IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (part 10 of 15)

IV. Concerning the infallible teaching of the Roman Pontiff: (part 10 of 15)

"On the 23d of April, the day after the dissolution of the provincial Congress of New York, the news from Lexington burst upon the city. Though it was Sunday, the inhabitants speedily unloaded two sloops which lay at the wharfs, laden with flour and supplies for the British at Boston, of the value of £80,000. … The royal government lay hopelessly prostrate. Isaac Sears concerted with John Lamb to stop all vessels going to Quebec, Newfoundland, Georgia, or Boston, where British authority was still supreme. The people shut up the custom-house, and the merchants whose vessels were cleared out dared not let them sail. In the following days the military stores of the city of New York were secured, and volunteer companies paraded in the streets. … On the 1st of May the people, at the usual places of election, chose for the city and county a new general committee of one hundred, who 'resolved in the most explicit manner to stand or fall with the liberty of the continent.' All parts of the colony were summoned to send delegates to a provincial convention, to which the city and county of New York deputed one-and-twenty as their representatives. … On the 2d of May the New Jersey committee of correspondence called a provincial congress for the 23d at Trenton. To anticipate its influence, the governor convened the regular assembly eight days earlier at Burlington, and laid before them the project of Lord North [adopted by the British parliament in February, offering to each colony freedom from taxation on its making satisfactory provision for the general defense and for support of government]. The assembly could see in the proposition no avenue to reconciliation, and declared their intention to 'abide by the united voice of the continental congress.' Such, too, was the spirit of Pennsylvania. 'Let us not have it said of Philadelphia that she passed noble resolutions and neglected them,' were the words of Mifflin, youngest of the orators who on the 25th of April addressed the town-meeting called in that city on receiving the news from Lexington. Thousands were present, and agreed 'to associate for the purpose of defending with arms their lives, their property, and liberty.' Thomas Paine from that day 'rejected the sullen Pharaoh of the British throne forever.' … In Philadelphia, thirty companies, with 50 to 100 in each, daily practiced the manual exercise of the musket. One of them was raised from the Quakers. … The Pennsylvania assembly, which met on the first day of May, rejecting the overtures of the governor, 'could form no prospect of lasting advantages for Pennsylvania but from a communication of rights and property with the other colonies.' … On the 5th Franklin arrived, after a voyage over the smoothest seas, and the next morning was unanimously elected a deputy to the congress. … In Maryland, at the request of the colonels of militia, Eden, at Annapolis, gave up the arms and ammunition of the province to the freemen of the county. Pleased with his concession, the provincial convention distinguished itself by its moderation; and its delegates to congress determined to labor for a reconciliation. In Virginia [where, in the night of April 20th, Governor Dunmore had carried off the gunpowder stored in the colony's magazine at Williamsburg, and where, as a consequence, the excited people were already in arms, though no further action had yet been taken], on the 2d of May, at the cry from Lexington, the independent company of Hanover and its county committee were called together by Patrick Henry. The soldiers, most of them young men, elected him their chief, and marched for Williamsburg, on the way greatly increasing in numbers. Alarmed by the 'insurrections,' Dunmore convened the council, and in a proclamation of the 3d pretended that he had removed the ammunition, lest it should be seized by slaves. Message after message could not arrest the march or change the purpose of Henry. … At sunrise on the 4th the governor's messenger met Henry at New Kent, and, as a compensation for the gunpowder taken out of the magazine, paid him £330, for which he was to account to the convention of Virginia. The sum was found to be more than the value of the powder, and the next Virginia convention directed the excess to be paid back. … In twelve or thirteen days the message from Lexington was borne to Newbern, in North Carolina, where it 'wrought a great change.' The governor, in his panic, ordered the cannon in the town to be dismounted; and, after a remonstrance made in the name of the inhabitants by Abner Nash, 'the oracle of their committee and a principal promoter of sedition,' he shipped his wife to New York and fled to Fort Johnston, where a sloop-of-war had its station. In South Carolina, Charles Pinckney, on learning the inflexibility of parliament, using power intrusted to him by the provincial congress, appointed a committee of five to place the colony in a state of defence; on the 21st of April, the very night after their organization, men of Charleston, without disguise, under their direction, seized all the powder in the public magazines, and removed 800 stand of arms and other military stores from the royal arsenal. The tidings from Lexington induced the general committee to hasten the meeting of the provincial congress, whose members, on the 2d of June, Henry Laurens being their president, associated themselves for defence against every foe; 'ready to sacrifice their lives and fortunes to secure her freedom and safety.' They resolved to raise two regiments of infantry and a regiment of rangers. … The people of Charleston are as mad as they are here in Boston,' was the testimony of Gage. The skirmish at Lexington became known in Savannah on the 10th of May, and added Georgia to the union. At that time she had about 17,000 white inhabitants and 15,000 Africans. Her militia was not less than 3,000. {3225} Her frontier, which extended from Augusta to St. Mary's, was threatened by the Creeks, with 4,000 warriors; the Chickasas, with 450; the Cherokees, with 3,000; the Choctas, with 2,500. But danger could not make her people hesitate. On the night of the 11th, Noble Wimberley Jones, Joseph Habersham, Edward Telfair, and others, broke open the king's magazine in the eastern part of the city, and took from it over 500 pounds of powder. To the Boston wanderers they sent 63 barrels of rice and £122 in specie; and they kept the king's birthday by raising a liberty-pole."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 4, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: T. Jones, History of New York during the Revolution, volume 1, chapter 2.

W. Wirt, Life of Patrick Henry, section 5.

W. B. Stevens, History of Georgia, book 4, chapter 1 (volume 2).

_Proceedings of New York Provincial Congress (New York State Archives, volume 1)._

W. H. Egle, History of Pennsylvania, chapter 8.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (May). The surprising of Ticonderoga and Crown Point.

"Early in the year 1775, as soon as it was made manifest by the attitude assumed on the part of the British government against the colonies, and by the conduct of General Gage in Boston, that open hostilities must inevitably commence in a short time, it began to be secretly whispered among the principal politicians in New England that the capture of Ticonderoga was an object demanding the first attention. In the month of March, Samuel Adams and Dr. Joseph Warren, as members of the Committee of Correspondence in Boston, sent an agent privately into Canada, on a political mission, with instructions to ascertain the feelings of the people there in regard to the approaching contest, and to make such reports as his observations should warrant. … This agent sent back intelligence from Montreal, and among other things advised, that by all means the garrison of Ticonderoga should be seized as quickly as possible after the breaking out of hostilities, adding that the people of the New Hampshire Grants had already agreed to undertake the task, and that they were the most proper persons to be employed in it. This hint was given three weeks anterior to the battle of Lexington, and how far it influenced future designs may not be known; but it is certain that, eight days after that event, several gentlemen at that time attending the Assembly in Hartford, Connecticut, concerted a plan for surprising Ticonderoga and seizing the cannon in that fortress, for the use of the army then marching from all quarters to the environs of Boston."

J. Sparks, Life of Ethan Allen (Library of American Biographies, volume 1), page 270.

The gentlemen above mentioned "borrowed of the Connecticut Treasury some 1,800 dollars, and enlisted Mott and Phelps of Hartford, and Blagden of Salisbury, to beat up recruits. With these they went northward, and at Pittsfield got the co-operation of Captains Easton and Brown. No time was to be lost, and they pushed on with some forty men to find that Vermont giant, Ethan Allen, at Bennington. Allen at once agreed to go; he sought out Seth Warner, and roused the 'Green Mountain Boys,' who were mostly Connecticut and Massachusetts men; so that, in a few days, there gathered at Castleton (7th of May, 1775) two hundred and seventy strong men. Allen was their first leader, Easton second, and Warner third. Their larger body was to cross the Lake in boats from Shoreham, and surprise 'Ty.' Captain Herrick, with thirty men, was to seize the pass of Skenesborough (now Whitehall) at the head of the Lake, and Captain Douglass was to search for and seize all boats and batteaux. While these things were in progress, the ambitious, active, and daring Benedict Arnold heard of this expedition, and at once got leave from the Committee of Safety at Cambridge, to lead it. He rode post-haste through Massachusetts to raise men, and, with a single follower, reached Castleton, and claimed the command. These rough cubs of the forest could not well understand why he should lead them, for had they not Allen, and Warner, and Easton, and Phelps, and Biggelow, and others? But they consented that he should join Allen as an equal; and so forward they went. On the 8th of May Captain Noah Phelps, disguised with rough farmer clothes, and a long beard, blundered into the fort at Ticonderoga, pretending he wanted to be shaved. He found the gates open, and discipline loose; for no telegraph had carried the Lexington news to them, nor had the winds wafted the smell of blood, or the sounds of muskets there. When the darkness was deepest on the night of the 9th, Allen and Arnold, with 83 men, pulled across the Lake, landed near the fort, and then sent back the boats for Warner and his men. They had a boy, Nathan Beman, for a guide, and were full of courage. Allen formed his men, made them a little speech, and all was ready, when the question arose as to who should have the honor of entering the fort first. The dispute was warm between Arnold and Allen, but was finally quieted; and, side by side, at daylight, they rushed through the gate of the fort, defended only by sleeping men. The sentinel snapped his musket, and ran, giving the alarm; the garrison hastily turned out, to find themselves in the face of superior numbers. Allen sought and found the Commander's bed-room, and when Captain Delaplace waked, he saw any thing but an Angel of Mercy with white wings. Delaplace opened the door, with trowsers in hand, and there the great gaunt Ethan stood, with a drawn sword in his hand. 'Surrender!' said Ethan. 'To you?' asked Delaplace. 'Yes, to me, Ethan Allen.' 'By whose authority?' asked Laplace. Ethan was growing impatient, and raising his voice, and waving his sword, he said: 'In the name of the Great Jehovah, and of the Continental Congress, by God!' Delaplace little comprehended the words, but surrendered at once. Thus, on the morning of 10th of May, the strong fortress of Ticonderoga was taken by the border-men, and with it 44 prisoners, 120 iron cannon, with swivels, muskets, balls, and some powder, without the loss of a single man. The surprise was planned and paid for by Connecticut, and was led by Allen, a Connecticut-born man, but was carried out by the 'Green Mountain Boys.' Skenesborough (Whitehall) was surprised and seized, while Major Skene was out shooting. Arnold at once manned a schooner, taken at Skenesborough, and led an attack against an armed sloop at St. John's; he took her and the place, and returned in triumph to meet Allen, who, in batteaux, was coming to sustain him. Warner led a party against Crown Point, and took it, with its hundred cannon, and small garrison of 12 men.

{3226}

News of these things was carried to the Continental Congress, reassembled at Philadelphia, which caused almost as much surprise there, as Allen's demand did to Captain Delaplace, and more exultation. They requested the Committees of Safety of New York and Albany, to have an inventory made of the stores, so that they might be returned 'when the restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the Colonies' should render it safe."

C. W. Elliott, The New England History, volume 2, chapter 18.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, The American Revolution, chapter 3 (volume 1).

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 3, chapter 17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (May). The Mecklenburg Declaration.

See NORTH CAROLINA:. A. D. 1775 (MAY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (May-August). The Second Continental Congress and its work. Its powers, theoretical and actual. Its opportunity. Its influence. The New England Army adopted as the "Continental Army," and Washington made Commander-in-chief.

"The second General Congress assembled at Philadelphia on the 10th of May. Peyton Randolph was again elected as president; but being obliged to return, and occupy his place as speaker of the Virginia Assembly, John Hancock, of Massachusetts, was elevated to the chair. … Many of those most active in vindicating colonial rights, and Washington among the number, still indulged the hope of an eventual reconciliation, while few entertained, or, at least, avowed the idea of complete independence. A second 'humble and dutiful' petition to the king was moved, but met with strong opposition. John Adams condemned it as an imbecile measure, calculated to embarrass the proceedings of Congress. He was for prompt and vigorous action. Other members concurred with him. Indeed, the measure itself seemed but a mere form, intended to reconcile the half-scrupulous; for subsequently, when it was carried, Congress, in face of it, went on to assume and exercise the powers of a sovereign authority. A federal union was formed, leaving to each colony the right of regulating its internal affairs according to its own individual constitution, but vesting in Congress the power of making peace or war; of entering into treaties and alliances; of regulating general commerce; in a word, of legislating on all such matters as regarded the security and welfare of the whole community. The executive power was to be vested in a council of twelve, chosen by Congress from among its own members, and to hold office for a limited time. Such colonies as had not sent delegates to Congress might yet become members of the confederacy by agreeing to its conditions. Georgia, which had hitherto hesitated, soon joined the league, which thus extended from Nova Scotia to Florida. Congress lost no time in exercising their federated powers. In virtue of them, they ordered the enlistment of troops, the construction of forts in various parts of the colonies, the provision of armies, ammunition, and military stores; while, to defray the expense of these, and other measures, avowedly of self-defence, they authorized the emission of notes to the amount of $3,000,000, bearing the inscription of 'The United Colonies'; the faith of the confederacy being pledged for their redemption. A retaliating decree was passed, prohibiting all supplies of provisions to the British fisheries; and another, declaring the province of Massachusetts Bay absolved from its compact with the crown, by the violation of its charter; and recommending it to form an internal government for itself. … The situation of the New England army, actually besieging Boston, became an early and absorbing consideration. It was without munitions of war, without arms, clothing, or pay; in fact, without legislative countenance or encouragement. Unless sanctioned and assisted by Congress, there was danger of its dissolution. … The disposition to uphold the army was general; but the difficult question was, who should be commander-in-chief? … The opinion evidently inclined in favor of Washington; yet it was promoted by no clique of partisans or admirers. More than one of the Virginia delegates, says Adams, were cool on the subject of this appointment. … Adams, in his diary, claims the credit of bringing the members of Congress to a decision. … On the 15th of June, the army was regularly adopted by Congress, and the pay of the commander-in-chief fixed at $500 a month. Many still clung to the idea, that in all these proceedings they were merely opposing the measures of the ministry, and not the authority of the crown, and thus the army before Boston was designated as the Continental Army, in contradistinction to that under General Gage, which was called the Ministerial Army. In this stage of the business, Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, rose, and nominated Washington for the station of commander-in-chief. The election was by ballot, and was unanimous. It was formally announced to him by the president, on the following day, when he had taken his seat in Congress. Rising in his place, he briefly expressed his high and grateful sense of the honor conferred on him, and his sincere devotion to the cause. 'But,' added he, 'lest some unlucky event should happen unfavorable to my reputation, I beg it may be remembered by every gentleman in the room, that I this day declare, with the utmost sincerity, I do not think myself equal to the command I am honored with. As to pay, I beg leave to assure the Congress that, as no pecuniary consideration could have tempted me to accept this arduous employment, at the expense of my domestic ease and happiness, I do not wish to make any profit on it. I will keep an exact account of my expenses. Those, I doubt not, they will discharge, and that is all I desire.'" Four major-generals,—Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler and Israel Putnam,—and eight brigadier-generals—Seth Pomeroy, Richard Montgomery, David Wooster, William Heath, Joseph Spencer, John Thomas, John Sullivan, and Nathaniel Greene—were appointed. "At Washington's express request, his old friend, Major Horatio Gates, then absent at his estate in Virginia, was appointed adjutant-general, with the rank of brigadier."

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 1, chapter 39.

"The Congress of 1775 was not content with mere expression of opinions. It took a large view of its powers. It realized that its efficiency depended wholly upon the acceptance of its acts by the principals of the different delegations; but, following its judgment as to what the patriotism of the colonies would approve and sustain, it initiated action of various kinds, which, from the beginning, assumed the certainty of adoption by the colonies, and derived all its energy from the probability of such ratification. {3227} The Congress doubtless exceeded the letter of the instructions received by a portion of its members; but this was not from any misconception of those instructions. … In pointing out to the colonies the direction which their preparations for resistance ought to take, the Congress no more acted upon an imagined authority to command the colonies than does the lookout at the bow of the ship, when he reports the direction of danger to the officer of the deck. The Congress unquestionably enjoyed a prestige at this juncture which it subsequently lost. The people, and even the provincial conventions, occasionally addressed it in a tone which indicated that they unconsciously attributed to it power which it plainly did not possess."

A. W. Small, The Beginnings of American Nationality (Johns Hopkins University Studies, 8th series, 1-2) page 73.

"With the energy and recklessness of a French revolutionary body it might have blotted out the distinctions between colonies, and established a centralized government, to be modified in time by circumstances. In fact, it took no such direction. It began its course by recommendations to the new colonial governments; it relied on them for executive acts; and, as soon as the new colonies were fairly under way, they seized on the power of naming and recalling the delegates to the Congress. From that time the decadence of the Congress was rapid; the national idea became dimmer; and the assertions of complete sovereignty by the political units became more pronounced."

A. Johnston, The United States: its History and Constitution, sections 63-66 (chapter 3).

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, The Rise of the Republic, chapter 10.

H. von Holst, Constitutional and Political History of the United States, volume 1, chapter 1.

P. Force, American Archives, volume 2.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (June). End of Royal Government in New Hampshire.

See NEW HAMPSHIRE: A. D. 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (June). The end of Royal Government In Virginia.

See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1775.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (June). The Battle of Bunker Hill.

"British reinforcements, under three generals, Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne, arrived at Boston soon after the fight at Lexington. Gage had now about 10,000 men. These occupied the town of Boston, which lay on a peninsula covering the middle of the harbor. Around them, on the hills of the mainland, there were about twice their number of undisciplined and poorly-armed Americans, without cannon and almost without food. Just north of Boston, another peninsula ran out into the harbor. On it there were several hills, and the Americans determined to seize and fortify one of them, called Bunker Hill. About 1,000 men, under Colonel Prescott, were sent into the peninsula for this on a suitable night. For some reason, they passed beyond Bunker Hill, and seized Breed's Hill, much closer to Boston. Breed's Hill is now usually called Bunker Hm, and the Bunker Hill monument is erected upon it. The American fortification was continued silently and swiftly through the night. In the morning of June 17, 1775, the British in Boston woke to see a long line of intrenchments running across the hill above them, and an American working-party busily strengthening it. For a time, the British frigates in the harbor kept up a slow and distant fire, to which the working-party paid no attention; but at noon the work was stopped, for the British troops were coming across the harbor in boats. Three thousand well armed, uniformed, and drilled soldiers, who had never known defeat in equal fight, landed near Charlestown, under General Howe. Here they formed at the water-side, and in a long, steady line began to move upward to scatter the 1,500 farmers who were watching them from the top of the hill. From the roofs of the houses in Boston, the rest of the British army and the townspeople were watching, anxious to see 'whether the Yankees would fight.' Most of the watchers expected to see the untrained soldiers in the fort fire a few hasty shots at a safe distance, and run. The fort held a threatening silence until the attacking column was within 150 feet. Then, at the word, came a sheet of fire from the marksmen within; and, when the smoke lifted, part of the British line was lying dead or wounded, and the rest were retreating hastily down the hill. The British were not cowards: the officers re-formed the line at the bottom of the hill, and, after setting fire to Charlestown, again advanced to the attack. Again there was a steady silence in the fort, a close and deadly fire, and the British line was driven down the hill again. The British then moved up the hill for the third time. The powder in the fort was now gone, and the garrison fought for a few minutes with gun stocks and stones against the British bayonets. But such a struggle was hopeless, and the British gained the fort. They were too tired to pursue the garrison, who escaped to the mainland."

A. Johnston, History of the United States for schools, sections 195-197.

"As soon as Prescott saw the defence was hopeless, he ordered a retreat, and friend and foe mingled together as they surged out of the sally-port amid the clouds of dust which the trampling raised, for a scorching sun had baked the new-turned soil. It was now, while the confused mass of beings rocked along down the rear slope of the hill, that Warren [who had joined the defending force that morning as a volunteer] fell, shot through the head. No one among the Americans knew certainly that he was dead, as they left him. … Prescott did not conceal his indignation at not having been better supported, when he made his report at Ward's headquarters. He knew he had fought well; but neither he nor his contemporaries understood at the time how a physical defeat might be a moral victory. Not knowing this, there was little else than mortification over the result,—indeed, on both sides. … The general opinion seems to be that the Americans had about 1,500 men engaged at one time, and that from 3,000 to 4,000 at different times took some part in it. The British had probably about the same numbers in all, but were in excess of the Americans at all times while engaged. The conflict with small arms lasted about ninety minutes."

J. Winsor, _The Conflict Precipitated (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6, chapter 2). _

"How can we exaggerate the relative importance of this day's action? Did it not, in fact, not only open, but make the contest, dividing into two parties not only those determined for the ministry or for enfranchisement, but also all timid, hesitating, reluctant neutrals? It was impossible after this to avoid taking a side. It rendered all reconciliation impossible, till it should offer itself in the shape of independence. {3228} It echoed the gathering cry that brought together our people from their farms and workshops, to learn the terrible art which grows more merciful only as it is more ferociously, that is, skilfully, pursued. The day needs no rhetoric to magnify it in our revolutionary annals. When its sun went down, the provincials had parted with all fear, hesitation, and reluctance. They found that it was easy to fight. … General Gage's account of the battle, acknowledging the loss of 226 killed and 828 wounded, was received in London, July 25th. While the ministry received with dismay this official intelligence, and kept it back from publication, many private letters accompanying it in its transit anticipated with exaggerations its humiliating details."

G. E. Ellis, History of the Battle of Bunker's Hill, pages 102-105.

ALSO IN: R. Frothingham, History of the Siege of Boston, chapters 4-7.

R. Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, chapter 16.

I. N. Tarbox, Life of Israel Putnam, chapters 7-11.

_H. B. Dawson, Bunker Hill (Historical Magazine, June, 1868)._

S. A. Drake, Historic Fields and Mansions of Middlesex, chapter 3.

P. Force, editor, American Archives, series 4, volume 2.

F. Moore, editor, Diary of the American Revolution, volume 1, pages 97-103.

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the American Revolution, volume 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (August-December). Unsuccessful expedition to Canada.

"The exploits of Allen and Arnold at Ticonderoga … had invited further conquests; but the Continental Congress hesitated to take any steps which might seem to carry war across the line till the Canadians had the opportunity of casting in their lot with their neighbors. On the 1st of June, 1775, Congress had distinctly avowed this purpose of restraint; and they well needed to be cautious, for the Canadian French had not forgotten the bitter aspersions on their religion which Congress had, with little compunction, launched upon its professors, under the irritation of the Quebec Act. Still their rulers were aliens, and the traditional hatred of centuries between races is not easily kept in abeyance. Ethan Allen was more eager to avail himself of this than Congress was to have him; but the march of events converted the legislators, and the opportunity which Allen grieved to see lost was not so easily regained when Congress at last authorized the northern invasion. Arnold and Allen had each aimed to secure the command of such an expedition, the one by appealing to the Continental Congress, the other by representations to that of New York. Allen had also gone in person to Philadelphia, and he and his Green Mountain Boys were not without influence upon Congress, in their quaint and somewhat rough ways, as their exuberant patriotism later made the New York authorities forget their riotous opposition to the policy which that province had been endeavoring to enforce in the New Hampshire Grants. Connecticut had already sent forward troops to Ticonderoga to hold that post till Congress should decide upon some definite action; and at the end of June, 1775, orders reached Schuyler which he might readily interpret as authorizing him, if the Canadians did not object, to advance upon Canada. He soon started to assume command, but speedily found matters unpromising. The Johnsons were arming the Indians up the Mohawk and beyond in a way that boded no good, and they had entered into compacts with the British commanders in Canada. Arnold had been at Ticonderoga, and had quarrelled with Hinman, the commander of the Connecticut troops. Schuyler heard much of the Green Mountain Boys, but he only knew them as the lawless people of the Grants, and soon learned that Allen and Warner had themselves set to quarrelling. … In August the news from Canada began to be alarming. Richard Montgomery, an Irish officer who had some years before left the army to settle on the Hudson and marry, was now one of the new brigadiers. He urged Schuyler to advance and anticipate the movement now said to be intended by Carleton, the English general commanding in Canada. At this juncture Schuyler got word from Washington that a coöperating expedition would be dispatched by way of the Kennebec, which, if everything went well, might unite with Schuyler's before Quebec."

_J. Winsor, The Conflict Precipitated (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6)._

The two movements were made, from Ticonderoga and from the Kennebec, with results which will be found related under CANADA: A. D. 1775-1776. "No expedition during the American Revolution had less elements of permanent value than those which were undertaken against Canada during the year 1775. Great results were anticipated, but none were realized. The obstacles were too substantial, and failure was inevitable. Wonderful endurance and great physical courage were manifested, and these were accompanied by a prodigious amount of faith, but there was neither ability nor opportunity for works commensurate with the faith. Certain Acts of Parliament, known as the Canadian Acts, were as offensive to Canadians as other legislation was to Americans; but the former were not pressed to the extremity of armed resistance. The people themselves having no harmony of religious or political views, were equally divided in language and race. Neither did the Canadians invite the aid of the colonies. The hypothesis that Canada would blend her destiny with that of New England, and would unite in resistance to the crown, certainly involved some identity of interest as well as of action. But the characters of the two people were too unlike to be unified by simple opposition to English legislation, and Canadians had no antecedents such as would prompt a hearty sympathy with New England and its controlling moral sentiment. Neither was there such a neighborly relation as admitted of prompt and adequate aid from one to the other, in emergencies calling for a combined effort. As a base of operations for a British army moving upon the colonies, Canada had the single advantage of being less distant from England than an Atlantic base, and many supplies could be procured without the expense and delay of their transportation across the Atlantic; but between Canada and the American colonies there was an actual wilderness. Hence a British offensive movement from Canada involved constant waste of men and materials, a deep line through an uninhabited or hostile region, and such a constant backing, as was both inconsistent with the resources of the base, and with a corresponding support of armies resting upon the sea coast. The British government was not ready for operations so extensive and so exhaustive of men and treasure; neither did it realize the necessity for that expenditure. {3229} There were two alternatives, one illustrated by General Carleton's plan, viz., to hold the forts of Lake Champlain, as advanced, defensive positions; and the other, that of Burgoyne, to strike through the country and depend upon support from the opposite base. The true defense of the colonies from such expeditions depended upon the prompt seizure and occupation of the frontier posts. An American advance upon Canada was not only through a country strategically bad, but the diversion of forces for that purpose endangered the general issue, and entrusted its interests to the guardianship of an army already insufficient to meet the pressing demands of the crisis. The occupation of New York in 1775, by an adequate British force, would have infinitely outweighed all possible benefit from the complete conquest of Canada. At the very time when Washington could hardly hold the British garrison of Boston in check,—when he had an average of but nine rounds of ammunition per man, he was required to spare companies, ammunition, and supplies for a venture, profitless at best,—with the certainty that reinforcements could not be supplied as fast as the enemy could draw veteran regiments from Great Britain and Ireland, to defend or recover Canadian soil. In giving a rapid outline of this first attempt of the colonies to enlarge the theatre of active operations, it should be noticed that the initiative had been taken before General Washington had been elected commander-in-chief, and that Congress itself precipitated the final movement."

H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapter 19.

ALSO IN: B. J. Lossing, Life and Times of Philip Schuyler, volume 1, chapters 19-29, and volume 2, chapters 1-4.

_J. Armstrong, Life of Richard Montgomery (Library of American Biographies, volume 1)._

J. Henry, Account of Arnold's Campaign against Quebec, by one of the Survivors.

I. N. Arnold, Life of Benedict .Arnold, chapters 3-5.

W. Irving, Life of Washington. volume 2, chapters 4-5, 8-9, 12, 15-16, 19-20.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (September). Flight of Govern or Tryon from New York.

See NEW YORK: A. D. 1775 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775-1776. Washington in command at Cambridge. The British forced out of Boston.

Washington "arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the 2d of July [1775], and on the following day presented himself at the head of the army. His head-quarters remained at Cambridge, till the evacuation of Boston by the royal forces on the 17th of March, 1776. The position of affairs was one of vast responsibility and peril. The country at large was highly excited, and expected that a bold stroke would be struck and decisive successes obtained. But the army was without organization and discipline; the troops unused to obey, the officers for the most part unaccustomed, some of them incompetent, to command. A few of them only had had a limited experience in the Seven Years' War. Most of the men had rushed to the field on the first alarm of hostilities, without any enlistment; and when they were enlisted, it was only till the end of the year. There was no military chest; scarce anything that could be called a commissariat. The artillery consisted of a few old field-pieces of various sizes, served with a very few exceptions by persons wholly untrained in gunnery. There was no siege train, and an almost total want of every description of ordnance stores. Barrels of sand, represented as powder, were from time to time brought into the camp, to prevent the American army itself from being aware of its deficiency in that respect. In the autumn of 1775, an alarm of small-pox was brought from Boston, and the troops were subjected to inoculation: There was no efficient power, either in the Provincial Assembly or the Congress at Philadelphia, by which these wants could be supplied and these evils remedied. Such were the circumstances under which General Washington took the field, at the head of a force greatly superior in numbers to the royal army, but in all other respects a very unequal match. Meantime the British were undisputed masters of the approaches to Boston by water. Washington's letters disclose extreme impatience under the inaction to which he was condemned; but the gravest difficulties attended the expulsion of the royal forces from Boston. It could only be effected by the bombardment and assault of that place; an attempt which must in any event have been destructive to the large non-combatant population, that had been unable to remove into the country, and which would have been of doubtful success, for the want of a siege train, and with troops wholly unused to such an undertaking. Having in the course of the year received some captured ordnance from Canada [from Fort Ticonderoga], and a supply of ammunition taken by privateers at sea, Washington was strongly disposed to assault the town, as soon as the freezing of the bay on the western side of the peninsula would allow the troops to pass on the ice. The winter, however, remained open longer than usual, and a council of war dissuaded this attempt. He then determined to occupy Nook's Hill (an eminence at the extremity of Dorchester 'Neck,' as it was called, separated from Boston by a narrow arm of the harbor), and Dorchester Heights, which commanded Nook's Hill and the town itself. In this way the royal forces would be compelled to take the risk of a general action, for the purpose of dislodging the Americans, or else to evacuate the town. The requisite preparations having been made with secrecy, energy, and despatch, the heights were covered with breastworks on the night of the 4th of March, 1776, as 'by enchantment.' A partial movement, undertaken by the royal army to dislodge the Americans, was frustrated by stress of weather; and on the 17th of March, in virtue of an agreement to that effect with the municipal government, the town and harbor of Boston were evacuated by the British army and army without firing a gun. Thus, without a battle and without the destruction of a building in Boston, the first year of the war was brought to a successful and an auspicious close."

E. Everett, Life of Washington, chapter 5.

ALSO IN: G. Washington, Writings; edited. by Ford, volume 3.

R. Frothingham, History of the Siege of Boston, chapters 8-13.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775-1776. The beginning of the American Navy, and the early fitting out of Privateers.

"Before the end of 1775 the Continental Congress ordered that five ships of 32 guns should be built, five of 28, and three of 24. This order was carried out, and these vessels are the proper beginning of the navy of the United States. Almost everyone of them, before the war was over, had been captured, or burned to avoid capture. {3230} But the names of the little fleet will always be of interest to Americans, and some of those names have always been preserved on the calendar of the navy. They are the 'Washington,' 'Raleigh,' 'Hancock,' 'Randolph,' 'Warren,' 'Virginia,' 'Trumbull,' 'Effingham,' 'Congress,' 'Providence,' 'Boston,' 'Delaware,' 'Montgomery.' The State of Rhode Island, at the very outbreak of hostilities, commissioned Abraham Whipple, who went with his little vessel as far as Bermuda, and, from his experience in naval warfare earned in the French War, he was recognized as commodore of the little fleet of American cruisers. … Meanwhile, every maritime State issued commissions to privateers, and established admiralty or prize courts, with power to condemn prizes when brought in. Legitimate commerce had been largely checked, and … the seamen of the country, who had formerly been employed in the fisheries, or in our large foreign trade with the West India Islands and with Europe, gladly volunteered in the private service. Till the end of the war the seamen preferred the privateer service to that of the government. … The larger maritime States had in commission one or more vessels from the beginning, but they found the same difficulty which the Congress found in enlisting seamen, when any bold privateer captain came into rivalry with them. … As early as the 22d of December, in 1775, Congress had appointed Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, commander-in-chief of its navy, and had named four captains besides, with several lieutenants, the first of whom was John Paul Jones. … On the 10th of October [1776] a resolution of Congress fixed the rank of captains in the navy, … Paul Jones eighteenth on a list of twenty-four. Jones was not pleased that his rank was not higher, but eventually his achievements were such that his reputation probably now stands higher as a successful officer than that of any of the number."

E. E. Hale, Naval History of the American Revolution (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6, chapter 7).

ALSO IN: J. F. Cooper, Naval History of the United States, volume 1, chapters 4-6.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (January). Adoption of a Constitution in New Hampshire.

See NEW HAMPSHIRE: A. D. 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (January-June). King George's war measures and Paine's "Common Sense." The setting of the tide of opinion toward national independence.

"Disastrous news arrived from England before the close of the winter of 1775-6. The King had opened Parliament with a speech in which he had denounced the Colonists as rebels, seeking, with deceitful pretences, to establish an independent empire; and his Majesty recommended decisive, coercive measures against them. … The answer to the Royal Address (adopted by a vote of seventy-six to thirty-three in the Lords, and two hundred and seventy-eight to one hundred and eight in the Commons) gave assurances of the firm support of Parliament to the proposed measures. The very moderately conciliatory propositions made by the Duke of Richmond, Mr. Burke, and the Duke of Grafton, were summarily voted down, and not far from the middle of December the atrocious' Prohibitory Act,' as it was generally designated, passed. It was, in effect, a declaration of war, and a war unrestrained by the customs, and unmitigated by the decencies of civilization. It authorized the confiscation of American vessels and cargoes, and those of all nations found trading in American ports. It authorized British commanders to impress American crews into the British Navy, and to place them on the same footing with voluntarily enlisted seamen; that is, to give them a choice between parricide and being hung at a yardarm! Finally, it referred all future negotiations to two Commissioners, to be sent out along with a conquering armament, who were allowed to grant pardons to individuals and Colonies, on submission, thus leaving no future alternative opposed to the latter but the sword, and indicating that henceforth all appeals to King or Parliament were cut off. … Concurrently with these legislative steps, the practical ones for carrying on the war, with a large army, were entered upon. Finding it difficult or impossible to obtain the necessary recruits at home, and that the existing English and Irish regiments embarked with such reluctance that it was necessary to keep a guard upon the transports 'to keep them from deserting by wholesale,' the Ministry successively applied to Russia, the States-General, and finally, several of the German States for mercenaries. … The infamy of filling up the British armament was reserved for the Princes of three or four petty German States. … As the news of these events successively reached the American Congress and people, in the winter and spring of 1775-6, the contest took a new coloring. Not only the bold, but the moderate began now to see the real alternative before them. And at a critical moment the remedy, and the path to it, were pointed out by a master hand. 'Common Sense' was published by Thomas Paine, and a more effective popular appeal never went to the bosoms of a nation. Its tone, its manner, its biblical illusions, its avoidance of all openly impassioned appeals to feeling, and its unanswerable common sense were exquisitely adapted to the great audience to which it was addressed; and calm investigation will satisfy the historical student that its effect in preparing the popular mind for the Declaration of Independence, exceeded that of any other paper, speech, or document made to favor it, and it would scarcely be exaggeration to add, than all other such means put together. John Adams, with a childish perpetuance, and with a rancor so vehement that it appears ridiculous, spares no occasion to underrate Paine's services, and to assault his opinions and character. … His transparent motive seems to be to decry the author of a paper which had too much the credit of preparing the public mind for the Declaration of Independence, a credit which Mr. Adams was more than anxious to monopolize. Let us be just. Paine's services in paving the way to the Declaration are not to be mentioned on the same page with John Adams's. Moreover, Independence would have been declared, and, perhaps, nearly as early, had Paine never written. But he did, at a propitious moment, and with consummate adaptation, write a paper which went like the arrow which pierces the centre of the target. Its effect was instantaneous and tremendous. … The work ran through innumerable editions in America and France. The world rung with it. … It admits of no doubt that pretty early in 1776, all the true Whigs in Congress, moderates as well as ultras, became satisfied of the necessity and expediency of separation, and that henceforth it was only a question of time with them. {3231} Enactments placing the struggle on the footing of open war, instead of mere insurrection—issuing letters of marque and reprisal against the enemies of our commerce—advising the local authorities to disarm the disaffected—opening the ports of the country to all nations but Great Britain—directing negotiations for foreign alliances to be undertaken—were successively made. Finally, on the 10th of May, a resolution, prepared by John Adams and R. H. Lee, passed the House, advising all the Colonies to form governments for themselves; and in this, unlike preceding instances of giving advice on the same subject, no limitation of the duration of the governments to be formed 'to the continuance of the present dispute' was inserted. This, with a befitting preamble, written by John Adams, was adopted on the 15th, … and was, obviously, a long and bold stride in the direction of independence, and must have been understood by all as its signal and precursor. … Congress cheered on those whom peculiar circumstances had rendered more backward, and it tarried for them a little by the way; on the other hand, it prudently waited for the prompting of the more forward. Thus it avoided the appearance of dominating over public opinion—thus it 'kept front and rear together.' Early in April (12th), North Carolina 'empowered' her delegates 'to concur with the delegates of other Colonies in declaring independency.' At its 'May session' (the day of the month not appearing in the record under our eye), the General Assembly of Rhode Island abolished its act of allegiance, and directed all commissions and legal processes henceforth to issue in the name and under the authority of the 'Governor and Company.' The Connecticut General Assembly, which met on the 9th of May, before its adjournment (date not before us), repealed its act against high treason, and made the same order with Rhode Island in regard to legal processes. On the 15th of May, Virginia took a still more decisive step, by instructing its delegates in Congress to move for a Declaration of Independence. … The Virginia delegates in Congress made choice of Richard H. Lee to move the resolutions contained in their instructions of May 15th; and he did so on Friday, the 7th day of June, John Adams seconding them. Their consideration was postponed until the next day, when they were referred to a committee of the whole, and debated throughout Saturday and the succeeding Monday. On the latter day (10th) Congress resolved: 'That the consideration of the first resolution be postponed to Monday, the first day of July next; and in the meanwhile, that no time be lost, in case the Congress agree thereto, that a committee be appointed to prepare a declaration to the effect of the said first resolution, which is in these words: That these Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown; and that all Political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.'"

H. S. Randall, Life of Jefferson, volume 1, chapter 4.

ALSO IN: _G. Bancroft, History of United States (Author's last revision), volume 4, chapters 24-28._

R. Frothingham, Rise of the Republic, chapter 11.

W. C. Rives, Life and Times of Madison, volume 1, chapters 4-5.

American Archives, series 4, volume 6.

E. G. Scott, The Development of Constitutional Liberty in the English Colonies, chapter 11.

C. J. Stille, Life and Times of John Dickinson, chapter 5.

See, also, NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776; and VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (January-June). Engagement of hireling Hessians to reinforce the British arms.

"The [British] Cabinet had entertained some hopes of Russian auxiliaries [application for 20,000 of whom had been made to the Empress Catherine, who refused them with hardly concealed scorn], but the negotiation for that object could not be matured. Early in the year treaties were signed with the Landgrave of Hesse for taking into British pay 12,000 of his men; with the Duke of Brunswick and other petty potentates of Germany for 5,000 more. These little princes, seeing the need of England, which did not choose to lean, as she might and should have done, on her own right arm, insisted on obtaining, and did obtain, most usurious terms. Under the name of levy-money, there was to be paid to them the price of 30 crowns for every foot-soldier. Under the name of subsidy, each of their Serene Highnesses was moreover to be indulged with a yearly sum, irrespective of the pay and subsistence of the troops; and on the plea that in this case no certain number of years was stipulated as the term of service, the Landgrave of Hesse claimed and was promised a double subsidy, namely 450,000 crowns a year. The men were to enter into pay before they began to march! The subsidies were to be continued for one full year at least after the war was over and the troops had returned to their respective homes. Never yet, in short, was the blood of brave men sold on harder terms. The disgrace of this transaction to the German Princes who engaged in it requires little comment. … The ablest by far of the German Princes at that time, Frederick of Prussia, was not in general a man of compassionate feelings. He had no especial love or care for the North American cause. … Yet even Frederick expressed in strong terms his contempt for the scandalous man-traffic of his neighbours. It is said that whenever any of the newly hired Brunswickers or Hessians had to pass through any portion of his territory he claimed to levy on them the usual toll as for so many head of cattle, since he said they had been sold as such! Nor can the British ministry in this transaction be considered free from blame. … Certain it is that among the various causes which at this period wrought upon our trans-Atlantic brethren to renounce their connection with us, there was none more cogent in their minds than the news that German mercenaries had been hired and were coming to fight against them."

Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), History of England, 1713-1783, chapter 53 (volume 6).

"The first German troops to start for America were the Brunswickers. These marched from Brunswick on February 22d, 1776, 2,282 strong, and were embarked at Stade, near the mouth of the Elbe. The second division of Brunswickers embarked at the end of May—about 2,000 men. The first Hessians set out from Cassel early in March, and were shipped at Bremerlehe, near the mouth of the Weser. The second division was embarked in June. Together they numbered between 12,000 and 13,000 men. {3232} They were for the most part excellent troops and well equipped, for the Landgrave's little army was one of the best in Germany. … The Prince of Waldeck sent his regiment through Cassel without trouble. The Prince of Hesse-Hanau, the Margrave of Anspach-Bayreuth, and the Prince of Anhalt-Zerbst had a longer road."

E. J. Lowell, The Hessians in the Revolutionary War, chapter 5.

ALSO IN: M. von Eelking, Memoirs of General Riedesel, volume 1, pages 18-88, and appendix.

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 4, chapter 22.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (February). Flight of the Royal Governor from Georgia.

See GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (March). State government organized and a Constitution adopted in South Carolina.

See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY-APRIL).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (April). North Carolina the first colony to declare for independence.

See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (May). Rhode Island renounces allegiance to the King.

See RHODE ISLAND: A. D. 1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (May). Popular vote for independence in Massachusetts.

See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1776 (APRIL-MAY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (May). Arnold's retreat from Canada.

See CANADA: A. D. 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (May-June). Independence declared and Constitution adopted in Virginia.

See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (June). The British repulsed at Charleston.

"Early in 1776 the task was assigned to Clinton, who had in January departed from Boston, … to force and hold the Southern colonies to their allegiance.

See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776.

Cornwallis, with troops, was sent over under convoy of Sir Peter Parker's fleet, to give Clinton the army he needed. The fleet did not reach North Carolina till May. In March, [Charles] Lee, while in New York, had wished to be ordered to the command in Canada, as 'he was the only general officer on the continent who could speak and think in French.' He was disappointed, and ordered farther south. By May he was in Virginia, ridding the country of Tories, and trying to find out where Parker intended to land. It was expected that Clinton would return north to New York in season to operate with Howe, when he opened the campaign there in the early summer, as that general expected to do, and the interval for a diversion farther south was not long. Lee had now gone as far as Charleston (South Carolina), and taken command in that neighborhood, while in charge of the little fort at the entrance of the harbor was William Moultrie, upon whom Lee was inculcating the necessity of a slow and sure fire, in case it should prove that Parker's destination, as it might well be, was to get a foothold in the Southern provinces, and break up the commerce which fed the rebellion through that harbor. The people of Charleston had been for some time engaged on their defences, and 'seem to wish a trial of their mettle,' wrote a looker-on. The fort in question was built of palmetto logs, and was unfinished on the land side. Its defenders had four days' warning, and the neighboring militia were summoned. On the 4th of June the hostile fleet appeared, and having landed troops on an adjacent island, it was not till the 27th that their dispositions were made for an attack. Their ships threw shot at the fort all day, which did very little damage, while the return fire was rendered with a precision surprising in untried artillerists, and seriously damaged the fleet, of which one ship was grounded and abandoned. The expected land attack from Clinton's troops, already ashore on Long Island, was not made. A strong wind had raised the waters of the channel between that island and Sullivan's Island so high that it could not be forded, and suitable boats for the passage were not at hand. A few days later the shattered vessels and the troops left the neighborhood, and Colonel Moultrie had leisure to count the cost of his victory, which was twelve killed and twice as many wounded. The courage of Sergeant Jasper, in replacing on the bastion a flag which had been shot away, became at once a household anecdote."

J. Winsor, The Conflict Precipitated (Narrative and Critical History of America. volume 6, chapter 2).

_ALSO IN: H. Flanders, Life of John Rutledge, chapter 10 (Lives of the Chief Justices, volume 1)._

C. B. Hartley, Life of General William Moultrie (Heroes and Patriots of the South), chapter 2.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (June). Resolutions for Independence. Making ready for the Declaration.

"Things were now verging on every side to the same point. North Carolina had conferred the necessary powers to vote for independence and foreign alliances as early as the 12th of April. And now came the news from Richard Lee, to Mr. Adams, that on the very day of the passage of the significant preamble in congress, the 15th of May, the convention of Virginia had gone a step further, and had instructed their delegates to propose independence. Authority to assent to its natural consequences, a confederation and foreign alliances, followed as a matter of course. On the other hand, the convention of Massachusetts had referred the subject back to the people, to be considered and acted upon at their primary town meetings, and the responses had been for some time corning in unequivocally enough. So decided was the feeling that Joseph Hawley, impatient of the delay, was stimulating the nowise reluctant Gerry to greater exertions. Perceiving these encouraging indications in opposite quarters, the friends of independence now consulted together, and made up their minds that the moment had come for a final demonstration. Resolutions, embracing the three great points, were carefully matured, which it was arranged that Richard Henry Lee, on behalf of the delegates of Virginia, should present, and John Adams should second, for Massachusetts. The movement took place, accordingly, on the 7th of June. It appears on the journal, recorded with the customary caution, as follows:

'Certain resolutions respecting independency being moved and seconded,—Resolved, that the consideration of them be referred till to-morrow morning; and that the members be enjoined to attend punctually at ten o'clock, in order to take the same into their consideration.' It was well that a measure of so momentous a character should be accompanied with as much of the forms of notice and special assignment as the body could properly give it. The record of what passed at the appointed time has come down to us very barren of details. {3233} We only know that the resolutions were referred to the committee of the whole, where they were debated with great spirit during that day, Saturday, and again on Monday, the 10th, by which time it had become quite clear that a majority of the colonies were prepared to adopt the first and leading resolution. This majority was composed of the four New England, and three out of the four southern colonies. But it being deemed unadvisable to place this great act upon so narrow a basis, and a prospect being held out of securing a more general concurrence by delaying the decision, a postponement until the 1st of July was effected by a change of the votes of two colonies. In the mean while, however, as it was thought suitable to accompany the act with an elaborate exposition of the causes which were held to justify it, a committee was ordered to have in charge the preparation of such a paper in season for the adjourned debate. … At the same time that Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston, all but the last named being of the movement, were appointed the committee to prepare a declaration, as mentioned, the congress formally voted a second committee, with powers to prepare and digest a form of confederation to be entered into between the colonies; and yet a third, to mature a plan of treaties to be proposed to foreign powers. In this compass were included all the elements of national sovereignty abroad and at home. … The bulk of opposition now centred in the five middle colonies, and the pillar upon which it leaned was John Dickinson. But under the combined assaults conducted by the leading colonies of Virginia and Massachusetts, it was plain that victory was become a mere question of time. Jonathan D. Sergeant, who had left congress to hasten a change in the counsels of New Jersey, had been so successful in spiriting up the assembly as to be able to write, on the 15th of June, to Mr. Adams, that the delegates about to be elected would be on the spot by the 1st of July, the day to which the question had been assigned, and that they would 'vote plump.' Equally favorable news soon came from Maryland. … Thus were two States secured. But Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New York yet remained to move. In the first of these, recourse was had once more to the so-called committees of conference. … And here, on the 23d of June, Dr. Benjamin Rush, then a young man, but acting entirely in sympathy and co-operation with the leaders in congress, moved and carried the appointment of a committee to declare the sense of the conference with respect to an independence of the province on the crown of Great Britain. He and James Smith were then joined with Thomas McKean, the chairman of the conference, in a committee, which was ready the next day with a report affirming the willingness of the deputies of the conference to concur in a vote declaring the United Colonies free and independent States. The report was adopted unanimously, was presented to congress on the 25th, and, doubtless, had its effect in determining those delegates of the colony to absent themselves on the final vote, upon whose resistance its adverse decision depended. As the hesitation of Delaware was chiefly owing to the feeling that pervaded the county of Sussex, Mr. Rodney had repaired thither for the purpose of bringing about a favorable change, in which errand the news came that he was laboring with success. The delegates from New York, no longer interposing any active opposition, yet unwilling to assume a responsibility which their constituents had not authorized, preferred to withdraw from participation in the decision. Such was the state of affairs on the 1st of July, to which day the discussion had been adjourned. There was then little doubt of an affirmative vote on the part of all but four colonies."

J. Q. Adams and C. F. Adams, Life of John Adams, volume 1, pages 308-318.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (June). End of proprietary and royal government in Maryland.

See MARYLAND: A. D. 1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (July). Authorship, adoption and signing of the Declaration of Independence.

For the last hundred years one of the first facts taught to any child of American birth is, that Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence. The original draft in his handwriting was afterward deposited in the State Department. It shows two or three trifling alterations, interlined in the handwritings of Franklin and Adams. Otherwise it came before Congress precisely as Jefferson wrote it. Many years afterward John Adams gave an account of the way in which Jefferson came to be the composer of this momentous document, differing slightly from the story told by Jefferson. But the variance is immaterial. … Jefferson's statement seems the better entitled to credit, and what little corroboration is to be obtained for either narrator is wholly in his favor. He says simply that when the Committee came together he was pressed by his colleagues unanimously to undertake the draft; that he did so; that, when he had prepared it, he submitted it to Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams, separately, requesting their corrections, 'which were two or three only and merely verbal,' 'interlined in their own handwritings'; that the report in this shape was adopted by the committee, and a 'fair copy,' written out by Mr. Jefferson, was then laid before Congress. A somewhat more interesting discussion concerns the question, how Jefferson came to be named first on the committee, to the entire exclusion of Lee, to whom, as mover of the resolution, parliamentary etiquette would have assigned the chairmanship.

See, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (JANUARY-JUNE).

Many explanations have been given, of which some at least appear the outgrowth of personal likings and dislikings. It is certain that Jefferson was not only preëminently fitted for the very difficult task of this peculiar composition, but also that he was a man without an enemy. His abstinence from any active share in debate had saved him from giving irritation; and it is a truth not to be concealed, that there were cabals, bickerings, heart-burnings, perhaps actual enmities among the members of that famous body, which, grandly as it looms up, and rightly too, in the mind's eye, was after all composed of jarring human ingredients. It was well believed that there was a faction opposed to Washington, and it was generally suspected that irascible, vain, and jealous John Adams, then just rising from the ranks of the people, made in this matter common cause with the aristocratic Virginian Lees against their fellow-countrymen. … So it is likely enough that a timely illness of Lee's wife was a fortunate excuse for passing him by, and that partly by reason of admitted aptitude, partly because no risk could be run of any interference of personal feelings in so weighty a matter, Jefferson was placed first on the committee, with the natural result of doing the bulk of its labor. {3234} On July 1, pursuant to assignment, Congress, in committee of the whole, resumed consideration of Mr. Lee's resolution, and carried it by the votes of nine colonies. South Carolina and Pennsylvania voted against it. The two delegates from Delaware were divided. Those from New York said that personally they were in favor of it and believed their constituents to be so, but they were hampered by instructions drawn a twelvemonth since and strictly forbidding any action obstructive of reconciliation, which was then still desired. The committee reported, and then Edward Rutledge moved an adjournment to the next day, when his colleagues, though disapproving the resolution, would probably join in it for the sake of unanimity. This motion was carried, and on the day following the South Carolinians were found to be converted; also a third member 'had come post from the Delaware counties' and caused the vote of that colony to be given with the rest; Pennsylvania changed her vote; and a few days later the Convention of New York approved the resolution, 'thus supplying the void occasioned by the withdrawing of her delegates from the vote.' On the same day, July 2, the House took up Mr. Jefferson's draft of the Declaration, and debated it during that and the following day and until a late hour on July 4. Many verbal changes were made, most of which were conducive to closer accuracy of statement, and were improvements. Two or three substantial amendments were made by the omission of passages; notably there was stricken out a passage in which George III. was denounced for encouraging the slave-trade. … No interpolation of any consequence was made. Jefferson had ample cause to congratulate himself upon this event of the discussion. … He himself spoke not a word in the debate. … The burden of argument, from which Jefferson wisely shrank, was gallantly borne by John Adams, whom Jefferson gratefully called 'the colossus of that debate.' Jefferson used afterward to take pleasure in tingeing the real solemnity of the occasion with a coloring of the ludicrous. The debate, he said, seemed as though it might run on interminably, and probably would have done so at a different season of the year. But the weather was oppressively warm, and the room occupied by the deputies was hard by a stable, whence the hungry flies swarmed thick and fierce, alighting on the legs of the delegates and biting hard through their thin silk stockings. Treason was preferable to discomfort, and the members voted for the Declaration and hastened to the table to sign it and escape from the horse-fly. John Hancock, making his great familiar signature, jestingly said that John Bull could read that without spectacles; then, becoming more serious, began to impress on his comrades the necessity of their 'all hanging together in this matter.' 'Yes, indeed,' interrupted Franklin, 'we must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.' … Amid such trifling, concealing grave thoughts, Jefferson saw his momentous document signed at the close of that summer afternoon."

J. T. Morse, Jr., Thomas Jefferson, chapter 3.

"The statements relative to signing the Declaration are conflicting. Jefferson states that it was signed generally on the 4th (Memoirs i, 94), and he in other places reiterates this statement, but this manuscript is not known to be extant. … According to the journals, Congress, on the 19th of July, resolved that the 'declaration, passed on the 4th, be fairly engrossed on parchment, with the title and style of "The unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America," and that the same, when engrossed, be signed by every member of Congress.' On the 2d day of August, the journals say, 'The Declaration being engrossed, and compared at the table, was signed by the members.' … This manuscript is preserved in the office of the Secretary of State."

R. Frothingham, The Rise of the Republic, page 545 and foot-note.

"Because statesmen like Dickinson and communities like Maryland were slow in believing that the right moment for a declaration of independence had come, the preposterous theory has been suggested that the American Revolution was the work of an unscrupulous and desperate minority, which, through intrigue mingled with violence, succeeded in forcing the reluctant majority to sanction its measures. Such a misconception has its root in an utter failure to comprehend the peculiar character of American political life, like the kindred misconception which ascribes the rebellion of the colonies to a sordid unwillingness to bear their due share of the expenses of the British Empire. It is like the misunderstanding which saw an angry mob in every town-meeting of the people of Boston, and characterized as a 'riot' every deliberate expression of public opinion. No one who is familiar with the essential features of American political life can for a moment suppose that the Declaration of Independence was brought about by any less weighty force than the settled conviction of the people that the priceless treasure of self-government could be preserved by no other means. It was but slowly that this unwelcome conviction grew upon the people; and owing to local differences of circumstances it grew more slowly in some places than in others. Prescient leaders, too, like the Adamses and Franklin and Lee, made up their minds sooner than other people. Even those conservatives who resisted to the last, even such men as John Dickinson and Robert Morris, were fully agreed with their opponents as to the principle at issue between Great Britain and America, and nothing would have satisfied them short of the total abandonment by Great Britain of her pretensions to impose taxes and revoke charters. Upon this fundamental point there was very little difference of opinion in America. As to the related question of independence, the decision, when once reached, was everywhere alike the reasonable result of free and open discussion; and the best possible illustration of this is the fact that not even in the darkest days of the war already begun did any state deliberately propose to reconsider its action in the matter. The hand once put to the plough, there was no turning back."

_J. Fiske, The American Revolution, chapter 4 (volume 1). _

ALSO IN: _G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 4, chapter 28._

H. S. Randall, Life of Jefferson, volume 1, chapter 5.

C. F. Adams, Life of John Adams, chapter 4.

J. Madison, Papers, volume 1, pages 9-27.

_J. Sanderson, Biographies of the Signers of the Declaration._

See, also, INDEPENDENCE HALL.

{3235}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (July). Text of the Declaration of Independence.

The following is the text of the great manifesto:

"When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.—Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within. He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands. He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our People, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislature. He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power. He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States: For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world: For imposing taxes on us without our Consent: For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences: For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies: For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with Power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions. In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free People. Nor have We been wanting in attention to our Brittish brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. {3236} We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends. We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.

John Hancock. New Hampshire Josiah Bartlett, Wm. Whipple, Matthew Thornton. Massachusetts Bay Saml. Adams, John Adams, Robt. Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry. Rhode Island Step. Hopkins, William Ellery. Connecticut. Roger Sherman, Sam'el Huntington, Wm. Williams, Oliver Wolcott. New York Wm. Floyd, Phil. Livingston, Frans. Lewis, Lewis Morris. New Jersey Richd. Stockton, Jno. Witherspoon, Fras. Hopkinson, John Hart, Abra. Clark. Pennsylvania Robt. Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benja. Franklin, John Morton, Geo. Clymer, Jas. Smith, Geo. Taylor, James Wilson, Geo. Ross. Delaware. Cæsar Rodney, Geo. Read, Tho. M'Kean. Maryland Samuel Chase, Wm. Paca, Thos. Stone, Charles Carroll of Carrollton. Virginia. George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Th Jefferson, Benja. Harrison, Thos. Ne]son, jr., Francis Lightfoot Lee, Carter Braxton. North Carolina. Wm. Hooper, Joseph Hewes, John Penn. South Carolina. Edward Rutledge, Thos. Heyward, Junr., Thomas Lynch, Junr., Arthur Middleton. Georgia. Button Gwinnett, Lyman Hall, Geo. Walton."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (July). Constitutional effect of the Declaration of Independence.

"The Declaration of Independence did not create thirteen sovereign states, but the representatives of the people declared that the former English colonies, under the name which they had assumed of the United States of America, became, from the 4th day of July, 1776, a sovereign state and a member of the family of nations, recognized by the law of nations; and further, that the people would support their representatives with their blood and treasure, in their endeavor to make this declaration a universally recognized fact. Neither congress nor the people relied in this upon any positive right belonging either to the individual colonies or to the colonies as a whole. Rather did the Declaration of Independence and the war destroy all existing political jural relations, and seek their moral justification in the right of revolution inherent in every people in extreme emergencies. … Political theories had nothing to do with this development of things. It was the natural result of given circumstances and was an accomplished fact before anyone thought of the legal consequences which might subsequently be deduced from it."

H. von Holst, Constitutional and Political History of the United States, volume 1, chapter 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (July). Independence declared in New Jersey and Governor Franklin arrested.

See NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1774-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (August). The struggle for New York and the Hudson. Battle of Long Island.

"Washington had been informed, early in January, that General Sir Henry Clinton had sailed from Boston, with a considerable body of troops, on a secret expedition. Apprehending that the city of New York was his destination, he immediately dispatched General Charles Lee to Connecticut to raise troops, and to proceed to that city to watch and oppose Clinton wherever he might attempt to land. Six weeks before the evacuation of Boston [March 17, 1776], Lee had encamped near New York with twelve hundred militia. Already the Sons of Liberty had been busy, and overt acts of rebellion had been committed by them. They had seized the cannons at Fort George, and driven Tryon, the royal governor, on board the Asia, a British armed vessel in the harbor. In March, Clinton arrived at Sandy Hook, just outside New York harbor, and on the same day, the watchful Lee providentially entered the city. The movement, although without a knowledge of Clinton's position, was timely, for it kept him at bay. Foiled in his attempt upon New York, that commander sailed southward. … The destination of Howe, when he left Boston, was also unknown to Washington. Supposing he, too, would proceed to New York, he put the main body of his army in motion toward that city, as soon as he had placed Boston in a state of security. He arrived in New York about the middle of April [April 14], and proceeded at once to fortify the town and vicinity, and also the passes of the Hudson Highlands, fifty miles above. In the mean while, General Lee, who had been appointed to command the American forces in the South, had left his troops in the charge of General Lord Stirling [March 7], and was hastening toward the Carolinas to watch the movements of Clinton, arouse the Whigs, and gather an army there. … Pursuant to instructions, General Howe proceeded toward New York, to meet General Clinton and Parker's fleet. He left Halifax on the 11th of June, [1776], and arrived at Sandy Hook on the 29th. On the 2d of July he took possession of Staten Island, where he was joined by Sir Henry Clinton [July 11], from the South, and his brother, Admiral Lord Howe [July 12], with a fleet and a large land force, from England. Before the first of August, other vessels arrived with a part of the Hessian troops, and on that day, almost 30,000 soldiers, many of them tried veterans, stood ready to fall upon the republican army of 17,000 men, mostly militia, which lay intrenched in New York and vicinity, less than a dozen miles distant. The grand object in view was the seizure of New York and the country along the Hudson, so as to keep open a communication with Canada, separate the patriots of New England from those of the other states, and to overrun the most populous portion of the revolted colonies. {3237} This was the military plan, arranged by ministers. They had also prepared instructions to their commanding generals, to be pacific, if the Americans appeared disposed to submit. Lord Howe and his brother, the general, were commissioned to 'grant pardon to all who deserved mercy,' and to treat for peace, but only on terms of absolute submission on the part of the colonies, to the will of the King and parliament. After making a foolish display of arrogance and weakness, in addressing General Washington as a private gentleman, and being assured that the Americans had been guilty of no offense requiring a 'pardon' at their hands, they prepared to strike an immediate and effective blow. The British army was accordingly put in motion on the morning of the 22d of August [1776], and during that day, 10,000 effective men, and forty pieces of cannon, were landed on the western end of Long Island, between the present Fort Hamilton and Gravesend village. Already detachments of Americans under General Sullivan, occupied a fortified camp at Brooklyn, opposite New York, and guarded seven passes on a range of hills which extend from the Narrows to the village of Jamaica. When intelligence of the landing of the invading army reached Washington, he sent General Putnam, with large reinforcements, to take the chief command on Long Island; and to prepare to meet the enemy. The American troops on the island now [August 26], numbered about 5,000. The British moved in three divisions. The left, under General Grant, marched along the shore toward Gowanus; the right, under Clinton and Cornwallis, toward the interior of the island; and the center, composed chiefly of Hessians, under De Heister, marched up the Flatbush road, south of the hills. Clinton moved under cover of night, and before dawn on the morning of the 27th, he had gained possession of the Jamaica pass, near the present East New York. At the same time, Grant was pressing forward along the shore of New York Bay, and at day-break, he encountered Lord Stirling, where the monuments of Greenwood cemetery now dot the hills. De Heister advanced from Flatbush at the same hour, and attacked Sullivan, who, having no suspicions of the movements of Clinton, was watching the Flatbush Pass. A bloody conflict ensued, and while it was progressing, Clinton descended from the wooded hills, by the way of Bedford, to gain Sullivan's rear. As soon as the latter perceived his peril, he ordered a retreat to the American lines at Brooklyn. It was too late; Clinton drove him back upon the Hessian bayonets, and after fighting desperately, hand to hand, with the foe in front and rear, and losing a greater portion of his men, Sullivan was compelled to surrender. As usual, misfortunes did not come single. While these disasters were occurring on the left, Cornwallis descended the port-road to Gowanus, and attacked Stirling. They fought desperately, until Stirling was made prisoner. Many of his troops were drowned while endeavoring to escape across the Gowanus Creek, as the tide was rising; and a large number were captured. At noon the victory for the British was complete. About 500 Americans were killed or wounded, and 1,100 were made prisoners. These were soon suffering dreadful horrors in prisons and prison-ships, at New York. The British loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was 367. It was with the deepest anguish that Washington had viewed, from New York, the destruction of his troops, yet he dared not weaken his power in the city, by sending reinforcements to aid them. He crossed over on the following morning [August 28], with Mifflin, who had come down from the upper end of York island with a thousand troops, and was gratified to find the enemy encamped in front of Putnam's lines, and delaying an attack, until the British fleet should co-operate with him. This delay allowed Washington time to form and execute a plan for the salvation of the remainder of the army, now too weak to resist an assault with any hope of success. Under cover of a heavy fog, which fell upon the hostile camps at midnight of the 29th, and continued until the morning of the 30th, he silently withdrew them from the camp, and, unperceived by the British, they all crossed over to New York in safety, carrying everything with them but their heavy cannons. … Howe, who felt sure of his prey, was greatly mortified, and prepared to make an immediate attack upon New York, before the Americans should become reinforced, or should escape from it."

B. J. Lossing, Family History of the United States, period 5, chapter 3.

ALSO IN: _H. P. Johnston, The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn, chapters 1-5, (Members of Long Island History Society, volume 3)._

_T. W. Field, The Battle of Long island (Members of Long Island History Society, volume 2)._

W. A. Duer, Life of Wm. Alexander, Earl of Stirling, chapter 5.

J. Fiske, The American Revolution, chapter 5 (volume 1).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (September). Quiet death of proprietary government in Pennsylvania and adoption of a State Constitution.

See PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (September-November). The struggle for New York and the Hudson. Successes of the British. Washington's retreat into New Jersey.

"At daybreak the British awoke, but it was too late. They had fought a successful battle, they had had the American army in their grasp, and now all was over. The victory had melted away, and, as a grand result, they had a few hundred prisoners, a stray boat with three camp-followers, and the deserted works in which they stood. To make such a retreat as this was a feat of arms as great as most victories, and in it we see, perhaps as plainly as anywhere, the nerve and quickness of the man who conducted it. It is true it was the only chance of salvation, but the great man is he who is entirely master of his opportunity, even if he have but one. The outlook, nevertheless, was, as Washington wrote, 'truly distressing.' The troops were dispirited, and the militia began to disappear, us they always did after a defeat. Congress would not permit the destruction of the city, different interests pulled in different directions, conflicting opinions distracted the councils of war, and, with utter inability to predict the enemy's movements, everything led to halfway measures and to intense anxiety, while Lord Howe tried to negotiate with Congress, and the Americans waited for events, Washington, looking beyond the confusion of the moment, saw that he had gained much by delay, and had his own plan well defined. … Everyone else, however, saw only past defeat and present peril.

{3238}

The British ships gradually made their way up the river, until it became apparent that they intended to surround and cut off the American army. Washington made preparations to withdraw, but uncertainty of information came near rendering his precautions futile. September 15th the men-of-war opened fire, and troops were landed near Kip's Bay. The militia in the breastworks at that point had been at Brooklyn and gave way at once, communicating their panic to two Connecticut regiments. Washington, galloping down to the scene of battle, came upon the disordered and flying troops. He dashed in among them, conjuring them to stop, but even while he was trying to rally them they broke again on the appearance of some sixty or seventy of the enemy, and ran in all directions. In a tempest of anger Washington drew his pistols, struck the fugitives with his sword, and was only forced from the field by one of his officers seizing the bridle of his horse and dragging him away from the British, now within a hundred yards of the spot. … The rout and panic over, Washington quickly turned to deal with the pressing danger. With coolness and quickness he issued his orders, and succeeded in getting his army off, Putnam's division escaping most narrowly. He then took post at King's Bridge, and began to strengthen and fortify his lines. While thus engaged, the enemy advanced, and on the 16th a sharp skirmish was fought, in which the British were repulsed, and great bravery was shown by the Connecticut and Virginia troops, the two commanding officers being killed. This affair, which was the first gleam of success, encouraged the troops, and was turned to the best account by the general. Still a successful skirmish did not touch the essential difficulties of the situation, which then as always came from within, rather than without. To face and check 25,000 well equipped and highly disciplined soldiers, Washington had now some 12,000 men, lacking in everything which goes to make an army, except mere individual courage and a high average of intelligence. Even this meagre force was an inconstant and diminishing quantity, shifting, uncertain, and always threatening dissolution. The task of facing and fighting the enemy was enough for the ablest of men; but Washington was obliged also to combat and overcome the inertness and dullness born of ignorance, and to teach Congress how to govern a nation at war. … Meanwhile the days slipped along, and Washington waited on the Harlem Plains, planning descents on Long Island, and determining to make a desperate stand where he was, unless the situation decidedly changed. Then the situation did change, as neither he nor anyone else apparently had anticipated. The British warships came up the Hudson past the forts, brushing aside our boasted obstructions, destroying our little fleet, and getting command of the river. Then General Howe landed at Frog's Point, where he was checked for the moment by the good disposition of Heath, under Washington's direction. These two events made it evident that the situation of the American army was full of peril, and that retreat was again necessary. Such certainly was the conclusion of the council of war, on the 16th, acting this time in agreement with their chief. Six days Howe lingered on Frog's Point, bringing up stores or artillery or something, … and gave six days to Washington. They were of little value to Howe, but they were of inestimable worth to Washington, who employed them in getting everything in readiness, in holding his council of war, and then on the 17th in moving deliberately off to very strong ground at White Plains. … On the 28th, Howe came up to Washington's position, and found the Americans quite equal in numbers, strongly intrenched, and awaiting his attack with confidence. He hesitated, doubted, and finally feeling that he must do something, sent 4,000 men to storm Chatterton Hill, an outlying post, where some 1,400 Americans were stationed. There was a short, sharp action, and then the Americans retreated in good order to the main army, having lost less than half as many men as their opponents. With caution now much enlarged, Howe sent for reinforcements, and waited two days. The third day it rained, and on the fourth Howe found that Washington had withdrawn to a higher and quite impregnable line of hills, where he held all the passes in the rear and awaited a second attack. Howe contemplated the situation for two or three days longer, and then broke camp and withdrew to Dobbs Ferry. Such were the great results of the victory of Long Island, two wasted months, and the American army still untouched. Howe was resolved, however, that his campaign, should not be utterly fruitless, and therefore directed his attention to the defences of the Hudson, Fort Lee, and Fort Washington, and here he met with better success. Congress, in its military wisdom, had insisted that these forts must and could be held. … An attempt was made to hold both forts, and both were lost, as he [Washington] had foreseen. From Fort Lee the garrison withdrew in safety. Fort Washington was carried by storm, after a severe struggle. Twenty-six hundred men and all the munitions of war fell into the hands of the enemy. It was a serious and most depressing loss, and was felt throughout the continent. Meantime Washington had crossed into the Jerseys, and, after the loss of Fort Lee, began to retreat before the British, who, flushed with victory, now advanced rapidly under Lord Cornwallis."

H. C. Lodge, George Washington, volume 1, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapters 33-36.

G. W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, chapters 8-11 (volume 1).

B. J. Lossing, Field Book of the American Revolution, volume 2, chapter 23.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (October). Connecticut assumes independence and sovereignty.

See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1777. Washington's retreat through New Jersey and his masterly return movement. The victories at Trenton and Princeton retrieving the situation.

"On the 17th [of November] Washington ordered Lee [who had lately returned from the south, and who had command of 7,000 men at Northcastle] to come over and join him; but Lee disobeyed, and in spite of repeated orders from Washington he stayed at Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward had some time since resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to Washington. A good many people were finding fault with the latter for losing the 3,000 men at Fort Washington, although, as we have seen, that was not his fault but the fault of Congress. {3239} Lee now felt that if Washington were ruined, he would surely become his successor in the command of the army, and so, instead of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing letters calculated to injure him. Lee's disobedience thus broke the army in two, and did more for the British than they had been able to do for themselves since they started from Staten Island. It was the cause of Washington's flight through New Jersey, ending on the 8th of December, when he put himself behind the Delaware river, with scarcely 3,000 men. Here was another difficulty. The American soldiers were enlisted for short terms, and when they were discouraged, as at present, they were apt to insist upon going home as soon as their time had expired. It was generally believed that Washington's army would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did not think it worth while to be at the trouble of collecting boats wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to Baltimore. People in New Jersey began taking the oath of allegiance to the crown. Howe received the news that he had been knighted for his victory on Long Island, and he returned to New York to celebrate the occasion. While the case looked so desperate for Washington, events at the north had taken a less unfavourable turn. Carleton [who began preparations to invade the province of New York as soon as Arnold retreated from Canada] had embarked on Lake Champlain early in the autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had fitted up a small fleet to oppose his advance, and on the 11th of October there had been a fierce naval battle between the two near Valcour Island, in which Arnold was defeated, while Carleton suffered serious damage. The British general then advanced upon Ticonderoga, but suddenly made up his mind that the season was too late for operations in that latitude. The resistance he had encountered seems to have made him despair of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d of November he started back for Canada. This retreat relieved General Schuyler at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and presently he detached seven regiments to go southward to Washington's assistance. On the 2d of December Lee crossed the Hudson with 4,000 men, and proceeded slowly to Morristown. Just what he designed to do was never known, but clearly he had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to assist Washington, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it certainly was. Whatever his plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud. For some unknown reason he passed the night of the 12th at an unguarded tavern, about four miles from his army; and there he was captured next morning by a party of British dragoons, who carried him off to their camp at Princeton. The dragoons were very gleeful over this unexpected exploit, but really they could not have done the Americans a greater service than to rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came in the nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid of Washington. Even after this force and that sent by Schuyler had reached the commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6,000 men fit for duty. With this little force Washington instantly took the offensive. It was the turning-point in his career and in the history of the Revolutionary War. On Christmas, 1776, and the following nine days, an Washington's most brilliant powers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 strong, lay at Princeton. The principal generals, thinking the serious business of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced party of Hessians, 1,000 strong, was posted on the bank of the Delaware at Trenton, and another one lower down, at Burlington. Washington decided to attack both these outposts, and arranged his troops accordingly, but when Christmas night arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating ice, and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the one that Washington led in person. It was less than 2,500 in number, but the moment had come when the boldest course was the safest. By daybreak Washington had surprised the Hessians at Trenton and captured them all. The outpost at Burlington, on hearing the news, retreated to Princeton. By the 31st Washington had got all his available force across to Trenton. Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others who had just gone home. At this critical moment the army was nearly helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning Robert Morris was knocking at door after door in Philadelphia, waking up his friends to borrow the $50,000, which he sent off to Trenton before noon. The next day Cornwallis arrived at Princeton, and taking with him all the army, except a rear-guard of 2,000 men left to protect his communications, came on toward Trenton. When he reached that town, late in the afternoon, he found Washington entrenched behind a small creek just south of the town, with his back toward the Delaware river. 'Oho!' said Cornwallis, 'at last we have run down the old fox, and we will bag him in the morning.' He sent back to Princeton, and ordered the rearguard to come up. He expected next morning to cross the creek above Washington's right, and then press him back against the broad and deep river, and compel him to surrender. Cornwallis was by no means a careless general, but he seems to have gone to bed on that memorable night and slept the sleep of the just. Washington meanwhile was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging and entrenching, and made a fine show with his camp-fires. Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek, and got around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered the British rear-guard, fought a sharp battle with it and sent it flying, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late. To preserve his communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown. There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a position. But to leave Washington in possession of Morristown was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For that position guarded the Highlands of the Hudson on the one hand, and the roads to Philadelphia on the other. Except that the British had taken the city of New York-which from the start was almost a foregone conclusion—they were no better off than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island. In nine days the tables had been completely turned. {3240} The attack upon, an outpost had developed into a campaign which quite retrieved the situation. The ill-timed interference of Congress, which had begun the series of disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated; and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier successes had been local; this was continental. Seldom has so much been done with such slender means."

J. Fiske, The War of Independence, chapter 6.

"The effect of these two unexpected strokes at Trenton and Princeton was to baffle Howe, and utterly disconcert his plans. Expecting to march upon Philadelphia at his leisure, he suddenly finds Washington turning about and literally cutting his way through the British posts, back to a point where he threatened Howe's flank and rear. The enemy were at once compelled to retire from all their positions below Brunswick, give up the thought of wintering in Philadelphia, and fall back to the vicinity of New York. When Horace Walpole heard of these movements, he wrote to Sir Horace Mann: 'Washington has shown himself both a Fabius and a Camillus. His march through our lines is allowed to have been a prodigy of generalship. In one word, I look upon a great part of America as lost to this country.' Here the campaign closed. Washington could not be dislodged from his strong mountain position, and Howe was satisfied to rest his troops and postpone further operations until the next season. Meantime the country took heart, Congress voted troops and supplies, and the army was recruited and organized on a better basis. 'The business of war is the result of Experience,' wrote Wolcott from Congress, with faith unshaken during the darkest hours of the campaign; and experience was now put to good profit. The crisis was passed. Events proved decisive. Hardship and anxiety were yet to come during succeeding years of the war; but it was the result of this year's struggle that cleared away misgivings and confirmed the popular faith in final success. England could do no more than she had done to conquer America; while America was now more ready than ever to meet the issue. Independence was established in the present campaign—in the year of its declaration; and more than to any others we owe this political privilege to the men who fought from Long Island to Princeton."

H. P. Johnston, Campaign of 1776, Memoirs of the Long Island Historical Society, volume 3, part 1, chapter 8.

ALSO IN: J. F. Hageman, History of Princeton, chapter 4, sections 4-5 (volume 1).

J. O. Raum, History of New Jersey, chapter 20 (volume 2).

W. B. Reed, Life of Joseph Reed, volume 1, chapter 4.

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 3, chapter 21.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1777. Prisoners and exchanges. British treatment of captives. The Jersey Prison-ship and the Sugar-house prison.

In New York, during the British occupation of the city, "wretched indeed was the condition of the poor refugee, of the sick soldier, and, above all, the patriot prisoner. The newspapers are filled with calls for charitable contributions for women and children perishing with cold and hunger, for disabled soldiers and families without a shelter. … But if the favored Tories suffered, what must have been the condition of the patriot prisoners, confined by thousands in bleak barracks, churches, and prison-ships? Let us pass up Broadway, amidst the uncleared ruins, and, turning down Liberty Street, pause before a huge brick building near the Middle Dutch Church. It is five stories high, with broken windows, through which the fierce winds of winter rush unrestrained. Through its imperfect roof and various openings, snow, ice, and water penetrate to every part of the building. Sentries pace round its walls prepared to fire upon any of its maddened inmates who attempt in desperation to escape. Wounded men crawl to the windows begging aid; but the impassive sentinel turns back the gifts of the charitable. No communication with the prisoners can be allowed. The walls within are bare and cheerless, nor do any of the common conveniences of life soften the horrors of those dreary chambers. Yet the old Sugar-House is the most crowded building in New York, and hundreds of prisoners, some chained, others at large, fill its comfortless interior. In the old Sugar-House were confined the prisoners of Long Island, the captives of sudden forays, the patriot citizen, and the heroes of the rebel army. Clothed in rags and scarcely covered from the winter air, crowded in narrow apartments and broken by hunger and disease, the prisoners died by thousands. The sick lay down on beds of snow to perish; the feeble wounded quivered in the February blast. Food of the coarsest kind was served out to them in scanty measure, and devoured with the eagerness of famine. Every night ten or twenty died; every day their corpses were thrown into pits without a single rite of burial. When led out to be exchanged, the glad hope of freedom gave them no joy—they died on the way to their friends, or lingered out a few weeks of miserable decline in the hospitals of the Jerseys. So wretched was their condition that Washington refused to consider them fit subjects for exchange. 'You give us only the dead or dying,' he wrote to Howe, 'for our well-fed and healthy prisoners.' Howe, as if in mockery, replied that they had been kept in 'airy, roomy buildings,' on the same fare as his own soldiers. Washington pointed to the condition in which they reached him—diseased, famished, emaciated, and dying, as they were conducted to his quarters. Across the river, in Wallabout Bay, lay the prison-ship 'Jersey.' She was the hulk of a 64 gun ship, long unseaworthy, her masts and rigging gone, her figurehead broken off, and her whole appearance singularly repulsive. Yet on board of the Jersey were confined 1,200 captured seamen. She was never cleansed, and lay in that condition seven years. No fires warmed her occupants in winter, no screen sheltered them from the August sun; no physician visited the sick, no clergyman consoled the dying there. Poor and scanty food, the want of clothing, cleanliness, and exercise, and raging diseases that never ceased their ravages, made the Jersey a scene of human suffering to which the Black Hole of Calcutta might favorably compare. Benevolent Tories would sometimes convey by stealth food or clothing to her unhappy inmates; but this was little. Toward the close of the war the British, from shame or pity, made some improvement in her condition; but she remained throughout the contest a centre of sickness and death, always decimated by disease and always replenished with new victims. The bones of her dead, estimated at 11,000, lie buried on the Brooklyn shore. The crowded city itself was never free from contagion. In winter the smallpox made fearful ravages."

_E. Lawrence, New York in the Revolution (Harper's Magazine, July, 1868)._

ALSO IN: _Force's American Archives, 4th Series, volume 6, 5th Series, volumes 1-3._

History Magazine, 1866, sup.

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 3, chapter 21.

{3241}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1778. Attitude and feeling of France. Her disposition to aid the colonies and the reasons for it. The American embassy to the French court. Silas Deane and Beaumarchais. Franklin at Passy.

"On March 17, 1776, Vergennes presented to his associates in the cabinet—Maurepas, Turgot (controller-general), Sartine (secretary of the navy), and St. Germain (secretary of war)—a paper entitled 'Considerations,' which, after for many years evading the search of historians, … was brought to light by De Witt and republished by Doniol. In this important paper Vergennes, after some general reflections on the advantages which the two crowns of France and Spain derived from the continuance of the civil war in America, and, on the other hand, on the inconveniences which might arise from the independence of the Colonies, and the probability that, in case of failure in North America, England would, to recover its credit, turn its arms against the French and Spanish possessions in America, proceeds to consider the course at once to be pursued. He bitterly attacks the English for their habitual breach of good faith, violation of treaties, and disregard of that observance of the sacred laws of morality which distinguish the French, and infers that they will take the first opportunity to declare war against France or invade Mexico. No doubt, if the kings of France and Spain had martial tendencies; if they obeyed the dictates of their own interests, and perhaps the justice of their cause, which was that of humanity, so often outraged by England; if their military resources were in a sufficiently good condition, they would feel that Providence had evidently chosen that very hour for humiliating England and revenging on her the wrongs she had inflicted on those who had the misfortune to be her neighbors and rivals, by rendering the resistance of the Americans as desperate as possible. The exhaustion produced by this internecine war would prostrate both England and her Colonies, and would afford an opportunity to reduce England to the condition of a second-rate power; to tear from her the empire she aimed at establishing in the four quarters of the world with so much pride and injustice, and relieve the universe of a tyranny which desires to swallow up both all the power and all the wealth of the world. But the two crowns not being able to act in this way, they must have recourse to a circumspect policy." Vergennes "draws the following inferences: (1) That they should continue dexterously to keep the English ministry in a state of false security with respect to the intentions of France and Spain. (2) That it would be politic to give the insurgents secret assistance in military stores and money; that the admitted utility would justify this little sacrifice, and no loss of dignity or breach of equity would be involved in it. (3) That it would not be consistent with the king's dignity or interest to make an open contract with the insurgents until their independence was achieved. (4) That in case France and Spain should furnish assistance, they should look for no other return than the success of the political object they had at that moment in view, leaving themselves at liberty to be guided by circumstances as to any future arrangements. (5) That perhaps a too-marked inactivity at the present crisis might be attributed by the English to fear, and might expose France to insults to which it might not be disposed to submit. The English, he adds, respect only those who can make themselves feared. (6) That the result to which all these considerations led was that the two crowns should actively prepare means to resist or punish England, more especially as, of all possible issues, the maintenance of peace with that power was the least probable. … It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the French support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and exercised a decisive influence. There was a conviction, and a right one, in France that for Britain to hold under control the whole of North America as well as of India would give her a maritime supremacy, as well as a superiority in wealth, which would constitute a standing menace to the rest of the civilized world. There was, again, an enthusiasm among the young nobility and among officers in the army for America, which, even aside from the bitterness towards Britain with which it was mingled, had great effect on people as well as on court; and to this was added the sympathy of doctrinaire political philosophers who then and for some time afterwards had great power in forming French public opinion. By the enthusiasm of the young nobility the queen—brilliant, bold, weary of the traditions of the old court, inconsiderate as to ultimate political results—was affected, and through her her husband was reached. But above this was the sense of right which was uppermost in the breast of the unfortunate sovereign who then, with little political experience but high notions of duty as well as of prerogative, occupied the throne."

F. Wharton, editor, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Introduction, chapter 4 (volume 1).

"From the earliest moment France had been hopefully regarded by the colonists as probably their friend and possibly their ally. To France, therefore, the first American envoy was dispatched with promptitude [receiving his instructions in March and reaching Paris in the following June, 1776] even before there was a declaration of independence or an assumption of nationality. Silas Deane was the man selected. He was the true Yankee jack-at-all-trades; he had been graduated at Yale College, then taught school, then practiced law, then engaged in trade, had been all the while advancing in prosperity and reputation, had been a member of the first and second congresses, had failed of reëlection to the third, and was now without employment. Mr'. Parton describes him as 'of somewhat striking manners and good appearance, accustomed to live and entertain in liberal style, and fond of showy equipage and appointment.' Perhaps his simple-minded fellow-countrymen of the provinces fancied that such a man would make an imposing figure at an European court. {3242} He developed no other peculiar fitness for his position; he could not even speak French; and it proved an ill hour for himself in which he received this trying and difficult honor. … Deane arrived in France in June, 1776. He had with him a little ready money for his immediate personal expenses, and some letters of introduction from Franklin. It was intended to keep him supplied with money by sending cargoes of tobacco, rice, and indigo consigned to him, the proceeds of which would be at his disposal for the public service. He was instructed to seek an interview with de Vergennes, the French minister for foreign affairs, and to endeavor with all possible prudence and delicacy to find out what signs of promise the disposition of the French government really held for the insurgents. He was also to ask for equipment for 25,000 troops, ammunition, and 200 pieces of field artillery, all to be paid for—when Congress should be able! In France he was to keep his mission cloaked in secure secrecy, appearing simply as a merchant conducting his own affairs. … Before the arrival of Deane the interests of the colonies had been already taken in hand and substantially advanced in France by one of the most extraordinary characters in history. Caron de Beaumarchais was a man whom no race save the French could produce, and whose traits, career, and success lie hopelessly beyond the comprehension of the Anglo-Saxon. Bred a watchmaker, he had the skill, when a mere youth, to invent a clever escapement balance for regulating watches; had he been able to insert it into his own brain he might have held more securely his elusive good fortunes. From being an ingenious inventor he became an adventurer general, watchmaker to the king, the king's mistresses, and the king's daughters, the lover, or rather the beloved, of the wife of the controller of the king's kitchen, then himself the controller, thence a courtier, and a favorite of the royal princesses. Through a clever use of his opportunities he was able to do a great favor to a rich banker, who in return gave him chances to amass a fortune, and lent him money to buy a patent of nobility. This connection ended in litigation, which was near ruining him; but he discovered corruption on the part of the judge, and thereupon wrote his Memorials, of which the wit, keenness, and vivacity made him famous. He then rendered a private, personal, and important service to Louis XV., and soon afterwards another to the young Louis XVI. … He became frenzied in the American cause. In long and ardent letters he opened upon King Louis and his ministers a rattling fire of arguments sound and unsound, statements true and untrue, inducements reasonable and unreasonable, forecastings probable and improbable, politics wise and unwise, all designed to show that it was the bounden duty of France to adopt the colonial cause."

J. T. Morse, Jr., Benjamin Franklin, chapter 9.

Soon after the arrival of Deane in Paris, the American Congress, having determined to declare the independence of the states represented in it, appointed a committee "to prepare the plan of a treaty to be proposed to foreign powers, which, after a long discussion, was at length agreed to, and ministers were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed. Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were elected; but, the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the appointment offered him, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was chosen in his place. These transactions were placed on the secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any specific information concerning them; or to state more than, 'that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary for obtaining foreign alliances.' The secret committee were directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of £10,000 sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners. They assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that the success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than it had been at any time during the war with both France and Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities and energies of the nation. They were assured that the ports of France would remain open to their ships, and that the American merchants might freely vend in them every article of commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their country. But it was apparent that the minister wished to avoid a rupture with England, and was, therefore, unwilling to receive them openly as the ministers of the United States, or to enter into any formal negotiation with them."

J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapter 7.

"It is … a settled rule of diplomacy that a minister should not be pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood that he will not be received. To this may be added the rule that applications for loans should, unless as part of a treaty alliance, be made through business channels. In disregard of these rules the majority of Congress, under the influence of Richard H. Lee and Samuel Adams, instituted a series of missions to European courts for the bare purpose of borrowing money, when the courts so addressed not only gave no intimation that they would receive these envoys, but when, from the nature of things, as well as from unofficial intimation, it should have been known that such reception would be refused. With France there was no difficulty, as France had intimated unofficially that such envoys would be received, at least in a private capacity, France being then ready to take the consequence of war with Britain. And this reception was accorded … first to Silas Deane, then to Franklin, and then to Arthur Lee. Here Franklin thought Congress should stop, saying that ministers should not be sent to sovereigns without first having some sort of assurance of recognition of the United States as an independent sovereignty, and that a 'virgin' republic, as he called it, should wait till there was some such recognition before thrusting embassies on foreign courts with demands for money. Congress thought differently. Arthur Lee was instructed to go to Madrid with an alternate commission to Berlin; William Lee was sent to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The Hague, Izard to Florence, and the instructions in each case were to demand not only recognition, but subsidy. … The policy of sending ministers to European courts where such ministers were not received worked injuriously to the United States from the mere fact of their non-reception. Another difficulty arose from the circumstance that several of these ministers took up their residence in Paris, and, without specific authority, considered it their duty to take part in the counsels of the American legation. {3243} Thus Ralph Izard, commissioned to Tuscany, never went there, but remained in Paris, claiming a right to be informed of all the details of the negotiations with France, and occupying no small share of the time and care of Franklin with discussions of this claim, which Franklin could not accede to, but on which Izard continued to insist. When the triple legation of Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee (and afterwards Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Adams), was commissioned, it was understood that its members were to divide, so that one (Franklin) should remain in Paris, while the others should take charge of the missions to other capitals. But Arthur Lee, when he found that he could not be received in Madrid, or in Vienna, or in Berlin, made but brief excursions to Spain, to Austria, and to Berlin, reporting himself after each short trip promptly at Paris, there to differ from Franklin not only as to important business details, but as to the whole policy of the mission. When Adams was in Paris, during their joint mission, he concurred with Arthur Lee in what turned out to be the disastrous measure of removing Williams as commercial agent and putting in his place William Lee, with a nephew of William and Arthur Lee as clerk; while on the whole question of sending legations to foreign courts which had not consented to receive them, and in the still more important question of the attitude to be assumed by the commissioners to the French court, Adams agreed with Lee. … It is due to Adams to say that he saw the inherent difficulties of permanent missions conducted by three joint commissioners; that he recommended that there should be but one permanent minister to France; and that he recognized Franklin's great influence with the French ministry as a strong reason for his retention though without colleagues. But there can be no doubt that down to the period when Franklin became sole minister, the American cause in Europe was much embarrassed by the fact that he had colleagues associated with him."

F. Wharton, Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of The United States, chapter 1, sections 16-17, and chapter 9, section 106 (volume 1).

Before Franklin or Lee reached France, Silas Deane had already entered into negotiations with Beaumarchais and opened a train of dealings which proved unfortunate for both. Leaving aside "all the long controversy about the rights and wrongs of Beaumarchais, which have never been completely and satisfactorily solved, … it appears that a large part of the misunderstanding between him and Deane and Arthur Lee is attributable to a change of plan between April and July, 1776. Beaumarchais's scheme of operation, when he saw Lee in London, was to expend money which should, at least in pretence and form, be obtained from the voluntary contributions of wealthy Frenchmen in aid of the American cause; but in July, when he saw Deane, that scheme had been dropped, and the project was that he should appear as a merchant. … In May, there was a plan on the part of the French government to employ a real merchant; now the plan was to employ a comedy merchant. This was exactly the role which Beaumarchais was qualified to fill, and he proceeded to establish and open a large house, with all the accessories of a house of business, as the same are understood and represented on the stage, At that time it was believed that the colonists had plenty of exportable products which they could and would contribute for the purpose [purchase?] of arms and ammunition. It was thought that their main difficulty would be to find any market in which they could purchase contraband of war. The chief assistance, therefore, which they would need from France would be secret permission to make this exchange in France. Beaumarchais's commercial operations would be real commercial operations, and at worst could only issue in some expenses and losses, on the balance of account, which the French government might have to make good. Beaumarchais approached Deane with all the forms and reality of a commercial proposition, and Deane assured him that he should have some returns in six months, and full pay for everything which he supplied in a year. Two days later they made a contract by which Congress was to pay the current price of the goods in America when they should arrive, or take them at the cost price, with insurance, charges, and commission 'proportioned to the trouble and care, which cannot now be fixed.' … August 18, Beaumarchais writes to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that, led by esteem for a people struggling for liberty, he has established an extensive commercial house, solely for the purpose of supplying them with all things useful, even gold for the payment of troops; and that without waiting for their consent he has already procured 200 cannons, 200,000 pounds of powder, 20,000 guns, with balls, lead, clothing, etc. He wants the cargoes consigned to him in return, and promises that he has great power to use any consignments whatsoever; but he wants especially tobacco. He signs this letter Roderique Hortales & Co. … A million livres were advanced by Spain to Beaumarchais, August 11, 1776, and the Farmers-general of France advanced a million livres, but took advantage of the distress of the Americans to stipulate that it should be paid for in tobacco at half its then current price. Beaumarchais also advanced money to Deane for his personal expenses; and it has never been doubted that he exerted himself with the utmost energy, if not always with the greatest prudence, to expedite the shipment of the goods. Of the three ships which he despatched at the end of the year, two were captured by the English; but the one which arrived was of the greatest possible value to the cause. … When Arthur Lee received his appointment as Commissioner to France and entered upon the discharge of his duties, he found that the promises made to him by Beaumarchais … had not been kept. He reported to the Committee of Secret Correspondence that a change in the mode of sending had been settled between Deane and Hortales. … Arthur Lee always held the attitude of suspicion that Deane and Beaumarchais were in a conspiracy to levy contributions for themselves on the free gifts of France to the United States. Franklin always affected to ignore the dealings with Beaumarchais, and to treat them as exclusively in the hands of Deane; while Congress always showed themselves very careful not to pay for anything which possibly was intended as a gift. Therefore Deane and Beaumarchais were left for years to claim and protest that there had been genuine mercantile contracts which had not been fulfilled, and they could scarcely obtain attention. … September 8, 1777, Congress voted that Deane had no authority to make contracts with persons to come to America. {3244} November 21, they voted to recall him. Undoubtedly the vexation which Deane had caused them by sending over a great number of persons to serve in the army, under contracts which enabled them to demand large pay and high rank, was the chief cause of irritation against him; but Arthur Lee had also been poisoning the mind of his brother, and through him, of the whole Lee-Adams faction in Congress, with suspicions of Deane's honesty. Deane had found himself transferred, within a period of two or three years, from an utterly obscure existence at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to the position of a quasi-ambassador at the court of France. He adopted a large and expensive style of living, and kept open house for the Americans at Paris. It is very reasonable to suppose that this large expenditure on his part was one of the chief grounds of belief that he was making great gain out of his position. … The affair of Silas Deane has importance far beyond the merits or the fate of that individual. The quarrel over him and his rights and wrongs, as will presently be seen, entered into the hottest party contests in Congress during the next two or three years, and it comes up again often subsequently. It has even been asserted that the intimacy into which John Adams was thrown with the Lees, in this connection, was what made him President of the United States, by winning him votes from Virginia in 1796. January 1, 1778, Beaumarchais, having heard that money had been given to the Americans through Grand, the banker, writes to Vergennes: 'So I have lost the fruit of the most noble and incredible labour by those very exertions which conduct others to glory.' … He is in terror of bankruptcy. Inasmuch as a treaty of alliance between France and the United States was now made, matters had entered upon a new stage. Beaumarchais, with his fictitious firm of Hortales, was no longer necessary or useful. The French government dealt directly with the American envoys in granting supplies and subsidies. April 7, Congress made a contract with Hortales that they should pay, for all the cargoes already shipped and those to be shipped, the first cost, charges, and freight, in France. The contract between Beaumarchais and Deane is recognized. Hortales is to pay bills drawn every two months at double usance for twenty-four million livres annually. This article, however, is subject to ratification by the house in Paris and the American Commissioners at Paris. American produce is to be exported and consigned to this house. Interest is to be paid on all sums due, with a commission of two and a half per cent. From this time Beaumarchais falls out of sight as an agent of aid and supplies to the American cause, and becomes a claimant, who considers that he has been treated with injustice and ingratitude by the United States."

W. G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, chapter 8 (volume 1).

"The episode of Beaumarchais … was a survival of the secret diplomacy of Louis XV, for a short time exercising an extraordinary influence in the first period of the reign of Louis XVI. Louis XVI, on reaching the throne, found the machinery of secret diplomacy so ingeniously constructed by his predecessor in full operation; and, … for one or two delicate inquiries at the outset of the new reign, Beaumarchais, who of all the diplomatists of this peculiar breed was the most adroit and fertile in expedients, was well fitted. Hence came his employment, and from his employment came his suggestions, full of brilliant wit and effective reasoning, as to America. But the antagonism between him and Vergennes was too marked to permit sustained political relationship; and when Franklin entered into diplomatic life in Paris Beaumarchais ceased to take a prominent political position. And even during the period of Beaumarchais' greatest activity it must be remembered that he was not technically Vergennes' subordinate. It was one of the peculiarities of the secret diplomacy of Louis XIV and Louis XV, as depicted by Broglie in his admirable treatise on that topic, that even the existence of the secret agent was not to be supposed to be known to the king's ostensible ministers. This was not the case with Beaumarchais; but at the same time Beaumarchais' political influence ceased … when, on the arrival of Franklin, Vergennes, with Franklin's aid, took control of Anglo-American diplomacy."

F. Wharton, Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, chapter 4, section 55 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: _E. E. Hale, Franklin in France._

J. Bigelow, editor, Life of Franklin, by himself, volume 2, chapters 13-15.

J. Parton, Life of Franklin, part 6 (volume 2).

L. de Lomenie, Beaumarchais and his Times, chapters 20-23 (volume 3).

_Papers in relation to the Case of Silas Deane (Seventy-Six Society, 1855)._

C. Tower, Jr., The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution, volume 1, chapter 5.

See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (FEBRUARY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1779. The Thirteen Colonies become States. The framing and adoption of State Constitutions.

"The recommendations to form governments proceeded from the general congress; the work was done by the several states, in the full enjoyment of self-direction. Each of them claimed to be of right a free, sovereign, and independent state; each bound its officers to bear to it true allegiance, and to maintain its freedom and independence. Massachusetts, which was the first state to frame a government independent of the king, deviated as little as possible from the letter of its charter; and, assuming that the place of governor was vacant from the 19th of July 1775, it recognised the council as the legal successor to executive power. On the 1st day of May 1776, in all commissions and legal processes, it substituted the name of its 'government and people' for that of the king. In June 1777, its legislature assumed power to prepare a constitution; but, on a reference to the people, the act was disavowed. In September 1779, a convention, which the people themselves had specially authorized, framed a constitution. It was in a good measure the compilation of John Adams, who was guided by the English constitution, by the bill of rights of Virginia, and by the experience of Massachusetts herself; and this constitution, having been approved by the people, went into effect in 1780. On the 5th of January 1776, New Hampshire shaped its government with the fewest possible changes from its colonial forms, like Massachusetts merging the executive power in the council. Not till June 1783 did its convention agree upon a more perfect instrument, which was approved by the people, and established on the 31st of the following October. {3245} The provisional constitution of South Carolina dates from the 26th of March 1776. In March 1778, a permanent constitution was introduced by an act of the legislature. Rhode Island enjoyed under its charter a form of government so thoroughly republican that the rejection of monarchy, in May 1776, required no change beyond a renunciation of the king's name in the style of its public acts. A disfranchisement of Catholics had stolen into its book of laws; but, so soon as it was noticed, the clause was expunged. In like manner, Connecticut had only to substitute the people of the colony for the name of the king; this was done provisionally on the 14th of June 1776, and made perpetual on the 10th of the following October. Before the end of June of the same year Virginia, sixth in the series, first in the completeness of her work, by a legislative convention without any further consultation of the people, framed and adopted a bill of rights, a declaration of independence, and a constitution. On the second of July 1776, New Jersey perfected its new, self-created charter. Delaware next proclaimed its bill of rights, and, on the 20th of September 1776, the representatives in convention having been chosen by the freemen of the state for that very purpose, finished its constitution. The Pennsylvania convention adopted its constitution on the 28th of September 1776; but the opposition of the Quakers whom it indirectly disfranchised, and of a large body of patriots, delayed its thorough organization for more than five months. The delegates of Maryland, meeting on the 14th of August 1776, framed its constitution with great deliberation; it was established on the 9th of the following November. On the 18th of December 1776, the constitution of North Carolina was ratified in the congress which framed it. On the 5th of February 1777, Georgia perfected its organic law by the unanimous agreement of its convention. Last of the thirteen came New York, whose empowered convention, on the 20th of April 1777, established a constitution that, in humane liberality, excelled them all. The privilege of the suffrage had been far more widely extended in the colonies than in England; by general consent, the extension of the elective franchise was postponed. The age of twenty-one was a qualification universally required. So, too, was residence, except that in Virginia and South Carolina it was enough to own in the district or town a certain freehold or 'lot.' South Carolina required the electors to 'acknowledge the being of a God, and to believe in a future state of rewards and punishments.' 'White men alone could claim the franchise in Virginia, in South Carolina, and in Georgia; but in South Carolina a benign interpretation of the law classed the free octaroon as a white, even though descended through an unbroken line of mothers from an imported African slave; the other ten states raised no question of color. In Pennsylvania, in New Hampshire, and partially in North Carolina, the right to vote belonged to every resident taxpayer; Georgia extended it to any white inhabitant 'of any mechanic trade'; with this exception, Georgia and all the other colonies required the possession of a freehold, or of property variously valued, in Massachusetts at about $200, in Georgia at £10. Similar conditions had always existed, with the concurrence or by the act of the colonists themselves. Maryland prescribed as its rule that votes should be given by word of mouth; Virginia and New Jersey made no change in their usage; in Rhode Island each freeman was in theory summoned to be present in the general court; he therefore gave his proxy to his representative by writing his own name on the back of his vote; all others adopted the ballot, New York at the end of the war, the other eight without delay."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, chapter 9.

ALSO IN: American Archives, series 5, volumes 2-3 (as indexed).

See, also, VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776; SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY-APRIL); NEW YORK: A. D. 1777; CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776; NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1774-1776; PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776; MARYLAND: A. D. 1776; GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777; NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1775-1776.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (January-December). The campaign on the Delaware. Lord Howe in possession of Philadelphia. Battles on the Brandywine and at Germantown. The winter of Washington's army at Valley Forge.

"Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was not until late in the spring that the new levies reached headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to Middlebrook and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th of June Howe marched from Brunswick and … endeavored to bring on a general engagement, … but Washington refused to leave the strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy. Early in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. … On the 23d of July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels, the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. … Signal fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th, it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting with his brother, the general, continued on his course southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay, and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry." Meantime, Washington had been in great uncertainty as to the destination and intentions of his antagonist, but had drawn his army near to Philadelphia. It had just been joined by several distinguished foreign officers, Lafayette, De Kalb and Pulaski in the number. At Philadelphia there was consternation on the approach of the enemy, but "the pacific influence which the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to bear down all military efforts. … To impress the lukewarm with the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the breasts of the patriotic, on the 24th of August Washington marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia. {3246} The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats." The advance of Howe from Elk Ferry was slow, and it was not until the 11th of September that the Americans encountered him, at Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, where they had taken position. In the battle which occurred that day the British gained a clear victory, by means of a successful flank movement which Cornwallis executed, crossing the river some miles above, while General Knyphausen made feigned attempts at Chad's Ford. "The American loss was about 1,000, killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of the British, 579. … The day after the battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle should be risked before the city should be given up. On the 16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing had actually begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the hills north of the valley, and, finding it impossible to repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and attack their rear should they attempt to follow." But Wayne was surprised at Paoli, and Washington was deceived by a feigned movement, so that Howe succeeded in entering Philadelphia without another battle, on the 26th, having occupied Germantown the day before. "The main portion of Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single street, two miles in length, and five from the city." Here, on the morning of October 4th, Washington attacked him, and, for a time, with great success; but confusion and misunderstandings on the part of the attacking columns arose, which turned the half-won victory into a defeat. "The Americans lost nearly 1,100 killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British 521. … While the Americans were defeated in their object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor. It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that, though driven from the field of Brandywine, they were still aggressive." The next few weeks were employed by Howe in reducing the forts which commanded the Delaware. Fort Mifflin was taken after a severe siege, and this compelled the abandonment of Fort Mercer, from which the British had been repulsed with heavy loss. Early in December Howe moved upon Washington's lines, at Whitemarsh, intending an attack; but found them so strong that he dared not venture the attempt, and returned to Philadelphia. "As the season was advancing, and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness. But the position was central and easily defended. The army arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection of huts began. They were built of logs, and were 14 by 15 feet each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes at the open fires. … The horses died of starvation by hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through their quarters with fearful rapidity. 'The unfortunate soldiers,' wrote Lafayette in after-years, 'were in want of everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes; their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it was often necessary to amputate them. … The army frequently remained whole days without provisions, and the patient endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which each moment served to renew.' … While the country around Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly owing to the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the congresses which had preceded it. 'The Continental Congress and the currency,' wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, 'have greatly depreciated.'"

F. D. Stone, The Struggle for the Delaware (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6, chapter 5).

The sufferings of the army at Valley Forge, and the shameful neglect which it experienced, were indignantly described by Washington, in a letter addressed to the President of Congress, December 23, 1777: "Since the month of July," he wrote, "we have had no assistance from the quartermaster-general, and to want of assistance from this department the commissary-general charges great part of his deficiency. To this I am to add, that, notwithstanding it is a standing order, and often repeated, that the troops shall always have two days' provisions by them, that they might be ready at any sudden call; yet an opportunity has scarcely ever offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy, that has not been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded on this account. And this, the great and crying evil, is not all. The soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by Congress, we see none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have now little occasion for; few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of the little benefit received from a clothier-general, and as a further proof of the inability of an army, under the circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of soldiers, (besides a number of men confined to hospitals for want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same account,) we have, by a field-return this day made, no less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men now in camp unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise naked. {3247} By the same return it appears, that our whole strength in Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive of the Mary]and troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty; notwithstanding which; and that since the 4th instant, our numbers fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone, particularly on account of blankets (numbers having been obliged, and still are, to sit up all night by fires, instead of taking comfortable rest in a natural and common way), have decreased near two thousand men. We find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter-quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of mine would warrant the Remonstrance), reprobating the measure as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well-appointed and provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania and Jersey. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen,—who were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops from ocular demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than others, and who advised me near a month ago to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days agreeably to a decree of the State (not one article of which, by the by, is yet come to hand),—should think a winter's campaign, and the covering of these States from the invasion of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul, I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to relieve or prevent. It is for these reasons, therefore, that I have dwelt upon the subject; and it adds not a little to my other difficulties and distress to find, that much more is expected of me than is possible to be performed, and that upon the ground of safety and policy I am obliged to conceal the true state of the army from public view, and thereby expose myself to detraction and calumny."

George Washington, Writings, edited by W. C. Ford, volume 6, pages 259-262.

It was during this trying winter, while the army suffered at Valley Forge, that it was joined by Baron Steuben, an accomplished Prussian officer, trained in the school of Frederick the Great, with a record of distinguished service in the Seven Years War. He came as a volunteer, and was welcomed by Washington, who found in him the organizer, the disciplinarian, the instructor, which the rudely formed American army so greatly needed. The services rendered by Baron Steuben during that first winter of his stay in America were especially valuable, beyond measure. In his own account of the state of things which he found he says: "'My determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied, but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first place, I informed myself relative to the military administration. I found that the different branches were divided into departments. There were those of the quarter-master general, war commissary, provisions commissary, commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc. But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to say, they had imitated the English administration, which is certainly the most imperfect in Europe. The general asked me to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the departments, and their various branches in the European armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon the functions of the quarter-masters (maréchaux généraux de logis) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system, bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and quarter-master had a commission of so much per cent. on all the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many millions. I pointed out to General Washington and several members of Congress the advantages of the contract system. I even drew up a memorandum on the subject, which Colonel Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies. But whether it was that they thought such a system impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were. I directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were supreme. … The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number, that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers. Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one corporal! … The soldiers were scattered about in every direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants, and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more commissaries and quarter-masters at that time than all the armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one servant, but others had two and even three. {3248} If the captains and colonels could give no account of their men, they could give still less an account of their arms, accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all the articles. A company, which consisted, in May, of fifty men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits, who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had completed their time of service. General Knox assured me that, previous to the establishment of my department, there never was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was still greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine months. Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his successor received another from the public store. No captain kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture to say that during an entire campaign there have not been twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. … The men were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge, mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old blanket or woolen bed-cover. With regard to their military discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. … I commenced operations by drafting 120 men from the line, whom I formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day; and to remove that English prejudice which some officers entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy, and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision. … I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army, and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers with an entire division in presence of the commander-in-chief.' … The most interesting narrative of the energy employed by Steuben, and the success of his system, is given by his favorite aid-de-camp and intimate friend, William North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his biographical sketch: 'Certainly it was a brave attempt! Without understanding a word of the English language, to think of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word, a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how to follow in a changement to which they had not been accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B. Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the orders and interpret to the troops. "If," said the baron, "I had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more rejoiced." … Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp, and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time, no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of this great object. Through the whole of each campaign, when troops were to maneuver, and that was almost every day, the baron rose at three o'clock; while his servant dressed his hair he smoked a single pipe and drank one cup of coffee, was on horseback at sunrise, and, with or without his suite, galloped to the parade. There was no waiting for a tardy aid-de-camp, and those who followed wished they had not slept. Nor was there need of chiding; when duty was neglected, or military etiquette infringed, the baron's look was quite sufficient.' … Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief. Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in the army, he had greater power and authority than any general could boast of."

F. Kapp, Life of Frederick William von Steuben, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapters 13, 18-19, and 23-27.

G. W. Greene, Life of General Nathanael Greene, book 2, chapters 16-25 (volume l).

J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott, History of Philadelphia, chapter 17 (volume l).

_C. J. Stille, Major-General Anthony Wayne, Chapter 3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (June). Vermont denied admission to the Union.

See VERMONT; A. D. 1777-1778.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (July). The coming of Lafayette.

"La Fayette, barely nineteen years old, was in garrison at Metz, when he was invited to a dinner that his commander, the Count de Broglie, gave to the brother of the king of England, the Duke of Gloucester, then on his way through the city. News had just been received of the proclamation of the independence of the United States, and, the conversation having naturally fallen on this subject, La Fayette plied the duke with questions to acquaint himself with the events, entirely new to him, which were happening in America. Before the end of the dinner he had made his decision, and, from that moment, he no longer thought of anything else except setting out for the new world. {3249} He went to Paris and confided his project to his friends, the Count de Segur and the Viscount de Noailles, who were to accompany him. The Count de Broglie, whom he also informed, tried to turn him from his design. 'I saw your uncle die in Italy,' he said to him, 'and your father at Min·den, and I do not wish to contribute to the ruin of your family by allowing you to go.' Nevertheless, he put La Fayette in communication with the former agent of Choiseul in Canada, the Baron de Kalb, who became his friend. De Kalb presented him to Silas Deane, who, considering him too young, wished to dissuade him from his project. But the news of the disasters experienced by the Americans before New York, at White Plains and in New Jersey, confirmed La Fayette in his resolution. He bought and fitted out a vessel at his own expense, and disguised his preparations by making a journey to London. Nevertheless his design was disclosed at Court. His family became angry with him. He was forbidden to go to America, and, to render this order effective, a lettre de cachet was issued against him. Nevertheless he left Paris with an officer named Mauroy, disguised himself as a courier, went on board his ship at Passage in Spain, and set sail April the 26th, 1777. He had several officers on board. La Fayette successfully avoided the English cruisers and the French vessels sent in pursuit of him. Finally, after a hazardous passage of seven weeks, he reached Georgetown, and, furnished with letters of recommendation from Deane, he reported to Congress."

T. Balch, The French in America during the War of Independence, chapter 7.

In consideration of the great personal sacrifice he had made in quitting France, and his offer to serve the American cause at his own expense and without pay, Congress, with hesitation, conferred on the young marquis the rank of Major General, but without command. He succeeded, too, in procuring a like commission for Baron de Kalb, who had accompanied him. While Lafayette was still busy with these arrangements, Washington came to Philadelphia, and they met at a dinner party. They seem to have been drawn to one another at the first exchange of words, and a friendship began which lasted through their lives. Lafayette was soon invited to become a member of the military family of the commander-in-chief.

B. Tuckerman, Life of General Lafayette, chapter 2.

ALSO IN: C. Tower, Jr., The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution, volume 1, chapter 1.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (July-October). The struggle for the Hudson. Burgoyne's expedition from Canada. His surrender at Saratoga.

Early in the summer of 1777 a formidable expedition under General Burgoyne was set in motion from Canada toward Lake Champlain. "It was a part of Burgoyne's plan, not merely to take Ticonderoga, but to advance thence upon Albany, and, with the co-operation of the troops at New York, to get possession also of the posts in the Highlands. The British would then command the Hudson through its whole extent, and New England, the head of the rebellion, would be completely cut off from the middle and southern colonies. Burgoyne started on this expedition with a brilliant army of 8,000 men, partly British and partly Germans, besides a large number of Canadian boatmen, laborers and skirmishers. On the western shore of Lake Champlain, near Crown Point, he met the Six Nations in council, and after a feast and a speech, some 400 of their warriors joined this army. His next step was to issue a proclamation … threatening with all the extremities of war all who should presume to resist his arms. Two days after the issue of this proclamation, Burgoyne appeared [July 1] before Ticonderoga." The commander of that important fort, General St. Clair, found defense impracticable and evacuated the place. He was vigorously pursued in his retreat and only escaped with the loss of most of his bag·gage and stores, besides several hundred men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. "After a seven days' march, he joined Schuyler at Fort Edward, on the Hudson. Here was assembled the whole force of the northern army, amounting to about 5,000 men; but a considerable part were militia hastily called in; many were without arms; there was a great deficiency of ammunition and provisions; and the whole force was quite disorganized. The region between Skenesborough [now Whitehall, where Burgoyne had halted] and the Hudson was an almost unbroken wilderness. Wood Creek was navigable as far as Fort Anne [which the Americans had fired and abandoned]; from Fort Anne to the Hudson, over an exceedingly rough country, … extended a single military road. While Burgoyne halted a few days at Skenesborough to put his forces in order, and to bring up the necessary supplies, Schuyler hastened to destroy the navigation of Wood Creek," and to make the road from Fort Anne as nearly impassable as a wilderness road can be made. "All the stock in the neighborhood was driven off, and the militia of New England was summoned to the rescue. … The advance from Skenesborough cost the British infinite labor and fatigue; but … [the] impediments were at length overcome; and Burgoyne, with his troops, artillery, and baggage, presently appeared [July 29] on the banks of the Hudson. … Fort Edward was untenable. As the British approached, the Americans crossed the river, and retired, first to Saratoga, and then to Stillwater, a short distance above the mouth of the Mohawk. Hardly had Schuyler taken up this position, when news arrived of another disaster and a new danger. While moving up Lake Champlain, Burgoyne had detached Colonel St. Leger, with 200 regulars, Sir John Johnson's Royal Greens, some Canadian Rangers, and a body of Indians under Brant, to harass the New York frontier from the west. St. Leger laid siege to Fort Schuyler, late Fort Stanwix, near the head of the Mohawk, then the extreme western post of the State of New York. General Herkimer raised the militia of Tryon county, and advanced to the relief of this important post, which was held by Gansevoort and Willett, with two New York regiments. About six miles from the fort [near Oriskany, August 6], owing to want of proper precaution, Herkimer fell into an ambush. Mortally wounded, he supported himself against a stump, and encouraged his men to the fight. By the aid of a successful sally by Willett, they succeeded at last in repulsing the assailants, but not without a loss of 400, including many of the leading patriots of that region, who met with no mercy at the hands of the Indians and refugees. Tryon county, which included the whole district west of Albany, abounded with Tories. {3250} It was absolutely necessary to relieve Fort Schuyler." General Arnold was accordingly despatched thither, with three regiments, and on his approach St. Leger, deserted by most of his Indian allies, retreated precipitately, leaving most of his stores and baggage behind. Meantime, Burgoyne was beginning to find his situation serious. To feed and otherwise supply his army was the chief difficulty. He could bring enough of stores to the head of Lake George, by the water carriage which he commanded, from Canada; but to transport them thence to the Hudson, though the distance was only eighteen miles, proved nearly impracticable. "The roads were so bad, and the supply of draft cattle so small, that, after a fortnight's hard labor, the British army had only four days' provision in advance." To improve his supplies, and partly, moreover, in the hope of finding discontent among the settlers of the New Hampshire Grants, Burgoyne sent 800 men, under Colonel Baum, into Vermont, They were defeated [August 16] at Bennington by the New Hampshire and Vermont militia under Colonel John Stark, and again defeated a second time the same day, after reinforcements had been sent to them. "Besides the killed, about 200 in number, the Americans took near 600 prisoners, 1,000 stand of arms, as many swords, and four pieces of artillery. … The American loss was only 14 killed and 42 wounded. … The victory of Stark had a magical effect in reviving the spirits of the people and the courage of the soldiers."

R. Hildreth, History of the United States, chapter 36 (volume 3).

"Burgoyne's position was by this time very dangerous. His Indians were leaving him; many of his best men had been killed or captured; and he was getting short of provisions. The army opposed to him was increasing: Congress was hurrying men up the Hudson; and the country militia were coming in rapidly. Burgoyne, therefore, desperately attempted to force his way through the American army. He crossed the Hudson, and moved slowly down its west bank toward the Mohawk. About the same time, Gates, who had been sent by Congress to take Schuyler's place, felt strong enough to move up the west bank of the Hudson, away from the Mohawk. The two armies met [September 19] at Bemis Heights, between Saratoga Lake and the Hudson. The battle which followed [called by some writers the battle of Freeman's Farm] was not decisive: the British held the ground; but the Americans had shown that Burgoyne could not break through."

A. Johnston, History of the United States for Schools, sections 222-223.

"Burgoyne now halted again, and strengthened his position by field-works and redoubts; and the Americans also improved their defences. The two armies remained nearly within cannon-shot of each other for a considerable time, during which Burgoyne was anxiously looking for intelligence of the promised expedition from New York, which, according to the original plan, ought by this time to have been approaching Albany from the south. At last, a messenger from Clinton made his way, with great difficulty, to Burgoyne's camp, and brought the information that Clinton was on his way up the Hudson to attack the American forts which barred the passage up that river to Albany. Burgoyne, in reply, on the 30th of September, urged Clinton to attack the forts as speedily as possible, stating that the effect of such an attack, or even the semblance of it, would be to move the American army from its position before his own troops. By another messenger, who reached Clinton on the 5th of October, Burgoyne informed his brother general that he had lost his communications with Canada, but had provisions which would last him till the 20th. Burgoyne described himself as strongly posted, and stated that though the Americans in front of him [at Stillwater] were strongly posted also, he made no doubt of being able to force them, and making his way to Albany; but that he doubted whether he could subsist there, as the country was drained of provisions. He wished Clinton to meet him there, and to keep open a communication with New York. Burgoyne had over-estimated his resources, and in the very beginning of October found difficulty and distress pressing him hard. The Indians and Canadians began to desert him; while, on the other hand, Gates's army was continually reinforced by fresh bodies of the militia. … Finding the number and spirit of the enemy to increase daily, and his own stores of provisions to diminish, Burgoyne determined on attacking the Americans in front of him, and by dislodging them from their position, to gain the means of moving upon Albany, or at least of relieving his troops from the straitened position in which they were cooped up. Burgoyne's force was now reduced to less than 6,000 men. The right of his camp was on some high ground a little to the west of the river; thence his entrenchments extended along the lower ground to the bank of the Hudson, the line of their front being nearly at a right angle with the course of the stream. The lines were fortified with redoubts and field-works. … The numerical force of the Americans was now greater than the British, even in regular troops, and the numbers of the militia and volunteers which had joined Gates and Arnold were greater still. General Lincoln, with 2,000 New England troops, had reached the American camp on the 29th of September. Gates gave him the command of the right wing, and took in person the command of the left wing, which was composed of two brigades under Generals Poor and Leonard, of Colonel Morgan's rifle corps, and part of the fresh New England Militia. The whole of the American lines had been ably fortified under the direction of the celebrated Polish General, Kosciusko, who was now serving as a volunteer in Gates's army. The right of the American position, that is to say, the part of it nearest to the river, was too strong to be assailed with any prospect of success: and Burgoyne therefore determined to endeavour to force their left. For this purpose he formed a column of 1,500 regular troops, with two twelve-pounders, two howitzers, and six six-pounders. He headed this in person, having Generals Philips, Riedesel; and Fraser under him. The enemy's force immediately in front of his lines was so strong that he dared not weaken the troops who guarded them, by detaching any more to strengthen his column of attack. It was on the 7th of October that Burgoyne led his column forward; and on the preceding day, the 6th, Clinton had successfully executed a brilliant enterprise against the two American forts which barred his progress up the Hudson. {3251} He had captured them both, with severe loss to the American forces opposed to him; he had destroyed the fleet which the Americans had been forming on the Hudson, under the protection of their forts; and the upward river was laid open to his squadron. He had also, with admirable skill and industry, collected in small vessels, such as could float within a few miles of Albany, provisions sufficient to supply Burgoyne's army for six months. He was now only 156 miles distant from Burgoyne; and a detachment of 1,700 men actually advanced within 40 miles of Albany. Unfortunately Burgoyne and Clinton were each ignorant of the other's movements; but if Burgoyne had won his battle on the 7th, he must on advancing have soon learned the tidings of Clinton's success, and Clinton would have heard of his. A junction would soon have been made of the two victorious armies, and the great objects of the campaign might yet have been accomplished. All depended on the fortune of the column with which Burgoyne, on the eventful 7th of October, 1777, advanced against the American position." It failed in the attempt to break the American line. Arnold, who bad been deprived of his command by Gates, rushed into the fight at its fiercest stage and assumed a lead, without authority, which contributed greatly to the result. General Fraser, on the British side, was wounded mortally by a sharp-shooter under Morgan's command. Burgoyne's whole force was driven back, with heavy losses in killed and wounded, leaving six cannon behind them, and the Americans, pursuing, carried part of their entrenchments by storm. By this success, the latter "acquired the means of completely turning the right flank of the British, and gaining their rear. To prevent this calamity, Burgoyne effected during the night an entire change of position. With great skill he removed his whole army to some heights near the river, a little northward of the former camp, and he there drew up his men, expecting to be attacked on the following day. But Gates was resolved not to risk the certain triumph which his success had already secured for him. He harassed the English with skirmishes, but attempted no regular attack. Meanwhile he detached bodies of troops on both sides of the Hudson to prevent the British from recrossing that river, and to bar their retreat. When night fell, it became absolutely necessary for Burgoyne to retire again, and, accordingly, the troops were marched through a stormy and rainy night towards Saratoga, abandoning their sick and wounded, and the greater part of their baggage, to the enemy. … Burgoyne now took up his last position on the heights near Saratoga; and hemmed in by the enemy, who refused any encounter, and baffled in all his attempts at finding a path of escape, he there lingered until famine compelled him to capitulate. The fortitude of the British army during this melancholy period has been justly eulogised by many native historians, but I prefer quoting the testimony of a foreign writer, as free from all possibility of partiality. Botta says: 'It exceeds the power of words to describe the pitiable condition to which the British army was now reduced. The troops were worn down by a series of toil, privation, sickness, and desperate fighting. They were abandoned by the Indians and Canadians; and the effective force of the whole army was now diminished by repeated and heavy losses, which had principally fallen on the best soldiers and the most distinguished officers, from 10,000 combatants to less than one-half that number. Of this remnant, little more than 3,000 were English. In these circumstances, and thus weakened, they were invested by an army of four times their own number, whose position extended three parts of a circle round them; who refused to fight them, as knowing their weakness, and who, from the nature of the ground, could not be attacked in any part. In this helpless condition, obliged to be constantly under arms, while the enemy's cannon played on every part of their camp, and even the American rifle-balls whistled in many parts of the lines, the troops of Burgoyne retained their customary firmness, and while sinking under a hard necessity, they showed themselves worthy of a better fate. They could not be reproached with an action or a word, which betrayed a want of temper or of fortitude.' At length the 13th of October arrived, and as no prospect of assistance appeared, and the provisions were nearly exhausted, Burgoyne, by the unanimous advice of a council of war, sent a messenger to the American camp to treat of a convention. General Gates in the first instance demanded that the royal army should surrender prisoners of war. He also proposed that the British should ground their arms. Burgoyne replied, 'This article is inadmissible in every extremity; sooner than this army will consent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter.' After various messages, a convention for the surrender of the army was settled, which provided that 'The troops under General Burgoyne were to march out of their camp with the honours of war, and the artillery of the intrenchments, to the verge of the river, where the arms and artillery were to be left. The arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers. A free passage was to be granted to the army under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest.' The articles of capitulation were settled on the 15th of October; and on that very evening a messenger arrived from Clinton with an account of his successes, and with the tidings that part of his force had penetrated as far as Esopus, within 50 miles of Burgoyne's camp. But it was too late. The public faith was pledged; and the army was, indeed, too debilitated by fatigue and hunger to resist an attack if made; and Gates certainly would have made it, if the convention had been broken off. Accordingly, on the 17th, the convention of Saratoga was carried into effect. By this convention 5,790 men surrendered themselves as prisoners. The sick and wounded left in the camp when the British retreated to Saratoga, together with the numbers of the British, German, and Canadian troops, who were killed, wounded, or taken, and who had deserted in the preceding part of the expedition, were reckoned to be 4,689. The British sick and wounded who had fallen into the hands of the Americans after the battle of the 7th, were treated with exemplary humanity; and when the convention was executed, General Gates showed a noble delicacy of feeling, which deserves the highest degree of honour. Every circumstance was avoided which could give the appearance of triumph. {3252} The American troops remained within their lines until the British had piled their arms; and when this was done, the vanquished officers and soldiers were received with friendly kindness by their victors, and their immediate wants were promptly and liberally supplied. Discussions and disputes afterwards arose as to some of the terms of the convention; and the American Congress refused for a long time to carry into effect the article which provided for the return of Burgoyne's men to Europe; but no blame was imputable to General Gates or his army, who showed themselves to be generous as they had proved themselves to be brave."

Sir E. Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, chapter 13.

ALSO IN: _General J. Burgoyne, State of the Expedition from Canada._

_S. A. Drake, Burgoyne's Invasion._

_W. L. Stone, Campaign of Burgoyne._

M. von Eelking, Memoir of General Riedesel, volume 1, pages 88-218.

B. J. Lossing, Life and Times of Philip Schuyler, volume 2, chapters 6-21.

Colonel M. Willett, Narrative of Military Actions, chapter 5.

C. Stark, Memoir of General John Stark, pages 46-140.

T. Dwight, Travels in New England and New York, volume 3, pages 220-233.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1778. The British in Philadelphia. Their gay winter.

See PHILADELPHIA: A. D. 1777-1778.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1778. The Conway Cabal.

The capitulation of Burgoyne at Saratoga "was an all-important event in its influence on the progress of the war; but its immediate effect was unpropitious to the reputation of the Commander-in-chief, who was compelled, at the close of the year, to place his army in a state of almost total destitution in winter-quarters at Valley Forge. The brilliant success of General Gates at Saratoga, in contrast with the reverses which had befallen the American Army under the immediate command of Washington, encouraged the operations of a cabal against him, which had been formed by certain disaffected officers of the army, and was countenanced by a party in Congress. The design was, by a succession of measures implying a want of confidence, to drive Washington to retire from the service in disgust: and, when this object was effected, to give the command of the army to General Gates, who lent a willing ear to these discreditable intrigues. A foreign officer in the American Army, of the name of Conway, was the most active promoter of the project, which was discovered by the accidental disclosure of a part of his correspondence with Gates. Washington bore himself on this occasion with his usual dignity, and allowed the parties concerned, in the army and in Congress, to take refuge in explanations, disclaimers, and apologies, by which those who made them gained no credit, and those who accepted them were not deceived. A part of the machinery of this wretched cabal was the publication, in London, and the republication in New York of [a] collection of forged letters … bearing the name of Washington, and intended to prove his insincerity in the cause of the Revolution. Nothing perhaps more plainly illustrates his conscious strength of character, than the disdainful silence with which he allowed this miserable fabrication to remain for twenty years without exposure. It was only in the year 1796, and when about to retire from the Presidency, that he filed, in the department of Slate, a denial of its authenticity."

E. Everett, Life of Washington, chapter 6.

In a letter written May 30, 1778, addressed to Landon Carter, from the camp at Valley Forge, Washington alluded to the subject of the cabal as follows: "With great truth I think I can assure you, that the information you received from a gentleman at Sabine Hall, respecting a disposition in the northern officers to see me superseded in my command by General G—s is without the least foundation. I have very sufficient reasons to think, that no officers in the army are more attached to me, than those from the northward, and of those, none more so than the gentlemen, who were under the immediate command of G--s last campaign. That there was a scheme of this sort on foot, last fall, admits of no doubt: but it originated in another quarter; with three men who wanted to aggrandize themselves; but finding no support, on the contrary, that their conduct and views, when seen into, were likely to undergo severe reprehension, they slunk back, disavowed the measure, and professed themselves my warmest admirers. Thus stands the matter at present. Whether any members of Congress were privy to this scheme, and inclined to aid and abet it, I shall not take upon me to say; but am well informed, that no whisper of the kind was ever heard in Congress."

George Washington, Writings, edited by W. C. Ford, volume 7, page 39.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapters 28-30.

J. C. Hamilton, History of the United States in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton, volume 1, chapters 13-14.

J. Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, volume 1, chapter 10.

W. V. Wells, Life of Samuel Adams, chapter 46 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1781. Adoption and ratification of the Articles of Confederation.

"On the 11th of June, 1776, the same day on which the committee for preparing the declaration of independence was appointed, congress resolved, that 'a committee be appointed to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between these colonies'; and on the next day a committee was accordingly appointed, consisting of a member from each colony. Nearly a year before this period (viz. on the 21st of July, 1775), Dr. Franklin had submitted to congress a sketch of articles of confederation, which does not, however, appear to have been acted on. … On the 12th of July, 1776, the committee appointed to prepare articles of confederation presented a draft, which was in the hand-writing of Mr. Dickenson, one of the committee, and a delegate from Pennsylvania. The draft, so reported, was debated from the 22d to the 31st of July, and on several days between the 5th and 20th of August, 1776. On this last day, congress, in committee of the whole, reported a new draft, which was ordered to be printed for the use of the members. The subject seems not again to have been touched until the 8th of April, 1777, and the articles were debated at several times between that time and the 15th of November of the same year. On this last day the articles were reported with sundry amendments, and finally adopted by congress. A committee was then appointed to draft, and they accordingly drafted, a circular letter, requesting the states respectively to authorize their delegates in congress to subscribe the same in behalf of the state. … It carried, however, very slowly conviction to the minds of the local legislatures. Many objections were stated, and many amendments were proposed. {3253} All of them, however, were rejected by congress, not probably because they were all deemed inexpedient or improper in themselves; but from the danger of sending the instrument back again to all the states, for reconsideration. Accordingly, on the 26th of June, 1778, a copy, engrossed for ratification, was prepared, and the ratification begun on the 9th day of July following. It was ratified by all the states, except Delaware and Maryland, in 1778; by Delaware in 1779, and by Maryland on the 1st of March, 1781, from which last date its final ratification took effect, and was joyfully announced by congress. In reviewing the objections taken by the various states to the adoption of the confederation in the form in which it was presented to them, … that which seemed to be of paramount importance, and which, indeed, protracted the ratification of the confederation to so late a period, was the alarming controversy in respect to the boundaries of some of the states, and the public lands, held by the crown, within these reputed boundaries."

J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, book 2, chapter 2 (volume 1).

The following is the text of the Articles of Confederation:

"Article I. The style of this Confederacy shall be, 'The United States of America.'

Article II. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.

Article III. The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.

Article IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States or either of them. If any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State shall flee from justice and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the governor or executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offense. Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.

Article V. For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the Legislature of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year. No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind. Each State shall maintain its own delegates in any meeting of the States and while they act as members of the Committee of the States. In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote. Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress; and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonment during the time of their going to and from, and attendance on, Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

Article VI. No State, without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any king, prince, or state; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States, in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility. No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue. No State shall lay any imposts or duties which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States, in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain. No vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only as shall be deemed necessary by the United States, in Congress assembled, for the defense of such State or its trade, nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use in public stores a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States, in Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States, in Congress assembled, can be consulted; nor shall any State grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States, in Congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or state, and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States, in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States, in Congress assembled, shall determine otherwise.

{3254}

Article VII. When land forces are raised by any State for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of Colonel shall be appointed by the Legislature of each State respectively by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first made the appointment.

Article VIII. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense, or general welfare, and allowed by the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to, or surveyed for, any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States, in Congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the Legislatures of the several States, within the time agreed upon by the United States, in Congress assembled.

Article IX. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth Article; of sending and receiving ambassadors; entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatever; of establishing rules for deciding, in all cases, what captures on land and water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated; of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace; appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures; provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following: Whenever the legislative or executive authority, or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another, shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in question, and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; but if they cannot agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the determination; and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons which Congress shall judge sufficient, or being present, shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and sentence of the court, to be appointed in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and decisive; the judgment or sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned; provided, that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the State where the cause shall be tried, 'well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward.' Provided, also, that no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States. All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they may respect such lands, and the States which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall, on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United States, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States; fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the United States; regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not infringed or violated; {3255} establishing and regulating post-offices from one State to another, throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office; appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers; appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States; making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated 'A Committee of the States,' and to consist of one delegate from each State, and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction; to appoint one of their number to preside; provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses; to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half year to the respective States an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted; to build and equip a navy; to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State, which requisition shall be binding; and thereupon the Legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the United States; and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States, in Congress assembled; but if the United States, in Congress assembled, shall, on consideration of circumstances, judge proper that any State should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number than its quota, and that any other State should raise a greater number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the same manner as the quota of such State, unless the Legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number can not be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared, and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States, in Congress assembled. The United States, in Congress assembled, shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same, nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States, in Congress assembled. The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of six months, and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations as in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State, on any question, shall be entered on the journal when it is desired by any delegate; and the delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the Legislatures of the several States.

Article X. The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States, in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled is requisite.

Article XI. Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.

Article XII. All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts contracted by or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present Confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged.

Article XIII. Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State. AND WHEREAS it hath pleased the great Governor of the world to incline the hearts of the Legislatures we respectively represent in Congress to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify, the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, know ye, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do, by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained. And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by the said Confederation are submitted to them; and that the Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent, and that the Union shall be perpetual. {3256} In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands in Congress. Done at Philadelphia in the State of Pennsylvania the ninth day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight, and in the third year of the independence of America."

"Under these Articles of Confederation the treaty of peace with England was concluded and the American nation was governed until the final adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The main defect of the Articles of Confederation was, that although powers sufficiently adequate to create a government were ceded, there was no power to raise revenue, to levy taxes, or to enforce the law, except with the consent of nine States; and although the government had power to contract debts, there were no means by which to discharge them. The government had power to raise armies and navies, but no means wherewith to pay them, unless the means were voted by the States themselves; they could make treaties with foreign powers, but had no means to coerce a State to obey such treaty. In short, it was a government which had the power to make laws, but no power to punish infractions thereof. Washington himself said: 'The Confederation appears to me to be little more than the shadow without the substance, and Congress a nugatory body.' Chief Justice Story, in summing up the leading defects of the Articles of Confederation, says: 'There was an utter want of all coercive authority to carry into effect its own constitutional measures; this of itself was sufficient to destroy its whole efficiency as a superintendent government, if that may be called a government which possessed no one solid attribute of power. In truth, Congress possessed only the power of recommendation. Congress had no power to exact obedience or punish disobedience of its ordinances; they could neither impose fines nor direct imprisonments, nor divest privileges, nor declare forfeitures, nor suspend refractory officers. There was no power to exercise force.'"

S. Sterne, Constitutional History of the United States, chapter 1.

"The individual states had attributed to themselves, in the Articles of Confederation, no powers which could place them in relation to foreign nations in the light of sovereign states. They felt that all such claims would be considered ridiculous, because back of these claims there was no real corresponding power. Congress therefore remained, as heretofore, the sole outward representative of sovereignty. But the power to exercise the prerogatives was taken from it, and this without placing it in any other hands. The changes effected by the Articles of Confederation were rather of a negative than of a positive nature. They did not give the State which was just coming into being a definite form, but they began the work of its dissolution. … The practical result … was that the United States tended more and more to split up into thirteen independent republics, and … virtually ceased to be a member of the family of nations bound together by the 'jus gentium.'"

H. von Holst, Constitutional and Political History of the United States, volume 1, chapter 1.

ALSO IN: G. Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution, volume 1, chapter 1.

D. R. Goodloe, The Birth of the Republic, pages 353-366.

H. W. Preston, Documents illustrative of American History, pages 218-231.

On the operation and failure of the Articles of Confederation.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1787.

On the question of the western territorial claims of several of the States, and the obstacle which it brought in the way of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1781-1786.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (February). The Treaty with France.

"The account of Burgoyne's surrender, which was brought to France by a swift-sailing ship from Boston, threw Turgot and all Paris into transports of joy. None doubted the ability of the states to maintain their independence. On the 12th of December their commissioners had an interview with Vergennes. 'Nothing,' said he, 'has struck me so much as General Washington's attacking and giving battle to General Howe's army. To bring troops raised within the year to this, promises everything. The court of France, in the treaty which is to be entered into, intend to take no advantage of your present situation. Once made, it should be durable; and therefore it should contain no condition of which the Americans may afterward repent, but such only as will last as long as human institutions shall endure, so that mutual amity may subsist forever. Entering into a treaty will be an avowal of your independence. Spain must be consulted, and Spain will not be satisfied with an undetermined boundary on the west. Some of the states are supposed to run to the South Sea, which might interfere with her claim to California.' It was answered that the last treaty of peace adopted the Mississippi as a boundary. 'And what share do you intend to give us in the fisheries?' asked Vergennes; for in the original draft of a treaty the United States had proposed to take to themselves Cape Breton and the whole of the island of Newfoundland. Explanations were made by the American commissioners that their later instructions removed all chances of disagreement on that subject. … The question of a French alliance … was discussed by Vergennes with the Marquis d'Ossun, the late French ambassador in Madrid, as the best adviser with regard to Spain, and the plan of action was formed. Then these two met the king at the apartment of Maurepas, where the plan, after debate, was finally settled. Maurepas, at heart opposed to the war, loved ease and popularity too well to escape the sway of external opinion; and Louis XVI. sacrificed his own inclination and his own feeling of justice to policy of state and the opinion of his advisers. So, on the 6th of February, a treaty of amity and commerce and an eventual defensive treaty of alliance were concluded between the king of France and the United States, on principles of equality and reciprocity, and for the most part in conformity to the proposals of congress. In commerce each party was to be placed on the footing of the most favored nation. The king of France promised his good offices with the princes and powers of Barbary. As to the fisheries, each party reserved to itself the exclusive possession of its own. Accepting the French interpretation of the treaties of Utrecht and of Paris, the United States acknowledged the right of French subjects to fish on the banks of Newfoundland, and their exclusive right to half the coast of that island for drying-places. {3257} On the question of ownership in the event of the conquest of Newfoundland the treaty was silent. The American proposal, that free ships give freedom to goods and to persons, except to soldiers in actual service of an enemy, was adopted. Careful lists were made out of contraband merchandises. The absolute and unlimited independence of the United States was described as the essential end of the defensive alliance; and the two parties mutually engaged not to lay down their arms until it should be assured by the treaties terminating the war. Moreover, the United States guaranteed to France the possessions then held by France in America, as well as those which it might acquire by a future treaty of peace; and, in like manner, the king of France guaranteed to the United States their present possessions and acquisitions during the war from the dominions of Great Britain in North America. A separate and secret act reserved to the king of Spain the power of acceding to the treaties. Within forty-two hours of the signature of these treaties of commerce and alliance the British ministry received the news by special messenger from their spy in Paris, but it was not divulged." It was officially communicated to the British government on the 13th of March, when ambassadors were withdrawn on both sides and war soon followed.

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, chapter 17.

ALSO IN: Treaties and Conventions of the United States (edition of 1889), page 296.

T. Balch, The French in America during the War of Independence, chapter 8.

See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1778.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (June). Peace-proposals from England. British evacuation of Philadelphia and march to New York. Battle of Monmouth.

"On May 11th, Sir Henry Clinton relieved Sir William Howe at Philadelphia, and the latter took his departure in a blaze of mock glory. … The new commander was more active than his predecessor, but no cleverer, and no better fitted to cope with Washington. … Expecting a movement by the enemy, Washington sent Lafayette forward to watch Philadelphia. Clinton, fresh in office, determined to cut him off, and by a rapid movement nearly succeeded in so doing. Timely information, presence of mind, and quickness, alone enabled the young Frenchman to escape, narrowly but completely. Meantime, a cause for delay, that curse of the British throughout the war, supervened. A peace commission, consisting of the Earl of Carlisle, William Eden, and Governor Johnstone, arrived. They were excellent men, but they came too late. Their propositions three years before would have been well enough, but as it was they were worse than nothing. Coolly received, they held a fruitless interview with a committee of Congress, tried to bribe and intrigue, found that their own army had been already ordered to evacuate Philadelphia [in apprehension of the arrival of the expected French fleet] without their knowledge, and finally gave up their task in angry despair, and returned to England to join in the chorus of fault-finding which was beginning to sound very loud in ministerial ears. Meanwhile, Washington waited and watched, puzzled by the delay, and hoping only to harass Sir Henry with militia on the march to New York. But, as the days slipped by, the Americans grew stronger, while Sir Henry weakened himself by sending 5,000 men to the West Indies, and 3,000 to Florida. When he finally started [evacuating Philadelphia June 17], he had with him less than 10,000 men, while the Americans had 13,000, nearly all continental troops. Under these circumstances, Washington determined to bring on a battle. He was thwarted at the outset by his officers, as was wont to be the case. Lee had returned more whimsical than ever, and at the moment was strongly adverse to an attack. … Washington was harassed of course by all this, but he did not stay his purpose, and as soon as he knew that Clinton actually had marched, he broke camp at Valley Forge and started in pursuit. There were more councils of an old-womanish character, but finally Washington took the matter into his own hands, and ordered forth a strong detachment to attack the British rear-guard. They set out on the 25th, and as Lee, to whom the command belonged, did not care to go, Lafayette [see above: A. D. 1777 (JULY)] was put in charge. As soon as Lafayette had departed, however, Lee changed his mind, and insisted that all the detachments in front, amounting to 6,000 men, formed a division so large that it was unjust not to give him the command. Washington, therefore, sent him forward next day with two additional brigades, and then Lee by seniority took command on the 27th of the entire advance. In the evening of that day, Washington came up, reconnoitred the enemy, and saw that, although their position was a strong one, another day's unmolested march would make it still stronger. He therefore resolved to attack the next morning, and gave Lee then and there explicit orders to that effect. In the early dawn he despatched similar orders, but Lee apparently did nothing except move feebly forward, saying to Lafayette, 'You don't know the British soldiers; we cannot stand against them.' He made a weak attempt to cut off a covering party, marched and countermarched, ordered and countermanded, until Lafayette and Wayne, eager to fight, knew not what to do, and sent hot messages to Washington to come to them. Thus hesitating and confused, Lee permitted Clinton to get his baggage and train to the front, and to mass all his best troops in the rear under Cornwallis, who then advanced against the American lines. Now there were no orders at all, and the troops did not know what to do, or where to go. They stood still, then began to fall back, and then to retreat. A very little more and there would have been a rout. As it was, Washington alone prevented disaster. … As the ill tidings grew thicker, Washington spurred sharper and rode faster through the deep sand and under the blazing mid-summer sun. At last he met Lee and the main body all in full retreat. He rode straight at Lee, savage with anger, not pleasant to look at, one may guess, and asked fiercely and with a deep oath, tradition says, what it all meant. … Lee gathered himself and tried to excuse and palliate what had happened, but although the brief words that followed are variously reported to us across the century, we know that Washington rebuked him in such a way, and with such passion, that all was over between them. Lee … went to the rear, thence to a court-martial, thence to dismissal and to a solitary life. … Having put Lee aside, Washington rallied the broken troops, brought them into position, turned them back, and held the enemy in check. {3258} It was not an easy feat, but it was done, and when Lee's division again fell back in good order the main army was in position, and the action became general. The British were repulsed, and then Washington, taking the offensive, drove them back until he occupied the battlefield of the morning. Night came upon him still advancing. He halted his army, lay down under a tree, his soldiers lying on their arms about him, and planned a fresh attack, to be made at daylight. But when the dawn came it was seen that the British had crept off, and were far on their road. The heat prevented a rapid pursuit, and Clinton got into New York. Between there and Philadelphia he had lost 2,000 men, Washington said, and modern authorities put it at about 1,500, of whom nearly 500 fell at Monmouth. … Monmouth has never been one of the famous battles of the Revolution, and yet there is no other which can compare with it as an illustration of Washington's ability as a soldier. … Its importance lies in the evidence which it gives of the way in which Washington, after a series of defeats, during a winter of terrible suffering and privation, had yet developed his ragged volunteers into a well-disciplined and effective army. The battle was a victory, but the existence and the quality of the army that won it were a far greater triumph. The dreary winter at Valley Forge had indeed borne fruit."

H. C. Lodge, George Washington, volume 1, chapter 7.

ALSO IN: H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapters 54-56.

Mrs. M. Campbell, Life of General W. Hull, chapter 14.

The Lee Papers, volumes 2-3 (New York Historical Society Collection, 1872-1873).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (June-November). The war on the border. Activity of Tories and Indians. The Massacre at Cherry Valley.

"The Six Nations were stirred to hostility by Sir John Johnson and the Mohawk chief Joseph Brant, with Walter Butler, of infamous name. Their tory partisans were more cruel than the red men. At Cobleskill, Schoharie county, June 1, 1778, Brant won a savage triumph with a mixed force, and burned and plundered the settlement. Springfield was also destroyed, and the assailants retired. A month later the Indians were again at Cobleskill, and, burning where they went, beat off a force that attempted to check them. The valley of the Schohariekill was in the succeeding year subjected to invasions from the Senecas, and suffered severely. About Fort Stanwix the tories and red men were continually hovering, and more than once persons were pounced upon and scalped in sight of the works. In 1778, in the early autumn, German Flats was visited by Brant and his followers, and was entirely destroyed, although all the inhabitants but two were warned in season to escape with their lives. An expedition was sent after the Indians, but failed to bring the warriors to battle, and was rewarded only by laying waste the Indian villages of Unadilla and Oquaga, and capturing a large supply of cattle and provisions. At Cherry Valley a fort had been built, and the village was occupied by a band of colonial troops under Colonel Ichabod Alden. He rested in security, and the settlers were scattered in their habitations, regardless of warnings of approaching foes. Under cover of a severe storm of snow and rain, November 11, Brant and Butler, with 800 Indians and tories, swooped upon the homes, and 43 persons, including women and children, were butchered, 40 taken prisoners, all the buildings were burned, and the domestic animals seized. So brutal was the massacre that Brant charged Butler and the tories with acting against his protests. Brant himself was content, July 19, 1779, with destroying the church, mills, houses, and barns at Minnisink, Orange county, without sacrificing lives, but turned upon a party sent in pursuit, and, after capturing a detachment, butchered the wounded, and slew 45 who tried to escape. Such deeds produced a terror in the colony. No one knew where the red men and tories would strike next. To check and counteract them, excursions were made against the tribes in their homes. One of these was led by Colonels Van Schaick and Willett from Fort Stanwix in April, 1779). Proceeding by Wood Creek and Oneida Lake, they penetrated the villages of the Onondagas, which they destroyed, and seized the provisions and even the weapons of the red men, who fled into the wilderness."

E. H. Roberts, New York, chapter 24 (volume 2).

The following account of the attack on Cherry Valley is from a pen friendly to Butler and from sources favorable to the Tory side: "After an exhausting march next day through a blinding snow-storm and over ground covered with deep wet snow and mud, Butler halted his men at dark in a pine wood which afforded them some shelter, six miles from Cherry Valley. He assembled the chiefs and proposed that as soon as the moon rose, they should resume their march and surround the house occupied by the officers, while he made a rush upon the fort with the rangers. They readily assented, but before the time appointed arrived it began to rain violently, and they obstinately refused to move until daybreak. It was then arranged that Captain McDonnel with 50 picked rangers and some Indians should storm the house, while Butler with the remainder assailed the fort. Without tents, blankets or fires, they spent a sleepless night cowering beneath the pines, and were glad to move as soon as day appeared. They had approached unperceived within a mile of the fort by passing through a dense swamp, when the Indians in front fired at two men cutting wood. One fell dead; the other, though bleeding, ran for his life and the entire body of Indians set up a whoop and followed at full speed. Unhappily the rangers had just been halted to fix flints and load their rifles, and the Indians obtained a long start. The Continental officers attempted to escape to the fort but only two or three reached it. The colonel, five other officers and twenty soldiers, were killed on the way and the lieutenant-colonel, three subalterns, and ten privates were taken. The colors of the regiment were abandoned in the house and burnt in it. The garrison of the fort was fully alarmed, and opened a fierce fire of artillery and small arms. The rangers seized and burnt a detached block-house, and fired briskly at the loop-holes in the palisades for ten minutes, when Butler saw with horror and consternation that the Indians had set their officers at defiance, and dispersed in every direction to kill and plunder. Their wretched misconduct forced him to collect all the rangers into a compact body on an eminence near the principal entrance to the fort, to oppose a sally by the garrison, which then undoubtedly outnumbered them considerably. {3259} There he was obliged to remain inactive all day under a ceaseless, chilling rain, while blazing houses and shrieks of agony told their pitiful tale in the settlement below. At nightfall he marched a mile down the valley and encamped. He then struggled with indifferent success to rescue the prisoners. Those surrendered were placed next the camp fires and protected by his whole force. Next morning most of the Indians and the feeblest men among the rangers were sent away with a huge drove of captured cattle for the supply of the garrison at Niagara, and McDonnel and Brant, with 60 rangers and 50 Indians, swept the valley from end to end, ruthlessly burning every building and stack in sight, while Butler, with the remainder, again stood guard at the gate of the fort. He hoped that this appalling spectacle would provoke the garrison to sally out and fight, but the lesson of Wyoming had not been lost on them, and they continued to look on from the walls in silent fury. Another great herd of cattle was collected, and Butler leisurely began his retreat, having had only two rangers and three Indians wounded during the expedition. He did not disguise the dark side of the story in his letter to Colonel Bolton of the 17th November. 'I have much to lament,' he said, 'that notwithstanding my utmost precautions to save the women and children, I could not prevent some of them falling victims to the fury of the savages. They have carried off many of the inhabitants and killed more, among them Colin Cloyd, a very violent rebel. I could not prevail on the Indians to leave the women and children behind, though the second morning Captain Johnson (to whose knowledge of the Indians and address in managing them I am much indebted) and I got them to permit twelve, who were loyalists, and whom I concealed, with the humane assistance of Mr. Joseph Brant and Captain Jacobs of Ochquaga, to return. The death of the women and children on this occasion may, I believe, be truly ascribed to the rebels having falsely accused the Indians of cruelty at Wyomen. This has much exasperated them, and they are still more incensed at finding that the colonel and those who had then laid down their arms, soon after marching into their country intending to destroy their villages, and they declared that they would be no more accused falsely of fighting the enemy twice, meaning they would in future give no quarter.'"

E. Cruikshank, The Story of Butler's Rangers, pages 55-56.

ALSO IN: W. W. Campbell, Annals of Tryon County, chapter 5.

Centennial Celebrations of New York, pages 359-383.

W. L. Stone, Life of Brant, volume 1, chapter 17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (July). The war on the border. Bloody work of the Tories and their Indian allies. The Massacre at Wyoming.

"In 1778, according to the plan of campaign as given by Guy Johnson in his correspondence, the English forces on the western borders of New York were divided into two bodies: one, consisting of Indians under Brant, to operate in New York, while Deputy Superintendent Butler with the other should penetrate the settled district on the Susquehanna. Brant [Joseph Brant, the Mohawk chief], who, according to Colonel Claus, 'had shown himself to be the most faithful and zealous subject his majesty could have in America,' did his work unsparingly, and ruin marked his track. In the valley of the upper Mohawk and the Schoharie nothing but the garrison-houses escaped, and labor was only possible in the field when muskets were within easy reach. Occasionally blows were struck at the larger settlements. … In July, 1778, the threatened attack on Wyoming took place. This region was at that time formally incorporated as the county of Westmoreland of the colony of Connecticut. … In the fall of 1776, two companies, on the Continental establishment, had been raised in the valley, in pursuance of a resolution of Congress, and were shortly thereafter ordered to join General Washington. Several stockaded forts had been built during the summer at different points. The withdrawal of so large a proportion of the able-bodied men as had been enlisted in the Continental service threw upon the old men who were left behind the duty of guarding the forts. … In March, 1778, another military company was organized, by authority of Congress, to be employed for home defence. In May, attacks were made upon the scouting parties by Indians, who were the forerunners of an invading army. The exposed situation of the settlement, the prosperity of the inhabitants, and the loyalty with which they had responded to the call for troops, demanded consideration from Connecticut, to whose quota the companies had been credited, and from Congress, in whose armies they had been incorporated; but no help came. On June 30th, an armed labor party of eight men, which went out from the upper fort, was attacked by Major Butler, who, with a force estimated by the American commander in his report at 800 men, Tories and Indians in equal numbers, had arrived in the valley. This estimate was not far from correct; but if we may judge from other raiding forces during the war, the proportion of whites is too large, for only a few local Tories had joined Butler. The little forts at the upper end of the valley offered no resistance to the invaders. On July 3d, there were collected at 'Forty Fort,' on the banks of the river, about three miles above Wilkesbarre, 230 Americans, organized in six companies (one of them being the company authorized by Congress for home defence), and commanded by Colonel Zebulon Butler, a resident in the valley and an officer in the Continental army. It was determined, after deliberation, to give battle. In the afternoon of that day, this body of volunteers, their number being swelled to nearly 300 by the addition of old men and boys, marched up the valley. The invaders had set fire to the forts of which they were in possession. This perplexed the Americans, as was intended, and they pressed on towards the spot selected by the English officer for giving battle. This was reached about four in the afternoon, and the attack was at once made by the Americans, who fired rapidly in platoons. The British line wavered, but a flanking fire from a body of Indians concealed in the woods settled the fate of the day against the Americans. They were thrown into confusion. No efforts of their officers could rally them while exposed to a fire which in a short time brought down every captain in the band. The Indians now cut off the retreat of the panic-stricken men, and pressed them towards the river. All who could saved their lives by flight. Of the 300 who went out that morning from Forty Fort, the names are recorded of 162 officers and men killed in the action or in the massacre which followed. {3260} Major Butler, the British officer in command, reported the taking of 'two hundred and twenty-seven scalps' 'and only five prisoners.' Such was the exasperation of the Indians, according to him, that it was with difficulty he saved these few. He gives the English loss at two whites killed and eight Indians wounded. During the night the worst passions of the Indians seem to have been aroused in revenge for Oriskany. Incredible tales are told of the inhumanity of the Tories. These measures of vengeance fell exclusively upon those who participated in the battle, for all women and children were spared. As soon as the extent of the disaster was made known, the inhabitants of the lower part of the valley deserted their homes, and fled in the direction of the nearest settlements. Few stayed behind who had strength and opportunity to escape. In their flight many of the fugitives neglected to provide themselves with provisions, and much suffering and some loss of life ensued. The fugitives from the field of battle took refuge in the forts lower down the valley. The next day, Colonel Zebulon Butler, with the remnants of the company for home defence, consisting of only fourteen men, escaped from the valley. Colonel Denison, in charge of Forty Fort, negotiated with Major Butler the terms of capitulation which were ultimately signed. In these it was agreed that the inhabitants should occupy their farms peaceably, and their lives should be preserved 'intire and unhurt.' With the exception that Butler executed a British deserter whom he found among the prisoners, no lives were taken at that time. Shortly thereafter, the Indians began to plunder, and the English commander, to his chagrin, found himself unable to check them. Miner even goes so far as to say that he promised to pay for the property thus lost. Finding his commands disregarded, Butler mustered his forces and withdrew, without visiting the lower part of the valley. The greater part of the Indians went with him, but enough remained to continue the devastation, while a few murders committed by straggling parties of Indians ended the tragedy. The whole valley was left a scene of desolation."

A. McF. Davis, The Indians and the Border Warfare of the Revolution (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6, chapter 8).

"Rarely, indeed, does it happen that history is more at fault in regard to facts than in the case of Wyoming. The remark may be applied to nearly every writer who has attempted to narrate the events connected with the invasion of Colonel John Butler. Ramsay, and Gordon, and Marshall—nay, the British historians themselves—have written gross exaggerations. Marshall, however, in his revised edition, has made corrections. … Other writers, of greater or less note, have gravely recorded the same fictions, adding, it is to be feared, enormities not even conveyed to them by tradition. The grossest of these exaggerations are contained in Thatcher's Military Journal and Drake's Book of the Indians. The account of the marching out of a large body of Americans from one of the forts, to hold a parley, by agreement, and then being drawn into an ambuscade and all put to death, is false; the account of 70 Continental soldiers being butchered, after having surrendered, is also totally untrue. No regular troops surrendered, and all escaped who survived the battle of the 3d. … There is still another important correction to be made. … This correction regards the name and the just fame of Joseph Brant, whose character has been blackened with all the infamy, both real and imaginary, connected with this bloody expedition. Whether Captain Brant was at any time in company with this expedition is doubtful; but it is certain, in the face of every historical authority, British and American, that, so far from being engaged in the battle, he was many miles distant at the time of its occurrence. … It will, moreover, be seen, toward the close of the present work, that after the publication of Campbell's 'Gertrude of Wyoming,' in which poem the Mohawk chieftain was denounced as 'the Monster Brant,' his son repaired to England, and, in a correspondence with the poet, successfully vindicated his father's memory."

W. L. Stone, Life of Joseph Brant, volume 1, page 339, foot-note, page 338 and footnote.

"No lives were taken by the Indians after the surrender; but numbers of women and children perished in the dismal swamp on the Pokono range of mountains, in the flight. … The whole number of people killed and missing was about 300. … The greatest barbarities of this celebrated massacre were committed by the tories."

W. L. Stone, Poetry and History of Wyoming, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: _W. P. Miner, History of Wyoming, Letters 17-18._

_G. Peck, Wyoming._

J. Fiske, The American Revolution, chapter 11 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (July-November). The French fleet and army and their undertakings. Ill fortune and ill-feeling between the new allies. The failure at Newport.

"The first minister of France to the United States, M. Gérard, came accompanied by a fleet and army, under D'Estaing, (July.) 'Unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances,' as Washington wrote, 'lessened the importance of the French services in a great degree.' In the first place, the arrival was just late enough to miss the opportunity of surprising the British fleet in the Delaware, not to mention the British army on its retreat to New York. In the next place, the French vessels proved to be of too great draught to penetrate the channel and cooperate in an attack upon New York. Thus disappointing and disappointed, D'Estaing engaged in an enterprise against Newport, still in British hands. It proved another failure. But not through the French alone; the American troops that were to enter the island at the north being greatly behindhand. The same day that they took their place, under Sullivan, Greene, and Lafayette, the French left theirs at the lower end of the island, in order to meet the British fleet arriving from New York, (August 10.) A severe storm prevented more than a partial engagement; but D'Estaing returned to Newport only to plead the injuries received in the gale as compelling his retirement to Boston for repairs. The orders of the French government had been peremptory, that in case of any damage to the fleet it should put into port at once. So far was D'Estaing from avoiding action on personal grounds, that when Lafayette hurried to Boston to persuade his countrymen to return, the commander offered to serve as a volunteer until the fleet should be refitted. The Americans, however, talked of desertion and of inefficiency,—so freely, indeed, as to affront their faithful Lafayette. {3261} At the same time, large numbers of them imitated the very course which they censured, by deserting their own army. The remaining forces retreated from their lines to the northern end of the island, and, after an engagement, withdrew to the mainland, (August 30.) It required all the good offices of Lafayette, of Washington, and of Congress, to keep the peace between the Americans and their allies. D'Estaing, soothed by the language of those whom he most respected, was provoked, on the other hand, by the hostility of the masses, both in the army and amongst the people. Collisions between his men and the Bostonians kept up his disgust; and, when his fleet was repaired, he sailed for the West Indies, (November.) … On the part of the British, there was nothing attempted that would not have been far better unattempted. Marauding parties from Newport went against New Bedford and Fairhaven. Others from New York went against Little Egg Harbor. Tories and Indians —'a collection of banditti,' as they were rightly styled by Washington, descended from the northern country to wreak massacre at Wyoming and at Cherry Valley. The war seemed to be assuming a new character: it was one of ravages unworthy of any cause, and most unworthy of such a cause as the British professed to be. Affairs were at a low state amongst the Americans."

S. Eliot, History of the United States, part 3, chapter 5.

ALSO IN: S. G. Arnold, History of Rhode Island, chapters 21-22 (volume 2).

O. W. B. Peabody, Life of General John Sullivan (Library of American Biographies, series 2, volume 3).

J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapter 9.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (December). Anxieties of Washington. His opinion of Congress. The serious defects and errors of that body.

"Much of the winter was passed by Washington in Philadelphia, occupied in devising and discussing plans for the campaign of 1779. It was an anxious moment with him. Circumstances which inspired others with confidence, filled him with solicitude. The alliance with France had produced a baneful feeling of security, which, it appeared to him, was paralyzing the energies of the country. England, it was thought, would now be too much occupied in securing her position in Europe, to increase her force or extend her operations in America. Many, therefore, considered the war as virtually at an end; and were unwilling to make the sacrifices, or supply the means necessary for important military undertakings. Dissensions, too, and party feuds were breaking out in Congress, owing to that relaxation of that external pressure of a common and imminent danger, which had heretofore produced a unity of sentiment and action. That august body had, in fact, greatly deteriorated since the commencement of the war. Many of those whose names had been as watchwords at the Declaration of Independence had withdrawn from the national councils; occupied either by their individual affairs, or by the affairs of their individual States. Washington, whose comprehensive patriotism embraced the whole Union, deprecated and deplored the dawning of this sectional spirit."

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapter 38.

The following, from a letter written by Washington in December, 1778, to Benjamin Harrison, Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, intimates the grave anxieties which filled his mind, and the opinion of Congress with which he had returned from a visit to Philadelphia:

"It appears as clear to me as ever the Sun did in its meridian brightness, that America never stood in more eminent need of the wise, patriotic, and spirited exertions of her Sons than at this period; and if it is not a sufficient cause for general lamentation, my misconception of the matter impresses it too strongly upon me, that the States, separately, are too much engaged in their local concerns, and have too many of their ablest men withdrawn from the general council, for the good of the common weal. … As there can be no harm in a pious wish for the good of one's Country, I shall offer it as mine, that each State would not only choose, but absolutely compel their ablest men to attend Congress; and that they would instruct them to go into a thorough investigation of the causes, that have produced so many disagreeable effects in the army and Country; in a word, that public abuses should be corrected & an entire reformation worked. Without these, it does not in my Judgment require the spirit of divination to foretell the consequences of the present administration; nor to how little purpose the States individually are framing constitutions, providing laws, and filling offices with the abilities of their ablest men. These, if the great whole is mismanaged, must sink in the general wreck, and will carry with it the remorse of thinking, that we are lost by our own folly and negligence, or the desire perhaps of living in ease and tranquillity during the expected accomplishment of so great a revolution, in the effecting of which the greatest abilities, and the honestest men our (i. e. the American) world affords, ought to be employed. It is much to be feared, my dear Sir, that the States, in their separate capacities, have very inadequate ideas of the present danger. Removed (some of them) far distant from the scene of action, and seeing and hearing such publications only, as flatter their wishes, they conceive that the contest is at an end, and that to regulate the government and police of their own State is all that remains to be done; but it is devoutly to be wished, that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them like a thunder-clap, that is little expected. I do not mean to designate particular States. I wish to cast no reflections upon any one. The Public believe (and, if they do believe it, the fact might almost as well be so), that the States at this time are badly represented, and that the great and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want either of abilities or application in the members, or through the discord & party views of some individuals. … P. S. Philadelphia: 30th. This letter was to have gone by Post from Middlebrook but missed that conveyance, since which I have come to this place at the request of Congress whence I shall soon return. I have seen nothing since I came here (on the 22d Inst.) to change my opinion of Men or Measrs., but abundant reason to be convinced that our affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition than they have been in since the commencement of the War.—By a faithful laborer then in the cause—By a man who is daily injuring his private Estate without even the smallest earthly advantage not common to all in case of a favorable Issue to the dispute—By one who wishes the prosperity of America most devoutly and sees or thinks he sees it, on the brink of ruin, you are beseeched most earnestly, my dear Colonel Harrison, to exert yourself in endeavoring to rescue your Country by (let me add) sending your ablest and best Men to Congress—these characters must not slumber nor sleep at home in such times of pressing danger—they must not content themselves in the enjoyment of places of honor or profit in their own Country while the common interests of America are mouldering and sinking into irretrievable (if a remedy is not soon applied) ruin in which theirs also must ultimately be involved. {3262} If I was to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of Men, from what I have seen, and heard, and in part know, I should in one word say that idleness, dissipation & extravagance seems to have laid fast hold of most of them.—That speculation—peculation—and an insatiable thirst for riches seems to have got the better of every other consideration and almost of every order of Men.—That party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day whilst the momentous concerns of an empire—a great and accumulated debt—ruined finances—depreciated money—and want of credit (which in their consequences is the want of everything) are but secondary considerations and postponed from day to day—from week to week as if our affairs wear the most promising aspect—after drawing this picture, which from my Soul I believe to be a true one, I need not repeat to you that I am alarmed and wish to see my Countrymen roused.—I have no resentments, nor do I mean to point at any particular characters,—this I can declare upon my honor for I have every attention paid me by Congress that I can possibly expect and have reason to think that I stand well in their estimation, but in the present situation of things I cannot help asking— Where is Mason—Wythe—Jefferson—Nicholas—Pendleton—Nelson—and another I could name—and why, if you are sufficiently impressed with your danger do you not (as New York has done in the case of Mr. Jay) send an extra member or two for at least a certain limited time till the great business of the Nation is put upon a more respectable and happy establishment.—Your Money is now sinking 5 Pr. ct. a day in this city; and I shall not be surprized if in the course of a few months a total stop is put to the currency of it.—And yet an Assembly—a concert—a Dinner—or supper (that will cost three or four hundred pounds) will not only take Men off from acting in but even from thinking of this business while a great part of the Officers of ye Army from absolute necessity are quitting the service and ye more virtuous few rather than do this are sinking by sure degrees into beggary and want.—I again repeat to you that this is not an exaggerated acct.; that it is an alarming one I do not deny, and confess to you that I feel more real distress on account of the prest. appearances of things than I have done at any one time since the commencement of the dispute—but it is time to bid you once more adieu.—Providence has heretofore taken me up when all other means and hope seemed to be departing from me in this."

George Washington, Writings, edited by W: C. Ford, volume 7, pages 297-303.

"The first Continental Congress enjoyed and deserved in a remarkable degree the respect and confidence of the country. The second Congress was composed of eminent men, and succeeded, for a time, to the honors and reputation of the first. But when it attempted to pass from discussion to organization, and to direct as well as to frame the machinery of administration, its delays and disputes and errors and contradictions and hesitations excited a well-founded distrust of its executive skill. Conscious of this distrust, it became jealous of its authority; and instead of endeavoring to regain, by correcting its errors, the ground which it had lost by committing them, it grew suspicious and exacting in proportion to the decay of its strength. And while this critical change in its relations to the country was taking place, important changes took place also in the materials of which it was composed,—some of its wisest members being removed by death, or imperative calls to other fields of duty, or by failing of re-election at the regular expiration of their terms of office. Among the first elements with which it was brought into collision were the newly organized governments of the States. The question of State rights, that unsolved problem of our history, begins almost with the beginning of the war. How abundant and active the materials of disunion were, and how difficult it was even for leading men to rise above them might be proved by numerous passages in the letters of Washington and Greene, if it were not still more evident from the conduct of the local legislatures. How far this spirit might have been counteracted or controlled if the policy of the Congress had been that policy of prompt decision and energetic action which, commanding respect at all times, commands in times of general danger general and implicit obedience, it is impossible to say. … Another element with which it was brought into immediate and constant relations was the army; and, unfortunately for both, these relations, from their very nature, brought into immediate and constant contrast the elements of opposition which they both contained, rather than the elements of harmonious action, which they also contained in an almost equal degree. If the Congress was composed of the representatives of the people, the army was composed in a large proportion of the constituents of the Congress. More than once also, during the course of the war, men who had done good work for their country as soldiers, withdrawing from their original field of action, did equally good service for her as statesmen. And more than once, too, men who had proved themselves wise and eloquent in counsel were found at the head of a regiment, or even in more subordinate positions in the army. … The real interest and the real object of the citizen in arms and of the citizen in the toga were still the same. But their point of view was different. The ever-present object of Congress was discussion as a means of organization. The ever-present object of the leaders of the army was decision as a means of action. Congress counted obstacles, weighed difficulties, balanced opposing advantages, eating and sleeping meanwhile and refreshing mind and body as nature bade. But while Congress was deliberating upon the best way of procuring meat, the army was often brought to the verge of starvation for the want of it. While Congress was discussing by a warm fire the most eligible method of providing the army with tents and blankets, half the army was sleeping on the snow without either blanket or tent. {3263} While Congress was framing elaborate resolutions, and drawing out and equipping regiments upon paper, officers in the field were standing disheartened before their thinned and disheartened ranks. … Errors of statesmanship, like errors of generalship, would easily have been forgiven and forgotten; for both statesmen and generals had still much to learn. Unfortunately, while the best generals strove earnestly to correct their errors by their experience, Congress, in too many things, clung obstinately to its errors, in spite of the most decisive experience. Those errors were twofold,—errors of policy and errors of principle,—the one tending to undermine the respect which, in the beginning, was felt for their wisdom; the other, to awaken a general distrust of their justice. The first year of the war demonstrated the danger of short enlistments and temporary levies. But more than half the second year was allowed to pass before it was decided to raise an army for the whole duration of the war. The first campaign demonstrated the necessity of providing by regularly organized departments for the food, clothing, and transportation of the army; but it was not till late in the second year that a board of war was organized; and not till later still that the Quartermaster-General and Commissary-General were allowed to devote themselves to their duty in camp, instead of waiting idly for orders at the door of Congress. All experience and the simplest reasoning showed the importance of strengthening the hands of their General by passing promptly all the acts needed for the conduct of an army in the field, or the support and instruction of an army in quarters; but, in spite of all experience and the plainest reason, Congress persisted in its unseasonable delays. … The policy of the Congress, in the organization and support of the army, was a policy of tergiversation and delay. No wonder that the army, leaders and all, should early lose their confidence in its wisdom! But the dissatisfaction did not end here. One of the earliest felt of the numerous wants of the army was the want of good officers. … To select them in the beginning from the mass of unproved candidates was impossible; but in the course of two campaigns, the characters and pretensions of men were well tried, the chaff thoroughly sifted, and what remained might be confidently accepted as sound. … It was evidently the policy of Congress to secure by all proper and reasonable inducements the services of such officers for the war. It was the duty of Congress, in its dealings with them, to remember that in becoming soldiers, and exposing themselves to the dangers and privations of a soldier's life, they adopted, with the ideas of subordination that lie at the basis of military discipline, the ideas of rank and grade which define and circumscribe that subordination. But Congress remembered nothing of this. It required of them the service of officers, but gave them a pay hardly sufficient to enable them to live like private soldiers. It demanded the present sacrifice of cold, hunger, hard service, and exposure to sickness, wounds, and death; and refused the prospective reward of half-pay or pension when sickness or wounds should have incapacitated them for further exertion, or death should have made their wives unprotected widows, and their children helpless orphans. Forgetting that pride is an essential element of the military character, and that self-respect is essential to a healthy and sustaining pride, it trifled with their claims to rank by the accepted rules of service, and claimed and exercised the power of dealing with commissions according to its own good pleasure."

G. W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, book 2, chapter 18 (volume 1).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779. Clark's conquest of the Northwest for Virginia, and its annexation to the district of Kentucky.

"Virginia … had more western enterprise than any other colony. In 1774 Dunmore's war gave her the 'back-lands,' into which her frontiersmen had been for some time pressing. Boone was a Carolinian, but Kentucky was a distinctively Virginia colony. In 1776 the Virginia legislature erected the County of Kentucky, and the next year a Virginia judge dispensed justice at Harrodsburg. Soon the colony was represented in the legislature of the parent state. While thus extending her jurisdiction over the region southwest of the Ohio, the Old Dominion did not forget the language of [her charter] of 1609, 'up into the land throughout from sea to sea, west and northwest.' George Rogers Clark, a Virginian who had made Kentucky his home, was endowed with something of the general's and statesman's grasp. While floating down the Ohio in 1776, being then 24 years of age, he conceived the conquest of the country beyond the river. … Clark says he had since the beginning of the war taken pains to make himself acquainted with the true situation of the Northwestern posts; and in 1777 he sent two young hunters to spy out the country more thoroughly, and especially to ascertain the sentiments of the 'habitants.' On the return of these hunters with an encouraging report, he went to Williamsburg, then the capital of Virginia, where he enlisted Governor Patrick Henry and other leading minds in a secret expedition to the Illinois. Acting under a vaguely worded law, authorizing him to aid 'any expedition against their Western enemies,' Governor Henry gave Clark some vague public instructions, directing him to enlist, in any county of the commonwealth, seven companies of men who should act under his command as a militia, and also private instructions that were much more full and definite. … Both the public and private instructions are dated January 2, 1778. The governor also gave the young captain a small supply of money. Clark immediately re-crossed the mountains and began to recruit his command. … Overcoming as best he could the difficulties that environed him, he collected his feeble command at the Falls of the Ohio. On June 26, 1778, he began the descent of the river. Leaving the Ohio at Fort Massac, forty miles above its mouth, he began the march to Kaskaskia. This fell into his hands, July 5th, and Cahokia soon after, both without the loss of a single life. Clark found few Englishmen in these villages, and the French, who were weary of British rule, he had little difficulty in attaching to the American interest. Vincennes, soon after, surrendered to a mere proclamation, when there was not an American soldier within one hundred miles of the place. … Clark prevailed upon 100 men to re-enlist for eight months; he then filled up his companies with recruits from the villages, and sent an urgent call to Virginia for re-enforcements. The salutary influence of the invasion upon the Indians was felt at once; it 'began to spread among the nations even to the border of the lakes;' and in five weeks Clark settled a peace with ten or twelve different tribes. … {3264} And now Clark began really to feel the difficulties of his situation. Destitute of money, poorly supplied, commanding a small and widely scattered force, he had to meet and circumvent an active enemy who was determined to regain what he had lost. Governor Hamilton [the British governor at Detroit] projected a grand campaign against the French towns that had been captured and the small force that held them. The feeble issue was the capture, in December, 1778, of Vincennes, which was occupied by but two Americans. Clark, who was in the Illinois at the time of this disaster, at once put his little force in motion for the Wabash, knowing, he says, that if he did not take Hamilton, Hamilton would take him; and, February 25, 1779, at the end of a march of 250 miles, that ranks in peril and hardship with Arnold's winter march to Canada, he again captured the town, the fort, the governor, and his whole command. Hamilton was sent to Virginia a prisoner of war, where he was found guilty of treating American prisoners with cruelty, and of offering the Indians premiums for scalps, but none for prisoners." Clark was ambitious to extend his march to Detroit, but could not compass the necessary means. "'Detroit lost for a few hundred men,' was his pathetic lament as he surrendered an enterprise that lay near his heart. Had he been able to achieve it, he would have won and held the whole Northwest. As it was he won and held the Illinois and the Wabash in the name of Virginia and of the United States. The bearing of this conquest on the question of western boundaries will be considered in another place, but here it is pertinent to remark that the American Commissioners, in 1782, at Paris, could plead 'uti possidetis' in reference to much of the country beyond the Ohio, for the flag of the Republic, raised over it by George Rogers Clark, had never been lowered. It would not be easy to find in our history a case of an officer accomplishing results that were so great and far-reaching with so small a force. Clark's later life is little to his credit, but it should not be forgotten that he rendered the American cause and civilization a very great service. All this time the British were not idle. War-party after war-party was sent against the American border. In 1780 a grand expedition was organized at Detroit and sent to Kentucky under the command of Captain Bird. But it accomplished nothing commensurate with its magnitude and cost. … The Northwest had been won by a Virginia army, commanded by a Virginia officer, put in the field at Virginia's expense. Governor Henry had promptly announced the conquest to the Virginia delegates in Congress. … But before Patrick Henry wrote this letter, Virginia had welded the last link in her chain of title to the country beyond the Ohio. In October, 1778, her Legislature declared: 'All the citizens of the commonwealth of Virginia, who are actually settlers there, or who shall hereafter be settled, on the west side of the Ohio, shall be included in the district of Kentucky which shall be called Illinois County.' Nor was this all. Soon after, Governor Henry appointed a lieutenant-commandant for the new county, with full instructions for carrying on the government. The French settlements remained under Virginia jurisdiction until March, 1784."

B. A. Hinsdale, The Old Northwest, chapter 9.

ALSO IN: _Clark's Campaign in the Illinois (Ohio Valley History Series, 3)._

J. H. Perkins, Annals of the West, chapter 7.

A. Davidson and B. Stuvé, History of Illinois, chapters 16-18.

T. Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, volume 2, chapters 2-3.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779. The French Alliance. Peril of France. Doubtful feeling in America. Spanish mediation with England.

"From the third volume of Doniol's comprehensive work on the 'Participation de la France a l'etablissement des Ètats Unis,' published in 1888, we are able to learn for the first time the extreme peril of France in 1778-1779. When Vergennes advised the recognition of the independence of the United States, it was on the same grounds that Canning advised the recognition of the independence of the Spanish South American States many years afterwards. The fair distribution of power in the civilized world, which was threatened in the latter period by the Holy Alliance, was threatened in the former period by the assumption of maritime supremacy by Britain. In each the object was to call up a new sovereignty in America, so as to check an undue concentration of sovereignty in Europe, Undoubtedly Vergennes was aided, as Canning was aided, by the enthusiasm felt by men of liberal views for a revolution that was expected to extend the domain of liberalism; but with Vergennes, as with Canning, the object was the establishing of a power abroad which could resist a dangerous aggression at home. When in February, 1778, France acknowledged the independence of the United States, Vergennes had good reason to hold either that Britain would not resent the insult by war, or that she would find that in such a war the odds were against her. A British army had just capitulated at Saratoga. America, so it was reported to Vergennes and so he believed, was unanimous in determining to defend her liberties to the last. In Holland there was a strong party which was expected to force the States-General into a recognition of their sister republic. Spain had already secretly advanced a million of francs to the American commissioners. From Frederick the Great, delighted to see his British relatives, who had not always supported him in his troubles, annoyed by a revolt in their own domain, came words very encouraging to the American envoys. Catharine II listened with apparent satisfaction to a scheme which would relieve her infant shipping from British oppression. It looked as if, should Britain declare war against France, she would have against her the armies and navies of all continental Europe, aided by the people of her American Colonies in a compact mass. But in a few months there came a great change. The British army under Howe was so largely reenforced as for the immediate present to give it a great superiority over any army Congress could bring against it in open field. … It is true that the news in April of the French treaty revived the energies of the revolutionists; but this treaty had its drawbacks, as the old dislike of France, in part inherited from England, in part the product of the Seven-years war, intensified the yearning for the mother country which in many hearts still remained. French officers complained that on their first arrival in New England they were received with sullen aversion by the people, though welcomed by the revolutionary leaders. {3265} The French army and navy, for the first year in which they were engaged in America, did no good to the American cause; and so great was the popular irritation at their inactivity, so strong, it was said, continued to be the old race attachment to England, that intelligent French observers in America advised Vergennes that he must move warily, for at any moment America might make a separate peace with Britain and then join the British forces against France. No doubt these reports, so far as they pronounced this to be the drift of a large minority in Congress, were unfounded in fact. They were nevertheless communicated under high sanction to Vergennes, and produced in his mind the liveliest anxiety. … English influence had for a time regained its ascendency in Holland. Prussia and Russia, having tasted the delights of neutral commerce, let it be plainly understood that they would not abandon a neutrality so profitable for the risks of belligerency. And Spain had taken alarm and was backing out not merely from the family compact, but from her recent promise to aid the insurgents. Aiding the insurgents, her minister declared, would be cutting her own throat, and no aid to the insurgents should be given except on a very heavy equivalent. If France was to meet the shock of the British navy alone she might be swept from the seas, and, aside from this danger, her finances were in such a ruinous condition that her bankruptcy was imminent. One of two courses must be adopted, not only to save France but to save the independence of the United States and the consequent equipoise of power for which France has gone to war. There must be either a general peace, which would include the independence of the United States, or there must be war, with Spain joining the allies. … It was in this condition of affairs that the position of Spain in 1778-1779 became of commanding importance. She offered herself as mediator between the allies and their common enemy, and through her the terms of pacification were discussed. In the negotiations, protracted and on both sides largely insincere, between Spain and Britain relative to the proposed pacification, the winter of 1778-1779 was consumed."

F. Wharton, Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, chapter 5, section 86 (volume 1).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779. The War carried into the South. Savannah taken and Georgia subdued.

Towards the end of November, 1778, a "body of troops, under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, sailed [from New York] for Georgia In the squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker; the British cabinet having determined to carry the war into the Southern States. At the same time General Prevost, who commanded in Florida, was ordered by Sir Henry Clinton to march to the banks of the Savannah River, and attack Georgia in flank, while the expedition under Campbell should attack it in front on the seaboard. … The squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker anchored in the Savannah River towards the end of December. An American force of about 600 regulars, and a few militia under General Robert Howe, were encamped near the town, being the remnant of an army with which that officer had invaded Florida, in the preceding summer, but had been obliged to evacuate it by a mortal malady which desolated his camp. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell landed his troops on the 29th of December, about three miles below the town. The whole country bordering the river is a deep morass, cut up by creeks, and only to be traversed by causeways. Over one of these, 600 yards in length, with a ditch on each side, Colonel Campbell advanced, putting to flight a small party stationed to guard it. General Howe had posted his little army on the main road, with the river on his left and a morass in front. A negro gave Campbell information of a path leading through the morass, by which troops might get unobserved to the rear of the Americans. Sir James Baird was detached with the light infantry by this path, while Colonel Campbell advanced in front. The Americans, thus suddenly attacked in front and rear, were completely routed; upwards of 100 were either killed on the spot, or perished in the morass; 38 officers and 415 privates were taken prisoners, the rest retreated up the Savannah River and crossed into South Carolina. Savannah, the capital of Georgia, was taken possession of by the victors, with cannon, military stores and provisions; their loss was only seven killed and nineteen wounded. Colonel Campbell conducted himself with great moderation; protecting the persons and property of the inhabitants, and proclaiming security and favor to all that should return to their allegiance. Numbers in consequence flocked to the British standard: the lower part of Georgia was considered as subdued, and posts were established by the British to maintain possession. While Colonel Campbell had thus invaded Georgia in front, General Prevost" entered the State from Florida, "took Sunbury, the only remaining fort of importance, and marched to Savannah, where he assumed the general command, detaching Colonel Campbell against Augusta. By the middle of January (1779) all Georgia was reduced to submission. A more experienced American general than Howe had by this time arrived to take command of the Southern Department, Major-general Lincoln, who had gained such reputation in the campaign against Burgoyne, and whose appointment to this station had been solicited by the delegates from South Carolina and Georgia. He had received his orders from Washington in the beginning of October."

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapter 37.

ALSO IN: W. B. Stevens, History of Georgia, book 4, chapter 4 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779. Washington guarding the Hudson. The storming of Stony Point. Marauding warfare of the British.

"After Clinton slipped away from Monmouth and sought refuge in New York, Washington took post at convenient points and watched the movements of the enemy. In this way the summer passed. As always, Washington's first object was to guard the Hudson, and while he held this vital point firmly, he waited, ready to strike elsewhere if necessary. It looked for a time as if the British intended to descend on Boston, seize the town, and destroy the French fleet, which had gone there to refit. Such was the opinion of Gates, then commanding in that department, and as Washington inclined to the same belief, the fear of this event gave him many anxious moments. {3266} He even moved his troops so as to be in readiness to march eastward at short notice; but he gradually became convinced that the enemy had no such plan. … The main army, therefore, remained quiet, and when the autumn had passed went into winter-quarters in well-posted detachments about New York. In December Clinton made an ineffectual raid [in New Jersey], and then all was peaceful again, and Washington was able to go to Philadelphia and struggle with Congress, leaving his army more comfortable and secure than they had been in any previous winter. … He now hoped and believed that the moment would come when, by uniting his army with the French, he should be able to strike the decisive blow. Until that time came, however, he knew that he could do nothing on a great scale, and he felt that meantime the British, abandoning practically the eastern and middle States, would make one last desperate struggle for victory, and would make it in the south. Long before anyone else, he appreciated this fact, and saw a peril looming large in that region. … All this, however, did not change his own plans one jot. He believed that the south must work out its own salvation, as New York and New England had done with Burgoyne, and he felt sure that in the end it would be successful. But he would not go south, nor take his army there. … The British might overrun the north or invade the south, but he would stay where he was, with his grip upon New York and the Hudson River. The tide of invasion might ebb and flow in this region or that, but the British were doomed if they could not divide the eastern colonies from the others. When the appointed hour came, he was ready to abandon everything and strike the final and fatal blow; but until then he waited and stood fast with his army, holding the great river in his grasp. He felt much more anxiety about the south than he had felt about the north, and expected Congress to consult him as to a commander, having made up his mind that Greene was the man to send. But Congress still believed in Gates, who had been making trouble for Washington all winter; and so Gates was sent, and Congress in due time got their lesson, and found once more that Washington understood men better than they did. In the north the winter was comparatively uneventful. The spring passed, and in June Clinton came out and took possession of Stony Point and Verplanck's Point, and began to fortify them. It looked a little as if Clinton might intend to get control of the Hudson by slow approaches, fortifying, and then advancing until he reached West Point. With this in mind, Washington at once determined to check the British by striking sharply at one of their new posts. Having made up his mind, he sent for Wayne and asked him if he would storm Stony Point. Tradition says that Wayne replied, 'I will storm hell, if you will plan it.' A true tradition, probably, in keeping with Wayne's character, and pleasant to us to-day as showing with a vivid gleam of rough human speech the utter confidence of the army in their leader, that confidence which only a great soldier can inspire. So Washington planned, and Wayne stormed [July 15, 1779], and Stony Point fell. It was a gallant and brilliant feat of arms, one of the most brilliant of the war. Over 500 prisoners were taken, the guns were carried off, and the works destroyed, leaving the British to begin afresh with a good deal of increased caution and respect. Not long after, Harry Lee stormed Paulus Hook with equal success, and the British were checked and arrested, if they intended any extensive movement. On the frontier, Sullivan, after some delays, did his work effectively. … In these various ways Clinton's circle of activity was steadily narrowed, but it may be doubted whether he had any coherent plan. The principal occupation of the British was to send out marauding expeditions and cut off outlying parties. Tryon burned and pillaged in Connecticut [at New Haven, Fairfield and Norwalk], Matthews in Virginia [at Norfolk, Portsmouth and elsewhere], and others on a smaller scale elsewhere in New Jersey and New York. … It was enough for Washington to hold fast to the great objects he had in view, to check Clinton and circumscribe his movements. Steadfastly he did this through the summer and winter of 1779."

H. C. Lodge, George Washington, volume 1, chapter 8.

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 3, chapters 38-40, and volume 4, chapter 1.

B. J. Lossing, Field-book of the Revolution, volume 1, chapter 31.

_J. Armstrong, Life of Anthony Wayne (Library of American Biographies, volume 4)._

C. J. Stillé, Major-General Anthony Wayne, chapter 5

G. W. Greene, Life of Nathaniel Greene, book 3, chapters 3-7 (volume. 2).

See, also, WEST POINT.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (August-September). General Sullivan's expedition against the Senecas.

For the purpose of putting an end to the destructive and bloody incursions of Tories and Indians from western New York, directed against the border settlements of that state and Pennsylvania—as at Cherry Valley and Wyoming—General Washington, in the early part of the year 1779, determined upon a measure for carrying the war into the home of the invaders. "The command was entrusted to General Sullivan. The army organized for the expedition was in three divisions. That part of it under the immediate command of General Sullivan, coming from Pennsylvania, ascended the Susquehannah to Tioga Point. Another division under the command of General James Clinton, constructing batteaux at Schenectady, ascended the Mohawk and rendezvoused at Canajoharrie, opened a road to the head of Otsego Lake, and from thence proceeded in a formidable fleet of over 200 batteaux, to Tioga Point, forming a junction with the force under General Sullivan, on the 22d of August. Previous to the arrival of General Clinton, Sullivan had sent forward a detachment which fell in with a scouting party of Indians, and a skirmish ensued. The combined forces amounted to 5,000 men. The expedition had been so long preparing, and upon the march, that the enemy were well apprized of an that was going on. Their plan of defence contemplated a decisive engagement upon the Chemung river. For this purpose the Rangers and regular British troops, under the command of Colonel John Butler, Colonels Guy and Sir John Johnson, Major Walter N. Butler and Captain M'Donald, and the Indians under Brant, had concentrated their forces upon a bend of the river, near the present village of Elmira [then called Newtown], where they had thrown up a long breast work of logs. The united forces of the British allies, as computed by General Sullivan, was about 1,500. {3267} Having ascertained their position, General Sullivan marched in full force and attacked them in the forenoon of the 29th of August. … The battle had been waged about two hours, when the British and Indians perceiving their forces inadequate, and that a maneuver to surround them was likely to be successful, broke and fled in great disorder. 'This,' says John Salmon, of Livingston county, who belonged to the expedition and gave an account of it to the author of the Life of .Mary Jemison, 'was the only regular stand made by the Indians. In their retreat they were pursued by our men to the Narrows, where they were attacked and killed in great numbers, so that the sides of the rocks next the River looked as if blood had been poured on them by pailfuls.' The details of all that transpired in this campaign are before the public in so many forms, that their repetition here is unnecessary. The route of the army was via 'French Catherine's Town,' head of Seneca Lake, down the east shore of the Lake to the Indian village of Kanadesaga (Old Castle), and from thence to Canandaigua, Honeoye, head of Conesus Lake, to Groveland. The villages destroyed (with the apple trees and growing crops of the Indians,) were at Catherinestown, Kendai, or 'Apple Town' on the east side of the Lake, eleven miles from its foot, Kanadesaga, Honeoye, Conesus, Canascraga, Little Beard's Town, Big Tree, Canawagus, and on the return of the army, Scawyace, a village between the Cayuga and Seneca Lakes, and several other Cayuga villages. … The march of Sullivan, the devastations committed by his army, would at this distant period seem like Vandalism, in the absence of the consideration that he was acting under strict orders; and that those orders were approved, if not dictated, by Washington. The campaign was a matter of necessity; to be effectual, it was not only necessary that its acts should be retaliatory and retributive, but that the haunts, the retreats, of a foe so ruthless, must be broken up. The object was to destroy all the means of subsistence of the Senecas, desolate their homes, prevent their return to them, and if possible, induce their permanent retreat beyond the Niagara River. The imprudence, the want of sagacity, which Colonel Stone has imputed to General Sullivan in alarming every village he approached by the sound of his cannon, the author conceives a misapprehension of his motives. Stealthy, quiet approaches, would have found as victims, in every village, the old men, the women and children—the warriors away, banded with their British allies. Humanity dictated the forewarning, that those he did not come to war against could have time to flee. … The march of General Sullivan, after leaving the Chemung, was bloodless, except in a small degree—just as it should have been, if he could not make victims of those he was sent to punish. The third expedition of this campaign, which has generally been lost sight of by historians, was that of General Broadhead. He left Fort Pitt in August with 600 men, and destroyed several Mingo and Muncey tribes living on the Allegany, French Creek, and other tributaries of the Ohio. The heavy artillery that General Sullivan brought as far as Newton, would indicate that Niagara was originally the destination. There the General and his officers, seeing how long it had taken to reach that point, in an probability determined that too much of the season had been wasted, to allow of executing their tasks in the Indian country, making their roads and moving the army and all its appointments to Niagara before the setting in of winter. Besides, before the army had reached the valley of the Chemung, the fact was ascertained that there would be a failure in a contemplated junction with the army under General Broadhead. After the expedition of General Sullivan, the Indians never had any considerable permanent re-occupancy of their villages east of the Genesee river. They settled down after a brief flight, in their villages on the west side of the river in the neighborhood of Geneseo, Mt. Morris and Avon, and at Gardeau, Canadea, Tonawanda, Tuscarora, Buffalo Creek, Cattaraugus and Allegany."

O. Turner, History of the Pioneer Settlement of Phelps and Gorham's Purchase, part 1, chapter 4.

"In his general orders of the 17th of October, General Washington announced to the army the result of the expedition, as follows: 'The Commander-in-chief has now the pleasure of congratulating the army on the complete and full success of Major General Sullivan, and the troops under his command, against the Seneca and other tribes of the Six Nations, as a just and necessary punishment for their wanton depredations, their unparalleled and innumerable cruelties, their deafness to all remonstrances and entreaty, and their perseverance in the most horrid acts of barbarity. Forty of their towns have been reduced to ashes, some of them large and commodious; that of the Genesee alone containing one hundred and twenty-eight houses. Their crops of corn have been entirely destroyed, which, by estimation, it is said, would have provided 160,000 bushels, besides large quantities of vegetables of various kinds. Their whole country has been overrun and laid waste, and they themselves compelled to place their security in a precipitate flight to the British fortress at Niagara. And the whole of this has been done with the loss of less than forty men on our part, including the killed, wounded, captured, and those who died natural deaths. The troops employed in this expedition, both officers and men, throughout the whole of it, and in the action they had with the enemy, manifested a patience, perseverance and valor that do them the highest honor. In the course of it, when there still remained a large extent of the enemy's country to be prostrated, it became necessary to lessen the issues of provisions to half the usual allowance. In this the troops acquiesced with a most general and cheerful concurrence, being fully determined to surmount every obstacle, and to prosecute the enterprise to a complete and successful issue. Major General Sullivan, for his great perseverance and activity, for his order of march and attack, and the whole of his dispositions; the Brigadiers and officers of all ranks, and the whole of the soldiers engaged in the expedition, merit and have the Commander-in-chief's warmest acknowledgements for their important services upon this occasion.' On the 9th of November, 1779, General Sullivan wrote to the President of Congress: 'It is with the deepest regret I find myself compelled to request from Congress liberty to retire from the army. My health is so much impaired by a violent bilious disorder, which seized me in the commencement and continued during the whole of the western expedition, that I have not the smallest hope of a perfect recovery.' … {3268} General Sullivan, in transmitting to Congress an official account of his operations, reported that … 'Every creek and river has been traced, and the whole country explored in search of Indian settlements, and I am well persuaded that, except one town situated near the Alleghany, about fifty-eight miles from Chinesee, there is not a single town left in the country of the Five Nations. … I flatter myself that the orders with which I was entrusted are fully executed, as we have not left a single settlement or field of corn in the country of the Five Nations, or is there even the appearance of an Indian on this side of Niagara. Messengers and small parties have been constantly passing, and some imprudent soldiers who straggled from the army mistook the route and went back almost to Chinesee without discovering even the track of an Indian.' Sullivan was mistaken in regard to the destruction of all the Indian towns as there were several small villages undiscovered by his troops. The principal villages, however, and probably nine-tenths of the growing crops, upon which the Indians had depended for sustenance during the following winter, were effectually destroyed. … While Sullivan fully accomplished the task given him to perform, the results expected were not fully realized. The power of the savages had been weakened, but they were not entirely subdued until years afterward, when 'Mad Anthony Wayne' defeated the confederated bands of the Indians of the west, in 1794, a measure which thoroughly humbled the Indians of Western New York, and gave to the settlers peace and security. Sullivan's expedition was fruitful of great results in other ways, however, than the temporary subjugation of the Indians. The fertile and beautiful country now forming the western part of the State of New York, was then an unknown wilderness, and its value and attractiveness were first made known to the white people through this expedition. … Soon after the close of the war the tide of emigration commenced to flow westward. From the New England States, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, came hardy pioneers, led on by the glowing accounts they had heard of the new country, and the vicinity of the inland lakes, the borders of the flowing streams, the forest-covered hills became the dwelling places of a rapidly growing band of settlers. The road which Sullivan had opened from the Susquehanna valley was followed by many of the settlers, even to the banks of the Genesee. Thus many of those who had shared the perils and privations of Sullivan's expedition against the Indian tribes of Western New York, afterward became settlers of the land they had aided to conquer."

A. T. Norton, History of Sullivan's Campaign against the Iroquois, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: L. L. Doty, History of Livingston County, New York, chapter 7.

O. W. B. Peabody, Life of John Sullivan (Library of American Biographies, series 2, volume. 3), chapter 7.

Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan, with records of Centennial Celebrations (including Historical Address by Reverend David Craft, pages 331-388).

J. E. Seaver, Life of Mary Jemison, appendix 2.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (September). Paul Jones' great sea-fight. The Bon Homme Richard and the Serapis.

"Near the end of July [1779], Paul Jones, a Scot by birth, in the service of the United States, sailed from l'Orient as commander of a squadron, consisting of the Poor Richard ['Bon Homme Richard,' Jones named her, in compliment to Franklin and to the language of the country from which Franklin's influence procured the ship] of 40 guns, many of them unserviceable; the Alliance of 36 guns, both American ships-of-war; the Pallas, a French frigate of 32; and the Vengeance, a French brig of 12 guns. They ranged the western coast of Ireland, turned Scotland, and, cruising off Flamborough Head, descried the British merchant fleet from the Baltic, under the convoy of the Serapis of 44 guns and the Countess of Scarborough of 20 guns. An hour after sunset, on the 23d of September, the Serapis, having a great superiority in strength, engaged the Poor Richard. Paul Jones, after suffering exceedingly in a contest of an hour and a half within musket-shot, bore down upon his adversary, whose anchor he hooked to his own quarter. The muzzles of their guns touched each other's sides. Jones could use only three nine-pounders beside muskets from the round-tops, but combustible matters were thrown into every part of the Serapis, which was on fire no less than ten or twelve times. There were moments when both ships were on fire. After a two-hours' conflict in the first watch of the night, the Serapis struck its flag. Jones raised his pendant on the captured frigate, and the next day had but time to transfer to it his wounded men and his crew before the Poor Richard went down. The French frigate engaged and captured the Countess of Scarborough. The Alliance, which from a distance had raked the Serapis during the action, not without injuring the Poor Richard, had not a man injured. On the fourth of October the squadron entered the Texel with its prizes. The British ambassador, of himself and again under instructions, reclaimed the captured British ships and their crews, 'who had been taken by the pirate Paul Jones of Scotland, a rebel and a traitor.' 'They,' he insisted, 'are to be treated as pirates whose letters of marque have not emanated from a sovereign power.' The grand pensionary would not apply the name of pirate to officers bearing the commissions of congress. In spite of the stadholder, the squadron enjoyed the protection of a neutral port."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, page 350.

ALSO IN. A. S. Mackenzie, Life of Paul Jones, chapters 8-9 (volume 1).

Life and Correspondence of John Paul Jones, pages 179-235.

W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay, Popular History of the United States, volume 3, chapter 24.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (September-October). Unsuccessful attack on Savannah by the Americans and French.

"The state of affairs in the South had called so imperatively for the attention of Congress that a portion of Washington's army had been detached to join General Lincoln. Washington solicited more powerful aid from D'Estaing, who then commanded in the West Indies an army sufficiently powerful to crush entirely the English in Georgia. The French admiral received this application just after having fought a hard battle against Commodore Byron without any decisive result, yet such as obliged the latter to go into port to refit. The former, being thus for a time master of the sea, determined at once to comply with the request, took on board 6,000 land-troops, and steered direct for Savannah, where, arriving quite unexpectedly, he captured by surprise a fifty-gun ship and three frigates. Prevost, too, was very unprepared, having his force broken up into detachments distributed along the frontier; but these being instantly ordered in, obeyed with such promptitude that, before the French had landed and formed a junction with Lincoln, nearly all had arrived. {3269} On the 16th of September, D'Estaing appeared before the place and summoned it to surrender. Prevost, under pretext of negotiation, obtained a suspension for twenty-four hours, during which Colonel Maitland entered with the last and largest detachment, eluding the Americans by a route supposed impassable; and the full determination to resist was then announced. The opinion of all military men now is that D'Estaing was guilty of the most outrageous folly in not marching at once to the attack of the city, without summoning the weakened garrison to surrender at all. The surprise would have then been complete, and the victory sure. … A regular siege was now commenced. Heavy ordnance and stores were brought up from the fleet, and the besieging army broke ground. By the 1st of October they had pushed their sap within 300 yards of the abattis, on the left of the British lines. Several batteries were opened on the besieged, which played almost incessantly upon their works, but made no impression on them. The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More time had already been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he had supposed would be necessary for the destruction of the British force in that State. He became uneasy for the possessions of France in the West Indies, and apprehensive for the safety of the ships under his command. The naval officers remonstrated strenuously against longer exposing his fleet on an insecure coast, at a tempestuous season of the year, and urged the danger of being overtaken by a British squadron when broken and scattered by a storm." D'Estaing accordingly decided that he must either raise the siege or attempt the enemy's works by storm. "The latter part of the alternative was adopted. … On the morning of the 9th of October, before day, … about 3,500 French and 1,000 Americans, of whom between 600 and 700 were regulars and the residue militia of Charleston, advanced in three columns, led by D'Estaing and Lincoln, aided by the principal officers of both nations, and made a furious assault on the British lines. Their reception was warmer than had been expected. … Both the French and Americans planted their standards on the walls, and were killed in great numbers while endeavoring to force their way into the works. For about fifty minutes the contest was extremely obstinate." Then the assailants gave way and a retreat was ordered. "In this unsuccessful attempt the French lost in killed and wounded about 700 men. Among the latter were the Count D'Estaing himself, Major General De Fontanges, and several other officers of distinction. The continental troops lost 234 men, and the Charleston militia, who, though associated with them in danger, were more fortunate, had one captain killed and six privates wounded. Count Pulaski was among the slain. The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed and wounded it amounted only to 55. So great was the advantage of the cover afforded by their works. … Count D'Estaing, having committed a blunder at the beginning, had committed a worse blunder at the end, by insisting on the assault, as unnecessary as it was rash. … He [now] insisted on raising the siege, and both the French and American armies moved from their ground on the evening of the 18th of October. D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies; and Lincoln recrossed the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry and again encamped in South Carolina."

C. B. Hartley, Life of General Marion (Heroes and Patriots of the South), chapter 11.

ALSO IN: C. C. Jones, Jr., History of Georgia, volume 2, chapters 20-21.

J. Sparks, Life of Pulaski (Library of American Biographies, series 2, volume 4).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (January-April). The gloomy winter at Morristown. Depreciation to worthlessness of the Continental Currency. Consequent sufferings of the army and the country.

"The year 1780 opened upon a famishing camp. 'For a fortnight past,' writes Washington, on the 8th of January, 'the troops, both officers and men, have been almost perishing with want. Yet,' adds he, feelingly, 'they have borne their sufferings with a patience that merits the approbation, and ought to excite the sympathies, of their countrymen.' The severest trials of the Revolution, in fact, were not in the field, where there were shouts to excite and laurels to be won; but in the squalid wretchedness of ill-provided camps, where there was nothing to cheer and everything to be endured. To suffer was the lot of the revolutionary soldier. A rigorous winter had much to do with the actual distresses of the army, but the root of the evil lay in the derangement of the currency. Congress had commenced the war without adequate funds, and without the power of imposing direct taxes. To meet pressing emergencies, it had emitted paper money, which, for a time, passed currently at par; but sank in value as further emissions succeeded, and that already in circulation remained unredeemed. The several States added to the evil by emitting paper in their separate capacities: thus the country gradually became flooded with a 'continental currency,' as it was called; irredeemable, and of no intrinsic value. The consequence was a general derangement of trade and finance. The continental currency declined to such a degree that forty dollars in paper were equivalent to only one in specie. Congress attempted to put a stop to this depreciation by making paper money a legal tender, at its nominal value, in the discharge of debts, however contracted. This opened the door to knavery, and added a new feature to the evil. The commissaries now found it difficult to purchase supplies for the immediate wants of the army, and impossible to provide any stores in advance. They were left destitute of funds, and the public credit was prostrated by the accumulating debts suffered to remain uncancelled. The changes which had taken place in the commissary department added to this confusion. The commissary-general, instead of receiving, as heretofore, a commission on expenditures, was to have a fixed salary in paper currency, and his deputies were to be compensated in like manner, without the usual allowance of rations and forage. No competent agents could be procured on such terms. … In the present emergency Washington was reluctantly compelled, by the distresses of the army, to call upon the counties of the State for supplies of grain and cattle, proportioned to their respective abilities. … Wherever a compliance with this call was refused, the articles required were to be impressed: it was a painful alternative, yet nothing else could save the army from dissolution or starving. … As the winter advanced, the cold increased in severity. {3270} It was the most intense ever remembered in the country. The great bay of New York was frozen over. … The insular security of the place was at an end. … Washington was aware of the opportunity which offered itself for a signal 'coup de main,' but was not in a condition to profit by it."

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapters 1 and 4.

"Paper for $9,000,000 was issued before any depreciation began. The issues of the separate colonies must have affected it, but the popular enthusiasm went for something. Pelatiah Webster, almost alone as it seems, insisted on taxation, but a member of Congress indignantly asked if he was to help tax the people when they could go to the printing-office and get a cartload of money. In 1776, when the depreciation began, Congress took harsh measures to try to sustain the bills. Committees of safety also took measures to punish those who 'forestalled' or 'engrossed,' these being the terms for speculators who bought up for a rise. … The enemy, perceiving the terrible harm the Americans were doing themselves, thought it well to help on the movement. They counterfeited the bills and passed them through the lines. At the end of 1779 Congress was at its wit's end for money. Its issues had put specie entirely out of reach, and the cause was in danger of being drowned under the paper sea. … The French alliance helped more by giving means of procuring loans in Europe than by military assistance. Congress promised to limit its issues to $200,000,000, and tried a new form of note; also loan offices and lotteries. Over 350,000,000 were issued in all, but it is doubtful if more than 200,000,000 were out at any one time. In the spring of 1780 the bills were worth two cents on the dollar, and then ceased to circulate. Specie now came into circulation, being brought by the French, and also that expended by the English passing the lines. The paper was now worth more for an advertisement or a joke than for any prospect of any kind of redemption. A barber's shop in Philadelphia was papered with it, and a dog, coated with tar, and with the bills stuck all over him, was paraded in the streets."

W. G. Sumner, History of American Currency, pages 44-47.

ALSO IN: W. G. Sumner, The Financier and Finances of the American Revolution, chapter 4 (volume 1).

A. S. Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 1774-1789, book 1.

J. J. Knox, United States Notes, chapter 2.

See, also, MONEY AND BANKING, A. D. 1775-1780.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (February-August). The siege and capture of Charleston by the British. Defeat of Gates at Camden. South Carolina subdued.

"After the failure of the attack on Savannah was learned by Sir Henry Clinton, he sent a large additional force to the South. Reinforcements were also sent on to Lincoln, while the main body of the American army went into winter quarters near Morristown, New Jersey. Sir Henry Clinton, as soon as his forces, which had been dispersed by a storm, had been collected at Savannah, proceeded to invest Charleston," landing his troops on St. John's Island in February. The blockading of the port and operations for the investment of the city were conducted cautiously and with success. On the 12th of May, the American commander, General Lincoln, "finding himself incapable of defending Charleston, decided on capitulating; and he acceded to the terms which the besiegers had first offered. The fortifications, shipping, artillery, and public stores were all surrendered. The garrison, and all who had borne arms, were prisoners of war. The militia were allowed to return home on parole. In the siege the British lost 76 killed, and 189 wounded. The Americans about an equal number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to 5,618, counting all the adult males of the town. To bring the country entirely under subjection, Clinton sent forth three detachments. The first and largest, in the northern part of the State, was under Lord Cornwallis. He detached Colonel Tarleton with his legion of cavalry and mounted infantry, to disperse Colonel Buford, then encamped near the North Carolina line. [Buford] was overtaken at the Waxhaws, and, on his refusal to surrender, Tarleton made a furious charge on Buford's men, when some, in dismay, threw down their arms and asked for quarter, and some fired on the enemy. After this partial resistance, no quarter was given. Colonel Buford, with a few of the horse, and about 100 infantry, escaped; 113 were killed on the spot; 150 so badly wounded as to be incapable of being moved; and 53 were brought away as prisoners. The American officers deny (what the British assert), that any who had laid down their arms had again taken them up. All further resistance to the enemy in South Carolina and Georgia seems then to have ceased. The two other detachments of the British army every where received the submission of the inhabitants, who either gave their parole not again to bear arms against the king, or took the oath of allegiance. In a proclamation for settling the government, Sir Henry Clinton required all to return to their allegiance on pain of being treated as rebels and enemies. He then returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command, with 4,000 troops. … Lord Cornwallis, considering South Carolina as entirely reannexed to Great Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants; but insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which, however, was generally taken with reluctance by the people of the lower country. … A considerable force, under Baron de Kalb, had been ordered for the Southern army by Congress; but, for want of money, and a sufficient Commissary department, they were so delayed in their march, that it was late in July before they reached Cape Fear River. Here they were joined by General Gates, who had been appointed to the command of the Southern army. The men of this detachment, ill-fed, suffered greatly from dysentery. In South Carolina, Gates was joined by Porterfield's Virginia regiment, Rutherford's corps of North Carolina militia, and Armaud's legion. … Gates having under him about 4,000 men, of whom the regulars were less than 1,000, took post at Clermont. As the force of the Americans was daily increasing, Cornwallis, having under him about 2,000 men, of whom 1,900 were regulars, decided on attacking the American army. It so happened, that the period chosen by Cornwallis to surprise Gates, was the very moment in which Gates proposed to surprise his adversary; and thus the advanced corps of both armies unexpectedly met at two o'clock in the morning [August 6, near Camden]. {3271} After some skirmishing, in which the British seemed to have had a decided advantage, both parties suspended their operations till the morning. On the first onset of the British, the Virginia militia under General Stevens fled with precipitation, and were followed by the infantry of Armstrong; and, except Colonel Dixon's regiment, the whole South Carolina division followed the example. Very few of the militia of either State discharged a single musket. Gates was borne away by the torrent, and, with General Caswell, retreated to Clermont, in the hope of collecting a sufficient number of the fugitives to cover the retreat of the regulars; but the hope was vain. He was fain to proceed to Hillsborough, to concert the future plan of operations. Thus left with an inadequate force on the field, De Kalb made a stout resistance; but in an impetuous charge he fell, after having received twelve wounds. His troops were then unable to rally, and their discomfiture was complete. Their loss, in killed, wounded and prisoners, could not have been less than 1,000 men. The British lost 325 men. Just before the action, Sumter had captured a convoy, and made 200 prisoners; but was subsequently surprised by Tarleton, who recaptured the stores, killed 150, and took 300 prisoners. Sumter escaped with difficulty. There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina, and Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction; and Sumter was able to collect a new force, with which he greatly annoyed the north-western parts of the State."

G. Tucker, History of the United States, chapter 3 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: D. Ramsey, History of South Carolina, section 7 (volume l).

H. Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, chapter 17.

F. Bowen, Life of Benjamin Lincoln, chapter 5.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (July). Fresh help from France. The arrival of Rochambeau and his army, with a fleet.

"La Fayette's second visit to his native country [1770], was most opportune. He arrived in Paris at the moment when the war for the independence of America was in high popularity throughout France. He was put in arrest a week for his disobedience to the order not to leave France, but this was a mere formality. Vergennes received him in private. His example had roused the spirit of the French nobles. The stage resounded with his applauses. Crowds followed his steps. Marie Antoinette, with her quick, enthusiastic spirit, joyed at his distinction. The council of state, the Parliament, the towns, the corporations mingled in the noble excitement. The Royal Treasury was assured support by patriotic offers of contributions, and then was formed the auxiliary army that was to bear succor to America. This public enthusiasm triumphed over the hesitating reluctance of Maurepas, and the economical prudence of Necker. The army, placed under the command of the veteran Rochambeau, commended for his 'steadiness, wisdom, ability and prudence,' a pupil of the Marshal de Belle Isle, distinguished in frequent service, was to be composed of 6,000 troops. Among these shone forth the most brilliant of the nobility."

J. C. Hamilton, History of the United States, as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton, chapter 20 (volume 2).

"La Fayette … made the ministers understand that if he was not placed in command of the expedition, which would surprise the Americans, at least it was imperative to place over it a French general who would consent to serve under the American commander-in-chief. But he knew well that his old companions in arms in France were jealous of his rapid military fortune and brilliant renown. He knew still better that the officers who were his seniors in rank would be unwilling to serve under him. His first proposition, therefore, was only made to satisfy public feeling in America, which left the management of this affair almost entirely in his hands. In view of the serious difficulties that necessarily would result from the adoption of such a decision—difficulties that might have most disastrous consequences for the cause to which he had devoted himself—he promised to make the Americans understand that he had preferred remaining at the head of one of their divisions and that he had refused the command of the French forces. But he insisted upon this point, that, in order to avoid wounding the self-respect of the Americans, it was indispensable to choose a general to command the expedition, whose promotion had been recent and whose talents were certainly equal to his mission, but who, considering this mission as a distinction, would consent to acknowledge General Washington's supremacy. The choice that was made, under these conditions, of the Count de Rochambeau was perfectly satisfactory to him, and, without waiting for the departure of the expedition, he embarked at Rochefort, on February the 18th, 1780, on board the frigate Hermione, which the king had given him as being a swift sailer. … He was anxious to inform Washington of the good news himself, and immediately upon his landing at Boston, on April the 28th, he hastened to Morristown to rejoin his well-beloved and revered friend, as he called him in his letters. … General Heath, who commanded the militia in the State of Rhode Is]and, announced on the 11th of July, the arrival of the French squadron to General Washington, who was then with his staff at Bergen. La Fayette set out almost immediately, provided with instructions from the commander-in-chief, dated the 15th, to repair to the French general and admiral to confer with them. For some time Washington had been considering a plan of offensive operation for the capture of the city and the garrison of New York. This plan, which conformed with the wishes of the French government, was only to be carried out upon certain conditions. First, it was necessary that the French troops should unite with the American forces, and, secondly, that the French should have a naval superiority over the forces of Admirals Graves and Arbuthnot, who had effected their junction at New York the day after the arrival of the French at Newport. This last condition was far from being fulfilled. … It had been foreseen that the English, who had concentrated their land and naval forces at New York, would not give the French time to establish themselves on Rhode Island; and Washington informed Rochambeau that Sir Henry Clinton was embarking his troops and would come shortly to attack the forces of the expedition with the squadrons assembled under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot, which were anchored at Sandy Hook, beyond New York, at the mouth of the Hudson River. {3272} The American general watched these movements, and, while he gave frequent information to the French of the projected attack upon them, he tried to prevent it. … At the same time, Washington crossed the Hudson above West Point with the greater part of his troops, and proceeded to King's Bridge, at the northern end of the island, where he made some hostile demonstrations. This manœuvre detained General Clinton, who had already embarked eight thousand men upon the ships of Arbuthnot. He landed his troops and gave up his project. Nevertheless, the English admiral set sail and appeared before Rhode Island with eleven ships of the line and a few frigates, twelve days after the French had landed. … On August the 9th, when La Fayette had returned to the headquarters of Washington, which were at Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's Bridge, on the right bank of the North River, he wrote to Rochambeau and de Ternay an urgent dispatch, in which he finished, in the name of the American general, by proposing to the French generals to come at once to attempt an attack on New York. … On the other hand, the same courier brought a letter from Washington which made no mention of this project, but which only replied by a kind of refusal to the request of Rochambeau for a conference, 'wherein in an hour of conversation they could agree upon more things than in volumes of correspondence.' Washington said with truth that he did not dare to leave his army in front of New York, for it might be attacked at any moment, and that by his presence he prevented the departure of the large body of the English forces that might have been sent against Rhode Island. Indeed, it is certain that if some differences had not arisen between General Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, the French might have found themselves in a dangerous position at the beginning. From the earliest letters exchanged upon this occasion some discord resulted between La Fayette, Rochambeau and Washington, but, owing to the good sense of Rochambeau, matters were soon smoothed over. He wrote in English to the American general to ask him thereafter to address himself directly to him, and to explain the reasons that induced him to postpone assuming the offensive. At the same time he urgently requested a conference. From that moment the relations between the two leaders were excellent. The mere presence of the French squadron and army, though they were still paralyzed and really blockaded by Admiral Arbuthnot, had effected a useful diversion, since the English had not been able to profit by all the advantages resulting from the capture of Charleston, and, instead of carrying on operations in the Carolinas with superior forces, they had had to bring the greater part of them back to New York."

T. Balch, The French in America in the War of Independence, chapters 10-11.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (August-September). The Treason of Benedict Arnold.

"Washington contemplated the aspect of affairs with the greatest alarm. Doubtful if the army could be kept together for another campaign, he was exceedingly anxious to strike some decisive blow. He proposed to Rochambeau, commanding the French troops at Newport, an attack upon New York; but that was not thought feasible without a superior naval force. Letters were sent to the French admiral in the West Indies entreating assistance; and Washington presently proceeded to Hartford, there to meet Rochambeau, to devise some definite plan of operations. During Washington's absence at Hartford, a plot came to light for betraying the important fortress of West Point and the other posts of the Highlands into the hands of the enemy, the traitor being no other than Arnold, the most brilliant officer and one of the most honored in the American army. The qualities of a brilliant soldier are unfortunately often quite distinct from those of a virtuous man and a good citizen. … Placed in command at Philadelphia, … he [Arnold] lived in a style of extravagance far beyond his means, and he endeavored to sustain it by entering into privateering and mercantile speculations, most of which proved unsuccessful. He was even accused of perverting his military authority to purposes of private gain. The complaints on this point, made to Congress by the authorities of Pennsylvania, had been at first unheeded; but, being presently brought forward in a solemn manner, and with some appearance of offended dignity on the part of the Pennsylvania council, an interview took place between a committee of that body and a committee of Congress, which had resulted in Arnold's trial by a court martial. Though acquitted of the more serious charges, on two points he had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to be reprimanded by the commander-in-chief. Arnold claimed against the United States a large balance, growing out of the unsettled accounts of his Canada expedition. This claim was greatly cut down by the treasury officers and when Arnold appealed to Congress, a committee reported that more had been allowed than was actually due. Mortified and soured, and complaining of public ingratitude, Arnold attempted, but without success, to get a loan from the French minister. Some months before, he had opened a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton under a feigned name, carried on through Major Andre, adjutant general of the British army. Having at length made himself known to his correspondents, to give importance to his treachery, he solicited and obtained from Washington, who had every confidence in him, the command in the Highlands, with the very view of betraying that important position into the hands of the enemy. To arrange the terms of the bargain, an interview was necessary with some confidential British agent; and Andre, though not without reluctance, finally volunteered for that purpose. Several previous attempts having failed, the British sloop-of-war Vulture, with Andre on board, ascended the Hudson as far as the mouth of Croton River, some miles below King's Ferry. Information being sent to Arnold under a flag, the evening after Washington left West Point for Hartford he dispatched a boat to the Vulture, which took Andre on shore, for an interview on the west side of the river, just below the American lines. Morning appeared before the arrangements for the betrayal of the fortress could be definitely completed, and Andre was reluctantly persuaded to come within the American lines, and to remain till the next night at the house of one Smith, a dupe or tool of Arnold's, the same who had been employed to bring Andre from the ship. {3273} For some reason not very clearly explained, Smith declined to convey Andre back to the Vulture. … Driven thus to the necessity of returning by land, Andre laid aside his uniform, assumed a citizen's dress, and, with a pass from Arnold in the name of John Anderson, a name which Andre had often used in their previous correspondence, he set off toward sunset on horseback, with Smith for a guide. They crossed King's Ferry, passed all the American guards in safety, and spent the night near Crom Pond, with an acquaintance of Smith's. The next morning, having passed Pine's Bridge, across Croton River, Smith left Andre to pursue his way alone. The road led through a district extending some thirty miles above the island of New York, not included in the lines of either army, and thence known as the 'Neutral Ground,' a populous and fertile region, but very much infested by bands of plunderers called 'Cow Boys' and 'Skinners.' The 'Cow Boys' lived within the British lines, and stole or bought cattle for the supply of the British army. The rendezvous of the 'Skinners' was within the American lines. They professed to be great patriots, making it their ostensible business to plunder those who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the State of New York." On the morning of Andre's journey, the road to Tarrytown, on which he rode, was being guarded by a small party of men, who watched for cattle thieves, and for suspicious travelers generally. Three of these intercepted the unfortunate young officer and discovered his character. Arnold received intelligence of what had happened in time to make his escape to the Vulture. Andre was examined before a board of which Lafayette, Steuben and Greene were members, and on his own statements was executed as a spy. The sympathy with him was very great, among Americans as well as among his own countrymen; but lenity in the case appeared too dangerous to Washington and his military advisers.

R. Hildreth, History of the United States, chapter 41 (volume 3).

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapters 2, 7, and 9-11.

_B. J. Lossing, The Two Spies._

J. Sparks, Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold (Library of American Biographies, volume 3, chapters 8-15).

W. Sargent, Life of Major John André, chapters 11-21.

I. N. Arnold, Life of Benedict Arnold, chapters 13-18.

J. H. Smith, Authentic Narrative of the Causes which led to the Death of Major André.

B. J. Lossing, Field-book of the Revolution, volume 1, chapters 30-32.

See, also, WEST POINT.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (August-December). Partisan warfare in South Carolina. Sumter and Marion.

A name "which recalls thrilling tales of desperate enterprise, surprises at midnight, sudden attacks in the gray twilight of morning, lurking-places in the depths of forests, restless activity, and untiring perseverance, is the name of Thomas Sumter. He comes before us tall, vigorous, dauntless, with a bold bearing, and imperious brow, stern to look upon, fierce in his self-will, arrogant in his decisions, tenacious in his prejudices, resolute and vigorous in the execution of his own plans, remiss and almost luke-warm in carrying out the plans of others. Born in South Carolina just as that colony had passed from the control of the Proprietaries to the control of the King, he lived to see her take the first decided step towards passing out of the Union. Little has been preserved of his early life, although his subsequent career in the Senate of the United States proves that he was not deficient in education then, wherever or whenever acquired. In the Revolution be took an early part, and soon made himself conspicuous as a bold and enterprising officer. But it was not till after the siege of Charleston that his talents were brought fully into play. Then at the head of a body of volunteers he moved rapidly from point to point, keeping alive the hopes of the Whigs and the fears of the Tories in the regions watered by the Broad River, the Ennoree, and the Tiger. … History, like tradition, has her favorite characters, on which she dwells with peculiar fondness, delighting herself in preserving the memory of every exploit, and giving the brightest tints to every circumstance connected with their career. … Of these children of a happy star, no one holds in our Revolutionary history the same place as Francis Marion. His story, irregularly told by a friend and companion, took an early hold upon the heart of the people; and the romantic traits of his career, warming the imagination of a great poet, have been recorded in beautiful verse. Impartial judgment and sober research have left his own laurels unimpaired, although they have dissipated the halo which tradition and fancy had shed around his men. His life forms one of those pictures upon which the mind loves to dwell, from the singular combination of rare qualities which it displays. His ancestors were Huguenot exiles, who took refuge in South Carolina, from the dragonnades of Louis XIV. His father was a planter near Georgetown, who, portioning out his estate to his children as they came of age, had nothing left for Francis, the youngest, and his next nearest brother, while they were yet children. At sixteen Francis found himself compelled to choose a pursuit for his support. With only a common English education, and no money to carry him through the preparatory courses, he could neither be a physician nor a lawyer. He resolved to be a sailor, and started upon a voyage to the West Indies. But his ship was burnt in a gale, and after tossing about eight days in an open boat, without water and with nothing but the raw flesh and skin of a single dog to eat, and seeing several of his companions die of hunger, he, with the starving survivors, were rescued, barely alive. He renounced the sea, returned to Georgetown, and engaged in farming. The Cherokee war of 1759 found him hard at his work. He was now twenty-six, small in frame, low in stature, but vigorous, active, and healthy. By nature he was taciturn and reticent, with nothing in the expression of his face to attract or interest a casual observer, but still inspiring confidence and commanding respect in those who were brought into intimate relations with him. When, therefore, a company of volunteers was raised to serve against the Indians, he was chosen lieutenant. In a second expedition, which soon after became necessary, he was made captain. Next came the War of Independence; and joining the first South Carolina levies, he was presently made a major; and with this rank took part in the gallant defense of Fort Moultrie in 1776. His next promotion was to the command of a regiment as lieutenant-colonel. {3274} During the siege of Charleston his leg was accidentally broken, a lucky accident, which left him free when the city fell, to engage in an adventurous system of warfare which was the only possible system in that low state of our fortunes. In the course of this he was promoted by Governor Rutledge to a brigadiership. When he first appeared in Gates's camp, he had but twenty men with him, or rather twenty between men and boys. Some of them were negroes. With these he rescued 150 of the prisoners of Camden, coming upon the British escort by surprise and overpowering it. Early in September a body of 200 Tories attempted to surprise him. He had 53 men with him when he heard of their intention, and instantly setting forward, surprised an advance party of 45, killing or wounding all but 15, and then attacked the main body of 200, and put them to flight. Before the end of the month he surprised another body of 60 men; and in October one of 200. His force was constantly fluctuating between 20 men and 70. Up to the 18th of October he had never had over 70. They went and came as they chose, their number ever ebbing and flowing like the tide. Sometimes the very men who had fought with him were ranged in arms against him; a few only serving from honest zeal and true love of country. … As his slender form concealed a lion heart, so under his cold, impassive face, there was a perpetual glow of tender sympathies. … Without claiming for Marion those powers of combination which belong to the highest order of military genius, he must be allowed to have excelled in all the qualities which form the consummate partisan,—vigilance, promptitude, activity, energy, dauntless courage, and unshaken self-control. … Two principles controlled all his actions, and shaped all his ends; the love of country, pure, earnest, and profound; the love of right, sincere, undeviating, and incorruptible."

G. W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, book 4, chapter 7 (volume 3).

"The other partisans … had been compelled to take refuge in the mountains. Marion found his security in the swamps. This able partisan maintained his ground below and along the Santee river, and managed, among the defiles and swamps of that region, to elude all the activity of his enemies. His force had been collected chiefly among his own neighbors, were practised in the swamps, and familiar with the country. Like Sumter, utterly unfurnished with the means of war at first, he procured them by similar means. He took possession of the saws from the mills, and converted them into sabres. So much was he distressed for ammunition that he has engaged in battle when he had not three rounds of powder to each man of his party. … Various were the means employed to draw off or drive away his followers. The houses on the banks of the Pedee, Lynch's Creek, and Black river, from whence they were chiefly taken, were destroyed by fire, the plantations devastated, and the negroes carried away. But the effect of this wantonness was far other than had been intended. Revenge and despair confirmed the patriotism of these ruined men, and strengthened their resolution. … For months, their only shelter was the green wood and the swamp—their only cover the broad forest and the arch of heaven. … With a policy that nothing could distract—a caution that no artifice could mislead—Marion led his followers from thicket to thicket in safety, and was never more perfectly secure than when he was in the neighborhood of his foe. He hung upon his flanks along the march—he skirted his camp in the darkness of the night—he lay in wait for his foraging parties—he shot down his sentries, and, flying or advancing, he never failed to harass the invader, and extort from him a bloody toll at every passage through swamp, thicket, or river, which his smaller parties made. In this sort of warfare—which is peculiarly adapted to the peculiarities of the country in Carolina, and consequently to the genius of her people—he contrived almost wholly to break up the British communications by one of the most eligible routes between the seaboard and the interior."

W. G. Simms, History of South Carolina, book 5, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: C. B. Hartley, Life of General Francis Marion (Heroes and Patriots of the South), chapters 14-15.

_W. G. Simms, Life of Francis Marion._

_Horry and Weems, Life of Marion._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781. Vermont as an independent State negotiating with the British.

See VERMONT: A. D. 1781.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781. Greene's campaign in the south. King's Mountain. The Cowpens. Guilford Court House. Hobkirk's Hill. Eutaw Springs. The British shut up in Charleston. Cornwallis withdrawn to Virginia.

"After his victory at Camden, Lord Cornwallis found it necessary to give his army some rest from the intense August heat. In September he advanced into North Carolina, boasting that he would soon conquer all the states south of the Susquehanna river. … In traversing Mecklenburg county Cornwallis soon found himself in a very hostile and dangerous region, where there were no Tories to befriend him. One of his best partisan commanders, Major Ferguson, penetrated too far into the mountains. The back-woodsmen of Tennessee and Kentucky, the Carolinas, and western Virginia were aroused; and under their superb partisan leaders—Shelby, Sevier, Cleaveland, McDowell, Campbell, and Williams—gave chase to Ferguson, who took refuge upon what he deemed an impregnable position on the top of King's Mountain. On the 7th of October the backwoodsmen stormed the mountain, Ferguson was shot through the heart, 400 of his men were killed and wounded, and all the rest, 700 in number, surrendered at discretion. The Americans lost 28 killed and 60 wounded. … In the series of events which led to the surrender of Cornwallis, the battle of King's Mountain played a part similar to that played by the battle of Bennington in the series of events which led to the surrender of Burgoyne. It was the enemy's first serious disaster, and its immediate result was to check his progress until the Americans could muster strength enough to overthrow him. The events, however, were much more complicated in Cornwallis's case, and took much longer to unfold themselves. … As soon as he heard the news of the disaster he fell back to Winnsborough, in South Carolina, and called for reinforcements. While they were arriving, the American army, recruited and reorganized since its crushing defeat at Camden, advanced into Mecklenburg county. Gates was superseded by Greene, who arrived upon the scene on the 2d of December. Under Greene were three Virginians of remarkable ability,—Daniel Morgan; William Washington, who was a distant cousin of the commander-in-chief; and Henry Lee, familiarly known as 'Light-horse Harry,' father of the great general, Robert Edward Lee. {3275} The little army numbered only 2,000 men, but a considerable part of them were disciplined veterans, fully a match for the British infantry." To increase this small force, Baron Steuben, the military organizer and disciplinarian of the Revolutionary armies, was sent down to Virginia, for the purpose of recruiting and organizing troops.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (JANUARY-DECEMBER).

Thereupon detachments from the British army at New York were dispatched by sea to Virginia, and Arnold, the traitor, was given command of them. "The presence of these subsidiary forces in Virginia was soon to influence in a decisive way the course of events. Greene, on reaching South Carolina, acted with boldness and originality. He divided his little army into two bodies, one of which cooperated with Marion's partisans in the northeastern part of the state, and threatened Cornwallis's communications with the coast. The other body he sent under Morgan to the southwestward, to threaten the inland posts and their garrisons. Thus worried on both flanks, Cornwallis presently divided his own force, sending Tarleton with 1,100 men to dispose of Morgan. Tarleton came up with Morgan on the 17th of January, 1781, at a grazing-ground known as the Cowpens, not far from King's Mountain. The battle which ensued was well fought, and on Morgan's part it was a wonderful piece of tactics. With only 900 men in open field he surrounded and nearly annihilated a superior force. The British lost 230 in killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and all their guns. Tarleton escaped with 270 men. The Americans lost 12 killed and 61 wounded. The two battles, King's Mountain and the Cowpens, deprived Cornwallis of nearly all his light-armed troops, and he was just entering upon a game where swiftness was especially required. It was his object to intercept Morgan and defeat him before he could effect a junction with the other part of the American army. It was Greene's object to march the two parts of his army in converging directions northwards across North Carolina and unite them in spite of Cornwallis. By moving in this direction Greene was always getting nearer to his reinforcements from Virginia, while Cornwallis was always getting further from his supports in South Carolina. … The two wings of the American army came together and were joined by the reinforcements; so that at Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March, Cornwallis found himself obliged to fight against heavy odds, 200 miles from the coast and almost as far from the nearest point in South Carolina at which he could get support. The battle of Guilford was admirably managed by both commanders and stubbornly fought by the troops. At nightfall the British held the field, with the loss of nearly one third of their number, and the Americans were repulsed. But Cornwallis could not stay in such a place, and could not afford to risk another battle. There was nothing for him to do but retreat to Wilmington, the nearest point on the coast. There he stopped and pondered. His own force was sadly depleted, but he knew that Arnold in Virginia was being heavily reinforced from New York. The only safe course seemed to march northward and join the operations in Virginia; then afterwards to return southward. This course Cornwallis pursued, arriving at Petersburg and taking command of the troops there on the 20th of May. Meanwhile Greene, after pursuing Cornwallis for about 50 miles from Guilford, faced about and marched with all speed upon Camden, 160 miles distant. … Lord Rawdon held Camden. Greene stopped at Hobkirk's Hill, two miles to the north, and sent Marion and Lee to take Fort Watson, and thus cut the enemy's communications with the coast. On April 23 Fort Watson surrendered; on the 25th Rawdon defeated Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, but as his communications were cut the victory did him no good. He was obliged to retreat toward the coast, and Greene took Camden on the 10th of May. Having thus obtained the commanding point, Greene went on until he had reduced every one of the inland posts. At last, on the 8th of September, he fought an obstinate battle at Eutaw Springs, in which both sides claimed the victory. … Here, however, as always after one of Greene's battles, it was the enemy who retreated and he who pursued. His strategy never failed. After Eutaw Springs the British remained shut up in Charleston under cover of their ships, and the American government was reëstablished over South Carolina. Among all the campaigns in history that have been conducted with small armies, there have been few, if any, more brilliant than Greene's."

J. Fiske, The War of Independence, chapter 7.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, The American Revolution, chapter 15 (volume 2).

H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapters 65-71.

G. W. Greene, Life of Nathanael Greene, volume 3, chapters 1-23.

_L. C. Draper, King's Mountain and its Heroes._

H. Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, chapters 18-34.

J. Graham, Life of General Daniel Morgan, chapters 13-17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January). The Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.

"As the year 1781 opened and the prospect of a new year of struggle became certain, and the invasion of the Southern States began to indicate the prospect of a southern campaign, which was at all times unpopular with northern troops, a disaffection was developed which at last broke forth in open mutiny, and a peremptory demand for discharge. This irritation was aggravated by hunger, cold, and poverty. Marshall says: 'The winter brought not much relaxation from toil, and none from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the point of starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed without proper clothing to the rigors of winter; and had now served almost twelve months without pay.' … On the 1st of January the Pennsylvania line revolted; Captain Billings was killed in an attempt to suppress the mutiny; General Wayne was powerless to restore order, and 1,300 men, with six guns, started to Princeton, with the declared purpose to march to Philadelphia, and obtain redress. They demanded clothing, the residue of their bounty, and full arrears of pay. A committee from Congress and the State authorities of Pennsylvania at once entered into negotiations with the troops for terms of compromise. The American Commander-in-chief was then at New Windsor. A messenger from General Wayne informed him on the 3d of January of the revolt, and the terms demanded. It appears from Washington's letters that it was his impulse, at the first intimation of the trouble, to go in person and attempt its control. His second impression was to reserve his influence and authority until all other means were exhausted. {3276} The complaint of the mutineers was but a statement of the condition of all the army, so far as the soldiers had served three years; and the suffering and failure to receive pay were absolutely universal. Leaving the preliminary discussion with the civil authorities who were responsible for much of the trouble, the Commander-in-chief appealed to the Governors of the northern States for a force of militia to meet any attacks from New York, and declined to interfere until he found that the passion had passed and he could find troops who would at all hazards execute his will. It was one of the most difficult passages in the war, and was so handled that the Commander-in-chief retained his prestige and regained control of the army. … General Clinton received information of the revolt as early as Washington, on the morning of the 23d, and sent messengers to the American army with propositions, looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents were retained in custody. It is sufficient to say that a portion of the troops were discharged without critical examination of their enlistments, on their own oath; that many promptly reenlisted, that as soon as Washington found that he had troops who did not share in the open mutiny, he used force and suppressed the disaffection, and that the soldiers themselves hung several agents who brought propositions from General Clinton which invited them to abandon their flag and join his command. The mutiny of the American army at the opening of the campaign of 1781, was a natural outbreak which human nature could not resist, and whatever of discredit may attach to the revolt, it will never be unassociated with the fact that, while the emergency was one that overwhelmed every military obligation by its pressure, it did not affect the fealty of the soldiers to the cause for which they took up arms. … La Fayette thus wrote to his wife, 'Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer the tenth part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens to support hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardiest and most patient that are to be found in the world.'"

H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapter 67.

ALSO IN: W. H. Egle, History of Pennsylvania, chapter 12.

C. J. Stillé, Major-General Anthony Wayne, chapter 6.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January-May). Benedict Arnold and the British in Virginia. Opening of Lafayette's campaign in that state.

"In January, 1781, the news reached headquarters in the Highlands of New York that General [Benedict] Arnold had landed in Virginia with a considerable force, was laying waste the country, and had already destroyed the valuable stores collected at Richmond; opposed to him were only the small commands of Steuben and Muhlenberg. The situation was very alarming, and threatened to place all the Southern States in the hands of the British. If Arnold succeeded in destroying the few American troops in Virginia, he could then march to the assistance of Cornwallis, who, with a superior force, was pressing General Greene very hard in the Carolinas. To defeat or capture Arnold before he could further prosecute his designs was, therefore, of the utmost importance. For this purpose it was necessary to send a detachment from the main army against Arnold by land, and a naval force to Chesapeake Bay to prevent his escape by sea. Washington at once communicated the state of affairs to Rochambeau, who, with the French fleet, had long been blockaded at Newport. Taking advantage of the serious injuries lately suffered by the blockading English fleet in consequence of a storm, Admiral Destouches despatched M. de Tilly to the Chesapeake with a ship-of-the-line and two frigates. To cooperate with these French vessels, Washington detached 1,200 light infantry from the main army, and placed them under the command of Lafayette. That officer was particularly chosen for this important trust, because the confidence reposed in him by both the American and French troops made him, in Washington's opinion, the fittest person to conduct a combined expedition. Thus opened the only campaign in America which afforded Lafayette an opportunity to show what abilities he possessed as an independent commander, and on this campaign his military reputation must chiefly rest. Lafayette moved rapidly southward," to Annapolis; but, the coöperating movement of the French fleet having, meantime, been frustrated by an attack from the English squadron, his instructions required him to abandon the expedition and return. He had already set his troops in motion northward when different instructions reached him. Two more British regiments had been sent to Virginia, under General Philips, who now took command of all the forces there, and this had increased the anxiety of Washington. "The situation of the Southern States had become extremely perilous. General Greene had all he could do to fight Lord Cornwallis's superior force in North Carolina. Unless a vigorous opposition could be made to Philips, he would have no difficulty in dispersing the militia of Virginia, and in effecting a junction with Cornwallis. With their forces so combined, the British would be masters in the South. Washington at once determined to place the defence of Virginia in Lafayette's hands. … Lafayette marched with such rapidity … that he reached Richmond, where there were valuable stores to be protected, a day in advance of General Philips. From his post on the heights of the town he saw the British set fire to the tobacco warehouses at Manchester, just across the river, but there were neither men nor boats enough to make an attack possible. Philips, on his part, was too much impressed with the show of strength made by the Americans to prosecute his plans on Richmond, and retreating down the James river, burning and laying waste as he went, he camped at Hog Island. Lafayette followed, harassing the enemy's rear, as far as the Chickahominy. Here the situation underwent a considerable change. Lord Cornwallis, after his long and unsuccessful campaign against Greene in North Carolina, made up his mind that his exhausting labors there would prove unprofitable until Virginia should be subjugated. His men were worn out with incessant marching and fighting, while no substantial advantage had been gained. Hearing that General Greene had marched to attack Lord Rawdon at Camden in South Carolina, he determined to join Philips. {3277} That officer, accordingly, received orders while at Hog Island to take possession of Petersburg and there await Cornwallis's arrival. … On the 13th of May, General Philips died at Petersburg of a fever. … Cornwallis arrived at Petersburg on the 20th of May. His forces now amounted to over 5,000 men, which number was soon increased to 8,000."

B. Tuckerman, Life of Lafayette, chapter 6.

ALSO IN: J. E. Cooke, Virginia, part 3, chapter 17.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (May-October). Cornwallis in Virginia and the trap into which he fell. Siege of Yorktown by the French and Americans. Surrender of the British army.

"On the 24th of May, Cornwallis, having rested his troops, marched from Petersburg, and endeavored to engage the American forces. But Lafayette, having removed the military stores from Richmond, retreated across the Chickahominy to Fredericksburg, where he expected to meet General Wayne and a battalion of Pennsylvania troops, without whose assistance he could not venture any fighting. … Cornwallis … moved between Lafayette and the town of Albemarle, where had been placed a great part of the military stores from Richmond, which now seemed doomed to destruction. But on the 10th of June Lafayette had received his expected reënforcement of Wayne's Pennsylvanians, and thus strengthened felt able to assume the offensive. Rapidly crossing the Rapidan he approached close to the British army which blocked the road to Albemarle. Nothing could have better suited Cornwallis, who prepared for a conflict in which he felt sure of a decisive victory. Lafayette, however, had not lost sight of the vital feature of his campaign,—to protect the property of the State without losing his army. Through his scouts he discovered an old unused road to Albemarle, unknown to the enemy. While Cornwallis was preparing for battle, he had the road cleared, and under cover of the night marched his men through it and took up a strong position before the town. There he was joined by militia from the neighboring mountains, and he showed so strong a front that the British commander did not venture an attack. … The British commander, so far foiled in his objects, had to march back to Richmond and thence to Williamsburg, near the coast, thus practically abandoning control over any part of Virginia except where naval forces gave possession. Lafayette effected a junction with Baron Steuben on the 18th of June, and thus increased his force to about four thousand men. The Americans had now become the pursuers instead of the pursued, and followed the British, harassing their rear and flanks."

B. Tuckerman, Life of General Lafayette, volume 1, chapter 6.

"There now came a pause in the Virginia Campaign, at least in daily operations and excitements. The State north of the James was relieved. Cornwallis crossed to the south side, at Cobham, on the 7th [July]; and Lafayette, retiring up the river, encamped, about the 20th, on the now historic Malvern Hill, then described as one of the healthiest and best watered spots in the State. … The entire British army was soon after concentrated at Portsmouth, and preparations made to transport a considerable portion of it to New York. Lafayette, meanwhile, at Malvern Hill, could only await developments. He thought of sending re-enforcements to Greene, and asked Washington if, in case Cornwallis left Virginia, he might not return to the Northern army. … But while the marquis and Washington and Greene were speculating on the future movements of Cornwallis and were persuaded, from embarkations at Portsmouth, that he was to be deprived of a large part of his force by Clinton, unexpected intelligence came to hand. Instead of any part going to New York, the British force suddenly made its appearance, during the first days in August, at Yorktown, on the Virginia peninsula, which it had abandoned but three weeks before. Here again was a new situation. Cornwallis, at last, at Yorktown—the spot he was not to leave except as a prisoner of war. Why he went there is a simple explanation. Clinton decided, upon certain dissenting opinions expressed by Cornwallis respecting the situation in Virginia, not to withdraw the force in the Chesapeake which he had called for, and which was about to sail for New York, but permitted Cornwallis to retain the whole—all with which he had been pursuing Lafayette and the large garrison at Portsmouth, a total of about seven thousand, rank and file. His new instructions, conveyed at the same time, were to the effect that his Lordship should abandon Portsmouth, which both generals agreed was too unhealthy for the troops, and fortify Old Point Comfort, where Fort Monroe now stands, as a naval station for the protection of the British shipping. In addition, if it appeared necessary, for the better security of the Point, to occupy Yorktown also, that was to be done. Obeying these instructions, Cornwallis ordered a survey of Old Point Comfort; but, upon the report of his engineers, was obliged to represent to Clinton that it was wholly unfit and inadequate for a naval station, as it afforded little protection for ships, and could not command the channel, on account of its great width. Then, following what he believed to be the spirit of his orders, Cornwallis, before hearing from Clinton, moved up to Yorktown, and began to fortify it in connection with Gloucester, on the opposite shore, as the best available naval station. Clinton made no subsequent objections, and there Cornwallis remained until his surrender. His occupation of the place was simply an incident of the campaign—a move taken for convenience and in the interests of the navy and the health of his command."

H. P. Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign, chapter 3.

"The march of Lord Cornwallis into Virginia was the first emphatic fact which enabled General Washington to plan an efficient offensive. The repeated detachment of troops from New York so sensibly lessened the capacity of its garrison for extensive field service at the north, that the American Commander-in-chief determined to attack that post, and as a secondary purpose, thereby to divert General Clinton from giving further aid to troops in the Southern States. As a matter of fact, the prudent conduct of the Virginia campaign eventually rallied to the support of General La Fayette an army, including militia, nearly as large as that of Washington, and the nominal strength of the allied army near Yorktown, early in September, was nearly or quite as great as that of Lord Cornwallis. There were other elements which, as in previous campaigns, hampered operations at the north. The Indians were still troublesome in Western New York, and the Canadian frontier continued to demand attention. The American navy had practically disappeared. {3278} The scarcity of money and a powerless recruiting service, increased the difficulties of carrying on the war in a manner that would use to the best advantage the troops of France. … The position of the American Commander-in-chief at this time was one of peculiar personal mortification. Appeals to State authorities failed to fill up his army. Three thousand Hessian reinforcements had landed at New York, and the government as well as himself would be compromised before the whole world by failure to meet the just demands which the French auxiliaries had a right to press upon his attention. Relief came most opportunely. The frigate Concorde arrived at Newport, and a reiteration of the purpose of Count de Grasse to leave St. Domingo on the 3d of August, for the Chesapeake direct, was announced by a special messenger. The possibilities of the future at once quickened him to immediate action. With a reticence so close that the army could not fathom his plans, he re-organized his forces for a false demonstration against New York and a real movement upon Yorktown. … Letters to the Governors of northern States called for aid as if to capture New York. Letters to La Fayette and the Count de Grasse embodied such intimations of his plans as would induce proper caution to prevent the escape of Lord Cornwallis, and secure transportation at Head of Elk. Other letters to authorities in New Jersey and Philadelphia, expressly defining a plan of operations against New York via Staten Island, with the assurance of ample naval support, were exposed to interception and fell into the hands of General Clinton. As late as the 19th, the roads leading to King's Bridge were cleared of obstructions, and the army was put in readiness to advance against New York Island. On the same day the New Jersey regiment and that of Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson at Dobb's Ferry, to threaten Staten Island, and ostensibly to cover some bake-houses which were being erected for the purpose of giving color to the show of operations against New York. The plan of a large encampment had been prepared, which embraced Springfield and the Chatham Pass to Morristown, and this was allowed to find its way to Clinton's headquarters. General Heath was assigned to command of the Hudson-river posts, with two regiments from New Hampshire, ten from Massachusetts, five from Connecticut, the Third artillery, Sheldon's dragoons, the invalid corps, all local companies, and the militia. The following forces were selected to accompany the Commander-in-chief, viz., the light infantry under Colonel Scammel, four light companies from New York and Connecticut, the Rhode Island regiment, under the new army establishment, two New York regiments, that of New Jersey and Hazen's regiment, (the last two already across the Hudson) and Lamb's artillery, in all about 2,000 men. The American troops crossed on the 21st, at King's Ferry, and encamped near Haverstraw. The French army followed, and the army was united on the 25th. … General Washington and suite reached Philadelphia about noon, August 30th. The army had already realized the fact that they were destined southward. Some dissatisfaction was manifested; but Count de Rochambeau advanced $20,000 in gold upon the pledge of Robert Morris that he would refund the sum by the 1st of October, and the effect upon the troops, who had long been without any pay, was inspiring."

H. B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution, chapter 74.

"Leaving Philadelphia, with the Army, on the 5th of September, Washington meets an express near Chester, announcing the arrival, in Chesapeake Bay, of the Count de Grasse, with a fleet of twenty-eight ships of the line, and with 3,500 additional French troops, under the command of the Marquis de St. Simon, who had already been landed at Jamestown, with orders to join the Marquis de La Fayette! 'The joy' says the Count William de Deux-Ponts, in his precious journal, 'the joy which this welcome news produces among all the troops, and which penetrates General Washington and the Count de Rochambeau, is more easy to feel than to express.' But, in a foot-note to that passage, he does express and describe it, in terms which cannot be spared and could not be surpassed, and which add a new and charming illustration of the emotional side of Washington's nature. 'I have been equally surprised and touched,' says the gallant Deux-Ponts, 'at the true and pure joy of General Washington. Of a natural coldness and of a serious and noble approach, which in him is only true dignity, and which adorn so well the chief of a whole nation, his features, his physiognomy, his deportment, all were changed in an instant. He put aside his character as arbiter of North America, and contented himself for a moment with that of a citizen, happy at the good fortune of his country. A child, whose every wish had been gratified, would not have experienced a sensation more lively, and I believe I am doing honor to the feelings of this rare man in endeavoring to express all their ardor.' Thanks to God, thanks to France, from all our hearts at this hour, for 'this true and pure joy' which lightened the heart, and at once dispelled the anxieties of our incomparable leader. It may be true that Washington seldom smiled after he had accepted the command of our Revolutionary Army, but it is clear that on the 5th of September he not only smiled but played the boy. … 'All now went merry,' with him, 'as a marriage bell.' Under the immediate influence of this joy, which he had returned for a few hours to Philadelphia to communicate in person to Congress, … and while the Allied Armies are hurrying southward, he makes a hasty trip with Colonel Humphreys to his beloved Mount Vernon and his more beloved wife—his first visit home since he left it for Cambridge in 1775. Rochambeau, with his suite, joins him there on the 10th, and Chastellux and his aids on the 11th; and there with Mrs. Washington, he dispenses for two days, 'a princely hospitality' to his foreign guests. But the 13th finds them all on their way to rejoin the Army at Williamsburg, where they arrive on the 15th, 'to the great joy of the troops and the people,' and where they dine with the Marquis de St. Simon. On the 18th Washington and Rochambeau, with Knox and Chastellux and Du Portail, and with two of Washington's aids, Colonel Cobb of Massachusetts, and Colonel Jonathan Trumbull, jr., of Connecticut, embark on the 'Princess Charlotte' for a visit to the French fleet. … A few days more are spent at Williamsburg on their return, where they find General Lincoln already arrived with a part of the troops from the North, having hurried them as Washington besought him, 'on the wings of speed,' and where the word is soon given, 'On, on, to York and Gloucester!' {3279} Washington takes his share of the exposure of this march, and the night of the 28th of September finds him, with all his military family, sleeping in an open field within two miles of Yorktown, without any other covering, as the journal of one of his aids states, 'than the canopy of the heavens, and the small spreading branches of a tree,' which the writer predicts 'will probably be rendered venerable from this circumstance for a length of time to come.' … Everything now hurries, almost with the rush of a Niagara cataract, to the grand fall of Arbitrary Power in America. Lord Cornwallis had taken post here at Yorktown as early as the 4th of August, after being foiled so often by 'that boy' as he called La Fayette, whose Virginia campaign of four months was the most effective preparation for all that was to follow, and who, with singular foresight, perceived at once that his lordship was now fairly entrapped, and wrote to Washington, as early as the 21st of August, that 'the British army must be forced to surrender.' Day by day, night by night, that prediction presses forward to its fulfillment. The 1st of October finds our engineers reconnoitering the position and works of the enemy. The 2d witnesses the gallantry of the Duke de Lauzun and his legion in driving back Tarleton, whose raids had so long been the terror of Virginia and the Carolinas. On the 6th, the Allied Armies broke ground for their first parallel, and proceeded to mount their batteries on the 7th and 8th. On the 9th, two batteries were opened—Washington himself applying the torch to the first gun; and on the 10th three or four more were in play—silencing the enemy's works, and making,' says the little diary of Colonel Cobb, 'most noble music.' On the 11th, the indefatigable Baron Steuben was breaking the ground for our second parallel, within less than four hundred yards of the enemy, which was finished the next morning, and more batteries mounted on the 13th and 14th. But the great achievement of the siege still awaits its accomplishment. Two formidable British advanced redoubts are blocking the way to any further approach, and they must be stormed. The allied troops divide the danger and the glory between them, and emulate each other in the assault. One of these redoubts is assigned to the French grenadiers and chasseurs, under the general command of the Baron de Viomesnil. The other is assigned to the American light infantry, under the general command of La Fayette. But the detail of special leaders to conduct the two assaults remains to be arranged. Viomesnil readily designates the brave Count William to lead the French storming party, who, though he came off from his victory wounded, counts it 'the happiest day of his life.' A question arises as to the American party, which is soon solved by the impetuous but just demand of our young Alexander Hamilton to lead it. And lead it he did, with an intrepidity, a heroism, and a dash unsurpassed in the whole history of the war. … Both redoubts were soon captured; and these brilliant actions virtually sealed the fate of Cornwallis. 'A small and precipitate sortie,' as Washington calls it, was made by the British on the following evening, resulting in nothing; and the next day a vain attempt to evacuate their works, and to escape by crossing over to Gloucester, was defeated by a violent and, for us … most providential storm of rain and wind. … A suspension of hostilities, to arrange terms of capitulation, was proposed by Cornwallis on the 17th; the 18th was occupied at Moore's House in settling those terms; and on the 19th the articles were signed by which the garrison of York and Gloucester, together with all the officers and seamen of the British ships in the Chesapeake, 'surrender themselves Prisoners of War to the Combined Forces of America and France.'"

Robert C. Winthrop, Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Oct. 19, 1881.

ALSO IN: Marquis Cornwallis, Correspondence, volume 1, chapters 4-5.

_Marquis Cornwallis, Answer to Sir H. Clinton._

_Count de Deux-Ponts, My Campaigns in America, 1781._

T. Balch, The French in America during the War of Independence, chapters 13-22.

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 25-26, and 28.

George Washington, Writings, edited by W. C. Ford, volume 9.

C. Tower, The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution, volume 2, chapters 25-28.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781-1782. Practical suspension of hostilities. Difficulty of maintaining the army. Financial distress of the country.

"Immediately after the surrender of Yorktown Washington returned with his army to the vicinity of New York [see NEWBURGH], but he felt himself far too weak to attempt its capture, and hostilities were restricted to a few indecisive skirmishes or predatory enterprises. It is curious to notice how far from sanguine Washington appeared even after the event which in the eyes of most men, outside America, had determined the contest without appeal. It was still impossible, he maintained, to do anything decisive unless the sea were commanded by a naval force hostile to England, and France alone could provide this force. The difficulties of maintaining the army were unabated. 'All my accounts,' he wrote in April 1782, 'respecting the recruiting service are unfavourable; indeed, not a single recruit has arrived to my knowledge from any State except Rhode Island, in consequence of the requisitions of Congress in December last.' He strongly urged the impossibility of recruiting the army by voluntary enlistment, and recommended that, in addition to the compulsory enrolment of Americans, German prisoners should be taken into the army. Silas Deane, in private letters, expressed at this time his belief that it would be utterly impossible to maintain the American army for another year; and even after the surrender of Cornwallis, no less a person than Sir Henry Clinton assured the Government that, with a reinforcement of only 10,000 men he would be responsible for the conquest of America. … Credit was gone, and the troops had long been unpaid. 'The long sufferance of the army,' wrote Washington in October 1782, 'is almost exhausted. It is high time for a peace.' Nothing, indeed, except the great influence, the admirable moderation and good sense, and the perfect integrity of Washington could have restrained the army from open revolt. … Holland, immediately after the surrender of Yorktown, had recognised the independence of America, which had as yet only been recognised by France. John Adams was received as representative at the Hague, and after several abortive efforts he succeeded in raising a Dutch loan. France, as her ablest ministers well knew, was drifting rapidly towards bankruptcy, yet two American loans, amounting together to £600,000, were extorted in the last year of the war. {3280} Up to the very eve of the formal signature of peace, and long after the virtual termination of the war, the Americans found it necessary to besiege the French Court for money. As late as December 5, 1782, Franklin wrote from Paris to Livingston complaining of the humiliating duty which was imposed on him. … The reply of Livingston was dated January 6, 1783, and it paints vividly the extreme distress in America. 'I see the force,' he writes, 'of your objections to soliciting the additional twelve millions, and I feel very sensibly the weight of our obligations to France, but every sentiment of this kind must give way to our necessities. It is not for the interest of our allies to lose the benefit of all they have done by refusing to make a small addition to it. … The army demand with importunity their arrears of pay. The treasury is empty, and no adequate means of filling it presents itself. The people pant for peace; should contributions be exacted, as they have hitherto been, at the point of the sword, the consequences may be more dreadful than is at present apprehended. I do not pretend to justify the negligence of the States in not providing greater supplies. Some of them might do more than they have done; none of them all that is required. It is my duty to confide to you, that if the war is continued in this country, it must be in a great measure at the expense of France. If peace is made, a loan will be absolutely necessary to enable us to discharge the army, that will not easily separate without pay.' It was evident that the time for peace had come. The predatory expeditions which still continued in America could only exasperate still further both nations, and there were some signs—especially in the conflicts between loyalists and revolutionists—that they were having this effect. England had declared herself ready to concede the independence America demanded. Georgia and South Carolina, where the English had found so many faithful friends, were abandoned in the latter half of 1782, and the whole force of the Crown was now concentrated at New York and in Canada. France and Spain for a time wished to protract negotiations in hopes that Rodney might be crushed, that Jamaica and afterwards Gibraltar might be captured; but all these hopes had successively vanished. … If the war continued much longer America would almost certainly drop away, and France, and perhaps Spain, become bankrupt."

W. E. H. Lecky, History of England in the 18th Century, chapter 15 (volume 4).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781-1786. The cession of Western Territory by the States to the Federal Union. The Western Reserve of Connecticut.

Although the Articles of Confederation were adopted by Congress in 1777 and ratified immediately by most of the States, it was not until 1781 that they became operative by the assent of all. "New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland held out against ratifying them for from two to four years. The secret of their resistance was in the claims to the western territory. … The three recalcitrant States had always had fixed western boundaries, and had no legal claim to a share in the western territory. … New Jersey and Delaware gave up the struggle in 1778 and 1779; but Maryland would not and did not yield, until her claims were satisfied. Dr. H. B. Adams has shown that the whole question of real nationality for the United States was bound up in this western territory; that even a 'league government' could not continue long to govern a great and growing territory like this without developing into a real national government, even without a change of strict law; and that the Maryland leaders were working under a complete consciousness of these facts."

A. Johnston, The United States: Its History and Constitution, sections 89-90.

The western claims of Virginia were the most sweeping and were founded upon the oldest historical document. "The charter granted by James I. to South Virginia, in 1600 [see VIRGINIA: A. D. 1609-1616] … embraced the entire north-west of North America, and, within certain limits, all the islands along the coast of the South Sea or Pacific Ocean. … The following is the grant: 'All those lands, countries and territories situate, lying and being in that part of America called Virginia, from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the northward 200 miles; and from the said Point or Cape Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the southward 200 miles; and all that space and circuit of land lying from the sea-coast of the precinct aforesaid, up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west; and also all the islands lying within 100 miles along the coast of both seas of the precinct aforesaid.' The extraordinary ambiguity of this grant of 1609, which was always appealed to as a legal title by Virginia, was first shown by Thomas Paine. … The chief ambiguity … lay in the interpretation of the words 'up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west.' From which point was the north-west line to be drawn, from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above, or from the point 200 miles below Cape Comfort? … The more favorable interpretation for Virginia and, perhaps, in view of the expression 'from sea to sea,' more natural interpretation, was to draw the north-western line from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above Point Comfort, and the western line from the southern limit below Point Comfort. This gave Virginia the greater part, at least, of the entire north-west, for the lines diverged continually. … At the outbreak of the Revolution, Virginia had annexed the 'County of Kentucky' to the Old Dominion, and, in 1778, after the capture of the military posts in the north-west by Colonel George Rogers Clarke, … that enterprising State proceeded to annex the lands beyond the Ohio, under the name of the County of Illinois

See, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779, CLARKE'S CONQUEST.

The military claims of Virginia were certainly very strong, but it was felt by the smaller States that an equitable consideration for the services of other colonies in defending the back country from the French, ought to induce Virginia to dispose of a portion of her western territory for the common good. It is easy now to conceive how royal grants to Massachusetts and Connecticut of lands stretching from ocean to ocean, must have conflicted with the charter claims and military title of Virginia to the great north-west. … The claims of Massachusetts were based upon the charter granted by William and Mary, in 1691, and those of Connecticut upon the charter granted by Charles II., in 1662. … {3281} The former's claim embraced the lands which now lie in southern Michigan and Wisconsin, or, in other words, the region comprehended by the extension westward of her present southern boundary and of her ancient northern limit, which was 'the latitude of a league north of the inflow of Lake Winnipiseogee in New Hampshire. The western claims of Connecticut [the zone lying between her northern and southern boundaries—41° and 42° 2' north latitude—extended westward] covered portions of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. … The extension of charter boundaries over the far west by Massachusetts and Connecticut led to no trespass on the intervening charter claims of New York. Connecticut fell into a serious controversy, however, with Pennsylvania, in regard to the possession of certain lands in the northern part of the latter State, but the dispute, when brought before a court appointed by Congress, was finally decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But in the western country, Massachusetts and Connecticut were determined to assert their chartered rights against Virginia and the treaty claims of New York; for, by virtue of various treaties with the Six Nations and allies, the latter State was asserting jurisdiction over the entire region between Lake Erie and the Cumberland mountains, or, in other words, Ohio and a portion of Kentucky. These claims were strengthened by the following facts: First, that the chartered rights of New York were merged in the Crown by the accession to the throne, in 1685, of the Duke of York as James II.; again, that the Six Nations and tributaries had put themselves under the protection of England, and that they had always been treated by the Crown as appendant to the government of New York; moreover, in the third place, the citizens of that State had borne the burden of protecting these Indians for over a hundred years. New York was the great rival of Virginia in the strength and magnitude of her western claims." In 1780, Maryland still insisting upon the surrender of these western land claims to the federal government, and refusing to ratify the Articles of Confederation until such cession was made, the claimant States began to yield to her firmness. On the 1st of March, 1781, the offer of New York to cede her claims, providing Congress would confirm her western boundary, was made in Congress. "On that very day, Maryland ratified the Articles and the first legal union of the United States was complete. The coincidence in dates is too striking to admit of any other explanation than that Maryland and New York were acting with a mutual understanding. … The offer of Virginia, reserving to herself jurisdiction over the County of Kentucky; the offer of Connecticut, withholding jurisdiction over all her back lands; and the offer of New York, untrammeled by burdensome conditions and conferring upon Congress complete jurisdiction over her entire western territory,—these three offers were now prominently before the country. … On the 29th of October, 1782, Mr. Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, moved that Congress accept the right, title, jurisdiction, and claim of New York, as ceded by the agents of that state on the first of March, 1781. … On the 13th day of September, 1783, it was voted by Congress to accept the cession offered by Virginia, of the territory north-west of the Ohio, provided that state would waive the obnoxious conditions concerning the guaranty of Virginia's boundary, and the annulling of all other titles to the north-west territory. Virginia modified her conditions as requested, and on the 20th of October, 1783, empowered her delegates in Congress to make the cession, which was done by Thomas Jefferson, and others, March 1, 1784."

H. B. Adams, Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States (Johns Hopkins University Studies, 3d series, Number 1), pages 9-11, 19-22, 36-39.

The Massachusetts deed of cession was executed April 19, 1785. It conveyed the right and title of the state to all lands "west of a meridian line drawn through the western bent or inclination of Lake Ontario, provided such line should fall 20 miles or more west of the western limit of the Niagara River" —that being the western boundary of New York, fixed four years before. In May, 1786, Connecticut authorized a cession which was not complete. Instead of beginning at the western boundary line of Pennsylvania, her conveyance was of lands beyond a line 120 miles west of the Pennsylvania line—thus retaining her claim to the large tract in Ohio known subsequently as the Western Reserve, or Connecticut Reserve. "The acceptance of this cession was strongly opposed in Congress. … After a severe struggle it was accepted, May 26, 1786, Maryland alone voting in the negative."

B. A. Hinsdale, The Old Northwest, chapter 13.

South Carolina executed the cession of her western claims in 1787; North Carolina in 1790, and Georgia in 1802.

A. Johnston, Connecticut, chapter 15.

ALSO IN: T. Donaldson, The Public Domain: its History, chapter 3.

See, also, OHIO: A. D. 1786-1796.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (February-May). Peace Resolutions in the British House of Commons. Retirement of Lord North. Pacific overtures through General Carleton.

"Fortunately for the United States, the temper of the British nation on the question of continuing the American war was not in unison with that of its sovereign. That war into which the nation had entered with at least as much eagerness as the minister had now become almost universally unpopular. Motions against the measures of administration respecting America were repeated by the opposition, and on every new experiment the strength of the minority increased. At length, on the 27th of February [1782], general Conway moved in the house of commons, 'that it is the opinion of this house that a further prosecution of offensive war against America, would, under present circumstances, be the means of weakening the efforts of this country against her European enemies, and tend to increase the mutual enmity so fatal to the interests both of Great Britain and America.' The whole force of administration was exerted to get rid of this question, but was exerted in vain; and the resolution was carried. An address to the king in the words of the motion was immediately voted, and was presented by the whole house. The answer of the crown being deemed inexplicit, it was on the 4th of March resolved by the commons, 'that the house will consider as enemies to his majesty and the country, all those who should advise or attempt a further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North America.' These votes were soon followed by a change of administration [Lord North resigning and being succeeded by Lord Rockingham, with Fox, Shelburne, Burke and Sheridan for colleagues], and by instructions to the commanding officers of his Brittanic majesty's forces in America which conformed to them. … {3282} Early in May, Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Sir Henry Clinton in the command of all the British forces in the United States, arrived at New York. Having been also appointed in conjunction with admiral Digby a commissioner to negotiate a peace, he lost no time in conveying to general Washington copies of the votes of the British parliament, and of a bill which had been introduced on the part of administration, authorizing his majesty to conclude a peace or truce with those who were still denominated the revolted colonies of North America. These papers he said would manifest the dispositions prevailing with the government and people of England towards those of America, and if the like pacific temper should prevail in this country, both inclination and duty would lead him to meet it with the most zealous concurrence. He had addressed to congress, he said, a letter containing the same communications, and he solicited from the American general a passport for the person who should convey it. At this time, the bill enabling the British monarch to conclude a peace or truce with America had not passed into a law; nor was any assurance given that the present commissioners possessed the power to offer other terms, than those which had formerly been rejected. General Carleton therefore could not hope that negotiations would commence on such a basis; nor be disappointed that the passports he requested were refused by congress, to whom the application was, of course, referred. … The several states passed resolutions expressing their objections to separate negotiations, and declaring those to be enemies to America who should attempt to treat without the authority of congress. But the public votes which have been stated, and probably the private instructions given to the British general, restrained him from offensive war, and the state of the American army disabled general Washington from making any attempt on the posts held by the enemy. The campaign of 1782 consequently passed away without furnishing any military operations of moment between the armies under the immediate direction of the respective commanders in chief."

J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope) History of England, 1713-1783, chapter 65 (volume 7).

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (April). Recognition by the Dutch Republic.

"Henry Laurens, the American plenipotentiary to the Netherlands, having been taken captive and carried to England, John Adams was appointed in his place. The new envoy had waited more than eight months for an audience of reception. Encouraged by the success at Yorktown, on the 9th of January 1782 Adams presented himself to the president of the states-general, renewed his formal request for an opportunity of presenting his credentials, and 'demanded a categorical answer which he might transmit to his sovereign.' He next went in person to the deputies of the several cities of Holland, and, following the order of their rank in the confederation, repeated his demand to each one of them. The attention of Europe was drawn to the sturdy diplomatist, who dared, alone and unsupported, to initiate so novel and bold a procedure. Not one of the representatives of foreign powers at the Hague believed that it could succeed;" but, beginning with Friesland, in February, the seven states, one by one, declared in favor of receiving the American envoy. "On the day which chanced to be the seventh anniversary of 'the battle of Lexington' their high mightinesses, the states-general, reporting the unanimous decision of the seven provinces, resolved that John Adams should be received as the minister of the United States of America. The Dutch republic was the second power in the world to recognise their independence."

G. Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), volume 5, page 527.

ALSO IN: J. Q. and C. F. Adams, Life of John Adams, chapter 6 (volume 1).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September). The opening of negotiations for Peace.

The Rockingham ministry, which succeeded Lord North's in the British government, in March, 1782 (see ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783), "though soon dissolved by the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, were early distracted by a want of unanimity, and early lost the confidence of the people. The negotiation with America during May and June made no progress. Mr. Oswald was the agent of Lord Shelburne, known to be opposed to the acknowledgment, and Mr. Grenville, of Mr. Fox. This ministry had been forced upon the king by a vote of the House of Commons. The hopes of regaining America were again excited by the decisive victory of Lord Rodney in the West Indies [see ENGLAND: A. D. 1780-1782], and the unexpected successes of Sir Eyre Coote against Hyder Ali in the East; and, if credit may be given to the reports of the day, the government looked forward with some confidence to the making a separate peace with Congress by means of Sir Guy Carleton, who had been appointed to the command of the forces in North America. … Mr. Adams, writing from the Hague, June 13, 1782, observes, 'I cannot see a probability that the English will ever make peace, until their finances are ruined, and such distress brought upon them, as will work up their parties into a civil war.' It was not till September of the same year, under Lord Shelburne's administration, formed upon the dissolution of the Rockingham, that the British government took a decisive and sincere step to make peace, and authorized their commissioner, Mr. Oswald, at Paris, to acknowledge the independence of the colonies. … This is the first instruction given by the British Ministry in which it was proposed to recognize the celebrated act of July 4th, 1776. A great and immediate progress was now made in the preliminaries. … The commission, under which the preliminaries of the treaty were actually concluded, was issued by Congress in June 1781. It empowered 'John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson, or the majority of them, or such of them as may assemble, or in case of the death, absence, indisposition, or other impediment of the others, to any one of them, full power and authority, general and special commission, … to sign, and thereupon make a treaty or treaties, and to transact every thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and strengthening the great work of pacification, in as ample form, and with the same effect, as if we were personally present and acted therein.' {3283} All the commissioners, except Mr. Jefferson, were present during the discussions, being in Europe at the time the meeting was appointed. Mr. Jefferson was in America, and did not leave it, as a report reached the government that the preliminaries were already signed. Mr. Oswald's commission in proper form was not issued till the 21st of September."

The Diplomacy of the United States, chapter 8.

"At the moment … that negotiations were set on foot, there seemed but little hope of finding the Court of France peaceably inclined. Fox alone among the Ministers, though strongly opposed to a French alliance, inclined to a contrary opinion, and imagined that the independence of America once recognized, no further demands would be made upon England. It was therefore his wish to recognize that independence immediately, and by a rapid negotiation to insure the conclusion of what he believed would prove a favourable peace. Shelburne on the contrary believed that further concessions would be asked by France, and that the best chance England possessed of obtaining honourable terms, was to reserve the recognition of independence as part of the valuable consideration to be offered to the Colonies for favourable terms, and to use the points where the interests of France, Spain, and the Colonies were inconsistent, to foment difficulties between them, and be the means of negotiating, if necessary, a separate peace with each of the belligerents, as opportunity might offer. The circumstances of the time favoured the design. Vergennes had not gone to war for the sake of American independence, but in order to humiliate England. He not only did not intend to continue the war a day longer than was necessary to establish a rival power on the other side of the Atlantic, but was desirous of framing the peace on conditions such as would leave England, Spain, and the United States to balance one another, and so make France paramount. He therefore intended to resist the claim which the Colonies had invariably advanced of pushing their frontiers as far west as the Mississippi, and proposed following the example of the Proclamation of 1763, to leave the country between Florida and the Cumberland to the Indians, who were to be placed under the protection of Spain and the United States, and the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by the Quebec Act of 1774. Nor was he prepared to support the claim of the New Englandmen to fish on the banks off Newfoundland, over a considerable portion of which he desired to establish an exclusive right for his own countrymen, in keeping with the French interpretation of the Treaties of Utrecht and Paris. Of a still more pronounced character were the views of Spain. Her troops had recently conquered West Florida and threatened East Florida as well. She had determined to obtain formal possession of these territories, and to claim that they ran into the interior till they reached the great lakes. The United States, according to both the French and Spanish idea, were therefore to be restricted to a strip of land on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, bounded by almost the same line which France had contended for against England after the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1779, when the alliance of France was not a year old, and the great triumph over Burgoyne was fresh, Congress notwithstanding the pressure of M. Gerard, the French envoy, had adopted the following conditions as the ultimatum of peace:

(l.) The acknowledgment of the independence of the United States by Great Britain, previous to any treaty or negotiation for peace.

(2.) The Mississippi as their western boundary.

(3.) The navigation of that river to the southern boundary of the States with a port below it.

They also passed a resolution to the effect that any interference after the conclusion of peace by any power with the fishery off Newfoundland hitherto exercised by the inhabitants of the Colonies, should be regarded as a casus belli. 'The advice of the allies, their knowledge of American interests, and their own discretion,' were in other matters to guide the American Commissioners sent to the European Courts. As however the war progressed, and French assistance, especially in money, became of greater and greater importance to the Congress, the tone of their instructions became sensibly modified, under the pressure, first of M. Gérard and then of Count Luzerne, his successor. On the 25th January 1780, M. Gérard having obtained the appointment of a Committee of Congress, informed them that the territories of the United States extended no further west than the limits to which settlements were permitted by the English proclamation of 1763; that the United States had no right to the navigation of the Mississippi, having no territories adjoining any part of the river; that Spain would probably conquer both Floridas, and intended holding them; and that the territory on the east side of the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain, and would probably be conquered by Spain. He at the same time urged upon Congress the immediate conclusion of an alliance with that power, to which Jay had been sent as Commissioner in 1779. On the 15th February, Congress having considered this communication, resolved to instruct Jay to abandon the claim to the navigation of the Mississippi. This practically implied the abandonment of the claim to that river as the western boundary. Shortly after, and again on the demand of Luzerne, the instructions to Adams, who had been appointed Commissioner for negotiating a peace, and was then in Europe, were altered. Independence was to be the sole ultimatum, and Adams was to undertake to submit to the guidance of the French Minister in every respect. 'You are to make the most candid and confidential communications,' so his amended instructions ran, 'upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge or concurrence, and to make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majesty's influence for effectual support in every thing that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the United States of America.' As a climax Count Luzerne suggested and Congress agreed to make Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and Laurens, joint Commissioners with Mr. Adams. Of the body thus appointed Jefferson refused to serve, while Laurens, as already seen, was captured on his way to England. Of the remaining Commissioners, John Adams was doubly odious to the diplomatists of France and Spain, because of his fearless independence of character, and because of the tenacity with which as a New Englander he clung to the American rights in the Newfoundland fisheries; Jay had been an enthusiastic advocate for the Spanish alliance, but the cavalier treatment he had received at Madrid, and the abandonment of the Mississippi boundary by Congress, had forced upon him the conviction that his own country was being used as a tool by the European powers, for their own ulterior objects. The French he hated. {3284} He said 'they were not a moral people, and did not know what it was.' Not so Franklin, influenced partly by his long residence in the French capital, and by the idea that the Colonies were more likely to obtain their objects, by a firm reliance upon France than by confidence in the generosity of England. He also pointed to the terms of the treaty he had negotiated with the former power, which forbade either party to conclude a separate peace without the leave previously obtained of the other, as imposing a moral and legal obligation on his countrymen to follow the policy which he believed their interests as a power required them to adopt. Meanwhile the King of France congratulated Congress on having entrusted to his care the interests of the United States, and warned them that if France was to be asked to continue hostilities for purely American objects it was impossible to say what the result might be, for the system of France depended not merely on America, but on the other powers at war."

Lord E. Fitzmaurice, Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, volume 3, chapter 4.

"Benjamin Franklin, now venerable with years, had been doing at the court of Versailles a work hardly less important than that of Washington on the battle-fields of America. By the simple grace and dignity of his manners, by his large good sense and freedom of thought, by his fame as a scientific discoverer, above all by his consummate tact in the management of men, the whilom printer, king's postmaster-general for America, discoverer, London colonial agent, delegate in the Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of Independence, had completely captivated elegant, free-thinking France. Learned and common folk, the sober and the frivolous alike swore by Franklin. Snuff-boxes, furniture, dishes, even stoves were gotten up 'à la Franklin.' The old man's portrait was in every house. That the French Government, in spite of a monarch who was half afraid of the rising nation beyond sea, had given America her hearty support, was in no small measure due to the influence of Franklin. And his skill in diplomacy was of the greatest value in the negotiations now pending."

E. B. Andrews, History of the United States, volume 1, pages 208-209.

ALSO IN: E. E. Hale, Franklin in France, volume 2, chapters 3-4.

Lord J. Russell, Life of Fox, chapters 16-17 (volume 1).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September-November). The Peace parleyings at Paris. Distrust of French aims by Jay and Adams. A secret and separate negotiation with England.

"The task of making a treaty of peace was simplified both by [the change of ministry which placed Lord Shelburne at the head of affairs in England] … and by the total defeat of the Spaniards and French at Gibraltar in September [see ENGLAND; A. D. 1780-1782]. Six months before, England had seemed worsted in every quarter. Now England, though defeated in America was victorious as regarded France and Spain. The avowed object for which France had entered into alliance with the Americans, was to secure the independence of the United States, and this point was now substantially gained. The chief object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France was to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was now decidedly lost. France had bound herself not to desist from the war until Spain should recover Gibraltar; but now there was little hope of accomplishing this, except by some fortunate bargain in the treaty, and Vergennes tried to persuade England to cede the great stronghold, in exchange for West Florida, which Spain had lately conquered, or for Oran or Guadaloupe. Failing in this, he adopted a plan for satisfying Spain at the expense of the United States; and he did this the more willingly as he had no love for the Americans, and did not wish to see them become too powerful. France had strictly kept her pledges; she had given us valuable and timely aid in gaining our independence; and the sympathies of the French people were entirely with the American cause. But the object of the French government had been simply to humiliate England, and this end was sufficiently accomplished by depriving her of her thirteen colonies. The immense territory extending from the Alleghany Mountains to the Mississippi River, and from the border of West Florida to the Great Lakes, had passed from the hands of France into those of England at the peace of 1763; and by the Quebec Act of 1774 England had declared the southern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River. … Vergennes maintained that the Americans ought to recognize the Quebec Act, and give up to England all the territory north of the Ohio River. The region south of this limit should, he thought, be made an Indian territory, and placed under the protection of Spain and the United States. … Upon another important point the views of the French government were directly opposed to American interests. The right to catch fish on the banks of Newfoundland had been shared by treaty between France and England; and the New England fishermen, as subjects of the king of Great Britain, had participated in this privilege. The matter was of very great importance, not only to New England, but to the United States in general. … The British government was not inclined to grant the privilege, and on this point Vergennes took sides with England, in order to establish a claim upon her for concessions advantageous to France in some other quarter. … Jay [who had lately arrived in Paris to take part in the negotiations] soon began to suspect the designs of the French minister. He found that he was sending M. de Rayneval as a secret emissary to Lord Shelburne under an assumed name; he ascertained that the right of the United States to the Mississippi valley was to be denied; and he got hold of a dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of legation at Philadelphia, to Vergennes, opposing the American claim to the Newfoundland fisheries. As soon as Jay learned these facts, he sent his friend Dr. Benjamin Vaughan to Lord Shelburne to put him on his guard, and while reminding him that it was greatly for the interest of England to dissolve the alliance between America and France, he declared himself ready to begin the negotiations without waiting for the recognition of independence, provided that Oswald's commission should speak of the thirteen United States of America, instead of calling them colonies and naming them separately. {3285} This decisive step was taken by Jay on his own responsibility, and without the knowledge of Franklin, who had been averse to anything like a separate negotiation with England. It served to set the ball rolling at once. … Lord Shelburne at once perceived the antagonism that had arisen between the allies, and promptly took advantage of it. A new commission was made out for Oswald, in which the British government first described our country as the United States; and early in October negotiations were begun and proceeded rapidly. On the part of England the affair was conducted by Oswald, assisted by Strachey and Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville. In the course of the month John Adams arrived in Paris, and a few weeks later Henry Laurens. … The arrival of Adams fully decided the matter as to a separate negotiation with England. He agreed with Jay that Vergennes should be kept as far as possible in the dark until everything was cut and dried, and Franklin was reluctantly obliged to yield. The treaty of alliance between France and the United States had expressly stipulated that neither power should ever make peace without the consent of the other. … In justice to Vergennes, it should be borne in mind that he had kept strict faith with us in regard to every point that had been expressly stipulated. … At the same time, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated, Vergennes was clearly playing a sharp game against us; and it is undeniable that, without departing technically from the obligations of the alliance, Jay and Adams—two men as honourable as ever lived—played a very sharp defensive game against him. … The treaty with England was not concluded until the consent of France had been obtained, and thus the express stipulation was respected; but a thorough and detailed agreement was reached as to what the purport of the treaty should be, while our not too friendly ally was kept in the dark."

J. Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, chapter 1.

"If his [Vergennes'] policy had been carried out, it seems clear that he would have established a claim for concessions from England by supporting her against America on the questions of Canada and the Canadian border and the Newfoundland fishery. … The success of such a policy would have been extremely displeasing to the Congress, and Jay and Adams defeated it. … The act was done, and if it can be justified by success, that justification, at least, is not wanting."

W. E. H. Lecky, History of England in the 18th Century, chapter 15 (volume 4).

"The instructions of congress, given to the American commissioners under the instigation of the French court, were absolute and imperative, 'to undertake nothing without the knowledge and concurrence of that court, and ultimately to govern themselves by their advice and opinion.' These orders, transmitted at the time of the enlargement of the commission, had just been reinforced by assurances given to quiet the uneasiness created in France by the British overtures through Governor Carleton. Thus far, although the commissioners had felt them to be derogatory to the honor of their country, as well as to their own character as its representatives, there had been no necessity for action either under or against them. But now that matters were coming to the point of a serious negotiation, and the secondary questions of interest to America were to be determined, especially those to which France had shown herself indifferent, not to say adverse, it seemed as if no chance remained of escaping a decision. Mr. Jay, jealous of the mission of De Rayneval, of which not a hint had been dropped by the French court, suspicious of its good faith from the disclosures of the remarkable dispatch of Marbois, and fearful of any advice like that of which he had received a foretaste through M. de Rayneval, at the same time provoked that the confidence expected should be all on one side, the Count communicating nothing of the separate French negotiation, came to the conclusion that the interests of America were safest when retained in American hands. He therefore declared himself in favor of going on to treat with Great Britain, without consulting the French court. Dr. Franklin, on the other hand, expressing his confidence in that court, secured by his sense of the steady reception of benefits by his country, signified his willingness to abide by the instructions he had received. Yet it is a singular fact, but lately disclosed, that, notwithstanding this general feeling, which was doubtless sincerely entertained, Dr. Franklin had been the first person to violate those instructions, at the very inception of the negotiations, by proposing to Lord Shelburne the cession of Canada, and covering his proposal with an earnest injunction to keep it secret from France, because of his belief that she was adverse to the measure. … It may fairly be inferred that, whatever Franklin might have been disposed to believe of the French court, his instincts were too strong to enable him to trust them implicitly with the care of interests purely American. And, in this, there can be no reasonable cause for doubt that he was right. The more full the disclosures have been of the French policy from their confidential papers, the more do they show Count de Vergennes assailing England in America, with quite as fixed a purpose as ever Chatham had to conquer America in Germany. Mr. Adams had no doubt of it. He had never seen any signs of a disposition to aid the United States from affection or sympathy. On the contrary, he had perceived their cause everywhere made subordinate to the general considerations of continental politics. Perhaps his impressions at some moments carried him even further, and led him to suspect in the Count a positive desire to check and depress America. In this he fell into the natural mistake of exaggerating the importance of his own country. In the great game of nations which was now playing at Paris under the practised eye of France's chief (for Count de Maurepas was no longer living), the United States probably held a relative position, in his mind, not higher than that of a pawn, or possibly a knight, on a chess-table. Whilst his attention was absorbed in arranging the combinations of several powers, it necessarily followed that he had not the time to devote that attention to any one, which its special representative might imagine to be its due. But even this hypothesis was to Mr. Adams justification quite sufficient for declining to submit the interests of his country implicitly to the Count's control. If not so material in the Count's eyes, the greater the necessity of keeping them in his own care. He therefore seized the first opportunity to announce to his colleagues his preference for the views of Mr. Jay. {3286} After some little reflection, Dr. Franklin signified his acquiescence in this decision. His objections to it had doubtless been increased by the peculiar relations he had previously sustained to the French court, and by a very proper desire to be released from the responsibility of what might from him be regarded as a discourteous act. No such delicacy was called for on the part of the other commissioners. Neither does it appear that Count de Vergennes manifested a sign of discontent with them at the time. He saw that little confidence was placed in him, but he does not seem to have made the slightest effort to change the decision or even to get an explanation of it. The truth is, that the course thus taken had its conveniences for him, provided only that the good faith of the American negotiators, not to make a separate peace, could be depended upon. Neither did he ever affect to complain of it, excepting at one particular moment when he thought he had cause to fear that the support he relied on might fail."

J. Q. and C. F. Adams, The Life of John Adams, volume 2, chapter 7.

"The radical difference between Franklin and his colleagues was in the question of trust. Franklin saw no reason to distrust the fidelity of France at any time to her engagements to the United States during the revolutionary war. His colleagues did not share this confidence, and yet, while impressed by this distrust of their ally, they made no appeal for explanation. The weight of opinion, as will hereafter be more fully seen, is now that Franklin was right, and they in this respect wrong. But whatever may have been the correctness of their view, it was proper that, before making it the basis of their throwing off the burden of treaty obligation and their own instructions, they should have first notified France of their complaint. Obligations cannot be repudiated by one party on the ground of the failure of the other party to perform some condition imposed on him, without giving him notice of the charge against him, so that he could have the opportunity of explanation. It may be added, on the merits, that the extenuation set up by Jay and Adams, that France was herself untrue to her obligations, however honestly they believed it, can not now be sustained. Livingston, who knew more of the attitude of France than any public man on the American side except Franklin, swept it aside as groundless. Edward Everett, one of the most accomplished historical writers and diplomatists the country has ever produced, speaks, as we shall see, to the same effect, and other historical critics of authority, to be also hereafter cited, give us the same conclusion. Yet there are other reasons which may excuse their course, and that of Franklin, who concurred with them rather than defeat a peace. In the first place, such was their isolation, that their means of communication with Congress was stopped; and they might well have argued that if Congress knew that the English envoys refused to treat with them except in secret conference their instructions would have been modified. In the second place we may accept Adams' statement that Vergennes was from time to time informally advised of the nature of the pending propositions. In the third place, the articles agreed on in 1782 were not to be a definite treaty except with the assent of France. … It now appears that the famous Marbois letter, handed to Jay by one of the British loyalists, and relied on by him as showing France's duplicity, was disavowed by Marbois; and there are, aside from this, very strong reasons to distrust its genuineness. In the second place, we have in the correspondence of George III a new light thrown, on the action taken by Jay in consequence of this letter. … Benjamin Vaughan, while a gentleman of great amiability and personal worth, was, when Jay sent him without Franklin's knowledge on a confidential mission to the British ministry, in the employ of that ministry as secret agent at Paris. It is due to Jay to say that he was ignorant of this fact, though he would have been notified of it had he consulted Franklin. One of the most singular incidents of this transaction is that George III, seeking double treachery in thus sending back to him his own agent in the guise of an agent from the American legation, regarded it as a peculiarly subtle machination of Franklin, which it was his duty to baffle by utterly discrediting Benjamin Vaughan. It should be added that Franklin's affection for Benjamin Vaughan was in no wise diminished by Vaughan's assumption, with an honesty which no one who knew him would question, of this peculiar kind of mediatorship. And in Jay Franklin's confidence was unabated. He more than once said that no one could be found more suited than Jay to represent the United States abroad. And when, in view of death, he prepared to settle his estate, he selected; Jay as his executor."

F. Wharton, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, chapter 9, section 111, and chapter 13, section 158 (volume 1).

Writing to M. de la Luzerne, the French Minister in the United States, under date of December 19, 1782, Count de Vergennes expressed himself on the conduct of the American Commissioners as follows: "You will surely be gratified, as well as myself, with the very extensive advantages, which our allies, the Americans, are to receive from the peace; but you certainly will, not be less surprised than I have been, at the conduct of the Commissioners. According to the instructions of Congress, they ought to have done nothing without our participation. I have informed you, that the King did not seek to influence the negotiation any further than his offices might be necessary to his friends. The American Commissioners will not say that I have interfered, and much less that I have wearied them with my curiosity. They have cautiously kept themselves at a distance from me. Mr. Adams, one of them, coming from Holland, where he had been received and served by our ambassador, had been in Paris nearly three weeks, without imagining that he owed me any mark of attention, and probably I should not have seen him till this time, if I had not caused him to be reminded of it. Whenever I have had occasion to see anyone of them, and inquire of them briefly respecting the progress of the negotiation, they have constantly clothed their speech in generalities, giving me to understand that it did not go forward, and that they had no confidence in the sincerity of the British ministry. Judge of my surprise, when, on the 30th of November, Dr. Franklin informed me that the articles were signed. The reservation retained on our account does not save the infraction of the promise, which we have mutually made, not to sign except conjointly. {3287} I owe Dr. Franklin the justice to state, however, that on the next day he sent me a copy of the articles. He will hardly complain that I received them without demonstrations of sensibility. It was not till some days after, that, when this minister had come to see me, I allowed myself to make him perceive that his proceeding in this abrupt signature of the articles had little in it, which could be agreeable to the King. He appeared sensible of it, and excused, in the best manner he could, himself and his colleagues. Our conversation was amicable."

J. Bigelow, Life of Benjamin Franklin, volume 3, page 207, note.

ALSO IN: _J. Jay, The Peace Negotiations of 1782-3 (Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 7, chapter 2)._

E. Fitzmaurice, Life of the Earl of Shelburne, volume 3, chapter 6.

E. E. Hale, Franklin in France, volume 2, chapters 5-8.

H. Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'établissement des États-Unis d'Amérique, tome 5.

See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

[Image: Map of the United States.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782-1783. Grievances of the Army. The Newburgh Addresses.

"Nothing had been done by Congress for the claims of the army, and it seemed highly probable that it would be disbanded without even a settlement of the accounts of the officers, and if so, that they would never receive their dues. Alarmed and irritated by the neglect of Congress; destitute of money and credit and of the means of living from day to day; oppressed with debts; saddened by the distresses of their families at home, and by the prospect of misery before them,—they presented a memorial to Congress in December [1782], in which they urged the immediate adjustment of their dues, and offered to commute the half-pay for life, granted by the resolve of October, 1780, for full pay for a certain number of years, or for such a sum in gross as should be agreed on by their committee sent to Philadelphia to attend the progress of the memorial through the house. It is manifest from statements in this document, as well as from other evidence, that the officers were nearly driven to desperation, and that their offer of commutation was wrung from them by a state of public opinion little creditable to the country. … The committee of the officers were in attendance upon Congress during the whole winter, and early in March, 1783, they wrote to their constituents that nothing had been done. At this moment, the predicament in which Washington stood, in the double relation of citizen and soldier, was critical and delicate in the extreme. In the course of a few days, all his firmness and patriotism, all his sympathies as an officer, on the one side, and his fidelity to the government, on the other, were severely tried. On the 10th of March, an anonymous address was circulated among the officers at Newburgh, calling a meeting of the general and field officers, and of one officer from each company, and one from the medical staff, to consider the late letter from their representatives at Philadelphia, and to determine what measures should be adopted to obtain that redress of grievances which they seemed to have solicited in vain. It was written with great ability and skill [by John Armstrong, afterwards General]. … Washington met the crisis with firmness, but also with conciliation. He issued orders forbidding an assemblage at the call of an anonymous paper, and directing the officers to assemble on Saturday, the 15th, to hear the report of their committee, and to deliberate what further measures ought to be adopted as most rational and best calculated to obtain the just and important object in view. The senior officer in rank present [General Gates] was directed to preside, and to report the result to the Commander-in-chief. On the next day after these orders were issued, a second anonymous address appeared from the same writer. In this paper he affected to consider the orders of General Washington, assuming the direction of the meeting, as a sanction of the whole proceeding which he had proposed. Washington saw, at once, that he must be present at the meeting himself, or that his name would be used to justify measures which he intended to discountenance and prevent. He therefore attended the meeting, and under his influence, seconded by that of Putnam, Knox, Brooks, and Howard, the result was the adoption of certain resolutions, in which the officers, after reasserting their grievances, and rebuking all attempts to seduce them from their civil allegiance, referred the whole subject of their claims again to the consideration of Congress. Even at this distant day, the peril of that crisis can scarcely be contemplated without a shudder. Had the Commander-in-chief been other than Washington, had the leading officers by whom he was surrounded been less than the noblest of patriots, the land would have been deluged with the blood of a civil war."

G. T. Curtis, History of the Constitution of the United States, book 2, chapter 1 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: J. Marshall, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 11.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782-1784. Persecution and flight of the Tories or Loyalists.

See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (April). Formation of the Society of the Cincinnati.

See CINCINNATI, THE SOCIETY OF THE.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (September). The definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States.

The four difficult questions on which the British and American negotiators at Paris arrived, after much discussion and wise compromise, at a settlement of differences originally wide, were (1) Boundaries; (2) Fishing rights; (3) Payment of debts from American to British merchants that were outstanding when the war began; (4) Amnesty to American loyalists, or Tories, and restoration of their confiscated property.

Within two months after the separate negotiations with England opened an agreement had been reached, and preliminary or provisional articles were signed on the 30th of November, 1782. The treaty was not to take effect, otherwise than by the cessation of hostilities, until terms of peace should be agreed upon between England and France. This occurred in the following January, and on the 3d of September, 1783, the definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States was signed [at Paris]. Its essential provisions were the following:

"Article 1. His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the Government, propriety and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof.

{3288}

Article II. And that all disputes which might arise in future, on the subject of the boundaries of the United States may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the following are, and shall be their boundaries, viz: From the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of Saint Croix River to the Highlands; along the said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwestern most head of Connecticut River; thence down along the middle of that river, to the 45th degree of north latitude; from thence, by a line due west on the said latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraquy; thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie; thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence along the middle of said water communication into the Lake Huron; thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior; thence through Lake Superior northward of the Isles Royal and Philipeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of said Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through the said lake to the most northwestern point thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi; thence by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river Mississippi until it shall intersect the northernmost part of the 31st degree of north latitude. South, by a line to be drawn due east from the determination of the line last mentioned, in the latitude of 31 degrees north of the Equator, to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River; thence strait to the head of St. Mary's River; and thence down along the middle of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean. East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid Highlands, which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river St. Lawrence; comprehending all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean; excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.

Article III. It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulph of Saint Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish. And also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island) and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement, without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.

Article IV. It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.

Article V. It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties which have been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of His Majesty's arms, and who have not borne arms against the said United States. …

Article VI. That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions commenced, against any person or persons for, or by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the present war. …

Article VII. There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between His Britannic Majesty and the said States, and between the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities, both by sea and land, shall from henceforth cease: All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty, and His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States. …

Article VIII. The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain, and the citizens of the United States."

Documents Illustrative of American History, edited by H. W. Preston, page 232.

ALSO IN: Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers (edition of 1889), pages 370-379.

Parliamentary History of England, volume 23.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (November-December). The British evacuation of New York. Dissolution of the Continental Army and Washington's farewell to it.

"The definitive treaty had been signed at Paris on the 3d of September, 1783, and was soon to be ratified by the United States in Congress assembled. The last remnant of the British army in the east had sailed down the Narrows on the 25th of November, a day which, under the appellation of Evacuation Day, was long held in grateful remembrance by the inhabitants of New York, and was, till a few years since, annually celebrated with fireworks and with military display. Of the continental army scarce a remnant was then [at the beginning of 1784] in the service of the States, and these few were under the command of General Knox. His great work of deliverance over, Washington had resigned his commission, had gone back to his estate on the banks of the Potomac, and was deeply engaged with plans for the improvement of his plantations. {3289} The retirement to private life of the American Fabius, as the newspapers delighted to call him, had been attended by many pleasing ceremonies, and had been made the occasion for new manifestations of affectionate regard by the people. The same day that witnessed the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from New York also witnessed the entry into that city of the army of the States. Nine days later Washington bid adieu to his officers. About noon on Thursday, the 4th of December, the chiefs of the army assembled in the great room of Fraunces's Tavern, then the resort of merchants and men of fashion, and there Washington joined them. Rarely as he gave way to his emotions, he could not on that day get the mastery of them. … He filled a glass from a decanter that stood on the table, raised it with a trembling hand, and said: 'With a heart full of love and gratitude I now take leave of you, and most devoutly wish your latter days may be as prosperous and happy as your former ones have been glorious and honorable.' Then he drank to them, and, after a pause, said: 'I cannot come to each of you to take my leave, but shall be obliged if you will each come and shake me by the hand.' General Knox came forward first, and Washington embraced him. The other officers approached one by one, and silently took their leave. A line of infantry had been drawn up extending from the tavern to Whitehall ferry, where a barge was in waiting to carry the commander across the Hudson to Paulus Hook. Washington, with his officers following, walked down the line of soldiers to the water. The streets, the balconies, the windows, were crowded with gazers. All the churches in the city sent forth a joyous din. Arrived at the ferry, he entered the barge in silence, stood up, took off his hat and waved farewell. Then, as the boat moved slowly out into the stream amid the shouts of the citizens, his companions in arms stood bareheaded on the shore till the form of their illustrious commander was lost to view."

J. B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States, chapter 2 (volume 1).

ALSO IN: W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 33.

Mrs. M. J. Lamb, History of the City of New York, volume 2, chapters 6-7.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1787. After the war. Resistance to the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace. National feebleness and humiliation. Failure of the Articles of Confederation. Movements toward a firmer Constitution.

"The revolution was at last accomplished. The evils it had removed, being no longer felt, were speedily forgotten. The evils it had brought pressed heavily upon them. They could devise no remedy. They saw no way of escape. They soon began to grumble, became sullen, hard to please, dissatisfied with themselves and with everything done for them. The States, differing in habits, in customs, in occupations, had been during a few years united by a common danger. But the danger was gone; old animosities and jealousies broke forth again with all their strength, and the union seemed likely to be dissolved. In this state of public discontent the House met at Philadelphia early in January, 1784. Some days were spent in examining credentials of new members, and in waiting for the delinquents to come in. It was not till the 14th of the month that the definitive treaty was taken under consideration and duly ratified. Nothing remained, therefore, but to carry out the stipulations with as much haste as possible. But there were some articles which the people had long before made up their minds never should be carried out. While the treaty was yet in course of preparation the royal commissioners had stoutly insisted on the introduction of articles providing for the return of the refugees and the payment of debts due to British subjects at the opening of the war. The commissioners on behalf of the United States, who well knew the tempers of their countrymen, had at first firmly stood out against any such articles. But some concessions were afterward made by each party, and certain stipulations touching the debts and the refugees inserted. Adams, who wrote in the name of his fellow-commissioners, … hoped that the middle line adopted would be approved. The middle line to which Adams referred was that Congress should recommend the States to make no more seizures of the goods and property of men lately in arms against the Confederation, and to put no bar in the way of the recovery of such as had already been confiscated. It was distinctly understood by each side that these were recommendations, and nothing more than recommendations. Yet no sooner were they made known than a shout of indignation and abuse went up from all parts of the country. The community in a moment was divided between three parties. The smallest of the three was made up of the Tories, who still hoped for place and power, and still nursed the delusion that the past would be forgotten. Yet they daily contributed to keep the remembrance of it alive by a strong and avowed attachment to Great Britain. Opposed to these was the large and influential body of violent Whigs, who insisted vehemently that every loyalist should instantly be driven from the States. A less numerous and less violent body of Whigs constituted the third party." The fury of the violent Whigs proved generally irresistible and great numbers of the obnoxious Tories fled before it.

See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

Some "sought a refuge in Florida, then a possession of Spain, and founded settlements which their descendants have since raised to prosperous and beautiful villages, renowned for groves of orange-trees and fields of cane. Others embarked on the British ships of war, and were carried to Canada or the island of Bermuda; a few turned pirates, obtained a sloop, and scoured the waters of Chesapeake bay. Many went to England, beset the ministry with petitions for relief, wearied the public with pathetic stories of the harsh ingratitude with which their sufferings had been requited, and were accused, with much show of reason, by the Americans of urging the severe restrictions which England began to lay on American commerce. Many more … set out for Nova Scotia. … The open contempt with which, in all parts of the country, the people treated the recommendation of Congress concerning the refugees and the payment of the debts, was no more than any man of ordinary sagacity could have foretold. Indeed, the state into which Congress had fallen was most wretched. … Each of the thirteen States the Union bound together retained all the rights of sovereignty, and asserted them punctiliously against the central government. {3290} Each reserved to itself the right to put up mints, to strike money, to levy taxes, to raise armies, to say what articles should come into its ports free and what should be made to pay duty. Toward the Continental Government they acted precisely as if they were dealing with a foreign power. In truth, one of the truest patriots of New England had not been ashamed to stand up in his place in the Massachusetts House of Deputies and speak of the Congress of the States as a foreign government. Every act of that body was scrutinized with the utmost care. The transfer of the most trivial authority beyond the borders of the State was made with protestations, with trembling, and with fear. Under such circumstances, each delegate felt himself to have much the character, and to be clothed with very much of the power, of ambassadors. He was not responsible to men, he was responsible to a State. … From beginning to end the system of representation was bad. By the Articles of Confederation each of the thirteen little republics was annually to send to Congress not more than seven and not less than two delegates. No thought was taken of population. … But this absolute equality of the States was more apparent than real. Congress possessed no revenue. The burden of supporting the delegates was cast on those who sent them, and, as the charge was not light, a motive was at once created for preferring a representation of two to a representation of seven, or, indeed, for sending none at all. While the war was still raging and the enemy marching and counter-marching within the border of every State, a sense of fear kept up the number of delegates to at least two. Indeed, some of the wealthier and more populous States often had as many as four congressmen on the floor of the House. But the war was now over. The stimulus derived from the presence of a hostile army was withdrawn, and the representation and attendance fell off fast. Delaware and Georgia ceased to be represented. From the ratification of the treaty to the organization of the Government under the Constitution six years elapsed, and during those six years Congress, though entitled to 91 members, was rarely attended by 25. The House was repeatedly forced to adjourn day after day for want of a quorum. On more than one occasion these adjournments covered a period of thirteen consecutive days. … No occasion, however impressive or important, could call out a large attendance. Seven States, represented by twenty delegates, witnessed the resignation of Washington. Twenty-three members, sitting for eleven States, voted for the ratification of the treaty. … It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress speedily degenerated into a debating club, and a debating club of no very high order. Neglected by its own members, insulted and threatened by its mutinous troops, reviled by the press, and forced to wander from city to city in search of an abiding place, its acts possessed no national importance whatever. It voted monuments that never were put up, rewarded meritorious services with sums of money that never were paid, formed wise schemes for the relief of the finances that never were carried out, and planned on paper a great city that never was built. In truth, to the scoffers and malcontents of that day, nothing was more diverting than the uncertain wanderings of Congress. … In the coffee-houses and taverns no toasts were drunk with such uproarious applause as 'A hoop to the barrel' and 'Cement to the Union'; toasts which not long before had sprung up in the army and come rapidly into vogue. … The men who, in after years, came to eminence as the framers of the Constitution, who became renowned leaders of the Federalists, presidents, cabinet ministers, and constitutional statesmen, were then in private life, abroad, or in the State Assemblies. Washington was busy with his negroes and tobacco; Adams was minister to Holland; Jefferson still sat in Congress, but was soon to be sent as minister to France; Madison sat in the Virginia House of Deputies; Hamilton was wrangling with Livingston and Burr at the bar of New York; Jay was minister to Spain."

J. B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States, volume 1, chapter 2.

Hamilton's description, in one of the papers of the Federalist, of the state of the country in 1787, is very graphic: "We may indeed, with propriety," he wrote, "be said to have reached almost the last stage of National humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character of an independent nation, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence! These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered! These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor Government. Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to National wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our Government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of National distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. {3291} To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded what indication is there of National disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? … The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money, but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that, though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option. … There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations, for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty; regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. … If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general discretionary superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all views towards a Confederate Government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a National Government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a Government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,—the only proper objects of Government."

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, number 15.

"Many of the States refused or neglected to pay even their allotted shares of interest upon the public debt, and there was no power in Congress to compel payment. Eighteen months were required to collect only one-fifth of the taxes assigned to the States in 1783. The national credit became worthless. Foreign nations refused to make commercial treaties with the United States, preferring a condition of affairs in which they could lay any desired burden upon American commerce without fear of retaliation by an impotent Congress. The national standing army had dwindled to a corps of 80 men. In 1785 Algiers declared war against the United States. Congress recommended the building of five 40-gun ships of war. But Congress had only power to recommend. The ships were not built, and the Algerines were permitted to prey on American commerce with impunity. England still refused to carry out the Treaty of 1783, or to send a Minister to the United States. The Federal Government, in short, was despised abroad and disobeyed at home. The apparent remedy was the possession by Congress of the power of levying and collecting internal taxes and duties on imports, but, after long urging, it was found impossible to gain the necessary consent of all the States to the article of taxation by Congress. In 1786, therefore, this was abandoned, and, as a last resort, the States were asked to pass an Amendment intrusting to Congress the collection of a revenue from imports. This Amendment was agreed to by all the States but one. New York alone rejected it, after long debate, and her veto seemed to destroy the last hope of a continuance of national union in America. Perhaps the dismay caused by the action of New York was the most powerful argument in the minds of many for an immediate and complete revision of the government. The first step to Revision was not so designed. In 1785 the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, in pursuance of their right to regulate commerce, had appointed Commissioners to decide on some method of doing away with interruptions to the navigation of Chesapeake Bay. The Commissioners reported their inability to agree, except in condemning the Articles of Confederation. The Legislature of Virginia followed the report by a resolution, inviting the other States to meet at Annapolis, consider the defects of the government, and suggest some remedy. In September, 1786, delegates from five of the Middle States assembled, but confined themselves to discussion, since a majority of the States were not represented. The general conclusion was that the government, as it then stood, was inadequate for the protection, prosperity or comfort, of the people, and that some immediate and thorough reform was needed. After drawing up a report for their States and for Congress, recommending another Convention to be held at Philadelphia, in May, 1787, they adjourned. Congress, by resolution, approved their report and the proposed Convention. The Convention met, as proposed, May 14th, 1787."

_A. Johnston, History of American Politics, 2d edition, chapter 1._

"Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the downfall of a government which had been framed with the hope and promise of perpetual duration. … But this brief interval was full of suffering and peril. There are scarcely any evils or dangers, of a political nature, and springing from political and social causes, to which a free people can be exposed, which the people of the United States did not experience during that period."

G. T. Curtis, History of the Constitution, book 3, chapter 1.

"It is not too much to say that the period of five years following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of the American people."

J. Fiske, Critical Period of American History, page 55.

ALSO IN: J. S. Landon, Constitutional History and Government of the United States, lecture 3.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1789. Depressed state of Trade and Industry. Commercial consequences of the want of nationality.

"The effect of the Revolutionary War on the merchant marine of the colonies, which thereby secured their independence as the United States, was not so disastrous as might have been expected. Many ships were lost or captured, and the gains of maritime commerce were reduced; but to offset these losses an active fleet of privateers found profitable employment in the seizure of English merchantmen, and thus kept alive the maritime spirit of the country, and supplied a revenue to the shipowners whose legitimate pursuits were suspended by the war. In 1783, therefore, the American merchant marine was in a fairly healthy condition. During the next six years the disadvantages of the new situation made themselves felt. Before the Revolution the colonies had had open trade with their fellow-subjects in the British West India Islands. The commerce thus carried on was a very profitable business. The island colonies were supplied with lumber, corn, fish, live stock, and surplus farm produce, which the continent furnished in abundance, together with rough manufactured articles such as pipe staves, and in return the ships of New York and New England brought back great quantities of coffee, sugar, cotton, rum, and indigo. … As a result of independence, the West India business was entirely cut off. The merchantmen of the United States then came in on the footing of foreign vessels, and all such vessels, under the terms of the Navigation Act, were rigorously excluded from trade with the British colonies. It was evident, however, that the sudden cessation of this trade, whatever loss it might inflict on the newly created state, would be tenfold more harmful to the islands, which had so long depended upon their neighbors of the mainland for the necessaries of life. Pitt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, appreciated this difficulty, and in 1783 brought a bill into Parliament granting open trade as to articles that were the produce of either country. The measure failed, owing to Pitt's resignation, and the next ministry, in consequence of the violent opposition of British shipowners, passed a merely temporary act, vesting in the crown the power of regulating trade with America. This power was occasionally exercised by suspending certain provisions of the navigation laws, under annual proclamations, but it did not serve to avert the disaster that Pitt had foreseen. Terrible sufferings visited the population of the West India colonies, and between 1780 and 1787 as many as 15,000 slaves perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the necessary supply of food when their own crops had been destroyed by hurricanes. Apart from the unfavorable condition of the West India trade, another and more important cause had operated to check the prosperous development of American commerce. The only bond of political union at this time was that formed by the Articles of Confederation, constituting a mere league of independent States, any one of which could pass laws calculated to injure the commerce of the others."

J. R. Soley, Maritime Industries of America (The United States of America, edition by N. S. Shaler, volume 1, chapter 10).

"The general commerce of the granulated mass of communities called the United States, from 1783 to 1780, was probably the poorest commerce known in the whole history of the country. England sent America £3,700,000 worth of merchandise in 1784, and took in return only £750,000. The drain of specie to meet this difference was very severe, and merchants could not meet the engagements so rashly made. They had imported luxuries for customers who were poor, and non-payment through all the avenues of trade was the consequence. One circumstance and detail of the internal management of this commerce added to the distress and to the necessary difficulties of the time. Immediately after the peace, British merchants, factors, and clerks came across the seas in streams, to take advantage of the new opportunities for trade. It seemed to the citizens to be a worse invasion of their economic rights than the coming of the troops had been to the political rights of the old colonists. The whole country was agitated, but action was initiated in Boston in 1785. The merchants met and discussed all these difficulties. They pledged themselves to buy no more goods of British merchants or factors in Boston. In about three weeks the mechanics and artisans met in the old Green Dragon Tavern and committed themselves to the same policy. But the merchants went beyond mere non-intercourse with traders at home. The root of the difficulty was in the ill-regulation or want of regulation of our commerce with all foreign countries. The confederation was giving and not getting. Where it should have gotten, foreigners were getting, because the parts of the country had not agreed to unite in acquiring for the common benefit, lest some part should be injured in the process. Congress made treaties for the Confederation. But if unable to treat with any} power which excluded American shipping from its ports, or laid duties on American produce, Congress did not control our ports in an equivalent manner. Each individual state was to decide whether the unfriendly power should trade at its own ports. This in effect nullified any retaliatory action. England, being the best market, virtually controlled any change in commerce, as it was then conducted. Her ports were closed to American products unless they were brought in British vessels. France admitted our vessels to her ports, but her merchants cried out against the competition. It was feared that the ministers would be obliged to yield to their clamor and close the ports. Probably the poor economic condition of the country affected the foreign trade even more than the bad adjustment of foreign relations. All causes combined to form two parties, one advocating imposts upon foreign trade or a Navigation Act, the other opposing this scheme, and insisting upon absolute freedom of commerce. It was in this direction that the Boston people moved, after they had instituted non-intercourse in their own market with British traders. They petitioned Congress to remedy these embarrassments of trade, and sent a memorial to their own legislature. This document urged that body to insist on action by Congress. They formed a Committee of Correspondence to enforce these plans upon the whole country."

W. B. Weeden, Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1780, chapter 22 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. Plans for new States in the Northwest Territory.

See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: A. D. 1784.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. Revolt in Tennessee against the territorial cession to Congress. The State of Franklin.

See TENNESSEE; A. D. 1776-1784; and 1785.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. The first daily Newspaper publication.

See PRINTING and PRESS; A. D. 1784-1813.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784. The financial administration of Robert Morris. Cost of the war.

From May, 1781, until April, 1785, the burden of the financial management of the revolutionary struggle rested upon Robert Morris, of Philadelphia, who held the office which Congress had created and entitled "the Superintendent of Finances." Morris's detractors argued that he deserved no great credit for his management of the finances as compared with his predecessors, because in his time everything turned in his favour. It is true that if things had remained as before, he could not have restored the finances; for the miracle of carrying on a war without means has never yet been performed by anybody. The events which gave him an opportunity to restore the finances, by intelligent and energetic action, were as follows. The first was the collapse of the paper currency and its absolute removal from circulation, in May, 1781, just before he took office. As soon as it was out of the way, specie came in. He was able to throw aside all the trammels in which the treasury operations had been entangled by the paper system. It is true that he did not succeed in his attempt to relieve himself entirely from these anticipations, which, inasmuch as they were anticipations, would have used up the revenues of his time; but it was a great gain for him to be able to conduct his current operations at least in terms of specie. The second thing in his favour was the great help granted by France in 1781, and especially the importation of a part of this in specie. This enabled him to found the bank, from which he borrowed six times what he put into it. The chief use of the bank to him, however, was to discount the notes which he took for bills of exchange. Then also it was possible for him to reduce the expenses in a way which his predecessors had not had the courage or the opportunity to accomplish, because in their time the abuses of the old method had not gone far enough to force acquiescence in the reforms. In Morris's time, and chiefly, as it appears, by his exertions and merit, the expenditures were greatly reduced for an army of a given size. When the war came to an end, it was possible for him to reduce the entire establishment to a very low scale. Next we notice that the efforts to introduce taxation bore fruit which, although it was trivial in one point of view, was large enough to be very important to him in his desperate circumstances. Finally, when his need was the greatest, and these advantages and opportunities proved inadequate, the rise of American credit made the loan in Holland possible, and this carried him through to the result. … By the Report of 1790 the total amount of expenditures and advances at the treasury of the United States, during the war, in specie value, was estimated as follows; 1775 and 1776, $20,064,666. 1777, $24,986,646. 1778, $24,289,438. 1779, $10,794,620. 1780, $3,000,000. 1781, $1,942,465. 1782, $3,632,745. 1783, $3,226,583. 1784, $548,525 to November 1. Total $92,485,693.

This table shows how the country lapsed into dependence on France after the alliance was formed. The round number opposite 1780 is very eloquent. It means anarchy and guesswork. … According to the best records we possess, the cost of the war to the United States, reduced to specie value year by year at the official scale of depreciation, which, being always below the truth, makes these figures too high, was, as above stated, $92,485,693, at the treasury. There were also certificates of indebtedness out for $16,708,009. There had been expended in Europe, which never went through the treasury, $5,000,000. The States were estimated to have expended $21,000,000. Total, $135,000,000. Jefferson calculated it at $140,000,000, by adding the debts incurred and the continental currency. The debt contracted by England during the war was £115,000,000, for which £91,000,000 were realized. The Comptroller of the Treasury of France said that it cost 60,000,000 livres a year to support the army in America. Vergennes told Lafayette, in November, 1782, that France had expended 250,000,000 livres in the war. There is an often-repeated statement that the war cost France 1,200,000,000 livres, or 1,280,000,000, or 1,500,000,000. Arthur Young put it at £50,000,000, sterling. Probably if 60,000,000 a year for five years, or $60,000,000, was taken as the amount directly expended for and in America by France, it would be as fair a computation as could be made of her contribution to American independence. She had large expenditures elsewhere in the prosecution of her war against Great Britain, and her incidental losses of ships, etc., were great. When England abandoned the effort to subdue the colonies, she was in a far better position for continuing it than either of her adversaries. George III. was by no means stupid in his comments and suggestions about the war. No Englishman of the period said things which now seem wiser in the retrospect. As early as September, 1780, he said: 'America is distressed to the greatest degree. The finances of France, as well as Spain, are in no good situation: This war, like the last, will prove one of credit.' This opinion was fully justified in 1782. French finances were then hastening toward bankruptcy, so that France could not continue the war expenses or the loans and subsidies to America. English credit was high. October 2, 1782, Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, that the English fleet was stronger than at the beginning of the war, while the fleets of France and Spain were weaker; that French finances were greatly weakened, while English credit was high; that England had recovered influence in Russia, and through Russia on Prussia and Austria. He wanted peace and reconciliation with England in order to act with her in eastern Europe. If England had chosen to persevere in the war, the matter of credit would have been the most important element in her chances of success, aside from the natural difficulties of the enterprise."

W. G. Sumner, The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution, chapter 23 (volume 2).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784-1788. Disputes with England over the execution of the Treaty of Peace. Difficulties with Spain. The question of the Navigation of the Mississippi. Eastern jealousy and Western excitement.

{3294}

"Serious disputes soon arose, concerning the execution of the treaty of peace; and each nation complained of infractions by the other. On the part of the United States, it was alleged that negroes had been carried away, contrary to the treaty; and as early as May, 1783, congress instructed their ministers for negotiating peace to remonstrate to the British court against this conduct of their commander in America, and to take measures to obtain reparation. The United States, also, complained that the western posts had not been sur·rendered, agreeably to treaty stipulations. Great Britain, on her part, alleged that legal impediments had been interposed to prevent the collection of British debts in America; and that the 5th and 6th articles, relating to the property of the loyalists, had not been complied with. In June, 1784, the legislature of Virginia not only declared that there had been an infraction on the part of Great Britain of the 7th article, in detaining the slaves and other property of the citizens of the United States, but instructed their delegates in congress to request that a remonstrance be presented to the British court against such infraction and to require reparation. They also directed them to inform congress that the state of Virginia conceived a just regard to the national honor and interest obliged her assembly to withhold their co-operation in the complete fulfilment of the treaty until the success of such remonstrance was known, or they should have further directions from congress. They at the same time declared, that as soon as reparation for such infraction should be made, or congress should judge it indispensably necessary, such acts as inhibited the recovery of British debts should be repealed, and payment made, in such time and manner as should consist with the exhausted situation of the state. In consequence of these difficulties and disputes, congress, early in the year 1785, determined to send a minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain; and on the 24th of February John Adams was appointed to represent the United States at the court of London. He was instructed 'in a respectful but firm manner to insist that the United States be put, without further delay, into possession of all the posts and territories within their limits which are now held by British garrisons.' … Mr. Jefferson was soon after appointed to represent the United States at the court of Versailles, in the room of Dr. Franklin, who had leave to return home, after an absence of nine years. Mr. Livingston having resigned the office of secretary of foreign affairs, Mr. Jay, in March, 1784, and before his return from Europe, was appointed in his place. Mr. Adams repaired to the British court, and was received as the first minister from the United States since their independence was acknowledged. … In December, 1785, Mr. Adams presented a memorial to the British secretary of state, in which, after stating the detention of the western posts contrary to the stipulations in the treaty of peace, he in the name and in behalf of the United States required 'that all his majesty's armies and garrisons be forthwith withdrawn from the said United States, from all and every of the posts and fortresses before enumerated, and from every port, place and harbor, within the territory of the said United States, according to the true intention of the treaties.' To this memorial the British secretary, lord Carmarthen, returned an answer, on the 28th of February, 1786, in which he acknowledges the detention of the posts, but alleges a breach of the 4th article of the treaty of peace on the part of the United States, by interposing impediments to the recovery of British debts in America. … This answer was accompanied with a statement of the various instances in which the 4th article had been violated by acts of the states. The complaints of Great Britain also extended to breaches of the 5th and 6th articles of the treaty, relating to the recovery of certain property and to confiscations. The answer of the British secretary was submitted to congress; and in order to remove the difficulties complained of, that body, in March, 1787, unanimously declared that all the acts, or parts of acts, existing in any of the states, repugnant to the treaty of peace, ought to be repealed; and they recommended to the states to make such repeal by a general law. … A circular letter to the states accompanied these declarations, in which congress say, 'we have deliberately and dispassionately examined and considered the several facts and matters urged by Great Britain, as infractions of the treaty of peace, on the part of America, and we regret that, in some of the states, too little attention has been paid to the public faith pledged by that treaty.' In consequence of this letter, the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, passed acts complying with the recommendations contained in it. The operation of the act of Virginia, however, which repealed all acts preventing the recovery of debts due to British subjects, was suspended until the governor of that state should issue a proclamation, giving notice that Great Britain had delivered up the western posts, and was also taking measures for the further fulfilment of the treaty of peace by delivering up the negroes belonging to the citizens of that state, carried away contrary to the 7th article of the treaty, or by making compensation for the same. … The British court was not yet disposed to enter into any commercial treaty with the United States. The ministers were, no doubt, satisfied that the advantages they enjoyed under their own regulations were greater than could be obtained by any treaty they could make with America. And this was, probably, one of the principal reasons of their refusal to enter into any such treaty. As the British court declined sending a minister to the United States, Mr. Adams, in October, 1787, at his request, had leave to return home. … The United States had also at this period to encounter difficulties with Spain as well as Great Britain. The two Floridas having been ceded to his catholic majesty, serious disputes soon arose, not only on the old subject of the navigation of the Mississippi, but with respect to the boundaries of Louisiana and the ceded territory. The Spanish court still persisted in its determination to exclude the Americans from the navigation of the Mississippi. … In December, 1784, congress declared it necessary to send a minister to Spain, for the purpose of adjusting the interfering claims of the two nations respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, and other matters highly interesting to the peace and good understanding which ought to subsist between them. This was prevented by the appointment of Don Diego Gardoqui, a minister from Spain, who arrived in the United States and was acknowledged by congress in the summer of 1785. {3295} Soon after his arrival, Mr. Jay, then secretary of foreign affairs, was appointed to treat with the Spanish minister on the part of the United States. … As Mr. Jay, by his instructions, was not to conclude a treaty until the same was communicated to congress and approved by them, and was also specially directed to obtain a stipulation acknowledging the right of the United States to their territorial claims and the free navigation of the Mississippi, as established in their treaty with Great Britain, he, on the 3d of August, 1786, submitted to congress the … plan of a commercial treaty, and stated the difficulties in obtaining the stipulation required. … 'Circumstanced as we are [said Mr. Jay] I think it would be expedient to agree that the treaty should be limited to twenty five or thirty years, and that one of the articles should stipulate that the United States would forbear to use the navigation of that river below their territories to the ocean. Thus the duration of the treaty and of the forbearance in question should be limited to the same period.' … Among other reasons, Mr. Jay stated that the navigation of the Mississippi was not at that time very important, and would not probably become so in less than twenty five or thirty years, and that a forbearance to use it, while it was not wanted, was no great sacrifice—that Spain then excluded the people of the United States from that navigation; and that it could only be acquired by war, for which the United States were not then prepared; and that in case of war France would no doubt join Spain. Congress were much divided on this interesting subject. The seven states at the north, including Pennsylvania, were disposed, in case a treaty could not otherwise be made, to forbear the use of the navigation of the Mississippi below the southern boundary of the United States, for a limited time, and a resolution was submitted to congress repealing Mr. Jay's instructions of the 25th of August, 1785, and which was carried, seven states against five. … This, however, was to be on the express condition that a stipulation of forbearance should not be construed to extinguish the right of the United States, independent of such stipulation, to use and navigate said river from its source to the ocean; and that such stipulation was not to be made unless it should be agreed in the same treaty that the navigation and use of the said river above such intersection to its source should be common to both nations—and Mr. Jay was to make no treaty unless the territorial limits of the United States were acknowledged and secured according to the terms agreed between the United States and Great Britain. … As by the confederation the assent of nine states was necessary in making a treaty the same number was considered requisite in giving specific instructions in relation to it; … and it was questioned whether the previous instructions given to Mr. Jay could be rescinded without the assent of nine states. These proceedings in congress, though with closed doors, soon became partly known, and excited great alarm in Virginia and in the western settlements. … While these negociations were pending, the fertile country at the west was settling with a rapidity beyond the most sanguine calculations; and it is not surprising that the news of an actual or intended abandonment of the navigation of the Mississippi, the only outlet for their productions, should have excited great alarm among its inhabitants. They were much exasperated by the seizure and confiscation of American property by the Spaniards, on its way down the river, which took place about the same time. The proposition made in congress was magnified into an actual treaty, and called from the western people most bitter complaints and reproaches. … To quiet the apprehensions of the western inhabitants, the delegates from North Carolina, in September, 1788, submitted to congress a resolution declaring that 'whereas many citizens of the United States, who possess lands on the western waters, have expressed much uneasiness from a report that congress are disposed to treat with Spain for the surrender of their claim to the navigation of the river Mississippi; in order therefore to quiet the minds of our fellow citizens by removing such ill founded apprehensions, resolved, that the United States have a clear, absolute, and unalienable claim to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, which claim is not only supported by the express stipulations of treaties, but by the great law of nature.' The secretary of foreign affairs, to whom this resolution was referred, reported, that as the rumor mentioned in the resolution was not warranted by the negociations between the United States and Spain, the members be permitted to contradict it, in the most explicit terms. Mr. Jay also stated, there could be no objection to declaring the right of the United States to the navigation of the river clear and absolute—that this had always been his opinion; and that the only question had been whether a modification of that right for equivalent advantages was advisable; and though he formerly thought such a modification might be proper, yet that circumstances and discontents had since interposed to render it questionable. He also advised that further negociations with Spain be transferred to the new general government. On this report, congress, on the 16th of September, 1788, in order to remove the apprehensions of the western settlers, declared that the members be permitted to contradict the report referred to by the delegates from North Carolina; and at the same time resolved 'that the free navigation of the river Mississippi is a clear and essential right of the United States, and that the same ought to be considered and supported as such.' All further negociations with Spain were also referred to the new federal government."

T. Pitkin, Political and Civil History of the United States, chapter 17 (volume 2).

"It was important for the frontiersmen to take the Lake Posts from the British; but it was even more important to wrest from the Spaniards the free navigation of the Mississippi. While the Lake Posts were held by the garrisons of a foreign power, the work of settling the northwestern territory was bound to go forward slowly and painfully; but while the navigation of the Mississippi was barred, even the settlements already founded could not attain to their proper prosperity and importance. … The Westerners were right in regarding as indispensable the free navigation of the Mississippi. They were right also in their determination ultimately to acquire the control of the whole river, from the source to the mouth. However, the Westerners wished more than the privilege of sending down stream the products of their woods and pastures and tilled farms. {3296} They had already begun to cast longing eyes on the fair Spanish possessions. … Every bold, lawless, ambitious leader among the frontier folk dreamed of wresting from the Spaniard some portion of his rich and ill-guarded domain. It was not alone the attitude of the frontiersmen towards Spain that was novel, and based upon a situation for which there was little precedent. Their relations with one another, with their brethren of the seaboard, and with the Federal Government, likewise had to be adjusted without much chance of profiting by antecedent experience. Many phases of these relations between the people who stayed at home and those who wandered off to make homes, between the frontiersmen as they formed young States, and the Central Government representing the old States, were entirely new, and were ill-understood by both parties. … The attitude towards the Westerners of certain portions of the population in the older States, and especially in the northeastern States, was one of unreasoning jealousy and suspicion; and though this mental attitude rarely crystallized into hostile deeds, its very existence, and the knowledge that it did exist, embittered the men of the West. … In the northeastern States, and in New England especially, this feeling showed itself for two generations after the close of the Revolutionary War. On the whole the New Englanders have exerted a more profound and wholesome influence upon the development of our common country than has ever been exerted by any other equally numerous body of our people. They have led the nation in the path of civil liberty and sound governmental administration. But too often they have viewed the nation's growth and greatness from a narrow and provincial standpoint, and have grudgingly acquiesced in, rather than led the march towards, continental supremacy. In shaping the nation's policy for the future their sense of historic perspective seemed imperfect. … The extreme representatives of this northeastern sectionalism not only objected to the growth of the West at the time now under consideration, but even avowed a desire to work it harm, by shutting the Mississippi, so as to benefit the commerce of the Atlantic States. … These intolerant extremists not only opposed the admission of the young western States into the Union, but at a later date actually announced that the annexation by the United States of vast territories beyond the Mississippi offered just cause for the secession of the northeastern States. Even those who did not take such an advanced ground felt an unreasonable dread lest the West might grow to overtop the East in power. … A curious feature of the way many honest men looked at the West was their inability to see how essentially transient were some of the characteristics to which they objected. Thus they were alarmed at the turbulence and the lawless shortcomings of various kinds which grew out of the conditions of frontier settlement and sparse population. They looked with anxious foreboding to the time when the turbulent and lawless people would be very numerous, and would form a dense and powerful population; failing to see that in exact proportion as the population became dense, the conditions which caused the qualities to which they objected would disappear. Even the men who had too much good sense to share these fears, even men as broadly patriotic as Jay, could not realize the extreme rapidity of western growth. Kentucky and Tennessee grew much faster than any of the old frontier colonies had ever grown; and from sheer lack of experience, eastern statesmen could not realize that this rapidity of growth made the navigation of the Mississippi a matter of immediate and not of future interest to the West. … While many of the people on the eastern seaboard thus took an indefensible position in reference to the trans-Alleghany settlements, in the period immediately succeeding the Revolution, there were large bodies of the population of these same settlements, including very many of their popular leaders, whose own attitude towards the Union was, if anything, more blameworthy. They were clamorous about their rights, and were not unready to use veiled threats of disunion when they deemed these rights infringed; but they showed little appreciation of their own duties to the Union. … They demanded that the United States wrest from the British the Lake Posts, and from the Spaniards the navigation of the Mississippi. Yet they seemed incapable of understanding that if they separated from the Union they would thereby forfeit all chance of achieving the very purposes they had in view, because they would then certainly be at the mercy of Britain, and probably, at least for some time, at the mercy of Spain also. They opposed giving the United States the necessary civil and military power, although it was only by the possession and exercise of such power that it would be possible to secure for the westerners what they wished. In all human probability, the whole country round the Great Lakes would still be British territory, and the mouth of the Mississippi still in the hands of some European power, had the folly of the separatists won the day and had the West been broken up into independent states. … This final triumph of the Union party in these first-formed frontier States was fraught with immeasurable good."

T. Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, volume 3, chapter 3.

See FLORIDA: A. D. 1783-1787; and LOUISIANA: A. D. 1785-1800.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1787. First troubles and dealings with the Barbary pirates.

See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1785-1801.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1786-1787. Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts.

See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1786-1787.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787. The, Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory. Exclusion of Slavery forever.

See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1787; also, EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1880.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787. The framing of the Federal Constitution. The Union constructed of compromises.

The convention of delegates appointed to revise the Articles of Confederation, but which took upon itself the task of framing anew a Federal Constitution for the States, assembled at Philadelphia on the 25th of May, 1787, eleven days later than the day appointed for its meeting. "The powers conferred by the several states were not uniform. Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey appointed their delegates 'for the purpose of revising the Federal Constitution;' North Carolina, New Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia 'to decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of the Federal Union;' New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut 'for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation;' South Carolina and Maryland 'to render the Federal Constitution entirely adequate to the actual situation.' {3297} Rhode Island held aloof. She was governed by a class of men who wanted to pay their debts in paper money, and she did not wish to surrender her power to collect duties upon the goods that came into her port. The trade of Newport at that day surpassed that of New York. Connecticut came in reluctantly, and New Hampshire late in July, 1787. … Washington was made president of the convention. … Many names great in the revolutionary struggle were absent from the roll of delegates. John and Samuel Adams, and John Hancock, were not there. Patrick Henry of Virginia refused to attend. Thomas Jefferson and John Jay were absent from the country. George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, however, were there. … Among the younger men was James Madison of Virginia. … Alexander Hamilton came from New York. … Charles C. Pinckney was a delegate from South Carolina. … James Wilson of Pennsylvania was a Scotchman. He surpassed all others in his exact knowledge of the civil and common law, and the law of nations. … Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman came from Connecticut. … Many of the 55 delegates shared Hamilton's contempt for a democracy, but the strength they would repose in a government they preferred to retain in the states. … The first business of the convention was the adoption of rules. Each state was to have one vote. Such was the rule in the Confederate Congress. Seven states made a quorum. The convention was to sit with closed doors, and everything was to be kept secret: nothing was to be given to the public except the completed work. This injunction of secrecy was never removed. Fortunately James Madison kept a pretty full account of the debates and proceedings, all in his own hand."

J. S. Landon, Constitutional History and Government of the United States, lecture 3.

"Madison tells us in his report of these debates that previous to the opening of the Convention it had been a subject of discussion among the members present, as to how the States should vote in the Convention. Several of the members from Pennsylvania had urged that the large States unite in refusing to the small States an equal vote, but Virginia, believing this to be injudicious if not unjust, ' discountenanced and stilled the project.' On the 29th the real business of the Convention was opened by Edmund Randolph, who as Governor of Virginia was put forward as spokesman by his colleagues. He began by saying that as the Convention had originated from Virginia, and the delegation from this State supposed that some proposition was expected from them, the task had been imposed on him. After enumerating the defects of the Confederation, he detailed the remedy proposed. This latter was set forth in fifteen resolutions and was called afterwards the Virginia plan of government. Charles Pinckney from South Carolina had also a draft of a federal government, which was read and like the former referred to a committee of the whole House. … The Committee of the Whole … debated from day to day the resolutions contained in the Virginia plan, and on the 13th of June they reported nineteen resolutions based upon those of Virginia, forming a system of government in outline. On the following day Mr. Paterson, of New Jersey, asked for time to prepare another plan founded on the Articles of Confederation. This was submitted to the Convention on the 15th. The Virginia and the New Jersey plan were contrasted briefly by one of the members: Virginia plan proposes two branches in the legislature, Jersey, a single legislative body; Virginia, the legislative powers derived from the people, Jersey, from the States; Virginia, a single executive, Jersey, more than one; Virginia, a majority of the legislature can act, Jersey, a small majority can control; Virginia, the legislature can legislate on all national concerns, Jersey, only on limited objects; Virginia, legislature to negative all State laws, Jersey, giving power to the executive to compel obedience by force; Virginia, to remove the executive by impeachment, Jersey, on application of a majority of the States; Virginia, for the establishment of inferior judiciary tribunals, Jersey, no provision. Neither of these plans commended themselves to men like Hamilton, who wanted a strong government, and were afraid of democracy or giving power to the people. He thought the Virginia plan 'but pork still with a little change of the sauce.' The Articles of Confederation amended, as in the New Jersey plan, set forth a government approved of by the opposite wing of the Convention, consisting of men like Lansing, who professed an ultra devotion to the rights and autonomy of the States. … The Convention did not go again into committee of the whole, but continued to debate the nineteen resolutions from the 19th of June until the 23d of July. Some of these were referred to grand committees, consisting of one member from each State, or they were referred to select committees consisting of five members."

K. M. Rowland, Life of George Mason, volume 2, chapter 4.

"The plan presented by Mr. Patterson, called the New Jersey plan, was concerted and arranged between the deputations of that State, of Delaware, of New York, and of Connecticut, with the individual cooperation of Mr. Luther Martin, one of the delegates of Maryland. The extreme jealousy … manifested by the representatives of the two first-named States with regard to the equal suffrage of the States in the common councils of the Confederacy, was the principal source of their aversion to the plan reported by the committee of the whole. The delegates of Connecticut, and Messrs. Lansing and Yates,—forming a majority of the delegation of New York,—united with the deputations of New Jersey and Delaware, not so much from an exclusive attachment to the principle of the sovereignty and equality of the States, as from the policy of preserving the existing framework of the confederation, and of simply vesting in Congress, as then organized, a few additional powers. It was under the influence of these mixed political views that the New Jersey plan was conceived and prepared. It proposed to vest in the existing Congress,—a single body in which all the States had an equal suffrage,—in addition to the powers already given to it by the articles of confederation, that of raising revenue by imposts and stamp and postage duties, and also that of passing acts for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and between the States; leaving the enforcement of all such acts, in the first instance, to the State courts, with an ultimate appeal to the tribunals of the United States. {3298} Whenever requisitions on the States for contributions should be made, and any State should fail to comply with such requisitions within a specified time, Congress was to be authorized to direct their collection in the non-complying States, and to pass the requisite acts for that purpose. None of the foregoing powers, however, were to be exercised by Congress without the concurrence of a certain number of the States, exceeding a bare majority of the whole. The plan also proposed the organization of a Federal executive and a Federal judiciary. … It was, finally, provided that if any State, or any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution any act of Congress passed in virtue of the powers granted to that body, or any treaty made and ratified under the authority of the United States, the Federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to the acts, or an observance of the treaties, whose execution shall have been so opposed or prevented. Such were the salient features of the plan now brought forward as a substitute for the Virginia propositions, as reported by the committee of the whole. … In the progress of the discussion upon the two plans, Colonel Hamilton, of New York, made an elaborate speech, declaring himself to be opposed to both, and suggesting a third and more absolute plan, which he thought was alone adequate to the exigencies of the country. He frankly avowed his distrust of both republican and federal government, under any modification. He entered into a minute analysis of the various sources and elements of political power, in order to show that all these would be on the side of the State governments, so long as a separate political organization of the States was maintained, and would render them an over-match for any general government that could be established, unless a 'complete sovereignty' was vested in the latter. He thought it essential, therefore, to the ends of a good and efficient government of the whole country, that the State governments, with their vast and extensive apparatus, should be extinguished; though 'he did not mean,' he said, 'to shock public opinion by proposing such a measure.' He also expressed his despair of the practicability of establishing a republican government over so extensive a country as the United States. He was sensible, at the same time, that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. Yet 'he had no scruple,' he said, 'in declaring that, in his private opinion, the British government was the best in the world, and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America.' He descanted upon the securities against injustice, violence, and innovation, afforded, in the English system, by the permanent constitution of the House of Lords, and by the elevated and independent position of the monarch. He thence deduced the necessity of as permanent a tenure as public opinion in this country would bear, of the leading branches of the new government. 'Let one branch of the legislature,' he said, 'hold their places for life, or at least during good behavior. Let the executive also be for life.' In concluding, he expressed his conviction that 'a great progress was going on in the public mind; that the people will, in time, be unshackled from their prejudices; and, whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan brought forward by Mr. Randolph [the Virginia plan] would place them, but would be ready to go as far, at least, as he proposed.' He then read a plan of government he had prepared, which, he said, he did not submit as a proposition to the convention, but as giving a correct sketch of his ideas, and to suggest the amendment which he should probably offer to the Virginia plan in the future stages of its consideration. … The convention now had presented for their consideration three distinct schemes of government: one purely Federal, founded upon the idea of preserving undiminished the sovereignty and equality of the States, and of constituting a special political agency in Congress for certain purposes, but still under the dependence and control of the States; another of a consolidated character, bottomed on the principle of a virtual annihilation of the State sovereignties and the creation of a central government, with a supreme and indefinite control over both individuals and communities; the third a mixed and balanced system, resting upon an agreed partition of the powers of sovereignty between the States and the Union,—one portion to be vested in the Union for certain objects of common and national concern, the residue retained by the States for the regulation of the general mass of their interior and domestic interests. … On the 19th of June … Mr. King, of Massachusetts, moved that 'the committee do now rise, and report that they do not agree to the propositions offered by the Honorable Mr. Patterson; and that they report to the House the resolutions offered by the Honorable Mr. Randolph, heretofore reported from a committee of the whole.' The motion was carried by the votes of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, in the affirmative,—New York, New Jersey, and Delaware voting in the negative; and Maryland, divided."

W. C. Rives, Life and Times of James Madison, chapter 29.

"It appeared," wrote Madison, in a letter to Jefferson, October 24th "to be the sincere and unanimous wish of the Convention to cherish and preserve the Union of the States. No proposition was made, no suggestion was thrown out, in favor of a partition of the Empire into two or more Confederacies. It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could not be secured by any system founded on the principle of a confederation of Sovereign States. A voluntary observance of the federal law by all the members could never be hoped for. A compulsive one could evidently never be reduced to practice, and if it could, involved equal calamities to the innocent and the guilty, the necessity of a military force, both obnoxious and dangerous, and, in general, a scene resembling much more a civil war than the administration of a regular Government. Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which, instead of operating on the States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals composing them; and hence the change in the principle and proportion of representation. {3299} This ground-work being laid, the great objects which presented themselves were: 1. To unite a proper energy in the Executive, and a proper stability in the Legislative departments, with the essential characters of Republican Government: 2. To draw a line of demarkation which would give to the General Government every power requisite for general purposes, and leave to the States every power which might be most beneficially administered by them. 3. To provide for the different interests of different parts of the Union. 4. To adjust the clashing pretensions of the large and small States.

Each of these objects was pregnant with difficulties. The whole of them together formed a task more difficult than can well be conceived by those who were not concerned in the execution of it. Adding to these considerations the natural diversity of human opinions on all new and complicated subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of concord which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle. The first of these objects, as respects the Executive, was peculiarly embarrassing. On the question whether it should consist of a single person or a plurality of co-ordinate members, on the mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree of power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated discussions took place. The plurality of co-ordinate members had finally but few advocates. Governor Randolph was at the head of them. The modes of appointment proposed were various; as by the people at large, by electors chosen by the people, by the Executives of the States, by the Congress; some preferring a joint ballot of the two Houses; some, a separate concurrent ballot, allowing to each a negative on the other house; some, a nomination of several candidates by one House, out of whom a choice should be made by the other. Several other modifications were started. The expedient at length adopted seemed to give pretty general satisfaction to the members. As to the duration in office, a few would have preferred a tenure during good behaviour; a considerable number would have done so in case an easy and effectual removal by impeachment could be settled. It was much agitated whether a long term, seven years for example, with a subsequent and perpetual ineligibility, or a short term, with a capacity to be re-elected, should be fixed. In favor of the first opinion were urged the danger of a gradual degeneracy of re-elections from time to time, into first a life and then a hereditary tenure, and the favorable effect of an incapacity to be reappointed on the independent exercise of the Executive authority. On the other side it was contended that the prospect of necessary degradation would discourage the most dignified characters from aspiring to the office; would take away the principal motive to the faithful discharge of its duties—the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment; would stimulate ambition to violent efforts for holding over the constitutional term; and instead of producing an independent administration and a firmer defence of the constitutional rights of the department, would render the officer more indifferent to the importance of a place which he would soon be obliged to quit forever, and more ready to yield to the encroachments of the Legislature, of which he might again be a member. The questions concerning the degree of power turned chiefly on the appointment to offices, and the controul on the Legislature. An absolute appointment to all offices, to some offices, to no offices, formed the scale of opinions on the first point. On the second, some contended for an absolute negative, as the only possible means of reducing to practice the theory of a free Government, which forbids a mixture of the Legislative and Executive powers. Others would be content with a revisionary power, to be overruled by three-fourths of both Houses. It was warmly urged that the judiciary department should be associated in the revision. The idea of some was, that a separate revision should be given to the two departments; that if either objected, two-thirds, if both, three-fourths, should be necessary to overrule. In forming the Senate, the great anchor of the government, the questions, as they come within the first object, turned mostly on the mode of appointment, and the duration of it. The different modes proposed were:

1. By the House of Representatives. 2. By the Executive. 3. By electors chosen by the people for the purpose. 4. By the State Legislatures.

On the point of duration, the propositions descended from good behaviour to four years, through the intermediate terms of nine, seven, six, and five years. The election of the other branch was first determined to be triennial, and afterwards reduced to biennial. The second object, the due partition of power between the General and local Governments, was perhaps, of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended for an entire abolition of the States; some, for indefinite power of Legislation in the Congress, with a negative on the laws of the States; some, for such a power without a negative; some, for a limited power of legislation, with such a negative; the majority, finally, for a limited power without the negative. The question with regard to the negative underwent repeated discussions, and was finally rejected by a bare majority. … I return to the third object above mentioned, the adjustments of the different interests of different parts of the continent. Some contended for an unlimited power over trade, including exports as well as imports, and over slaves as well as other imports; some, for such a power, provided the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses were required; some, for such a qualification of the power, with an exemption of exports and slaves; others, for an exemption of exports only. The result is seen in the Constitution. South Carolina and Georgia were inflexible on the point of the slaves. The remaining object created more embarrassment, and a greater alarm for the issue of the Convention, than all the rest put together. The little States insisted on retaining their equality in both branches, unless a compleat abolition of the State Governments should take place; and made an equality in the Senate a sine qua non. The large States, on the other hand, urged that as the new Government was to be drawn principally from the people immediately, and was to operate directly on them, not on the States; and, consequently, as the States would lose that importance which is now proportioned to the importance of their voluntary compliance with the requisitions of Congress, it was necessary that the representation in both Houses should be in proportion to their size. It ended in the compromise which you will see, but very much to the dissatisfaction of several members from the large States."

J. Madison, Letters and other Writings, volume 1, pages 344-354.

{3300}

"Those who proposed only to amend the old Articles of Confederation and opposed a new Constitution, objected that a government formed under such a Constitution would be not a federal, but a national, government. Luther Martin said, when he returned to Maryland, that the delegates 'appeared totally to have forgot the business for which we were sent. … We had not been sent to form a government over the inhabitants of America considered as individuals. … That the system of government we were intrusted to prepare was a government over these thirteen States; but that in our proceedings we adapted principles which would be right and proper only on the supposition that there were no state governments at all, but that all the inhabitants of this extensive continent were in their individual capacity, without government, and in a state of nature.' He added that, 'in the whale system there was but one federal feature, the appointment of the senators by the States in their sovereign capacity, that is by their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it was said that this feature was only federal in appearance.' The Senate, the second house as it was called in the convention, was in part created, it is needless to say, to meet, or rather in obedience to, reasoning like this. … The Luther Martin protestants were too radical to remain in the convention to the end, when they saw that such a confederacy as they wanted was impossible. But there were not many who went the length they did in believing that a strong central government was necessarily the destruction of the state governments. Still fewer were those who would have brought this about if they could. … The real difficulty, as Madison said in the debate on that question, and as he repeated again and again after that question was settled, was not between the larger and smaller States, but between the North and South; between those States that held slaves and those that had none. Slavery in the Constitution, which has given so much trouble to the Abolitionists of this century, and, indeed, to everybody else, gave quite as much in the last century to those who put it there. Many of the wisest and best men of the time, Southerners as well as Northerners, and among them Madison, were opposed to slavery. … Everywhere north of South Carolina, slavery was looked upon as a misfortune which it was exceedingly desirable to be free from at the earliest possible moment; everywhere north of Mason and Dixon's Line, measures had already been taken, or were certain soon to be taken, to put an end to it; and by the Ordinance for the government of all the territory north of the Ohio River, it was absolutely prohibited by Congress, in the same year in which the Constitutional Congress met. But it was, nevertheless, a thing to the continued existence of which the anti-slavery people of that time could consent without any violation of conscience. Bad as it was, unwise, wasteful, cruel, a mockery of every pretense of respect for the rights of man, they did not believe it to be absolutely wicked. … The question with the North was, how far could it yield; with the South, how far could it encroach. It turned mainly an representation. … There were some who maintained at first that the slave population should not be represented at all. Hamilton proposed in the first days of the convention 'that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants.'"

S. H. Gay, James Madison, chapters 7-8.

"When the great document was at last drafted by Gouverneur Morris, and was all ready far the signatures [September 17, 1787], the aged Franklin produced a paper, which was read for him, as his voice was weak. Same parts of this Constitution, he said, he did not approve, but he was astonished to find it so nearly perfect. Whatever opinion he had of its errors he would sacrifice to the public good, and he hoped that every member of the convention who still had objections would on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and for the sake of unanimity put his name to this instrument. Hamilton added his plea. A few members, he said, by refusing to sign, might do infinite mischief. … From these appeals, as well as from Washington's solemn warning at the outset, we see how distinctly it was realized that the country was on the verge of civil war. Most of the members felt so, but to some the new government seemed far too strong, and there were three who dreaded despotism even more than anarchy. Mason, Randolph, and Gerry refused to sign. … In the signatures the twelve states which had taken part in the work were all represented, Hamilton signing alone for New York."

J. Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, page 303.

A "popular delusion with regard to the Constitution is that it was created out of nothing; or, as Mr. Gladstone puts it, that ·It is the greatest work ever struck off at any one time by the mind and purpose of man.' The radical view on the other side is expressed by Sir Henry Maine, who informs us that the 'Constitution of the United States is a modified version of the British Constitution … which was in existence between 1760 and 1787.' The real source of the Constitution is the experience of Americans. They had established and developed admirable little commonwealths in the colonies; since the beginning of the Revolution they had had experience of State governments organized on a different basis from the colonial; and, finally, they had carried on two successive national governments, with which they had been profoundly discontented. The general outline of the new Constitution seems to be English; it was really colonial. The President's powers of military command, of appointment, and of veto were similar to those of the colonial governor. National courts were created on the model of colonial courts. A legislature of two houses was accepted because such legislatures had been common in colonial times. In the English Parliamentary system as it existed before 1760 the Americans had had no share; the later English system of Parliamentary responsibility was not yet developed, and had never been established in colonial governments; and they expressly excluded it from their new Constitution. They were little more affected by the experience of other European nations. … The chief source of the details of the Constitution was the State constitutions and laws then in force. Thus the clause conferring a suspensive veto on the President is an almost literal transcript from the Massachusetts constitution. In fact, the principal experiment in the Constitution was the establishment of an electoral college; and of all parts of the system this has worked least as the framers expected. The Constitution represents, therefore, the accumulated experience of the time. … The real boldness of the Constitution is the novelty of the federal system which it set up."

A. B. Hart, Formation of the Union (Epochs of American History), section 62.

{3301}

"That a constitution should be framed in detail by a body of uninstructed delegates, expressly chosen for that purpose, was familiar in the States of the Union; but was perhaps unexampled elsewhere in the world, and was certainly unexampled in the history of federations. That the instrument of federal government should provide for proportional representation in one house, and for a federal court, was a step in federal organization which marks a new federal principle. For many purposes the Union then created was stronger than the Prussian monarchy at that moment. In many respects the States were left stronger than the little nominally independent German principalities. The great merit of the members of the convention is their understanding of the temper of their own countrymen. They selected out Of English, or colonial, or State usages such practices and forms as experience had shown to be acceptable to the people. … The Convention had further the wisdom to express their work in general though carefully stated principles. All previous federal governments had been fettered either by an imperfect and inadequate statement, as in the constitution of the United Netherlands, or by an unwritten constitution with an accumulation of special precedents, as in the Holy Roman Empire. The phrases of the Constitution of 1787 were broad enough to cover cases unforeseen. A third distinction of the federal Convention is the skill with which it framed acceptable compromises upon the three most difficult questions before it. The two Houses of Congress satisfied both large and small States; the three-fifths representation of slaves postponed an inevitable conflict; the allowance of the slave trade for a term of years made it possible for Congress to perfect commercial legislation. The Convention had profited by the experience of the Confederation: on every page of the Constitution may be found clauses which would not have stood there had it been framed in 1781. An adequate revenue was provided; foreign and interstate commerce was put under the control of Congress; the charge of foreign affairs was given entirely to the central authority; the powers of government were distributed among three departments."

A. B. Hart, Introduction to the Study of Federal Government, chapter 4.

ALSO IN: _I. Eliot, Debates in the Convention at Philadelphia, 1787._

_J. Madison, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution._

W. C. Rives, Life and Times of James Madison, chapters 27-33 (volume 2).

G. Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States.

_G. T. Curtis, History of the Constitution of the United States._

_C. E. Stevens, Sources of the Constitution of the United States._

_J. H. Robinson, The Original and Derived Features of the Constitution. (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, volume l)._

For the text of the Constitution.

See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787-1789. The struggle for the Federal Constitution in the States. Its ratification. The end of the Confederation.

The fate of the proposed Constitution remained doubtful for many months after the adjournment of the convention. Hamilton said it would be arrogance to conjecture the result. … Delaware was the first state to accept it, [December 7, 1787]. Gratified by the concession of equality in the federal Senate, the ratification was prompt, enthusiastic, and unanimous. Pennsylvania was the second [December 12]. The opposition was sharp, but Franklin was president of the state, and Wilson a delegate to the state convention. Their influence was great. … The ratification was effected by a vote of 46 to 23. Then New Jersey [December 18] and Georgia [January 2, 1788] followed unanimously. Next came Connecticut [January 9] by a vote of 128 to 40. The result in these five states was the more easily obtained because the friends of the Constitution were prompt to act. With delay in the other states came a bitterness of contention which made the result doubtful. The first close struggle was in Massachusetts. The public creditor favored the proposed Constitution. He saw in it some hope of his long deferred pay. But the debtor class opposed it; for it would put an end to cheap paper money, with which they hoped to pay their debts, when it became still cheaper. … Hancock and Adams scarcely favored the Constitution. They feared it infringed upon the rights of the people, and especially upon the rights of the states. … Hancock finally came forward as a mediator. He proposed that the Constitution be ratified, with an accompanying recommendation that it be amended in the particulars in which it was thought to be defective. His proposition was adopted, and the Constitution was ratified [February 6] by a vote of 187 to 168. Maryland next ratified the Constitution with much unanimity [April 28], notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of Luther Martin. … South Carolina followed next [May 23], and ratified the Constitution by a majority of 76, but recommended amendments substantially like those of Massachusetts. South Carolina was the eighth state; and, if one more could be obtained, the Constitution would take effect between the nine ratifying states. There remained the five states of Virginia, New York, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. The state convention of Virginia was called for the 2d of June 1788, of New York for the 17th, and of New Hampshire for the 18th of the same month. The result was expected to be adverse in everyone of these states. In Virginia the opposition was led by Patrick Henry. … Henry was ably seconded by Richard Henry Lee, William Grayson, and George Mason. … James Monroe followed their lead. James Madison and Governor Randolph were the leading champions of the new Constitution. … John Marshall, afterwards chief justice, came to their assistance. … The debate lasted a month. It may be read with instruction, as it is reported in the volumes of Elliot. The ratification prevailed [June 25] by a majority of ten in a vote of 186. After all, the influence of Washington procured the result. … Meanwhile, the state of New Hampshire had ratified the Constitution [June 21], but the fact was not known in Virginia. The opposition to the Constitution was great and bitter in the State of New York. Fortunately the convention was held so late that New Hampshire, the ninth state, had ratified while the New York convention was engaged in its heated discussions. Two thirds of the delegates were elected to oppose it. … The friends of the Constitution felt, long before the convention assembled, that public discussion might be useful in overcoming the hostile attitude of the state. {3302} Accordingly, a series of essays in exposition of the Constitution was written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, over the common signature of 'Publius.' These essays were published in a newspaper, between October, 1787, and June, 1788. … They were subsequently collected and published in a volume styled 'The Federalist.' From that day to this, 'The Federalist' has held unequalled rank as an authority upon the construction of the Constitution." On the 24th of June a fleet courier, employed by Hamilton, brought from Concord to Poughkeepsie, where the New York convention sat, news of the ratification of the Constitution by New Hampshire, the ninth state. "Now, indeed, the situation was changed. There was no longer a confederacy; the Union was already formed. … The state must either join the new system or stay out of it. New York was not favorably situated for a separate nation. New England on the east, and New Jersey and Pennsylvania on the south, belonged to the new Union. Canada was on the north. … Delay, with its altered circumstances, finally brought to Hamilton and his party the victory that had been denied to argument and eloquence. But the Anti-Federalists were reluctant to yield, and the debate was prolonged," until the 26th of July, when the ratification was carried by 30 votes against 27. "North Carolina remained out of the Union until November, 1789, and Rhode Island until June, 1790. … The ratification by nine states having been certified to the Congress of the Confederacy, that body adopted a resolution fixing the first Wednesday of March, 1789, as the day when the new government should go into operation. As the day fell on the 4th of March, that day became fixed for the beginning and the end of congressional and presidential terms."

J. S. Landon, Constitutional History and Government of the United States, lecture 4.

ALSO IN: J. Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, chapter 7.

G. T. Curtis, History of the Constitution of the United States, book 5 (volume 2).

G. Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution, book 4 (volume 2).

J. Elliot, editor, Debates in the State Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.

The Federalist.

A. Hamilton, Works, volume 2.

W. C. Rives, Life and Times of Madison, chapters 34-36 (volume 2).

K. M. Rowland, Life of George Mason. volume 2, chapters 6-8.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789. The First Presidential Election. Washington called to the head of the new Government.

"The adoption of the Federal constitution was another epoch in the life of Washington. Before the official forms of an election could be carried into operation a unanimous sentiment throughout the Union pronounced him the nation's choice to fill the presidential chair. He looked forward to the possibility of his election with characteristic modesty and unfeigned reluctance; as his letters to his confidential friends bear witness. … The election took place at the appointed time [the first Wednesday in January, 1789], and it was soon ascertained that Washington was chosen President for the term of four years from the 4th of March. By this time the arguments and entreaties of his friends, and his own convictions of public expediency, had determined him to accept. … From a delay in forming a quorum of Congress the votes of the electoral college were not counted until early in April, when they were found to be unanimous in favor of Washington 'The delay,' said he in a letter to General Knox, 'may be compared to a reprieve; for in confidence I tell you (with the world it would obtain little credit), that my movements to the chair of government will be accompanied by feelings not unlike those of a culprit, who is going to the place of his execution; so unwilling am I, in the evening of a life nearly consumed in public cares, to quit a peaceful abode for an ocean of difficulties, without that competency of political skill, abilities and inclination, which are necessary to manage the helm.' … At length on the 14th of April he received a letter from the president of Congress, duly notifying him of his election; and he prepared to set out immediately for New York, the seat of government."

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 4, chapter 37.

The secondary electoral votes, by which the Vice President was, at that time, chosen, were scattered among eleven candidates. John Adams received the greater number (34) though not quite a majority of the 69, and was elected.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789. Passage of the Act of Congress organizing the Supreme Court of the United States.

See SUPREME COURT.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789-1792. Hamilton's report on Manufactures.

See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1789-1791.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789-1792; Organization of the Federal government and first administration of Washington. The dividing of Parties. Federalists and Democratic Republicans.

"March 4th, 1789, had been appointed for the formal inauguration of the new Government, but the members elect had not yet unlearned the Confederacy's slovenly habits. It was not until April 6th that a sufficient number of members of Congress arrived in New York to form a quorum and count the electoral votes. At that time, and until 1805, no electoral votes were cast distinctively for President and Vice-President. Each elector voted by ballot for two persons. If a majority of all the votes were cast for any person, he who received the greatest number of votes became President, and he who received the next greatest number became Vice-President. When the votes were counted in 1789 they were found to be, for George Washington, of Virginia, 69 (each of the electors having given him one vote), for John Adams, of Massachusetts, 34, and 35 for various other candidates. Washington received notice of his election, and, after a triumphal progress northward from his home at Mount Vernon, was sworn into office April 30th [at Federal Hall, corner Wall and Nassau Streets, New York]. The Vice-President had taken his place as presiding officer of the Senate a few days before. Frederick A. Muhlenberg, of Pennsylvania, was chosen Speaker of the House, but the vote had no party divisions, for Parties were still in a state of utter confusion. Between the extreme Anti-federalists, who considered the Constitution a long step toward a despotism, and the extreme Federalists, who desired a monarchy modeled on that of England, there were all varieties of political opinion. … The extreme importance of Washington lay in his ability, through the universal confidence in his integrity and good judgment, to hold together this alliance of moderate men for a time, and to prevent party contests upon the interpretation of federal powers until the Constitution should show its merit and be assured of existence. {3303} The President selected his Cabinet with a careful regard to the opposite opinions of his supporters. The Treasury Department was given to Alexander Hamilton, of New York, a Federalist. … The War Department was given to General Henry Knox, of Massachusetts, also a Federalist. The State Department was given to Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, an Anti-federalist. … Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, also an Anti-federalist, was appointed Attorney-General, and John Jay, of New York, a Federalist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Twelve Amendments were adopted by this Session of Congress, in order to meet the conscientious objections of many moderate Anti-federalists, and to take the place of a 'Bill of Rights.' Ten of these, having received the assent of the necessary number of States, became a part of the Constitution, and now stand the first ten of the Amendments. They were intended to guarantee freedom of religion, speech, person, and property. … January 9th [1790] Hamilton offered his famous Report on the Settlement of the Public Debt. It consisted of three recommendations, first, that the foreign debt of the Confederacy should be assumed land paid in full; second, that the domestic debt of the Confederacy, which had fallen far below par and had become a synonym for worthlessness, should also be paid at its par value; and third, that the debts incurred by the States during the Revolution, and still unpaid, should be assumed and paid in full by the Federal Government. Hamilton's First recommendation was adopted unanimously. The Second was opposed, even by Madison and many moderate Anti-federalists, on the ground that the domestic debt was held by speculators, who had bought it at a heavy discount, and would thus gain usurious interest on their investment. Hamilton's supporters argued that, if only for that reason, they should be paid in full, that holders of United States securities might learn not to sell them at a discount, and that the national credit might thus be strengthened for all time to come. After long debate the second recommendation was also adopted. Hamilton's Third recommendation involved a question of the powers of the Federal Government. It therefore for the first time united all the Anti-federalists in opposition to it. They feared that the rope of sand of the Confederacy was being carried to the opposite extreme; that the 'money power' would, by this measure, be permanently attached to the Federal Government; and that the States would be made of no importance. But even this recommendation was adopted, though only by a vote of 31 to 26 in the House. A few days later, however, the Anti-federalists received a reinforcement of seven newly arrived North Carolina members. The third resolution was at once reconsidered, and voted down by a majority of two. Hamilton secured the final adoption of the third resolution by a bargain which excited the deep indignation of the Anti-federalists. A National Capital was to be selected. The Federalists agreed to vote that it should be fixed upon the Potomac River [see WASHINGTON (CITY): A. D. 1791], after remaining ten years in Philadelphia, and two Anti-federalist members from the Potomac agreed in return to vote for the third resolution, which was then finally adopted. Hamilton's entire report was thus successful. Its immediate effects were to appreciate the credit of the United States, and to enrich the holders of the Continental debt. Its further effect was to make Hamilton so much disliked by Anti-federalists that, despite his acknowledged talents, his party never ventured to nominate him for any elective office. … Party Organization may be considered as fairly begun about the close [of the first Session of the Second Congress, in 1792]. … The various Anti-federalist factions, by union in resisting the Federalists, had learned to forget minor differences and had been welded into one party which only lacked a name. That of Anti-federalist was no longer applicable, for its opposition to the Federal Union had entirely ceased. A name was supplied by Jefferson, the recognized leader of the party, after the French Revolution had fairly begun its course. That political convulsion had, for some time after 1789, the sympathy of both Federalists and Anti-federalists, for it seemed the direct outgrowth of the American Revolution. But, as its leveling objects became more apparent, the Federalists grew cooler and the Anti-federalists warmer towards it. The latter took great pains, even by dress and manners, to show the keenness of their sympathy for the Republicans of France, and about this time adopted the name Democratic-Republican, which seemed sufficiently comprehensive for a full indication of their principles. This has always been the official party title. It is now abbreviated to Democratic, though the name Democrat was at first used by Federalists as one of contempt, and the party called itself Republican, a title which it could hardly claim with propriety, for its tendency has always been toward a democracy, as that of its opponents has been toward a strong republic. The name Republican, therefore, belongs most properly to its present possessors (1879). But it must be remembered that the party which will be called Republican until about 1828 was the party which is now called Democratic."

A. Johnston, History of American Politics, chapter 2.

Jefferson's bitterness of hostility to the Federalists was due to the belief that they aimed at the overthrow of the Republic. His conviction as to these really treasonable purposes in the leaders of the party was often expressed, but never more distinctly than in a letter written in 1813 to an English traveller, Mr. Melish. At the same time, he set forth the principles and aims of his own party: "Among that section of our citizens called federalists," he wrote, "there are three shades of opinion. Distinguishing between the leaders and people who compose it, the leaders consider the English constitution as a model of perfection, some, with a correction of its vices, others, with all its corruptions and abuses. This last was Alexander Hamilton's opinion, which others, as well as myself, have often heard him declare, and that a correction of what are called its vices would render the English an impracticable government. This government they wished to have established here, and only accepted and held fast, at first, to the present constitution, as a stepping-stone to the final establishment of their favorite model. This party has therefore always clung to England as their prototype and great auxiliary in promoting and effecting this change. A weighty minority, however, of these leaders, considering the voluntary conversion of our government into a monarchy as too distant, if not desperate, wish to break off from our Union its eastern fragment, as being, in truth, the hot-bed of American monarchism, with a view to a commencement of their favorite government, from whence the other States may gangrene by degrees, and the whole be thus brought finally to the desired point. {3304} For Massachusetts, the prime mover in this enterprise, is the last State in the Union to mean a final separation, as being of all the most dependent on the others. Not raising bread for the sustenance of her own inhabitants, not having a stick of timber for the construction of vessels, her principal occupation, nor an article to export in them, where would she be, excluded from the ports of the other States, and thrown into dependence on England, her direct, and natural, but now insidious rival? At the head of this minority is what is called the Essex Junto of Massachusetts. But the majority of these leaders do not aim at separation. In this, they adhere to the known principle of General Hamilton, never, under any views, to break the Union. Anglomany, monarchy, and separation, then, are the principles of the Essex federalists. Anglomany and monarchy, those of the Hamiltonians, and Anglomany alone, that of the portion among the people who call themselves federalists. These last are as good republicans as the brethren whom they oppose, and differ from them only in their devotion to England and hatred of France which they have imbibed from their leaders. The moment that these leaders should avowedly propose a separation of the Union, or the establishment of regal government, their popular adherents would quit them to a man, and join the republican standard; and the partisans of this change, even in Massachusetts, would thus find themselves an army of officers without a soldier. The party called republican is steadily for the support of the present constitution. They obtained at its commencement all the amendments to it they desired. These reconciled them to it perfectly, and if they have any ulterior view, it is only, perhaps, to popularize it further, by shortening the Senatorial term, and devising a process for the responsibility of judges, more practicable than that of impeachment. They esteem the people of England and France equally, and equally detest the governing powers of both. This I verily believe, after an intimacy of forty years with the public councils and characters, is a true statement of the grounds on which they are at present divided, and that it is not merely an ambition for power. An honest man can feel no pleasure in the exercise of power over his fellow citizens. And considering as the only offices of power those conferred by the people directly, that is to say, the executive and legislative functions of the General and State governments, the common refusal of these, and multiplied resignations, are proofs sufficient that power is not alluring to pure minds, and is not, with them, the primary principle of contest. This is my belief of it; it is that on which I have acted; and had it been a mere contest who should be permitted to administer the government according to its genuine republican principles, there has never been a moment of my life in which I should have relinquished for it the enjoyments of my family, my farm, my friends and books. You expected to discover the difference of our party principles in General Washington's valedictory, and my inaugural address. Not at all. General Washington did not harbor one principle of federalism. He was neither an Angloman, a monarchist, nor a separatist. He sincerely wished the people to have as much self-government as they were competent to exercise themselves. The only point on which he and I ever differed in opinion, was, that I had more confidence than he had in the natural integrity and discretion of the people, and in the safety and extent to which they might trust themselves with a control over their government. He has asseverated to me a thousand times his determination that the existing government should have a fair trial, and that in support of it he would spend the last drop of his blood. He did this the more repeatedly, because he knew General Hamilton's political bias, and my apprehensions from it."

_T. Jefferson, Letter to Mr. Melish, January 13, 1813 (Writings, edited by Washington, volume 6)._

The view taken at the present day of the Federalism and the Federalists of the first three decades of the Union, among those who see more danger in the centrifugal than in the centripetal forces in government, are effectively stated in the following: "The popular notion in regard to Federalism is that to which the name naturally gives rise. By Federalists are commonly understood those men who advocated a union of the States and an efficient Federal government. This conception is true, but is at the same time so limited that it may fairly be called superficial. The name arose from its first object which the friends of the Constitution strove to achieve; but this object, the more perfect union, and even the Constitution itself, were but means to ends of vastly more importance. The ends which the Federalists sought formed the great principles on which the party was founded, and it can be justly said that no nobler or better ends were ever striven for by any political party or by any statesmen. The first and paramount object of the Federalists was to build up a nation and to create a national sentiment. For this they sought a more perfect union. Their next object was to give the nation they had called into existence not only a government, but a strong government. To do this, they had not only to devise a model, to draw a constitution, to organize a legislature, executive, and judiciary, but they had to equip the government thus formed with all those adjuncts without which no government can long exist under the conditions of modern civilization. The Federalists had to provide for the debt, devise a financial and foreign policy, organize an army, fortify the ports, found a navy, impose and collect taxes, and put in operation an extensive revenue system. We of the English race—whose creed is that governments and great political systems grow and develop slowly, are the results of climate, soil, race, tradition, and the exigencies of time and place, who wholly disavow the theory that perfect governments spring in a night from the heated brains of Frenchmen or Spaniards—can best appreciate the task with which our ancestors grappled. … Upon a people lately convulsed by civil war, upon a people who had lost their old political habits and traditions without finding new ones in their stead, it was necessary to impose a government, and to create a national sentiment. This the Federalists did, and they need no other eulogy. {3305} With no undue national pride, we can justly say that the adoption and support of the Constitution offer an example of the political genius of the Anglo-Saxon race to which history cannot furnish a parallel. The political party to whose exertions these great results were due was the Federal party. They were the party of order, of good government, and of conservatism. Against them was ranged a majority of their fellow-citizens. But this majority was wild, anarchical, disunited. The only common ground on which they could meet was that of simple opposition. The only name they had was anti-Federalists. They had neither leaders, discipline, objects, nor even a party cry. Before the definite aims and concentrated ability of the Federalists, they fled in helpless disorder, like an unarmed mob before advancing soldiers. But, though dispersed, the anti-Federalists were still in a numerical majority. They needed a leader, organization, and opportunity, and they soon found all three. Thomas Jefferson arrived in New York, not only to enter into Washington's cabinet, and lend the aid of his great talents to the success of the new scheme, but soon also to put himself at the head of the large though demoralized opposition to the administration he had sworn to support. Filled with the wild democratic theories which his susceptible nature had readily imbibed in France, Jefferson soon infused them into the minds of most of his followers. Instead of a vague dislike to any and all government, he substituted a sharp and factious opposition to each and every measure proposed by the friends of the Constitution."

H. C. Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, chapter 11.

ALSO IN: W. C. Rives, Life and Times of Madison, chapters 37-46 (volume 3).

J. Parton, Life of Jefferson, chapters 42-47.

M. Van Buren, Political Parties in the United States, chapters 2-4.

J. D. Hammond, History of Political Parties in New York, volume 1, chapters 1-2.

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 5, chapters 1-16.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789-1810. Founding of the Roman Episcopate.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1789-1810.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1790. The First Census.

Total population, 3,929,827, classed and distributed as follows:

North.

White. Free black. Slave. Connecticut. 232,581 2,801 2,759 Maine. 96,002 538 0 Massachusetts. 373,254 5,463 0 New Hampshire. 141,111 630 158 New Jersey. 169,954 2,762 11,423 New York. 314,142 4,654 21,324 Pennsylvania. 424,099 6,537 3,737 Rhode Island. 64,689 3,469 952 Vermont. 85,144 255 17 --- --- --- Total 1,900,976 27,109 40,370

South.

White. Free black. Slave. Delaware. 46,310 3,899 8,887 Georgia. 52,886 398 29,264 Kentucky. 61,133 114 11,830 Maryland. 208,649 8,043 103,036 North Carolina. 288,204 4,975 100,572 South Carolina. 140,178 1,801 107,094 Tennessee. 32,013 361 3,417 Virginia. 442,115 12,766 293,427 --- --- --- Total 1,271,488 32,357 657,527

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1790-1795. War with the Indian tribes of the Northwest. Disastrous expeditions of Harmar and St. Clair, and Wayne's decisive victory.

See NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY: A. D. 1790-1795.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1791. Admission of Vermont to the Union.

See VERMONT: A. D. 1790-1791.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1791. Incorporation of the first Bank of the United States.

See MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1791-1816.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1791. The founding of the Federal Capital.

See WASHINGTON (CITY): A. D. 1791.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1791. Adoption of the first ten Amendments to the Federal Constitution.

The first ten amendments to the Constitution (see CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA), embodying a declaration of rights which was thought to be necessary by many who had consented to the adoption of the Constitution, but only with the understanding that such amendments should be added, were proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the First Congress, on the 25th of September, 1789. At different dates between November 20, 1789 and December 15, 1791, they were ratified by eleven of the then fourteen States. "There is no evidence on the journals of Congress that the legislatures of Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts ratified them."

Constitution, Rules and Manual of the UNITED STATES SENATE (1885) page 61.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1792. Admission of Kentucky to the Union. Slavery in the Constitution of the new State.

See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1789-1792.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1792. Second Presidential Election.

George Washington re-elected with unanimity, receiving 132 votes of the Electoral College, John Adams, Vice President, receiving 77 votes, with 50 cast for George Clinton, 4 for Jefferson and 1 for Burr.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1793. The First Fugitive Slave Law.

For some time after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, its provision relating to the rendition of persons "held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another" remained without legislation to execute it; "and it is a striking fact that the call for legislation came not from the South, but from a free State; and that it was provoked, not by fugitive slaves, but by kidnappers. … A free negro named John was seized at Washington, Pennsylvania, in 1791, and taken to Virginia. The Governor of Pennsylvania, at the instigation of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, asked the return of the three kidnappers; but the Governor of Virginia replied that, since there was no national law touching such a case, he could not carry out the request. On the matter being brought to the notice of Congress by the Governor of Pennsylvania," a bill was passed which "became law by the signature of the President, February 12, 1793. … The act provided at the same time for the recovery of fugitives from justice and from labor; but the alleged criminal was to have a protection through the requirement of a requisition, a protection denied to the man on trial for his liberty only. The act was applicable to fugitive apprentices as well as to slaves, a provision of some importance at the time. In the Northwest Territory there were so-called negro apprentices, who were virtually slaves, and to whom the law applied, since it was in terms extended to all the Territories. Proceedings began with the forcible seizure of the alleged fugitive. The act, it will be observed, does not admit a trial by jury. {3306} It allowed the owner of the slave, his agent or attorney, to seize the fugitive and take him before any judge of a United States Circuit or District Court, or any local magistrate. The only requirement for the conviction of the slave was the testimony of his master, or the affidavit of some magistrate in the State from which he came, certifying that such a person had escaped. Hindering arrest or harboring a slave was punishable by a fine of five hundred dollars. The law thus established a system allowing the greatest harshness to the slave and every favor to the master. Even at that time, when persons might still be born slaves in New York and New Jersey, and gradual emancipation had not yet taken full effect in Rhode Island and Connecticut, it was repellent to the popular sense of justice; there were two cases of resistance 'to the principle of the act before the close of 1793. Until 1850 no further law upon this subject was passed, but as the provisions of 1793 were found ineffectual, many attempts at amendment were made."

_M. G. McDougall, Fugitive Slaves, 1619-1865 (Fay House Monographs, number 3), pages 17-19._

"The fugitive-slave clause in the Constitution is of course obligatory, but there is a wide distinction between the fugitive-slave clause and the fugitive-slave law. The Constitution gives no power to Congress to legislate on the subject, but imposes on the States the obligation of rendition. Chief-Justice Hornblower, of New York, and Chancellor Walworth, of New York, long since pronounced the fugitive law of '93 unconstitutional on this very ground."

_William Jay, Letter to Josiah Quincy (quoted in B. Tuckerman's "William Jay and the Constitutional Movement for the Abolition of Slavery")._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1793. Popular sympathy with the French Revolution. Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality. Insolent conduct of the French minister, Genet.

"The French Revolution, as was natural from the all-important services rendered by France to the United States in their own revolutionary struggle, enlisted the warm sympathy of the American people. … As the United States were first introduced to the family of nations by the alliance with France of 1778, the very important question arose, on the breaking out of the war between France and England, how far they were bound to take part in the contest. The second article of the treaty of alliance seemed to limit its operation to the then existing war between the United States and Great Britain; but by the eleventh article the two contracting powers agreed to 'guarantee mutually from the present time and forever, against all other powers,' the territories of which the allies might be in possession respectively at the moment the war between France and Great Britain should break out, which was anticipated as the necessary consequence of the alliance. Not only were the general sympathies of America strongly with France, but the course pursued by Great Britain toward the United States, since the peace of 1783, was productive of extreme irritation, especially her refusal to give up the western posts, which … had the effect of involving the northwestern frontier in a prolonged and disastrous Indian war. These causes, together with the recent recollections of the revolutionary struggle, disposed the popular mind to make common cause with France, in what was regarded as the war of a people struggling for freedom against the combined despots of Europe. Washington, however, from the first, determined to maintain the neutrality of the country;" and, with the unanimous advice of his cabinet, he issued (April 22, 1793) a proclamation of neutrality. "This proclamation, though draughted by Mr. Jefferson and unanimously adopted by the Cabinet, was violently assailed by the organs of the party which followed his lead. … The growing excitement of the popular mind was fanned to a flame by the arrival at Charleston, South Carolina [April 9], of 'Citizen' Genet, who was sent as the minister of the French Republic to the United States. Without repairing to the seat of government, or being accredited in any way, in his official capacity, he began to fit out privateers in Charleston, to cruise against the commerce of England. Although the utmost gentleness and patience were observed by the executive of the United States in checking this violation of their neutrality, Genet assumed from the first a tone of defiance, and threatened before long to appeal from the government to the people. These insolent demonstrations were of course lost upon Washington's firmness and moral courage. They distressed, but did not in the slightest degree intimidate him; and their effect on the popular mind was to some extent neutralized by the facts, that the chief measures to maintain the neutrality of the country had been unanimously advised by the Cabinet, and that the duty of rebuking his intemperate course had devolved upon the secretary of state [Jefferson], the recognized head of the party to which Genet looked for sympathy."

E. Everett, Life of Washington, chapter 8.

A demand for "Genet's recall was determined on during the first days of August. There was some discussion over the manner of requesting the recall, but the terms were made gentle by Jefferson, to the disgust of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War [Hamilton and Knox], who desired direct methods and stronger language. As finally toned up and agreed upon by the President and cabinet, the document was sufficiently vigorous to annoy Genet, and led to bitter reproaches addressed to his friend in the State Department. … The letter asking Genet's recall, as desired by Washington, went in due time, and in the following February came a successor. Genet, however, did not go back to his native land, for he preferred to remain here and save his head, valueless as that article would seem to have been. He spent the rest of his days in America, married, harmless, and quite obscure. His noise and fireworks were soon over, and one wonders now how he could ever have made as much flare and explosion as he did."

H. C. Lodge, George Washington, volume 2, pages 155-156.

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, Life of Jefferson, volume 2, chapter 4.

J. T. Morse, Life of Hamilton, volume 2, chapter 3.

American State Papers, volume 1, pages 140-188, 243-246, and 311-314.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1793. Whitney's Cotton-gin and the series of inventions which it made complete. Their political effect. The strengthening of the Slave Power, and the strengthening of Unionism.

"Some English artisans, who, about the middle of the last century, were obtaining a scanty living by spinning, weaving and other such occupations, turned their inventive talent to the improvement of their art. {3307} Paul and Wyatt introduced the operation of spinning by rollers; Highs, or Hargreaves, invented the jenny, by which a great many threads could be spun as easily as one. Paul devised the rotating carding-engine; Crompton the mule; Arkwright the water-frame, which produced any number of threads of any degree of fineness and hardness. These ingenious machines constituted a very great improvement on the spindle and distaff of ancient times, and on the spinning-wheel, originally brought from Asia, or perhaps reinvented in Europe. At length one spinner was able to accomplish as much work as one hundred could have formerly done. While the art of producing threads was undergoing this singular improvement, Cartwright, a clergyman, invented, in 1785, the power-loom, intended to supersede the operation of weaving by hand, and to make the production of textile fabrics altogether the result of machinery. After some modifications, that loom successfully accomplished the object for which it was devised. As these inventions succeeded, they necessarily led to a demand for motive power. In the first little cotton factory, the germ of that embodiment of modern industry, the cotton-mill, a water-wheel was employed to give movement to the machinery. The establishment was, therefore, necessarily placed near a stream, where a sufficient fall could be obtained. The invention of the steam-engine by Watt, which was the consequence of the new and correct views of the nature of vapors that had been established by Dr. Black, supplied, in due time, the required motive power, and by degrees the water-wheel went almost out of use. Textile manufacture needed now but one thing more to become of signal importance—it needed a more abundant supply of raw material. … Cotton, the fibre chiefly concerned in these improvements, was obtained in limited quantities from various countries; but, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, not a single pound was exported from the United States. What was grown here was for domestic consumption. Every good housewife had her spinning-wheel, every plantation its hand-loom. The difficulty of supplying cotton fibre in quantity sufficient to meet the demands of the new machinery was due to the imperfect means in use for separating the cotton from its seeds—a tedious operation, for the picking was done by hand. Eli Whitney, a native of Massachusetts, by his invention of the cotton-gin in 1793, removed that difficulty. The fibre could be separated from the seeds with rapidity and at a trifling cost. There was nothing now to prevent an extraordinary development in the English manufactures. A very few years showed what the result would be. In 1790 no cotton was exported from the United States. Whitney's gin was introduced in 1793. The next year about 1½ million of pounds were exported; in 1795, about 5¼ millions; in 1860, the quantity had reached 2,000 millions of pounds. The political effect of this mechanical invention, which thus proved to be the completion of all the previous English inventions, being absolutely necessary to give them efficacy, was at once seen in its accomplishing a great increase and a redistribution of population in England. … In the United States the effects were still more important. Cotton could be grown through all the Southern Atlantic and the Gulf States. It was more profitable than any other crop—but it was raised by slaves. Whatever might have been the general expectation respecting the impending extinction of slavery, it was evident that at the commencement of this century the conditions had altogether changed. A powerful interest had come into unforeseen existence both in Europe and America which depended on perpetuating that mode of labor. Moreover, before long it was apparent that, partly because of the adaptation of their climate to the growth of the plant, partly because of the excellence of the product, and partly owing to the increasing facilities for interior transportation, the cotton-growing states of America would have a monopoly in the supply of this staple. But, though mechanical invention had reinvigorated the slave power by bestowing on it the cotton-gin, it had likewise strengthened unionism by another inestimable gift—the steam-boat. At the very time that the African slave-trade was prohibited, Fulton was making his successful experiment of the navigation of the Hudson River by steam. This improvement in inland navigation rendered available, in a manner never before contemplated, the river and lake system of the continent; it gave an instantaneous value to the policy of Jefferson, by bringing into effectual use the Mississippi and its tributaries; it crowded with population the shores of the lakes; it threw the whole continent open to commerce, it strengthened the central power at Washington by diminishing space, and while it extended geographically the domain of the republic, it condensed it politically. It bound all parts of the Union more firmly together. … In the Constitution it had been agreed that three fifths of the slaves should be accounted as federal numbers in the apportionment of federal representation. A political advantage was thus given to slave labor. This closed the eyes of the South to all other means of solving its industrial difficulties. … To the cotton-planter two courses were open. He might increase his manual force, or he might resort to machinery. … It required no deep political penetration for him to perceive that the introduction of machinery must in the end result in the emancipation of the slave. Machinery and slavery are incompatible—the slave is displaced by the machine. In the Southern States political reasons thus discouraged the introduction of machinery. Under the Constitution an increased negro force had a political value, machinery had none. The cotton interest was therefore persuaded by those who were in a position to guide its movements, that its prosperity could be secured only through increased manual labor."

Dr. J. W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, section 3, chapter 16 (volume 1).

See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1818-1821.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1794. Resistance to the Excise. The Whisky Insurrection in Pennsylvania.

See PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1794.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1794-1795. Threatening relations with Great Britain. The Jay Treaty.

"The daily increasing 'love-frenzy for France,' and the intemperate language of the Democratic press, naturally emphasized in England that reaction against America which set in with the treaty of peace. On the other hand, the retention of the frontier posts in violation of that treaty was a thorn in the side of the young Republic. In the course of the war England had adopted, by successive Orders in Council, a policy ruinous to the commerce of neutral nations, especially of the United States. {3308} In the admiralty courts of the various British West India islands hundreds of ships from New England were seized and condemned, for carrying French produce or bearing cargoes of provisions chartered to French ports. The New England fishermen and shipowners were vociferous for war, and the Democratic clubs denounced every British insult and celebrated every French victory. On March 26, 1794, an embargo against British ships was proclaimed for thirty days, and then extended for thirty days longer. The day after the embargo was laid, Dayton, of New Jersey, moved in Congress to sequester all moneys due to British creditors, and apply it towards indemnifying shipowners for losses incurred through the Orders in Council; and on April 21st the Republicans moved a resolution to suspend, all commercial intercourse with Great Britain till the western posts should be given up, and indemnity be paid for injuries to American commerce in violation of the rights of neutrals. The passage of such an act meant war; and for war the United States was never more unprepared. … Peace could be secured only by immediate negotiation and at least a temporary settlement of the causes of neutral irritation, and for such a task the ministers at London and Washington were incompetent or unsuited. … In this crisis Washington decided to send to England a special envoy. Hamilton was his first choice, but Hamilton had excited bitter enmities." On Hamilton's recommendation, John Jay, the Chief Justice, was chosen for the difficult mission, and he sailed for England in May, 1794, landing at Falmouth on the 8th of June. Within the succeeding five months he accomplished the negotiation of a treaty, which was signed on the 19th of November. "The main points that Jay had been instructed to gain were compensation for negroes [carried away by the British armies on the evacuation of the country in 1783], surrender of the posts, and compensation for spoliations; in addition, a commercial treaty was desired. When Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Jay had argued that the negroes, some 3,000 in number, who, at the time of the evacuation, were within the British lines, relying on proclamations that offered freedom, and who followed the troops to England, came within that clause of the treaty of peace which provided that the army should be withdrawn without 'carrying away any negroes or other property.' Lord Grenville, however, insisted upon refusing any compensation. Once within the British lines, he said, slaves were free for good and all. … From any point of view the matter was too insignificant to wreck the treaty upon it, and Jay waived the claim. As to the western posts [Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, Mackinaw, etc.], it was agreed that they should be surrendered by June 12, 1796. But compensation for the detention was denied on the ground that it was due to the breach of the treaty by the United States in permitting the States to prevent the recovery of British debts." For the determination and payment of such debts, it was now provided that a board of five commissioners should sit at Philadelphia; while another similar board at London should award compensation for irregular and illegal captures or condemnations made during the war between Great Britain and France. "Under this clause American merchants received $10,345,000. … The disputed questions of boundaries, arising from the construction of the treaty of peace, were referred to joint commissioners: properly enough, as the confusion was due to ignorance of the geography of the Northwest. British and American citizens holding lands at the time respectively in the United States and in any of the possessions of Great Britain were secured in their rights; a clause much objected to in America, but which was obviously just. A still more important provision followed, a novelty in international diplomacy, and a distinct advance in civilization: that war between the two countries should never be made the pretext for confiscation of debts or annulment of contracts between individuals. In the War of 1812 the United States happened for the moment to be the creditor nation, and the millions which this provision saved to her citizens it would be difficult to estimate. … It was the commercial articles which excited the most intense hostility in America. … To unprejudiced eyes, after the lapse of a hundred years, considering the mutual exasperation of the two peoples, the pride of England in her successes in the war with France, the weakness and division of the United States, the treaty seems a very fair one. Certainly one far less favorable to America would have been infinitely preferable to a war, and would probably in the course of time have been accepted as being so. The commercial advantages were not very considerable, but they at least served as 'an entering wedge,' to quote Jay's expression, and they were 'pro tanto' a clear gain to America. … The treaty was not published till July 2d. … Even before its contents were known, letters, signed 'Franklin,' appeared abusing the treaty; and in Philadelphia an effigy of Jay was placed in the pillory, and finally taken down, guillotined, the clothes fired, and the body blown up. It was clear, then, that it was not this particular treaty, but any treaty at all with Great Britain, that excited the wrath of the Republicans. On July 4th toasts insulting Jay or making odious puns on his name, were the fashion. … On June 24th the treaty was ratified by the Senate, with the exception of the article about the West India trade. On August 15th it was signed, with the same exception by Washington."

G. Pellew, John Jay, chapter 11.

"The reception given to the treaty cannot be fully explained by the existing relations between the United States and England. It was only in consequence of its Francomania that the opposition assumed the character of blind rage."

H. von Holst, Constitutional and Political History of the United States, volume 1, page 124.

ALSO IN: H. S. Randall, Life of Jefferson, volume 2, chapters 4-6.

W. Jay, Life of John Jay, volume 1, chapters 8-10 and volume 2, pages 216-264.

American State Papers, volume 1, pages 464-525.

J. B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States, volume 2, chapter 9.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1796. Admission of Tennessee to the Union.

See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1785-1796.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1796. Washington's Farewell Address.

"The period for the presidential election was drawing near, and great anxiety began to be felt that Washington would consent to stand for a third term. No one, it was agreed, had greater claim to the enjoyment of retirement, in consideration of public services rendered; but it was thought the affairs of the country would be in a very precarious condition should he retire before the wars of Europe were brought to a close. {3309} Washington, however, had made up his mind irrevocably on the subject, and resolved to announce, in a farewell address, his intention of retiring. Such an instrument, it will be recollected, had been prepared for him from his own notes, by Mr. Madison, when he had thought of retiring at the end of his first term. As he was no longer in confidential intimacy with Mr. Madison, he turned to Mr. Hamilton as his adviser and coadjutor, and appears to have consulted him on the subject early in the present year [1796], for, in a letter dated New York, May 10th, Hamilton writes: 'When last in Philadelphia, you mentioned to me your wish that I should "re-dress" a certain paper which you had prepared. As it is important that a thing of this kind should be done with great care and much at leisure, touched and retouched, I submit a wish that, as soon as you have given it the body you mean it to have, it may be sent to me.' The paper was accordingly sent, on the 15th of May, in its rough state, altered in one part since Hamilton had seen it. 'If you should think it best to throw the whole into a different form,' writes Washington, 'let me request, notwithstanding, that my draft may be returned to me (along with yours) with such amendments and corrections as to render it as perfect as the formation is susceptible of; curtailed if too verbose, and relieved of all tautology not necessary to enforce the ideas in the original or quoted part. My wish is, that the whole may appear in a plain style; and be handed to the public in an honest, unaffected, simple garb.' We forbear to go into the vexed question concerning this address; how much of it is founded on Washington's original 'notes and heads of topics'; how much was elaborated by Madison, and how much is due to Hamilton's recasting and revision. The whole came under the supervision of Washington; and the instrument, as submitted to the press, was in his handwriting, with many ultimate corrections and alterations. Washington had no pride of authorship; his object always was to effect the purpose in hand, and for that he occasionally invoked assistance, to ensure a plain and clear exposition of his thoughts and intentions. The address certainly breathes his spirit throughout, is in perfect accordance with all his words and actions, and 'in an honest, unaffected, simple garb,' embodies the system of policy on which he had acted throughout his administration. It was published in September [17], in a Philadelphia paper called the Daily Advertiser. The publication of the Address produced a great sensation. Several of the State legislatures ordered it to be put on their journals."

W. Irving, Life of Washington, volume 5, chapter 30.

The following is the text of the Address.

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