastened to the wales; ship rigged; cordage standing and running rigging complete; two hawsers; two suits of sails complete; the ship to be fastened with iron hanging-knees from the upper deck, and with diagonal iron knees from lower-deck beams to the bilge; patent pumps on deck, and also bilge pumps; all the timber, cordage, sail-cloth, and ironwork, to be of the best materials.
[64] It was contended that as the whole freight of sugar was only 3_l._ per ton from the West Indies or Cuba, equal to one-third of a penny per lb., while the duty was 14_s._ per cwt., or 1½_d._ per lb., any reduction in the freight could not reach the consumer. Such was, also, the case with other articles of large consumption. The average freight of tea was 4_l._ 15_s._ per ton, of 50 cubic feet, equal to 1-5/10_d._ per lb., the duty 2_s._ 2_d._ per lb. The average freight on tobacco from New Orleans had been 50_s._ per hogshead, or equal to 7/15ths of a penny per lb.; from Virginia, 35_s._ per hogshead, or one-third of a penny per lb.; the duty being 3_s._ per lb. Taking flour from the United States at 4_s._ per barrel, freight would be a farthing a lb. The freight upon indigo at 4_l._ 15_s._ per ton, of 50 cubic feet, would be equal to 11/16 a lb. The freight on coffee at 4_l._ per ton is equal to about one-third of a penny per lb., the duty on foreign being 6_d._, and on coffee from the British possessions 4_d._ per lb. On cotton the average freight for the previous ten years from Bombay, 3_l._ 5_s._ 4_d._ per ton, of 50 cubic feet, which is equivalent to 7/16ths of a penny per lb.; from the United States it was estimated at 5/8ths of a penny per lb. At these rates, it was urged that it would require a microscopic coinage to secure it to the consumer; it would all be absorbed. Supposing the freight to be reduced one-third, below which no British shipowner could live, leaving a fair freight to pay for the expenses of the ship, and a small profit, and supposing the freight to be so reduced from the foreigner sailing cheaper than we could, it was contended that no benefit could result to the consumer: on the other hand, by its retention, you retain, also, that which it is of the most vital interest for any country to retain, its national defences.
[65] Taking a hypothetical calculation of the result of a voyage of twelve months’ duration of a British ship of 500 tons, and of a ship of equal tonnage of the above-mentioned nations respectively, and taking the items of wages, insurance, interest on capital, calculated at 5 per cent., and depreciation of the property, which experience warrants at 10 per cent. per annum, the total amount of those items, on a ship of 500 tons built in England, and costing 8750_l._, would be 2623_l._ 10_s._ on such a voyage; on a ship of the United States, costing, as estimated, 7250_l._, it would be 2191_l._ 10_s._; that on a Dutch ship, costing 7000_l._, it would be 2110_l._; that on a Bremen ship, costing 5500_l._, it would be 1626_l._; that on a Swedish ship, costing the same amount, it would be 1550_l._; and that on a Prussian ship, costing 4720_l._, it would be 1329_l._; making a difference in favour of an American ship of 432_l._; of a Dutch ship of 513_l._ 10_s._; of a Bremen ship of 997_l._ 10_s._; of a Swedish ship of 1073_l._ 10_s._; and of a Prussian ship of 1294_l._ 10_s._ These gross disbursements resolved into their elements, as regards wages, stood thus. The wages on a British ship were calculated at 786_l._; the wages of an American ship of the same size, viz., 500 tons, 669_l._; in a Dutch ship, 640_l._; in a Bremen ship, 471_l._; in a Swedish ship, 395_l._; and in a Prussian ship, 331_l._ 10_s._ The items of these wages, as regards British ships, were, an English captain, 10_l._ a month [that is the amount of wages, but the emoluments of a British captain would be very much more than that]; chief mate, 6_l._ per month; second mate, 4_l._ per month; boatswain, 3_l._ 10_s._ per month; carpenter, 5_l._ per month; cook, 2_l._ 10_s._; nine able seamen, at 45_s._ each, 20_l._ 5_s._; eight ordinary seamen, at 30_s._ each, 12_l._; and three apprentices, at 15_s._ each, 2_l._ 5_s._; making a monthly amount of 65_l._ 10_s._, which multiplied by 12, gives the amount stated, 786_l._
[66] Mr. Colquhoun, now Sir Patrick Colquhoun, Q.C., at one time Plenipotentiary of the Hanse Towns at Constantinople, also gave evidence (see 3980, &c.); but, from a point of view entirely different from that of Mr. Richmond. The Hanse Towns, as carriers for the large continent of Germany, were naturally opposed to a system which circumvented their sphere of action, while Holland took the opposite view.
[67] Mr. Richmond was one of my constituents when I represented the Borough of Tynemouth, and, though he strongly opposed my return to Parliament, I have a pleasing recollection of him as a courteous man, and a fine specimen of the old school of Protectionists. In reply to a question of how it was that, in spite of such gloom and ruin, the shipowners of that borough continued to build more vessels, he replied, “Sir, do not you know that Hope is the last thing that forsakes the human breast?”
[68] See ante, p. 42-8, Reports from their Consuls.
[69] Evidence of Captain Briggs.
[70] Evidence of Captain Briggs.
[71] These tables occupy much space. Vide ‘Report,’ p. 690. House of Commons Inquiry.
[72]
Per Ton. £ s. A ship 12 years, A 1 Class, 300 tons old measure, } built complete, sold for } 12 12 ” 10 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 10 10 ” 9 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 9 0 ” 8 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 8 0 ” 7 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 7 0 ” 6 ” A 1 Class, ditto ditto 6 0
[73] Vide Evidence of Mr. Braysher, 2297.
[74] It followed from the system, that there was coincidently a protected trade and an unprotected trade. The protected trade included in 1847 the whole coast of Africa and Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena and Ascension, Mauritius, British India, the British North American Colonies, the Australian Colonies, the British West Indies, the Fisheries, and the Channel Islands. The unprotected trade included Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Prussia, Germany, Holland, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Gibraltar and Malta[75], Turkey, the Morea and Egypt, Tripoli, Barbary and Marocco, China, Sumatra and Java, the foreign West Indies, the United States of America, Mexico and the States of South America, the Ionian Islands, the Cape de Verde and the South Sea Islands. In these two categories, protected and unprotected, the whole of the British trade was then comprehended.
[75] Gibraltar and Malta, although colonies of the British Crown, were considered as not in Europe, or foreign countries, with reference to the Navigation Laws, and our Customs Regulations.
[76] On April 3, 1848, Mr. Bright urged on Mr. Labouchere the propriety of importing cotton from Havre, then abundant there; but he replied that the Minister could not abrogate the Navigation Laws; Hansard, vol. xvii. p. 1202.
[77] See Tooke’s ‘History of Prices,’ vol. v. p. 95.
[78] Mr. Tooke says in a note that the highest price in Mark Lane had been reached on the 17th May, when 115_s._ per quarter was paid for wheat; a very fine parcel was sold in the Uxbridge Market, at 125_s._
[79] The total quantity of grain imported of all kinds into this country was 3,790,957 quarters in 1846; but the total imports in 1847 reached 9,436,677 quarters, while the imports of meal and flour in these two years amounted to 3,347,565, and 8,633,991 cwts. respectively. That year my firm alone (W. S. Lindsay and Co.) chartered, in their capacity as shipbrokers, vessels to bring from the Black Sea, Egypt, America, and elsewhere, no less than 1,250,000 quarters of grain of different sorts.
Chapter VII
New Parliament, November 18, 1847—Speech from Throne—Mr. Robinson and Shipowners deceived—Conversation between Mr. Bancroft and Lord Palmerston—Mr. Bancroft’s declaration—Official letter from Mr. Bancroft to Lord Palmerston, November 3, 1847—Lord Palmerston’s reply, November 17, practically giving prior information to the Americans—Lord Clarendon tells the Shipowners’ Society that the laws will not be altered, December 26, 1846; and repeats this assurance, March 15, 1847—Interview between Lord Palmerston and Mr. Bancroft, published in ‘Washington Union’—Excites great indignation when known in England, January 1848—Parliament re-assembles, February 3, 1848—Lord Palmerston admits the correspondence with America—The Earl of Hardwicke’s proposal, February 25, 1848—Earl Grey grants a Committee—Evidence of the Shipowners before the Lords’ Committee—Mr. Young proposes some modifications, the first concessions of the Anti-Repeal Party—Claim in favour of direct voyages—Government insists on Total Repeal—Detailed views of Admiral Sir George Byam Martin—Importance of keeping up the merchant navy—Arguments from his personal experience as to its value as a nursery for seamen—Working of the system of apprenticeship, and of impressment—Evidence of Admiral Berkeley, and of Mr. R. B. Minturn—Details about American ships—Reciprocity treaties so far as they affect Americans—Their whale fishery.
[Sidenote: New Parliament, November 18, 1847.]
On the 18th of November, 1847, the new Parliament was opened by commission. It had been thus early called together to consider the distress caused by the recent commercial embarrassments and the severe pressure still prevailing in Ireland, notwithstanding an abundant harvest, together with the importation of an unprecedented quantity of grain, flour, and provisions.
[Sidenote: Speech from Throne.]
The Speaker having been chosen, the Speech from the Throne, delivered by the Marquess of Lansdowne, contained the following important paragraph:—“Her Majesty recommends to the consideration of Parliament the laws which regulate the navigation of the United Kingdom, with a view to ascertain whether any changes can be adopted which, without danger to our maritime strength, may promote the commercial and colonial interests of the empire.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Robinson and Shipowners deceived.]
The guarded terms in which this paragraph was couched lulled the suspicions of some of the leaders of the Protectionist party. Mr. Robinson, a merchant connected with the Newfoundland trade, and an influential member of Lloyd’s, was, at that time, in Parliament for the borough of Poole. On the debate on the Address, he said, “that with respect to the Navigation Laws, he had looked with much attention to the precise words in her Majesty’s Speech on this subject, and he did not object to them. He did not object to inquiry into those laws, with a view to consider any or what relaxation or modification might be made applicable to the existing state of things, and the maintenance of the maritime interests of Great Britain and her dependencies.”
[Sidenote: Conversation between Mr. Bancroft and Lord Palmerston.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Bancroft’s declaration.]
But though Mr. Robinson and the party of whose views he was then the exponent may have deluded themselves into a belief that Government had no intention of bringing any measure into Parliament for the abrogation of the Navigation Laws, it is, now, beyond doubt that the administration of Lord Russell, whatever might have been his Lordship’s individual opinions, had resolved to introduce and support, with all its power, a very sweeping measure. In the autumn of 1847 the American Minister put himself in communication and had interviews with Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at which Mr. Labouchere was present.[80] On one of these occasions, Mr. Bancroft informed them that the American Government, believing it was the disposition of Parliament to make a large and liberal alteration in the Navigation Laws, was anxious to co-operate with the English Ministers in that great work, and, in conjunction with them, to set an example which he hoped would be productive of important and salutary effects. Mr. Bancroft’s language was singularly expressive and emphatic. In one of the interviews he said to the English Ministers: “We are ready to do anything you like; if you can do but little, we must do little; if you can do much, we will do much; IF YOU SHALL DO ALL, WE SHALL DO ALL.”[81]
This important declaration (whether or not Mr. Bancroft had any authority for making it in all its fulness) became at a future period the subject of incessant comment and controversy. It is important, therefore, that the facts, as they occurred, should be clearly stated. There can be no doubt that this conversation took place in the month of October 1847, but what Mr. Bancroft meant must probably ever remain a matter of conjecture. If, however, language is of any value in conveying the views or intention of the person who speaks, it may fairly be presumed that the positive expression “little” had reference to the carriage of European produce, indifferently, in either American or British ships to the ports of the United States, and the general produce of the world from American ports in the like manner to ports of Great Britain. The equivalent the Americans could give in return for the comparative “much,” presuming this to mean unrestricted trade with British colonies, is difficult to conjecture; seeing that the Americans have no colonies, and, in point of fact, no equivalent whatever to give. As regards the superlative “all, in return for all,” it could only have had reference to the coasting trade so jealously guarded at that time by both countries; and, in the sequel, it will be evident how far this magnanimous offer corresponded with the tenacious policy then and to this day adhered to by the United States Government.
Lord Palmerston, entertaining a strong feeling in favour of the repeal of the Navigation Laws, at once perceived what use could be made of the concurrence of the United States Government in a LARGE measure of reform. He accordingly requested Mr. Bancroft to put his views in a formal communication, which was done as follows:—
[Sidenote: Official letter from Mr. Bancroft to Lord Palmerston, November 3, 1847.]
“American Legation, 3rd November, 1847.
“The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, has the honour to inquire of Viscount Palmerston, her British Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, if her Majesty’s Government is inclined to remove existing restrictions on international commerce.
“Universal reciprocity, in the widest sense, is held by the American Government as the only thoroughly appropriate basis for intercourse between two great nations. The prohibition of the indirect trade has but restrained enterprise: it has done good to neither country. To abrogate it would at once set free dormant commercial wealth without injuring any one.
“Should her Majesty’s Government entertain similar views, the undersigned is prepared on the part of the American Government to propose that British ships may trade from any port of the world to any port in the United States, and be received, protected, and, in respect to charges and duties, be treated like American ships, if, reciprocally, American ships may in like manner trade from any port in the world to any port under the dominion of her British Majesty.
“The removal of commercial restrictions, while it would be of mutual advantage to the material interests of both countries, could not but give openings to still further relations of amity between them, and, by its influence on the intercourse of nations, create new guarantees for the peace of the world.
“The undersigned, &c.
(Signed) “GEORGE BANCROFT.”
The following reply was given by Lord Palmerston:—
[Sidenote: Lord Palmerston’s reply, November 17,]
“Foreign Office, 17th November, 1847.
“SIR,
“I have lost no time in communicating to my colleagues your note of the 3rd inst. on the subject of the Navigation Laws which regulate the commerce of the British Empire and that of the United States with each other.
“This question has already engaged the serious attention of her Majesty’s Ministers, and we observe with pleasure that the sentiments we entertain with regard to it are shared by the Government of a country, with which we are so closely united by the ties of an extensive commerce and of a common origin.
“We do not, however, think that we should be justified in advising the Crown to enter into an engagement which would be at variance with some of the most important principles of the existing Navigation Law without the previous sanction of Parliament; but it is our intention to propose to Parliament, without unnecessary delay, measures which would enable us to place our commercial intercourse in regard to the matters to which your note refers on the most liberal and comprehensive basis with respect to all countries which shall be willing to act in a corresponding spirit towards us.
(Signed) “PALMERSTON.”[82]
[Sidenote: practically giving prior information to the Americans.]
[Sidenote: Lord Clarendon tells Shipowners’ Society that the laws will not be altered, December 26, 1846, and repeats this assurance, March 15, 1847.]
It thus appears that the English Ministers communicated their intentions formally and explicitly to the American Government, and, through that Government to the American people, a day before they chose to inform the English Parliament and the nation, somewhat vaguely, in the Queen’s Speech, of the course they might, eventually, be led to pursue. A year previously, on the 21st of December, 1846, the Shipowners’ Society of London had had an interview with Lord Clarendon at the Board of Trade. On that occasion, as appears from the Minutes of the Society, they were graciously received, and assured in distinct language, that no intention was entertained on the part of her Majesty’s Government of making any alteration in these laws. Three months later, on the 15th March, 1847, these gentlemen, entertaining a feeling of mistrust in the then governing powers, went again to the Board of Trade and asked the same question, and were once more assured that there was no intention on the part of Government to interfere with the fundamental principles of the Navigation Laws; that an individual member, Mr. Ricardo, had indeed mooted the subject of a committee, which Government could not refuse, but that the committee should be a fair one, with Mr. Milner Gibson[83] as chairman, as they were desirous to give satisfaction to all parties interested. So far no intention was expressed of tampering with these laws; and we have seen that Mr. Robinson, on scrutinising the terms of the Queen’s Speech in November, acquiesced in its propriety, no suspicion having entered his mind, that, already, these laws were foredoomed by Ministers, still less that, the very day before Parliament met, they had communicated their intentions to a foreign maritime Power—a nation, too, which, at that moment, was straining every nerve to wrest from us the supremacy of the ocean. Under such circumstances as these, the following article, first published in the ‘Washington Union,’[84] created intense astonishment. Nor is it surprising that it should have done so:—
[Sidenote: Interview between Lord Palmerston and Mr. Bancroft published in ‘Washington Union.’]
“Repeal of the Navigation Laws.—A correspondence has taken place between the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs and our Minister at that Court relative to the repeal of the Navigation Laws of Great Britain. Mr. Bancroft applied to Viscount Palmerston early in November to learn whether Ministers would consent to establish with the United States a perfect system of reciprocity, in making all vessels of either country, fitting out from any port of the world, free to trade to any port of the other nation, whether home or colonial. Viscount Palmerston, after the lapse of some weeks (it was just fourteen days), replied that, although her Majesty’s Ministers did not feel at liberty to advise her Majesty at once to make such a change in the commercial system as was asked by Mr. Bancroft without the consent of Parliament, yet as soon as that body should meet, a measure would be introduced which would embrace all the views put forth by Mr. Bancroft in his note. It is not doubted that Parliament will at once act favourably on the Bill. The importance to the United States of such a measure can scarcely be exaggerated. The British colonial system has been a most grievous restriction on our commerce, and its annihilation, as promised by Lord Palmerston, will open to our enterprising merchants the lucrative trade of the East and West Indies, and of the other British settlements from which they have been hitherto debarred. This will be the greatest stride yet taken by Free-trade: and it is not to be doubted that all Europe will follow the example of Great Britain! The liberal commercial treaty made by Hanover with the United States has been in no small degree instrumental in disposing the British Government to this wise measure. The Rhine provinces have recently imitated the example of Hanover towards the United States; and everywhere silently but steadily our commercial relations are being put upon the most advantageous footing. The repeal by Great Britain of the laws restricting the trade of the United States with her colonies will be far more beneficial to this country than any commercial treaty ever made by our Government.”
Such was the announcement put forth in the American journals semi-officially, and the reader will judge how far this “puff direct” of the American executive was borne out by facts, or the dates and tenor of the correspondence given between the American Minister in England and the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The spirit of the most perfect liberality, and, I must add, complete reciprocity, seemed to pervade all Mr. Bancroft’s professions when communicating with Lord Palmerston and Mr. Labouchere, promising “little, much, and all,” according as the same could be obtained from Parliament. In his special despatch, he described the concessions his Government was prepared to grant, as universal reciprocity in its widest sense, which, if it meant anything at all, meant the opening to our ships of their extensive coasting trade in return for the opening of our still more extensive colonial trade to the ships of the United States; or, if such was not his meaning, it meant that, when we opened our coasting trade, they would do so likewise. But the latter portion of his despatch, and the semi-official announcement in the ‘Washington Union,’ contain, in other respects, many vague generalities and, as subsequently appeared, the Government of the United States never had any intention of opening its coasting trade to the ships of Great Britain.
[Sidenote: Excites great indignation when known in England, January 1848.]
When the correspondence transpired in January 1848, it created great astonishment, if not alarm and indignation, throughout the country, especially among shipowners and all persons who considered that their best interests were interwoven with the maintenance of the Navigation Laws. The Conservative press loudly reproached Lord Palmerston for having made known the intentions of Government with regard to this important measure to the American Minister before communicating them to Parliament; nor could the Liberals approve of the course that had been adopted.
[Sidenote: Parliament re-assembles on February 3, 1848.]
[Sidenote: Lord Palmerston admits the correspondence with. America.]
On the evening of the 3rd February, 1848, the day of the re-assembling of Parliament, there was considerable excitement in the House of Commons, and, amidst it, Mr. Robinson asked the Foreign Minister whether any correspondence or communication had taken place between him and the Minister of the United States about the Navigation Laws; and, if so, whether he would lay it upon the table? Lord Palmerston, with the ready tact for which he was distinguished, and with the smiling coolness so characteristic of him, especially in times of excitement, at once and frankly avowed that there had been such a correspondence; looking, with a twinkle in his eye and a smile on his lip, at Mr. Robinson, as if to inquire in turn, and “if there has been, what is there to make such a fuss about?” adding that the correspondence would, at once, be laid on the table.
This announcement, perhaps more from the manner in which it was made than from the fact accompanying it, that Ministers intended immediately to submit to Parliament a proposition on the subject, quieted the House, but, at the same time, awakened the shipowners out of doors to what they considered their dangerous situation. They felt conscious that, in the House of Commons, a Free-trade majority would sanction any measure the Government might have the courage to propose. On the other hand, in the House of Lords, where popular passions prevailed less, they hoped to find a less prejudiced tribunal; hence, they prudently resolved to change the “venue,” and to appeal to the Upper House for the perpetuation of Protection. With this view they selected Lord Hardwicke as their mouthpiece and champion; and, in order to complete the inquiry commenced by the Lower House in the preceding session, resolved to move the appointment of a Committee of the Lords to inquire into the policy and operation of the Navigation Laws; the shipowners being sanguine that there, at least, they would be able to make out a satisfactory case, and counteract the one-sided evidence they conceived had been given by the repeal party before the Committee of the Commons.
[Sidenote: The Earl of Hardwicke’s proposal, February 25, 1848.]
Accordingly Lord Hardwicke on the 25th February, pursuant to notice, moved the appointment of a Select Committee of the Lords.[85] Recapitulating in his speech the events of the preceding year, and, dwelling in terms of indignation on the dissimulation which, he said, had been practised, he charged Ministers with having deceived the country; and stigmatised the whole evidence before the Committee of the Commons as one-sided and unfair. He complained that a distinguished officer of the Royal Navy, Sir James Stirling, had given his evidence in favour of the abolition of the Navigation Laws; but that, before he could be cross-examined, the Committee were informed, that the duty of the gallant officer required his absence, and that he had sailed from England. His Lordship then entered into numerous details, pronouncing Mr. Porter’s evidence to be false; he, and the statistical officers of the Board of Trade, “being learned in that description of theory which was so popular now-a-days;” whereby forty-seven vessels of 7101 tons, which had, in 1846, entered inwards from French ports, were converted, by multiplying the number of entries inwards, into 228,186 tons, and by treating the clearances outwards in a similar manner magnified to such an extent that they represented 556,824 tons; while the Prince Ernest, a passenger and mail boat, employed between Calais and Dover, of 145 tons, figured in the Custom House returns as 24,215 tons of British shipping![86]
[Sidenote: Earl Grey grants a Committee.]
Earl Grey, in granting the committee, took care to express an opinion, that no further inquiry was necessary. He defended the course taken by his colleague, Lord Palmerston, contending that no understanding had been come to with the Government of the United States with regard to the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and that the correspondence implied nothing more, than that a mutual relaxation of existing restrictions would be beneficial to the maritime commerce of both countries: he concluded by defending Mr. Porter’s returns, and added, that “their Lordships would find that, on strict examination, the allegations of falseness would vanish altogether.”
[Sidenote: Evidence of the Shipowners before the Lords’ Committee.]
The contest being thus transferred for the time to a Committee of the Lords, the shipowners feeling sure of success before this tribunal, brought forward a large amount of evidence, much of which was instructive, though somewhat conflicting. Mr. G. F. Young, who again took the leading part, insisted that if foreign ships were allowed to trade indiscriminately with British possessions, and took part in the indirect trade with foreign countries, it would be impossible that British ships could obtain an equivalent, because by far the greater proportion of foreign States do not possess any colonies. But, even if they had anything to offer in return, he had little faith in “reciprocity;” because every nation, except England, appears to exhibit, with respect to its maritime commerce, an intense feeling of nationality, and a fixed determination to support its commercial marine. Sweden, he said, admits any article used in the construction and equipment of Swedish-built ships duty free, and remits to such vessels, for the first year after they are built, the export duties on goods charged to others. Russia adopted a somewhat similar policy by exempting all vessels built in that country from the payment of her port-charges, for the first three years after they were launched. But Mr. Young failed to see that, while all such concessions as these must be made good by extra taxes on the people of the respective countries, they were at the same time prejudicial to their own shipping, in that they encouraged the production of cheap and inferior vessels.
Numerous arguments of a similar character were adduced, some based on facts, others on conjectures; and not a few adverted to heavy losses the British shipowner contemplated from causes which never had and never could have any real existence. Prussia, for instance, he said, confines the trade in the importation of salt to her own ships, which was true; America, invariably, gave the preference to her own ships, a statement either conjectural or, in some degree, supported by the fact that her merchants often found it to their interest as traders, and, not through any feeling of “intense nationality,” to employ on certain trades their own ships in preference to those of any other nation. He further alleged that British shipowners would be irretrievably ruined by the admission of foreign ships, an assertion, of course, speculative, or purely imaginary. While maintaining that the evils of the Navigation Laws had been greatly overrated, he thought the advantages of these restrictive laws were equally exaggerated. He, however, attached the very greatest importance to the “Long Voyage clause,” considering that it was far from clear that the interests of the country required its repeal, or that it could be safely repealed without the most injurious consequences to British navigation; in a word, he thought no other clause in the Navigation Act so essential to the maintenance of British navigation.
[Sidenote: Mr. Young proposes some modifications,]
He could not, however, fail to see that the impossibility of bringing American cotton from Havre, cochineal from Teneriffe, or hides from Buenos Ayres (about which great complaints had been raised), occasioned great inconvenience. The cochineal from Teneriffe was no doubt, as explained elsewhere, absurdly exaggerated as a grievance, but it involved other articles, and could not be maintained on principle. Mr. Young, therefore, to remedy this evil, suggested a modification of the third clause of the Navigation Act, by introducing some words with respect to the produce of distant quarters of the world, as that which regulated by the second clause the importations from Europe; namely, by the limitation of the restriction to certain articles to be specifically enumerated; the enumerated articles being made to comprise all those bulky commodities, the retention of the importation of which to British shipping was of the last importance, while the surrender of the remainder would not materially affect British maritime commerce, and ought therefore, in his opinion, to be conceded to general convenience. The effect of this would be to exclude from the restriction such minor articles as are not the staple produce of those countries, and which, though not entering largely into British consumption, might occasionally be required as part of assorted cargoes. Another relaxation Mr. Young proposed, guarding himself, however, by stating that he had no authority to do so from any constituted body of shipowners, was to introduce in like manner, in perfect accordance with the general principle of the Navigation Laws, a permission to import the produce of Asia, Africa, and America, not only from the country of production, but, from the country within those distant parts of the world in which the produce might be found. Under such a regulation, he explained that if it should happen that the hides of Buenos Ayres were found at New York, it would enable those hides to be imported into England either in British ships or in American ships; and it would enable tea, the produce of China, in like manner to be imported from New York, or any part of Asia, Africa, or America.
[Sidenote: the first concessions of the Anti-Repeal party.]
This was, perhaps, the first concession which the anti-repeal party had made with regard to the Navigation Laws. They vainly thought it would tend to settle the whole question. They saw that the relaxation proposed, if fully carried out, while meeting many of the cases of real grievance complained of by commission merchants, would practically retain most important advantages they would never consent to relinquish, but which they would as certainly lose if they were to allow the importation of goods, the produce of distant quarters of the globe, in foreign ships direct into Great Britain from the place of production.
This modification of the Navigation Laws was, doubtless, important, and was said to be in strict harmony with the principle then regulating the importation of goods from the various countries of Europe, which, in 1825, was permitted by Mr. Huskisson to be made from the place where found, the earlier restriction having been that the importation must be from the place of production.
The shipowners would still have retained to British shipping the advantage of the direct voyage, which was, after all, their great point. In consenting to the plan, they urged that, in the end, the interest of the consumer would be equally secured with that of the shipowner, by giving that encouragement afforded by the Navigation Act to direct rather than indirect importation. The opponents of repeal exhibited great alarm lest, if indirect importations were permitted, these would take place from distant ports of the world into the nearer ports of Europe, and be there warehoused: and they expressed the fear that the people of this country would then consume considerable proportions of the productions of tropical climates, burdened with the expenses of previous importation into the ports of continental nations, in addition to what was then paid under the limited direct importation!! It was only, he said, with the view of remedying palpable absurdities, such as that of the hides brought from Buenos Ayres to Hamburg, that Mr. Young suggested a modification of the existing law, which he thought would not merely meet that case, but also remove the greater part of the inconveniences complained of arising from the operation of the Navigation Laws.
[Sidenote: Government insists on Total Repeal.]
But these concessions were not sufficient for the requirements of Government. They, or rather the Free-trade party, which had by this time greatly increased in power and influence, had long felt that the principle on which the Navigation Laws were framed was entirely wrong, and consequently, that they could not accept any modification short of total and unconditional repeal. But they knew, also, they had still a powerful party to contend against, and that it was necessary to fortify their opinions by as strong an array of facts as could be collected. These were not, however, easily obtainable; nor could the advantages derivable from free navigation be proved by experience. No nation as yet had put this to the test; and, in fact, experience would hitherto have shown that the experiment of throwing open British ports to vessels of all nations, so that they might enter and depart, unconditionally, would have been alike unwise and dangerous. Nevertheless, Government felt its views to be sound, and that the change contemplated would benefit shipowners as well as the nation, but, in the absence of facts, experience alone could support the opinions thus formed and used as arguments in favour of the Government policy. The inferiority, in many respects, of the masters of our merchant ships, compared with those of other nations, which competition, they said, would improve, as well as the vessels under their charge, was one of their strongest points.
But Government had to meet many other arguments on which no experience existed; and, not the least of these was the question of manning the navy, embracing the all-important one of the maintenance of the British fleet.
[Sidenote: Detailed views of Admiral Sir George Byam Martin.]
Among other witnesses who came before the Lords’ Committee, Admiral Sir George Byam Martin was a stout advocate for upholding the Navigation Laws. He contended that these laws gave encouragement to the British shipowner by exclusive advantages in the colonial and coasting trade, which he regarded as a compensation for the obligation of building his ships in some parts of the Queen’s dominions, and of employing a certain number of apprentices. If manufacturers really felt that these laws in any degree cramped their commercial enterprise, they ought also, he thought, to be content to yield somewhat for the maintenance of a service to which they all owed their protection and safety. The Admiral held that the Navigation Laws gave protection to British seamen, by securing to them employment in a calling for which they qualified themselves by a long and severe apprenticeship. There were only, he said, four main objects presented to the shipowner to give him hope of a satisfactory competition with the cheap carriers of other countries:
1st. That by the abrogation of the Navigation Laws he would be left at liberty to build his ships in cheap foreign countries.
2ndly. That he would be allowed to take foreign seamen, without limitation of number.
3rdly. That he would no longer be compelled to take apprentices; and
4thly. As a further temptation to the shipowner to be reconciled to the change, his men would no longer be liable to impressment.
None, however, of these points could, in the opinion of Admiral Martin, be conceded without loss to the public service.
If the abrogation of the Navigation Laws left the shipowner at liberty to build his ships in foreign countries, and he availed himself of that licence, it would inevitably diminish the shipwright class in this kingdom; yet on this class, the admiral argued, the safety of England had greatly depended during the late and former wars, and this he thought would be even more the case in any future wars in which the country may be plunged.
“During the war which ended in 1815, we had,” remarked the admiral, “800 pennants flying, and even so many as 900 ships were in commission for a considerable time. Great exertions were necessary on the part of the shipwrights to keep up the repairs of such a fleet, and to build new ships to supply the decay and the casualties constantly going on. But numerous as our fleet was then, it was likely to be on a much larger scale hereafter; for, in addition to our usual fleets, there must, of necessity, be an immense number of steamers in a great measure as an addition, though not as a substitute for sailing ships.”[87]
The number of shipwrights in the King’s yards throughout the war, he estimated, might be taken at an average of 3714 and 875 apprentices, making a total of 4589 working shipwrights, besides 550 in the colonial yards. Notwithstanding this great shipwright strength, and the efforts exacted from them, the Admiralty was obliged to seek every possible assistance from the private shipbuilders,[88] and to these persons Admiral Martin maintained protection was due, considering how much they had done for the country when we had enemies to deal with in every quarter.
I need not dwell upon all the other points of Admiral Martin’s evidence; but that which relates to the merchant service and manning the navy must not be omitted.
[Sidenote: Importance of keeping up the merchant navy.]
[Sidenote: Arguments from his personal experience as to its value as a nursery for seamen.]
If the Navigation Laws were done away, Admiral Martin believed, the shipowner who would go to foreign countries for cheap ships would, from the same motive, take foreign seamen, such as Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, or Dutchmen, who would be content with small wages and a cheap scale of dietary. In this way, a large number of British seamen would be deprived of the employment they now enjoyed owing mainly to the Navigation Laws; and, in such a case, the naval service must suffer in proportion, especially, when, in time of war, seamen are most urgently required. It had been said, and it was a “marvellous assertion,” that the merchant service contributes so little towards the supply of the navy—that, so far as concerned this point, there need be no hesitation in abandoning the Navigation Laws. An assertion more completely contradicted by all experience, Admiral Martin confidently stated, had never been uttered. The merchant service, he held, was everything to the navy, while the navy, he was convinced, could not exist without it. He was unable, adequately, to express his surprise at these loose assertions, for every person who remembered the muster of the navy immediately preceding the war in 1793, could not fail to know that the glorious victory of the 1st of June, 1794, under Lord Howe, was gained by the merchant seamen of the kingdom. We had not then, he said, 20,000 men, and these were scattered over the globe when the war broke out; it was, therefore, the merchant service that enabled us rapidly to man some sixty sail of the line, and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels. By promptly bringing together about 35,000 or 40,000 seamen of the mercantile marine, Admiral Gardner was able at once to proceed to the West Indies with seven sail of the line, nine frigates and sloops of war; Lord Hood to man twenty-two sail of the line, and a large number of frigates and sloops, with which he occupied Toulon and took Corsica; while, by its aid, other squadrons were sent to America and to the East Indies to protect our interests in those quarters. The command of seamen from the merchant service also enabled Lord Howe to occupy the Channel with twenty-seven sail of the line and numerous frigates, thereby affording security to our own homes, and the means of protecting our colonies and commerce by detached squadrons.
[Sidenote: Working of the system of apprenticeship,]
Notwithstanding these proofs of naval energy on the first outburst of the late war, and of the important help derived from the merchant service, the number of men obtained was, after all, inadequate to the wants of the country. The merchant service, suddenly drained of so many thousands, could, afterwards, give only a comparatively small and occasional supply as ships arrived from foreign ports, or as apprentices grew out of their time. Now this continued, though insufficient succour to the navy, Admiral Martin thought, could never have been maintained throughout so long a war but for the provident provisions of the Navigation Laws in making it compulsory on shipowners to take a certain number of apprentices, and thus to keep up a constant replenishment of seafaring men.[89]
He expressed himself of quite a different opinion to those who were sanguine in believing the abrogation of the Navigation Laws would increase our shipping; and stoutly combated the notion that we could retain the same quantity of tonnage after we had entered on a system of rivalry with foreign countries in cheap carrying. But, assuming that we retained 4,000,000 tons[90] of shipping, it might be well to see how the comparison stood with respect to the supply of men derived from the 1,500,000 in 1793, and what might be expected from the present 4,000,000 tons. In 1793, and up to 1835, the Act of Queen Anne secured a replenishment of seafaring men by apprentices of more than double the number, when we had only 1,500,000, to what the Act of 1835 did in 1848 with 4,000,000. Consequently, in that respect, nothing was gained by the increased tonnage. By the Act of Queen Anne, vessels of 30 tons were obliged to take an apprentice; whereas under the Act of 1835 a vessel of 200 tons takes only one apprentice. Under the Act of Queen Anne, vessels of 400 tons took five apprentices; under the Act of 1835, only two. Formerly ships of 1400 tons were obliged to take fifteen apprentices; whereas, under the present Act, the largest ship built was only required to take five: so that the lesser amount of tonnage in 1793 gave a larger supply of fresh hands than the 4,000,000 tons.
The admiral did not fail to point out, in comparing the two periods, that the increase to 4,000,000 exhibited a noble proof of our commercial growth under the protection of the Navigation Laws, and seemed to warn us of what we hazarded in giving up 4,000,000 of shipping tonnage to be scrambled for by all the nations of the world.
[Sidenote: and of impressment.]
A more important and alarming view of the subject was the encouragement held out to the shipowner to believe that, among other changes contemplated, his men would be no longer subject to impressment. If that were to be the case, asked, pertinently, Admiral Martin, what was the use of increased numbers, the presumed result of increased tonnage, if the men were locked up, and, thus, were not at once available for the navy?[91]
It is unnecessary to repeat Admiral Martin’s further remarks concerning apprentices. I may, however, state that he considered the complaints against them but a “plausible grievance” of a few shipowners. Apprentices, he held, were not much expense, for though they ate as much as men, they soon became active and useful in the ship, performing a man’s duty without wages. They were, besides, the cheapest people to shipowners, who in war time were glad enough to have their full number of them, because, as apprentices, they were in fact so many hands protected from impressment. The number of fresh hands required to keep up the stock of seamen was very considerable; for the hard life of sailors tells early on human strength, and the perils of their pursuit contributes much to the waste of life. The Admiral, therefore, held that law which compelled shipowners to take apprentices was a most valuable part of the Navigation Laws, and ought not on any account to be given up: and that a constant influx of young blood into the sea service was essential to the interests of a naval country, and any diminution of the present number of apprentices in proportion to the existing tonnage would, in his opinion, be detrimental to the navy, and hazardous to our national security.
With regard to the quality of the supply from the commercial to the military navy of this country, and to the comparative value of those who had been brought up in the merchant service, or of those who entered the navy for the first time, Admiral Martin unhesitatingly said, that the real practical seaman was the north country sailor; but that the coasting sailor and the South Sea-fishery sailor were now very scarce, if we had not lost the latter altogether.
[Sidenote: Evidence of Admiral Berkeley,]
Captain Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley, R.N., who also gave evidence, entered into various explanations concerning the effect of bounties, and of the impressment of seamen, and approved the practice by which seamen in foreign parts could enter her Majesty’s ships without being deemed deserters: he admitted, however, that if he were a captain in a merchant vessel “he might probably think it a hard case.” He took care to remark that “the fault was not always with the men;” and, at the same time, gave a different testimony to that of Sir James Stirling about the proportion of merchant seamen who served on board men-of-war. In his opinion, two-fifths of the navy had been brought up in the merchant service; while a good many who had commenced life in it as boys, had subsequently gone into the merchant service. With respect to the registry system, he remarked that in the Jews’ shops at Shadwell, and in similar places at Bristol, sailors could purchase as many register-tickets as they wanted, and, for half the amount of the fine, that would be asked of them if they went to the Custom House.[93]
[Sidenote: and of Mr. R. B. Minturn.]
Mr. Robert B. Minturn, an eminent merchant and shipowner of New York, was the last witness examined before the Committee of the Lords. He was owner of portions of many ships, and part owner in the lines of packets between New York and London, and between New York and Liverpool. He traded also with India and China, and was also owner of whalers which went to the South Seas. Like most others of the high-class merchants trading to foreign countries, he was neither concerned in the inland trade of the United States nor the coasting trade. Having furnished evidence as to the progress of American tonnage, he stated that the New York packets, which were universally acknowledged to be the best description of ships built in the United States, having all of them a portion of live oak in them, cost, exclusively of their cabins, about $70 per ton, equal to about 14_l._ 10_s._ per ton, sterling. In this estimate it must be remarked that the American tonnage differs from our own.[94]
[Sidenote: Details about American ships.]
The American classification of ships also differs from that at Lloyd’s. There the rating depends on the age, the material, its quality, together with the quantity of the fastenings, whether copper or iron, and the mode of workmanship. The oak used in New York comes principally from Virginia, the live oak entirely from Florida; and the sheathing-copper and iron are those supplied from England, iron from other countries then paid a duty of 30 per cent.: sheathing-copper was free of duty, but cake or pig-copper, from which bolts are manufactured in America, paid 5 per cent. Sails were, till recently, brought from England, Holland, and Russia; but hemp-canvas was then being made in America. Cotton sail-cloth had for a long time been used to a considerable extent.
Shipwrights’ wages in the United States were then $2½ a day, about 10_s._ 6_d._ sterling. In New York, these artificers work only ten hours per day on new work, and nine hours on old work; but repairs of ships were more expensive in England than in the United States. In the equipment, as we have seen, of American ships, great attention was paid to lessening manual labour by capstans, winches, and other contrivances; and as they were much more lightly rigged in proportion to their tonnage, they were sailed with fewer men; the average number being about two and a half sailors to every 100 tons in a packet ship ranging from 900 to 1200 tons; but in a common American freighting ship, where despatch was of less importance, the proportion is even smaller. For instance, the Henry Clay, already mentioned, 1207 tons, American, and 1467 tons, English, had thirty seamen, two boys, and a carpenter, besides the captain, four mates, cook, and steward: 40 all told.
With regard to the payment of the American captains, it is not the practice to pay them by time, but by some advantage in the voyage. In foreign freighting voyages the captains depend chiefly on the primage, which is 5 per cent. upon the amount of the freight. That is usually their chief source of emolument; but they, generally, receive also $30 a month wages. This, of course, gives them an interest in prosecuting the voyage successfully, and in stimulating their men to exertion; but, with great good taste, Mr. Minturn excused himself from making a comparison between American and other ships; he strenuously, however, denied that any national feeling influenced the merchants in the least degree with respect to the freighting their goods from England in American bottoms.
[Sidenote: Reciprocity treaties]
[Sidenote: so far as they affect Americans.]
With regard to the effect on America of the reciprocity treaties to which I have already alluded, and which came into operation shortly prior to 1830, it would appear that though the Government of the United States proposed to all foreign nations that, if they would open their ports to American shipping, they might enjoy all the benefits of their foreign trade, the shipowners were distrustful of the operation of this Free-trade system, as it was chiefly embraced by the States of the north of Europe, which had no commerce to offer in return. Hence efforts were continually made to rescind these treaties; but the experience of their operation has been that the American commerce has increased in a much greater ratio since that period than it had done before. The reciprocity treaties have not, indeed, promoted the growth of American tonnage; but, on the other hand, they have not retarded it; and if the shipowners in the United States do not avow their error, at all events their opposition has now ceased. Mr. Minturn was far from acknowledging that the Americans had gained by these treaties; indeed, he gave a positive opinion that they had nothing to do with the increase of United States shipping. No new markets had been opened, but commerce with all the world had increased, and probably nowhere so much as with England. The chief extension of the commerce of the United States with South America was with the Brazils, which was enhanced owing to the consumption of coffee, the duty on which had been taken off, the result being that the American consumption had doubled within ten years.
The temperance system adopted on board the American vessels had resulted in the greatest possible advantage, both in the efficiency and discipline of the crews; and, with these, in the increased safety of the ship and consequent diminution in the rates of insurance. Indeed, Mr. Minturn stated that American underwriters attached so much importance to it, that at the commencement of this reform they encouraged it by offering to return 10 per cent. on the premium, on all vessels that performed a voyage without the use of ardent spirits.
Such are a few of the leading points of evidence furnished to the Lords’ Committee, who adjourned sine die on the 6th July, 1848.
FOOTNOTES:
[80] I take this from Mr. Labouchere’s account given many months afterwards. See Hansard, vol. xcviii. p. 1008.
[81] These are the exact words given by Mr. Labouchere in his speech, May 15, 1848.
[82] Vide ‘Parliamentary Papers,’ vol. lix., 1847-8, p. 33.
[83] Vice-President of the Board of Trade.
[84] This paper was the Government organ.
[85] See Hansard, vol. xcvi. p. 1313.
[86] ‘Parliamentary Paper, 1847,’ No. 28.
[87] How completely this prediction has been falsified by the substitution of steam vessels for all the old sailing line-of-battle ships!
[88] The first ship of the line built by contract was in 1755, when Messrs. Wells built the Elizabeth, of 74 guns; and, since that time, private shipbuilders have contributed greatly to the public wants. They built and repaired (chiefly in the last war) 93 sail of line-of-battle ships, and 466 frigates and smaller vessels, making a total of 559 vessels of war. In the last war Napoleon I. had as building ports, Venice, Genoa, Toulon, Rochefort, L’Orient, Cherbourg, Antwerp, and, practically also, all the ports of Holland.
[89] One of the most remarkable incidents of the manning of a ship of war is that of Sir Edward Pellew and H.M.S. Nymphe. When war was declared by the French in February, 1793, it was unexpected; and the navy was on a peace establishment of only 16,000 sailors and marines. It was necessary at once to increase this number to 60,000. Pellew, finding it impossible to get seamen for his frigate, at once put eighty Cornish miners on board his ship, and a few months later fought and won the celebrated action with the Cleopatra—most of his crew never having seen a shot fired before. (See Osler’s ‘Life of Viscount Exmouth.’)
[90] There belonged, in round numbers, to the United Kingdom and her colonies and possessions on the 1st January, 1875, 7,500,000 tons of merchant vessels: of these about 2,000,000 tons were steam vessels; and as each of these will perform the work of four sailing vessels, it may be said that we now possess in our merchant service an equivalent to 13,500,000 registered tons of sailing shipping, so that in twenty-five years we have more than trebled Admiral Martin’s highest estimate.
[91] The question of impressment is too important to be passed over without any notice. Every well-constituted mind holds the principle of impressment in abhorrence; but every reflecting statesman is aware of the immense importance of such a power, especially as it is never brought into use but when the country is in actual peril. Admiral Martin, in his evidence, furnished his experience of what impressment had practically done for us in times past, he having been in three armaments, 1787, 1790, and 1791, on all of which occasions the equipment of the fleet was like magic[92], and the effect of the prompt display of the gigantic naval strength of this country in each case saved the expenditure of thousands of lives and millions of money. If these objects be worthy of national regard, we must submit to the mortification of sanctioning even so great a trespass on the liberty of the subject. The event of 1790, Admiral Martin thought, deserves especial mention as showing distinctly what the nation gained by impressment, and the results of a great naval demonstration. A quarrel had at that time arisen, though, perhaps, from an insignificant cause, with the Court of Spain; it became, however, of the greatest importance, owing to the threatened alliance of France, then under the control of the National Assembly, with the Court of the Escurial. On the 2nd of May, the King in Council authorized the issue of warrants of impressment of seafaring men, and, in the middle of June, Admiral Barrington put to sea with a large division of the fleet. It was insisted that this could never have been accomplished except by the power of impressment; and Admiral Martin, doubtless, expressed the general opinion of his profession in stating as his sincere belief that “if we lost the power of impressment we should lose the country.” Yet, while urging the necessity of preserving the power of impressment, he also maintained that nothing should be left undone which could tend to render the practice as infrequent as possible, and that every exertion should be made to render the service itself attractive to the seamen.
[92] In 1787, we equipped a fleet to support the Stadtholder. In 1790, we had a misunderstanding with Spain about Nootka Sound; and in 1791, we raised a naval armament to check the ambition of Russia.
[93] By the law then in force every seaman, before he could be employed on board a merchant ship, was required to produce a certificate from the officer of the Registrar of Seamen, called a register-ticket, showing that he was duly qualified for his duties, either as able or ordinary seaman; but the system was found to be impracticable, and was so grossly abused that it has since been abolished.
[94] In the United States the old English measurement is still adhered to, and the poops of ships are not measured, which accounts for much of the difference observable in the measurement of British and American ships. For example, the Henry Clay, of 1207 tons American measurement, where the poop was not included, measured 1467 tons by the new English mode, on which light, dock, and other dues are charged. The ship Queen of the West, 1106 tons American, measured for light dues in Liverpool, 1270 tons English. The effect of this would be that the calculation of $70 per ton would be diminished in a corresponding ratio if taken in English tonnage, and with the poops included. The estimate of $70 per ton, that is, American measurement, applies to the cost of a ship with her spars and sails, rigging, and everything complete ready to receive a cargo, but without her sea stores.
Chapter VIII
Motion of Mr. Herries, 1848—Protectionist principles stated—Extent of shipping trade—National defences endangered—Mr. Labouchere’s reply—Alderman Thompson—Mr. Gladstone’s views—Mr. Hudson—Lord George Bentinck—Mr. Hume—Mr. Cobden—Mr. Disraeli—Sir Robert Peel—The resolution carried by 117, but abandoned for a time—Temper of the Shipowners—Efforts of Ministers to obtain reciprocity by a circular from the Foreign Office—Reply thereto of America—Mr. Buchanan’s letter—Reply of other Powers—Progress of Free-trade views—Parliament of 1849—Death of Lord George Bentinck, September 21, 1848—Mr. Labouchere’s new resolution, February 14, 1849—Proposed change in coasting trade—Mr. Bancroft recalcitrates—Hence, withdrawal of the coasting clauses—The debate—Alderman Thompson, &c.—Mr. Ricardo—Meeting of Shipowners’ Society—Their report—The manning-clause grievance—Policy proposed—Agitation in the country.
Although the shipowners appear to have placed much confidence in the House of Lords, they saw that unless they could convince the Commons that the repeal of the Navigation Laws would be prejudicial to the interests of England, they would have no hope of maintaining the status quo: and, further, that no modification would satisfy the demands of the Free-traders, who, strong in their principles, consequently repudiated all compromise with Protectionists.
[Sidenote: Motion of Mr. Herries, 1848.]
One of the most earnest leaders of the latter class had just re-entered the House of Commons after a long absence from it. Mr. Herries had been Chancellor of the Exchequer so long before as 1828. He was an able and honest Conservative; sound in his principles and earnest in everything he undertook. To him, therefore, the Protectionist shipowners in their hour of trial appealed for aid; nor did they appeal in vain. Mr. Herries was heart and soul with them. He saw nothing but ruin and desolation in the abolition of these ancient laws. They had, in his judgment, been tampered with and weakened by Huskisson, and now they were about to be destroyed by such men as Cobden, Bright, Ricardo, and Milner Gibson, backed, alas! “by his old friend and colleague, Sir Robert Peel.” No wonder, therefore, that he buckled on his armour with vigour for the fight; and, soon after the debate on the resolution of the Government, he submitted, though on a separate occasion, the following counter-resolution:—“That it is essential to the national interests of the country to maintain the fundamental principles of the existing Navigation Laws, subject to such modifications as may be best calculated to obviate any proved inconvenience to the commerce of the United Kingdom and its dependencies without danger to our national strength.”
This resolution had been framed with great care. It had been the subject of unusual consideration by the Shipowners’ Society of London, then the oracle of all the other Protectionist societies in England, whose object was the maintenance of the Navigation Laws; and, in their opinion, the maritime greatness of England depended upon its success. If defeated, “Rule Britannia” would for ever be expunged from our national songs; the glories of Duncan and Nelson would “wither like the aspen-leaf, and fade like the Tyrian dye;” and, as none but “Yankees, Swedes, Danes, and Norwegian sailors would be found in our ports, who, they demanded, would there be to fight our battles and defend our sea-girt shores?” These were, then, no mere words of course; they were the honest expressions of the thoughts of earnest men, who, however mistaken in their views, or perhaps in some instances blinded by what they conceived to be self-interest, firmly believed that the power and greatness of their native land depended on the preservation of the Navigation Laws.
The counter-declaration of Mr. Herries was therefore introduced with the sole object of getting rid of the Ministerial measure, failing that, of modifying it in such a manner as not to abrogate the principle of these laws. Hence he embodied in his speech all the leading arguments of the advocates of a restrictive policy. Thus, after alluding to the proceedings of the committee of the previous year, Mr. Herries found fault with Government for having, without further inquiry, announced in the Speech from the Throne their evident intentions, however vaguely worded, of making an entire change in the maritime policy of Great Britain. Six months had elapsed and Ministers had proposed no measure; while the House of Lords, acting more wisely, had instituted the further inquiry then going on, a portion of the evidence taken having been already laid before the House of Commons. If, argued Mr. Herries, the Lords should, from the evidence taken before them, resolve on the maintenance of those laws and on the rejection of the Government measure, such a course might occasion embarrassment. He complained that while the British shipowner would be exposed to foreign competition by the removal of all protection, the heavy burden of being required to man his ship agreeably with the rules of the Navigation Laws was still retained. Criticising in succession the various pleas in behalf of Prussia, America, and our West Indian Colonies, for the repeal or modification of the present code, he remarked that Prussia had nothing to give us in return for the concessions she sought, and that her warnings and threats of withdrawing such advantages as she had already conceded were of trivial moment. America, in the most friendly way, no doubt, requested to participate in our foreign and colonial trade, in return for reciprocal concessions to be made to us: but America had no colonies; and it was wholly out of her power to give us any equivalent for the advantages she would be sure to acquire by the abolition of our Navigation Laws. “Why did not ‘free’ America,” he exclaimed, “show us an example, and abolish her laws, which were quite as stringent as ours?”
[Sidenote: Protectionist principles stated.]
As to the West Indies, Mr. Herries gave many details in proof of his assertion that the petition against the Navigation Laws from the Jamaica House of Assembly but imperfectly represented the real sentiments of either that body or of the island at large. Had its promoters been aware that, by the abrogation of these laws, freights from the foreign islands (whence sugar was brought to England, as well as from the British Islands) would be materially lowered, they never would have assented to it. To facilitate importations from Cuba by an alteration of the Navigation Laws would only aggravate the disadvantages from which they were at present suffering. Relying on the authority of Mr. Huskisson, he quoted him for a definition of that Protective principle he was willing to stand by; a principle which would reserve our colonial, coasting, and fishing trade wholly to ourselves, while protecting our foreign trade, so far as was consistent with our relations and engagements with foreign countries. If the House were agreed on the general principle of protecting our marine, Mr. Herries argued that it might, in committee, remove those anomalies which in some quarters were so much the object of censure and ridicule.
[Sidenote: Extent of the shipping trade.]
He reminded the House that the tonnage of the vessels belonging to this kingdom and her colonies then amounted to 3,900,000 tons; the number of sailors employed in our mercantile marine, to 230,000; and the capital embarked in shipping, to little less than 40,000,000_l._; while the trades immediately connected therewith, or subservient to the shipping interest, employed a capital of from 16,000,000_l._ to 17,000,000_l._ In this way there was between 50,000,000_l._ and 60,000,000_l._ of property which would be immediately affected by the proposed change. In this branch of national industry about 50,000 artisans, whose wages amounted to 5,000,000_l._ a-year, were employed; while the cost of victualling the ships he estimated at 9,000,000_l._, and the freights the mercantile marine earned per annum at nearly 30,000,000_l._[95]
[Sidenote: National defences endangered.]
These were enormous interests, he exclaimed, and ought not to be dealt with lightly; but when, in addition to all this, it was considered that the existence of these interests lay at the foundation of our national defences, and, that without these defences, we could not maintain our present position as a nation, surely there were ample reasons, if not for resisting all change, at least for adopting such changes as appeared necessary, not in the reckless way now proposed, by a sweeping resolution for the entire abolition of the Navigation Laws, but by improving, altering, and modifying them in such a manner as would be consistent with the great interest they were framed to protect. He therefore prayed the House not to assent to experimental changes, which might impair the strength of the right arm this nation had hitherto put forth to awe and control the world, and convert it into a palsied limb, with which the meanest of our rivals might successfully grapple.
[Sidenote: Mr. Labouchere’s reply.]
Mr. Labouchere followed in an elaborate speech, in general support of the Ministerial measure, but at the same time admitting that the real point for the decision of the House was fairly raised by Mr. Herries’ resolution. “Would they, however,” he asked, “be content with patchwork legislation? Was it in fact right to maintain the principle of the Navigation Laws? or were they prepared to consider the propriety of departing from those principles, so as to conciliate the wants of commerce and the exigencies of the case before them, with a view of adapting them to the spirit of the times, and of meeting the just demands of other countries, the wishes of our own colonies, and the interests of our expanding trade?” Of course, if Mr. Herries carried his resolution, it would be fatal to the measure of the Government.
[Sidenote: Alderman Thompson.]
Alderman Thompson, an opulent merchant extensively engaged in the iron trade, supported the Protectionist view of the question. He ridiculed the plan submitted by Sir James Stirling for manning the navy as “Utopian,” proposing as this plan did to train up a race of seamen exclusively for the navy, and, therefore irrespectively of the commercial marine. “Would Mr. Hume,” he asked, directing his remarks towards that gentleman, “sanction a vote for 120,000 men during peace?” He warned the House against the effect on our colonial shipping trade should it be thus thrown open to the Americans, whose ships, he said, already supplied our West Indian settlements with the whole of the lumber required by them, though under the disadvantage of returning from their ports in ballast. Various speakers on both sides followed during several adjourned debates: Dr. Bowring, Mr. Moffatt, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Milner Gibson, on the side of repeal; Mr. H. J. Baillie, Mr. Scott, Mr. Robinson, the Marquess of Granby, and Mr. Henley on that of Protection.
[Sidenote: Mr. Gladstone’s views.]
On the 2nd June, Mr. Gladstone, then sitting with Sir Robert Peel on the cross-benches, resumed the debate in a most exhaustive speech. His views were not in exact accordance with either party in the debate, but he took the affirmative side on the broad question of repeal as a matter of reasonable expediency, although, on the specific scheme of Government he gave only a qualified opinion, as he would have preferred a more gradual measure. He wished Government had adhered to the uniform course of precedents, making large concessions conditional upon reciprocal action by other Powers. He objected to the discretionary power of the Queen in Council, with a view of extorting reciprocity, a discretion at once too large and too delicate: if it were really intended that this power should be a living and practical one, to be put in force in case of need, he thought it would be wiser and safer to undo, bit by bit, the system we have got, than to sweep it away in order to reconstruct it piecemeal; and then, perhaps shortly afterwards, to pull it down again. With that keen foresight for which he has ever been distinguished, he particularly censured that part of the plan which reserved the coasting trade. He contended that the American coasting trade was of the highest value, and equivalent to a colonial trade. “Let us give her our coasting trade, and we are entitled, not merely in policy but in justice, to ask her for her coasting trade. But let us give her the colonial trade without the coasting trade, and we give her the valuable boon, while we withhold the worthless; but we cannot say to her, ‘Give us all, for we have given you all.’” Mr. Gladstone relied on the sincerity of the American diplomatist, and therefore, urged this point as one of the highest importance, Mr. Bancroft’s offer appearing to him a forcible argument for including the coasting trade in any future arrangement. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that when England and America had concurred in setting an example to the world of free navigation, other nations would be induced to imitate it by a moral force it would be difficult to resist; and that we should live to see the ocean, that great highway of nations, as free as the ships that traverse its bosom, or the winds that blow over it.
Though Mr. Gladstone would have preferred securing such reciprocal privileges as other nations had power to confer before throwing open our ports to their ships, his speech was in effect a splendid declamation in favour of Free-trade principles, as applied to navigation; and his argument pointed to the conclusion that, even if other nations were not prepared for reciprocity, it would still be for the interests of Great Britain to repeal her restrictive laws.
[Sidenote: Mr. Hudson.]
Mr. Hudson, as the representative of Sunderland, apart from his own Conservative principles, made an earnest appeal to the House against Free-trade in navigation, and hoped it would not be led away by any fanciful notions. Captain Berkeley, on the other hand, expressed an opinion rather favourable to the Government measure, though, should it become law, he feared, with most of his brother naval officers, that there would be a difficulty in manning the Royal Navy. But Mr. J. Clay, though an extreme Free-trader, refused to support the Government till all restrictions on shipowners, who had great influence at Hull, which he so long represented, were removed. Mr. Newdegate opposed the Government scheme in an elaborate speech; and the then member for South Shields, though sitting opposite, followed in the same line with a brief but argumentative address. Lord Ingestrie and Mr. R. Hildyard likewise denounced the measure; while Lord John Hay predicted eventual success by its adoption. A division was then taken, after three nights’ debate (May 29th, June 1st and 2nd), on the question that the debate be now adjourned, which was carried by a majority of 163—the numbers being 236 to 73.
On the 8th of June the debate was resumed by Sir J. Walsh, who had carried the adjournment, when Mr. Miles and Sir Charles Burrell spoke on the same side against repeal. The most prominent speakers on the Free-trade side were Mr. Cardwell, Sir George Clerk, and Sir Charles Wood; Mr. Cardwell thinking the time had arrived for a judicious relaxation of the Navigation Laws, and Sir Charles Wood noticing the very general concurrence in favour of some change. The debate, however, did not close, though the subject seemed exhausted, but was adjourned for the fourth time, and the last night called forth some of the most powerful speeches which had yet been delivered on the question.
[Sidenote: Lord George Bentinck.]
Lord George Bentinck resumed the debate on the 9th of June, and defended the shipmasters against the aspersions cast upon them by Mr. James Wilson, who had described them as unable to obtain freights from Rio Janeiro, on account of the bad character they bore for carelessness in the carriage or delivery of goods entrusted to their charge, and concluded one of the best speeches he ever delivered by pointing out the danger of repeal, as the seamen could not in future be pressed into our service when the day of difficulty and danger might arise. “Let us cherish our brave seamen,” exclaimed the noble Lord; “show them that, alike in peace and in war, we will provide for them; that we scorn to weigh in the balance with the comforts, the prosperity, and happiness of our gallant defenders, the miserable saving of 2_s._ 6_d._ per ton upon the freight of our shipping, and the eighteenth part of a farthing per pound on our sugar and coffee, and then we may again, as heretofore, boldly challenge and safely defy all the nations of the earth.”
[Sidenote: Mr. Hume.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Cobden.]
Mr. Hume supported the Ministerial measure, and pressed upon the Government the necessity of removing every burden on British ships to which foreigners were not liable. Admiral Bowles spoke on the opposite side; and Mr. Cobden, following, asked, why should not the sailor in his ship, as well as the workman in his factory, or the labourer on his farm, be able to compete with foreigners? He then appealed to the evidence, showing, as this did, that we could build better ships than foreign nations, and at as cheap a rate, quality considered; sail them as well; take greater care of their cargoes; and secure greater punctuality and despatch; adding, that our sailors had the greatest natural aptitude for the sea of any in the world. The only drawbacks, he continued, were of a moral kind, insubordination and drunkenness; but these would yield to better culture. We heard a great outcry about the burdens of the landowner, such as county-rates, highway-rates, poor-rates, and church-rates; but the shipowner paid none of these, being exempted from any such burdens. Therefore, on the score of taxation, the shipowner and the sailor were infinitely better able to compete with the foreigner than any other class of the community. Mr. Cobden then reviewed the position of the shipbuilder, the shipowner, and the sailor, and contended that they had no need to fear competition with the foreigner. He regretted that the power of retaliation should be given to the Queen in Council, not that he believed it would ever be acted upon, and, after repudiating the boastful language so frequently held respecting England’s naval supremacy, he asked, “was this a time to be always singing ‘Rule Britannia’?” concluding his remarks by stating, with great wisdom, that constant assertion of maritime supremacy was calculated to provoke kindred passions in other nations; whereas, if Great Britain enunciated the doctrines of peace, she would invoke similar sentiments from the rest of the world.
[Sidenote: Mr. Disraeli.]
Mr. Disraeli, at that time exhibiting no mean promise of future distinction, delivered an eloquent speech, illustrated with that brilliant rhetoric, sarcastic humour and point, for which he has been ever famous in debate. There was nothing, he said, more fatal to national interests than the recklessness of ignorance. He would not, indeed, sing “Rule Britannia,” for fear of distressing Mr. Cobden, but he did not think the House would encore “Yankee Doodle.” Mr. Labouchere had described this as the age of “commerce, peace, and internal improvement;” on the contrary, it was, in his opinion, the age of no trade, of intended war, and of communists tearing up railways. Naples is in a state of siege, he exclaimed; Paris in insurrection; Vienna in revolt; Berlin barricaded; four pitched battles have been fought in Europe in eight weeks, and the Baltic and the Adriatic are alike blockaded, so that Mr. Cobden himself could scarcely be so devout a believer as he pretended in the quiet of nations without arms. “At least,” concluded Mr. Disraeli, “I will not incur the responsibility by my vote of endangering that empire gained by so much valour, and guarded by so much vigilance—that empire broader than both the Americas, and richer than the farthest Ind, which was foreshadowed in its infancy by the genius of a Blake, and consecrated in its culminating glory by the blood of a Nelson—the empire of the seas.”
[Sidenote: Sir Robert Peel.]
At this stage of the debate Sir Robert Peel, who had been silently waiting to express his opinions, rose to address the House. On rising he had to encounter an unusual demonstration of hostility from the Protectionist benches; and for the first few sentences these unseemly interruptions continued; but he soon imposed silence upon his opponents by turning round disdainfully and saying, “this is not a matter to be disposed of by clamour, but by deliberate reason. It is possible the opinions I avow may be erroneous, but, depend on it, you show no confidence in the strength of your own if you have no better answer to give me than boisterous clamour.” This appeal to be answered by arguments alone secured the ex-minister a hearing. His speech, however, was not one of his happiest efforts. He went over the same ground as preceding speakers, referring to many parts of the evidence, produced mainly to show that England need not fear competition even with the Americans; he warned the House that the claims of Canada could not be long resisted, remarking that it will benefit Parliament to examine into the state of the Navigation Laws, with a view to an extensive alteration of them. He, however, avoided giving a direct opinion on many essential points; and, with respect to the policy of opening the coasting trade or continuing the restriction, he reserved his views for the present. Nor did he offer any opinion as to the policy of requiring for every “British ship” that three-fourths of the crew should be British seamen. He also reserved his judgment as to the mode by which Government proposed to make the alterations: his first impression being to proceed by reciprocity treaties, and to make concessions to such Powers as were willing to make equivalent concessions to us. On the other hand, it did not escape him that these reciprocity treaties were themselves sources of constant trouble. The “favoured-nation clause,” he added, seems simple enough, but when you come to act on it, practically, these treaties involve us in great difficulties. There was, he said, an admitted difference between the case of differential duties on navigation and on the imports of goods under a tariff. And he felt that it was most difficult to determine whether the concessions any given country is willing to make, or has the power to make, are equivalent to those made by some other, the commercial demands and commercial produce of which may be of a totally different nature. Again, with regard to reciprocity treaties, great difficulty he thought might ensue in the event of war; and the power Government proposed to retain of re-imposing restrictive duties would be found very difficult to exercise. It would in his judgment invert the relations between the Crown and the Parliament. The House of Commons would be favourable, and relax, the Crown would restrain. The House of Commons would give universal privileges, and in the course of four or five years the invidious duty would be thrown upon the Crown of withdrawing privileges the House of Commons had granted. Sir Robert, to avoid this ungracious duty, threw out the hint that the Act should be made limited in duration, so as to come again before Parliament. Suppose, he suggested, the trade were to be opened for five years; at the end of that period the privileges given would necessarily expire, and every country would have notice that they had the means of averting the re-establishment of restrictions by entering into some further arrangement with this country. He preferred to see the object effected in that way rather than by new reciprocity treaties; in short, that America, as well as other nations, should do what she had proposed by legislation rather than by treaty.
There was some renewal of hostile interruption at the conclusion of Sir Robert’s speech; but it seemed clear that he felt by no means disposed to run at once a race with the Whigs in a Free-trade policy as regarded navigation; at least, it was evident from his speech that his mind was not then made up on many essential points, and, further, that he had doubts as to the wisdom or expediency of immediate and unconditional repeal.
[Sidenote: The resolution carried by 117,]
This important and remarkable debate was closed by a short speech from Lord John Russell, who apparently did not then take that interest in the question which might have been expected from his position as Prime Minister, and considering the views he had long entertained on all the great questions of progress. The House then went to a division on Mr. Herries’ amendment, or rather on the previous question, when there appeared, Ayes 294, Noes 177, being a majority of 117 in favour of going into committee upon the Navigation Laws.
[Sidenote: but abandoned for a time.]
By this decision the ground was cleared for the Ministerial measure; but as the above result was not arrived at until the 9th June, it was manifestly hopeless to expect that any Bill could be carried through both Houses of Parliament during that session; the more so as the Committee of the House of Lords was still sitting. Hence many who were anxious for a settlement, seeing the great majority by which the resolution was carried, censured Government for having delayed the measure until so late a period of the session. During the ensuing month, however, the subject was avoided on both sides; the Lords’ Committee adjourned sine die, with no other result than the printing of the evidence; and on the 10th August, when Mr. Labouchere laid his resolution in form upon the table, he announced the intention of Ministers to abandon the measure for the present session, hoping to re-introduce the subject at an early period the following year. In fact, a tacit understanding had been come to by all parties that the struggle should be deferred, and, in this spirit, Mr. Labouchere carefully avoided any remark that might lead to discussion. He, however, announced his intention of bringing in a Bill pro formâ, as preferable to making any further official statement. The original resolution was then laid on the table unopposed, although Mr. Gladstone criticised its form, and Mr. Robinson denied that the House had affirmed the principle of the Government measure; they had, he said, only negatived the counter-resolution proposed by Mr. Herries. So jealous, indeed, were the Protectionists, that they would not allow the resolution to be laid upon the table till the Minister had given his assurance that no evasion should be practised, and that the Bill should be exactly in conformity with Mr. Labouchere’s resolution. The original Bill bears date 16th August, 1848, and was prepared and brought in by Mr. Bernal, Mr. Labouchere, and Lord John Russell. It was entitled “A Bill to amend the laws in force for the Encouragement of British Shipping and Navigation.”[96] Its provisions were strictly in accordance with Mr. Labouchere’s statement and resolution, and reserved the coasting and colonial coasting trade, with power of retaliation against foreigners who might decline to reciprocate.
[Sidenote: Temper of Shipowners.]
Thus ended the first great Parliamentary struggle of 1848. The shipowners had so far succeeded that they had staved off, for a while, the impending danger; but the great majority in the Commons declaring it expedient to revise the existing laws, left no doubt on any reasonable mind that a sweeping change would be effected in the ensuing session.
It will have been noticed that the main question in any proposed alteration of the Navigation Laws was, whether foreign countries, and especially the United States, would respond to our liberal policy, and, in a spirit of fairness, make such alterations in their navigation laws, tonnage dues, and tariff, as would promote increased commercial intercourse on the footing of an honourable competition. Of course the Protectionists did not assent to all this; but the temper of the House of Commons plainly indicated that a great relaxation of restriction was inevitable, the only real doubt being as to the best mode of securing reciprocity. The Ministers of the Crown saw clearly that the shipowners were alarmed at the vast change threatened, while the periodical press, during the autumn of 1848, teemed with the most alarming statements of impending ruin to all classes connected with ships and navigation. The Shipowners’ Society gave extensive circulation to a variety of fugitive publications, all advocating the defence of the national interests and condemning indiscriminate repeal. On the other hand, there were many whose authors were strongly in favour of reciprocity;[97] the number in favour of total and unconditional repeal being comparatively few. But as “Repeal,” or “No Repeal,” was the popular cry, it became more and more manifest that unless some pledge were given that foreign nations would reciprocate our concessions, it would be difficult, with all the influence of the Free-trade party, to carry the Bill through Parliament, and especially through the Upper House.
[Sidenote: Efforts of ministers to obtain reciprocity by a circular from the Foreign Office.]
It became, therefore, of the utmost importance to extract from Foreign Powers some intimation of their intentions. Hence Lord Palmerston, in his own name, addressed a circular from the Foreign Office, dated 22nd December, 1848, to her Majesty’s diplomatic agents in various countries, requesting information on those points.
In this circular, Lord Palmerston informed his agents that the measure for modifying the Navigation Laws would be again submitted to Parliament on its re-assembling; and, as the principle of some modification had been practically accepted, there was no doubt that many extensive measures would receive the sanction of Parliament. These diplomatic agents were furnished with a statement of the existing Navigation Laws, and of the Registry Acts, together with a notice of the changes proposed; these being the sweeping away all existing restrictions, with the exception of those directly relating to the coasting trade of Great Britain and of the British possessions abroad, all other trades being thus opened to vessels of all nations. The Bill had, in fact, left to all foreign British possessions power either to open their own coasting trade, if they should think fit, or to regulate that trade with the consent of the Queen in Council. It also gave them power to deal in like manner with the trade between one colony and another.
It was likewise explained that ample powers were reserved by the Crown for the imposition of differential duties, prohibitions, and restrictions, on ships of such countries as should still subject British ships to various duties, restrictions, or prohibitions. It was further intended that the Bill should not come into operation for some months after the day on which it was passed, in order that Government might have time to ascertain the dispositions of Foreign Powers, and be able to frame proper orders for such differential duties as might be required whenever the intended relaxations should take effect towards ships of such nations as were willing to adopt the principle of reciprocity.
Finally, it was pointed out that, on the one hand, the definition of a “British ship” was no longer to signify one of British build; but only that she should be owned by a British subject, and be navigated by a crew whereof three-fourths were British subjects; the definition foreign ship being purposely omitted, in order that any ship acknowledged by the law of a particular country to be a ship of such country should be also recognised as a ship of that country by British law.
With this view, Lord Palmerston desired the diplomatic agents to inform him what restrictions were actually in force against British vessels at such countries where they were resident, what voyages they might engage in (with the goods they might carry), and what differential duties or charges, direct or indirect, they were liable to, from which the national vessels were exempt, and, above all, whether any further restrictions or differential duties were then contemplated.
In this circular Lord Palmerston disclosed the intended policy of the British Government, in that, while not attempting to make the alteration in its law strictly dependent on the legislation of other countries, it was yet prepared to consider the general policy of each State. His agents were, therefore, instructed to ascertain whether the Governments to which they were accredited would accept advances on the part of Great Britain, with the object of placing their ships on a footing of equality; the only reservation being the coasting trade; or whether they would require any particular privileges or exemptions for their national vessels, thereby rendering “it impossible for this country to concede to their shipping the whole of the advantages which would, under the contemplated measure, attach to the shipping of such States as may place British and national vessels on a footing of more perfect equality.”
Practically, Lord Palmerston offered, on the part of the British Government, to remove nearly all the restrictions of the British Navigation Law, whenever such a proposal was met in a spirit of corresponding liberality, at the same time, however, reserving the right to take such course as Government might deem necessary where no such reciprocal feeling was shown.
[Sidenote: Reply thereto of America.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Buchanan’s letter.]
It is unnecessary to enter at great length into the explanations given in reply by foreign Governments. Some of these are, however, too important to be omitted in a work of this kind. Pre-eminently the disposition of the United States, or rather the opinion of Congress, as well as of the Executive, was essentially necessary to be known on this side of the Atlantic. Consequently Mr. John F. Crampton, our Envoy at Washington, lost no time in bringing the question before the then American Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan.[98] That gentleman in reply said, that the most satisfactory answer he could give was to furnish a copy of the first section of the Act of Congress, approved on the 24th May, 1828, intituled “An Act, in addition to an Act intituled, ‘an Act concerning discriminating Duties of Tonnage and Import, and to equalise the duties on Prussian Vessels and their Cargoes.’” The substance of this law will be found in another part of this work,[99] and it will be remembered that it conferred a power on the American President to reciprocate by proclamation any abolition of discriminating duties of tonnage or imports made by foreign nations. Mr. Buchanan pointed out with just pride that Congress twenty years previously had offered reciprocity of trade to all the world, and that England might, by complying with the fair and equitable conditions of that Act, have at any moment placed her vessels and their cargoes, both in our direct and indirect foreign trade, on the same footing with those of America. Mr. Buchanan added that, previously to 1828, reciprocity in commerce and navigation had been practically adopted by his Government in specific treaties with Denmark, Sweden, the Hanseatic Republics, and Prussia, and had since been carried out in other treaties concluded with Austria, Russia, &c., all of these being still in force.
But the following remarkable observation made by Mr. Buchanan at the close of his letter, gives conclusive testimony that when Mr. Bancroft offered “to give us all,” i.e. the coasting trade, this offer was wholly unauthorized by the American Government.[100] The words of Mr. Buchanan were: “I might add that the President, in accordance with the spirit of this Act (of 1828) has already made a specific proposal to Great Britain through Mr. Bancroft to Lord Palmerston, dated 3rd November, 1847, to conclude a treaty providing that “British ships may trade from any port in the world to any port in the United States, and be received, protected, and, in respect to charges and duties, treated like American ships, if, reciprocally, American ships may in like manner trade from any port of the world to any port under the dominion of her Britannic Majesty”: but of course, this proposal was not intended to embrace the coasting trade of either country.”[101] Mr. Buchanan did not confine himself merely to this honest, frank disclaimer. While his own opinions, as well as those of the highly liberal and intelligent Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. R. J. Walker, whose admirable report was published at the same time, were decidedly in favour of meeting the change proposed by reciprocal legislation, he did not conceal from Mr. Crampton that it was probable some difference of opinion would manifest itself in Congress upon this question, from the unwillingness felt in some quarters to throw open the ship-building business in the United States to the formidable competition of British shipbuilders, and more particularly to that of the shipbuilders of the British North American colonies.
Many persons in England shared the apprehensions expressed by Mr. Buchanan, especially those who, having watched throughout the progress of the agitation for the repeal of the Navigation Laws, were aware of the strong Protectionist feelings then and still prevalent on the seaboard of the States, though not shared to the same extent by the non-navigating classes: they did not, therefore, believe that Congress would allow the President to put even the Act for 1828 in force without a serious struggle. However, though no opposition was offered, the expressions of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Crampton warranted a reasonable doubt lest, when it came to the point, whether reciprocity would be granted to the ships of Great Britain. That no difficulty was started on the other side was mainly due to the meritorious reports of Mr. Walker, whose zeal in the cause of freedom of commerce and navigation deserves the highest encomium.
[Sidenote: Reply of other Powers.]
The application made to France with a view of ascertaining the disposition of the Republic to enter into a course of mutual Free-trade had no result. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in a letter dated 31st January, 1849, (misdated 1848, see p. 209), complained of our partial non-execution of the clauses of the Convention of 1826; but, as regarded future legislation, he said in substance that, as in England the question was being subjected to the gravest consideration, so in France, now that her mission was to march in the way of liberality, the greatest circumspection was necessary. The subject was referred to the competent authorities, and a few vague words about a desire on the part of the Republic to follow the principles of reciprocity closed the despatch, for whatever the opinions of the President may have been, the people of France were not then prepared to recognise the principles of Free-trade.
Sardinia expressed a very honourable desire to meet us on the basis of reciprocity. With Russia a practical reciprocity already existed. In Austria no differential duties existed between national and English vessels. The answer, however, given by Count Bülow on the part of Prussia was by no means satisfactory, inasmuch as he could give no pledge as to future legislation, the policy of Prussia being bound up with the Zollverein States. The answer from Belgium presented difficulties. That from Portugal intimated general, but very equivocating and undecided, Free-trade principles, to the effect that, as the peculiarities of the commerce of the different nations of Europe were so various, the Minister of Portugal “could not believe in the complete acquiescence of those same nations with the plan which England proposed to follow.” A glance was directed to the benefits of Free-trade, and Viscount de Castro added: “But if this is not the time for restrictions, neither can it be for Portugal that of reducing the few that exist, as that would be the means of entirely destroying the mercantile navy.” Lord Palmerston was, however, consoled for the unfavourable answer by the assurance of the Portuguese Government that whatever were the facilities the nations of Europe might adopt in correspondence with the Bill then under discussion in the British Parliament, England would not obtain from any of those nations the almost entire monopoly she then enjoyed in her maritime intercourse with Portugal. The Viscount de Castro hoped, therefore, that “in Council” no exception would be made to injure the trade of Portugal.
In spite of the want of success (and they received but scanty support) Ministers met in their applications to foreign countries for reciprocity, they resolutely persevered in their policy, resting for their chief support almost wholly on the Free-trade party in the House of Commons. The principles of Free-trade had become the established and predominant policy of the nation, and navigation alone was the exceptional branch which, until then, had successfully resisted innovation.
[Sidenote: Progress of Free-trade views.]
It was very remarkable, that in the celebrated Petition of the London merchants to the House of Commons, so far back as 1820,[102] from which the Free-trade movement may be dated, no mention is made of the Navigation Laws. Mr. Tooke, who drew the petition, directed chiefly attention to the then unacknowledged fact that freedom from restraint was calculated to give the utmost extension to foreign trade, and the best direction to the capital and industry of the country. That the maxim of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, the rule of every merchant in his individual dealings, was as strictly applicable to the trade of the nation; but had Mr. Tooke at that time hinted anything about navigation, or the abrogation of the existing Navigation Laws, he would have exposed himself almost to personal danger. The success, however, of the Free-trade measures which had been adopted since 1842 had totally changed the current of public opinion, and it was now only the shipowners, and the still powerful Protectionist party in Parliament, which resisted this last crowning measure of Free-trade. The opposition of the shipowners arose from a deep-seated conviction that utter and inevitable ruin to their class would result from the abrogation of the Navigation Laws.
[Sidenote: Parliament of 1849.]
Parliament assembled on the 2nd of February, 1849. The commercial and manufacturing interests were rallying, but had not as yet effectually revived from the prostration occasioned by the commercial crisis of 1847, and the general want of confidence resulting from the shock of the foreign revolutions in 1848. The shipping trade was in a state of transition, as it was not until some time later that the gold discoveries in Australia gave a fresh impulse to the “long voyage” trade, and that towards a region of the globe which promised but a slow, however certain, future development of wealth and navigation. The shipowners were, in fact, still suffering a periodical depression of trade after two or three very prosperous years.
In the Speech from the Throne delivered by her Majesty in person, she said: “I again commend to your attention the restrictions imposed on commerce by the Navigation Laws. If you shall find that these laws are, in whole or in part, unnecessary for the maintenance of our maritime power while they fetter trade and industry, you will no doubt deem it right to repeal or modify their provisions.”
[Sidenote: Death of Lord George Bentinck, 21st September, 1848.]
When the House of Commons assembled, a great void was felt in the absence of Lord George Bentinck, who, during the recess, had been snatched away by death in the very pride of manhood. His devotion to the cause of the shipowners and Protectionist principles rendered his loss deeply felt by many classes. On the day of his interment, which was dark, cold, and drizzling, this feeling of respect was paid in a manner almost reverential. From nine till eleven o’clock that day all the British shipping in the docks and in the river, from London Bridge to Gravesend, hoisted flags half-mast high, and minute guns were fired from appointed stations along the Thames. The same mournful ceremony was observed in all the ports of the United Kingdom; and not only in these, for the flag was half-mast high on every British ship at Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Havre.[103] Whatever may have been the political errors of Lord George Bentinck, he was eminently the friend and champion of the shipowners. Shortly before his death he had renounced the leadership of his party in the House of Commons, and Mr. Disraeli had succeeded him. In the House of Lords the re-appointment of the committee of the preceding year was slightly mentioned; but upon an intimation from the Marquess of Lansdowne that the measure to be introduced by Government would not be delayed for the report of this committee, the shipowners abandoned whatever designs some of them may have had to prolong the inquiry.
[Sidenote: Mr. Labouchere’s new resolution, February 14, 1849.]
On the 14th February Mr. Labouchere, still President of the Board of Trade, moved a fresh resolution almost in the identical terms employed in the preceding year. He recapitulated at great length the arguments in favour of repeal which he had employed in the previous session. It will be unnecessary to dwell upon these here; but his new light with regard to the coasting trade deserves a place in tracing the progress of our mercantile marine: on this branch of the subject he seemed to tremble before the superior abilities of Mr. Gladstone; and the remarks of that gentleman intimating a strong desire to surrender the coasting trade, with a view to obtain in return that of the United States, evidently made considerable impression upon his mind, so that he scarcely knew what to grant or refuse. Mr. Gladstone asked, not merely that we should give colonial trade for colonial trade, but our coasting trade for theirs. It was asserted that the American trade, say from New York to California, was a foreign, or colonial, rather than a coasting traffic. But to argue that a voyage from London to Malta was to be held part of a colonial trade, while a voyage from California to New York was to be considered part of a coasting trade, was preposterous, and Mr. Labouchere affected to believe that the United States would not persist in a policy so contrary to the dictates of justice and common sense.[104]
[Sidenote: Proposed change in the coasting trade.]
The fresh consideration which Mr. Labouchere had given to his measure enabled him now to propose a plan which, while it did not imply a total abolition of all restrictions, would effect a considerable modification of them, and at the same time enable us, as he conceived, to get, without cavil or hesitation, such a measure from America as the important interests of this country demanded, without exposing our revenue to danger, or exciting alarm among those engaged in the coasting trade of this country.[105] Such were the sanguine but vain expectations of Mr. Labouchere. He tried to make it appear that there were two branches of the coasting trade, which, although they went by the same name, were yet essentially distinct from each other. There was the trade, conducted principally either by steamboats or small vessels, consisting in the carrying of goods and passengers to and fro, and depending on local connection with the places between which the trade was conducted. With that trade foreigners could not compete; and, consequently, he illogically argued that it was not intended to disturb that trade or throw it open to foreign competition; so that he proposed to keep the coasting trade, which consisted of passing from one port to another of the United Kingdom, on its present footing. Government had, however, he said, resolved to abolish restrictions which prevented the combination of a coasting with a foreign voyage. It was not proposed that either a foreign vessel or an English vessel foreign bound should be allowed to proceed from port to port in England and then return; but that sailing from a British port, and being bound for a foreign port, they should be permitted to carry from one British port to another, and then clear out and proceed on their voyage. The Customs’ authorities reported that this could be done consistently with safety to the revenue, provided there was a restriction that the cargoes should not be carried in vessels under 100 tons burden, so as to prevent smuggling, although, as a matter of fact, the light dues and other charges must effectually prevent such a trade. Such was the bungling scheme respecting the coasting trade proposed by Mr. Labouchere, whereby he attempted to satisfy all parties, and bring the Americans to terms.
[Sidenote: Mr. Bancroft recalcitrates.]
[Sidenote: Hence withdrawal of the coasting clauses.]
When Alderman Thompson asked whether any intimation had been received from the American Government as to any convention with respect to the coasting trade, Mr. Labouchere answered, that in a recent interview he had had with Mr. Bancroft, that gentleman said, “he should be willing the next day to sign any convention which should include the coasting trade”, and Mr. Labouchere believed him to be sincere;[106] though, by Mr. Buchanan’s letter of the 9th February (which had not yet reached England), the American Secretary of State had expressly said, “the coasting trade is of course reserved.” As a matter of course, when Mr. Buchanan’s letter reached England all Mr. Labouchere’s visions of reciprocity in the coasting trade vanished. At a subsequent period Mr. Labouchere, curiously enough, entered into a defence of Mr. Bancroft, “who was a most honourable and straightforward man.” Be that, however, as it may, he certainly deceived Mr. Labouchere; and, indeed, Lord Palmerston also, who up to the 5th March, expressed himself in the strongest manner that the reply of the American Government would fully bear out Mr. Bancroft’s pledges. Such was the ignominious rejection of these clauses relating to the coasting trade, which had been inserted in the Bill of 1849 to meet “the conciliatory disposition” of Mr. Bancroft, but which his superiors at Washington sternly and unequivocally repudiated.
[Sidenote: The debate.]
[Sidenote: Alderman Thompson, &c.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Ricardo.]
The debate on Mr. Labouchere’s resolution brought out again all Mr. Herries’ arguments and adverse predictions about repeal. Alderman Thompson complained that the United States minister was recalled with every change of Presidency, and that Mr. Bancroft was notoriously more liberal than President Taylor, who had been elected upon the principle of Protection to native industry. Mr. Banks, Mr. Hildyard, Sir John Tyrrell, and the Marquess of Granby followed Mr. Herries and Alderman Thompson in the same line of objection; whilst Mr. Hume, Colonel Thompson, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. John Williams, maintained the Free-trade line of argument. Mr. J. L. Ricardo vehemently supported the extreme views of Free-trade, and said emphatically to the shipowners: “Depend upon yourselves—depend upon your energies as Englishmen—depend upon the resources of this country and the wealth which commands the resources of the world, and do not trust to Acts of Parliament. It would be better to send forth our ships free as the winds which filled their sails, with liberty to go where they would, and come from where it suited them, than to start them from our ports encumbered with the 8 & 9 Vict. cap. 88, and ballasted with twelve volumes of Hertslet’s ‘Commercial Treaties.’” The resolution was agreed to without a trial of strength, and the Bill was brought in.[107] It contained twenty-three clauses.
[Sidenote: Meeting of the Shipowners’ Society.]
Upon the 2nd March, the second reading of the Bill having been fixed for the 9th March, the General Shipowners’ Society held their annual meeting at the London Tavern. Their accustomed comments upon lights, harbours, and pilotage; discriminating duties in foreign ports; the East Indian salt monopoly; the Merchant Seamen’s Act; the Passengers’ Act; the Merchant Seamen’s Fund, and a variety of other points, which, at ordinary times, usually occupied a large share of their attention and space in their report—were on this occasion all subordinate to the one question of all-absorbing consequence, the threatened impending repeal of the Navigation Laws. To discuss special regulations affecting maritime commerce, while the whole question of general policy trembled in the balance, was both inconvenient and embarrassing.
[Sidenote: Their report.]
The committee narrated at great length the various steps taken by Government since 1846 with regard to the Navigation Laws. In reviewing the evidence taken before both Houses, the shipowners made it appear that they were completely triumphant in establishing all the various points on which they took their ground; viz., that no evil susceptible of any remedy had been or could be proved, arising from the practical operation of the Navigation Laws: that the maintenance of the Protective principle on which those laws were founded was indispensable to the maintenance of an extensive mercantile marine: that the preservation of such a mercantile marine was equally necessary for the existence of a powerful navy: and that, hence, the repeal of the Navigation Laws would involve danger to the basis of our national defence.
Having proclaimed their own triumph, they next turned their attention to the Bill then before the public, and, pointing out the unsparing criticism it had provoked, demanded the strenuous and uncompromising resistance, not only of every shipowner, but of every friend to his country. They accordingly denounced it “as fraught with consequences destructive to the shipping interest, and dangerous to the welfare and safety of the country;” in short, as one of the most unjust measures ever submitted to Parliament.
The Committee next proceeded to analyse the Bill, justifying their censure of its provisions. It was said to be a concession to the demands of the West Indies and Canada. The demand having been made under an official stimulant, the West Indian interest, perceiving their error, they alleged, has now disclaimed it, and publicly declared that they have no desire for the repeal. Canada, with selfish and precipitate incaution, had put forward a similar demand; but the demand for free navigation was coupled in the same document with an inconsistent claim for the re-enactment of a Protective duty in favour of her agricultural produce. The expectation of benefit entertained by the Canadians from the repeal of the Navigation Laws had, in the opinion of the shipowners, as little real foundation as those the West Indians had first entertained, but subsequently abandoned. Their Committee expressed doubt of any beneficial reciprocity from the United States, especially as any commercial treaty must be controlled by two-thirds of the Senate.[108] They treated the power of re-imposing restrictions as in principle opposed to every prudent rule of State policy. The coasting-trade clauses, of course, met with condemnation. If, they asserted, the censure cast upon shipmasters was deserved, the injustice to the owner was flagrant. If unmerited, the measure was sustained by cruel calumny.
[Sidenote: The manning-clause grievance.]
But the most notorious as well as the most important and disqualifying inconsistency was the compulsion on a British shipowner to man his ship with British seamen. This was magnified into a stupendous grievance. It was said to force the shipowner to conduct his affairs contrary to his conviction of his own interest, and according to the arbitrary dictates of an inconsistent and tyrannical Act of Parliament. The Committee, kindling with indignation at the mere recital of their grievances, averred that if the Navigation Laws were repealed, a British registry must be regarded as a badge of slavery, and an instrument of oppressive interference; nor did they doubt that to escape its bonds, unaccompanied as it then would be by any benefit whatsoever, British capital would to a great extent be invested in foreign shipping, to be engaged in the British carrying trade.
[Sidenote: Policy proposed.]
With these views, they enjoined union among themselves. They trusted that shipowners would abstain from promulgating separate opinions, or allow themselves to be drawn into controversy and disunion, as, by these means, successful resistance would be impossible. They called on the shipowners at the several outports to send deputies to the “central committee in London for upholding the principles of the Navigation Laws.”
By these means, they argued that there would be an opportunity for a careful consideration of the future steps to be taken during the progress of the Bill through the House of Commons. They further suggested, that every possible endeavour should be made to enlist the sympathy and engage the support of other powerful interests. The principle they proposed was the disclaiming all desire for monopoly, and the advocacy of such moderate and just protection to all interests as would admit of foreign competition, so far as might be sufficient to stimulate to the utmost domestic energies, but, at the same time, would limit this competition within such bounds as to prevent domestic energies from being crushed in the struggle. They concluded by reminding the shipowners that “Union is Strength,” and by expressing a fervent hope that this contest, which their enemies had insultingly designated as a struggle “for the last rag of Protection,” would, in its results, roll back the tide on their opponents, thus leading to the universal application of the principles of just and moderate protection to domestic interests, and superseding for ever the rash and delusive theories which, in recent legislation, had successively involved every interest of the State in difficulty, distress, and ruin.
[Sidenote: Agitation in the country.]
The agitation thus invoked by the central body of shipowners in London was responded to by their fellow-shipowners throughout the country. Meetings were held at Belfast, Bristol, Dartmouth, Devonport, Dunfermline, Dundee, Exeter, Exmouth, Fleetwood, Glasgow, Gateshead, Hull, Hartlepool, London, Liverpool, Leith, Lynn, Montrose, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Portsmouth, Penzance, Perth, Sunderland, Shields, St. Andrews, Swansea, Saltash, Tynemouth, Weymouth, and Yarmouth. The petition from London was signed by 27,000 persons of the most respectable classes; while that from Liverpool comprised 24,700 names, not shipowners exclusively. This petition, eloquently drawn up, expressed alarm at the progress of a measure which proposed to take away from this country advantages it had so long and so successfully enjoyed, and to invite, unwisely, foreign nations to share those advantages with us; nations, too, utterly unable, even if willing, to confer on us any adequate equivalent in return. It pointed at the evident result of the substitution, to a great extent, of foreign for British and colonial shipping, the employment of foreign labour and capital in lieu of our own, and the creation of new relations between foreign nations and our own colonies; thereby weakening the ties which bind the latter to the mother-country, and diminishing British power and influence throughout the world. They did not fail to show, above all, the consequences the measure would have on the supply of seamen to the Royal Navy.
The second reading of the Bill was fixed for the 9th March, when each party mustered all its forces. The shipowners throughout the kingdom were in a state of great excitement. It was true that among them were many who were ready to accept the measure as proposed by Government, if other nations would only reciprocate; and there were even a few who were so extreme in their views of Free-trade as to desire that the Bill should be carried as it stood, but the majority were vehemently opposed to repeal; and, though some fears were entertained that the second reading of the Bill would be carried in the House of Commons, it was confidently anticipated that a considerable majority in the Lords would, under the brilliant leadership of Lord Stanley (Lord Derby), who had warmly espoused their cause, defeat its progress and throw out the Whig administration.
FOOTNOTES:
[95] All these figures may now (1875) be at least doubled, except the number of men, as the improvements in mechanical contrivances have materially reduced manual labour since the repeal of the Navigation Laws. In the case of steam ships to nearly one-half. See following table:—
-------+----------------------------------+-------------------------------- | Sailing Ships. | Steam Vessels. +-----------+---------+------------+-----------+--------+----------- Years. | | | Proportion | | | Proportion | Tons. | Men. | of Men to | Tons. | Men. | of Men to | | | 100 Tons. | | | 100 Tons. -------+-----------+---------+------------+-----------+--------+----------- 1852 | 3,215,665 | 146,286 | 4·55 | 165,219 | 13,277 | 8·04 1854 | 3,516,456 | 146,522 | 4·17 | 212,637 | 15,894 | 7·47 1869 | 4,677,275 | 152,186 | 3·25 | 880,028 | 43,304 | 4·92 1870 | 4,519,141 | 147,207 | 3·25 | 1,039,969 | 48,755 | 4·69 1871 | 4,343,558 | 141,035 | 3·25 | 1,290,003 | 58,703 | 4·55 1872 | 4,245,904 | 137,101 | 3·23 | 1,515,704 | 66,619 | 4·40 1873 | 4,067,144 | 130,877 | 3·22 | 1,680,953 | 71,362 | 4·24 1874 | 4,037,564 | 128,733 | 3·19 | 1,827,024 | 74,873 | 4·10 -------+-----------+---------+------------+-----------+--------+-----------
[96] The original Bill will be found in vol. iv., Session 1847-8, p. 495.
[97] It was on this occasion that I first appeared before the public as a politician. Following in the wake, but a long way astern, of Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Gladstone, I addressed a number of letters to Lord John Russell, which appeared in the ‘Morning Herald,’ and were afterwards republished in a pamphlet. They had a very large circulation, and caused considerable excitement among shipowners at the time. They were written in a homely style, commencing, “I am a plain man of business, daily to be found at my office in one of the City lanes, in the midst of my clerks, in the centre of a large dingy room. Business is my politics, not politics my business. If I have a leaning it is towards Free-trade principles,” and so forth. But I soon learned that my “principles,” as I laid them down, were, however plausible, fundamentally and radically wrong. Sound enough they no doubt were, if all nations had been prepared to adopt them; and if they could have been applied to the world at large, no system could have been more perfect. But, unfortunately, Foreign States were not prepared to adopt Free-trade; and if we adopted retaliation against those which did not, we reverted to Protection in its most pernicious form. Consequently we pursued the policy most likely to suit our own interests, and very wisely did not attempt to enforce it on other nations. Therein Government was right and I was wrong.
[98] See ‘Parliamentary Papers,’ vol. li., 1849, p. 237, et seq.
[99] Ante, p. 63.
[100] In truth, the policy of the American Government, since that country became an independent nation, has with few exceptions been throughout in favour of Protection. When Congress was first inaugurated in 1789, one of the measures of that year (4th July) was “An Act for levying Duty on Goods,” &c., and another (20th July, 1789) was passed, entitled “An Act imposing Duties on Tonnage.” Indeed, so thoroughly Protectionist were the great founders of the Republic, that Mr. Adams, writing to Mr. Jay in Paris on the 26th February, 1786, says: “If the United States would come to the resolution to prevent all foreign vessels from coming to their ports, and confine all exports and imports to their own ships and seamen, they would do for anything that I know the wisest thing which human prudence could dictate.” Further he says: “On the other hand, if the United States would adopt the principle of the French economists, and allow the ships and merchants of all nations equal privileges with their own citizens, the consequence would be the sudden annihilation of their manufactures and navigation.” And this has been in a great measure the opinion entertained by the Americans throughout, no doubt under the impression that, with so vast a territory, where they had within themselves almost everything they required, they could do without foreign nations. They have not yet seen the advantages they would derive by being allowed to purchase in the cheapest market, wherever that market may be,—home or abroad.
[101] See Mr. Buchanan’s letter in full, vol. li., ‘Parliamentary Papers,’ p. 239.
[102] It was presented on the 8th May, 1820, by Mr. Alexander Baring, afterwards Lord Ashburton. The whole case is reported in Tooke’s ‘History of Prices.’ Appendix, p. 332.
[103] Vide ‘Lord George Bentinck: a Political Biography.’ By the Right Hon. B. Disraeli. Pp. 421, 422. See also p. 409, a curious story of the marine picture in the Miracle Room at the cathedral of Antwerp.
[104] The Americans have, however, persisted in this policy to this day; a fact which cannot be too often repeated.
[105] It may be said that the reason for maintaining the coasting trade was not so much the fear of injuring the shipowners employed in it as destroying “the nursery for our seamen.”
[106] See ‘Hansard,’ March 23, 1849, vol. ciii. p. 1229.
[107] The original Bill, and the Bill as amended in Committee, will be found in vol. iv., 1849, pp. 331 and 347.
[108] In the first draft of the Constitution of the United States, the power of Congress was limited by a special provision that “No Navigation Acts should be passed without the assent of two-thirds of the members present in each House.” See Pitkin’s ‘Political and Civil History of the United States;’ and, though this proposal was afterwards reported against, it remains in force to the present day.