Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (part 2 of 3)

Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (part 2 of 3)

In a similar manner Melanchthon was admonished also by Brenz, who preferred exile and misery to the Interim. In a letter written early in 1549 he said: "It is also most manifest that the Interitus [Ruin, a term employed by Brenz for Interim] conflicts with the Word of the Lord. What concord, then, can be found between such conflicting things? You think that one ought to come to the assistance of the churches and pious ministers. Correct if such can be done without dishonor to Christ. Perhaps you believe that the Interimists will tolerate the pious doctrine if we agree to accept all their ceremonies. But do you not know that it is clearly commanded in the introduction of the Interitus that no one shall speak or write against this book? What kind of liberty in regard to doctrine is this? Therefore, if the Church and the pious ministers cannot be saved in any other way than by dishonoring the pious doctrine, let us commend them to Christ, the Son of God. He will take care of them. Meanwhile let us patiently bear our exile and wait for the Lord." (C. R. 7, 289.)

June 18, 1550, Calvin also wrote a letter of warning to Melanchthon, in which he said in substance: "My grief renders me almost speechless. How the enemies of Christ enjoy your conflicts with the Magdeburgers appears from their mockeries. Nor do I acquit you altogether of all guilt. Permit me to admonish you freely as a true friend. I should like to approve of all your actions. But now I accuse you before your very face (ego te nunc apud te ipsum accuso). This is the sum of your defense: If the purity of doctrine be retained, externals should not be pertinaciously contended for (modo retineatur doctrinae puritas, de rebus externis non esse pertinaciter dimicandum). But you extend the adiaphora too far. Some of them plainly conflict with the Word of God. Now, since the Lord has drawn us into the fight, it behooves us to struggle all the more manfully (eo virilius nos eniti decebat). You know that your position differs from that of the multitude. The hesitation of the general or leader is more disgraceful than the flight of an entire regiment of common soldiers. Unless you set an example of unflinching steadfastness, all will declare that vacillation cannot be tolerated in such a man. By yielding but a little, you alone have caused more lamentations and complaints than a hundred ordinary men by open apostasy (Itaque plures tu unus paululum cedendo querimonias et gemitus excitasti quam centum mediocres aperta defectione). I would die with you a hundred times rather than see you survive the doctrine surrendered by you. You will pardon me for unloading into your bosom these pitiable, though useless groans." (Schluesselburg 13, 635; C. R. 41 [Calvini Opera 13], 593; Frank 4, 88.)

129. Interim Eliminated Politically, But Not Theologically.

It was also in the interest of allaying the animosity against his own person that Elector Maurice had prevailed upon Melanchthon to frame the Leipzig Interim. But in this respect, too, the document proved to be a dismal failure. Openly the people, his own former subjects included, showed their contempt for his person and character. Everywhere public sentiment was aroused against him. He was held responsible for the captivity and shameful treatment of Philip of Hesse and especially of John Frederick, whom the people admired as the Confessor of Augsburg and now also as the innocent Martyr of Lutheranism. Maurice, on the other hand, was branded a mameluke, condemned as a renegade and an apostate, despised as the traitor of Lutheranism, and abhorred as the "Judas of Meissen," who had sold his coreligionists for an electorate.

At the same time Maurice was provoked by the arbitrary manner in which the Emperor exploited and abused his victory by a repeated breach of his promises, and by the treacherous and shameful treatment accorded his father-in-law, Philip of Hesse. Chagrined at all this and fully realizing the utter impossibility of enforcing the Interim, Maurice decided to end the matter by a single stroke which at the same time would atone for his treachery, and turn shame into glory and the vile name of a "traitor" into the noble title of "Champion of Protestantism." Accordingly Maurice, easily the match of Charles in duplicity and cunning, secretly prepared his plans, and, suddenly turning his army against the unsuspecting Emperor, drove him from Innsbruck, scared the "Fathers of Trent" to their homes, and on April 5, 1552, victoriously entered Augsburg, where he was received with great rejoicing. The fruits of this victory were the Treaties of Passau August 2, 1552, and of Augsburg, 1555, which for the first time granted religious liberty to the Protestants. The latter placed Lutherans and Catholics on an equal footing in the Empire and, according to the rule: Cuius regio, eius religio, gave every prince religious control in his own territory, non-conformists being granted the right of emigration. To the great advantage of the Romanists, however, the treaty also provided that territories ruled by bishops must remain Catholic even though the ruler should turn Protestant.

But while the Interim was thus eliminated as a political and practical issue, the theological controversy precipitated by it continued unabated. Its political elimination cleared the situation toward the Romanists, but left conditions within the Lutheran Church unsettled. It neither unified nor pacified the Church. It neither eliminated the false doctrines and unionistic principles and tendencies injected by the Interimists, nor did it restore confidence in the doctrinal soundness, loyalty, and sincerity of the vacillating Philippists, who had caused the first breach in the Lutheran Church. "Does it agree with the character of the Lutheran Church to tolerate and approve the doctrines and principles contained and involved in the Interim, and to harbor and fellowship such indifferentists as framed, indorsed, and defended this document?" such and similar were the questions which remained live issues even after the Interim was politically dead. The theological situation within the Lutheran Church, therefore, was not changed in the least when the annihilation threatening her from without was warded off by the victory of Maurice over the Emperor. The Interim was fraught with doctrinal issues which made unavoidable the subsequent controversies.

XI. Controversies Following the Interim and Settled by the Formula of Concord.

130. Three Theological Parties.

In the theological conflicts after Luther's death three parties may be distinguished. The first party embraced chiefly the Interimists, the Synergists, and the Crypto-Calvinists. They were adherents of Philip Melanchthon, hence called Melanchthonians or, more commonly, Philippists, and were led by the theologians of Electoral Saxony. Their object was to supplant the authority and theology of Luther by the unionistic and liberal views of Melanchthon. Their headquarters were the universities of Wittenberg and Leipzig. Some of their chief representatives were: Joachim Camerarius (born 1500, professor of Greek in Leipzig, a close friend of Melanchthon, died 1574); Paul Eber (born 1511, professor in Wittenberg, died 1568); Caspar Cruciger, Jr. (born 1525, professor in Wittenberg, died at Cassel 1597); Christopher Pezel (born 1539, professor in Wittenberg, died 1600 or 1604); George Major (Meier; born 1502, professor in Wittenberg, died 1574); Caspar Peucer (doctor of medicine, son-in-law of Melanchthon; born 1525, imprisoned from 1574 till 1586 died 1602); Paul Crell (born 1531, professor in Wittenberg, died 1579); John Pfefflnger (born 1493, professor in Leipzig, died 1573); Victorin Strigel (born 1524, 1548 professor in Jena, died in Heidelberg 1569); John Stoessel (born 1524, died in prison 1576); George Cracow (born 1525, professor of jurisprudence in Wittenberg, privy counselor in Dresden, died in prison 1575).

The second party, the so-called Gnesio-Lutherans (genuine Lutherans), was represented chiefly by the theologians of Ducal Saxony and embraced such staunch and loyal men as Amsdorf, Flacius, Wigand, Gallus, Matthias Judex, Moerlin, Tileman Hesshusius, Timann, Westphal, and Simon Musaeus. Though some of these leaders were later discredited by falling into extreme positions themselves, they all proved to be valiant champions of Luther and most determined opponents of the Philippists. The strongholds of this party were Magdeburg and the University of Jena, founded by the sons of John Frederick in 1547. Led by Flacius, this university unflinchingly opposed the modified and unionistic Lutheranism advocated by the Philippists at Wittenberg and Leipzig. Seeberg says, in substance: The Gnesio-Lutherans were opposed to the philosophy of the Philippists and stood for "the simple Biblical truth as Luther had understood it." Even when opposed by the government, they defended the truth, and were willing to suffer the consequences. Strict doctrinal discipline was exercised by them. They opposed with equal determination the errors also of their fellow-combatants: Amsdorf, Flacius, Poach, and others. Intellectually they were superior to the Philippists. Seeberg concludes: "In the forms of their time (which were not outgrown by any one of the Philippists either) they preserved to the Church genuine Luther-treasures--echtes Luthergut." (Dogmengeschichte 4, 2, 482.)

The third, or center-party, was composed of the loyal Lutherans who took no conspicuous part in the controversies, but came to the front when the work of pacification began. They were of special service in settling the controversies, framing the Formula of Concord, and restoring a true and godly peace to our Church. Prominent among them were Brenz, Andreae, Chemnitz, Selneccer, Chytraeus, Cornerus, Moerlin, and others. These theologians were, on the one hand, opposed to all unnecessary logomachies i.e., controversies involving no doctrinal differences, and, at the same time, were most careful not to fall into any extreme position themselves. On the other hand, however, they approved of all controversies really necessary in the interest of truth, rejected and condemned all forms of indifferentism and unionism, and strenuously opposed every effort at sacrificing, veiling, or compromising any doctrine by ambiguous formulas for the sake of external peace or any other policy whatsoever. (CONC. TRIGL., 855f.)

131. Various Theological Controversies.

Following is a synopsis and summary of the main controversies within the Lutheran Church after the death of Luther, which were settled in the first eleven articles of the Formula of Concord. The sequence of these articles, however, is not strictly historical and chronological, but dogmatic. In the main, the arrangement of the Augsburg Confession is observed.

The first of these controversies was the so-called Adiaphoristic Controversy, from 1548 to 1555, in which the Wittenberg and Leipzig theologians (Melanchthon, Eber, Pfeffinger, etc.) defended the Leipzig Interim and the reintroduction of Romish ceremonies into the Lutheran Church. They were opposed by the champions of a consistent and determined Lutheranism, led by Flacius, who declared: "Nihil est adiaphoron in statu confessionis et scandali. Nothing is an adiaphoron in case of confession and offense." The controversy was decided by Article X.

The second is the Majoristic Controversy, from 1551 to 1562, in which George Major and Justus Menius defended the phrase of Melanchthon that good works are necessary to salvation. They were opposed by the loyal Lutherans, of whom Amsdorf, however, lapsed into the opposite error: Good works are detrimental to salvation. This controversy was settled by Article IV.

The third is the Synergistic Controversy, from 1555 to 1560, in which Pfeffinger, Eber, Major, Crell, Pezel, Strigel, and Stoessel held with Melanchthon that man by his own natural powers cooperates in his conversion. Their opponents (Amsdorf, Flacius, Hesshusius, Wigand, Gallus, Musaeus, and Judex) taught, as formulated by Flacius: "Solus Deus convertit hominem.... Non excludit voluntatem, sed omnem efficaciam et operationem eius.... God alone converts man.... He does not exclude the will, but all efficaciousness and operation of the same." This controversy was decided and settled by Article II.

The fourth is the Flacian Controversy, from 1560 to 1575, in which Flacius, supported by Cyriacus Spangenberg, Christian Irenaeus, Matthias Wolf, I. F. Coelestinus, Schneider, and others, maintained that original sin is not an accident, but the very substance of fallen man. The Lutherans, including the Philippists, were practically unanimous in opposing this error. It was decided by Article I.

The fifth was the Osiandristic and the Stancarian Controversy, from 1549 to 1566, in which Andrew Osiander denied the forensic character of justification, and taught that Christ is our righteousness only according to His divine nature, while Stancarus contended that Christ is our righteousness according to His human nature only. Both, Osiander as well as Stancarus, were opposed by Melanchthon, Flacius, and practically all other Lutherans, the Philippists included. This controversy was settled by Article III.

The sixth was the Antinomistic Controversy, from 1527 to 1556, in which various false views concerning the Law and the Gospel were defended, especially by John Agricola who maintained that repentance (contrition) is not wrought by the Law, but by the Gospel (a view which, in a modified form was later on defended also by Wittenberg Philippists), and, after Luther's death, by Poach and Otto, who rejected the so-called Third Use of the Law. The questions involved in these Antinomian controversies were decided by Articles V and VI.

The seventh was the Crypto-Calvinistic Controversy, from 1560 to 1574, in which the Philippists in Wittenberg, Leipzig, and Dresden (Peucer, Cracow, Stoessel, etc.) endeavored gradually to supplant Luther's doctrines concerning the Lord's Supper and the majesty of the human nature of Christ by the Calvinistic teachings on these points. These secret and dishonest enemies of Lutheranism were opposed by true Lutherans everywhere, notably by the theologians of Ducal Saxony. In 1574 they were publicly unmasked as deceivers and Calvinistic schemers. The controversy was settled by Articles VII and VIII.

The two last controversies were of a local nature. The first was chiefly confined to Hamburg, the second to Strassburg. In the former city John Aepinus taught that Christ's descent into hell was a part of His suffering and humiliation. He was opposed by his colleagues in Hamburg. In Strassburg John Marbach publicly denounced Zanchi, a Crypto-Calvinist, for teaching that faith, once engendered in a man, cannot be lost. The questions involved in these two articles are dealt with in Articles IX and XI, respectively.

132. Conflicts Unavoidable.

When describing the conflicts after Luther's death, historians frequently deplore "the dreadful controversies of these dark days of doctrinal extremists and the polemical spirit of rigid Lutheranism." G. J. Planck, in particular, characterized them all as useless quarrels and personal wranglings of narrow-minded, bigoted adherents of Luther, who vitiated original Lutheranism by making it essentially a matter of "pure doctrine." To the present day indifferentistically inclined historians are wont to mar their pages with similar views.

True, "pure doctrine," "unity in the pure doctrine of the Gospel," such was the shibboleth of the faithful Lutherans over against the Melanchthonians and other errorists. But this was neither reprehensible doctrinalism nor a corruption of original Lutheranism, but the very principle from which it was born and for which Luther contended throughout his life--a principle of life or death for the Lutheran Church. It was the false doctrine of justification which made Luther a most miserable man. It was the pure doctrine as taught by St. Paul which freed his conscience, transported him into Paradise, as he himself puts it, and made him the Reformer of the Church. Ever since, purity of doctrine was held, by Luther and all true Lutheran theologians, to be of paramount import to Christianity and the Church. Fully realizing that adulteration of any part of the Christian doctrine was bound to infect also the doctrine of faith and justification and thus endanger salvation, they earnestly warned against, and opposed, every deviation from the clear Word of God, no matter how insignificant it might appear. They loved the truth more than external peace, more even than their own lives. Hence they found it impossible to be silent, apathetic, and complacent spectators while the Philippists and others denied, attacked, and corrupted the truth taught by Luther from the Word of God.

Accordingly, since the Leipzig Interim involved and maintained doctrines and principles subversive of genuine Lutheranism and was prepared, introduced, and defended by the very men who were regarded as pillars of the Lutheran Church, it was evident from the outset that this document must of necessity precipitate most serious internal troubles. From the moment the Wittenbergers cast the Interim as a firebrand into the Church, a domestic warfare was unavoidable,--if indeed any true disciples of Luther still remained in the Church of which he, and not Melanchthon, was the founder. While the Augsburg Interim resulted in an external theological warfare of the Lutherans against the Romanists, the Leipzig Interim added a most serious domestic conflict, which conscientious Lutherans could not evade, though it well-nigh brought our Church to the brink of destruction. For now the issue was not merely how to resist the Pope and the Romanists, but, how to purge our own Church from the Interimists and their pernicious principles. And as long as the advocates of the Interim or of other aberrations from the old Lutheran moorings refused to abandon their errors, and nevertheless insisted on remaining in the Church, there was no real unity in the truth. Hence there could also be no true peace and brotherly harmony among the Lutherans. And the way to settle these differences was not indifferently to ignore them, nor unionistically to compromise them by adopting ambiguous formulas, but patiently to discuss the doctrines at issue until an agreement in the truth was reached, which finally was done by means of the Formula of Concord.

True, these controversies endangered the very existence of our Church. But the real cause of this was not the resistance which the loyal Lutherans offered to the errorists, nor even the unseemly severity by which the prosecution of these controversies was frequently marred, but the un-Lutheran spirit and the false principles and doctrines manifested and defended by the opponents. In so far as divine truth was defended and error opposed, these controversies were truly wars to end war, and to establish real peace and true unity within our Church. A cowardly surrender to the indifferentistic spirit, the unionistic policy, the false principles, and the erroneous doctrines of the Interimists would have been tantamount to a complete transformation of our Church and a total annihilation of genuine Lutheranism.

The manner in which these controversies were conducted, it is true, was frequently such as to obstruct, rather than further, mutual understanding and peace. As a rule, it is assumed that only the genuine Lutherans indulged in unseemly polemical invective, and spoke and wrote in a bitter and spiteful tone. But the Melanchthonians were to say the least, equally guilty. And when censuring this spirit of combativeness, one must not overlook that the ultimate cause of the most violent of these controversies was the betrayal of the Lutheran Church by the Interimists; and that the severity of the polemics of the loyal Lutherans did not, at least not as a rule, emanate from any personal malice toward Melanchthon, but rather from a burning zeal to maintain sound Lutheranism, and from the fear that by the scheming and the indifference of the Philippists the fruits of Luther's blessed work might be altogether lost to the coming generations. The "peace-loving" Melanchthon started a conflagration within his own church in order to obtain a temporal and temporary peace with the Romanists; while the loyal Lutherans, inasmuch as they fought for the preservation of genuine Lutheranism, stood for, and promoted, a truly honorable, godly, and lasting peace on the basis of eternal truth. And while the latter fought honestly and in the open, the Philippists have never fully cleared themselves from the charges of duplicity, dishonesty, and dissimulation.

133. Melanchthon Prime Mover of Conflicts.

The Leipzig Interim was the signal for a general and prolonged warfare within the Lutheran Church. It contained the germs of various doctrinal errors, and produced a spirit of general distrust and suspicion, which tended to exaggerate and multiply the real differences. Schmauk says: "The seeds of the subsequent controversies are all to be found in the Leipzig Interim." (595.) At any rate, most of the controversies after Luther's death flowed from, or were in some way or other connected with, this unfortunate document. Such is the view also of the Formula of Concord, which declares that the thirty years' controversies which it settled originated especially in the Interim. (857, 19; 947, 29.)

Yet the Interim was rather the occasion than the ultimate cause of these conflicts. Long before the flames of open discord burst forth, the embers of secret doctrinal dissension had been glowing under the surface. Even during the life of Luther much powder had been secretly stored up for which the Interim furnished the spark. This is proved, among other things, by Luther's predictions (referred to in the preceding chapter) concerning his own colleagues. And above all it was the "peace-loving" Philip who first and most successfully sowed the dragon's teeth of discord. Melanchthon's doctrinal deviations from the teachings of Luther and from his own former position must be regarded as the last cause of both the Leipzig Interim and the lamentable controversies that followed in its wake. Indeed, a tragic sight to behold: The co-laborer of Luther, the servant of the Reformation second only to Luther, the Praeceptor Germaniae, the ardent and anxious lover of peace, etc.--untrue to his confiding friend, disloyal to the cause of the Reformation, and the chief cause of strife and dissension in the Lutheran Church! And withal, Melanchthon, mistaking external union for real unity and temporal peace with men for true peace with God, felt satisfied that he had spent the efforts of his entire life in the interest of the true welfare of the Church! Shortly before his death (April 19, 1560) he expressed his joy that now he would be delivered from the "fury of the theologians." On a sheet of paper found on his table were written a number of reasons why he feared death less. One of them was: "Liberaberis ab aerumnis et a rabie teologorum. You will be delivered from toils and from the fury of the theologians." (C. R. 9, 1098.) Thus even in the face of death he did not realize that he himself was the chief cause of the conflicts that had embittered his declining years!

134. Melanchthon's Humanistic and Unionistic Tendencies.

Till about 1530 Melanchthon seems to have been in complete harmony with Luther, and to have followed him enthusiastically. To propagate, coin, and bring into scholastic form the Christian truths once more brought to light by the Reformer he considered to be his peculiar mission. But his secret letters and, with gradually increasing clearness and boldness, also his publications show that later on he began to strike out on paths of his own, and to cultivate and disseminate doctrines incompatible with the Lutheranism of Luther. In a measure, these deviations were known also to the Wittenberg students and theologians, to Cordatus, Stifel, Amsdorf, the Elector John Frederick, Brueck, and Luther, who also called him to account whenever sufficient evidence warranted his doing so. (Lehre und Wehre 1908, 61ff.)

In a letter to Cordatus, dated April 15, 1537, Melanchthon was bold enough to state that he had made many corrections in his writings and was glad of the fact: "Multa ultro correxi in libellis meis et correxisse me gaudeo." (C. R. 3, 342.) In discussing the squabble between Cordatus and Melanchthon whether good works are necessary for salvation, Luther is reported by the former to have said, in 1536: "To Philip I leave the sciences and philosophy and nothing else. But I shall be compelled to chop off the head of philosophy, too." (Kolde, Analecta, 266.) Melanchthon, as Luther put it, was always troubled by his philosophy; that is to say, instead of subjecting his reason to the Word of God, he was inclined to balance the former against the latter. The truth is that Melanchthon never fully succeeded in freeing himself from his original humanistic tendencies, a fact which gave his mind a moralistic rather than a truly religious and Scriptural bent. Even during the early years of the Reformation when he was carried away with admiration for Luther and his work, the humanistic undercurrent did not disappear altogether. January 22, 1525, he wrote to Camerarius: "Ego mihi conscius sum, non ullam ob causam unquam tetheologekenai, nisi at mores meos emendarem. I am conscious of the fact that I have never theologized for any other reason than to improve my morals." (C. R. 1, 722.) Such, then, being his frame of mind, it was no wonder that he should finally desert Luther in most important points, lapse into synergism and other errors, and, in particular value indifferentistically doctrinal convictions, notably on the real presence in the Lord's Supper and the person of Christ. "Over against Luther," says Schaff, "Melanchthon represented the unionistic and liberal type of Lutheranism." (Creeds, 1, 259.) This is correct; but the stricture must be added that, since unionism and liberalism are incompatible with the very essence of Lutheranism, Melanchthonianism as such was in reality not a "type," but a denial of Lutheranism.

Melanchthon lacked the simple faith in, and the firm adherence and implicit submission to, the Word of God which made Luther the undaunted and invincible hero of the Reformation. Standing four-square on the Bible and deriving from this source of divine power alone all his theological thoughts and convictions, Luther was a rock, firm and immovable. With him every theological question was decided and settled conclusively by quoting a clear passage from the Holy Scriptures, while Melanchthon, devoid of Luther's single-minded and whole-hearted devotion to the Word of God, endeavored to satisfy his reason as well. Consequently he lacked assurance and firm conviction, wavered and vacillated, and was never fully satisfied that the position he occupied was really the only correct one, while, on the other hand, he endeavored to present his views concerning some of the disputed doctrines in ambiguous and indefinite terms. "We have twenty-eight large volumes of Melanchthon's writings," says C. P. Krauth, "and, at this hour, impartial and learned men are not agreed as to what were his views on some of the profoundest questions of church doctrine, on which Melanchthon was writing all his life!" (Conservative Ref., 291; Schmauk, 748.) This indefinite and wavering attitude towards divine truth, the natural consequence of the humanistic bent of his mind, produced in Melanchthon a general tendency and proneness to surrender or compromise doctrinal matters in the interest of policy, and to barter away eternal truth for temporal peace. It made him an indifferentist and a unionist, always ready to strike a bargain also in matters pertaining to Christian faith, and to cover doctrinal differences with ambiguous formulas. While Luther's lifelong attitude on matters of Christian doctrine is characterized by the famous words spoken by him at Worms in 1521: "Ich kann nicht anders, I cannot do otherwise," Melanchthon, treating even questions of faith as matters of expediency rather than of conscience, was the man who, as a rule, could also do otherwise, and who was great in manufacturing "Polish boots," as the ambiguous phrases by which he endeavored to unite opposing parties were called by the Lutherans in Reuss.

In order to preserve peace with the Romanists at Augsburg in 1530, he did not hesitate to sacrifice Lutheran truths and to receive into the bargain a number of what he considered minor papal errors. In his subsequent overtures to the Reformed he was more than willing to make similar concessions. The spirit of Melanchthon was the spirit of religious indifference and of unionism, which, though thoroughly eliminated by the Formula of Concord, was from time to time revived within the Lutheran Church by such men as Calixtus, Spener, Zinzendorf, Neander, and, in our own country, by S. S. Schmucker.

The unionistic tendencies and doctrinal corruptions which Melanchthon injected into Lutheranism were all the more dangerous to our Church because they derived special weight and prestige from the fact that Luther had unstintingly praised his gifts, his books, and the services he had rendered the Church (St. L. 18, 1671; 23, 1152), that he was now generally regarded as Luther's successor with regard to theological leadership of the Church; and that he was gratefully admired as the Praeceptor Germaniae by a host of loyal pupils, who made it a point also to cultivate just those theological peculiarities of Master Philip, as they called him, in which he differed from Luther.

135. Melanchthon's "Shameful Servitude."

That Melanchthon failed our Church in the Interim emergency as well as in the subsequent controversies is generally ascribed to the fact that he lacked the bracing influence and assistance of Luther. No doubt, there is a good deal of truth in this assumption. But the true reason why he did not measure up to the demands of the times and the expectations of our Church were not mere moral weaknesses, but rather the errors and false principles to which he was wedded. How could Melanchthon have approved himself a leader of the Lutherans when he was out of sympathy with them, doubted some of their most cherished doctrines, and long ago had struck out on a path deviating from that mapped out by Luther? True, the bracing which he received from Luther in the past had repeatedly kept him from publicly sacrificing the truth, but even in these instances he did not always yield because he was really convinced, but because he feared the uncompromising spirit of Luther.

That fear of an open conflict with Luther which, he felt, would result in a crushing defeat for himself, bulked large among the motives which prompted him to maintain a semblance of true orthodoxy as long as Luther lived, is clearly admitted by Melanchthon himself. In his notorious and most discreditable letter to Carlowitz (counselor of Elector Maurice), written April 28, 1548, eight days after the meeting at Celle, where he had debauched his conscience by promising submission to the religious demands of the Emperor, Melanchthon, pouring forth his feelings and revealing his true inwardness and his spirit of unionism and indifferentism as much as admitted that in the past he had been accustomed to hiding his real views. Here he declared in so many words that it was not he who started, and was responsible for, the religious controversy between the Lutherans and Romanists, but rather Luther whose contentious spirit (he said) also had constantly increased the rupture, and that under Luther he had suffered "a most shameful servitude."

In the original the letter reads, in part, as follows: "Totum enim me tibi [Carlowitz] aperio.... Ego, cum decreverit princeps etiamsi quid non probabo, tamen nihil seditiose faciam, sed vel tacebo, vel cedam, vel feram, quidquid accidet. Tuli etiam antea servitutem paene deformem, cum saepe Lutherus magis suae naturae, in qua filoneikia erat non exigua, quam vel personae suae vel utilitati communi serviret. Et scio, omnibus aetatibus, ut tempestatum incommoda, ita aliqua in gubernatione vitia modeste et arte ferenda et dissimulanda esse.... Fortassis natura sum ingenio servili." (C. R. 6, 879f.)

Even before Melanchthon had, in private letters to his friends, displayed a similar vein of ill will toward Luther, whom he evidently feared because of his own secret doctrinal deviations. (Lehre und Wehre 1908, 61. 68.) No doubt, as stated above, fear was also among the motives which induced him to identify himself with the Leipzig Interim. But evidently his own theological attitude, too, differed little from the spirit pervading this document. At any rate, the letter to Carlowitz does not support the assumption that Melanchthon really outraged his own convictions when he wrote and adopted the Interim. As a matter of fact, he also continued to defend the Interim; and it was as late as 1556 before he was ready to make even a qualified admission of one of the errors connected with it.

While, therefore, the Lutheran Church will always gratefully acknowledge the splendid services which Melanchthon rendered in the work of Luther's Reformation, it must at the same time be admitted and cannot be gainsaid that, in the last analysis, Melanchthon, by reason of his deviations from Luther, which will be set forth more fully in the following, was the ultimate cause and originator of most of the dissensions which began to distract the Lutheran Church soon after the death of Luther. Andrew Musculus, who assisted in drafting the Formula of Concord, brought out this fact (though in terms too strong) when he characterized Melanchthon as a "philosophical theologian and a patriarch of all heretics." (Meusel, Handl. 4, 710.) In a way, Melanchthon may even be regarded as the indirect cause of the Smalcald War and its unfortunate issue, inasmuch, namely, as his vacillating and compromising attitude and his incompetent leadership created conditions of internal weakness among the Lutherans, which invited the aggression of Pope and Emperor.

XII. The Adiaphoristic Controversy.

136. Contents of the Leipzig Interim.

To exhibit the insidious character of the Leipzig Interim more fully, we submit the following quotations. In its Introduction we read: "As far as the doctrine of the state and nature of man before and after the Fall is concerned, there is no controversy" (between the Lutherans and Romanists). The article "Of Justification," in which the Lutheran sola fide is omitted, declares: "The merciful God does not work with man as with a block, but draws him, so that his will also cooperates if he be of understanding years." Again: "And they who have thus received the forgiveness of sins and the Holy Ghost, and in whom the Holy Ghost begins faith and trust in the Son of God, love and hope, then become heirs of eternal salvation for the Savior's sake." In the article "Of Good Works" we read: "Nevertheless, the new virtues and good works are so highly necessary that, if they were not quickened in the heart there would be no reception of divine grace." Again: "It is certainly true that these virtues, faith, love, hope, and others, must be in us and are necessary to salvation.... And since the virtues and good works, as has been said, please God, they merit also a reward in this life, both spiritual and temporal, according to God's counsel, and still more reward in the eternal life, because of the divine promise."

The article "Of Ecclesiastical Power" runs as follows: "What the true Christian Church gathered in the Holy Ghost, acknowledges, determines, and teaches in regard to matters of faith is to be taught and preached, since it neither should nor can determine anything contrary to the Holy Scriptures." Self-evidently, Romanists construed this as an a priori endorsement of the Council and its resolutions. In the article "Of Ecclesiastical Ministers" we read: "And that all other ministers should be subject and obedient to the chief bishop [the Pope] and to other bishops who administer their episcopal office according to God's command, using the same for edification and not for destruction; which ministers should be ordained also by such bishops upon presentation by the patrons." This article conceded the primacy of the Pope and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the bishops. The article "Of Ordination" declares: "Also, that, as has been said, upon presentation by patrons, ministers should hereafter be ordained with Christian ceremonies by such bishops as administer their episcopal office, and that no one should be allowed to be in the ministry unless, as has been said, he be presented by the patrons and have the permission of the bishops." That was tantamount to a restoration of the "sacrament" of episcopal ordination.

The Interim furthermore demanded the immediate reintroduction of abolished ceremonies, such as exorcism and other ceremonies of Baptism, confirmation by bishops, auricular confession, extreme unction, episcopal ordination, and the like. We read: "That repentance, confession, and absolution, and what pertains thereto, be diligently taught and preached; that the people confess to the priests, and receive of them absolution in God's stead, and be also diligently admonished and urged to prayer, fasting, and almsgiving; also, that no one be admitted to the highly venerable Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ [in this indirect way only the cup of the laity is referred to in the Interim] unless he have first confessed to the priest and received of him absolution." Again: "Although in this country the unction [Extreme Unction] has not been in use for many years, yet ... such unction, according to the apostle, may be hereafter observed." Again: "That henceforth the mass be observed in this country with ringing of bells, with lights and vessels, with chants, vestments, and ceremonies." Among the holidays to be observed the Interim mentions also Corpus Christi and the festivals of the holy Virgin Mary. Again we read: "The images and pictures of the sufferings of Christ and of the saints may be also retained in the churches." Again: "In the churches where the canonical hours have been formerly observed, the devout Psalms shall be sung in chapters and towns at the appointed time and on other high festivals, and also on Sundays." "Likewise, that on Fridays and Saturdays, as well as during fasts, the eating of meat be abstained from and that this be observed as an external ordinance at the command of His Imperial Majesty." The clause, "that this be observed," etc., was regarded by Flacius and Gallus as implying self-deception and hypocrisy on the part of the Interimists. (Frank 4 72. 119.) Again, as to the apparel of priests, that "a distinction be observed between ministers and secular persons, and that proper reverence be paid the priestly estate." The Introduction of the Interim gives the assurance that the Lutherans would obey the Emperor and be found disposed toward peace and unity. The Conclusion adds the humble promise: "In all other articles we are ready ... in a friendly and submissive manner to confer with Your Beloved and Princely Graces, and to settle our differences in a Christian way." (C. R. 7, 258. Jacobs, Book of Concord, 2, 260.)

137. Issue in Adiaphoristic Controversy.

From the passages quoted it appears that the Leipzig Interim was inoculated with the germs of many controversies. However, while in the beginning its offensive doctrinal features were not fully and generally recognized and realized, the Emperor's demand for, and approval of, the Wittenberg and Leipzig theologian's reintroduction of the Romish ceremonies immediately created an acute situation and a great commotion everywhere. The resulting theological conflict pertaining to the latter point in particular was called the Adiaphoristic or Interimistic Controversy. And, as explained above, even after the Interim had become a dead letter politically, this controversy did not subside, because its paramount object was not merely to pass a correct judgment on past events during the Interim, nor even to obtain norms for similar situations in the future, but, above all, to eliminate from our Church the spirit of indifferentism, unionism, and of direct as well as indirect denial of the Gospel-truth.

Accordingly, the exact issue in the Adiaphoristic Controversy was: May Lutherans, under conditions such as prevailed during the Interim, when the Romanists on pain of persecution and violence demanded the reinstitution of abolished papal ceremonies, even if the ceremonies in question be truly indifferent in themselves, submit with a good conscience, that is to say, without denying the truth and Christian liberty, without sanctioning the errors of Romanism, and without giving offense either to the enemies or to the friends of the Lutheran Church, especially its weak members? This was affirmed by the Interimists and denied by their opponents.

138. Opposition to the Adiaphorists.

Prominent among the theologians who participated in the controversy against the Adiaphorists were Flacius, Wigand, Gallus, and others, who in Magdeburg opened a most effective fire on the authors, sponsors, and advocates of the Interim. Following are some of the chief publications which dealt with the questions involved: "Opinion concerning the Interim, by Melanchthon, June 16, 1548," published by Flacius without the knowledge of Melanchthon.--"Report on the Interim by the Theologians of Meissen," 1548.--"That in These Dangerous Times (in diesen geschwinden Laeuften) Nothing is to be Changed in the Churches of God in Order to Please the Devil and the Antichrist," by John Hermann, 1548. A Latin edition of this publication appeared 1549, mentioning Flacius as its author.--"A Brief Report (Ein kurzer Bericht) on the Interim from which One may Easily Learn the Doctrine and Spirit of That Book," 1548.--"A General Protest and Writ of Complaint (Eine gemeine Protestation und Klageschrift) of All Pious Christians against the Interim and Other Sinister Schemes and Cruel Persecutions by the Enemies of the Gospel, by John Waremund, 1548." Waremund was a pseudonym for Flacius.--"Against the Interim, Papal Mass, Canon, and Master Eisleben," 1519.--"Against the Vile Devil (Wider den schnoeden Teufel), who Now Again Transforms Himself into an Angel of Light, i.e., against the New Interim, by Carolus Azarias Gotsburgensis, 1549." Of this book, too, Flacius was the author. (Preger 1, 67.)--"Apology (Entschuldigung) of Matthias Flacius Illy. to a Certain Pastor," 1549.--"Several Letters of the Venerable D. M. Luther concerning the Union of Christ and Belial, Written 1530 to the Theologians at the Diet in Augsburg," 1549, with a preface by Flacius.--"Apology of Matthias Flacius Illy., Addressed to the University of Wittenberg, regarding the Adiaphora," 1549.--"Writing of Matthias Flacius Illy. against a Truly Heathen, yea, Epicurean Book of the Adiaphorists (in which the Leipzig Interim is Defended) in Order to Guard Oneself against the Present Counterfeiters of the True Religion," 1549.--"Answer of Magister Nicolas Gallus and Matthias Flacius Illy. to the Letter of Some Preachers in Meissen regarding the Question whether One should Abandon His Parish rather than Don the Cassock" (linea vestis, Chorrock).--"Against the Extract of the Leipzig Interim, or the Small Interim," by Flacius, 1549.--"Book concerning True and False Adiaphora (Liber de Veris et Falsis Adiaphoris), in which the Adiaphoristic Controversy is Explained Almost in Its Entirety, by Flacius, 1549." This book, which is most frequently quoted and deals most thoroughly with the questions involved, is found in Schluesselburg's Catalogus Haereticorum 13, 154ff.--"An Admonition (Vermahnung) to be Constant in the Confession of the Truth, in Cross and Prayer, by Flacius," 1549.--"A Christian Admonition by Matthias Flacius Illy. to be Constant in the True, Pure Religion of Jesus Christ and in the Augsburg Confession," 1550.--"Against the Alleged Power and Primacy of the Pope, Useful to Read at This Time, when the Whole World Endeavors again to Place the Expelled Antichrist into the Temple of Christ, by Matthias Flacius Illy."--"Against the Evangelist of the Holy Chorrock, D. Geitz Major, by Matthias Flacius Illy., 1552."--For a complete list of the writings of Flacius against the Interim, see Preger's Matthias Flacius Illyricus, 2, 540 ff.

Even the titles of these publications indicate that the Adiaphoristic Controversy did not lack violence and virulence. This animosity against the Interimists was chiefly due to the fear that their policy would finally lead to the complete undoing of the Reformation. For while Melanchthon still believed in and hoped for, an understanding with the Romanists, Flacius saw through their schemes and fully realized the impending danger. In the reintroduction of Catholic ceremonies which Melanchthon regarded as entirely harmless, Flacius beheld nothing but the entering wedge, which would gradually be followed by the entire mass of Romish errors and abuses and the absolute dominance of Pope and Emperor over the Lutheran Church. The obedience demanded by the Emperor, said Flacius, consists in this, that "we abandon our true doctrine and adopt the godless Papacy." In all its details, he explained, the ultimate purpose of the Interim is none other than the reestablishment of Popery, of which even such seemingly trifling matters as the reintroduction of the Chorrock (linea vestis) were but the beginning, as it were, the breach in the dam which was bound ultimately to result in a complete submersion of Lutheranism. (Frank 4, 74. 76. 119.)

Since the loyal Lutherans, in keeping with the teaching of Luther and the Lutheran Confessions, regarded the Papacy as antichristendom, they could not but abhor the concessions made by the Interimists as treachery against the truth. From the very outset Flacius and Gallus insisted that their opponents answer the question, "whether the Pope with his government is the true Antichrist in the Church as according to the Word of God he has been publicly declared to be in our churches, and whether he still should and must be regarded and confessed as such." And if Luther's doctrine was to stand, how, then, they argued, could a union be effected between the enemies of the Gospel (the Antichrist and his bishops) and the Lutherans without idolatry and denial of the religion of Christ? (53. 107.) On the title-page of his Apology, of 1549, Flacius declares: "The upshot [of the Interim] is the establishment of the Papacy and the installation of the Antichrist in the temple of Christ, the encouragement of the wicked to flaunt their victory over the Church of Christ and to grieve the godly, likewise weakening, leading into doubt, separation and innumerable offenses." (Schaff 1, 301.) Regarding the acknowledgment of the Pope and bishops by the Interim, Flacius remarked: "Mark well, here the werewolf (Baerwolf), together with his fellow-wolves, is placed over the little flock of Christ. There is, however, no danger whatever; for, as is added [in the Interim: "The Pope should use his power not for destruction, but for edification"], they have counted the sheep and commanded the wolves to be gentle. In my opinion this is certainly a good adiaphoron to restore Antichrist to the temple from which he has been expelled by the Finger of God." (Preger 1, 191.) Accordingly, burning with shame and indignation, and trembling with fear for the future of Lutheranism, Flacius charged Melanchthon with want of faith and with treason against the truth, and characterized the Leipzig Interim as an unholy union of Christ and Belial, of light and darkness, of Christ and Antichrist.

While Flacius thus denounced the Interim as well as its authors and abettors, he at the same time admonished and encouraged the Lutheran pastors to be steadfast in confessing the truth, in spite of cross and persecution, and to stand by their flocks as true shepherds. That minister, he said, who denies or fails to confess the truth, or who yields to a tyrant, deserts his Church. We must not only confess with our mouths, but by deeds and actions as well. Not abandonment of the flock, but suffering is the best way to win the victory over a tyrant. Flacius also earnestly warned the people against yielding to the princes and acknowledging, hearing, and following their own ministers if they advocated and introduced the Interim. Moreover, he encouraged both pastors and laymen to resist the tyranny of princes demanding the reinstitution of the Roman ceremonies. "A government," said he in his Admonition, "no matter which, has not the authority to forbid pastor to preach the pure doctrine." When the government persecutes the truth, we must not yield, no matter what the consequences may be. Christians will sacrifice everything to a tyrannical prince, but not "the truth, not the consolation of divine grace, nor the hope of eternal life." (Frank 4, 68. 117.)

139. Doctrinal Position of Anti-Adiaphorists.

The theological position occupied by the opponents of the Adiaphorists may be summarized as follows: Ceremonies which God has neither commanded nor prohibited are adiaphora (res mediae, Mitteldinge) and ceteris paribus (other things being equal), may be observed or omitted, adopted or rejected. However, under circumstances testing one's faith they may become a matter of principle and conscience. Such is the case wherever and whenever they are demanded as necessary, or when their introduction involves a denial of the truth, an admission of error, an infringement of Christian liberty, an encouragement of errorists and of the enemies of the Church, a disheartening of the confessors of the truth, or an offense to Christians, especially the weak. Such conditions, they maintained, prevailed during the time of the Interim, when both Pope and Emperor plainly declared it to be their object to reestablish the Romish religion in Lutheran churches; when the adoption of the Interim and the reinstitution of the papal ceremonies were universally regarded, by Catholics as well as Protestants, as the beginning of just such a reestablishment of the Papacy; when the timid Wittenberg and Leipzig theologians, instead of boldly confessing the Gospel and trusting to God for the protection of His Church, compromised the truth and yielded to the demands of the Romanists in order to escape persecution when the consciences of Lutherans were perplexed and confused wherever the abolished rites were reinstituted. Accordingly, they declared that under the prevailing circumstances the reintroduction of the Romish ceremonies was nothing short of a denial of Christian faith and of Christian love as well.

Flacius, in particular, maintained that under the prevailing circumstances even such ceremonies as were in themselves true adiaphora ceased to be adiaphora and could not be reintroduced with a good conscience, because they were forced upon the Lutherans by the enemies of the Gospel, because they were accepted for reprehensible reasons, such as fear of persecution and desire for external peace, and because their reintroduction confounded the consciences, offended the weak, and gave comfort and encouragement to the enemies of Christ. The people, Protestants as well as Catholics, said Flacius, would regard such reintroduction both as an admission on the part of the Lutherans that they had been in the wrong and the Romanists in the right, and as the beginning of a general restoration of the Papacy. Explain the reintroduction of the ceremonies as piously as you may, said he to the Interimists, the common people, especially the Romanists, always impressed by ceremonies much more than by the doctrine, will infer that those teachers who reintroduce the ceremonies approve of the Papacy in every respect and reject the Evangelical doctrine. In his book De Veris et Falsis Adiaphoris we read: "Adversarii totum suum cultum, vel certe praecipua capita suae religionis in ceremoniis collocant, quas cum in nostris ecclesiis in eorum gratiam restituimus, an non videmur tum eis, tum aliis eorum impiis cultibus assentiri? Nec dubitant, quin quandoquidem in tantis rebus ipsis cesserimus, etiam in reliquis cessuri simus, nostrum errorem agnoscamus, eorumque religionem veram esse confiteamur." (Schluesselburg 13, 217.) Accordingly, Flacius contended that under the prevailing circumstances a concession to the Romanists, even in ceremonies harmless in themselves, was tantamount to a denial of Lutheranism. The entire argument of the Anti-Adiaphorists was by him reduced to the following principle or axiom: "Nihil est adiaphoron in casu confessionis et scandali. Nothing is an adiaphoron when confession and offense are involved." And wherever the Interim was enforced, the consequences foretold by Flacius showed themselves: consciences were confused, simple Christians were offended, and the enemies were strengthened in their error and emboldened in their attacks and in further demands made upon the Lutherans.

140. Sophistries of Adiaphorists Refuted.

The Wittenberg Interimists endeavored to justify their attitude by a series of sophisms to which they also adhered in the "Final Report (Endlicher Bericht) of the Theologians of Both Universities of Leipzig and Wittenberg," 1570. (Frank 4, 87. 2.) By adopting the Interim, the Wittenbergers, in reality, had assented also to doctrinally false and dubious statements and to a number of ceremonies objectionable as such. Yet they pleaded the guilelessness of their intentions and the harmlessness of their procedure. They maintained that they had yielded merely in minor matters and ceremonies, which were neither commanded nor prohibited by the Word of God; that this was done in order to preserve intact the central Christian truth of justification; to preserve political peace and to save the Church from ruin; to protect the weak, whose shoulders were not strong enough to suffer persecution; that in their concessions they had been guided by the dictates of true wisdom, which always chooses the lesser of two evils; and that in all this they had merely followed the example set by Luther himself. They minimized the entire affair, and endeavored to explain away the seriousness of the situation. In particular they ridiculed Flacius for shouting and sounding the fire-alarm when in reality, they said, he had discovered nothing but a little smoke coming from a Wittenberg chimney.

But in the ears of all genuine and earnest Lutherans their sophistries and apologies rang neither true nor sincere. The arguments which they employed merely served to defeat their own purpose. What else, for example, than disgust, indignation, and distrust could be the effect on all honest Lutherans when the Wittenberg theologians, dishonestly veiling the real facts, declared in their official "Exposition" of 1559 (when danger of persecution had passed long ago) concerning the reintroduction of Corpus Christi that they had reintroduced this festival all the more readily in order that they might be able to instruct the people in the right use of the Sacrament and in the horrible abuses and profanations of the most holy Supper of the Lord in the circumgestation and adoration of the bread which their critics [the Lutheran opponents of the Interimists, by their doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper] strengthened and that they might thank God for the purification of the temple from the Romish idol Maozim, Dan. 11, 38. (Tschackert, 510.) Frank remarks: "One must see this passage black on white in order to believe the Wittenbergers really capable of stultifying themselves in such an incredible manner. It is a monstrosity, a defense unworthy of an honest man, let alone an Evangelical Christian." (4, 61. 113.)

The weak and insincere arguments of the Adiaphorists were thoroughly and convincingly refuted by their opponents. To the assertion of the Wittenbergers that the dispute was concerning mere unimportant ceremonies which were neither commanded nor prohibited by God, Flacius and Gallus replied (in their answer to the question of the ministers of Meissen whether they should leave their charges rather than don the Chorrock, lineam vestem induere) that even with respect to such seemingly most trifling adiaphora as the cope (Chorrock, vestis alba) one must not overlook what is attached to it. "We do not believe," they said, "that the robber will let the traveler keep his money, although first he only asks for his coat or similar things, at the same time, however, not obscurely hinting that, after having taken these, he will also demand the rest. We certainly do not doubt that you yourselves, as well as all men endowed with a sound mind, believe that, since the beginning is always hardest, these small beginnings of changes are at present demanded only that a door may be opened for all the other impieties that are to follow--quod tantum ideo parva ista mutationum initia iam proponantur, ut quia principia semper sunt dificillima per ea aditus reliquis omnibus secuturis impietatibus patefiat." (Schluesselburg 13, 644.)

The Adiaphorists pretended that they had consented to the Interim in the interest of the weak, who were unable to bear persecution. But the Lutherans answered that weak Christians could not be strengthened in their faith by teaching and persuading them to deny it and that the enemies and persecutors of the Gospel could certainly not be regarded as weak. (Frank 4, 78.) The protestations of the Adiaphorists that they had made the changes in ceremonies with the very best of intentions were answered by Flacius in De Veris et Falsis Adiaphoris as follows: Hardly ever has a Christian denied Christ without endeavoring to deceive both God and himself as to his motives. "But one must also consider, as may be clearly shown from 1 Cor. 10, with what design (quo animo) the adversaries propose such things to us, likewise, how they as well as others interpret our act." (Schl. 13, 217.) "Even though the intention of those who receive and use the adiaphora be not an evil one, the question is," said Martin Chemnitz in his Iudicium de Adiaphoris, "whether the opinion of the one who commands, imposes, and demands the adiaphora is impious or wicked, whether such reception and observation is interpreted and understood as a turning away from the confession of the true doctrine, and whether the weak are offended and grow faint thereby." (717.)

To the claims of the Interimists that they were but following the example of Luther, who, for the sake of the weak, had tolerated Romish ceremonies, etc., the Lutherans replied: Distinguish times and conditions! Luther was dealing with Christians who in their consciences still felt bound to the Roman usages, while the "weakness" spoken of by Adiaphorists is not an erring conscience, but fear of persecution. Moreover Luther tolerated existing Romish ceremonies as long as there was hope of arriving at an agreement with the Romanists in doctrine, while the Adiaphorists reinstitute ceremonies which have been abolished, and this, too, in deference and obedience to irreconcilable adversaries of the truth. Accordingly, Luther's attitude in this matter flowed from pure love for truth and from compassion with the weak, whom he endeavored to win for the truth, while the submission of the Adiaphorists to the demands of their adversaries is nothing short of unchristian denial of both true love and faith. (Frank 4, 55.) Brenz declared: "Adiaphora ex suis conditionibus iudicanda sunt. Adiaphora must be judged from their conditions. For if the condition is good, the adiaphoron, too, is good, and its observance is commanded. If, however, the condition is evil, the adiaphoron, too, is evil, and the observance of it is prohibited." (Schl. 13, 562.)

Furthermore, when the Wittenberg and Leipzig theologians maintained that, in preferring the lesser evil (the Roman ceremonies) to the greater (persecution), they had merely listened to, and followed, the voice of true wisdom, the Lutherans replied that moral evils must not be placed on a level with physical evils, nor guilt be incurred in order to avoid suffering and persecution. Westphal declared in his Explicatio Generalis Sententiae, quod a Duobus Malis Minus sit Eligendum: "Impium est, amoliri pericula per peccata, nec ita removentur aut minuuntur sed accersuntur et augentur poenae. It is wicked to avert dangers by sins, nor are they removed or diminished in this way, but rather superinduced and increased." (13, 251.) "It is better to take upon oneself punishments and great dangers than to offend God and to provoke His wrath by such offense." (250.) "It is better and easier to bear many evils and to undergo many dangers than to be unfaithful in the least commandment of God, and burden oneself with the guilt of even a single sin." (251.) Our paramount duty is not to escape persecution, but to retain a good conscience. Obey the Lord and await His help! Such was the counsel of Flacius and the loyal Lutherans. (Frank 4, 65.)

But our Wittenberg school will be closed, our churches will be desolated, and our preachers will be banished, exclaimed the faint-hearted Wittenbergers. The Lutherans answered: It is our duty to confess the truth regardless of consequences, and, at the same time, to look to God for the protection of His Church. Flacius said, in De Veris et Falsis Adiaphoris: Confess the truth and suffer the consequences! A Christian cannot obtain peace by offending God and serving and satisfying tyrants. Rather be drowned by the Spaniards in the Elbe with a millstone about one's neck than offend a Christian, deny the truth, and surrender the Church to Satan. "Longe satius esset teste Christo pati, ut alligata mola asinaria in medium Albis ab Hispanis proiiceremur, quam unicum parvulum Christi scandalizaremus, multo vero magis haec et quaevis gravissima pati deberemus, quam tam infinitis (ut iam fit) Christi parvulis offendiculum daremus, ecclesiam Satanae proderemus et salvificam confessionem veritatis abiiceremus." (Schl. 13, 227.)

As to the Wittenberg School, Flacius said: "It would certainly be better that the school were closed not one, but many years than that we, by avoiding confession, extremely weaken our own religion as well as strengthen the one opposed to it." (13, 231.) "As for myself, I do not doubt that, if only the theologians had been steadfast, the Wittenberg School would have been to-day much firmer than it is.... The Interim sprang from the timidity of the Wittenberg theologians.... Even a thousand Wittenberg schools ought certainly not to be valued so highly by pious men that, in order to preserve them unimpaired, they would rather suffer the world to be deprived of the light of the Gospel. Certe non tanti mille Wittenbergenses scholae piis esse debent, ut propter earum incolumitatem velint pati orbem terrarum Evangelii luce privari." (232.) In a letter to Melanchthon, written in the beginning of 1549, Brenz said: "If therefore the Church and pious ministers cannot be preserved in any other way than by bringing reproach upon the pious doctrine, then let us commend them to Christ, the Son of God; He will take care of them; and in the mean time let us patiently bear our banishment and wait for the Lord." (C. R. 7, 290.)

June 30, 1530, Luther had written to Melanchthon, who was then in Augsburg: "You want to govern things according to your philosophy; you torment yourself and do not see that this matter is not within your power and wisdom.... If we fall, Christ, that is to say, the Ruler of the world, falls with us; and even though He should fall, I would rather fall with Christ than stand with the Emperor." This passage is contained in one of the letters of Luther which Flacius published 1548 in order to dispel Melanchthon's timidity, rouse his Lutheran consciousness, and cure him of his vain and most dangerous disposition to save the Church by human wisdom and shrewdness, instead of, as Luther believed, solely by a bold confession of the truth of God's Word.

141. Theological Attitude of Flacius Sanctioned.

The theological position which Flacius and his fellow-combatants occupied over against the Adiaphorists was embodied in the Tenth Article of the Formula of Concord, and thus endorsed by the Lutheran Church as a whole. Frank says concerning this most excellent article which our Church owes to the faithfulness of the Anti-Melanchthonians, notably Flacius: "The theses which received churchly recognition in the Formula of Concord were those of Flacius." The entire matter, too, concerning the adiaphora had been discussed so thoroughly and correctly that the subsequent formulation and recognition of the Tenth Article caused but little difficulties. (Frank 4, 3f.)

Even Melanchthon, though refusing to confess that he was guilty of any doctrinal deviations, finally yielded to the arguments of his opponents and admitted that they were right in teaching as they did regarding the adiaphora. In his famous letter to Flacius (who, however, was not satisfied with the manner of Melanchthon's retraction), dated September 5, 1556, he wrote with respect to the Adiaphoristic Controversy: "I knew that even the least changes [in ceremonies] would be unwelcome to the people. However, since the doctrine [?] was retained, I would rather have our people submit to this servitude than forsake the ministry of the Gospel. Cum doctrina retineretur integra, malui nostros hanc servitutem subire quam deserere ministerium evangelii. And I confess that I have given the same advice to the Francans (Francis). This I have done; the doctrine of the Confession I have never changed.... Afterwards you began to contradict. I yielded; I did not fight. In Homer, Ajax fighting with Hector is satisfied when Hector yields and admits that the former is victor. You never come to an end with your accusations. Where is the enemy that does such a thing as striking those who yield and cast their arms away? Win! I yield. I do not contend concerning those rites, and I most earnestly wish that the churches would enjoy sweet concord. I also admit that I have sinned in this matter, and ask forgiveness of God, that I did not flee far from those insidious deliberations [in which the Interim was framed]. Fateor hoc in re a me peccatum esse, et a Deo veniam peto, quod non procul fugi insidiosas illas deliberationes." (C. R. 8, 839.)

On January 17, 1557, Melanchthon wrote to the Saxon pastors: "I was drawn into the insidious deliberations of the courts. Therefore, if in any way I have either fallen or been too weak, I ask forgiveness of God and of the Church, and I shall submit to the judgments of the Church." (9, 61.) In the Formula Consensus, written by Melanchthon at Worms, in 1557, the Interim is expressly condemned. For here we read: "With the help of God we retain, and shall retain, the entire doctrine of justification, agreeing with the Augsburg Confession and with the confessions which were published in the church of Hamburg against the book called Interim. Nor do we want any corruptions or ambiguities to be mixed with it; and we desire most earnestly that the true doctrine in all its articles be set forth, as far as possible, in identical and proper forms of speech, and that ambitious innovations be avoided." (9, 369.) The Frankfurt Recess of 1558, also written by Melanchthon and signed by the princes, maintains: "Where the true Christian doctrine of the holy Gospel is polluted or persecuted, there the adiaphora as well as other ceremonies are detrimental and injurious." (9, 501.)

XIII. The Majoristic Controversy.

142. Early Origin of This Error.

Though not personally mentioned and attacked by the opponents of Majorism, Melanchthon must be regarded as the real father also of this controversy. He was the first to introduce and to cultivate the phrase: "Good works are necessary to salvation." In his Loci of 1535 he taught that, in the article of justification, good works are the causa sine qua non and are necessary to salvation, ad vitam aeternam, ad salutem. (Herzog, R. E., 1903, 12, 519; Galle, Melanchthon, 345. 134.) Melanchthon defined: "Causa sine qua non works nothing, nor is it a constituent part but merely something without which the effect does not occur, or by which, if it were not present, the working cause would be hindered because it was not added. Causa sine qua non nihil agit, nec est pars constituens, sed tantum est quiddam, sine quo non fit effectus, seu quo, si non adesset, impediretur agens, ideo quia illud non accessisset." (Preger 1, 356.) According to Melanchthon, therefore, justification cannot occur without the presence of good works. He explained: "Et tamen bona opera ita necessaria sunt ad vitam aeternam, quia sequi reconciliationem necessario debent. Nevertheless good works are necessary to eternal life, inasmuch as they must necessarily follow reconciliation." (C. R. 21, 429. 775.) According to the context in which it is found, this statement includes that good works are necessary also to justification; for Melanchthon, too, correctly held "that the adoption to eternal life or the gift of eternal life was connected with justification, that is, the reconciliation imparted to faith." (453.)

At Wittenberg Melanchthon's efforts to introduce the new formula met with energetic opposition, especially on the part of Cordatus and Amsdorf. The formula: "Bona opera non quidem esse causam efficientem salutis, sed tamen causam sine qua non--Good works are indeed not the efficient cause of salvation, but nevertheless an indispensable cause," a necessary antecedent, was launched in a lecture delivered July 24, 1536, by a devoted pupil of Melanchthon, Caspar Cruciger, Sr. [born at Leipzig, January 1, 1504; professor in Wittenberg; assisted Luther in translating the Bible and in taking down his lectures and sermons; present at colloquies in Marburg 1529, in Wittenberg 1536, in Smalcald 1537, in Worms and Hagenau 1540 in Regensburg 1541, in Augsburg 1548; died November 16, 1548]. According to Ratzeberger, Cruciger had dictated: "Bona opera requiri ad salutem tamquam causam sine qua non." Cordatus reports Cruciger's dictation as follows: "Tantum Christus est causa propter quem; interim tamen verum est, homines agere aliquid oportere; oportere nos habere contritionem et debere Verbo erigere conscientiam, ut fidem concipiamus, ut nostra contritio et noster conatus sunt causae iustificationis sine quibus non--our contrition and our endeavor are causes of justification without which it does not take place." (3, 350.)

Cordatus immediately attacked the new formula as false. "I know," said he, "that this duality of causes cannot stand with the simple article of justification." (3, 350.) He demanded a public retraction from Cruciger. Before long Amsdorf also entered the fray. September 14, 1536, he wrote to Luther about the new-fangled teaching of Melanchthon, "that works are necessary to eternal life." (3, 162; Luther, St. L. 21b, 4104.) Pressed by Cordatus, Cruciger finally admitted that Melanchthon was back of the phrases he had dictated. He declared that he was the pupil of Mr. Philip; that the entire dictation was Mr. Philip's; that by him he had been led into this matter; and that he did not know how it happened. Se esse D. Philippi discipulum, et dictata omnia esse D. Philippi, se ab eo in illam rem traductum, et nescire quomodo." [tr. note: no opening quotation mark in original] (C. R. 3, 162.)

That Melanchthon had been making efforts to introduce the new phrases in Wittenberg appears from the passage in his Loci of 1535 quoted above, and especially from his letters of the two following years. November 5, 1536, he wrote to Veit Dietrich: "Cordatus incites the city, its neighborhood, and even the Court against me because in the explanation of the controversy on justification I have said that new obedience is necessary to salvation, novam obedientiam necessariam esse ad salutem." (185. 179.) May 16, 1537, Veit Dietrich wrote to Forester: "Our Cordatus, driven, I know not, by what furies, writes against Philip and Cruciger as against heretics, and is determined to force Cruciger to retract because he has said that good works are necessary to salvation.... This matter worries Philip very much, and if certain malicious men do not control themselves, he threatens to leave." (372.) As for Melanchthon, he made no efforts to shirk the responsibility for Cruciger's dictation. "Libenter totam rem in me transfero--I cheerfully transfer the entire affair to myself" he wrote April 15, 1537. Yet he was worried much more than his words seem to indicate. (342.)

Complaints against the innovations of Melanchthon and Cruciger were also lodged with Luther by Cordatus, Amsdorf, and Stiefel. Cordatus reports Luther as saying after the matter had been related to him, October 24, 1536: "This is the very theology of Erasmus, nor can anything be more opposed to our doctrine. Haec est ipsissima theologia Erasmi, neque potest quidquam nostrae doctrinae esse magis adversum." To say that new obedience is the "causa sine qua non--sine qua non contingit vita aeterna," Luther declared, was tantamount to treading Christ and His blood under our feet. "Cruciger autem haec, quae publice dictavit, publice revocabit. What he has publicly dictated, Cruciger shall publicly retract." (Kolde, Analecta, 266.)

According to Ratzeberger, Luther immediately warned and censured Cruciger "in severe terms." (C. R. 4, 1038.) Flacius reports that Luther had publicly declared more than five times: "Propositionem: Bona opera esse necessaria ad salutem, volumus damnatam, abrogatam, ex ecclesiis et scholis nostris penitus explosam." (Schluesselburg 7, 567.) After his return from Smalcald, where he had expressed grave fears as to the future doctrinal soundness of his Wittenberg colleagues, Luther, in a public disputation on June 1, 1537 "exploded and condemned" the teaching that good works are necessary to salvation, or necessary to salvation as a causa sine qua non. (Lehre u. Wehre 1908, 65.) Both parties were present at the disputation, Cordatus as well as Melanchthon and Cruciger. In a letter to Veit Dietrich, June 27, 1537, Cruciger reports: Luther maintained that new obedience is an "effect necessarily following justification," but he rejected the statement: "New obedience is necessary to salvation, necessariam ad salutem." He adds: "Male hoc habuit nostrum [Melanchthon], sed noluit eam rem porro agitare. Melanchthon was displeased with this, but he did not wish to agitate the matter any further." (C. R. 3, 385.) After the disputation Cruciger was handed an anonymous note, saying that his "Treatise on Timothy" was now branded as "heretical, sacrilegious, impious, and blasphemous (haeretica, sacrilega, impia et blasphema)," and unless he retracted, he would have to be regarded as a Papist, a teacher and servant of Satan and not of Christ, and that his dictations would be published. (387.) In a letter to Dietrich, Cruciger remarks that Luther had disapproved of this anonymous writing, but he adds: "I can't see why he [Luther] gives so much encouragement to Cordatus." (385.)

In private, Luther repeatedly discussed this matter also with Melanchthon. This appears from their Disputation of 1536 on the question: "Whether this proposition is true: The righteousness of works is necessary to salvation." (E. 58, 353.) In a letter to Dietrich of June 22, 1537, Melanchthon, in substance, refers as follows to his discussions with Luther: I am desirous of maintaining the unity of the Wittenberg Academy; in this matter I also employ some art; nor does Luther seem to be inimical; yesterday he spoke to me in a very kind manner on the questions raised by Quadratus [Cordatus]. What a spectacle if the Lutherans would oppose each other as the Cadmean brethren! I will therefore modify whatever I can. Yet I desire a more thorough exposition of the doctrines of predestination, of the consent of the will, of the necessity of our obedience, and of the sin unto death. (C. R. 3, 383.)

A number of private letters written by Melanchthon during and immediately after his conflict with Cordatus, however, reveal much animosity, not only against Cordatus, but against Luther as well. Nor do those written after Luther's disputation, June 1, 1537, indicate that he was then fully cured of his error. (357. 392. 407.) Moreover, in his Loci of 1538 we read: "Et tamen haec nova spiritualis obedientia (nova spiritualitas) necessaria est ad vitam aeternam. And nevertheless this new spiritual obedience is necessary to eternal life." (21, 429.) Evidently, then, Melanchthon did not grasp the matter, and was not convinced of the incorrectness of his phraseology. Yet he made it a point to avoid and eliminate from his publications the obnoxious formula: "Bona opera necessaria esse ad salutem." At any rate, his essay on Justification and Good Works, of October 1537, as well as subsequent publications of his, do not contain it. In the Loci of 1538, just referred to, he replaced the words bona opera by the phrase obedientia haec nova spiritualis,--indeed, a purely verbal rather than a doctrinal change. Nor did it reappear even in the Variata of 1540. In 1541, at Regensburg, Melanchthon consented to the formula "that we are justified by a living and efficacious faith--iustificari per fidem vivam et efficacem." But when Luther deleted the words "et efficacem, and efficacious," Melanchthon acquiesced. (4, 499.) In the Loci of 1543 he expunged the appendix "ad salutem, to salvation." At the same time, however, he retained the error in a more disguised form, viz., that good works are necessary to retain faith. For among the reasons why good works are necessary he here enumerates also "the necessity of retaining the faith, since the Holy Spirit is expelled and grieved when sins against the conscience are admitted." (21, 775.)

143. Formula Renewed--Abandoned.

Under the duress of the Augsburg Interim, Melanchthon relapsed into his old error. July 6, 1548, he (together with Caspar Cruciger, John Pfeffinger, Daniel Gresser, George Major, and John Foerster) agreed to the statement: "For this proposition is certainly true that no one can be saved without love and good works. Yet we are not justified by love and good works, but by grace for Christ's sake." (7, 22.) In the Leipzig Interim, adopted several months later, the false teaching concerning the necessity of good works to salvation was fully restored, as appears from the quotations from this document cited in the chapter on the Adiaphoristic Controversy. According to the Formula of Concord this renewal of the obnoxious formula at the time of the Interim furnished the direct occasion for the Majoristic Controversy. For here we read: "The aforesaid modes of speech and false expressions [concerning the necessity of good works to salvation] were renewed by the Interim just at a time when there was special need of a clear, correct confession against all sorts of corruptions and adulterations of the article of justification." (947, 29.) However, when the controversy on good works began, and George Major zealously championed the restored formula, Melanchthon, probably mindful of his former troubles in this matter, signally failed to support and endorse his friend and colleague. Moreover, he now advised Major and others to abstain from using the phrase: Good works are necessary to salvation, "because," said he, "this appendix [to salvation, ad salutem] is interpreted as merit, and obscures the doctrine of grace."

In an opinion of December, 1553, Melanchthon explains: "New obedience is necessary; ... but when it is said: New obedience is necessary to salvation, the Papists understand that good works merit salvation. This proposition is false, therefore I relinquish this mode of speech." (C. R. 8, 194.) January 13, 1555, he wrote to the Senate of Nordhausen that their ministers "should not preach, defend, and dispute the proposition [Good works are necessary to salvation], because it would immediately be interpreted to mean that good works merit salvation--weil doch alsbald diese Deutung angehaengt wird, als sollten gute Werke Verdienst sein der Seligkeit." (410.) September 5, 1556, he said in his letter to Flacius: "I have always admonished George [Major] not only to explain his sentence (which he did), but to abandon that form of speech. And he promised that he would not use it. What more can I ask? The same I did with others." (842.)

In the Frankfurt Recess of 1558, written by Melanchthon and signed by the Lutheran princes, we read: "Although therefore this proposition, 'New obedience is necessary (Nova obedientia est necessaria, nova obedientia est debitum),' must be retained, we nevertheless do not wish to attach these words, 'ad salutem, to salvation,' because this appendix is interpreted as referring to merit and obscures the doctrine of grace, for this remains true that man is justified before God and is an heir of eternal salvation by grace, for the sake of the Lord Christ, by faith in Him only." (9, 497. 405.) In an opinion written November 13, 1559, Melanchthon (together with Paul Eber, Pfeffinger, and H. Salmut) again declared: "I say clearly that I do not employ the phrase, 'Good works are necessary to salvation.'" (969.) In his Responsiones ad Articulos Bavaricos of 1559 he wrote: "Ego non utor his verbis: Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem, quia hoc additione 'ad salutem' intelligitur meritum. I do not use these words: Good works are necessary to salvation, because by the addition 'to salvation' a merit is understood." In his lectures, too, Melanchthon frequently rejected the appendix (to salvation), and warned his pupils not to use the phrase. (4, 543; Lehre und Wehre 1908, 78.)

Thus Melanchthon, time and again, disowned the proposition which he himself had first introduced. Nowhere, however, did he reject it or advise against its use because it was inherently erroneous and false as such but always merely because it was subject to abuse and misapprehension,--a qualified rejection which self-evidently could not and did not satisfy his opponents. In an opinion, dated March 4, 1558, Melanchthon refuses to reject flatly the controverted formula, and endeavors to show that it is not in disagreement with the mode of speech employed in the Bible. We read: "Illyricus and his compeers are not satisfied when we say that the appendix [to salvation] is to be omitted on account of the false interpretation given it, but demand that we simply declare the proposition, 'Good works are necessary to salvation,' to be wrong. Against this it must be considered what also Paul has said, Rom. 10: Confession is made to salvation (Confessio fit ad salutem), which Wigand maliciously alters thus: Confession is made concerning salvation (Confessio fit de salute). Again, 2 Cor. 7: 'For godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation,' Likewise Phil. 2: 'Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling.' Nor do these words sound any differently: 'Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord will be saved,' Acts 2, 21. But, they say, one must understand these expressions correctly! That is what we say, too. This disputation however, would be ended if we agreed to eliminate the appendix and rack our brains no further--dass wir den Anhang ausschliessen und nicht weiter gruebelten." (9, 474.)

144. Major Champions Error.

The immediate cause of the public controversy concerning the question whether good works are necessary to salvation was George Major, a devoted pupil and adherent of Melanchthon and a most active member of the Wittenberg faculty [Major was born April 25, 1502; 1529 Rector of the school in Magdeburg; 1536 Superintendent in Eisleben; soon after, preacher and professor in Wittenberg; 1544 Rector of the University of Wittenberg; in 1548, at Celle, he, too, submitted to the demands of Maurice, in the Leipzig Interim he merely objected to the insertion of Extreme Unction; 1552 Superintendent in Eisleben; professor in Wittenberg from 1553 until his death in 1574].

"That Dr. Pommer [Bugenhagen] and Dr. Major have Caused Offense and Confusion. Nicholas Amsdorf, Exul Christi. Magdeburg, 1551,"--such was the title of a publication which appeared immediately prior to Major's appointment as Superintendent in Eisleben. In it Bugenhagen (who died 1558) and Major (of course, Melanchthon could and should have been included) were denounced for their connection with the Leipzig Interim. Major in particular, was censured for having, in the Interim, omitted the word sola, "alone," in the phrase "sola fide justificamur, we are justified by faith alone," and for having emphasized instead that Christian virtues and good works are meritorious and necessary to salvation. When, as a result of this publication the preachers of Eisleben and Mansfeld refused to recognize Major as their superior the latter promised to justify himself publicly. He endeavored to do so in his Answer published 1552 at Wittenberg, after he had already been dismissed by Count Albrecht as Superintendent of Eisleben. The Answer was entitled: Auf des ehrenwuerdigen Herrn Niclas von Amsdorfs Schrift, so jetzund neulich mense Novembri 1551 wider Dr. Major oeffendtlich im Druck ausgegangen. Antwort Georg Majors. In it Major disclaimed responsibility for the Interim (although he had been present at Celle, where it had been framed), and declared that he had never doubted the "sola fide, by faith alone." "But," continued Major, "I do confess that I have hitherto taught and still teach, and henceforth will teach all my life: that good works are necessary to salvation. And I declare publicly and with clear and plain words that no one is saved by evil works, and also that no one is saved without good works. Furthermore I say, let him who teaches otherwise, even though an angel from heaven, be accursed (der sei verflucht)!" Again: "Therefore it is impossible for a man to be saved without good works." Major explained that good works are necessary to salvation, not because they effect or merit forgiveness of sins, justification, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and eternal life (for these gifts are merited alone by the death of our only Mediator and Savior Jesus Christ, and can be received only by faith), "but nevertheless good works must be present, not as a merit, but as due obedience toward God." (Schlb. 7, 30.)

In his defiant attitude Major was immediately and firmly opposed by Amsdorf, Flacius, Gallus, and others. Amsdorf published his "Brief Instruction Concerning Dr. Major's Answer, that he is not innocent, as he boasts. Ein kurzer Unterricht auf Dr. Majoris Antwort, dass er nicht unschuldig sei, wie er sich ruehmet," 1552. Major's declaration and anathema are here met by Amsdorf as follows: "First of all, I would like to know against whom Dr. George Major is writing when he says: Nobody merits heaven by evil works. Has even the angry and impetuous Amsdorf ever taught and written thus? ...We know well, praise God, and confess that a Christian should and must do good works. Nobody disputes and speaks concerning that; nor has anybody doubted this. On the contrary, we speak and dispute concerning this, whether a Christian earns salvation by the good works which he should and must do.... For we all say and confess that after his renewal and new birth a Christian should love and fear God and do all manner of good works, but not that he may be saved, for he is saved already by faith (aber nicht darum, dass er selig werde, denn er ist schon durch den Glauben selig). This is the true prophetic and apostolic doctrine, and whoever teaches otherwise is already accursed and damned. I, therefore, Nicholas von Amsdorf, declare: Whoever teaches and preaches these words as they read (Good works are necessary to salvation), is a Pelagian, a mameluke, and a denier of Christ, and he has the same spirit which prompted Drs. Mensing and Witzel to write against Dr. Luther, of blessed memory, that good works are necessary to salvation." (Schlb. 7, 210.)

Another attack was entitled: "Against the Evangelist of the Holy Gown, Dr. Miser Major. Wider den Evangelisten des heiligen Chorrocks, Dr. Geitz Major," 1552. Here Flacius--for he was the author of this publication--maintained that neither justification, nor salvation, nor the preservation of the state of grace is to be based on good works. He objected to Major's propositions because they actually made good works the antecedent and cause of salvation and robbed Christians of their comfort. He declared: "When we say: That is necessary for this work or matter, it means just as much as if we said: It is a cause, or, by this or that work one effects this or that." As to the practical consequences of Major's propositions, Flacius remarks: "If therefore good works are necessary to salvation, and if it is impossible for any one to be saved without them, then tell us, Dr. Major, how can a man be saved who all his life till his last breath has led a sinful life, but now when about to die, desires to apprehend Christ (as is the case with many on their death-bed or on the gallows)? How will Major comfort such a poor sinner?" The poor sinner, Flacius continues, would declare: "Major, the great theologian, writes and teaches as most certain that no one can be saved without good works, and that good works are absolutely necessary (ganz notwendig) to salvation; therefore I am damned, for I have heretofore never done any good works." "Furthermore Major will also have to state and determine the least number of ounces or pounds of good works one is required to have to obtain salvation." (Preger 1, 363f.)

In his "Explanation and Answer to the New Subtle Corruption of the Gospel of Christ--Erklaerung und Antwort auf die neue subtile Verfaelschung des Evangelii Christi," 1554 Nicholas Gallus maintained that, if the righteousness presented by Christ alone is the cause of our justification and salvation, then good works can only be the fruits of it. In a similar way Schnepf, Chemnitz, and others declared themselves against Majorism. (Schlb. 7, 55. 162. 205. 534. 572; C. R. 9, 475; Seeberg, Dogg. 4, 486.)

145. Major's Modifications.

Major answered his opponents in his book of 1553 entitled, A Sermon on the Conversion to God of St. Paul and All God-fearing Men. In it he most emphatically denied that he had ever taught that good works are necessary in order to earn salvation, and explained more fully "whether, in what way, which, and why good works are nevertheless necessary to salvation." Here he also admits: "This proposition would be dangerous and dark if I had said without any distinction and explanation: Good works are necessary to salvation. For thus one might easily be led to believe that we are saved by good works without faith, or also by the merit of good works, not by faith alone." "We are not just and saved by renewal, and because the fulfilment of the Law is begun in us, as the Interim teaches, but in this life we always remain just and saved by faith alone." (Preger 1, 364ff.)

Major explains: "When I say: The new obedience or good works which follow faith are necessary to salvation, this is not to be understood in the sense that one must earn salvation by good works, or that they constitute, or could effect or impart the righteousness by which a man may stand before the judgment-seat of God, but that good works are effects and fruits of true faith, which are to follow it [faith] and are wrought by Christ in believers. For whoever believes and is just, he, at the risk of losing his righteousness and salvation, is in duty bound and obliged to begin to obey God as his Father, to do that which is good, and to avoid evil." (370.)

Major furthermore modified his statement by explaining: Good works are necessary to salvation, not in order to obtain but to retain, salvation. "In order to retain salvation and not to lose it again," he said, "they are necessary to such an extent that, if you fail to do them, it is a sure indication that your faith is dead and false, a painted faith, an opinion existing only in your imagination." The reason, said Major (Menius, too, later on expressed his agreement in this point with Major), why he had urged his proposition concerning the necessity of good works to salvation, was the fact that the greater number also of those who claim to be good evangelical Christians "imagine that they believe, and imagine and fabricate a faith which may exist without good works, though this is just as impossible as that the sun should not emit brightness and splendor." (Tschackert 515; Frank 2, 162. 373.)

Reducing his teaching to a number of syllogisms, Major argued, in substance, as follows: Eternal life is given to none but the regenerate; regeneration, however, is new obedience and good works in the believers and the beginning of eternal life: hence the new life, which consists in good works, is necessary to believers for salvation. Again: No one is saved unless he confesses with his mouth the faith of his heart in Christ and remains steadfast in such faith, Rom. 10, 9. 10; Matt. 22, 13; hence the works of confessing and persevering faith are necessary to salvation as fruits of faith, in order that salvation, obtained by faith, may not be lost by denial and apostasy. (Frank 2, 162.) Again: The thing without which salvation cannot be preserved is necessary to salvation; without obedience toward God salvation, received by grace through faith, cannot be preserved; hence obedience toward God is necessary in order that by it salvation, received by grace, may be preserved and may not be lost by disobedience. At the conclusion of his "Sermon on Paul's Conversion," Major also repeated his anathema against all those who teach otherwise, and added: "Hiewider moegen nun Amseln [Amsdorf] oder Drosseln singen und schreien, Haehne [Gallus] kraehen oder gatzen [gakkern], verloffene und unbekannte Wenden und Walen [Flacius] laestern, die Schrift verwenden, verkehren, kalumniieren, schreiben und malen, wie sie wollen, so bin ich doch gewiss, dass diese Lehre, so in diesem Sermon steht die rechte goettliche Wahrheit ist, wider welche auch alle hoellischen Pforten nichts Bestaendiges oder Gruendliches koennen aufbringen, wie boese sie sich auch machen." (Preger 1, 371. 380.)

Schluesselburg charges Major also with confounding justification with sanctification. In proof of this he quotes the following from Major's remarks on Rom. 8: "Salvation or justification is twofold: one in this life and the other in eternal life. The salvification in this life consists, first, in the remission of sins and in the imputation of righteousness; secondly, in the gift and renewing of the Holy Spirit and in the hope of eternal life bestowed freely for the sake of Christ. This salvification and justification is only begun [in this life] and imperfect; for in those who are saved and justified by faith there still remains sin, the depravity of nature, there remain also the terrors of sin and of the Law, the bite of the old Serpent, and death, together with all miseries that flesh is heir to. Thus by faith and the Holy Ghost we, indeed, begin to be justified, sanctified, and saved, but we are not yet perfectly justified, sanctified, and saved. It remains, therefore, that we become perfectly just and saved. Sic per fidem et Spiritum Sanctum coepimus quidem iustificari, sanctificari, et salvari, nondum tamen perfecte iusti et salvi sumus. Reliquum igitur est, ut perfecte iusti et salvi fiamus." (7, 348.)

146. Menius Sides with Major.

Prominent among the theologians who were in essential agreement with Major was Justus Menius. He was born 1499; became Superintendent in Gotha 1546; was favorably disposed toward the Leipzig Interim; resigned his position in Gotha 1557; removed to Leipzig, where he published his polemical writings against Flacius; died August 11, 1558. In 1554 he was entangled in the Majoristic controversy. In this year Amsdorf demanded that Menius, who, together with himself, Schnepf, and Stolz, had been appointed visitors of Thuringia, declare himself against the Adiaphorists, and, in particular, reject the books of Major, and his doctrine that good works are necessary to salvation. Menius declined, because, he said, he had not read these books. As a result Menius was charged with being a secret adherent of Majorism.

In 1556, however, Menius himself proved by his publications that this suspicion was not altogether unwarranted. For in his Preparation for a Blessed Death and in a Sermon on Salvation, published in that year, Menius taught that the beginning of the new life in believers is "necessary to salvation" (Tschackert, 517; Herzog, R. 12, 89.) This caused Flacius to remark in his book, Concerning the Unity of Those who in the Past Years have Fought for and against the Adiaphora, 1556: "Major and Menius, in their printed books, are again reviving the error that good works are necessary to salvation, wherefore it is to be feared that the latter misfortune will be worse than the former." (Preger 1, 382.) Soon after, Menius was suspended from office and required to clear himself before the Synod in Eisenach, 1556. Here he subscribed seven propositions in which the doctrine that good works are necessary to salvation, or to retain salvation, was rejected.

The seven Eisenach propositions, signed by Menius, read as follows: "1. Although this proposition, Good works are necessary to salvation, may be tolerated in the doctrine of the Law abstractly and ideally (in doctrina legis abstractive et de idea tolerari potest), nevertheless there are many weighty reasons why it should be avoided and shunned no less than the other: Christ is a creature. 2. In the forum of justification and salvation this proposition, Good works are necessary to salvation, is not at all to be tolerated. 3. In the forum of new obedience, after reconciliation, good works are not at all necessary to salvation but for other causes. 4. Faith alone justifies and saves in the beginning, middle, and end. 5. Good works are not necessary to retain salvation (ad retinendam salutem). 6. Justification and salvation are synonyms and equipollent or convertible terms, and neither can nor must be separated in any way (nec ulla ratione distrahi aut possunt aut debent). 7. May therefore the papistical buskin be banished from our church on account of its manifold offenses and innumerable dissensions and other causes of which the apostles speak Acts 15." (Preger 1, 383.)

In his subscription to these theses Menius declared: "I, Justus Menius, testify by my present signature that this confession is true and orthodox, and that, according to the gift given me by God, I have heretofore by word and writing publicly defended it, and shall continue to defend it." In this subscription Menius also promised to correct the offensive expressions in his Sermon on Salvation. However, dissatisfied with the intolerable situation thus created, he resigned, and soon after became Superintendent in Leipzig. In three violently polemical books, published there in 1557 and 1558, he freely vented his long pent-up feelings of anger and animosity, especially against Flacius. (384f.)

In these publications, Menius denied that he had ever used the proposition of Major. However, he not only refused to reject it, but defended the same error, though in somewhat different terms. He merely replaced the phrase "good works" by "new life," "new righteousness," "new obedience," and affirmed "that it is necessary to our salvation that such be wrought in us by the Holy Ghost." He wrote: The Holy Spirit renews those who have become children of God by faith in Christ, and that this is performed in them "this, I say, they need for their salvation--sei ihnen zur Seligkeit vonnoeten." (Frank 2, 223.) Again: "He [the Holy Spirit] begins righteousness and life in the believers, which beginning is in this life (as long as we dwell on earth in this sinful flesh) very weak and imperfect, but nevertheless necessary to salvation, and will be perfect after the resurrection, that we may walk in it before God eternally and be saved." (222.) Works, said Menius, must not be introduced into the article of justification, reconciliation, and redemption; but when dealing with the article of sanctification, "then it is correct to say: Sanctification, or renewal of the Holy Spirit, is necessary to salvation." (Preger 1, 388.)

With respect to the proposition, Good works are necessary to salvation, Menius stated that he could not simply condemn it as altogether false and heretical. Moreover, he argued: "If it is correct to say: Sanctification, or renewal by the Holy Spirit, is necessary to salvation, then it cannot be false to say: Good works are necessary to salvation, since it is certain and cannot be gainsaid that sanctification and renewal do not and cannot exist without good works." (386.) Indeed, he himself maintained that "good works are necessary to salvation in order that we may not lose it again." (387. 391.) At the same time Menius, as stated above, claimed that he had never employed Major's proposition, and counseled others to abstain from its use in order to avoid misinterpretation. The same advice he gave with respect to his own formula that new obedience is necessary to salvation. (Frank 2, 165. 223.)

Menius also confounded justification and sanctification. He wrote: "By faith in Christ alone we become just before God and are saved. Why? Because by faith one receives first, forgiveness of sins and the righteousness or obedience of Christ, with which He fulfilled the Law for us; thereupon, one also receives the Holy Spirit, who effects and fulfils in us the righteousness required by the Law, here in this life imperfectly and perfectly in the life to come." (Preger 1, 387.) At the synod of Eisenach, 1556, the theologians accordingly declared: "Although it is true that grace and the gift through grace cannot be separated, but are always together, nevertheless the gift of the Holy Spirit is not a piece or part, much less a co-cause of justification and salvation, but an appendix, a consequence, and an additional gift of grace.-- Wiewohl es wahr ist, dass gratia und donum per gratiam nicht koennen getrennt werden, sondern allezeit beieinander sind, so ist doch die Gabe des Heiligen Geistes nicht ein Stueck oder Teil, viel weniger eine Mitursache der Justifikation und Salvation, sondern ist ein Anhang, Folge und Zugab be der Gnade." (Seeberg 4, 487.)

147. Attitude of Anti-Majorists.

With the exception of Menius and other adherents in Electoral Saxony, Major was firmly opposed by Lutheran ministers and theologians everywhere. Even when he was still their superintendent, the ministers of Mansfeld took issue with him; and after he was dismissed by Count Albrecht, they drafted an Opinion, in which they declared that Major's proposition obscures the doctrine of God's grace and Christ's merit. Also the clergy of Luebeck, Hamburg, Lueneburg, and Magdeburg united in an Opinion, in which they rejected Major's proposition. Chief among the theologians who opposed him were, as stated, Amsdorf, Flacius, Wigand, Gallus, Moerlin and Chemnitz. In their publications they unanimously denounced the proposition that good works are necessary to salvation, and its equivalents, as dangerous, godless, blasphemous, and popish. Yet before the controversy they themselves had not all nor always been consistent and correct in their terminology.

The Formula of Concord says: "Before this controversy quite a few pure teachers employed such and similar expressions [that faith is preserved by good works, etc.] in the exposition of the Holy Scriptures, in no way, however, intending thereby to confirm the above-mentioned errors of the Papists." (949, 36.) Concerning the word "faith," 1549, Flacius, for example had said that our effort to obey God might be called a "causa sine qua non, or something which serves salvation." His words are: "Atque hinc apparet, quatenus nostrum studium obediendi Deo dici possit causa sine qua non, seu huperetikon ti, id est, quiddam subserviens ad salutem." But when his attention was called to this passage, he first eliminated the causa sine qua non and substituted ad vitam aeternam for ad salutem, and afterwards changed this phrase into ad veram pietatem. (Frank 2, 218. 169.) However, as soon as the controversy began, the Lutherans, notably Flacius, clearly saw the utter falsity of Major's statements.

Flacius wrote: "Salvation is forgiveness of sins, as Paul testifies, Rom. 4, and David, Ps. 32: 'Blessed are they whose sins are forgiven.' 'Thy faith hath made thee whole.' Matt. 9; Mark 5. 10, Luke 7. 8. 18. Jesus saves sinners and the lost. Matt. 1, 18; 1 Tim. 1. Since, now, salvation and forgiveness of sins are one and the same thing, consider, dear Christian, what kind of doctrine this is: No one has received forgiveness of sins without good works; it is impossible for any one to receive forgiveness of sins or to be saved without good works; good works are necessary to forgiveness of sins." (Preger 1, 375.) Again: "Young children and those who are converted in their last hour (who certainly constitute the greater part), must confess that they neither possess, nor will possess, any good works, for they die forthwith. Indeed, St. Bernard also wrote when on his deathbed: Perdite vixi--I have led a wicked life! And what is still more, all Christians, when in their dying moments, they are striving with sins, must say: 'All our good works are like filthy rags; in my life there is nothing good;' and, as David says, Ps.51: 'Before Thee I am nothing but sin,' as Dr. Luther explains it." (376.) Again: "We are concerned about this, that poor and afflicted consciences may have a firm and certain consolation against sin, death, devil, and hell, and thus be saved. For if a condition or appendix concerning our good works and worthiness is required as necessary to salvation, then, as Dr. Major frequently discusses this matter very excellently, it is impossible to have a firm and solid consolation." (376.)

Flacius showed that Major's proposition taken as it reads, can be interpreted only in a papistical sense, and that no amount of explanations is able to cure it of its ingrained falsity. Major, said he, must choose between his proposition or the interpretations which he places upon it; for the former does not admit of the latter. He added that a proposition which is in constant need of explanations in order not to be misunderstood is not adapted for religious instruction. From the fact, says Flacius, that the justified are obliged to obey the Law, it follows indeed that good works are necessary, but not that they are necessary to salvation (as Major and Menius inferred). "From the premises [that Christians are in duty bound to obey the Law and to render the new obedience] it merely follows that this obedience is necessary; but nothing is here said of salvation." (392.) Flacius showed that Major's proposition, even with the proviso that each and every merit of works was to be excluded, remained objectionable. The words "necessary to, necessaria ad," always, he insisted, designate something that precedes, moves, works, effects. The proposition: Justification, salvation, and faith are necessary to good works, cannot be reversed, because good works are not antecedents, but consequents of justification, salvation, and faith.

For the same reason Flacius objected to the phrase that good works are necessary as causa sine qua non. "Dear Dr. G." (Major), says he, "ask the highly learned Greek philosophers for a little information as to what they say de causa sine qua non, hon ouk aneu. Ask I say, the learned and the unlearned, ask philosophy, reason, and common languages, whether it is not true that it [causa sine qua non] must precede." (377.) No one, said he would understand the propositions of Major and Menius correctly. Illustrating this point Flacius wrote: "Can one become a carpenter without the house which he builds afterwards? Can one make a wagon or ship without driving or sailing? I say, yes! Or, dear Doctor, are we accustomed to say: Driving and sailing is necessary to the wagon and ship respectively, and it is impossible for a wagon or ship to be made without driving or sailing? I hear: No!" (375.) "Nobody says: Fruits and leaves are necessary to the tree; wine and grapes are necessary to the vineyard; or dwelling is necessary to a house; driving and sailing, to a wagon and ship; riding is necessary to a horse; but thus they speak: Wagons and horses are necessary to riding, a ship is necessary to sailing." (391.)

The charge that Major's proposition robbed Christians of their assurance of salvation was urged also by Nicholas Gallus. He says: It is giving with one hand and taking again with the other when Major adds [to his proposition concerning the necessity of good works to salvation] that our conscience is not to look upon our works, but on Christ alone. (Frank 2, 224.) The same point was stressed in the Opinion of the ministers of Luebeck, Hamburg, Lueneburg, and Magdeburg, published by Flacius and Gallus in 1553. (220.) The Hamburg theologians declared: "This appendix [necessary to salvation, ad salutem] indicates a cause and a merit." They added that in this sense also the phrase was generally understood by the Papists. (Planck, Geschichte des prot. Lehrbegriffes 5, 505. 497.) Gallus also explained that it was papistical to infer: By sins we lose salvation, hence it is retained by good works; or, Sins condemn, hence good works save. (Frank 2, 171.) Hesshusius wrote to Wigand: "I regard Eber's assertion that good works are necessary to justification because they must be present, as false and detrimental. For Paul expressly excludes good works from the justification of a sinner before God, not only when considered a merit cause, glory, dignity, price, object or trust, and medium of application, etc., but also as to the necessity of their presence (verum etiam quoad necessitatem praesentiae). If it is necessary that good works be present with him who is to be justified, then Paul errs when he declares that a man is justified without the works of the Law." (172.)

Regarding this point, that good works are necessary to justification in so far as they must be present, the Majorists appealed to Luther, who, however, had merely stated that faith is never alone, though it alone justifies. His axiom was: "Faith alone justifies, but it is not alone-- Fides sola iustificat, sed non est sola." According to Luther good works, wherever they are found, are present in virtue of faith; where they are not present, they are absent because faith is lacking; nor can they preserve the faith by which alone they are produced. At the Altenburg Colloquy (1568 to 1569) the theologians of Electoral Saxony insisted that, since true faith does not and cannot exist in those who persevere in sins against their conscience, good works must not be altogether and absolutely excluded from justification, at least their necessity and presence must not be regarded as unnecessary. (189.) The theologians of Ducal Saxony, however, denied "that in the article and act of justification our good works are necessary by necessity of presence. Sed impugnamus istam propositionem, in articulo et actu iustificationis bona nostra opera necessaria esse necessitate praesentiae." "On the other hand, however, they, too, were solicitous to affirm the impossibility of faith's coexisting with an evil purpose to sin against God in one and the same mind at the same time." (237; Gieseler 3, 2, 251.) In the Apology of the Book of Concord the Lutheran theologians declared: "The proposition (Justification of faith requires the presence of good works) was rejected [in the Formula of Concord] because it cannot be understood otherwise than of the cause of justification. For whatever is present in justification as necessary in such a manner that without its presence justification can neither be nor occur, that must indeed be understood as being a cause of justification itself." (238)

148. Major's Concessions Not Satisfactory.

In order to put an end to the controversy, Major offered a concession in his "Confession concerning the Article of Justification, that is, concerning the doctrine that by faith alone, without any merit, for the sake of Christ, a man has forgiveness of sins, and is just before God and an heir of eternal salvation," 1558. Here he states that he had not used the controverted formula for several years and, in order not to give further cause for public contention, he promised "not to employ the words, 'Good works are necessary to salvation,' any more, on account of the false interpretations placed upon it." (Preger 1, 396.) In making this concession, however, Major did not at all intend to retract his teaching or to condemn his proposition as false. He promised to abstain from its use, not because he was now convinced of his error and viewed his propositions as false and incorrect as such, but merely because it was ambiguous and liable to abuse, and because he wished to end the conflict. (Frank 2, 166f. 223.)

Nor did Major later on ever admit that he had erred in the matter. In an oration delivered 1567 he boasted of his intimate relation and doctrinal agreement with Luther and Melanchthon, adding: "Neither did I ever deviate, nor, God assisting me, shall I ever deviate, from the truth once acknowledged. Nec discessi umquam nec Deo iuvante discedam ab agnita semel veritate." He had never thought or taught, said he, that good works are a cause of justification. And concerning the proposition, "Good works are necessary to salvation," he had expressly declared that he intended to abstain from its use "because it had offended some on account of its ambiguity, cum propter ambiguitatem offenderit aliquos." He continued: "The facts show that we [the professors of Wittenberg University] are and have remained guardians of that doctrine which Luther and Melanchthon ... delivered to us, in whose writings from the time of the [Augsburg] Confession there is neither a dissonance nor a discrepancy, either among themselves or from the foundation, nor anything obscure or perplexing." (Frank 2, 224. 167.)

Also in his Testament (Testamentum Doctoris Georgii Majoris), published 1570, Major emphatically denied that he had ever harbored or taught any false views concerning justification, salvation, and good works. Of his own accord he had also abandoned the phrases: "Good works are necessary to salvation; it is impossible to be saved without good works; no one has ever been saved without good works--Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem; impossibile est, sine bonis operibus salvum fieri; nemo umquam sine bonis operibus salvatus est." He had done this in order to obviate the misapprehension as though he taught that good works are a cause of salvation which contribute to merit and effect salvation. According to this Testament, he desired his doctrines and writings to be judged. In future he would not dispute with anybody about these phrases. (168.) Thus in his Testament, too, Major withdrew his statements not because they were simply false, but only because they had been interpreted to mean that good works are the efficient cause of justification and salvation. And while Major in later writings did eliminate the appendix "ad salutem, to salvation," or "ad vitam aeternam, to eternal life," he retained, and continued to teach, essentially the same error in another garb, namely, that good works are necessary in order to retain faith. Enumerating, in his Explanation of the Letter to the Galatians, of 1560, the purposes on account of which good works ought to be rendered, he mentions as the "first, in order to retain faith, the Holy Spirit, the grace bestowed, and a good conscience." (218.)

Thus Major was willing to abandon as dangerous and ambiguous, and to abstain from the use of the formula, "Good works are necessary to salvation," but refused to reject it as false and to make a public admission and confession of his error. This, however, was precisely what his opponents demanded; for they were convinced that they could be satisfied with nothing less. As a result the controversy continued till Major's death, in 1574. The Jena professors, notably Flacius, have been charged with prolonging the controversy from motives of personal revenge. (Schaff, 276.) No doubt, the Wittenbergers had gone to the very limit of rousing the animosity and resentment of Flacius (who himself, indeed, was not blameless in the language used against his opponents). Major had depicted Flacius as a most base and wicked man, as a cunning and sly adventurer; as a tyrant, who, after having suppressed the Wittenbergers, would, as a pope, lord it over all Germany; as an Antinomian and a despiser of all good works, etc. (Preger 1, 397.) In the address of October 18, 1567 already referred to, Major said: "There was in this school [Wittenberg] a vagabond of uncertain origin, fatherland, religion, and faith who called himself Flacius Illyricus.... He was the first one to spew out against this school, against its principal Doctors, against the churches of these regions, against the princes themselves, the poison which he had brewed and imbibed some time ago, and, having gnawed and consumed with the bite of a serpent the womb of his mother, to destroy the harmony of these churches, at first by spreading his dreams, fables, and gossip but now also by calumnies and manifest lies." (Frank 2, 217.) Melanchthon, too, had repeatedly written in a similar vein. In an Opinion of his, dated March 4, 1558, we read: "Even if they [Flacius and his adherents] condemn and banish me, I am well satisfied; for I do not desire to associate with them, because I well know that the said Illyricus with his adherents does not seek the honor of God, but publicly opposes the truth, and as yet has never declared himself concerning the entire sum of Christian doctrine." (C. R. 9, 463. 476. 311.) In an Opinion of March 9, 1559, Melanchthon even insinuated that Flacius denied the Trinity. (763.) Before this, August, 1549, he had written to Fabricius: "The Slavic runagate (Slavus drapetes) received many benefits from our Academy and from me. But we have nursed a serpent in our bosom. He deserves to be branded on his forehead as the Macedonian king did with a soldier: 'Ungrateful stranger, xevnos acharistos.' Nor do I believe that the source of his hatred is any other than that the place of Cruciger was not given to him. But I omit these disagreeable narrations." (7, 449. 478 ff.) This personal abuse, however, was not the reason why Flacius persisted in his opposition despite the concessions made by Major and Menius,-- concessions with which even such moderate men as Martin Chemnitz were not satisfied.

Flacius continued his opposition because he could not do otherwise without sacrificing his own principles, compromising the truth, and jeopardizing the doctrine of justification. He did not yield because he was satisfied with nothing less than a complete victory of the divine truth and an unqualified retraction of error. The truly objective manner in which he dealt with this matter appears from his Strictures on the Testament of Dr. Major (Censura de Testamento D. Majoris). Here we read, in substance: In his Testament Major covers his error with the same sophism which he employed in his former writings. For he says that he ascribes the entire efficient cause, merit, and price of our justification and salvation to Christ alone, and therefore excludes and removes all our works and virtues. This he has set forth more fully and more clearly in his previous writings, saying that the proposition, "Good works are necessary to salvation," can be understood in a double sense; viz., that they are necessary to salvation as a certain merit, price, or efficient cause of justification or salvation (as the Papists understand and teach it), or that they are necessary to salvation as a certain debt or an indispensable cause (causa sine qua non), or a cause without which it is impossible for the effect of salvation to follow or for any one to obtain it. He now confesses this same opinion. He does not expressly eliminate "the indispensable cause, or the obligation without the fulfilment of which it is impossible for any one to be preserved, as he asserted repeatedly before this, from which it appears that he adheres to his old error. Et non diserte tollit causam sine qua non seu debitum, sine cuius persolutione sit impossibile quemquam servari, quod toties antea asseruit; facile patet, eum pristinum illum suum errorem retinere." (Schlb. 7, 266; Preger 1, 398.) Flacius demanded an unqualified rejection of the statement, "Good works are necessary to salvation"--a demand with which Major as well as Melanchthon refused to comply. (C. R. 9, 474 f.)

The Formula of Concord, however, sanctioned the attitude of Flacius. It flatly rejected the false and dubious formulas of Melanchthon, Major, and Menius concerning the necessity of good works to salvation, and fully restored Luther's doctrine. Luther's words concerning "good works" are quoted as follows: "We concede indeed that instruction should be given also concerning love and good works, yet in such a way that this be done when and where it is necessary, namely, when otherwise and outside of this matter of justification we have to do with works. But here the chief matter dealt with is the question not whether we should also do good works and exercise love, but by what means we can be justified before God and saved. And here we answer with St. Paul: that we are justified by faith in Christ alone, and not by the deeds of the Law or by love. Not that we hereby entirely reject works and love, as the adversaries falsely slander and accuse us, but that we do not allow ourselves to be led away, as Satan desires, from the chief matter, with which we have to do here, to another and foreign affair, which does not at all belong to this matter. Therefore, whereas and as long as we are occupied with this article of justification, we reject and condemn works, since this article is so constituted that it can admit of no disputation or treatment whatever regard ing works. Therefore in this matter we cut short all Law and works of the Law." (925, 29.)

The Formula of Concord rejects the Majoristic formula, not because it is ambiguous, but because it is false. Concerning ambiguous phrases it declares: "To avoid strife about words, aequivocationes vocabulorum, i.e., words and expressions which are applied and used in various meanings, should be carefully and distinctly explained." (874, 51.) An ambiguous phrase or statement need not be condemned, because it may be made immune from error and misapprehension by a careful explanation. The statement, "Good works are necessary to salvation," however, does not admit of such treatment. It is inherently false and cannot be cured by any amount of explanation or interpretation. Because of this inherent falsity it must be rejected as such. Logically and grammatically the phrase, "Good works are necessary to salvation," reverses the correct theological order, by placing works before faith and sanctification before justification. It turns things topsy-turvy. It makes the effect the cause; the consequent, the antecedent, and vice versa.

Not personal animosity, but this fundamental falsity of the Majoristic formula was, in the last analysis, the reason why the explanations and concessions made by Major and Menius did not and could not satisfy their opponents. They maintained, as explained above, that the words "necessary to" always imply "something that precedes, moves, effects, works," and that, accordingly, the obnoxious propositions of Major "place good works before the remission of sins and before salvation." (Preger 1, 377.) Even Planck admits that only force could make the proposition, "Good works are necessary to salvation," say, "Good works must follow faith and justification." "According to the usage of every language," says he, "a phrase saying that one thing is necessary to another designates a causal connection. Whoever dreamt of asserting that heat is necessary to make it day, because it is a necessary effect of the rays of the sun, by the spreading of which it becomes day." (4, 542. 485.) Without compromising the truth and jeopardizing the doctrine of justification, therefore, the Lutherans were able to regard as satisfactory only a clear and unequivocal rejection of Majorism as it is found in the Formula of Concord.

149. Absurd Proposition of Amsdorf.

Nicholas Amsdorf, the intimate and trusted friend of Luther, was among the most zealous of the opponents of Majorism. He was born December 3, 1483; professor in Wittenberg; 1521 in Worms with Luther; superintendent in Magdeburg; 1542 bishop at Naumburg; banished by Maurice in 1547, he removed to Magdeburg; soon after professor and superintendent in Jena; opposed the Interimists, Adiaphorists, Osiandrists, Majorists, Synergists, Sacramentarians, Anabaptists, and Schwenckfeldians; died at Eisenach May 14, 1565. Regarding the bold statements of Major as a blow at the very heart of true Lutheranism, Amsdorf antagonized his teaching as a "most pernicious error," and denounced Major as a Pelagian and a double Papist. But, alas, the momentum of his uncontrolled zeal carried him a step too far--over the precipice. He declared that good works are detrimental and injurious to salvation, bona opera perniciosa (noxia) esse ad salutem. He defended his paradoxical statement in a publication of 1559 against Menius, with whose subscription to the Eisenach propositions, referred to above, he was not satisfied; chiefly because Menius said there that he had taught and defended them also in the past. The flagrant blunder of Amsdorf was all the more offensive because it appeared on the title of his tract, reading as follows: "Dass diese Propositio: 'Gute Werke sind zur Seligkeit schaedlich,' eine rechte, wahre christliche Propositio sei, durch die heiligen Paulum und Lutherum gelehrt und gepredigt. Niclas von Amsdorf, 1559. That this proposition, 'Good works are injurious to salvation,' is a correct, true, Christian proposition taught and preached by Sts. Paul and Luther." (Frank 2, 228.)

Luther, to whose writings Amsdorf appealed, had spoken very guardedly and correctly in this matter. He had declared: Good works are detrimental to the righteousness of faith, "if one presumes to be justified by them, si quis per ea praesumat iustificari." Wherever Luther speaks of the injuriousness of good works, it is always sub specie iustificationis, that is to say, viewing good works as entering the article of justification, or the forgiveness of sins. (Weimar 7, 59; 10, 3, 373. 374. 387; E. 16, 465. 484; Tschackert, 516.) What vitiated the proposition as found in Amsdorf's tract was the fact that he had omitted the modification added by Luther. Amsdorf made a flat statement of what Luther had asserted, not flatly, nude et simpliciter, but with a limitation, secundum quid.

Self-evidently the venerable Amsdorf, too, who from the very beginning of the Reformation had set an example in preaching as well as in living a truly Christian life, did not in the least intend to minimize, or discourage the doing of, good works by his offensive phrase, but merely to eliminate good works from the article of justification. As a matter of fact, his extravagant statement, when taken as it reads, flatly contradicted his own clear teaching. In 1552 he had declared against Major, as recorded above: "Who has ever taught or said that one should or need not do good works?" "For we all say and confess that after his renewal and new birth a Christian should love and fear God and do all manner of good works," etc. What Amsdorf wished to emphasize was not that good works are dangerous in themselves and as such, but in the article of salvation. For this reason he added: "ad salutem, to salvation." By this appendix he meant to emphasize that good works are dangerous when introduced as a factor in justification and trusted in for one's salvation.

Melanchthon refers to the proposition of Amsdorf as "filthy speech, unflaetige Rede." In 1557, at Worms, he wrote: "Now Amsdorf writes: Good works are detrimental to salvation.... The Antinomians and their like must avoid the filthy speech, 'Good works are detrimental to salvation.'" (C. R. 9, 405 ff.) Though unanimously rejecting his blundering proposition, Amsdorf's colleagues treated the venerable veteran of Lutheranism with consideration and moderation. No one, says Frank, disputed the statement in the sense in which Amsdorf took it, and its form was so apparently false that it could but be generally disapproved. (2, 176.) The result was that the paradox assertion remained without any special historical consequences.

True, Major endeavored to foist Amsdorf's teaching also on Flacius. He wrote: Flacius "endeavors with all his powers to subvert this proposition, that good works are necessary to those who are to be saved; and tries to establish the opposite blasphemy, that good works are dangerous to those who are to be saved, and that they area hindrance to eternal salvation--evertere summis viribus hanc propositionem conatur: bona opera salvandis esse necessaria. Ac contra stabilire oppositam blasphemiam studet: Bona opera salvandis periculosa sunt et aeternae saluti officiunt." Major continues: "Let pious minds permit Flacius and his compeers, at their own risk, to prostitute their eternal salvation to the devils, and by their execrations and anathemas to sacrifice themselves to the devil and his angels." (Frank 2, 221.) This, however, was slander pure and simple, for Flacius was among the first publicly to disown Amsdorf when he made his extravagant statement against Menius. (Preger 1, 392. 384.)

The Formula of Concord most emphatically rejects the error of Amsdorf (the bare statement that good works are injurious to salvation) "as offensive and detrimental to Christian discipline." And justly so; for the question was not what Amsdorf meant to say: but what he really did say. The Formula adds: "For especially in these last times it is no less, needful to admonish men to Christian discipline and good works, and remind them how necessary it is that they exercise themselves in good works as a declaration of their faith and gratitude to God, than that works be not mingled in the article of justification; because men may be damned by an Epicurean delusion concerning faith, as well as by papistic and Pharisaical confidence in their own works and merits." (801, 18.)

150. Other Points of Dispute.

Is it correct to say: God requires good works, or, Good works are necessary, and, Christians are obliged or in duty bound to do good works (bona opera sunt necessaria et debita)? This question, too, was a point of dispute in the Majoristic controversy. Originally the controversy concerning these terms and phrases was a mere logomachy, which, however, later on (when, after the error lurking in the absolute rejection of them had been pointed out, the phrases were still flatly condemned), developed into a violent controversy. The Formula of Concord explains: "It has also been argued by some that good works are not necessary (noetig), but are voluntary (freiwillig), because they are not extorted by fear and the penalty of the Law, but are to be done from a voluntary spirit and a joyful heart. Over against this the other side contended that good works are necessary. This controversy was originally occasioned by the words necessitas and libertas ["notwendig" und "frei"], that is, necessary and free, because especially the word necessitas, necessary, signifies not only the eternal, immutable order according to which all men are obliged and in duty bound to obey God, but sometimes also a coercion, by which the Law forces men to good works. But afterwards there was a disputation not only concerning the words, but the doctrine itself was attacked in the most violent manner, and it was contended that the new obedience in the regenerate is not necessary because of the above-mentioned divine order." (939, 4f.)

From the very beginning of the Reformation the Romanists had slandered Luther also by maintaining that he condemned good works and simply denied their necessity. A similar charge was made by the Majorists against their opponents generally. And Melanchthon's writings, too, frequently create the same impression. But it was an inference of their own. They argued: If good works are not necessary to salvation, they cannot be necessary at all. Wigand wrote: "It is a most malicious and insidious trait in the new teachers [the Majorists] that they, in order to gloss over their case, cry out with the Papists that the controversy is whether good works are necessary. But this is not in dispute, for no Christian ever denied it. Good works are necessary; that is certainly true. But the conflict arises from the appendix attached to it, and the patch pasted to it, viz., 'to salvation.' And here all God-fearing men say that it is a detrimental, offensive, damnable, papistic appendix." (Planck 4, 498. 544.)

It is true, however, that the Antinomians (who will be dealt with more extensively in a following chapter) as well as several other opponents of the Majorists were unwilling to allow the statement, "Good works are necessary." Falsely interpreting the proposition as necessarily implying, not merely moral obligation, but also compulsion and coercion, they rejected it as unevangelical and semipopish. The word "must" is here not in place, they protested. Agricola, as well as the later Antinomians (Poach and Otto), rejected the expressions "necessarium, necessary" and "duty, debitum," when employed in connection with good works. January 13, 1555, Melanchthon wrote: "Some object to the words, 'Good works are necessary,' or, 'One must do good works.' They object to the two words necessitas and debitum. And the Court-preacher [Agricola] at that time juggled with the word must: 'das Muss ist versalzen.' He understood necessarium and debitum as meaning, coerced by fear of punishment, extortum coactione (extorted by coercion), and spoke high-sounding words, such as, how good works came without the Law. Yet the first meaning of necessarium and debitum is not extortum coactione, but the eternal and immutable order of divine wisdom; and the Lord Christ and Paul themselves employ these words necessarium and debitum." In December, 1557, he wrote: "They [the Antinomians] object to the proposition: 'New obedience is necessary;' again: 'New obedience is a debt (debitum).' And now Amsdorf writes: 'Good works are detrimental to salvation,'and it was Eisleben's [Agricola's] slogan: 'Das Muss ist versalzen.' In Nordhausen some one has publicly announced a disputation which contains the proposition: 'Summa ars Chriatianorum est nescire legem.--The highest art of a Christian is not to know the Law.'" March 4, 1558: "Some, for instance, Amsdorf and Gallus, object to the word debitum." (C. R. 8, 411. 194. 842; 9, 405. 474.)

Andrew Musculus, professor in Frankfurt on the Oder, is reported to have said in a sermon, 1558: "They are all the devil's own who teach: 'New obedience is necessary (nova obedientia est necessaria)'; the word 'must (necessary)' does not belong here. 'Good works are necessary to salvation,' and, 'Good works are necessary, but not to salvation'--these are both of a cloth--das sind zwei Hosen aus EINEM Tuch." (Meusel, Handlexikon 4, 710; Gieseler 3, 2, 216.)

Over against this extreme position, Melanchthon, Flacius, Wigand, Moerlin, and others held that it was entirely correct to say that good works are necessary. In the Opinion of November 13, 1559, referred to above, Melanchthon, after stating that he does not employ the phrase, "Good works are necessary to salvation," continues as follows: "But I do affirm that these propositions are true, and that one may properly and without sophistry say, 'The new obedience or good works are necessary,' because obedience is due to God and because it is necessary that, after the Holy Spirit has been received, regeneration or conversion be followed by motions corresponding to the Holy Spirit.... And the words 'duty' and 'necessity' signify the order of God's wisdom and justice; they do not signify an obedience which is compelled or extorted by fear." (C. R. 9, 969.) The Frankfurt Rezess of 1558 [Rezess, Rueckzug, Vergleich = Agreement], written by Melanchthon and signed by the Lutheran princes, declared: "These propositions, 'Nova obedientia est necessaria, nova obedientia est debitum, New obedience is necessary, is a debt,' shall not be rejected." The Rezess explained: "It is certainly a divine, immovable truth that new obedience is necessary in those who are justified; and these words are to be retained in their true meaning. 'Necessary' signifies divine order. New obedience is necessary and is a debt for the very reason that it is an immutable divine order that the rational creature obeys God." (C. R. 9, 496. 498.)

In a similar way this matter was explained by Flacius and other theologians. They all maintained that it is correct to say, Good works are necessary. Even Amsdorf wrote 1552 in his Brief Instruction against Major: "For we all say and confess that a Christian after his renewal and new birth should and must (soll und muss) love and fear God and do all manner of good works, but not in order to be saved thereby, for he is saved already by faith." (Schlb. 7, 210.) This view, which was also plainly taught in the Augsburg Confession, prevailed and received the sanction of our Church in Article IV of the Formula of Concord. When a Christian spontaneously and by the free impulse of his own faith does (and would do, even if there were no law at all) what, according to the holy will of God, revealed in the Ten Commandments, he is obliged and in duty bound to do--such works, and such only, are, according to the Formula of Concord, truly good works, works pleasing to God. It was the doctrine of Luther, who had written, e.g., in his Church Postil of 1521: "No, dear man, you [cannot earn heaven by your good works, but you] must have heaven and already be saved before you do good works. Works do not merit heaven, but, on the contrary, heaven, imparted by pure grace, does good works spontaneouslv, seeking no merit, but only the welfare of the neighbor and the glory of God. Nein, lieber Mensch, du musst den Himmel haben und schon selig sein, ehe du gute Werke tust. Die Werke verdienen nicht den Himmel, sondern wiederum [umgekehrt], der Himmel, aus lauter Gnaden gegeben, tut die guten Werke dahin, ohne Gesuch des Verdienstes, nur dem Naechsten zu Nutz und Gott zu Ehren." (E. 7, 174.) Again, in De Servio Arbitrio of 1525: "The children of God do good entirely voluntarily, seeking no reward, but only the glory and will of God, ready to do the good even if, assuming the impossible, there were neither heaven nor hell. Filii autem Dei gratuita voluntate faciunt bonum, nullum praemium quaerentes, sed solam gloriam et voluntatem Dei, parati bonum facere, si per impossibile neque regnum neque infernus esset." (E. v. a. 7, 234.)

XIV. The Synergistic Controversy.

151. Relation of Majorism and Synergism.

The theological connection between Majorism and synergism is much closer than is generally realized. Both maintain that, in part, or in a certain respect, salvation depends not on grace alone, but also on man and his efforts. The Majorists declared good works to be necessary to salvation, or at least to the preservation of faith and of salvation. Thus salvation would, in a way, depend on the right conduct of a Christian after his conversion. The Synergists asserted: Man, too, must do his bit and cooperate with the Holy Spirit if he desires to be saved. Conversion and salvation, therefore, would depend, at least in part, on man's conduct toward converting grace, and he would be justified and saved, not by grace alone, but by a faith which to a certain extent is a work of his own. The burden of both, Majorism and synergism, was the denial of the sola gratia. Both coordinated man and God as the causes of our salvation. Indeed, consistently carried out, both destroyed the central Christian truth of justification by grace alone and, with it, the assurance of a gracious God and of eternal salvation--the supreme religious concern of Luther and the entire Lutheran theology.

Majorists and Synergists employed also the same line of argument. Both derived their doctrine, not from any clear statements of the Bible, but by a process of anti-Scriptural and fallacious reasoning. The Majorists inferred: Since evil works and sins against conscience destroy faith and justification, good works are required for their preservation. The Synergists argued: Since all who are not converted or finally saved must blame, not God, but themselves for rejecting grace, those, too, who are converted must be credited with at least a small share in the work of their salvation, that is to say, with a better conduct toward grace than the conduct of those who are lost.

However, while Majorism as well as synergism, as stated, represented essentially the same error and argued against the doctrine of grace in the same unscriptural manner, the more subtle, veiled, and hence the more dangerous of the two, no doubt, was synergism, which reduced man's cooperation to a seemingly harmless minimum and, especially in the beginning, endeavored to clothe itself in ambiguous phrases and apparently pious and plausible formulas. Perhaps this accounts also for the fact that, though Melanchthon and the Majorists felt constrained to abandon as described in the preceding chapter, the coarser and more offensive Majoristic propositions, they had at the same time no compunctions about retaining and defending essentially the same error in their doctrine of conversion; and that, on the other hand, their opponents, who by that time fully realized also the viciousness of synergism, were not satisfied with Major's concessions in the controversy on good works, because he and his colleagues in Wittenberg were known to identify themselves with the Synergists. For the same reason the dangerous error lurking in the synergistic phrases does not seem from the first to have been recognized by the Lutherans in the same degree as was the error contained in the Majoristic propositions, which indeed had even during Luther's life to some extent become a subject of dispute. Yet it seems hardly possible that for years they should not have detected the synergistic deviations in Wittenberg from Luther's doctrine of free will. Perhaps the fact that at the time when Melanchthon came out boldly with his synergism, 1548, the Lutherans were engrossed with the Adiaphoristic and Majoristic controversies may help to explain, at least to some extent, why the synergistic error caused small concern, and was given but little consideration in the beginning. As a matter of fact, although a considerable amount of synergistic material had been published by 1548, the controversy did not begin till 1556, while the error that good works are necessary to salvation was publicly opposed soon after its reappearance in the Leipzig Interim. At the Weimar Disputation, 1560, Strigel referred to this silence, saying: "I am astonished that I am pressed so much in this matter [concerning synergism], since three years ago at Worms no mention whatever [?] was made of this controversy, while many severe commands were given regarding others." (Richard, Conf. Prin., 349.) The matter was mentioned at Worms, but Melanchthon is reported to have satisfied Brenz and others by declaring that in the passages of his Loci suspected of synergism he meant "the regenerated will."

152. Luther's Monergism.

According to Lutheran theology, the true opposite of synergism is not Calvinism with its double election, irresistible grace, denial of universal redemption, etc., but the monergism of grace, embracing particularly the tenets that in consequence of Adam's fall man is spiritually dead and utterly unable to contribute in any degree or manner toward his own justification and conversion; moreover, that, being an enemy of God, man, of his own natural powers, is active only in resisting the saving efforts of God, as well as able and prone only to do so; that God alone and in every respect is the Author of man's conversion, perseverance, and final salvation; and that, since the grace of God is universal and earnestly proffered, man alone is responsible for, and the cause of, his own damnation.

"Sola fides iustificat, Faith alone justifies"--that was the great slogan of the Reformation sounded forth by Luther and his followers with ever increasing boldness, force and volume. And the distinct meaning of this proposition, which Luther called "hoc meum dogma, this my dogma," was just this, that we are saved not by any effort or work of our own, but in every respect by God's grace alone. The restoration of this wonderful truth, taught by St. Paul, made Luther the Reformer of the Church. This truth alone, as Luther had experienced, is able to impart solid comfort to a terror-stricken conscience, engender divine assurance of God's pardon and acceptance, and thus translate a poor miserable sinner from the terrors of hell into paradise.

In the Seven Penitential Psalms, written 1517, Luther says: "If God's mercy is to be praised, then all [human] merits and worthiness must come to naught." (Weimar 1, 161.) "Not such are blessed as have no sins or extricate themselves by their own labors, but only those whose sins are graciously forgiven by God." (167.) "It is characteristic of God (es ist Gottes Natur) to make something out of nothing. Hence God cannot make anything out of him who is not as yet nothing.... Therefore God receives none but the forsaken, heals none but the ill, gives sight to none but the blind, quickens none but the dead, makes pious none but the sinners, makes wise none but the ignorant,--in short, He has mercy on none but the miserable, and gives grace to none but those who are in disgrace. Whoever therefore, is a proud saint, wise or just, cannot become God's material and receive God's work within himself, but remains in his own work and makes an imaginary, seeming, false, and painted saint of himself, i.e., a hypocrite." (183.) "For he whom Thou [God] dost justify will never become righteous by his works; hence it is called Thy righteousness, since Thou givest it to us by grace, and we do not obtain it by works." (192.) "Israel the true [new] man, does not take refuge in himself, nor in his strength, nor in his righteousness and wisdom.... For help and grace is not with themselves. They are sinners and damned in themselves, as He also says through Hosea: O Israel, with thee there is nothing but damnation, but with Me is thine help." (210.) "He, He, God Himself, not they themselves, will deliver the true Israel.... Mark well, Israel has sin and cannot help itself." (211.)

In his explanation of Ps. 109 (110), 1518, Luther says: "He calls these children [conceived from spiritual seed, the Word of God] dew, since no soul is converted and transformed from Adam's sinful childhood to the gracious childhood of Christ by human work, but only by God, who works from heaven like the dew, as Micah writes: 'The children of Israel will be like the dew given by God which does not wait for the hands of men.'" (701.) Again: "In every single man God precedes with grace and works before we pray for grace or cooperate. The Doctors call this gratiam primam et praevenientem, that is, the first and prevenient grace. Augustine: Gratia Dei praevenit, ut velimus, ne frustra velimus. God's grace prevenes that we will, lest we will in vain." (710.)

In his 40 theses for the Heidelberg disputation, also of 1518, Luther says of man's powers in spiritual matters: "13. Free will after sin [the Fall] is a mere titular affair [an empty title only], and sins mortally when it does what it is able to do. Liberum arbitrium post peccatum res est de solo titulo et dum facit, quod in se est, peccat mortaliter." "16. A man desirous of obtaining grace by doing what he is able to do adds sin to sin, becoming doubly guilty. Homo putans, se ad gratiam velle pervenire faciendo, quod est in se, peccatum addit peccato, ut duplo reus fiat." "18. It is certain that a man must utterly despair of himself in order to become apt to acquire the grace of Christ. Certum est, hominem de se penitus oportere desperare, ut aptus fiat ad consequendam gratiam Christi." (W. 1, 354.) By way of explanation Luther added to thesis 13: "The first part [of this thesis, that free will is a mere empty title] is apparent, because the will is a captive and a servant to sin, not that it is nothing, but that it is free only to [do] evil--non quod sit nihil, sed quod non sit liberum nisi ad malum. John 8, 34. 36: 'Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.' Hence, St. Augustine says in his book De Spiritu et Litera: Free will without grace can only sin--non nisi ad peccandum valet. And in his second book against Julianus: You call that a free will which in truth is captive, etc." To thesis 16 Luther added: "When man does what he is able to do (dum facit, quod est in se), he sins, seeking altogether his own. And if he is minded to become worthy of, and apt for, grace by a sin, he adds proud presumption."

In his sermon of 1519 on Genesis 4, Luther remarked: "This passage ['The Lord had respect unto Abel'] subverts the entire liberty of our human will. Hic locus semel invertit universam libertatem voluntatis nostrae." (Weimar 9, 337.) In a sermon of September 8, 1520, we read: "By nature we are born accursed;... through Christ we are born again children of life. Thus we are born not by free will, not by works, not by our efforts. As a child in the womb is not born by its own works, but suffers itself to be carried and to be given birth, so we are justified by suffering, not by doing." (474.) "Where, then," Luther exclaimed about the same time in his Operationes in Psalmos, "will free will remain? where the doing what one can? Ubi ergo manebit liberum arbitrium, ubi facere quod in se?" (5, 544. 74.) In a sermon of February 2, 1521, he said: "Whatever grace is in us comes from God alone. Here free will is entirely dead. All that we attempt to establish with our powers is lost unless He prevenes and makes us alive through His grace. Grace is His own work, which we receive in our hearts by faith. This grace the soul did not possess before, for it is the new man.... The great proud saints will not do this [ascribe everything to God and His mercy]. They, too, would have a share in it, saying to our Lord: 'This I have done by my free will, this I have deserved.'" (9, 573; 5, 544.)

Thus Luther, from the very beginning of the Reformation, stood for the doctrine of justification, conversion, and salvation by grace alone. Most emphatically he denied that man though free to a certain extent in human and temporal affairs, is able to cooperate with the powers of his natural, unregenerate will in matters spiritual and pertaining to God. This was also the position which Luther victoriously defended against Erasmus in his De Servo Arbitrio of 1525. Goaded on by the Romanists to come out publicly against the German heretic, the great Humanist, in his Diatribe of 1524, had shrewdly planned to attack his opponent at the most vulnerable point. As such he regarded Luther's monergistic doctrine, according to which it is God alone who justifies, converts, preserves, and saves men, without any works of their own. In reality, however, as presently appeared from his glorious classic on the sola-gratia doctrine, Erasmus had assaulted the strongest gate of Luther's fortress. For the source of the wonderful power which Luther displayed throughout the Reformation was none other than the divine conviction born of the Word of God that in every respect grace alone is the cause of our justification and salvation. And if ever this blessed doctrine was firmly established, successfully defended, and greatly glorified, it was in Luther's book against Erasmus.

Justification, conversion, perseverance in faith, and final salvation, obtained not by any effort of ours, but in every respect received as a gracious gift of God alone--that was the teaching also to which Luther faithfully, most determinedly, and without any wavering adhered throughout his life. In his Large Confession of 1528, for example, we read: "Herewith I reject and condemn as nothing but error all dogmas which extol our free will, as they directly conflict with this help and grace of our Savior Jesus Christ. For since outside of Christ death and sin are our lords, and the devil our god and prince, there can be no power or might, no wisdom or understanding, whereby we can qualify ourselves for, or strive after, righteousness and life; but we must be blinded people and prisoners of sin and the devil's own, to do and to think what pleases them and is contrary to God and His commandments." (CONC. TRIGL. 897, 43.)

153. Luther's Doctrine Endorsed.

To adhere faithfully to Luther's doctrine of conversion and salvation by grace alone was also the determination of the loyal Lutherans in their opposition to the Synergists. Planck correctly remarks that the doctrine which Flacius and the Anti-Synergists defended was the very doctrine which "Luther advocated in his conflict with Erasmus." (Prot. Lehrbegriff 4, 667.) This was substantially conceded even by the opponents. When, for example, at the colloquy in Worms, 1557, the Romanists demanded that Flacius's doctrine of free will be condemned by the Lutherans, Melanchthon declared that herein one ought not to submit to the Papists, who slyly, under the name of Illyricus [Flacius], demanded the condemnation of Luther, whose opinion in the doctrine of free will he [Melanchthon] was neither able nor willing to condemn. (Gieseler 3, 2, 232.) In their Confession, published in March, 1569, the theologians of Ducal Saxony (Wigand, Coelestin, Irenaeus, Kirchner, etc.) declared: "We also add that we embrace the doctrine and opinion of Dr. Luther, the Elias of these latter days of the world, as it is most luminously and skilfully set forth in the book De Servo Arbitrio, against Erasmus, in the Commentary on Genesis, and in other books; and we hold that this teaching of Luther agrees with the eternal Word of God." (Schluesselburg, Catalogus 5, 133.)

Luther's sola-gratia-doctrine was embodied also in the Formula of Concord, and this with a special endorsement of his book De Servo Arbitrio. For here we read: "Even so Dr. Luther wrote of this matter [the doctrine that our free will has no power whatever to qualify itself for righteousness, etc.] also in his book De Servo Arbitrio; i.e., Of the Captive Will of Man, in opposition to Erasmus, and elucidated and supported this position well and thoroughly [egregie et solide]; and afterward he repeated and explained it in his glorious exposition of the book of Genesis, especially of chapter 26. There likewise his meaning and understanding of some other peculiar disputations introduced incidentally by Erasmus, as of absolute necessity, etc., have been secured by him in the best and most careful way against all misunderstanding and perversion; to which we also hereby appeal and refer others." (897, 44; 981, 28.) In the passage of his Commentary on Genesis referred to by the Formula, Luther does not, as has been claimed, retract or modify his former statements concerning the inability of the human will and the monergism of grace, but emphasizes that, in reading De Servo Arbitrio, one must heed and not overlook his frequent admonitions to concern oneself with God as He has revealed Himself in the Gospel, and not speculate concerning God in His transcendence, absoluteness, and majesty, as the One in whom we live and move and have our being, and without whom nothing can either exist or occur, and whose wonderful ways are past finding out. (CONC. TRIGL., 898.) And the fact that the Lutheran theologians, living at the time and immediately after the framing of the Formula of Concord, objected neither to the book De Servo Arbitrio itself nor to its public endorsement by the Formula of Concord, is an additional proof of the fact that they were in complete agreement with Luther's teaching of conversion and salvation by grace alone. (Frank 1, 120.)

This sola-gratia-doctrine, the vital truth of Christianity, rediscovered and proclaimed once more by Luther, was, as stated, the target at which Erasmus directed his shafts. In his Diatribe he defined the power of free will to be the faculty of applying oneself to grace (facultas applicandi se ad gratiam), and declared that those are the best theologians who, while ascribing as much as possible to the grace of God, do not eliminate this human factor. He wrote: Free will is "the ability of the human will according to which man is able either to turn himself to what leads to eternal salvation or to turn away from it." (St.L. 18, 1612.) Again: "Those, therefore, who are farthest apart from the views of Pelagius ascribe to grace the most, but to free will almost nothing; yet they do not abolish it entirely. They say that man cannot will anything good without special grace, cannot begin anything good, cannot continue in it, cannot complete anything without the chief thing, the constant help of divine grace. This opinion seems to be pretty probable because it leaves to man a striving and an effort, and yet does not admit that he is to ascribe even the least to his own powers." (1619.) One must avoid extremes, and seek the middle of the road, said Erasmus. Pelagius had fallen into Scylla, and Luther into Charybdis. "I am pleased with the opinion of those who ascribe to free will something, but to grace by far the most." (1666.) Essentially, this was the error held, nursed, and defended also by the Synergists, though frequently in more guarded and ambiguous phrases. But their theory of conversion also involved, as Schaff and Schmauk put it, "the idea of a partnership between God and man, and a corresponding division of work and merit." (Conf. Principle, 600.)

However, these attempts to revamp the Semi-Pelagian teaching resulted in a controversy which more and longer than any other endangered and disquieted the Lutheran Church, before as well as after the adoption of the Formula of Concord. Whether the unregenerate man, when the Word of God is preached, and the grace of God is offered him, is able to prepare himself for grace, accept it, and assent thereto, was, according to the Formula of Concord, "the question upon which, for quite a number of years now, there has been a controversy among some theologians in the churches of the Augsburg Confession." (881, 2.) And of all the controversies after Luther's death the synergistic controversy was most momentous and consequential. For the doctrine of grace with which it dealt is the vital breath of every Christian. Without it neither faith nor the Christian religion can live and remain. "If we believe," says Luther in De Servo Arbitrio, "that Christ has redeemed men by His blood, then we must confess that the entire man was lost; otherwise we make Christ superfluous or the Redeemer of but the meanest part of us, which is blasphemous and sacrilegious." Reading the book of Erasmus, in which he bent every effort toward exploding the doctrine of grace, Luther felt the hand of his opponent clutching his throat. In the closing paragraph of De Servo Arbitrio Luther wrote: "I highly laud and extol you for this thing also, that of all others you alone have gone to the heart of the subject.... You alone have discerned the core of the matter and have aimed at the throat, for which I thank you heartily.--Unus tu et solus cardinem rerum vidisti, et ipsum iugulum petisti, pro quo ex animo tibi gratias ago, in hac enim causa libentius versor, quantum favet tempus et otium." (E. v. a. 7, 367. 137; St. L. 18, 1967; Pieper, Dogm. 2, 543.) And so the Synergists, who renewed the doctrine of Erasmus, also flew at the throat of Christianity. Genuine Lutheranism would have been strangled if synergism had emerged victorious from this great controversy of grace versus free will.

154. The Father of Synergism.

During the first period of his activity in Wittenberg, Melanchthon was in perfect agreement with Luther also on the question of man's inability in spiritual matters and the sole activity, or monergism, of grace in the work of his salvation. As late as 1530 he incorporated these views in the Augsburg Confession, as appears, in particular, from Articles II, V, XVIII, and XIX. His later doctrine concerning the three concurring causes of conversion (the Holy Spirit, the Word, and the consenting will of man), as well as his theory explaining synergistically, from an alleged dissimilar action in man, the difference why some are saved while others are lost, is not so much as hinted at in the Confession. But even at this early date (1530) or soon after, Melanchthon also does not seem any longer to have agreed whole-heartedly with Luther in the doctrine of grace and free will. And in the course of time his theology drifted farther and farther from its original monergistic moorings. Nor was Luther wholly unaware of the secret trend of his colleague and friend toward--Erasmus. In 1536, when the deviations of Melanchthon and Cruciger, dealt with in our previous chapter, were brought to his notice, Luther exclaimed: "Haec est ipsissima theologia Erasmi. This is the identical theology of Erasmus, nor can there be anything more opposed to our doctrine." (Kolde, Analecta, 266.)

That Melanchthon's theology was verging toward Erasmus appears from his letter of June 22, 1537, to Veit Dietrich, in which he said that he desired a more thorough exposition also of the doctrines of predestination and of the consent of the will. (C. R. 3, 383.) Before this, in his Commentary on Romans of 1532, he had written that there is some cause of election also in man; viz., in as far as he does not repudiate the grace offered--"tamen eatenus aliquam causam in accipiente esse quatenus promissionem oblatam non repudiat." (Seeberg 4, 442.) In an addition to his Loci of 1533 he also spoke of a cause of justification and election residing in man. (C. R. 21, 332.) In the revised editions of 1535 and 1543 he plainly began to prepare the way for his later bold and unmistakable deviations. For even though unable to point out a clean-cut and unequivocal synergistic statement, one cannot read these editions without scenting a Semi-Pelagian and Erasmian atmosphere. What Melanchthon began to teach was the doctrine that man, when approached by the Word of God, is able to assume either an attitude of pro or con, i.e., for or against the grace of God. The same applies to the Variata of 1540 in which the frequent "adiuvari" there employed, though not incorrect as such, was not without a synergistic flavor.

Tschackert remarks of the Loci of 1535: "Melanchthon wants to make man responsible for his state of grace. Nor does the human will in consequence of original sin lose the ability to decide itself when incited; the will produces nothing new by its own power, but assumes an attitude toward what approaches it. When man hears the Word of God, and the Holy Spirit produces spiritual affections in his heart, the will can either assent or turn against it. In this way Melanchthon arrives at the formula, ever after stereotype with him, that there are three concurring causes in the process of conversion: 'the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will, which, indeed, is not idle, but strives against its infirmity.'" (520.)

However, during the life of Luther, Melanchthon made no further measurable progress towards synergism. Perhaps the unpleasant experiences following upon his innovations in the doctrine of good works acted as a check also on the public development of his synergistic tendencies. During Luther's life Melanchthon, as he himself admitted to Carlowitz (106), dissimulated, keeping his deviating views to himself and his intimate friends. After Luther's death, however, he came out unmistakably and publicly, also in favor of synergism, endorsing even the Erasmian definition of free will as "the power in man to apply himself to grace." He plainly taught that, when drawn by the Holy Spirit, the will is able to decide pro or con, to obey or to resist. Especially in his lectures, Melanchthon--not indeed directly, but mentioning the name of Flacius--continually lashed such phrases of Luther as "purely passive," "block," "resistance,"--a fact to which Schluesselburg, who had studied in Wittenberg, refers in support of his assertion that Melanchthon had departed from Luther's teaching on free will. (Catalogus 5, 32.) While Melanchthon formerly (in his Loci of 1543) had spoken of three causes of a good action (bonae actionis) he now publicly advocated the doctrine of three concurring causes of conversion. Now he boldly maintained that, since the grace of God is universal, one must assume, and also teach, that there are different actions in different men, which accounts for the fact that some are converted and saved while others are lost. According to the later Melanchthon, therefore, man's eternal salvation evidently does not depend on the gracious operations of God's Holy Spirit and Word alone, but also on his own correct conduct toward grace. In his heart, especially when approaching the mercy-seat in prayer, Melanchthon, no doubt, forgot and disavowed his own teaching, and believed and practised Luther's sola-gratia-doctrine. But it cannot be denied that, in his endeavors to harmonize universal grace with the fact that not all, but some only, are saved, Melanchthon repudiated the monergism of Luther, espoused and defended the powers of free will in spiritual matters, and thought, argued, spoke, and wrote in terms of synergism. Indeed, Melanchthon must be regarded as the father of both synergism and the rationalistic methods employed in its defense, and as the true father also of the modern rationalistico-synergistic theology represented by such distinguished men as Von Hofmann, Thomasius, Kahnis, Luthardt, etc. (Pieper 2, 582; Frank 1, 231.)

155. Unsound Statements of Melanchthon.

Following are some of the ambiguous and false deliverances of Melanchthon: In the Loci of 1535 the so-called human cause of conversion which must be added to the Word and Spirit is described as endeavoring, striving, and wishing to obey and believe. We read: "We do not say this to ensnare the consciences, or to deter men from the endeavor to obey and believe, or from making an effort. On the contrary, since we are to begin with the Word, we certainly must not resist the Word of God, but strive to obey it.... We see that these causes are united: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not idle, but strives against its infirmity. In this manner ecclesiastical writers are accustomed to join these causes. Basil says: 'Only will, and God will precede,' God precedes, calls, moves, assists us, but let us beware lest we resist.... Chrysostom says: He who draws, draws him who is willing." (C. R. 21, 376.)

In conversion and salvation God certainly must do and does His share, but man must beware lest he fail to do what is required of him. This is also the impression received from Melanchthon's statements in the third elaboration of his Loci, 1543. We read: "Here three causes of a good action concur (hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis): the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will assenting to and not resisting the Word of God (humana voluntas assentiens, nec repugnans Verbo Dei). For it could expel [the Spirit], as Saul expelled [Him] of his own free will. But when the mind hearing and sustaining itself does not resist, does not give way to diffidence, but, the Holy Spirit assisting, endeavors to assent,--in such a struggle the will is not inactive (in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa). The ancients have said that good works are done when grace precedes and the will follows. So also Basil says: 'Monon theleson, kai theos proapanta, Only will, and God anticipates. God precedes, calls, moves, assists us; but as for us, let us see to it that we do not resist. Deus antevertit nos, vocat, movet, adiuvat, SED NOS VIDERIMUS, ne repugnemus,' (21, 658.) And Phil. 1, 6: 'He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ,' i.e., we are assisted by God (adiuvamur a Deo), but we must hear the Word of God and not resist the drawing God." (916.) "God draws our minds that they will, but we must assent, not resist. Deus trahit mentes, ut velint, sed assentiri nos, non repugnare oportet." (917.) Here we also meet the remark: "But the will, when assisted by the Holy Spirit, becomes more free. Fit autem voluntas adiuvata Spiritu Sancto magis libera." (663.) Frank comments pertinently that the magis presupposes a certain degree of liberty of the will before the assistance of the Holy Spirit. (1, 198.)

The boldest synergistic statements are found in the Loci of 1548. It was the year of the Leipzig Interim, in which the same error was embodied as follows: "The merciful God does not deal with man as with a block, but draws him in such a way that his will, too, cooperates." (C. R. 7, 51. 260.) As to the Loci of this year, Bindseil remarks in the Corpus Reformatorum: "This edition is famous on account of certain paragraphs inserted by the author in the article on Free Will. For these additions contain the Erasmian definition of free will (that it is the faculty of applying oneself to grace), on account of which Melanchthon was charged with synergism by the Flacians.... For this reason the edition is called by J. T. Mayer 'the worst of all (omnium pessima).'" At the Weimar colloquy, 1560, even Strigel was not willing to identify himself openly with the Erasmian definition of free will (facultas applicandi se ad gratiam) as found in one of these sections. When Flacius quoted the passage, Strigel retorted excitedly: "I do not defend that definition which you have quoted from the recent edition [1548]. When did you hear it from me? When have I undertaken to defend it?" (Frank 1, 199. 135.) At the Herzberg colloquy Andreae remarked: "The Loci Communes of Melanchthon are useful. But whoever reads the locus de libero arbitrio must confess, even if he judges most mildly, that the statements are dubious and ambiguous. And what of the four paragraphs which were inserted after Luther's death? For here we read: 'There must of necessity be a cause of difference in us why a Saul is rejected, a David received.'" (Pieper 2, 587.)

From these additions of 1548 we cite: "Nor does conversion occur in David in such a manner as when a stone is turned into a fig: but free will does something in David; for when he hears the rebuke and the promise, he willingly and freely confesses his fault. And his will does something when he sustains himself with this word: The Lord hath taken away your sin. And when he endeavors to sustain himself with this word, he is already assisted by the Holy Spirit." (C. R. 21, 659.) Again: "I therefore answer those who excuse their idleness because they think that free will does nothing, as follows: It certainly is the eternal and immovable will of God that you obey the voice of the Gospel, that you hear the Son of God, that you acknowledge the Mediator. How black is that sin which refuses to behold the Mediator, the Son of God, presented to the human race! You will answer: 'I cannot.' But in a manner you can (immo aliquo modo potes), and when you sustain yourself with the voice of the Gospel, then pray that God would assist you, and know that the Holy Spirit is efficacious in such consolation. Know that just in this manner God intends to convert us, when we, roused by the promise wrestle with ourselves, pray and resist our diffidence and other vicious affections. For this reason some of the ancient Fathers have said that free will in man is the faculty to apply himself to grace (liberum arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam); i.e., he hears the promise, endeavors to assent, and abandons sins against conscience. Such things do not occur in devils. The difference therefore between the devils and the human race ought to be considered. These matters however, become still clearer when the promise is considered. For since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory wills in God, there must of necessity be in us some cause of difference why Saul is rejected and David is received; i.e., there must of necessity be some dissimilar action in these two. Cum promissio sit universalis, nec sint in Deo contradictoriae voluntates, necesse est in nobis esse aliquam discriminis causam, cur Saul abiiciatur. David recipiatur, id est, necesse est aliquam esse actionem dissimilem in his duobus. Properly understood, this is true, and the use [usus] in the exercises of faith and in true consolation (when our minds acquiesce in the Son of God, shown in the promise) will illustrate this copulation of causes: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the will." (C. R. 21, 659f.)

At the colloquy of Worms, 1557, Melanchthon, interpellated by Brenz, is reported to have said that the passage in his Loci of 1548 defining free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace referred to the regenerated will (voluntas renata), as, he said, appeared from the context. (Gieseler 3, 2, 225; Frank 1, 198.) As a matter of fact, however, the context clearly excludes this interpretation. In the passage quoted, Melanchthon, moreover, plainly teaches: 1. that in conversion man, too, can do, and really does, something by willingly confessing his fault, by sustaining himself with the Word, by praying that God would assist him, by wrestling with himself, by striving against diffidence, etc.; 2. that the nature of fallen man differs from that of the devils in this, that his free will is still able to apply itself to grace, endeavor to assent to it, etc.; 3. that the dissimilar actions resulting from the different use of this natural ability accounts for the fact that some are saved while others are lost. Such was the plain teaching of Melanchthon from which he never receded, but which he, apart from other publications, reaffirmed in every new edition of his Loci. For all, including the last one to appear during his life (1559), contain the additions of 1548. "The passage added by the author [Melanchthon, 1548] after Luther's death is repeated in all subsequent editions," says Bindseil. (C. R. 21, 570.)

The sections which were added to the Loci after 1548 also breathe the same synergistic spirit. In 1553 Melanchthon inserted a paragraph which says that, when approached by the Holy Spirit, the will can obey or resist. We read: "The liberty of the human will after the Fall, also in the non-regenerate, is the faculty by virtue of which man is able to govern his motions, i.e., he can enjoin upon his external members such actions as agree, or such as do not agree, with the Law of God. But he cannot banish doubts from his mind and evil inclinations from his heart without the light of the Gospel and without the Holy Spirit. But when the will is drawn by the holy Spirit, it can obey or resist. Cum autem trahitur a Spiritu Sancto, potest obsequi et repugnare." (21, 1078; 13, 162.)

Other publications contain the same doctrine. While in his Loci of 1543 he had spoken only of three causes of a good action (bonae actionis), Melanchthon, in his Enarratio Symboli Nicaeni of 1550, substituted "conversion" for "good action." We read: In conversion these causes concur: the Holy Spirit, the voice of the Gospel, "and the will of man, which does not resist the divine voice, but somehow, with trepidation, assents. Concurrunt in conversione hae causae: Spiritus Sanctus ... vox Evangelii ... et voluntas hominis, quae non repugnat voci divinae, sed inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur." Again: "And concerning this copulation of causes it is said: The Spirit comes to the assistance of our infirmity. And Chrysostom truly says: God draws, but he draws him who is willing." Again: God's promise is universal, and there are no contradictory wills in God; hence, though Paul is drawn in a different manner than Zacchaeus, "nevertheless there is some assent of the will (tamen aliqua est voluntatis assensio)." "God therefore begins and draws by the voice of the Gospel but He draws him who is willing, and assists him who assents." "Nor is anything detracted from the glory of God, but it is truly affirmed that the assistance of God always concurs in the beginning and afterwards (auxilium Dei semper initio et deinceps concurrere)." (23, 280 ff.) Accordingly, God merely concurs as one of three causes, among which the will of man is the third. In his Examen Ordinandorum of 1554, Melanchthon again replaced the term "good action" by "conversion." He says: "In conversion these causes concur: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and Son send to kindle our hearts, and our will, assenting and not resisting the Word of God (et nostra voluntas assentiens et non repugnans Verbo Dei). And lest we yield to diffidence, we must consider that both preachings are universal, the preaching of repentance as well as the promise of grace.... Let us therefore not resist but assent to the promise, and constantly repeat this prayer: I believe, O Lord, but come to the help of my weakness." (23, 15.) Finally in his Opinion on the Weimar Book of Confutation, March 9, 1559, Melanchthon remarks: "Again, if the will is able to turn from the consolation, it must be inferred that it works something and follows the Holy Spirit when it accepts the consolation. Item, so sich der Wille vom Trost abwenden mag, so ist dagegen zu verstehen, dass er etwas wirket und folget dem Heiligen Geist, so er den Trost annimmt." (9, 768.)

W. Preger is right when he says: "According to Melanchthon's view, natural man is able to do the following [when the Word of God is preached to him]: he is able not to resist; he is able to take pains with respect to obedience; he is able to comfort himself with the Word.... This [according to Melanchthon] is a germ of the positive good will still found in natural man which prevenient grace arouses." (Flacius Illyricus 2, 189 f.) Schmauk writes: Melanchthon found "the cause for the actual variation in the working of God's grace in man, its object. This subtle synergistic spirit attacks the very foundation of Lutheranism, flows out into almost every doctrine, and weakens the Church at every point. And it was particularly this weakness which the great multitude of Melanchthon's scholars, who became the leaders of the generation of which we are speaking, absorbed, and which rendered it difficult to return, finally, after years of struggle, to the solid ground, once more recovered in the Formula of Concord." (Conf. Principle, 601.)

R. Seeberg characterizes Melanchthon's doctrine as follows: "A synergistic trait therefore appears in his doctrine. In the last analysis, God merely grants the outer and inner possibility of obtaining salvation. Without man's cooperation this possibility would not become reality; and he is able to refuse this cooperation. It is, therefore, in conversion equally a cause with the others. Sie [die Mitwirkung des Menschen] ist also freilich eine den andern Ursachen gleichberechtigte Ursache in der Bekehrung." God makes conversion possible, but only the decision of man's free will makes it actual,--such, according to Seeberg, was the "synergism" of Melanchthon. (Seeberg, Dogg., 4, 444. 446.)

Frank says of Melanchthon's way of solving the question why some are converted and saved while others are lost: "The road chosen by Melanchthon has indeed led to the goal. The contradictions are solved. But let us look where we have landed. We are standing--in the Roman camp!" After quoting a passage from the Tridentinum, which speaks of conversion in terms similar to those employed by Melanchthon, Frank continues: "The foundation stone of Luther's original Reformation doctrine of salvation by grace alone; viz., that nothing in us, not even our will moved and assisted by God, is the causa meritoria of salvation, is subverted by these propositions; and it is immaterial to the contrite heart whether much or little is demanded from free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace." Frank adds: "What the Philippists, synchronously [with Melanchthon] and later, propounded regarding this matter [of free will] are but variations of the theme struck by Melanchthon. Everywhere the sequence of thought is the same, with but this difference, that here the faults of the Melanchthonian theory together with its consequences come out more clearly." (1, 134f.) The same is true of modern synergistic theories. Without exception they are but variations of notes struck by Melanchthon,--the father of all the synergists that have raised their heads within the Lutheran Church.

156. Pfeffinger Champions Synergistic Doctrine.

Prior to 1556 references to the unsound position of the Wittenberg and Leipzig theologians are met with but occasionally. (Planck 4, 568.) The unmistakably synergistic doctrine embodied in the Loci of 1548, as well as in the Leipzig Interim, did not cause alarm and attract attention immediately. But when, in 1555, John Pfeffinger [born 1493; 1539 superintendent, and 1543 professor in Leipzig; assisted 1548 in framing the Leipzig Interim; died January 1, 1573] published his "Five Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will--De Libertate Voluntatis Humanae Quaestiones Quinque. D. Johannes Pfeffinger Lipsiae Editae in Officina Georgii Hantschi 1555," the controversy flared up instantly. It was a little booklet containing besides a brief introduction, only 41 paragraphs, or theses. In these Pfeffinger discussed and defended the synergistic doctrine of Melanchthon, maintaining that in conversion man, too, must contribute his share though it be ever so little.

Early in the next year Pfeffinger was already opposed by the theologians of Thuringia, the stanch opponents of the Philippists, John Stolz, court-preacher at Weimar composing 110 theses for this purpose. In 1558 Amsdorf published his Public Confession of the True Doctrine of the Gospel and Confutation of the Fanatics of the Present Time, in which he, quoting from memory, charged Pfeffinger with teaching that man is able to prepare himself for grace by the natural powers of his free will, just as the godless sophists, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and their disciples, had held. (Planck 4, 573. 568.) About the same time Stolz published the 110 theses just referred to with a preface by Aurifaber (Refutatio Propositionum Pfeffingeri de Libero Arbitrio). Flacius, then professor in Jena, added his Refutation of Pfeffinger's Propositions on Free Will and Jena Disputation on Free Will. In the same year, 1558, Pfeffinger, in turn published his Answer to the Public Confession of Amsdorf, charging the latter with falsification, and denouncing Flacius as the "originator and father of all the lies which have troubled the Lutheran Church during the last ten years." But at the same time Pfeffinger showed unmistakably that the charges of his opponents were but too well founded. Says Planck: "Whatever may have moved Pfeffinger to do so, he could not (even if Flacius himself had said it for him) have confessed synergism more clearly and more definitely than he did spontaneously and unasked in this treatise." (4, 574.) Frank: "Pfeffinger goes beyond Melanchthon and Strigel; for the action here demanded of, and ascribed to, the natural will is, according to him, not even in need of liberation by prevenient grace.... His doctrine may without more ado be designated as Semi-Pelagianism." (1, 137.)

At Wittenberg, Pfeffinger was supported by George Major, Paul Eber, and Paul Crell and before long his cause was espoused also by Victorin Strigel in Jena. Disputations by the Wittenberg and Leipzig synergists (whom Schluesselburg, 5, 16, calls "cooperators" and "die freiwilligen Herren") and by their opponents in Jena increased the animosity. Both parties cast moderation to the winds. In a public letter of 1558 the Wittenberg professors, for example, maligned Flacius in every possible way, and branded him as "der verloffene undeutsche Flacius Illyricus" and as the sole author of all the dissensions in the churches of Germany. (Planck 4, 583.)

157. Statements of Pfeffinger.

Following are some of the synergistic deliverances made by Pfeffinger in his Five Questions Concerning the Liberty of the Human Will. Par. 11 reads: "Thirdly, when we inquire concerning the spiritual actions, it is correct to answer that the human will has not such a liberty as to be able to effect the spiritual motions without the help of the Holy Spirit (humanam voluntatem non habere eiusmodi libertatem, ut motus spirituales sine auxilio Spiritus Sancti efficere possit)." Par. 14: "Therefore some assent or apprehension on our part must concur (oportet igitur nostram aliquam assensionem seu apprehensionem concurrere) when the Holy Spirit has aroused (accenderit) the mind, the will and the heart. Hence Basil says: Only will, and God anticipates; and Chrysostom: He who draws, draws him who is willing; and Augustine: He assists those who have received the gift of the call with becoming piety, and preserve the gifts of God as far as man is able. Again: When grace precedes, the will follows--praeeunte gratia, comitante voluntate." In Par. 16 we read: "The will, therefore, is not idle, but assents faintly. Voluntas igitur non est otiosa sed languide assentitur."

Paragraph 17 runs: "If the will were idle or purely passive, there would be no difference between the pious and the wicked, or between the elect and the damned, as, between Saul and David, between Judas and Peter. God would also become a respecter of persons and the author of contumacy in the wicked and damned; and to God would be ascribed contradictory wills, --which conflicts with the entire Scripture. Hence it follows that there is in us a cause why some assent while others do not. Sequitur ergo in nobis esse aliquam causam, cur alii assentiantur, alii non assentiantur." Par. 24: "Him [the Holy Spirit], therefore, we must not resist; but on the part of our will, which is certainly not like a stone or block, some assent must be added--sed aliquam etiam assensionem accedere nostrae voluntatis, quam non sicut saxum aut incudem se habere certum est." Par. 30: "But apprehension on our part must concur. For, since the promise of grace is universal, and since we must obey this promise, some difference between the elect and the rejected must be inferred from our will (sequitur, aliquod discrimen inter electos et reiectos a voluntate nostra sumendum esse), viz., that those who resist the promise are rejected, while those who embrace the promise are received.... All this clearly shows that our will is not idle in conversion or like a stone or block in its conduct. Ex quibus omnibus manifestissimum apparet, voluntatem nostram non esse otiosam in conversione, aut se ut saxum aut incudem habere."

Par. 34 reads: "Some persons, however, shout that the assistance of the Holy Spirit is extenuated and diminished if even the least particle be attributed to the human will. Though this argument may appear specious and plausible, yet pious minds understand that by our doctrine-- according to which we ascribe some cooperation to our will; viz., some assent and apprehension (qua tribuimus aliquam SYNERGIAM voluntati nostrae, videlicet qualemcumque assensionem et apprehensionem)-- absolutely nothing is taken away from the assistance rendered by the Holy Spirit. For we affirm that the first acts (primas partes) must be assigned and attributed to Him who first and primarily, through the Word or the voice of the Gospel, moves our hearts to believe, to which thereupon we, too, ought to assent as much as we are able (cui deinde et NOS, QUANTUM IN NOBIS EST, ASSENTIRI oportet), and not resist the Holy Spirit, but submit to the Word, ponder, learn, and hear it, as Christ says: 'Whosoever hath heard of the Father and learned, cometh to Me.'" Par. 36: "And although original sin has brought upon our nature a ruin so sad and horrible that we can hardly imagine it, yet we must not think that absolutely all the knowledge (notitiae) which was found in the minds of our first parents before the Fall has on that account been destroyed and extinguished after the Fall, or that the human will does not in any way differ from a stone or a block; for we are, as St. Paul has said most seriously, coworkers with God, which coworking, indeed, is assisted and strengthened by the Holy Spirit--sumus synergi Dei, quae quidem synergia adiuvatur a Spiritu Sancto et confirmatur." Evidently no comment is necessary to show that the passages cited from Pfeffinger are conceived, born, and bred in Semi-Pelagianism and rationalism.

Planck furthermore quotes from Pfeffinger's Answer to Amsdorf, 1558: "And there is no other reason why some are saved and some are damned than this one alone, that some, when incited by the Holy Spirit, do not resist, but obey Him and accept the grace and salvation offered, while others will not accept it, but resist the Holy Spirit, and despise the grace." (4, 578.) Again: "Although the will cannot awaken or incite itself to spiritually good works, but must be awakened and incited thereto by the Holy Ghost, yet man is not altogether excluded from such works of the Holy Ghost, as if he were not engaged in it and were not to contribute his share to it--dass er nicht auch dabei sein und das Seine nicht auch dabei tun muesse." (576.) Again: In the hands of the Holy Spirit man is not like a block or stone in the hands of a sculptor, which do not and cannot "know, understand, or feel what is done with them, nor in the least further or hinder what the artist endeavors to make of them." (576.) "But when the heart of man is touched, awakened, and moved by the Holy Ghost, man must not be like a dead stone or block, ... but must obey and follow Him. And although he perceives his great weakness, and, on the other hand, how powerfully sin in his flesh opposes, he must nevertheless not desist, but ask and pray God for grace and assistance against sin and flesh." (577.) Planck remarks: According to Pfeffinger, the powers for all this are still found in natural man, and the only thing required is, not to recreate them, but merely to incite them to action. (579.)

In 1558, in an appendix to his disputation of 1555, Pfeffinger explained and illustrated his position, in substance, as follows: I was to prove nothing else than that some use of the will [in spiritual matters] was left, and that our nature is not annihilated or extinguished, but corrupted and marvelously depraved after the Fall. Now, to be sure, free will cannot by its own natural powers regain its integrity nor rise after being ruined, yet as the doctrine [the Gospel] can be understood by paying attention to it, so it can also in a manner (aliquo modo) be obeyed by assenting to it. But it is necessary for all who would dwell in the splendor of the eternal light and in the sight of God to look up to and not turn away from, the light. Schluesselburg adds: "Haec certe est synergia--This is certainly synergism." (Catalogus 5, 161.)

Tschackert summarizes Pfeffinger's doctrine as follows: "When the Holy Spirit, through the Word of God, influences a man, then the assenting will becomes operative as a factor of conversion. The reason why some assent while others do not must be in themselves.... Evidently Pfeffinger's opinion was that not only the regenerate, but even the natural will of man possesses the ability either to obey the divine Spirit or to resist Him." (521.) According to W. Preger, Pfeffinger taught "that the Holy Spirit must awaken and incite our nature that it may understand, think, will and do what is right and pleasing to God," but that natural free will is able "to obey and follow" the motions of the Spirit. (2, 192. 195.)

No doubt, Pfeffinger advocated, and was a candid exponent and champion of, nothing but the three-concurring-causes doctrine of Melanchthon, according to which God never fails to do His share in conversion, while we must beware (sed nos viderimus, C. R. 21, 658) lest we fail to do our share. Pfeffinger himself made it a special point to cite Melanchthon as his authority in this matter. The last (41st) paragraph in his Five Questions begins as follows: "We have briefly set forth the doctrine concerning the liberty of the human will, agreeing with the testimonies of the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures, a fuller explanation of which students may find in the writings of our preceptor, Mr. Philip (prolisciorem explicationem requirant studiosi in scriptis D. Philippi, praeceptoris nostri)." And when, in the subsequent controversy Pfeffinger was publicly assailed by Amsdorf, Flacius, and others, everybody knew that their real target was none other than-- Master Philip. Melanchthon, too, was well aware of this fact. In his Opinion on the Weimar Confutation, of March 9, 1559, in which the synergism of the Philippists is extensively treated, he said: "As to free will, it is apparent that they attack me, Philip, in particular." (C. R. 9, 763.)

158. Strigel and Huegel Entering Controversy.

The synergistic controversy received new zest and a new impetus when, in 1559, Victorin Strigel and Huegel (Hugelius), respectively professor and pastor at Jena, the stronghold of the opponents of the Wittenberg Philippists, opposed Flacius, espoused the cause of Pfeffinger, championed the doctrine of Melanchthon, and refused to endorse the so called Book of Confutation which Flacius had caused to be drafted particularly against the Wittenberg Philippists and Synergists, and to be introduced. The situation thus created was all the more sensational because, in the preceding controversies, Strigel had, at least apparently, always sided with the opponents of the Philippists.

The "Konfutationsbuch--Book of Confutation and Condemnations of the Chief Corruptions, Sects, and Errors Breaking in and Spreading at this Time" was published in 1559 by Duke John Frederick II as a doctrinal norm of his duchy. In nine chapters this Book, a sort of forerunner of the Formula of Concord, dealt with the errors 1. of Servetus, 2. of Schwenckfeld, 3. of the Antinomians, 4. of the Anabaptists, 5. of the Zwinglians, 6. of the Synergists, 7. of Osiander and Stancarus, 8. of the Majorists, 9. of the Adiaphorists. Its chief object, as expressly stated in the Preface, was to warn against the errors introduced by the Philippists, whose doctrines, as also Planck admits, were not in any way misrepresented in this document. (4, 597. 595.) The sixth part, directed against synergism bore the title: "Confutatio Corruptelarum in Articulo de Libero Arbitrio sive de Viribus Humanis--Confutation of the Corruptions in the Article Concerning Free Will or Concerning the Human Powers." The Confutation was framed by the Jena theologians, Strigel and Huegel also participating in its composition. However, some of the references to the corruptions of the Philippists must have been rather vague and ambiguous in the first draft of the book; for when it was revised at the convention in Weimar, Flacius secured the adoption of additions and changes dealing particularly with the synergism of the Wittenbergers, which were energetically opposed by Strigel.

Even before the adoption of the Book of Confutation, Strigel had been polemicizing against Flacius. But now (as Flacius reports) he began to denounce him at every occasion as the "architect of a new theology" and an "enemy of the Augsburg Confession." At the same time he also endeavored to incite the students in Jena against him. Flacius, in turn, charged Strigel with scheming to establish a Philippistic party in Ducal Saxony. The public breach came when the Book of Confutation was submitted for adoption and publication in the churches and schools. Pastor Huegel refused to read and explain it from the pulpit, and Strigel presented his objections to the Duke, and asked that his conscience be spared. But when Strigel failed to maintain silence in the matter, he as well as Pastor Huegel were summarily dealt with by the Duke. On March 27, 1559, at two o'clock in the morning, both were suddenly arrested and imprisoned. Flacius who was generally regarded as the secret instigator of this act of violence, declared publicly that the arrest had been made without his counsel and knowledge. About six months later (September 5, 1569) Strigel and Huegel after making some doctrinal concessions and promising not to enter into any disputation on the Confutation, were set at liberty. (Planck 4, 591. 604.)

159. Weimar Disputation.

In order to settle the differences, Flacius and his colleagues (Wigand, Judex, Simon Musaeus), as well as Strigel, asked for a public disputation, which John Frederick, too was all the more willing to arrange because dissatisfaction with his drastic procedure against Strigel and Huegel was openly displayed everywhere outside of Ducal Saxony. The disputation was held at Weimar, August 2 to 8, 1560. It was attended by the Saxon Dukes and their entire courts, as well as by a large number of other spectators, not only from Jena, but also from Erfurt, Wittenberg and Leipzig. The subjects of discussion, for which both parties had submitted theses were: Free Will, Gospel, Majorism, Adiaphorism, and Indifferentism (academica epoche, toleration of error). The disputing parties (Flacius and Strigel) agreed that "the only rule should be the Word of God, and that a clear, plain text of the Holy Scriptures was to weigh more than all the inferences and authorities of interpreters" (Planck 4, 606.)

According to the proceedings of the Weimar Disputation, written by Wigand and published by Simon Musaeus 1562 and 1563 under the title: "Disputatio de Originali Peccato et Libero Arbitrio inter M. Flacium Illyr. et Vict. Strigelium Publice Vinariae Anno 1560 Habita," the only questions discussed were free will and, incidentally, original sin. Strigel defended the Melanchthonian doctrine, according to which the causes of conversion are the Holy Spirit, the Word of God, and the will of man feebly assenting to the Gospel and, at the same time, seeking strength from God. He repeated the formula: "Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis, quae voci divinae assentitur." Flacius, on the other hand, defended the mere passive of Luther, according to which man, before he is converted and endowed with faith, does not in any way cooperate with the Holy Spirit but merely suffers and experiences His operations. At the same time, however, he seriously damaged and discredited himself as well as the sacred cause of divine truth by maintaining that original sin is not a mere accident, such as Strigel maintained, but the very substance of man. The discussions were discontinued after the thirteenth session. The Duke announced that the disputation would be reopened later, charging both parties in the mean time to maintain silence in public,--a compromise to which Flacius and his adherents were loath to consent.

John Wigand and Matthias Judex however continued to enforce the Book of Confutation demanding an unqualified adoption in every point, per omnia. When the jurist Matthew Wesenbecius declined to accept the book in this categorical way, he was not permitted to serve as sponsor at a baptism. John Frederick was dissatisfied with this procedure and action of the ministers; and when they persisted in their demands, the autocratic Duke deprived them of the right to excommunicate, vesting this power in a consistory established at Weimar. Flacius and his adherents protested against this measure as tyranny exercised over the Church and a suppression of the pure doctrine. As a result Musaeus, Judex, Wigand, and Flacius were suspended and expelled from Jena, December, 1561. (Gieseler 3, 2, 244. 247.) Their vacant chairs at the university were filled by Freihub, Salmuth, and Selneccer, who had been recommended by the Wittenberg Philippists at the request of the Duke, who now evidently favored a compromise with the Synergists. Strigel, too, was reinstated at Jena after signing an ambiguous declaration.

Amsdorf, Gallus, Hesshusius, Flacius, and the other exiled theologians denounced Strigel's declaration as insincere and in conflict with Luther's book De Servo Arbitrio, and demanded a public retraction of his synergistic statements. When the ministers of Ducal Saxony also declined to acknowledge Strigel's orthodoxy, a more definite "Superdeclaration," framed by Moerlin and Stoessel (but not signed by Strigel), was added as an interpretation of Strigel's declaration. But even now a minority refused to submit to the demands of the Duke, because they felt that they were being deceived by ambiguous terms, such as "capacity" and "aptitude," which the wily Strigel and the Synergists used in the active or positive, and not in the passive sense. These conscientious Lutherans whom the rationalist Planck brands as "almost insane, beinahe verrueckt," were also deposed and banished, 1562. Strigel's declaration of March, 1562 however, maintaining that "the will is passive in so far as God alone works all good, but active in so far as it must be present in its conversion, must consent, and not resist, but accept," showed that he had not abandoned his synergism. In the same year he applied for, and accepted, a professorship in Leipzig. Later on he occupied a chair at the Reformed university in Heidelberg, where he died 1569, at the age of only forty-five years.

In 1567, when John William became ruler of Ducal Saxony, the Philippists were dismissed, and the banished Lutheran pastors and professors (with the exception of Flacius) were recalled and reinstated. While this rehabilitation of the loyal Lutherans formally ended the synergistic controversy in Ducal Saxony, occasional echoes of it still lingered, due especially to the fact that some ministers had considered Strigel's ambiguous declaration a satisfactory presentation of the Lutheran truth with regard to the questions involved. That the synergistic teaching of Melanchthon was continued in Wittenberg appears, for example, from the Confessio Wittenbergica of 1570.

160. Strigel's Rationalistic Principle.

Although at the opening of the disputation the debaters had agreed to decide all questions by clear Scripture-passages alone, Strigel's guiding principle was in reality not the Bible but philosophy and reason. His real concern was not, What does Scripture teach concerning the causes of conversion? but, How may we harmonize the universal grace of God with the fact that only some are converted and saved? Self-evidently Strigel, too, quoted Bible-passages. Among others, he appealed to such texts as John 6, 29; Rom. 1, 16; 10, 17; Luke 8, 18; Heb. 4, 2; Rev. 3, 20; Luke 11, 13; Mark 9, 24; 1 Thess. 2, 13; Jas. 1, 18. But as we shall show later, his deductions were philosophical and sophistical rather than exegetical and Scriptural. Preger remarks: In his disputation Strigel was not able to advance a single decisive passage of Scripture for the presence and cooperation of a good will at the moment when it is approached and influenced (ergriffen) by grace. (2, 211.) And the clear, irrefutable Bible-texts on which Flacius founded his doctrine of the inability of natural will to cooperate in conversion, Strigel endeavored to invalidate by philosophical reasoning, indirect arguing, and alleged necessary logical consequences.

At Weimar and in his Confession of December 5 1560, delivered to the Duke soon after the disputation, Strigel argued: Whoever denies that man, in a way and measure, is able to cooperate in his own conversion is logically compelled also to deny that the rejection of grace may be imputed to man, compelled to make God responsible for man's damnation; to surrender the universality of God's grace and call; to admit contradictory wills in God, and to take recourse to an absolute decree of election and reprobation in order to account for the fact that some reject the grace of God and are lost while others are converted and saved. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not say that the will is able to assent to the Word without the Holy Spirit, but that, being moved and assisted by the Spirit, it assents with trepidation. If we were unable to do this, we would not be responsible for not having received the Word. Si hoc [utcumque assentiri inter trepidationes] non possemus, non essemus rei propter Verbum non receptum." Again, also at Weimar: "If the will is not able to assent in some way, even when assisted, then we cannot be responsible for rejecting the Word, but the blame must be transferred to another, and others may judge how religious that is. Si voluntas ne quidem adiuta potest aliquo modo annuere, non possumus esse rei propter Verbum reiectum, sed culpa est in alium transferenda quod quam sit religio sum, alii iudicent." (Planck 4, 689. 719; Luthardt, Lehre vom freien Willen, 222.)

Over against this rationalistic method of Strigel and the Synergists generally, the Lutherans adhered to the principle that nothing but a clear passage of the Bible can decide a theological question. They rejected as false philosophy and rationalism every argument directed against the clear sense of a clear Word of God. They emphatically objected to the employment of reason for establishing a Christian doctrine or subverting a statement of the Bible. At Weimar, Flacius protested again and again that human reason is not an authority in theological matters. "Let us hear the Scriptures! Audiamus Scripturam!" "Let the woman be silent in the Church! Mulier taceat in ecclesia!" With such slogans he brushed aside the alleged necessary logical inferences and deductions of Strigel. "You take your arguments from philosophy," he said in the second session, "which ought not to be given a place in matters of religion. Disputas ex philosophia, cui locus in rebus religionis esse non debet." Again, at Weimar: "It is against the nature of inquiring truth to insist on arguing from blind philosophy. What else corrupted such ancient theologians as Clement, Origen, Chrysostom, and afterwards also the Sophists [scholastic theologians] but that they endeavored to decide spiritual things by philosophy, which does not understand the secret and hidden mysteries of God. Est contra naturam inquirendae veritatis, si velimus ex caeca philosophia loqui. Quid aliud corrupit theologos veteres, ut Clementem, Originem, Chrysosthomum et postea etiam Sophistas, nisi quod de rebus divinis ex philosophia voluerunt statuere, quae non intelligit abstrusissima et occultissima mysteria Dei." "May we therefore observe the rule of Luther: Let the woman be silent in the Church! For what a miserable thing would it be if we had to judge ecclesiastical matters from logic! Itaque observemus legem Lutheri: Taceat mulier in ecclesia! Quae enim miseria, si ex dialectica diiudicandae nobis essent res ecclesiae!" (Planck 4, 709.)

In an antisynergistic confession published by Schluesselburg, we read: "This doctrine [of conversion by God's grace alone] is simple, clear, certain, and irrefutable if one looks to God's Word alone and derives the Nosce teipsum, Know thyself, from the wisdom of God. But since poor men are blind, they love their darkness more than the light, as Christ says John 3, and insist on criticizing and falsifying God's truth by means of blind philosophy, which, forsooth, is a shame and a palpable sin, if we but had eyes to see and know.... Whatsoever blind reason produces in such articles of faith against the Word of God is false and wrong. For it is said: Mulier in ecclesia taceat! Let philosophy and human wisdom be silent in the Church." (Catalogus 5, 665f.) Here, too, the sophistical objections of the Synergists are disposed of with such remarks as: "In the first place, this is but spun from reason, which thus acts wise in these matters. Denn fuers erste ist solches nur aus der Vernunft gesponnen, die weiss also hierin zu kluegeln." (668.) "This is all spun from reason; but God's Word teaches us better. Dies ist alles aus der Vernunft spintisiert; Gottes Wort aber lehrt es besser." (670.)

Evidently Strigel's rationalistic method was identical with that employed by Melanchthon in his Loci, by Pfeffinger, and the Synergists generally. Accordingly, his synergism also could not differ essentially from Melanchthon's. Planck pertinently remarks: "It is apparent from this [argument of Strigel that natural man must have power to cooperate in his conversion because otherwise God would be responsible for his resistance and damnation] that his synergism was none other than that of the Wittenberg school; for was not this the identical foundation upon which Melanchthon had reared his [synergism]?" (4, 690.) Like methods lead to the same results, and vice versa. Besides, Strigel had always appealed to the Wittenbergers; and in his Opinion on the Weimar Confutation 1559, Melanchthon, in turn, identified himself with Strigel's arguments. (C. R. 9, 766.) The "Confession and Opinion of the Wittenbergers Concerning Free Will--Confessio et Sententia Wittebergensium de Libero Arbitrio" of 1561 also maintained the same attitude.

161. Strigel's Theory.

Strigel's views concerning the freedom of man's will in spiritual matters may be summarized as follows: Man, having a will, is a free agent, hence always able to decide for or against. This ability is the "mode of action" essential to man as long as he really is a man and in possession of a will. Even in matters pertaining to grace this freedom was not entirely lost in the Fall. It was impeded and weakened by original sin, but not annihilated. To be converted, man therefore requires that these residual or remaining powers be excited and strengthened rather than that new spiritual powers be imparted or a new will be created. Accordingly, persuasion through the Word is the method of conversion employed by the Holy Spirit. When the will is approached by the Word, incited and assisted by the Spirit, it is able to admit the operations of the Spirit and assent to the Word, though but feebly. Hence, no matter how much of the work of conversion must be ascribed to the Holy Spirit and the Word the will itself, in the last analysis, decides for or against grace. Man is, therefore, not purely passive in his conversion, but cooperates with the Holy Spirit and the Word, not merely after, but also in his conversion, before he has received the gift of faith.

"God who, outside of His essence in external actions, is the freest agent," said Strigel "created two kinds of natures, the one free, the other acting naturally (naturaliter agentes). The free natures are the angels and men. Those acting naturally embrace all the rest of the creatures. A natural agent is one that cannot do anything else [than it does], nor suspend its action e.g., fire. Men and angels were created differently, after the image of God, that they might be free agents. Homines et angeli aliter conditi sunt ad imaginem Dei, ut sint liberum agens." (Planck 4, 669.) This freedom, which distinguishes man essentially from all other creatures, according to Strigel, always implies the power to will or not to will with respect to any object. He says: The act of willing, be it good or evil, always belongs to the will, because the will is so created that it can will or not, without coercion. "Ipsum velle, seu bonum seu malum, quod ad substantiam attinet, semper est voluntatis; quia voluntas sic est condita, UT POSSIT VELLE AUT NON; sed etiam hoc habet voluntas ex opere creationis quod adhuc reliquum, et non prorsus abolitum et extinctum est, UT POSSIT VELLE AUT NON SINE COACTIONE." (674.) According to Strigel, the very essence of the will consists in being able, in every instance, to decide in either direction, for or against. Hence the very idea of will involves also a certain ability to cooperate in conversion. (689.)

This freedom or ability to decide pro or con, says Strigel, is the mode of action essential to man, his mode of action also in conversion. And in the controversy on free will he sought to maintain that this alleged mode of action was a part of the very essence of the human will and being. At Weimar Strigel declared: "I do not wish to detract from the will the mode of action which is different from other natural actions. Nolo voluntati detrahi modum agendi, qui est dissimilis aliis actionibus naturalibus." (Planck 4, 668.) Again: "The will is not a natural, but a free agent; hence the will is converted not as a natural agent, but as a free agent.... In conversion the will acts in its own mode; it is not a statue or a log in conversion. Hence conversion does not occur in a purely passive manner. Voluntas non est agens naturale, sed liberum; ergo convertitur voluntas non ut naturaliter agens, sed ut liberum agens.... Et voluntas suo modo agit in conversione, nec est statua vel truncus in conversione. Et per consequens non fit conversio pure passive." (Luthardt, 217. 219. 209.)

What Strigel means is that man, being a free agent, must, also in conversion, be accorded the ability somehow to decide for grace. According to the Formula of Concord the words, "man's mode of action," signify "a way of working something good and salutary in divine things." (905, 61.) The connection and the manner in which the phrase was employed by Strigel admitted of no other interpretation. Strigel added: This mode of action marks the difference between the will of man and the will of Satan, for the devil neither endeavors to assent, nor prays to God for assistance, while man does. (Luthardt, 220.) Natural man is by Strigel credited with the power of "endeavoring to assent, conari assentiri," because he is endowed with a will. But shrewd as Strigel was, it did not occur to him that, logically, his argument compelled him to ascribe also to the devils everything he claimed for natural man, since they, too, have a will and are therefore endowed with the same modus agendi, which, according to Strigel, belongs to the very idea and essence of will. Yet this palpable truth, which overthrew his entire theory, failed to open the eyes of Strigel.

If, as Strigel maintained, the human will, by virtue of its nature as a free agent, is, in a way, able to cooperate in conversion, then the only question is how to elevate this ability to an actuality, in other words, how to influence the will and rouse its powers to move in the right direction. Strigel answered: Since the will cannot be forced, moral suasion is the true method required to convert a man. "The will," says he "cannot be forced, hence it is by persuasion, i.e., by pointing out something good or evil, that the will is moved to obey and to submit to the Gospel, not coerced, but somehow willing. Voluntas non potest cogi, ergo voluntas persuadendo, id est ostensione alicuius boni vel mali flectitur ad obediendum et obtemperandum evangelio, non coacta, sed ALIQUO MODO VOLENS." (Seeberg 4, 491.) Again: "Although God is efficacious through the Word, drawing and leading us efficaciously, yet He does not make assenting necessary for such a nature as the will,--a nature so created that it is able not to assent, if it so wills, and to expel Him who dwells in us. This assent therefore is the work of God and the Holy Spirit, but in so far as it is a free assent, not coerced and pressed out by force, it is also the work of the will. Etiam si Deus est efficax per Verbum et efficaciter nos trahit et ducit, tamen non affert necessitatem assentiendi tali naturae, qualis est voluntas, id est, quae sic est condita, ut possit non assentiri, si velit, et excutere sessorem. Est igitur hic assensus opus Dei et Spiritus Sancti, sed quatenus est liber assensus, non coactus, expressus vi, EST ETIAM VOLUNTATIS." (491.) Strigel evidently means: The fact that man is able not to assent to grace of necessity involves that somehow (aliquo modo) he is able also to assent, according to man's peculiar mode of action (freedom) he must himself actualize his conversion by previously (in the logical order) willing it, deciding for it, and assenting to it; he would be converted by coercion if his assent to grace were an act of the will engendered and created solely by God, rather than an act effected and produced by the powers of the will when incited and assisted by the Spirit. Man is converted by persuasion only, because God does not create assent and faith in him but merely elicits these acts from man by liberating and appealing to the powers of his will to effect and produce them.

In defending this freedom of the will, Strigel appealed also to the statement of Luther: "The will cannot be coerced;... if the will could be coerced, it would not be volition, but rather nolition. Voluntas non potest cogi;... si posset cogi voluntas, non esset voluntas sed potius voluntas." However, what Luther said of the form or nature of the will, according to which it always really wills what it wills, and is therefore never coerced, was by Strigel transferred to the spiritual matters and objects of the will. According to Strigel's theory, says Seeberg, "the will must be free even in the first moment of conversion, free not only in the psychological, but also in the moral sense." (4, 492.) Tschackert, quoting Seeberg remarks that Strigel transformed the natural formal liberty into an ethical material liberty--"indem die natuerliche formale Freiheit sich ihm unter der Hand [?] verwandelte in die ethische materiale Freiheit." (524.)

162. Strigel's Semi-Pelagianism.

Strigel's entire position is based on the error that a remnant of spiritual ability still remains in natural man. True, he taught that in consequence of original sin the powers of man and the proper use and exercise of these powers are greatly impeded, weakened, checked, and insulated, as it were, and that this impediment can be removed solely by the operation of the Holy Spirit. "Through the Word the Holy Spirit restores to the will the power and faculty of believing," Strigel declared. (Luthardt, 250.) But this restoration, he said, was brought about by liberating, arousing, inciting, and strengthening the powers inherent in man rather than by divine impartation of new spiritual powers or by the creation of a new good volition.

Strigel plainly denied that natural man is truly spiritually dead. He declared: "The will is so created that it can expel the Holy Spirit and the Word, or, when assisted by the Holy Spirit, can in some manner will and obey--to receive is the act of the will; in this I cannot concede that man is simply dead--accipere est hominis; in hoc non possum concedere simpliciter mortuum esse hominem." (Frank 1, 199.) Natural man, Strigel explained, is indeed not able to grasp the helping hand of God with his own hand; yet the latter is not dead, but still retains a minimum of power. (678.) Again: Man is like a new-born child, whose powers must first be strengthened with nourishment given it by its mother, and which, though able to draw this nourishment out of its mother's breast, is yet unable to lift itself up to it, or to take hold of the breast, unless it be given it. (Preger 2, 209.)

With special reference to the last illustration, Flacius declared: "Strigel, accordingly, holds that we have the faculty to desire and receive the food, i.e., the benefits of God. Forsooth, you thereby attribute to corrupt man a very great power with respect to spiritual things. Now, then, deny that this opinion is Pelagian." (209.) "Your statements agree with those of Pelagius, yet I do not simply say that you are a Pelagian; for a good man may fall into an error which he does not see." Pelagius held that man, by his natural powers, is able to begin and complete his own conversion; Cassianus, the Semi-Pelagian taught that man is able merely to begin this work; Strigel maintained that man can admit the liberating operation of the Holy Spirit, and that after such operation of the Spirit he is able to cooperate with his natural powers. Evidently, then, the verdict of Flacius was not much beside the mark. Planck though unwilling to relegate Strigel to the Pelagians, does not hesitate to put him down as a thoroughgoing Synergist. (Planck 4, 683f.) Synergism, however, always includes at least an element of Pelagianism.

Strigel illustrated his idea by the following analogy. When garlic-juice is applied to a magnet, it loses its power of attraction, but remains a true magnet, and, when goat's blood is applied, immediately regains its efficaciousness. So the will of man is hindered by original sin from beginning that which is good; but when the impediment has been removed through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the native powers of the will again become efficacious and active. (Tschackert, 524; Planck 4, 672; Preger 2, 198; Luthardt, 211.) Frank remarks: "The example of the temporarily impeded power of the magnet, which was repeated also at this juncture [in the disputation at Weimar], immediately points to the related papal doctrine, for the Catholic Andradius explains the dogma of the Tridentinum to this effect: The free will of natural man may be compared to a chained prisoner who, though still in possession of his locomotive powers, is nevertheless impeded by his fetters." (1, 136.) Also the Formula of Concord, evidently with a squint at Strigel, rejects as a Pelagian error the teaching "that original sin is not a despoliation or deficiency but only an external impediment to these spiritual good powers, as when a magnet is smeared with garlic-juice, whereby its natural power is not removed, but only hindered or that this stain can be easily washed away as a spot from the face or a pigment from the wall." (865, 22.)

163. Strigel's "Cooperation."

When the impediment caused by original sin has been removed, and the will liberated and aroused to activity, man, according to Strigel, is able also to cooperate in his conversion. At Weimar he formulated the point at issue as follows: "The question is whether [in conversion] the will is present idle, as an inactive, indolent subject, or, as the common saying is, in a purely passive way; or whether, when grace precedes, the will follows the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, and in some manner assents--an vero praeeunte gratia voluntas comitetur efficaciam Spiritus Sancti et aliquo modo annuat." (Luthardt, 222.) Following are some of his answers to this question: When incited by the Spirit, the will is able to assent somewhat and to pray for assistance. Inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur, simul petens auxilium. Contrition and faith, as well as other virtues, are gifts of God, "but they are given to those only who hear and contemplate God's Word, embrace it by assenting to it, strive against their doubts and in this conflict pray for the help of God." (230.) The Holy Ghost converts those "who hear the Word of God and do not resist stubbornly, but consent," and God assists such only "as follow His call and pray for assistance." (229.) "The will and heart do not resist altogether, but desire divine consolation, when, indeed, they are assisted by the Holy Ghost." "The will is neither idle nor contumacious; but, in a manner, desires to obey." (Planck 4, 682.) "Man is dead [spiritually] in as far as he is not able to heal his wounds with his own powers; but when the remedy is offered him by the Holy Spirit and the Word, then he, at least in receiving the benefit, is not altogether dead; for otherwise a conversion could not occur. For I cannot conceive a conversion where the process is that of the flame consuming straw (denn ich kann mir keine Bekehrung vorstellen, bei der es zugeht, wie wenn die Flamme das Stroh ergreift). The nature of the will is such that it can reject the Holy Spirit and the Word; or, being supported by the Holy Spirit, can in a manner will and obey. The remedy is heavenly and divine, but the will--not the will alone, but the will supported by the Holy Spirit--is able to accept it. One must ascribe at least a feeble consent and an 'Aye' to the will, which is already supported by the Holy Spirit." (Preger 2, 208.) "In a betrothal, consent is necessary; conversion is a betrothal of Christ to the Church and its individual members; hence consent is required," which the will is able to give when assisted by the Holy Spirit. (Luthardt, 224.)

It is, however, only a languid, wavering, and weak consent which man is able to render (qualiscumque assensio languida, trepida et imbecilla). "Compared with the divine operation," Flacius reports Strigel as having said, "the cooperation of our powers in conversion is something extremely small (quiddam pertenue prorsus). If, after drinking with a rich man, he paying a taler and I a heller, I would afterwards boast that I had been drinking and paying with him--such is cooperation, talis est synergia." (Planck 4, 677; Luthardt, 220. 222.) According to Strigel, therefore, man is not purely passive, but plays an active part in his conversion. With Melanchthon and Pfeffinger he maintained: "These three concur in conversion: the Holy Spirit, who moves the hearts; the voice of God; the will of man, which assents to the divine voice. Concurrunt in conversione haec tria: Spiritus Sanctus movens corda, vox Dei, voluntas hominis, quae voci divinae assentitur." (Tschackert, 524.)

Flacius declared with respect to the issue formulated by Strigel: "I explain my entire view as follows: Man is purely passive (homo se habet pure passive). If you consider the native faculty of the will, its willing and its powers, then he is purely passive when he receives (in accipiendo). But if that divinely bestowed willing or spark of faith kindled by the Spirit is considered, then this imparted willing and this spark is not purely passive. But the Adamic will does not only not operate or cooperate, but, according to the inborn malice of the heart, even operates contrarily (verum etiam pro nativa malitia cordis sui contra operatur)." (Planck 4, 697.) Thus Flacius clearly distinguished between cooperation before conversion (which he rejected absolutely) and cooperation after conversion (which he allowed). And pressing this point, he said to Strigel: "I ask whether you say that the will cooperates before the gift of faith or after faith has been received whether you say that the will cooperates from natural powers, or in so far as the good volition has been bestowed by the renovation of the Holy Spirit. Quaero, an dicas, voluntatem cooperari ante donum fidei aut post acceptam fidem; an dicas, cooperari ex naturalibus viribus aut quatenus ex renovatione Spiritus Sancti datum est bene velle." (Seeberg 4, 492.) Again: I shall withdraw the charge of Pelagianism if you will declare it as your opinion "that only the regenerated, sanctified, renewed will cooperates, and not the other human, carnal, natural will." "Confess openly and expressly and say clearly: 'I affirm that man cooperates from faith and the good will bestowed by God, not from the will he brings with him from his natural Adam--quod homo cooperetur ex fide et bono velle divinitus donato, non ex eo, quod attulit ex suo naturali Adamo.'" "We say, Only the regenerate will cooperates; if you [Strigel] say the same, the controversy is at an end." Strigel, however, who, to use a phrase of Luther (St. L. 18, 1673), was just as hard to catch as Proteus of old, did not reply with a definite yes or no, but repeated that it was only a weak assent (qualiscumque assensio languida trepida et imbecilla) which man was able to render when his will was incited and supported by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit. (Preger 2, 217; Luthardt, 217. 222. 227; Frank 1, 115.)

164. Objections Answered.

At Weimar, Strigel insisted: The human will must not be eliminated as one of the causes of conversion; for without man's will and intellect no conversion is possible. Flacius replied: The will, indeed, is present in conversion, for it is the will that is converted and experiences conversion; but the inborn power of the natural will contributes nothing to conversion, and therefore the will "is purely passive in the reception of grace." (Preger 2, 217.) "We are pressed hard with the sophistical objection that man is not converted without his knowledge and will. But who doubts this? The entire question is: Whence does that good knowledge originate? Whence does that good volition originate?" (216.) "We certainly admit that in conversion there are many motions of the intellect and will, good and bad. But the dispute among us is not whether in conversion the intellect understands and the will wills; but whence is the capability to think right, and whence is that good willing of the will? Is it of us, as of ourselves, or is this sufficiency of willing and thinking of God alone?" (Planck 4, 711.) The fact that God alone converts man, said Flacius, "does not exclude the presence of the will; but it does exclude all efficaciousness and operation of the natural will in conversion (non excludit voluntatem, ne adsit, sed excludit omnem efficaciam et operationem naturalise voluntatis in conversione)." (Seeberg 4, 492.)

In order to prove man's cooperation in conversion, Strigel declared: "Both [to will and to perform] are in some way acts of God and of ourselves; for no willing and performing takes place unless we will. Utrumque [velle et perficere] aliquo modo Dei et nostrum est non fit velle aut perficere nisi nobis volentibus." Charging Strigel with ambiguity, Flacius replied: "You speak of one kind of synergism and we of another. You cannot affirm with a good conscience that these questions are unknown to you." Strigel, protesting that he was unable to see the difference, answered: "For God's sake, have a little forbearance with me, I cannot see the difference. If that is to my discredit, let it be to my discredit.--Bitte um Gottes willen, man wolle mir's zugut halten; ich kann's nicht ausmessen. Ist mir's eine Schand', so sei mir's eine Schand'." (Frank 1, 136.) Strigel, however, evidently meant that man, too, has a share in producing the good volition, while Flacius understood the phraseology as Luther and Augustine explained it, the latter, e.g., writing in De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio: "It is certain that we will when we will; but He who makes us will is He of whom it is written: It is God who worketh in us to will. Certum est nos velle cum volumus; sed ille facit, ut velimus, de quo dictum est: Deus est, qui operatur in nobis velle." (Frank 1, 238.)

In his objections to the doctrine that man is purely passive in his conversion, Strigel protested again and again that man is not like a block or stone when he is converted. "That is true," said Flacius, "for a block can neither love nor hate God, while man by nature hates God, and scoffs at Him. Rom. 8, 1; 1 Cor. 2. Thus God is dealing with one whose will and heart is altogether against Him. But here [in the denial that man is purely passive in conversion] is buried a popish meritum de congruo and a particle of free will." (Preger 2, 191.) Flacius furthermore explained that in his conversion man is able to cooperate just as little as a stone can contribute to its transformation into a statue. Indeed, man's condition is even more miserable than that of a stone or block (miserior trunco), because by his natural powers he resists, and cannot but resist, the operations of the Spirit. (Planck 4, 696f.)

Strigel reasoned: If man is converted without his consent, and if he cannot but resist the operations of the Holy Spirit, conversion is an impossibility, a contradiction. He said: "If the will, even when assisted by the Holy Spirit, is unable to assent, it must of necessity resist Him perpetually, drive out, reject, and repudiate the Word and Holy Spirit; for it is impossible that motions extremely conflicting and contradictory, the one embracing, the other repudiating and persistently rejecting, should be in the same will. Si voluntas etiam adiuta a Spiritu Sancto non potest assentiri, necesse est, ut perpetuo ei repugnet, ut excutiat, reiiciat et repudiet Verbum et Spiritum Sanctum. Nam impossibile est in eadem voluntate esse motus extreme pugnantes et contradictorios, quorum alter est amplecti, alter repudiare et quidem perstare in reiectione." Flacius replied: You need but distinguish between the sinful natural will inherited from Adam, which always resists, and the new consenting will implanted by God in conversion. "Man consents with the faith given by God, but he resists with the inborn wickedness of his Old Adam." Your error is that you acknowledge only an inciting grace, which mere incitation presupposes powers of one's own to do and to perform (talis incitatio includit proprias vires ad perficiendum). "I plead," said Flacius, "that by original sin man is not only wounded, but, as the Scriptures affirm, entirely dead, and his faculties to do that which is good have been destroyed; on the other hand, however, he is alive and vigorous toward evil (hominem ... penitus esse mortuum, extinctum et interfectum ad bonum et contra insuper vivum et vigentem ad malum)." "The will is free with respect to things beneath itself, but not with respect to things above itself. In spiritual matters it is a servant of Satan." Hence, said Flacius, in order to cooperate, new spiritual life must first be imparted to, and created in, man by the grace of God. (Planck 4, 693ff.; Frank 1, 224ff., Luthardt, 224; Preger 2, 216.)

Strigel argued: If man is able only to sin and to resist the grace of God, he cannot be held accountable for his actions. But Flacius replied: "Also the non-regenerate are justly accused [made responsible for their actions] for with the remnant of the carnal liberty they are able at least to observe external decency (Zucht), which God earnestly demands of us, for example, to hear God's Word, to go to church more frequently than into the tavern." "Furthermore, there are many carnal transgressions in which natural man could have done something which he has not done." "God may justly hold us responsible also with respect to things which we are unable to do because He has bestowed uninjured powers upon the human race, which, though forewarned, man has shamefully lost through his own fault." (Preger 2, 214f.)

Time and again Strigel told Flacius that according to his doctrine man is coerced to sin and compelled to resist the grace of God. But the latter replied: As far as his own powers are concerned, the natural will of man indeed sins and resists inevitably and of necessity (voluntas repugnat necessario et inevitabiliter), but not by coercion or compulsion. Necessity to resist (necessitas repugnandi), Flacius explained, does not involve coercion to resist (coactio repugnandi), since there is such a thing as a necessity of immutability (necessitas immutabilitatis), that is to say, man may be unable to act otherwise and yet act willingly. The impossibility of being able to will otherwise than one really wills, does, according to Flacius, not at all involve coercion or compulsion. The holy angels are free from compulsion, although they cannot sin or fall any more. It is the highest degree of freedom and Christian perfection when, in the life to come, our will to remain in union with God is elevated to immutability of so willing. Again, though Satan cannot but sin, yet he is not coerced to sin. Thus too, of his own powers, natural man is able only to resist grace, yet there is no compulsion involved. The fact, therefore, that natural man cannot but sin and resist grace does not warrant the inference that he is compelled to sin; nor does the fact that natural man is not coerced to resist prove that he is able also to assent to grace. The fact, said Flacius, that the wicked willingly will, think, and do only what pleases Satan does not prove an ability to will in the opposite spiritual direction, but merely reveals the terrible extent of Satan's tyrannical power over natural man. (Luthardt 224. 231.) According to Flacius the will always wills willingly when it wills and what it wills. In brief: The categories "coercion" and "compulsion" cannot be applied to the will. This, however, does not imply that God is not able to create or restore a good will without coercion or compulsion. There was no coercion or compulsion involved when God, creating Adam, Eve, and the angels, endowed them with a good will. Nor is there any such thing as coercion or compulsion when God, in conversion, bestows faith and a good will upon man.

In his statements on the freedom of the will, Flacius merely repeated what Luther had written before him, in De Servo Arbitrio: "For if it is not we, but God alone, who works salvation in us, then nothing that we do previous to His work, whether we will or not, is salutary. But when I say, 'by necessity,' I do not mean by coercion, but, as they say by the necessity of immutability, not by necessity of coercion, i.e., man, destitute of the Spirit of God, does not sin perforce, as though seized by the neck [stretched upon the rack] nor unwillingly, as a thief or robber is led to his punishment but spontaneously and willingly. And by his own strength he cannot omit, restrain, or change this desire or willingness to sin, but continues to will it and to find pleasure in it. For even if he is compelled by force, outwardly to do something else, within, the will nevertheless remains averse, and rages against him who compels or resists it. For if it were changed and willingly yielded to force, it would not be angry. And this we call the necessity of immutability, i.e., the will cannot change itself and turn to something else, but is rather provoked to will more intensely by being resisted, as is proved by its indignation. Si enim non nos, sed solus Deus operatur salutem in nobis, nihil ante opus eius operamur salutare, velimus nolimus. Necessario vero dico, NON COACTE, sed, ut illi dicunt, necessitate immutabilitatis, NON COACTIONIS; id est homo cum vacat Spiritu Dei, NON QUIDEM VIOLENTIA, velut raptus obtorto collo, NOLENS facit peccatum, quemadmodum fur aut latro nolens ad poenam ducitur, sed sponte et libenti voluntate facit. Verum hanc libentiam seu voluntatem faciendi non potest suis viribus omittere, coercere aut mutare, sed pergit volendo et lubendo; etiamsi ad extra cogatur aliud facere per vim, tamen voluntas intus manet aversa et indignatur cogenti aut resistenti. Non enim indignaretur, si mutaretur ac volens vim sequeretur. Hoc vocamus modo necessitatem immutabilitatis, id est, quod voluntas sese mutare et vertere alio non possit, sed potius irritetur magis ad volendum, dum ei resistitur, quod probat eius indignatio." (E. v. a. 7, 155f. 134. 157; St. L. 18 1717. 1692. 1718.)

Flacius was also charged with teaching that "man is converted resisting (hominem converti repugnantem)." In their Confession and Opinion Concerning Free Will, of 1561, the Wittenberg theologians repeated the assertion that Flacius taught "converti hominem ... repugnantem et hostiliter Deo convertenti adversantem." (Planck 4, 688.) But Flacius protested: "I do not simply say that man is converted resisting (hominem repugnantem converti). But I say that he resists with respect to his natural and carnal free will." "It is not denied that God converts us as willing and understanding (quin Deus nos convertat volentes et intelligentes), but willing and understanding not from the Old Adam but from the light given by God and from the good volition bestowed through the Word and the Holy Spirit." (692.) "Man is converted or drawn by the Father to the Son not as a thief is cast into prison, but in such a manner that his evil will is changed into a good will by the power of the Holy Spirit." (Preger 2, 218.) It is the very essence of conversion that by the grace of God unwilling men are made willing.

In support of his error that natural man is able to cooperate in his conversion Strigel appealed to Rom. 8, 26: "Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities," etc.; and appealing to the Augustana for the correctness of his interpretation, he declared that this passage proves that one may speak of a languid and weak assent in man even before he is endowed with faith. Flacius replied that this Bible-passage referred to such only as are already converted, and that Strigel's interpretation was found not in the original Augustana, but in the Variata.--From the admonition 2 Cor. 5, 20: "Be ye reconciled to God," Strigel inferred that free will must to a certain extent be capable of accepting the grace offered by God. Flacius answered that it was a logical fallacy, conflicting also with the clear Word of God, to conclude that man by his own powers is able to perform something because God demands it and admonishes and urges us to do it.--From Acts 5, 32: "...the Holy Ghost, whom God hath given to them that obey Him," Strigel argued that the will is able to consent to the Holy Spirit. But Flacius rejoined that this passage refers to special gifts bestowed upon such as are already converted.--In support of his synergism, Strigel also appealed to the Parable of the Prodigal Son, who himself repented and returned to his father. But Flacius answered: If every detail of this parable taken from every-day life were to be interpreted in such a manner, Strigel would have to abandon his own teaching concerning prevenient grace, since according to the parable the repentance and return of the son precedes the grace bestowed by the father. (Preger 2, 210f.)

165. Teaching of the Anti-Synergists.

While the Philippists, also in the Synergistic Controversy, endeavored to supplant the authority and doctrine of Luther by that of Melanchthon, their opponents, Amsdorf, Flacius, Wigand, Hesshusius, and others (though not always fortunate in the choice of their phraseology), stood four-square on Luther's teaching of the sola gratia, which, they were fully convinced, was nothing but the pure truth of the Gospel itself. They maintained that, as a result of the Fall, man has lost his original holiness and righteousness or the image of God; that both as to his intellect and will he is totally corrupt spiritually; that of his own powers he is utterly unable to think or will anything that is truly good; that not a spark of spiritual life is found in natural man by virtue of which he might assent to the Gospel or cooperate with the Holy Spirit in his conversion; that his carnal mind is enmity toward God; that of his own powers he is active only in resisting the work of the Holy Spirit, nor is he able to do otherwise; that such resistance continues until he is converted and a new will and heart have been created in him; that conversion consists in this, that men who by nature are unwilling and resist God's grace become such as willingly consent and obey the Gospel and the Holy Spirit; that this is done solely by God's grace, through Word and Sacrament; that man is purely passive in his conversion, inasmuch as he contributes nothing towards it, and merely suffers and experiences the work of the Holy Spirit; that only after his conversion man is able to cooperate with the Holy Spirit; that such cooperation, however, flows not from innate powers of the natural will, but from the new powers imparted in conversion; that also in the converted the natural sinful will continues to oppose whatever is truly good, thus causing a conflict between the flesh and the spirit which lasts till death; in brief, that man's conversion and salvation are due to grace alone and in no respect whatever to man and his natural powers.

The Book of Confutation, of 1559, drafted, as stated above, by the theologians of Jena, designates the synergistic dogma as a "rejection of grace." Here we also meet with statements such as the following: Human nature "is altogether turned aside from God, and is hostile toward Him and subject to the tyranny of sin and Satan (naturam humanam prorsus a Deo aversam eique inimicam et tyrannidi peccati ac Satanae subiectam esse)." It is impossible for the unregenerate man "to understand or to apprehend the will of God revealed in the Word, or by his own power to convert himself to God and to will or perform anything good (homini non renato impossibile esse intelligere aut apprehendere voluntatem Dei in Verbo patefactam aut sua ipsius voluntate ad Deum se convertere, boni aliquid velle aut perficere)." "Our will to obey God or to choose the good is utterly extinguished and corrupted. Voluntas nostra ad Dei obedientiam aut ad bonum eligendum prorsus extincta et depravata est." (Tschackert, 523; Gieseler 3, 2, 229.)

The second of the Propositions prepared by Simon Musaeus and Flacius for the Disputation at Weimar, 1560, reads: "Corrupt man cannot operate or cooperate toward anything good by true motions, and such as proceed from the heart; for his heart is altogether dead spiritually, and has utterly lost the image of God, or all powers and inclinations toward that which is good. Homo corruptus nihil boni potest veris ac ex corde proficiscentibus motibus operari aut cooperari, nom plane est spiritualiter mortuus et Dei imaginem seu omnes bonas vires et inclinationes prorsus amisit." The third: Not only "has he lost entirely all good powers, but, in addition, he has also acquired contrary and most evil powers, ... so that, of necessity or inevitably, he constantly and vehemently opposes God and true piety (ita [tr. note: sic on punctuation] ut necessario seu inevitabiliter Deo ac verae pietati semper et vehementer adversetur." The fourth thesis states that God alone, through His Word and the Holy Spirit, converts, draws, and illumines man, kindles faith, justifies, renews, and creates him unto good works, while natural or Adamic free will is of itself not only inactive, but resists (non solum non cooperante ex se naturali aut Adamico libero arbitrio, sed etiam contra furente ac fremente). (Planck 4, 692; Gieseler 3, 2, 245.)

The same position was occupied by the Mansfeld ministers in a statement of August 20, 1562, and by Hesshusius in his Confutation of the Arguments by which the Synergists Endeavor to Defend Their Error Concerning the Powers of the Dead Free Will. They held that in his conversion man is purely passive and has no mode of action whatever; that he is but the passive subject who is to be converted (subiectam patiens, subiectum convertendum); that he contributes no more to his conversion than an infant to its own formation in the womb of its mother; that he is passive, like a block, inasmuch as he does not in any way cooperate, but at the same time differs from, and is worse than, a block, because he is active in resisting the Holy Spirit until he has been converted. The Confession presented by the theologians of Ducal Saxony (Wigand, Coelestinus, Irenaeus, Rosinus, Kirchner, etc.) at the Altenburg Colloquy March, 1569, occupies the same doctrinal position. As stated before, these theologians made it a special point also to declare their agreement with Luther's book De Servo Arbitrio. (Schluesselburg 5, 316. 133.)

166. Attitude of Formula of Concord.

The second article of the Formula of Concord, which decided the questions involved in the Synergistic Controversy, takes a clear, determined, and consistent stand against all forms and formulas of synergism. At the same time it avoids all extravagant, improper, offensive, and inadequate terms and phrases, as well as the numerous pitfalls lurking everywhere in the questions concerning free will, against which also some of the opponents of the Synergists had not always sufficiently been on their guard. Article II teaches "that original sin is an unspeakable evil and such an entire corruption of human nature that in it and all its internal and external powers nothing pure or good remains, but everything is entirely corrupt, so that on account of original sin man is in God's sight truly spiritually dead, with all his powers dead to that which is good (dass der Mensch durch die Erbsuende wahrhaftig vor Gott geistlich tot und zum Guten mit allen seinen Kraeften erstorben sei)" (CONC. TRIGL. 879, 60); "that in spiritual and divine things the intellect, heart, and will of the unregenerate man are utterly unable, by their own natural powers, to understand, believe, accept, think, will, begin, effect, work, or concur in working, anything, but they are entirely dead to what is good, and corrupt, so that in man's nature since the Fall, before regeneration, there is not the least spark of spiritual power remaining, nor present, by which, of himself, he can prepare himself for God's grace, or accept the offered grace, nor be capable of it for and of himself, or apply or accommodate himself thereto, or by his own powers be able of himself, as of himself, to aid, do, work, or concur in working anything towards his conversion either wholly, or half, or in any, even the least or most inconsiderable part; but that he is the servant [and slave] of sin, John 8, 34, and a captive of the devil, by whom he is moved, Eph. 2, 2; 2 Tim. 2, 26. Hence natural free will according to its perverted disposition and nature is strong and active only with respect to what is displeasing and contrary to God" (883, 7; 887, 17); that "before man is enlightened, converted, regenerated, renewed and drawn by the Holy Spirit he can of himself and of his own natural powers begin work, or concur in working in spiritual things and in his own conversion or regeneration just as little as a stone or a block or clay." (891, 24); that, moreover, "in this respect" [inasmuch as man resists the Holy Spirit] "it may well be said that man is not a stone or block, for a stone or block does not resist the person who moves it, nor does it understand and is sensible of what is being done with it, as man with his will so long resists God the Lord until he is converted (donec ad Deum conversus fuerit)" (905, 59); that "the Holy Scriptures ascribe conversion, faith in Christ, regeneration, renewal, and all that belongs to their efficacious beginning and completion, not to the human powers of the natural free will, neither entirely, nor half nor in any, even the least or most inconsiderable part, but in solidum, that is, entirely and solely, to the divine working and the Holy Spirit" (891, 25); that "the preaching and hearing of God's Word are instruments of the Holy Ghost, by, with, and through which He desires to work efficaciously, and to convert men to God, and to work in them both to will and to do" (901, 52); that "as soon as the Holy Ghost ... has begun in us this His work of regeneration and renewal, it is certain that through the power of the Holy Ghost we can and should cooperate (mitwirken), although still in great weakness" (907, 65); that this cooperation, however, "does not occur from our carnal natural powers, but from the new powers and gifts which the Holy Ghost has begun in us in conversion," and "is to be understood in no other way than that the converted man does good to such an extent and so long as God by His Holy Spirit rules, guides, and leads him, and that as soon as God would withdraw His gracious hand from him, he could not for a moment persevere in obedience to God," and that hence it is not a power independent from, and coordinated with, the Holy Spirit, as though "the converted man cooperated with the Holy Ghost in the manner as when two horses together draw a wagon" (907, 66); and finally, that as to the three-concurring-causes doctrine it is "manifest, from the explanations presented that conversion to God is a work of God the Holy Ghost alone, who is the true Master that alone works this in us, for which He uses the preaching and hearing of His holy Word as His ordinary means and instrument. But the intellect and will of the unregenerate man are nothing else than subiectum convertendum, that is, that which is to be converted, it being the intellect and will of a spiritually dead man, in whom the Holy Ghost works conversion and renewal, towards which work man's will that is to be converted does nothing, but suffers God alone to work in him until he is regenerated and then he [cooperates] works also with the Holy Ghost that which is pleasing to God in other good works that follow in the way and to the extent fully set forth above" (915, 90).

It has been said that originally also the Formula of Concord in its Torgau draft (Das Torgausche Buch, i.e., the draft preceding the Bergic Book=Formula of Concord) contained the three-concurring-causes doctrine of Melanchthon and the Synergists. As a matter of fact, however, the Torgau Book does not speak of three causes of conversion, but of three causes in those who are already converted,--a doctrine entirely in agreement with the Formula of Concord, which, as shown, plainly teaches that after conversion the will of man also cooperates with the Holy Spirit. In the Torgau Book the passage in question reads: "Thus also three causes concur to effect this internal new obedience in the converted. The first and chief cause is God Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.... The second is God's Word.... The third is man's intellect, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, which ponders and understands God's command [threat and promise], and our new and regenerate will, which is governed by the Holy Spirit, and now desires with a glad and willing heart (herzlich gern und willig), though in great weakness, to submit to, and obey, the Word and will of God." In the same sense, at the colloquy in AItenburg, 1568 to 1569, the Jena theologians also mentioned as a "third cause" "the mind of man, which is regenerated and renewed, and yields to, and obeys, the Holy Spirit and the Word of God (des Menschen Gemuet, so wiedergeboren und erneuert ist und dem Heiligen Geiste und Gottes Wort Folge tut und gehorsam ist)." (Frank 1, 214f.)

XV. The Flacian Controversy.

167. Flacius Entrapped by Strigel.

Matthias Flacius Illyricus, one of the most learned and capable theologians of his day and the most faithful, devoted, staunch, zealous, and able exponent and defender of genuine Lutheranism, was the author of the malignant controversy which bears his name. Flacius was born March 3, 1520, in Illyria hence called Illyricus. He studied in Basel, Tuebingen, and Wittenberg. At Wittenberg he was convinced that the doctrine of the Lutheran Church is in complete agreement with the Word of God. Here, too, he was appointed Professor of Hebrew in 1544. In April, 1549, he left the city on account of the Interim. He removed to Magdeburg where he became the energetic and successful leader of the opponents of the Interimists and Adiaphorists. He was appointed professor at the University of Jena, founded 1547, partly in opposition to Philippism. In December 1561, he and his adherents were banished from Jena. When the latter returned in 1567, he was not recalled. Persecuted by his enemies (especially Elector August of Saxony) and forsaken by his friends, he now moved from one place to another: from Jena to Regensburg, thence to Antwerp, to Frankfort-on-the-Main, to Strassburg (from where he was expelled in the spring of 1573), and again to Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he found a last asylum for himself and his family (wife and eight children), and where he also died in a hospital, March 11, 1575.

In the Adiaphoristic Controversy Flacius had time and again urged the Lutherans to die rather than deny and surrender the truth. And when in the controversy about original sin all shunned him and turned against him he gave ample proof of the fact that he himself was imbued with the spirit he had endeavored to kindle in others, being willing to suffer and to be banished and persecuted rather than sacrifice what he believed to be the truth.--The most important of his numerous books are: Catalogus Testium Veritatis, qui ante nostram aetatem reclamarunt Papae, 1556; Ecclesiastica Historia, or the so-called Magdeburg Centuries (Centuriones), comprising the history of the first thirteen centuries, and published 1559-1574; Clavis Scripturae, of 1567; and Glossa Novi Testamenti. Walther remarks: "It was a great pity that Flacius, who had hitherto been such a faithful champion of the pure doctrine, exposed himself to the enemies in such a manner. Henceforth the errorists were accustomed to brand all those as Flacianists who were zealous in defending the pure doctrine of Luther." (Kern und Stern, 34.)

The Flacian Controversy sprang from, and must be regarded as an episode of, the Synergistic Controversy, in which also some champions of Luther's theology (Amsdorf, Wigand, Hesshusius, and others) had occasionally employed unguarded, extreme, and inadequate expressions. Following are some of the immoderate and extravagant statements made by Flacius: God alone converts man, the Adamic free will not only not cooperating, "but also raging and roaring against it (sed etiam contra furente ac fremente)." (Preger 2, 212.) The malice of our free will is a "diabolical malice (nostra diabolica malitia carnis aut liberi arbitrii)." By original sin man is "transformed into the image of Satan (ad imaginem Satanae transformatus, eiusque charactere [foeda Satanae imagine] signatus)." (Gieseler 3, 2, 245.) By original sin "the substance of man is destroyed (substantiam hominis ablatam esse);" after the Fall original sin is the substance of man; man's nature is identical with sin; in conversion a new substance is created by God. In particular, the assertions concerning the substantiality of original sin gave rise to the so-called Flacian Controversy. After Strigel, at the second session of the disputation in Weimar, had dilated on the philosophical definitions of the terms "substance" and "accident" ("accidens, quod adest vel abest praeter subiecti corruptionem"), and had declared that original sin was an accident which merely impeded free will in its activity, Flacius, in the heat of the controversy, exclaimed: "Originale peccatum non est accidens. Original sin is not an accident, for the Scriptures call it flesh, the evil heart," etc. Thus he fell into the pitfall which the wily Strigel had adroitly laid for him. Though Flacius seemed to be loath to enter upon the matter any further, and protested against the use of philosophical definitions in theology, Strigel now was eager to entangle him still further, plying him with the question: "An negas peccatum originis esse accidens? Do you deny that original sin is an accident?" Flacius answered: "Lutherus diserte negat esse accidens. Luther expressly denies that it is an accident." Strigel: "Visne negare peccatum esse accidens? Do you mean to deny that sin is an accident?" Flacius: "Quod sit substantia, dixi Scripturam et Lutherum affirmare. I have said that Scripture and Luther affirm that it is a substance." (Luthardt, 213. 216.)

After the session in which the fatal phrase had fallen from his lips, Wigand and Musaeus expostulated with Flacius, designating (according to later reports of theirs) his statement as "this new, perilous, and blasphemous proposition of the ancient Manicheans (haec nova, periculosa et blasphema veterum Manichaeorum propositio)." (Planck 4, 611.) Flacius declared that, "in the sudden and pressing exigency, in the interest of truth, and against Pelagian enthusiasm, he had taken this expression [concerning the substantiality of original sin] from Luther's doctrine and books." (Preger 2, 324.) In the following (third) session, however, he repeated his error, declaring: I must stand by my statement that original sin is not an accident, but a substance, "because the testimonies of the Holy Scriptures which employ terms denoting substance (quae verbis substantialibus utuntur) are so numerous." (Planck 4, 610; Luthardt, 216.) Also later on Flacius always maintained that his doctrine was nothing but the teaching of the Bible and of Luther. As to Scripture-proofs, he referred to passages in which the Scriptures designate sin as "flesh," "stony heart," etc. Regarding the teaching of Luther, he quoted statements in which he describes original sin as "man's nature," "essence," "substantial sin," "all that is born of father and mother," etc. (Preger 2, 318.)

However, the palpable mistake of Flacius was that he took the substantial terms on which he based his theory in their original and proper sense, while the Bible and Luther employ them in a figurative meaning, as the Formula of Concord carefully explains in its first article, which decided and settled this controversy. (874, 50.) Here we read: "Also to avoid strife about words, aequivocationes vocabulorum, that is, words and expressions which are applied and used in various meanings, should be carefully and distinctly explained, as when it is said: God creates the nature of men, there by the term nature the essence, body, and soul of men are understood. But often the disposition or vicious quality of a thing is called its nature, as when it is said: It is the nature of the serpent to bite and poison. Thus Luther says that sin and sinning are the disposition and nature of corrupt man. Therefore original sin properly signifies the deep corruption of our nature as it is described in the Smalcald Articles. But sometimes the concrete person or the subject that is, man himself with body and soul in which sin is and inheres, is also comprised under this term, for the reason that man is corrupted by sin, poisoned and sinful, as when Luther says: 'Thy birth, thy nature, and thy entire essence is sin,' that is, sinful and unclean. Luther himself explains that by nature-sin, person-sin, essential sin he means that not only the words, thoughts, and works are sin, but that the entire nature, person and essence of man are altogether corrupted from the root by original sin." (875, 51f.)

168. Context in which Statement was Made.

In making his statement concerning the substantiality of original sin, the purpose of Flacius was to wipe out the last vestige of spiritual powers ascribed to natural man by Strigel, and to emphasize the doctrine of total corruption, which Strigel denied. His fatal blunder was that he did so in terms which were universally regarded as savoring of Manicheism. As was fully explained in the chapter of the Synergistic Controversy Strigel taught that free will, which belongs to the substance and essence of man, and hence cannot be lost without the annihilation of man himself, always includes the capacity to choose in both directions, that also with respect to divine grace and the operations of the Holy Spirit man is and always remains a liberum agens in the sense that he is able to decide in utramque partem; that this ability, constituting the very essence of free will, may be weakened and impeded in its activity, but never lost entirely. If it were lost, Strigel argued, the very substance of man and free will as such would have to be regarded as annihilated. But now man, also after the Fall, is still a real man, possessed of intellect and will. Hence original sin cannot have despoiled him of this liberty of choosing pro or con also in matters spiritual. The loss of original righteousness does not, according to Strigel, involve the total spiritual disability of the will and its sole tendency and activity toward what is spiritually evil. Moreover, despite original corruption, it is and remains an indestructible property of man to be able, at least in a measure, to assent to and to admit, the operations of the Holy Spirit, and therefore and in this sense to be converted "aliquo modo volens." (Planck 4, 667. 675. 681.)

It was in opposition to this Semi-Pelagian teaching that Flacius declared original sin to be not a mere accident, but the substance of man. Entering upon the train of thought and the phraseology suggested by his opponent, he called substance what in reality was an accident, though not an accident such as Strigel contended. From his own standpoint it was therefore a shrewd move to hide his own synergism and to entrap his opponent, when Strigel plied Flacius with the question whether he denied that original sin was an accident. For in the context and the sense in which it was proposed the question involved a vicious dilemma. Answering with yes or no, Flacius was compelled either to affirm Strigel's synergism or to expose himself to the charge of Manicheism. Instead of replying as he did, Flacius should have cleared the sophistical atmosphere by explaining: "If I say, 'Original sin is an accident,' you [Strigel] will infer what I reject, viz., that the corrupt will of man retains the power to decide also in favor of the operations of the Holy Spirit. And if I answer that original sin is not an accident (such as you have in mind), you will again infer what I disavow, viz., that man, who by the Fall has lost the ability to will in the spiritual direction, has eo ipso lost the will and its freedom entirely and as such." As it was, however, Flacius instead of adhering strictly to the real issue--the question concerning man's cooperation in conversion--and exposing the sophistry implied in the question put by Strigel, most unfortunately suffered himself to be caught on the horns of the dilemma. He blindly walked into the trap set for him by Strigel, from which also later on he never succeeded in fully extricating himself.

With all his soul Flacius rejected the synergism involved in Strigel's question. His blunder was, as stated, that he did so in terms universally regarded as Manichean. He was right when he maintained that original sin is the inherited tendency and motion of the human mind, will, and heart, not toward, but against God,--a direction, too, which man is utterly unable to change. But he erred fatally by identifying this inborn evil tendency with the substance of fallen man and the essence of his will as such. It will always be regarded as a redeeming feature that it was in antagonizing synergism and championing the Lutheran sola gratia that Flacius coined his unhappy proposition. And in properly estimating his error, it must not be overlooked that he, as will be shown in the following, employed the terms "substance" and "accident" not in their generally accepted meaning but in a sense, and according to a philosophical terminology, of his own.

169. Formal and Material Substance.

The terms "substance" and "accident" are defined in Melanchthon's Erotemata Dialectices as follows: "Substantia est ens, quod revera proprium esse habet, nec est in alio, ut habens esse a subiecto. Substance is something which in reality has a being of its own and is not in another as having its being from the subject." (C. R. 13, 528.) "Accidens est quod non per sese subsistit, nec est pars substantiae, sed in alio est mutabiliter. Accident is something which does not exist as such nor is a part of the substance, but is changeable in something else." (522.) Melanchthon continues: "Accidentium alia sunt separabilia ut frigus ab aqua, notitia a mente, laetitia, tristitia a corde. Alia accidentia sunt inseparabilia, ut quantitas seu magnitudo a substantia corporea, calor ab igni, humiditas ab aqua, non separantur... Et quia separabilia accidentia magis conspicua sunt, ideo inde sumpta est puerilis descriptio: Accidens est, quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Whatever is present or absent without the corruption of the subject is an accident." (C. R. 13, 523; Preger 2, 396. 407; Seeberg 4, 494.)

Evidently this last definition, which was employed also by Strigel, is ambiguous, inasmuch as the word "corruption" may signify an annihilation, or merely a perversion, or a corruption in the ordinary meaning of the word. In the latter sense the term applied to original sin would be tantamount to a denial of the Lutheran doctrine of total corruption. When Jacob Andreae, in his disputation with Flacius, 1571, at Strassburg, declared that accident is something which is present or absent without corruption of the subject, he employed the term in the sense of destruction or annihilation. In the same year Hesshusius stated that by original sin "the whole nature body and soul, substance as well as accidents, are defiled, corrupted, and dead," of course, spiritually. And what he understood by substance appears from his assertion: "The being itself, the substance and nature itself, in as far as it is nature, is not an evil conflicting with the Law of God.... Not even in the devil the substance itself, in as far as it is substance, is a bad thing, i.e., a thing conflicting with the Law." (Preger 2, 397.)

The Formula of Concord carefully and correctly defines: "Everything that is must be either substantia, that is, a self-existent essence, or accidens, that is, an accidental matter, which does not exist by itself essentially but is in another self-existent essence and can be distinguished from it." "Now, then, since it is the indisputable truth that everything that is, is either a substance or an accidens that is, either a self-existing essence or something accidental in it (as has just been shown and proved by testimonies of the church-teachers, and no truly intelligent man has ever had any doubts concerning this), necessity here constrains, and no one can evade it if the question be asked whether original sin is a substance, that is, such a thing as exists by itself, and is not in another, or whether it is an accidens, that is, such a thing as does not exist by itself, but is in another, and cannot exist or be by itself, he must confess straight and pat that original sin is no substance, but an accident." (877, 54; 57.)

Flacius, however, took the words "substance" and "accident" in a different sense. He distinguished between the material and formal substance, and the latter he regarded as man's true original essence. This essence he explained, consisted in the original righteousness and holiness of man, in the image of God or the will as truly free and in proper relation toward God. He said: "Ipsum hominem essentialiter sic esse formatum, ut recta voluntas esset imago Dei, non tantum eius accidens." (Seeberg 4, 494.) He drew the conclusion that original sin, by which the image of God (not the human understanding and will as such) is lost, cannot be a mere accident, but constitutes the very essence and substance of fallen man. He argued: The image of God is the formal essence of man, or the soul itself according to its best part, by original sin this image is changed into its opposite: hence the change wrought by original sin is not accidental, but substantial,--just as substantial and essential as when wine is changed into vinegar or fire into frost. What man has lost, said Flacius, is not indeed his material substance (substantia materialis), but his true formal substance or substantial form (substantia formalis or forma substantialis). Hence also original sin, or the corruption resulting from the Fall, in reality is, and must be designated, the formal substance or substantial form of natural man. Not all gifts of creation were lost to man by his Fall; the most essential boon, however, the image of God, was destroyed and changed into the image of Satan. "In homine," said Flacius, "et mansit aliquid, et tamen quod optimum in ratione et essentia fuit, nempe imago Dei, non tantum evanuit, sed etiam in contrarium, nempe in imaginem diaboli, commutatum est." The devil, Flacius continued, has robbed man of his original form (forma), the image of God, and stamped him with his own diabolical form and nature. (Luthardt 215; Gieseler 3, 2, 253.)

170. Further Explanations of Flacius.

The manner in which Flacius distinguished between material and formal substance appears from the tract on original sin (De Peccati Originalis aut Veteris Adami Appellationibus et Essentia), which he appended to his Clavis Scripturae of 1567. There we read: "In this disputation concerning the corruption of man I do not deny that this meaner matter (illam viliorem materiam) or mass of man created in the beginning has indeed remained until now, although it is exceedingly vitiated, as when in wine or aromas the spirituous (airy) or fiery substance escapes, and nothing remains but the earthy and watery substance; but I hold that the substantial form or the formal substance (formam substantialem aut substantiam formalem) has been lost, yea, changed into its opposite. But I do not speak of that external and coarse form (although it too, is corrupted and weakened very much) which a girl admires in a youth, or philosophy also in the entire man, according to which he consists of body and soul, has an erect stature two feet, hands, eyes, ears, and the like, is an animal laughing, counting, reasoning, etc.; but I speak of that most noble substantial form (nobilissima substantialis forma) according to which especially the heart itself or rather the rational soul, was formed in such a manner that his very essence might be the image of God and represent Him, and that his substantial powers, intellect and will, and his affections might be conformed to the properties of God, represent, truly acknowledge, and most willingly embrace Him." (Preger 2, 314; Gieseler 3, 2, 254.)

Again: "In this manner, therefore, I believe and assert that original sin is a substance, because the rational soul (as united with God) and especially its noblest substantial powers, namely, the intellect and will which before had been formed so gloriously that they were the true image of God and the fountain of all justice, uprightness, and piety, and altogether essentially like unto gold and gems, are now, by deceit of Satan, so utterly perverted that they are the true and living image of Satan, and, as it were, filthy or rather consisting of an infernal flame, not otherwise than when the sweetest and purest mass, infected with the most venomous ferment, is altogether and substantially changed and transformed into a lump of the same ferment." (Gieseler 3, 2, 254.) Original sin "is not a mere accident in man, but his inverted and transformed essence or new form itself, just as when a most wholesome medicine is changed into the most baneful poison." "The matter remains, but it receives a new form, namely, the image of Satan." "Man, who in his essential form was the image of God, has in his essential form become the image of Satan." "This change may be compared to the change which the golden image of a beautiful man undergoes when it is transformed into the image of a dragon, the matter at the same time being corrupted." (Preger 2, 214. 217. 325.)

Dilating on the substantiality of original sin, Flacius furthermore declared: "Original malice in man is not something different from the evil mind or stony heart itself, not something that destroys him spiritually as a disease consumes him bodily, but it is ruined and destroyed nature itself (sed est tantum ipsa perditissima et iam destructissima natura). Original malice was not, as many now think infused from without into Adam in such a way as when poison or some other bad substance is thrown or poured into good liquor, so that by reason of the added bad substance also the rest becomes noxious, but in such a way as when good liquor or bread itself is perverted so that now it is bad as such and poisonous or rather poison (ut illud per se iam malum ac venenatum aut potius venenum sit)." (Preger 2, 313.)

Also concerning the body and soul of fallen man Flacius does not hesitate to affirm that, since they are permeated and corrupted by original sin, "these parts themselves are sin, eas ipsas [partes, corpus et animam] esse illud nativum malum, quod cum Deo pugnat." "Some object," says Flacius, "that the creature of God must be distinguished from sin, which is not of God. I answer: now do separate, if you can, the devil from his inherent wickedness!... How can the same thing be separated from itself! We therefore can not distinguish them in any other way than by stating that with respect to his first creation and also his present preservation man, even as the devil himself, is of God, but that with respect to this horrible transformation (ratione istius horrendae metamorphoseos) he is of the devil, who, by the force of the efficacious sentence and punishment of angry God: 'Thou shalt die,' not only captured us to be his vilest slaves, but also recast, rebaked, and changed, or, so to speak, metamorphosed us into another man, as the Scripture says, even as he [the devil] himself is inverted." All parts, talents, and abilities of man, Flacius contends, are "evil and mere sins," because they all oppose God. "What else are they than armed unrighteousness!" he exclaims. Even the natural knowledge of God "is nothing but the abominable source of idolatry and of all superstitions." (Preger 316f.; Gieseler 3, 2, 255.)

That the fundamental view of Flacius, however, was much farther apart from Manicheism than some of his radical phrases imply, appears from his "Gnowthi seauton, De Essentia Originalis Institutiae," of 1568. After admitting that Augustine, Luther, and the Apology of the Augsburg Confession are correct when they define original sin as an inordinate disposition, a disorder (ataxia), perversion, and confusion of the parts of man, Flacius proceeds: "The substantial form of a certain thing for the most part, consists in the right position and disposition of the parts; as, for example, if a human body were born which had its eyes, ears, and mouth on the belly or feet, and, vice versa, the toes on the head, no one would say that it was properly a man, but rather a monster. ... It appears, therefore, that the inordinate disposition of the parts produces an altogether new body or thing. Thus, forsooth, the horrible perturbation of the soul has also produced, as it were a new kind of monster fighting against God." (Preger 2, 409.) Accordingly, it was not man's body and soul as such, but the alteration of the relation of his powers toward one another and the consequent corruption of these powers, that Flacius had in mind when he designated original sin as the new substantial form, or substance, of sinful man.

Flacius expressly denied that the fall of man or his conversion involved a physical change. "I do not teach a physical regeneration," he declared, "nor do I say that two hearts are created, but I say that this most excellent part of the soul or of man is once more established, or that the image of God is recast and transformed out of the image of Satan, even as before the image of God was transformed into the image of Satan. Physicam renascentiam non assero nec dico duo corda creari, sed dico istam praestantissimam animae aut hominis partem denuo condi aut ex imagine Satanae refundi aut transformari imaginem Dei, sicut antea imago Dei fuit transformata in imaginem Satanae." (Seeberg 4, 495.) Gieseler pertinently remarks: "It is apparent that Flacius did not deviate from the common concept of original sin, but from the concepts of substance and accident, but that here, too, he was uncertain, inasmuch as he employed the terms substantia, forma substantialis, and substantia formalis promiscuously." (3, 2, 255.)

If not necessarily involved in, it was at least in keeping with his extreme position and extravagant phraseology concerning original sin when Flacius, in his De Primo et Secundo Capite ad Romanos, quatenus Libero Arbitrio Patrocinari Videntur, rejected the doctrine of an inborn idea of God and of His Law inscribed in the heart of natural man. On Rom. 1, 19 he comments: It is only from the effects in the world that man infers the existence of a supreme cause. And with respect to Rom. 2, 15 he maintains that Paul's statements were to be understood, not of a law written in the heart of man, but of a knowledge which the heathen had derived by inference, from experience, or from tradition of the fathers. On this point Strigel, no doubt was correct when he objected: If the knowledge of God's existence were really extinguished from the heart, there could be no discipline among men; and if man had no inborn knowledge of the Law, then there could be no such thing as conscience which condemns him when he sins. The fact that man fears punishments even when there is no government to fear, as was the case with Alexander when he had murdered Clitus, proves that in the heart there is a certain knowledge both of God and of His Law. (Preger 2, 213.) However, Flacius did not, as Strigel seems to insinuate, deny that natural man has an obscure knowledge of God's existence and Law, but merely maintained that this knowledge was not inborn or inherited, but acquired from without.

171. Controversy Precipitated by Flacius.

Though Flacius, when he first made his statement concerning the substantiality of original sin may not have felt absolutely sure of the exact meaning, bearing, and correctness of his position, yet the facts do not warrant the assumption that afterwards he was in any way diffident or wavering in his attitude. Whatever his views on this subject may have been before 1560--after the fatal phrase had fallen from his lips, he never flinched nor flagged in zealously defending it. Nor was he ever disposed to compromise the matter as far as the substance of his doctrine was concerned. In 1570 Spangenberg of Mansfeld, who sided with Flacius, suggested that he retain his meaning, but change his language: "Teneat Illyricus mentem, mutet linguam." To this Flacius consented. On September 28 1570, he published his Brief Confession, in which he agreed to abstain from the use of the term "substance." However, what he suggested as a substitute, viz., that original sin be defined as the nature of man (the word "nature," as he particularly emphasized, to be taken not in a figurative, but in its proper meaning), was in reality but another way of repeating his error.

The same was the case in 1572, when Flacius, opposed and sorely pressed by the ministerium of Strassburg (whence he was banished the following year), offered to substitute for the word "substance" the phrase "essential powers." (Preger 2, 371.) Two years later, at the public disputation in Langenau, Silesia, where Flacius defended his doctrine with favorable results for himself against Jacob Coler [born 1537; studied in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 1564 pastor in Lauban, Upper Lausatia (Oberlausitz); 1573 in Neukirch; 1574 he opposed Leonard Crentzheim and Flacius; 1575 professor in Frankfort; afterwards active first as Praepositus in Berlin and later on as Superintendent in Mecklenburg, published Disputatio De Libero Arbitrio; died March 7, 1612], he declared that he did not insist on his phrase as long as the doctrine itself was adopted and original sin was not declared to be a mere accident. But this, too, was no real retraction of his error. (Preger 2, 387.) In a similar way Flacius repeatedly declared himself willing to abstain from the use of the word "substance" in connection with his doctrine concerning original sin, but with conditions and limitations which made his concessions illusory, and neither did nor could satisfy his opponents.

At the disputation in Weimar, 1560, Wigand and Musaeus, as stated, warned Flacius immediately after the session in which he had made his statement. Schluesselburg relates: "Immediately during the disputation, as I frequently heard from their own lips, Dr. Wigand, Dr. Simon Musaeus, and other colleagues of his who attended the disputation ... admonished Illyricus in a brotherly and faithful manner to abstain from this new, perilous and blasphemous proposition of the ancient Manicheans, which would cause great turmoil in the Church of God, and to refute the error of Victorin [Strigel] concerning free will not by means of a false proposition, but with the Word of God. However, intoxicated with ambition, and relying, in the heat of the conflict, too much on the acumen and sagacity of his own mind, Illyricus haughtily spurned the brotherly and faithful admonitions of all his colleagues." (Catalogus 2, 4.) In his book De Manichaeismo Renovato Wigand himself reports: "Illyricus answered [to the admonition of his colleagues to abstain from the Manichean phrase] that he had been drawn into this discussion by his opponent against his own will. But what happened? Contrary to the expectations of his colleagues, Illyricus in the following session continued, as he had begun, to defend this insanity." (Preger 2, 324; Planck 4, 611.) However, it does not appear that after the disputation his friends pressed the matter any further, or that they made any efforts publicly to disavow the Flacian proposition.

In 1567 Flacius published his tract De Peccati Originalis aut Veteris Adami Appellationibus et Essentia, "On the Appellations and Essence of Original Sin or the Old Adam," appending it to his famous Clavis Scripturae of the same year. He had written this tract probably even before 1564. In 1566 he sent it to Simon Musaeus, requesting his opinion and the opinion of Hesshusius, who at that time was celebrating his marriage with the daughter of Musaeus. In his answer, Musaeus approved the tract, but desired that the term "substance" be explained as meaning not the matter, but the form of the substance to which Hesshusius also agreed. After the tract had appeared, Musaeus again wrote to Flacius, June 21, 1568, saying that he agreed with his presentation of original sin. At the same time, however, he expressed the fear that the bold statement which Flacius had retained, "Sin is substance," would be dangerously misinterpreted. (Preger 2, 327.) And before long a storm was brewing, in which animosity registered its highest point, and a veritable flood of controversial literature (one publication following the other in rapid succession) was poured out upon the Church, which was already distracted and divided by numerous and serious theological conflicts.

By the publication of this treatise Flacius, who before long also was harassed and ostracized everywhere, had himself made a public controversy unavoidable. In the conflict which it precipitated, he was opposed by all parties, not only by his old enemies, the Philippists, but also by his former friends. According to the maxim: Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas, they now felt constrained, in the interest of truth, to turn their weapons against their former comrade and leader. Flacius himself had made it impossible for his friends to spare him any longer. Nor did he deceive himself as to the real situation. In a letter written to Wigand he reveals his fear that the Lutherans and Philippists, then assembled at the Colloquium in Altenburg (held from October 21, 1568, to March, 1569, between the theologians of Thuringia and those of Electoral Saxony), would unite in a public declaration against his teaching. Wigand whose warning Flacius had disregarded at Weimar, wrote to Gallus: Flacius has forfeited the right to request that nothing be published against him, because he himself has already spread his views in print. And before long Wigand began to denounce publicly the Flacian doctrine as "new and prolific monsters, monstra nova et fecunda."

172. Publications Pro and Con.

According to Preger the first decided opposition to the Flacian teaching came from Moerlin and Chemnitz, in Brunswick, to whom Flacius had also submitted his tract for approval. Chemnitz closed his criticism by saying: It is enough if we are able to retain what Luther has won (parta tueri), let us abandon all desires to go beyond (ulterius quaerere) and to improve upon him. (Preger 2, 328.) Moerlin characterized Flacius as a vain man, and dangerous in many respects. Flacius answered in an objective manner, betraying no irritation whatever. (332.) In a letter of August 10, 1568, Hesshusius, who now had read the tract more carefully charged Flacius with teaching that Satan was a creator of substance, and before long refused to treat with him any further. In September of the same year Flacius published his Gnothi seauton against the attacks of the Synergists and Philippists, notably Christopher Lasius [who studied at Strassburg and Wittenberg, was active in Goerlitz, Greussen, Spandau, Kuestrin, Cottbus, and Senftenberg, wrote Praelibationes Dogmatis Flaciani de Prodigiosa Hominis Conversione; died 1572]. In the same year Hesshusius prepared his Analysis, which was approved by Gallus and the Jena theologians.

Realizing that all his former friends had broken with him entirely, Flacius, in January 1570, published his Demonstrations Concerning the Essence of the Image of God and the Devil, in which he attacked his opponents, but without mentioning their names. His request for a private discussion was bluntly rejected by the Jena theologians. Wigand, in his Propositions on Sin of May 5, 1570, was the first publicly to attack Flacius by name. About the same time Moerlin's Themata de Imagine Dei and Chemnitz's Resolutio appeared. The former was directed "against the impious and absurd proposition that sin is a substance", the latter, against the assertion "that original sin is the very substance of man, and that the soul of man itself is original sin." Hesshusius also published his Letter to M. Flacius Illyricus in the Controversy whether Original Sin is a Substance. Flacius answered in his Defense of the Sound Doctrine Concerning Original Righteousness and Unrighteousness, or Sin, of September 1, 1570. Hesshusius published his Analysis, in which he repeated the charge that Flacius made the devil a creator of substance.

In his Brief Confession, of September 28 1570, Flacius now offered to abstain from the use of the term "substance" in the manner indicated above. A colloquium, however, requested by Flacius and his friends on the basis of this Confession, was declined by the theologians of Jena. Moreover, in answer to the Brief Confession, Hesshusius published (April 21, 1571) his True Counter-Report, in which he again repeated his accusation that Flacius made the devil a creator of substance. He summarized his arguments as follows: "I have therefore proved from one book [Flacius's tract of 1567] more than six times that Illyricus says: Satan condidit, fabricavit, transformavit veterem hominem, Satan est figulus, that is: The devil created and made man, the devil is man's potter." The idea of a creation out of nothing, however, was not taught in the statements to which Hesshusius referred. (Preger 2, 348.)

Further publications by Andrew Schoppe [died after 1615], Wigand, Moerlin, Hesshusius, and Chemnitz, which destroyed all hopes of a peaceful settlement, caused Flacius to write his Orthodox Confession Concerning Original Sin. In this comprehensive answer, which appeared August 1, 1571, he declares "that either image, the image of God as well as of Satan, is an essence, and that the opposite opinion diminishes the merit of Christ." At the same time he complained that his statements were garbled and misinterpreted by his opponents, that his was the position of the man who asked concerning garlic and received an answer concerning onions, that his opponents were but disputing with imaginations of their own. (349f.)

In the same year, 1571, Wigand published a voluminous book, On Original Sin, in which he charged Flacius with teaching that original sin is the entire carnal substance of man according to both his body and soul. In his description of the Flacian doctrine we read: "Original sin is a substance, as they teach. Accordingly, original sin is an animal, and that, too, an intelligent animal. You must also add ears, eyes, mouth, nose, arms, belly, and feet. Original sin laughs, talks, sews, sows, works, reads, writes, preaches, baptizes, administers the Lord's Supper, etc. For it is the substance of man that does such things. Behold, where such men end!" Flacius replied in his Christian and Reliable Answer to All manner of Sophistries of the Pelagian Accident, 1572, protesting that the doctrine ascribed to him was a misrepresentation of his teaching. In the same year Wigand published Reasons Why This Proposition, in Controversy with the Manicheans: "Original Sin Is the Corrupt Nature," Cannot Stand. Here Wigand truly says: "Evil of the substance and evil substance are not identical. Malum substantiae et mala substantia non sunt idem." (Preger 2, 353. 410.)

In several publications of the same year Hesshusius asserted (quoting testimonies to this effect from Augustine), that the Flacian doctrine was identical with the tenets of the Manicheans, in substance as well as terms. Flacius answered in De Augustini et Manichaeorum Sententia, in Controversia Peccati, 1572, in which he declared: "I most solemnly condemn the Manichean insanity concerning two creators. I have always denied that original sin is something, or has ever been something outside of man; I have never ascribed to this sin any materiality of its own." (355.) This book was followed by another attack by Hesshusius and an answer, in turn, by Flacius.

In the same year Hesshusius, in order to prevent further accessions to Flacianism, published his Antidote (Antidoton) against the Impious and Blasphemous Dogma of Matthias Flacius Illyricus by which He Asserts that Original Sin Is Substance. In this book, which was republished in 1576 and again in 1579, Hesshusius correctly argued: "If original sin is the substance of the soul, then we are compelled to assert one of two things, viz., either that Satan is the creator of substances or that God is the creator and preserver of sin. Si substantia animae est peccatum originis, alterum a duobus necesse est poni, videlicet, aut Satanam esse conditorem substantiarum, aut Deum esse peccati creatorem et sustentatorem." (Gieseler 3, 2, 256.) At this late hour, 1572, Simon Musaeus, too, entered the arena with his Opinion Concerning Original Sin, Sententia de Peccato Originali. In it he taught "that original sin is not a substance, but the utmost corruption of it, in matter as well as form," and that therefore "Pelagianism no less than Manicheism is to be excluded and condemned."

When the ministerium of Strassburg turned against Flacius, he again published several books defending his position on the controverted questions, which resulted in his expulsion from the city. In 1573 Flacius published an answer to Hesshusius's Antidote entitled, Solid Refutation of the Groundless Sophistries, Calumnies, and Figments, as also of the Most Corrupt Errors of the "Antidote" and of Other Neopelagian Writers. Flacius charged Hesshusius with misrepresentation, and demanded that he swear whether he really believed to have found the alleged errors in his writings. (Preger 2, 364ff.)

Till his death, on March 11, 1575, at Frankfort-on-the-Main, Flacius consistently adhered to his false terminology as well as teaching, apparently never for a moment doubting that he was but defending Luther's doctrine. One of his last books was entitled, Some Clear and Splendid Testimonies of Martin Luther Concerning the Evil Essence, Image, Form, or Shape (Wesen, essentia, Bild, Form oder Gestalt) of the Earthly Dead Adam and Concerning the Essential Transformation of Man. (389.) As stated above, the mistake of Flacius was that he took literally terms denoting substance which the Bible and Luther employ in a figurative sense.

173. Adherents of Flacius.

The chief supporters of Flacius were the Mansfeldians, Count Vollrath and Cyriacus Spangenberg [born 1528; studied in Wittenberg; served in Eisleben, then in Mansfeld; died in Strassburg February 10, 1604]. In the serious dissensions which arose in Mansfeld in consequence of the controversy on original sin, the Count and Spangenberg were opposed by the Jena theologians and Superintendent Menzel [Jerome Menzel, born 1517; studied in Wittenberg; wrote against Spangenberg; died 1590]. As stated above, it was Spangenberg who endeavored to bring about an understanding between the contending parties on the principle: "Teneat Illyricus mentem, mutet linguam." A colloquy was held 1572 at Castle Mansfeld, in which Flacius and his adherents were pitted against Menzel, Rhode, Fabricius, and others. When Fabricius declared in the discussions: "Only in so far as our nature is not in conformity with the Law of God is it corrupt," Flacius exclaimed: "Non quantum, not in as far; but I say it is not in conformity because it is corrupt, quia corrupta est." (Preger 2, 375.) Count Vollrath and his adviser, Caspar Pflug gave Flacius a written testimony that at the colloquy he had not been convinced, but found to be correct in the controversy on original sin. The publication of this testimony by Flacius as also of the minutes of the Colloquy by Count Vollrath, in 1573, resulted in a number of further publications by Flacius and his friends as well as his opponents. At Mansfeld the animosity against the Flacians did not subside even after the death of Flacius in 1575. They were punished with excommunication, incarceration, and the refusal of a Christian burial. Count Vollrath left 1577, and died at Strassburg 1578. Spangenberg, who also had secretly fled from Mansfeld, defended the doctrine of Flacius in a tract, De Peccato Originali, Concerning Original Sin, which he published 1586 under a pseudonym. He died without retracting or changing his views.

Another adherent of Flacius was F. Coelestinus, professor at Jena. After his suspension he left the city and participated in the controversy. He published Colloquium inter Se et Tilem. Hesshusium. He died 1572. In August, 1571, Court-preacher Christopher Irenaeus and Pastors Guenther and Reinecker were dismissed in Weimar because of Flacianism. Irenaeus published Examen Libri Concordiae and many other books, in which he contends that original sin is a substance. Pastors Wolf in Kahla, Schneider in Altendorf, and Franke in Oberrosla were dismissed in 1572 for the same reason. They, too, entered the public arena in favor of Flacius. At Lindau four preachers, who had identified themselves with Flacius, were also deposed. One of them, Tobias Rupp, held a public disputation with Andreae. In Antwerp the elders forbade their ministers to indulge in any public polemics against Flacius. Among the supporters of Flacius were also his son, Matthias Flacius, and Caspar Heldelin. It may be noted here that Saliger (Beatus) and Fredeland, who were deposed at Luebeck in 1568 also taught "that original sin is the very substance of the body and soul of man," and that Christ had assumed "the flesh of another species" than ours. (Gieseler 3, 2, 257.)

In Regensburg four adherents of Flacius were dismissed in 1574, among them Joshua Opitz [born 1543; died 1585]. These and others emigrated to the Archduchy of Austria, where the Lutherans were numerous and influential, Opitz frequently preaching to an audience of 7,000. No less than 40 of the Lutheran ministers of Austria are said to have shared the views of Flacius. (Preger 2, 393.) Only a few of them revealed symptoms of fanaticism, which resulted in their dismissal. Among the latter was Joachim Magdeburgius, then an exile at Efferding. He taught "that the bodies of believing Christians after their death were still essential original sin, and that God's wrath remained over them till the Day of Judgment." (Joecher, Lexicon 3, 32.) At the same time he branded as errorists Spangenberg, Opitz, and Irenaeus, who declared their dissent. In 1581 the Flacians in Austria issued a declaration against the Formula of Concord, charging its teaching to be inconsistent with Luther's doctrine on original sin. As late as 1604 there were numerous Flacianists in German Austria.

174. Decision of Formula of Concord.

Seeberg remarks: "Flacius was not a heretic, but in the wrangle of his day he was branded as such, and this has been frequently repeated." (4, 2, 495.) A similar verdict is passed by Gieseler and other historians. But whatever may be said in extenuation of his error, it cannot be disputed that the unfortunate phrases of Flacius produced, and were bound to produce, most serious religious offense, as well as theological strife, and hopeless doctrinal confusion. Even when viewed in the light of his distinction between formal substance (man as endowed with the image of God) and material substance (man as possessed of body and soul, together with will and intellect), the odiousness of his terminology is not entirely removed. It was and remained a form of doctrine and trope or mode of teaching which the Lutherans were no more minded to tolerate than the error of Strigel.

Accordingly, the first article of the Formula of Concord rejects both the synergistic as well as the Manichean aberrations in the doctrine of original sin. In its Thorough Declaration we read: "Now this doctrine [of original sin] must be so maintained and guarded that it may not deflect either to the Pelagian or the Manichean side. For this reason the contrary doctrine ... should also be briefly stated." (865, 16.) Accordingly, in a series of arguments, the Flacian error is thoroughly refuted and decidedly rejected. At the same time the Formula of Concord points out the offensiveness of the Flacian phraseology. It refers to the controversy regarding this question as "scandalous and very mischievous," and declares: "Therefore it is unchristian and horrible to hear that original sin is baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity, sanctified, and saved, and other similar expressions found in the writings of the recent Manicheans, with which we will not offend simple-minded people." (873, 45. 59.)

On the other hand, the Formula of Concord is just as determined in opposing every effort at extenuating the corruption wrought by original sin. It is solicitous to explain that in designating original sin as an accident, its corruption is not minimized in the least, if the answer concerning the nature of this accident is not derived from philosophy or human reason, but from the Holy Scriptures. "For the Scriptures," says the Formula, "testify that original sin is an unspeakable evil and such an entire corruption of human nature that in it and all its internal and external powers nothing pure or good remains, but everything is entirely corrupt, so that on account of original sin man in God's sight is truly spiritually dead (plane sit emortuus), with all his powers dead to that which is good." (879, 60.)

Accordingly, the Formula of Concord rejects the errors of Strigel and the Semi-Pelagians, "that original sin is only external, a slight, insignificant spot sprinkled, or a stain dashed, upon the nature of man ... along with and beneath which the nature nevertheless possesses and retains its integrity and power even in spiritual things. Or that original sin is not a despoliation or deficiency, but only an external impediment to these spiritual good powers.... They are rebuked and rejected likewise who teach that the nature has indeed been greatly weakened and corrupted through the Fall, but that nevertheless it has not entirely lost all good with respect to divine, spiritual things, and that what is sung in our churches, 'Through Adam's fall is all corrupt, nature and essence human,' is not true, but from natural birth it still has something good, small, little, and inconsiderable though it be, namely, capacity, skill, aptness, or ability to begin, to effect, or to help effect something in spiritual things." (865, 21ff.)

While the Formula of Concord does not deny the capacity of fallen man for salvation, it is careful in defining that this is not an active, but a passive capacity. That is to say: Man is utterly incapable of qualifying himself for, or of contributing in the least toward, his own spiritual restoration; but what is impossible for man is not impossible with God who, indeed, is able to convert man, endow him with new spiritual powers, and lead him to eternal salvation,--a goal for the attainment of which, in contradistinction from inanimate and other creatures, man, being a rational creature, endowed with intellect and will, was created by God and redeemed by Christ. In the Formula of Concord we read: "And although God, according to His just, strict sentence, has utterly cast away the fallen evil spirits forever, He has nevertheless, out of special, pure mercy, willed that poor fallen human nature might again become and be capable and participant of conversion, the grace of God, and eternal life; not from its own natural, active [or effective] skill, aptness, or capacity (for the nature of man is obstinate enmity against God), but from pure grace, through the gracious efficacious working of the Holy Ghost. And this Dr. Luther calls capacitatem (non activam, sed passivam), which he explains thus: Quando patres liberum arbitrium defendunt, capacitatem libertatis eius praedicant, quod scilicet verti potest ad bonum per gratiam Dei et fieri revera liberum, ad quod creatum est. That is: When the Fathers defend the free will, they are speaking of this, that it is capable of freedom in this sense, that by God's grace it can be converted to good, and become truly free, for which it was created in the beginning." (889, 20.)

This accords with Luther's words in De Servo Arbitrio: "It would be correct if we should designate as the power of free will that [power] by which man, who is created for life or eternal death, is apt to be moved by the Spirit and imbued with the grace of God. For we, too, confess this power, i.e., aptitude or, as the Sophists [Scholastic theologians] say, disposition and passive aptitude. And who does not know that trees and animals are not endowed with it? For, as the saying goes, heaven is not created for geese. Hanc enim vim, hoc est, aptitudinem, seu, ut Sophistae loquuntur, dispositivam qualitatem et passivam aptitudinem, et nos confitemur; quam non arboribus neque bestiis inditam esse, quis est, qui nesciat? Neque enim pro anseribus, ut dicitur, coelum creavit." (E. v. a. 158: St. L. 18. 1720.)

XVI. The Osiandrian and Stancarian Controversies.

175. Osiander in Nuernberg and in Koenigsberg.

In the writings of Luther we often find passages foreboding a future corruption of the doctrine of justification, concerning which he declared in the Smalcald Articles: "Of this article nothing can be yielded or surrendered, even though heaven and earth, and whatever will not abide, should sink to ruin.... And upon this article all things depend which we teach and practise in opposition to the Pope, the devil, and the world. Therefore we must be sure concerning this doctrine, and not doubt, for otherwise all is lost, and the Pope and devil and all things gain the victory and suit over us." (461, 5.) Martin Chemnitz remarks: "I frequently shudder, because Luther--I do not know by what kind of presentiment--in his commentaries on the Letter to the Galatians and on the First Book of Moses so often repeats the statement: 'This doctrine [of justification] will be obscured again after my death.'" (Walther, Kern und Stern, 26.)

Andrew Osiander was the first to fulfil Luther's prophecy. In 1549 he began publicly to propound a doctrine in which he abandoned the forensic conception of justification by imputation of the merits of Christ, and returned to the Roman view of justification by infusion i.e., by infusion of the eternal essential righteousness of the divine nature of Christ. According to his own statement, he had harbored these views ever since about 1522. He is said also to have presented them in a sermon delivered at the convention in Smalcald, 1537. (Planck 4, 257.) Yet he made no special effort to develop and publicly to disseminate his ideas during the life of Luther. After the death of the Reformer, however, Osiander is reported to have said: "Now that the lion is dead, I shall easily dispose of the foxes and hares"--i.e., Melanchthon and the other Lutheran theologians. (257.) Osiander was the originator of the controversy "Concerning the Righteousness of Faith before God," which was finally settled in Article III of the Formula of Concord.

Osiander, lauded by modern historians as the only real "systematizer" among the Lutherans of the first generation, was a man as proud, overbearing, and passionate as he was gifted, keen, sagacious, learned, eloquent, and energetic. He was born December 19, 1498, at Gunzenhausen, Franconia, and died October 17, 1552, at Koenigsberg, where he was also buried with high honors in the Old City Church. In 1522 he was appointed priest at St. Lawrence's Church in the Free City of Nuernberg. Here he immediately acted the part of a determined champion of the Reformation. Subsequently he also participated in some of the most important transactions of his day. He was present at the Marburg Colloquy, 1529, where he made the personal acquaintance of Luther and the Wittenbergers. He also took part in the discussions at the Diet in Augsburg, 1530; at Smalcald, 1537; at Hagenau and Worms, 1540. Nor were his interests confined to theological questions. When, at Nuernberg, 1543, the work of Copernicus, De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium, "Concerning the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies," was published for the first time, Osiander read the proof-sheets and wrote the Preface, in which he designated the new theory as "hypotheses," thus facilitating its circulation also among the Catholics, until in the 17th century the book was placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, where it remained till the 18th century.

When the Augsburg Interim was introduced in Nuernberg, Osiander resigned, and with words of deep emotion (in a letter of November 22, 1548, addressed to the city council) he left the place where he had labored more than a quarter of a century. January 27 1549, he arrived in Koenigsberg. Here he was joyously received by Count Albrecht of Prussia, whom he had gained for the Reformation in 1523. Moved by gratitude toward Osiander, whom he honored as his "spiritual father," Count Albrecht appointed him pastor of the Old City Church and, soon after, first professor of theology at the University of Koenigsberg, with a double salary, though Osiander had never received an academic degree. The dissatisfaction which this unusual preferment caused among his colleagues, Briessman, Hegemon, Isinder, and Moerlin, soon developed into decided antipathy against Osiander, especially because of his overbearing, domineering ways as well as his intriguing methods. No doubt, this personal element added largely to the animosity and violence of the controversy that was soon to follow, and during which the professors in Koenigsberg are said to have carried firearms into their academic sessions. (Schaff, Creeds 1, 273.) Yet it cannot be regarded as the real cause or even as the immediate occasion, of the conflict, which was really brought about by the unsound, speculative, and mystical views of Osiander on the image of God and, particularly, on justification and the righteousness of faith,--doctrinal points on which he deviated from the Lutheran teaching to such an extent that a controversy was unavoidable. Evidently, his was either a case of relapse into Romanism, or, what seems to be the more probable alternative, Osiander never attained to a clear apprehension of the Lutheran truth nor ever fully freed himself from the Roman doctrine, especially in its finer and more veiled form of mysticism.

176. Opposed by Moerlin and Lutherans Generally.

Osiander, as stated, had conceived the fundamental thoughts of his system long before he reached Koenigsberg. In 1524, when only twenty-six years of age, he laid down the outlines of his theory in a publication entitled: "A Good Instruction (Ein gut Unterricht) and Faithful Advice from the Holy Divine Scriptures What Attitude to Take in These Dissensions Concerning Our Holy Faith and Christian Doctrine, dealing especially with the questions what is God's Word and what human doctrine, what Christ and what Antichrist." Here he says: "Whoever hears, retains, and believes the Word, receives God Himself, for God is the Word. If, therefore, the Word of God, Christ, our Lord, dwells in us by faith and we are one with Him, we may say with Paul: 'I live, though not I, but Christ lives in me,' and then we are justified by faith." (Gieseler 3, 2, 270.) In the following year, 1525, he wrote in his Action of the Honorable Wise Council in Nuernberg with their Preachers (Handlung eines ehrsamen weisen Rats zu Nuernberg mit ihren Praedikanten): "The one and only righteousness availing before God is God Himself. But Christ is the Word which we apprehend by faith, and thus Christ in us, God Himself, is our Righteousness which avails before God." "The Gospel has two parts; the first, that Christ has satisfied the justice of God; the other, that He has cleansed us from sin, and justifies us by dwelling in us (und uns rechtfertigt, so er in uns wohnet)." (271.) The embryonic ideas of these early publications concerning the image of God and justification were fully developed by Osiander in his book of 1550, Whether the Son of God would have had to be Incarnated (An Filius Dei fuerit Incarnandus), if Sin had Not Entered the World; and especially in his confession of September, 1551, Concerning the Only Mediator Jesus Christ (Von dem einigen Mittler Jesu Christo) and Justification of Faith which appeared also in Latin under the title De Unico Mediatore, in October of the same year.

The public conflict began immediately after Osiander had entered upon his duties at the university. In his inaugural disputation of April 5, 1549, "Concerning the Law and Gospel (De Lege et Evangelio)," Osiander's vanity prompted him at least to hint at his peculiar views, which he well knew were not in agreement with the doctrine taught at Wittenberg and in the Lutheran Church at large. His colleague, Matthias Lauterwald, a Wittenberg master, who died 1555, immediately took issue with him. On the day following the disputation, he published theses in which he declared: "Osiander denied that faith is a part of repentance." October 24 of the following year Osiander held a second disputation ("On Justification, De Iustificatione") in which he came out clearly against the doctrine hitherto taught in the Lutheran Church. But now also a much more able and determined combatant appeared in the arena, Joachim Moerlin, who henceforth devoted his entire life to defeat Osiandrism and to vindicate Luther's forensic view of justification.

Moerlin (Moehrlein) was born at Wittenberg April 6, 1514, he studied under Luther and was made Master in 1537 and Doctor in 1540; till 1543 he was superintendent in Arnstadt, Thuringia, and superintendent in Goettingen till 1549, when he was compelled to leave because of his opposition to the Augsburg Interim. Recommended by Elizabeth Duchess of Braunschweig-Lueneburg, the mother-in-law of Duke Albrecht, he was appointed preacher at the Dome of Koenigsberg in 1550. Clearly understanding that solid comfort in life and death is possible only as long as our faith rests solely on the aliena iustitia, on the objective righteousness of Christ, which is without us, and is offered in the Gospel and received by faith; and fully realizing also that Christian assurance is incompatible with such a doctrine as Osiander taught, according to which our faith is to rely on a righteous condition within ourselves, Moerlin publicly attacked Osiander from his pulpit, and in every way emphasized the fact that his teaching could never be tolerated in the Lutheran Church. Osiander replied in his lectures. The situation thus created was most intolerable. At the command of the Duke discussions were held between Moerlin and Osiander, but without result.

In order to settle the dispute, Duke Albrecht, accordingly, on October 5, 1551, placed the entire matter before the evangelical princes and cities with the request that the points involved be discussed at the various synods and their verdicts forwarded to Koenigsberg. This aroused the general interest and the deepest concern of the entire Lutheran Church in Germany. Numerous opinions of the various synods and theologians arrived during the winter of 1551 to 1552. With the exception of the Wuerttemberg Response (Responsum), written by John Brenz, and the Opinion of Matthew Vogel, both of whom regarded Osiander's teaching as differing from the doctrine received by the Lutheran Church in terms and phrases rather than in substance, they were unfavorable to Osiander. At the same time all, including the opinions of Brenz and Vogel, revealed the fact that the Lutherans, the theologians of Wittenberg as well as those of Jena, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Hamburg, etc., were firmly united in maintaining Luther's doctrine, viz., that the righteousness of faith is not the essential righteousness of the Son of God, as Osiander held but the obedience of Christ the God-man imputed by grace to all true believers as their sole righteousness before God.

Feeling safe under the protection of Duke Albrecht, and apparently not in the least impressed by the general opposition which his innovations met with at the hands of the Lutherans, Osiander continued the controversy by publishing his Proof (Beweisung) that for Thirty Years I have Always Taught the Same Doctrine. And irritated by an opinion of Melanchthon (whom Osiander denounced as a pestilential heretic), published with offensive explanations added by the Wittenbergers, he in the same year (April, 1552) wrote his Refutation (Widerlegung) of the Unfounded, Unprofitable Answer of Philip Melanchthon. In this immoderate publication Osiander boasted that only the Philippian rabble, dancing according to the piping of Melanchthon, was opposed to him.

Before long, however, also such opponents of the Philippists as Flacius, Gallus, Amsdorf, and Wigand were prominently arraigned against Osiander. Meanwhile (May 23, 1552) Moerlin published a large volume entitled: Concerning the Justification of Faith. Osiander replied in his Schmeckbier of June 24 1552, a book as keen as it was coarse. In 1552 and 1553 Flacius issued no less than twelve publications against Osiander, one of them bearing the title: Zwo fuernehmliche Gruende Osiandri verlegt, zu einem Schmeckbier; another: Antidotum auf Osiandri giftiges Schmeckbier. (Preger 2, 551)

When the controversy had just about reached its climax, Osiander died, October 17, 1552. Soon after, the Duke enjoined silence on both parties, and Moerlin was banished. He accepted a position as superintendent in Brunswick, where he zealously continued his opposition to Osiandrism as well as to other corruptions of genuine Lutheranism. At Koenigsberg the Osiandrists continued to enjoy the protection and favor of Duke Albrecht and gradually developed into a quasi-political party. The leader of the small band was John Funck, the son-in-law of Osiander and the chaplain of the Duke. In 1566, however, the king of Poland intervened, and Funck was executed as a disturber of the public peace. Moerlin was recalled and served as bishop of Samland at Koenigsberg from 1567 till his death in 1571. The Corpus Doctrinae Pruthenicum, or Borussicum, framed by Moerlin and Chemnitz and adopted 1567 at Koenigsberg, rejected the doctrines of Osiander. Moerlin also wrote a history of Osiandrism entitled: Historia, welcher gestalt sich die Osiandrische Schwaermerei im Lande zu Preussen erhaben.

177. Corruptions Involved in Osiander's Teaching.

Osiander's theory of justification according to which the righteousness of faith is the eternal, essential holiness of the divine nature of Christ inhering and dwelling in man, consistently compelled him to maintain that justification is not an act by which God declares a man just, but an act by which He actually makes him inherently just and righteous; that it is not an imputation of a righteousness existing outside of man, but an actual infusion of a righteousness dwelling in man; that it is not a mere acquittal from sin and guilt, but regeneration, renewal, sanctification and internal, physical cleansing from sin that it is not a forensic or judicial act outside of man or a declaration concerning man's standing before God and his relation to Him but a sort of medicinal process within man, that the righteousness of faith is not the alien (strange, foreign) righteousness, aliena iustitia (a term employed also by Luther), consisting in the obedience of Christ, but a quality, condition, or change effected in believers by the essential righteousness of the divine nature dwelling in them through faith in Christ; that faith does not justify on account of the thing outside of man in which it trusts and upon which it relies, but by reason of the thing which it introduces and produces in man; that, accordingly, justification is never instantaneous and complete, but gradual and progressive.

Osiander plainly teaches that the righteousness of faith (our righteousness before God) is not the obedience rendered by Christ to the divine Law, but the indwelling righteousness of God (iustitia Dei inhabitans),--essentially the same original righteousness or image that inhered in Adam and Eve before the Fall. It consists, not indeed in good works or in "doing and suffering," but in a quality (Art) which renders him who receives it just, and moves him to do and to suffer what is right. It is the holiness (Frommigkeit) which consists in the renewal of man, in the gifts of grace, in the new spiritual life, in the regenerated nature of man. By His suffering and death, said Osiander, Christ made satisfaction and acquired forgiveness for us, but He did not thereby effect our justification. His obedience as such does not constitute our righteousness before God, but merely serves to restore it. It was necessary that God might be able to dwell in us, and so become our life and righteousness. Faith justifies, not inasmuch as it apprehends the merits of Christ, but inasmuch as it unites us with the divine nature, the infinite essential righteousness of God, in which our sins are diluted, as it were, and lost, as an impure drop disappears when poured into an ocean of liquid purity.

According to the teaching of Osiander therefore, also the assurance that we are justified and accepted by God does not rest exclusively on the merits of Christ and the pardon offered in the Gospel, but must be based on the righteous quality inhering in us. Our assurance is conditioned not alone upon what Christ has done outside of us and for us but rather upon what He is in us and produces in us. The satisfaction rendered by Christ many centuries ago is neither the only ground on which God regards us as just, nor a sufficient basis of our certainty that we are accepted by God. Not the Christ for us, but rather the Christ in us, is the basis both of our justification and assurance. Accordingly in order to satisfy an alarmed sinner, it is not sufficient to proclaim the Gospel-promise of divine absolution. In addition, an investigation is required whether the righteousness and holiness of God is also really found dwelling in him. While Luther had urged alarmed consciences to trust in the merits of Christ alone for their justification and salvation, Osiander led them to rely on the new life of divine wisdom, holiness, and righteousness dwelling in their own hearts. From the very beginning of the controversy, Moerlin, Melanchthon, and the Lutherans generally were solicitous to point out that Osiander's doctrine robs Christians of this glorious and only solid comfort that it is not a subjective quality in their own hearts, but solely and only the objective and absolutely perfect obedience rendered by Christ many hundred years ago, which God regards when He justifies the wicked, and upon which man must rely for the assurance of his acceptance and salvation.

Consistently developed, therefore, the innovation of Osiander was bound to vitiate in every particular the doctrine of justification restored once more by Luther. In fact, his theory was but a revamping of just such teaching as had driven the Lutherans out of the Church of Rome. True, Osiander denied that by our own works we merit justification; that our righteousness consists in our good works; that our good works are imputed to us as righteousness. But the fact that he held a subjective condition to be our righteousness before God gives to his doctrine an essentially Roman stamp, no matter how widely it may differ from it in other respects. Moehler, the renowned Catholic apologist, declared that properly interpreted and illucidated, Osiander's doctrine was "identical with the Roman Catholic doctrine." (Frank 2, 5. 91.) As stated before, his teaching was Romanism in its finer and more veiled form of mysticism.

178. Excerpts from Osiander's Writings.

In his publication of January 10, 1552 Wider den lichtfluechtigen Nachtraben, Osiander endeavors to prove that he is in complete doctrinal agreement with Luther. In it he gives the following summary, but guarded, presentation of his views. "I understand it this way," says he. "1. It flowed from His pure grace and mercy that God sacrificed His only Son for us. 2. The Son became man and was made under the Law, and He has redeemed us from the Law and from the curse of the Law. 3. He took upon Himself the sins of the whole world, for which He suffered, died, shed His blood, descended into hell, rose again, and thus overcame sin, death, and hell, and merited for us forgiveness of sin, reconciliation with God, the grace and gift of justification, and eternal life. 4. This is to be preached in all the world. 5. Whoever believes this and is baptized, is justified and blessed (selig) by virtue of such faith. 6. Faith apprehends Christ so that He dwells in our hearts through faith, Eph. 3, 17. 7. Christ, living in us through faith, is our Wisdom, Righteousness, Holiness, and Redemption, 1 Cor. 1, 30, Jer. 23, 6; 33, 16. 8. Christ, true God and man, dwelling in us through faith, is our Righteousness according to His divine nature, as Dr. Luther says: 'I rely on the righteousness which is God Himself; this He cannot reject. Such is, says Luther, the simple, correct understanding; do not suffer yourself to be led away from it.'" (Frank 2, 7f.) Seeberg cites the following passage: "But if the question be asked what is righteousness, one must answer: Christ dwelling in us by faith is our Righteousness according to His divinity; and the forgiveness of sins, which is not Christ Himself, but merited by Christ, is a preparation and cause that God offers us His righteousness, which He is Himself." (Dogg. 4, 498.) Incidentally Osiander's appeal to Luther is unwarranted. For according to him Christ is our Righteousness because His obedience is God's obedience, the work not only of His human nature, but, at the same time, also of His divine nature, while according to Osiander everything that Christ did for us merely serves to bring about the indwelling of the divine nature of Christ, whose essential holiness is our righteousness before God. That Osiander was not in agreement with Luther, as he claimed, appears also from his assertion that such statements of Luther as: Christ's death is our life, forgiveness of sins is our righteousness, etc., must be explained figuratively, as words flowing from a joyous heart. (2, 23.)

The manner in which Osiander maintained that Christ is our Righteousness only according to His divine nature appears from the following excerpts: "If the question be asked according to what nature Christ, His whole undivided person, is our Righteousness, then just as when one asks according to what nature He is the Creator of heaven and earth, the clear, correct, and plain answer is that He is our Righteousness according to His divine, and not according to His human nature, although we are unable to find, obtain or apprehend such divine righteousness apart from His humanity." (Frank 2, 12.) Again: "When we say: Christ is our Righteousness, we must understand His deity, which enters us through His humanity. When Christ says: I am the Bread of Life, we must understand His deity which comes into us through His humanity and is our life. When He says: My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed, we must take it to mean His deity which is in the flesh and blood and is meat and drink for us. Thus, too, when John says, 1 John 1, 7: The blood of Christ cleanseth us from all sin, we must understand the deity of Christ which is in the blood; for John does not speak of the blood of Christ as it was shed on the cross, but as it, united with the flesh of Christ, is our heavenly meat and drink by faith." (23.) Osiander, therefore, is but consistent when he reiterates that the Son of God, the Holy Spirit, and the Father are our Righteousness, because their divine essence which by faith dwells in Christians, is one and the same.

Osiander emphasizes that the essential righteousness of the divine nature of Christ alone is able to save us. He says: "For of what help would it be to you if you had all the righteousness which men and angels can imagine, but lacked this eternal righteousness which is itself the Son of God, according to His divine nature, with the Father and the Holy Ghost? For no other righteousness can lift you up to heaven and bring you to the Father. But when you apprehend this righteousness through faith, and Christ is in you, what can you then be lacking which you do not possess richly, superabundantly, and infinitely in His deity?" Again: "Since Christ is ours and is in us, God Himself and all His angels behold nothing in us but righteousness on account of the highest, eternal, and infinite righteousness of Christ, which is His deity itself dwelling in us. And although sin still remains in, and clings to, our flesh, it is like an impure little drop compared with a great pure ocean, and on account of the righteousness of Christ which is in us God does not want to see it." (Frank 2, 100. 102.)

To this peculiarity of Osiander, according to which he seems to have had in mind a justification by a sort of mystico-physical dilution rather than by imputation, the Formula of Concord refers as follows: "For one side has contended that the righteousness of faith, which the apostle calls the righteousness of God, is God's essential righteousness, which is Christ Himself as the true, natural, and essential Son of God, who dwells in the elect by faith and impels them to do right, and thus is their righteousness, compared with which righteousness the sins of all men are as a drop of water compared with the great ocean." (917, 2; 790, 2.)

In his confession Concerning the Only Mediator, of 1551, Osiander expatiates on justification, and defines it as an act by which righteousness is "infused" into believers. We read: "It is apparent that whatever part Christ, as the faithful Mediator, acted with regard to God, His heavenly Father, for our sakes, by fulfilling the Law and by His suffering and death, was accomplished more than 1,500 years ago, when we were not in existence. For this reason it cannot, properly speaking, have been, nor be called, our justification, but only our redemption and the atonement for us and our sins. For whoever would be justified must believe; but if he is to believe, he must already be born and live. Therefore Christ has not justified us who now live and die; but we are redeemed by it [His work 1,500 years ago] from God's wrath, death, and hell.... This, however, is true and undoubted that by the fulfilment of the Law and by His suffering and death He merited and earned from God, His heavenly Father, this great and superabounding grace, namely, that He not only has forgiven our sin and taken from us the unbearable burden of the Law, but that He also wishes to justify us by faith in Christ, to infuse justification or the righteousness (sondern auch uns durch den Glauben an Christum will rechtfertigen, die Gerechtmachung eingiessen), and, if only we obey, through the operation of His Holy Spirit and through the death of Christ, in which we are embodied by the baptism of Christ, to mortify, purge out, and entirely destroy sin which is already forgiven us, but nevertheless still dwells in our flesh and adheres to us. Therefore the other part of the office of our dear faithful Lord and Mediator Jesus Christ is now to turn toward us in order to deal also with us poor sinners as with the guilty party, that we acknowledge such great grace and gratefully receive it by faith, in order that He by faith may make us alive and just from the death of sin, and that sin, which is already forgiven, but nevertheless still dwells and inheres in our flesh, may be altogether mortified and destroyed in us. And this, first of all, is the act of our justification." (Tschackert, 492f.; Planck 4, 268.)

That Osiander practically identified justification with regeneration, renewal, and gradual sanctification appears from the following quotations. To justify, says he, means "to make a just man out of an unjust one, that is to recall a dead man to life--ex impio iustum facere, hoc est, mortuum ad vitam revocare." (Seeberg 4, 499.) Again: "Thus the Gospel further shows its power and also justifies us, i.e., it makes us just, even as, and in the same degree as, He also makes us alive (eben und in aller Masse, wie er uns auch lebendig macht)." (Frank 2, 18.) "And here you see again how terribly those err who endeavor to prove by this passage of David and Paul that our righteousness is nothing else than forgiveness of sin; for they have overlooked the covering of sin with the [essential] righteousness of Christ whom we put on in Baptism; they have also removed from justification the renewal of the inner man effected by regeneration." (102.)

Osiander was fanatical in denouncing those who identified justification with the forgiveness of sins. In his Disputation of October 24, 1550, he declared: "The entire fulness of the deity dwells in Christ bodily, hence in those also in whom Christ dwells.... Therefore we are just by His essential righteousness.... Whoever does not hold this manner of our justification is certainly a Zwinglian at heart, no matter what he may confess with his mouth.... They also teach things colder than ice [who hold] that we are regarded as righteous only on account of the forgiveness of sins, and not on account of the [essential] righteousness of Christ who dwells in us through faith. Glacie frigidiora docent nos tantum propter remissionem peccatorum reputari iustos, et non etiam propter iustitiam Christi per fidem in nobis inhabitantis. Non enim tam iniquus Deus est, ut eum pro iusto habeat, in quo verae iustitiae prorsus nil est." (Frank 2, 97; Tschackert, 494; Seeberg 4, 497.) They are errorists, Osiander declared, "who say, teach, and write that the righteousness is outside of us." (Frank 2, 100.) "The [essential] righteousness of Christ is indeed, imputed to us, but only when it is in us." "For God is not so unrighteous, nor such a lover of unrighteousness that He regards him as just in whom there is absolutely nothing of the true righteousness; as it is written, Ps. 5, 4: 'For Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness; neither shall evil dwell with Thee,'" (Planck 4, 273.) Evidently, Osiander rejected or had never fully grasped Paul's clear statement and teaching concerning the God who justifies the ungodly, Rom. 4, 5: "But to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness."

179. Attitude of Brenz and Melanchthon.

With the exception of Brenz and Vogel, who, as stated before, regarded Osiander's doctrine as differing from the generally received view in phraseology and mode of presentation rather than in substance, the Lutherans everywhere were unanimous in rejecting Osiander's theory as a recrudescence of the Romish justification not by imputation, but by infusion. And as to Brenz, who put a milder construction on the statements of Osiander, Melanchthon wrote October 1, 1557: "Concerning the affair with Osiander, my writings are publicly known, which I hope will be of benefit to many. Brenz also is agreed with us doctrinally. He said he had advised peace, for he did not take Osiander's expressions to be as dangerous as the opponents did, and for this reason could not as yet condemn his person; but in doctrine he was agreed with us and would unite in condemning Osiander if the charges made against him were proved." Melanchthon himself fully realized the viciousness of Osiander's error, although at the colloquy in Worms, 1557, he, too, was opposed to condemning Osiandrism together with Zwinglianism, Majorism, and Adiaphorism, as the theologians of Ducal Saxony demanded. (C. R. 9, 311. 402.)

In May, 1551, Melanchthon wrote to Osiander that by the essential righteousness of Christ renewal is effected in us, but that we have forgiveness of sins and are reputed to be righteous on account of the merit of Christ whose blood and death appeased the wrath of God. In his confutation of the Osiandric doctrine, written in September, 1555, we read: "Osiander's definition of righteousness is: Righteousness is that which makes us do what is righteous.... Hence man is righteous by doing what is righteous.... Thereupon Osiander, in order to say something also concerning forgiveness of sins, tears remission of sins from righteousness. He expressly declares that the sins are forgiven to all men; Nero however, is damned because he does not possess the essential righteousness; and this, he says, is God Himself, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.... Osiander contends that man is just on account of the indwelling of God, or on account of the indwelling God, not on account of the obedience of the Mediator, not by the imputed righteousness of the Mediator through grace. And he corrupts the proposition, 'By faith we are justified,' into, By faith we are prepared that we may become just by something else, viz., the inhabiting God. Thus he in reality says what the Papists say: 'We are righteous by our renewal,' except that he mentions the cause where the Papists mention the effect. Ita re ipsa dicit, quod Papistae dicunt, sumus iusti novitate, nisi quod nominat causam, ubi nominant Papistae effectum. We are just when God renews us. He therefore detracts from the honor due to the Mediator, obscures the greatness of sin, destroys the chief consolation of the pious, and leads them into perpetual doubt. For faith cannot exist unless it looks upon the promise of mercy concerning the Mediator. Nor is there an inhabitation unless the consolation is received by this faith. And it is a preposterous way of teaching that one is to believe first the inhabitation, afterwards forgiveness of sins (prius credere inhabitationem, postea remissionem peccatorum). Since therefore this dogma of Osiander is both false and pernicious to consciences, it must be shunned and damned." (C. R. 7, 781; 8, 579ff.)

In another essay, of September, 1556, signed also by Melanchthon, the following propositions are rejected: 1. Man becomes righteous on account of the essential righteousness. 2. Man becomes righteous on account of the essential righteousness of God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 3. Man becomes righteous before God on account of the indwelling of God. 4. Righteousness consists in the indwelling of Christ, on account of which God imputes righteousness to us.... 5. Nor must one say there are two or more parts of justification: faith, inhabitation, good works, etc. For justification before God is to receive forgiveness of sins and to become acceptable to God on account of Christ.... 6. This proposition, too, is false: The regenerate after the Fall are righteous in the same manner as Adam was before the Fall, namely, not by imputation, but by inhabitation or original righteousness.... 8. It is also false when some say we are righteous by faith, namely, in a preparative way in order afterwards to be righteous by the essential righteousness. At bottom this is Popish and destructive of faith.... 9. The following propositions must be rejected altogether: The obedience of Christ is called righteousness in a tropical sense; Christ justifies accidentally (per accidens). (C. R. 8, 561f.; 9, 3l9. 451. 455. 457.)

180. Osiander's Views on Image of God.

Osiander's corruption of the doctrine of justification was closely connected with his peculiar view concerning the image of God (the central idea of his entire system), of which, however, he declared that he did not consider it essential, and would not contend with anybody about it. Nor were the questions involved disputed to any extent or dealt with in the Formula of Concord. As to Osiander, however, the train of his thoughts runs as follows:--

The Logos, the divine Word, is the image of God, into whom His entire essence flows in a manner and process eternal. In a temporal and historical way the same image is destined to be realized in the nature of man. Divine essential righteousness indwelling and efficacious in humanity--such was the eternal plan of God. For the realization of this purpose the Logos, God's image, was to become man, even if the human race should not have fallen. This was necessary because in finite man there is absolutely no similarity with the infinite essence of the non-incarnate Logos. Without the incarnation, therefore, this infinite dissimilarity would have remained forever (esset et maneret simpliciter infinita dissimilitudo inter hominem et Verbum Dei). And in order that man might be capable of God and share His divine nature (capax Dei et divinae naturae consors), God created him according to His image; i.e., according to the idea of the incarnate Logos. "God formed the body of man," said Osiander, "that it should be altogether like unto the future body of Christ. Thereupon He breathed into it the breath of life, i.e., a rational soul together with the human spirit, adorned with the proper powers, in such a manner that it, too, should be like unto the future soul of Christ in everything." (Frank 2, 104.)

In the incarnate Logos, however, according to whom man was created, humanity and divinity are personally united. When the Word was made flesh, the divine essence was imparted to His human nature. And Christ, in turn, imparts the same essence to all who by faith are one with Him. From eternity the incarnate Word was destined to be the head of the congregation in order that the essential righteousness of God might flow from Him into His body, the believers. Before the Fall the Son of God dwelled in Adam, making him just by God's essential righteousness. By the Fall this righteousness was lost. Hence the redemption and atonement of Christ were required in order again to pave the way for the renewal of the lost image or the indwelling of God's essential righteousness in man. The real source of this righteousness and divine life in man, however, is not the human, but the divine nature of Christ. In the process of justification or of making man righteous, the human nature of Christ merely serves as a medium, or as it were, a canal, through which the eternal essential wisdom, holiness, and righteousness of Christ's divine nature flows into our hearts.

Christ, the "inner Word" (John 1), says Osiander, approaches man in the "external Word" (the words spoken by Jesus and His apostles), and through it enters the believing soul. For through Word, Sacrament, and faith we are united with His humanity. In the Lord's Supper, for instance, we become the flesh and blood of Christ, just as we draw the nourishment out of natural food and transform it into our flesh and blood. And since the humanity of Christ, with which we become one in the manner described, is personally united with the deity, it imparts to us also the divine essence, and, as a result, we, too, are the abode of the essential righteousness of God. "We cannot receive the divine nature from Christ," says Osiander, "if we are not embodied in Him by faith and Baptism, thus becoming flesh and blood and bone of His flesh, blood, and bone." As the branches could not partake of the nature of the vine if they were not of the wood of the vine, even so we could not share the divine nature of Christ if we had not, incorporated in Him by faith and Baptism, become flesh, blood, and bone of His flesh, blood, and bone. Accordingly, as Christ's humanity became righteous through the union with God, the essential righteousness which moved Him to obedience toward God, thus we also become righteous through our union with Christ and in Him with God. (Frank 2, 104. 20ff.; Seeberg 4, 497f.)

In view of such speculative teaching, in which justification is transformed into a sort of mystico-physical process, it is not surprising that the charge of pantheism was also raised against Osiander. The theologians of Brandenburg asserted that he inferred from his doctrine that the believers in Christ are also divine persons, because the Father, Son and Holy Ghost dwell in them essentially. But Osiander protested: "Creatures we are and creatures we remain, no matter how wonderfully we are renewed; but the seed of God and the entire divine essence which is in us by grace in the same manner as it is in Christ by nature and remains eternally in us (das also aus Gnaden in uns ist wie in Christo von Natur und bleibt ewiglich in uns) is God Himself, and no creature, and will not become a creature in us or on account of us but will eternally remain in us true God." Frank says concerning the doctrine of Osiander: It is not pantheism or a mixture of the divine and human nature, "but it is a subjectivism by which the objective foundation of salvation as taught by the Lutheran Church is rent to the very bottom. It is a mysticism which transforms the Christ for us into the Christ in us, and, though unintentionally, makes the consciousness of the inhabitatio essentialis iustitiae (indwelling of the essential righteousness) the basis of peace with God." (2, 19. 10. 13. 95. 103.) In his teaching concerning the image of God and justification, Osiander replaced the comforting doctrine of the Bible concerning the substitutionary and atoning work of Christ in His active and passive obedience unto death with vain philosophical speculations concerning divinity and humanity or the two natures of Christ. It was not so very far beside the mark, therefore, when Justus Menius characteized his theory as "a new alchmistic theology." (Planck 4, 257.)

181. Error of Stancarus.

The Stancarian dispute was incidental to the Osiandric conflict. Its author was Francesco Stancaro (born in Mantua, 1501), an Italian ex-priest, who had emigrated from Italy on account of his Protestant views. Vain, opinionated, haughty, stubborn, and insolent as he was, he roamed about, creating trouble wherever he appeared, first in Cracow as professor of Hebrew, 1551 in Koenigsberg then in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, next at various places in Poland, Hungary, and Transylvania. He died at Stobnitz, Poland, November 12, 1574. Stancarus treated all of his opponents as ignoramuses and spoke contemptuously of Luther and Melanchthon, branding the latter as an antichrist. In Koenigsberg he immediately felt called upon to interfere in the controversy which had just flared up. He opposed Osiander in a fanatical manner, declaring him to be the personal antichrist. The opponents of Osiander at Koenigsberg however, were not elated over his comradeship, particularly because he fell into an opposite error. They were glad when he resigned and left for Frankfort the same year he had arrived at Koenigsberg. In Frankfort, Stancarus continued the controversy, publishing, 1552, his Apology against Osiander--Apologia contra Osiandrum. But he was ignored rather than opposed by the Lutheran theologians. In 1553 Melanchthon wrote his Answer (Responsio) Concerning Stancar's Controversy. Later on, 1561, when Stancarus was spreading his errors in Poland, Hungary, and Transylvania, Calvin and the ministers of Zurich also wrote against him. The chief publication in which Stancarus set forth and defended his views appeared 1562, at Cracow, under the title: Concerning the Trinity (De Trinitate) and the Mediator, Our Lord Jesus Christ. As late as 1585 Wigand published his book Concerning Stancarism--De Stancarismo.

Stancarus had been trained in scholastic theology and was a great admirer of Peter Lombard. In his book De Trinitate et Mediatore he says: "One Peter Lombard is worth more than a hundred Luthers, two hundred Melanchthons, three hundred Bullingers, four hundred Peter Martyrs, five hundred Calvins out of whom, if they were all brayed in a mortar, not one drop of true theology would be squeezed. Plus valet unus Petrus Lombardus quam centum Lutheri, ducenti Melanchthones, trecenti Bullingeri, quadringenti Petri Martyres et quingenti Calvini, qui omnes, si in mortario contunderentur, non exprimeretur una mica verae theologiae." (J. G. Walch, Religionsstreitigkeiten 4, 177.)

Concerning Christ's obedience Peter Lombard taught: "Christus Mediator dicitur secundum humanitatem, non secundum divinitatem.... Mediator est ergo, in quantum homo, et non in quantum Deus. Christ is called Mediator according to His humanity, not according to His divinity.... He is therefore Mediator inasmuch as He is man, and not inasmuch as He is God." (Planck 4, 451; Seeberg 4, 507.) In accordance with this teaching, Stancarus maintained, in pointed opposition to Osiander, that Christ is our Righteousness only according to His human nature, and not according to His divine nature. The divine nature of Christ, Stancarus declared must be excluded from the office of Christ's mediation and priesthood; for if God the Son were Mediator and would do something which the Father and the Holy Spirit could not do, then He would have a will and an operation and hence also a nature and essence different from that of the Father and the Holy Spirit. He wrote: "Christ, God and man, is Mediator [and Redeemer] only according to the other nature, namely, the human, not according to the divine; Christ made satisfaction for us according to His human nature, but not according to His divine nature; according to His divine nature Christ was not under the Law, was not obedient unto death, etc." (Frank 2, 111.) Stancarus argued: "Christ is one God with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Apart from the three personal properties of 'paternitas, filiatio, and spiratio passiva' the three divine persons are absolutely identical in their being and operation. Their work is the sending of the Mediator, whose divine nature itself, in an active way, participates in this sending; hence only the human nature of the God-man is sent, and only the human nature of the Mediator acts in a reconciling way. Men are reconciled by Christ's death on the cross; but the blood shed on the cross and death are peculiar to the human nature, not to the divine nature; hence we are reconciled by the human nature of Christ only, and not by His divine nature (ergo per naturam humanam Christi tantum sumus reconciliati et non per divinam)." (Schluesselburg 9, 216ff.)

Consistently, the Stancarian doctrine destroys both the unity of the person of Christ and the sufficiency of His atonement. It not only corrupts the doctrine of the infinite and truly redeeming value of the obedience of the God-man, but also denies the personal union of the divine and human natures in Christ. For if the divine nature is excluded from the work of Christ, then it must be excluded also from His person, since works are always acts of a person. And if it was a mere human nature that died for us, then the price of our redemption is altogether inadequate, and we are not redeemed, as Luther so earnestly emphasized against Zwingli. (CONC. TRIGL. 1028, 44.) True, Stancarus protested: "Christ is Mediator according to the human nature only; this exclusive 'only' does not exclude the divine nature from the person of Christ, but from His office as Mediator." (Frank 2, 111.) However, just this was Luther's contention, that Christ is our Mediator also according to His divine nature, and that the denial of this truth both invalidates His satisfaction and divides His person.

The Third Article of the Formula of Concord, therefore, rejects the error of Stancarus as well as that of Osiander. Against the latter it maintains that the active and passive obedience of Christ is our righteousness before God: and over against the former, that this obedience was the act of the entire person of Christ, and not of His human nature alone. We read: "In opposition to both these parties [Osiander and Stancarus] it has been unanimously taught by the other teachers of the Augsburg Confession that Christ is our Righteousness not according to His divine nature alone, nor according to His human nature alone, but according to both natures; for He has redeemed, justified, and saved us from our sins as God and man, through His complete obedience; that therefore the righteousness of faith is the forgiveness of sins, reconciliation with God, and our adoption as God's children only on account of the obedience of Christ, which through faith alone, out of pure grace is imputed for righteousness to all true believers, and on account of it they are absolved from all their unrighteousness." (917, 4.)

182. Deviations of Parsimonious and Hamburg Ministers.

In 1563 a collateral controversy concerning the obedience of Christ was raised by Parsimonius (George Karg). He was born 1512; studied under Luther in Wittenberg; 1547 he became pastor in Schwabach, and 1556 superintendent in Ansbach; 1563 he was deposed because of erroneous theses published in that year; he was opposed by Hesshusius and Ketzmann in Ansbach; 1570, having discussed his difference with the theologians in Wittenberg, Karg retracted and was restored to his office; he died 1576. In his theses on justification Parsimonius deviated from the Lutheran doctrine by teaching that Christ redeemed us by His passive obedience only, and by denying that His active obedience had any vicarious merit, since as man He Himself owed such obedience to the Law of God,--a view afterwards defended also by such Reformed divines as John Piscator, John Camero, and perhaps Ursinus. (Schaff 1, 274.)

Over against this error the Formula of Concord explains and declares: "Therefore the righteousness which is imputed to faith or to the believer out of pure grace is the obedience suffering, and resurrection of Christ, since He has made satisfaction for us to the Law, and paid for our sins. For since Christ is not man alone, but God and man in one undivided person, He was as little subject to the Law (because He is the Lord of the Law) as He had to suffer and die as far as His person is concerned. For this reason, then, His obedience, not only in suffering and dying, but also in this, that He in our stead was voluntarily made under the Law and fulfilled it by this obedience, is imputed to us for righteousness, so that, on account of this complete obedience which He rendered His heavenly Father for us, by doing and suffering, in living and dying, God forgives our sins, regards us as godly and righteous, and eternally saves us." (919, 16.)--

In their zealous opposition to the doctrine of Osiander according to which the indwelling essential holiness of the divine nature of Christ is our righteousness before God, also the Hamburg ministers went a step too far in the opposite direction. They denied, or at any rate seemed to deny, the indwelling of the Holy Trinity as such in believers. In their Response (Responsio) of 1552 they declared: "God is said to dwell where He is present by His grace and benevolence, where He gives the Word of His grace, and reveals His promises concerning His mercy and the remission of sins, where He works by His Spirit, etc." (Frank 2, 107.) Again: "That His indwelling pertains to His efficacy and operation appears from many passages which describe without a figure the efficacy and operation of Christ and of the Holy Spirit dwelling in believers." "The dwelling of the Holy Spirit in believers signifies that they are led by the Spirit of God." "But it cannot be proved by the Scripture that the fulness of God dwells bodily in us as it dwells in Christ Jesus. The inhabitation of God in us is a matter of grace, not of nature; of gift, not of property." (107.)

In 1551 Melanchthon had written: "It must be admitted that God dwells in our hearts, not only in such a manner that He there is efficacious, though not present with His own essence, but that He is both present and efficacious. A personal union, however, does not take place in us, but God is present in us in a separable manner as in a separable domicile." (C. R. 7, 781.) This was the view of the Lutheran theologians generally. Article III of the Formula of Concord, too, is emphatic in disavowing a personal union of the deity and humanity in believers, as well as in asserting that God Himself, not merely His gifts, dwell in Christians. (935, 54; 937, 65.) In addition to the aberrations enumerated, Article III rejects also some of the Roman and the Romanizing errors concerning justification in the Leipzig Interim, and some views entertained by Majorists which are extensively and ex professo dealt with in Article IV. (CONC. TRIGL. 917, 5.)

XVII. The Antinomistic Controversy.

183. Distinction between Law and Gospel of Paramount Import.

Zwingli, who was a moralist and a Humanist rather than a truly evangelical reformer, taught: "In itself the Law is nothing else than a Gospel; that is, a good, certain message from God by means of which He instructs us concerning His will." (Frank 2, 312.) While Zwingli thus practically identified Law and Gospel, Luther, throughout his life, held that the difference between both is as great as that between life and death or the merits of Christ and our own sinful works; and that no one can be a true minister of the Christian Church who is unable properly to distinguish and apply them. For, according to Luther, a commingling of the Law and the Gospel necessarily leads to a corruption of the doctrine of justification, the very heart of Christianity. And as both must be carefully distinguished, so both must also be upheld and preached in the Church; for the Gospel presupposes the Law and is rendered meaningless without it. Wherever the Law is despised, disparaged, and corrupted, the Gospel, too, cannot be kept intact. Whenever the Law is assailed, even if this be done in the name of the Gospel, the latter is, in reality, hit harder than the former. The cocoon of antinomianism always bursts into antigospelism.

Majorism, the mingling of sanctification and justification, and synergism, the mingling of nature and grace, were but veiled efforts to open once more the doors of the Lutheran Church to the Roman work-righteousness, which Luther had expelled. The same is true of antinomianism in all its forms. It amounts to nothing less than apostasy from true Evangelicalism and a return to Romanism. When Luther opposed Agricola, the father of the Antinomians in the days of the Reformation, he did so with the clear knowledge that the Gospel of Jesus Christ with its doctrine of justification by grace and faith alone was at stake and in need of defense. "By these spirits," said he, "the devil does not intend to rob us of the Law, but of Christ, who fulfilled the Law." (St. L. 20, 1614; Pieper, Dogm. 3, 279; Frank 2, 268. 325.)

With the same interest in view, to save the Gospel from corruption, the Formula of Concord opposes antinomianism and urges that the distinction between the Law and the Gospel be carefully preserved. The opening paragraph of Article V, "Of the Law and the Gospel," reads: "As the distinction between the Law and Gospel is a special brilliant light which serves to the end that God's Word may be rightly divided, and the Scriptures of the holy prophets and apostles may be properly explained and understood, we must guard it with especial care, in order that these two doctrines may not be mingled with one another, or a Law be made out of the Gospel, whereby the merit of Christ is obscured and troubled consciences are robbed of their comfort, which they otherwise have in the holy Gospel when it is preached genuinely and in its purity, and by which they can support themselves in their most grievous trials against the terrors of the Law." (951, 1.) The concluding paragraph of this article declares that the proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel must be preserved, "in order that both doctrines, that of the Law and that of the Gospel, be not mingled and confounded with one another, and what belongs to the one may not be ascribed to the other, whereby the merit and benefits of Christ are easily obscured and the Gospel is again turned into a doctrine of the Law, as has occurred in the Papacy, and thus Christians are deprived of the true comfort which they have in the Gospel against the terrors of the Law, and the door is again opened in the Church of God to the Papacy." (961, 27.) The blessed Gospel, our only comfort and consolation against the terrors of the Law, will be corrupted wherever the Law and the Gospel are not properly distinguished,--such, then, was the view also of the Formula of Concord.

Articles V and VI of the Formula treat and dispose of the issues raised by the Antinomians. In both Luther's doctrine is maintained and reaffirmed. Article V, "Of the Law and Gospel," teaches that, in the proper sense of the term, everything is Law that reveals and rebukes sin, the sin of unbelief in Christ and the Gospel included; that Gospel, in the proper and narrow sense, is nothing but a proclamation and preaching of grace and forgiveness of sin, that, accordingly, the Law as well as the Gospel are needed and must be retained and preached in the Church. This was precisely what Luther had taught. In one of his theses against Agricola he says: "Whatever discloses sin, wrath, or death exercises the office of the Law; Law and the disclosing of sin or the revelation of wrath are convertible terms. Quidquid ostendit peccatum, iram seu mortem, id exercet officium legis; lex et ostensio peccati seu revelatio irae sunt termini convertibiles." Article VI "Of the Third Use of the Law," teaches that although Christians, in as far as they are regenerate, do the will of God spontaneously, the Law must nevertheless be preached to them on account of their Old Adam, not only as a mirror revealing their sins and as a check on the lusts of the flesh, but also as a rule of their lives. This, too, is precisely what Luther had maintained against Agricola: "The Law," said he, "must be retained [in the Church], that the saints may know which are the works God requires." (Drews, Disputationen Dr. Martin Luthers, 418; Herzog R. I, 588; Frank 2, 272; Tschackert, 482.)

184. Agricola Breeding Trouble.

In the Lutheran Church antinomianism appeared in a double form: one chiefly before the other after the death of Luther. The first of these conflicts was originated by Agricola who spoke most contemptuously and disparagingly of the Law of God, teaching, in particular, that true knowledge of sin and genuine contrition is produced, not by the Law, but by the Gospel only, and that hence there is in the Church no use whatever for the Law of God. After Luther's death similar antinomistic errors were entertained and defended by the Philippists in Wittenberg, who maintained that the sin of unbelief is rebuked not by the Law, but by the Gospel. Poach, Otto, and others denied that, with respect to good works, the Law was of any service whatever to Christians after their conversion.

Barring Carlstadt and similar spirits, John Agricola (Schnitter, Kornschneider, Magister Islebius--Luther called him Grickel) was the first to strike a discordant note and breed trouble within the Lutheran Church. Born April 20, 1492, at Eisleben, he studied at Leipzig, and from 1515 to 1516 at Wittenberg. Here he became an enthusiastic adherent and a close friend of Luther and also of Melanchthon, after the latter's arrival in 1518. In 1539 Luther himself declared that Agricola had been "one of his best and closest friends." (St. L. 20, 1612.) In 1519 he accompanied both to the great debate in Leipzig. In 1525 he became teacher of the Latin school and though never ordained, pastor of the church in Eisleben. Being a speaker of some renown he was frequently engaged by the Elector of Saxony, especially on his journeys--to Speyer 1526 and 1529, to Augsburg 1530, to Vienna 1535. At Eisleben, Agricola was active also in a literary way, publishing sermons, a catechism, and, 1526, a famous collection of 300 German proverbs (the Wittenberg edition of 1592 contains 750 proverbs).

When the new theological professorship created 1526 at Wittenberg was given to Melanchthon, Agricola felt slighted and much disappointed. In the following year he made his first antinomian attack upon Melanchthon. The dispute was settled by Luther, but only for a time. In 1536 Agricola, through the influence of Luther (whose hospitality also he and his large family on their arrival in Wittenberg enjoyed for more than six weeks), received an appointment at the university. He rewarded his generous friend with intrigues and repeated renewals of the antinomian quarrels, now directing his attacks also against his benefactor. By 1540 matters had come to such a pass that the Elector felt constrained to institute a formal trial against the secret plotter, which Agricola escaped only by accepting a call of Joachim II as courtpreacher and superintendent at Berlin. After Luther's death, Agricola, as described in a preceding chapter, degraded and discredited himself by helping Pflug and Sidonius to prepare the Augsburg Interim (1547), and by endeavoring to enforce this infamous document in Brandenburg. He died September 22, 1566.

Vanity, ambition, conceit, insincerity, impudence, arrogance, and ungratefulness were the outstanding traits of Agricola's character. Luther said that Agricola, swelled with vanity and ambition, was more vexatious to him than any pope; that he was fit only for the profession of a jester, etc. December 6, 1540, Luther wrote to Jacob Stratner, courtpreacher in Berlin: "Master Grickel is not, nor ever will be, the man that he may appear, or the Margrave may consider him to be. For if you wish to know what vanity itself is you can recognize it in no surer image than that of Eisleben. Si enim velis scire, quidnam ipsa vanitas sit, nulla certiore imagine cognosces quam Islebii." (St. L. 21b, 2536.) Flacius reports that shortly before Luther's death, when some endeavored to excuse Agricola, the former answered angrily: "Why endeavor to excuse Eisleben? Eisleben is incited by the devil, who has taken possession of him entirely. You will see what a stir he will make after my death! Ihr werdet wohl erfahren, was er nach meinem Tod fuer einen Laerm wird anrichten!" (Preger 1, 119.)

185. Agricola's Conflict with Melanchthon.

The antinomian views that repentance (contrition) is not wrought by the Law, but by the Gospel, and that hence there is no room for the Law and its preaching in the Christian Church, were uttered by Agricola as early as 1525. In his Annotations to the Gospel of St. Luke of that year he had written: "The Decalog belongs in the courthouse, not in the pulpit. All those who are occupied with Moses are bound to go to the devil. To the gallows with Moses!" (Tschackert 481; Herzog R. 1, 688; E. 4, 423.) The public dispute began two years later when Agricola criticized Melanchthon because in the latter's "Instructions to the Visitors of the Churches of Saxony" (Articles of Visitation, Articuli, de quibus Egerunt per Visitatores in Regione Saxionae, 1527) the ministers were urged first to preach the Law to their spiritually callous people in order to produce repentance (contrition), and thus to prepare them for saving faith in the Gospel the only source of truly good works. Melanchthon had written: "Pastors must follow the example of Christ. Since He taught repentance and remission of sins, pastors also must teach these to their churches. At present it is common to vociferate concerning faith, and yet one cannot understand what faith is, unless repentance is preached. Plainly they pour new wine into old bottles who preach faith without repentance, without the doctrine of the fear of God, without the doctrine of the Law, and accustom the people to a certain carnal security, which is worse than all former errors under the Pope have been." (C. R. 26, 9.) Agricola considered these and similar exhortations of Melanchthon unfriendly and Romanizing, and published his dissent in his 130 Questions for Young Children, where he displayed a shocking contempt for the Old Testament and the Law of God. In particular, he stressed the doctrine that genuine repentance (contrition) is wrought, not by the Law, but by the Gospel only. In letters to his friends, Agricola at the same time charged Melanchthon with corrupting the evangelical doctrine. (Frank 2, 252.)

At a meeting held at Torgau, November 26 to 28, 1527, the differences were discussed by Agricola and Melanchthon in the presence of Luther and Bugenhagen. The exact issue was: Does faith presuppose contrition? Melanchthon affirmed the question, and Agricola denied it. Luther finally effected an agreement by distinguishing between general and justifying faith, and by explaining that repentance (contrition), indeed, presupposes a general faith in God, but that justifying faith presupposes the terrors of conscience (contrition) wrought by the Law. His decision ran "that the term faith should be applied to justifying faith which consoles us in these terrors [produced by the threats of the Law] but that the word repentance correctly includes a general faith," viz., that there is a God who threatens transgressors, etc. (C. R. 1, 916.)

In agreement herewith Melanchthon wrote in the German Unterricht der Visitatoren, published 1528 at Wittenberg, that, in the wider and more general sense, the term "faith" embraces contrition and the Law, but that in the interest of the common people the word "faith" should be reserved for the special Christian or justifying faith in Christ. We read: "Denn wiewohl etliche achten, man solle nichts lehren vor dem Glauben, sondern die Busse aus und nach dem Glauben folgend lehren, auf dass die Widersacher [Papisten] nicht sagen moegen, man widerrufe unsere vorige Lehre, so ist aber doch anzusehen, weil [dass] die Busse und Gesetz auch zu dem gemeinen Glauben gehoeren. Denn man muss ja zuvor glauben, dass Gott sei, der da drohe, gebiete, schrecke usw. So sei es fuer den gemeinen, groben Mann, dass man solche Stuecke des Glaubens lasse bleiben unter dem Namen Busse, Gebot, Gesetz, Furcht usw., auf dass sie desto unterschiedlicher den Glauben Christi verstehen, welchen die Apostel iustificantem fidem, das ist, der da gerecht macht und Suende vertilgt, nennen, welches der Glaube von dem Gebot und Busse nicht tut und doch der gemeine Mann ueber dem Wort Glauben irre wird und Fragen aufbringt ohne Nutzen." (C. R. 26, 51f.)

186. Luther's First Disputation against the Antinomians.

At Wittenberg, in 1537, Agricola renewed his antinomianism by secretly and anonymously circulating a number of propositions (Positiones inter Fratres Sparsae) directed against both Luther and Melanchthon, whom he branded as "contortors of the words of Christ," urging all to resist them in order to preserve the pure doctrine. Quotations from Luther and Melanchthon were appended to the theses in order to show that their teaching concerning the "mode of justification (modus iustificationis)" was sometimes "pure," sometimes "impure." Agricola wrote: "Impure [among the statements of Melanchthon and Luther] are: 1. In the Saxon Visitation: 'Since Christ commands that repentance and remission of sins is to be preached in His name, hence the Decalog is to be taught,' 2. Again ... 'As the Gospel therefore teaches that the Law has been given to humiliate us, in order that we may seek Christ,' etc. 3. In his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians Luther says that it is the office of the Law to torment and to terrify the conscience, that it may know Christ more readily. Many similar passages are found in this commentary, which we reject as false, in order to maintain the purity of the doctrine." (E., v. a. 4, 422f.; St. L. 20, 1627.)

Luther answered by publishing, December 1, 1537, the theses of Agricola together with Other Antinomian Articles (Alii Articuli Antinomi), compiled from written and verbal expressions of Agricola and his followers. In his introductory remarks Luther not only disowned and emphatically condemned (nos ab eiusmodi portentis prorsus abhorrere) Agricola's Positiones inter Fratres Sparsae, but also announced a number of disputations against antinomianism. (E. 4, 420.) The first was held December 18, 1537, in which Luther maintained: Contrition is wrought by the preaching of the Law; but a man is able to make a good resolution and to hate sin out of love toward God only after the Gospel has comforted his alarmed conscience.

Following are some of the 39 theses discussed by Luther in his first disputation against the Antinomians: "4. The first part of repentance, contrition, is [wrought] by the Law alone. The other part, the good purpose, cannot be [wrought] by the Law. 24. And they [the Antinomians] teach perniciously that the Law of God is simply to be removed from the church, which is blasphemous and sacrilegious. 25. For the entire Scripture teaches that repentance must begin from the Law, which also the order of the matter itself as well as experience shows. 31. Necessarily, then, sin and death cannot be revealed by the Word of Grace and Solace, but by the Law. 32. Experience teaches that Adam is first reproved as a transgressor of the Law and afterwards cheered by the promised Seed of the woman. 33. Also David is first killed by the Law through Nathan, saying: 'Thou art the man,' etc.--afterwards he is saved by the Gospel, declaring: 'Thou shalt not die,' etc. [2 Sam. 12, 7. 13.] 34. Paul, prostrated by the Law, first hears: 'Why persecutest thou Me?' Afterwards he is revived by the Gospel: 'Arise,' etc. [Acts 9, 4. 6.] 35. And Christ Himself says, Mark 1, 15: 'Repent ye and believe the Gospel, for the kingdom of God is at hand.' 36. Again: 'Repentance and remission of sins should be preached in His name,' [Luke 24, 47.] 37. Likewise the Spirit first reproves the world of sin, in order to teach faith in Christ, i.e., forgiveness of sin. [John 16, 8.] 38. In the Epistle to the Romans Paul observes this method, first to teach that all are sinners, and thereupon, that they are to be justified solely through Christ." (Drews, 253ff.; St. L. 20, 1628ff.)

187. Luther's Second Disputation against the Antinomians.

Since Agricola did not appear at the first public disputation against the Antinomians, moreover secretly ["im Winkel"] continued his opposition and intrigues, Luther insisted that his privilege of lecturing at the university be withdrawn. Thus brought to terms Agricola, through his wife, sued for reconciliation. Luther demanded a retraction to be made at his next disputation, which was held January 12, 1538. (Drews, 248. 334f.; C. R. 25, 64; 3, 482f.) Here Luther explained that, though not necessary to justification, the Law must not be cast out of the church, its chief object being to reveal the guilt of sin; moreover, that the Law must be taught to maintain outward discipline, to reveal sin, and to show Christians what works are pleasing to God. (Drews, 418.)

Following are some of the 48 theses discussed by Luther in his second disputation: "3. When treating of justification, one cannot say too much against the inability of the Law [to save] and against the most pernicious trust in the Law. 4. For the Law was not given to justify or vivify or help in any way toward righteousness. 5. But to reveal sin and work wrath, i.e., to render the conscience guilty. [Rom. 3, 20; 4, 15.] 8. In brief, as far as heaven is from the earth, so far must the Law be separated from justification. 9. And nothing is to be taught, said, or thought in the matter of justification but only the word of the grace exhibited in Christ. 10. From this, however, it does not follow that the Law is to be abolished and excluded from the preaching of [done in] the church. 11. Indeed, just for the reason that not only is it not necessary to justification, but also cannot effect it, it is the more necessary to teach and urge it. 12. In order that man, who is proud and trusts in his own powers, may be instructed that he cannot be justified by the Law. 18. Whatever reveals sin, wrath, or death exercises the office of the Law, whether it be in the Old or in the New Testament. 19. For to reveal sin is nothing else, nor can it be anything else, than the Law or an effect and the peculiar power of the Law. 20. Law and revelation of sin or of wrath are convertible terms. 24. So that it is impossible for sin to be, or to be known, without the Law written or inscribed [in the heart]. 27. And since the Law of God requires our obedience toward God, these Antinomians (nomomachi) abolish also obedience toward God. 28. From this it is manifest that Satan through these his instruments teaches about sin, repentance, and Christ in words only (verbaliter tantum). 29. But in reality he takes away Christ, repentance, sin, and the entire Scripture, together with God, its Author. 46. For the Law, as it was before Christ, did indeed accuse us; but under Christ it is appeased through the forgiveness of sins, and thereafter it is to be fulfilled through the Spirit. 47. Therefore the Law will never, in all eternity, be abolished, but will remain, either to be fulfilled by the damned, or already fulfilled by the blessed. 48. These pupils of the devil however, seem to think that the Law is temporary only, which ceased under Christ even as circumcision did." (Drews, 336ff.; St. L. 20, 1632ff.)

Following is a summary of the views expressed by Luther in his second disputation: "Why is the Law to be taught? The Law is to be taught on account of discipline, according to the word of Paul, 1 Tim. 1, 9: 'The Law is made for the lawless,' and that by this pedagogy men might come to Christ as Paul says to the Galatians (3, 24): 'The Law was our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ,' In the second place, the Law is to be taught to reveal sin, to accuse, terrify, and damn the consciences, Rom. 3, 20: 'By the Law is the knowledge of sin;' again, chapter 4, 15: 'The Law worketh wrath,' In the third place, the Law is to be retained that the saints may know what kind of works God requires in which they may exercise their obedience toward God. Lex est retinenda, ut sciant sancti, quaenam opera requirat Deus, in quibus obedientiam exercere erga Deum possint." (Drews, 418; Herzog R. 1, 688.)

188. Third and Fourth Series of Luther's Theses against Antinomianism.

Having complied with the conditions, and publicly (also in two sermons delivered April 23) retracted his error, and declared his assent to the views expressed in Luther's second disputation, Agricola was again permitted to preach and teach. As a result, Luther also, though he had no faith in the sincerity of Agricola's retraction, did not carry out his original plan of discussing a third and fourth series of theses which he had prepared against antinomianism. (Drews, 419ff.; E. 4, 430ff.)

From the third series, comprising 40 theses, we quote the following: "1. The repentance of the Papists, Turks, Jews, and of all unbelievers and hypocrites is alike in every respect. 2. It consists in this, that they are sorry and make satisfaction for one or several sins, and afterwards are secure as to other sins or original sin. 5. The repentance of believers in Christ goes beyond the actual sins, and continues throughout life, till death. 8. For the sin in our flesh remains during the entire time of our life, warring against the Spirit, who resists it. [Rom. 7, 23.] 9. Therefore all works after justification are nothing else than a continuous repentance, or a good purpose against sin. 10. For nothing else is done than that sin, revealed by the Law and forgiven in Christ, is swept out. 17. The Lord's Prayer, taught by the Lord Himself to the saints and believers, is a part of repentance, containing much of the doctrine of the Law. 18. For whoever prays it aright confesses with his own mouth that he sins against the Law and repents. 27. Therefore also the Lord's Prayer itself teaches that the Law is before, below, and after the Gospel (legem esse ante, sub et post evangelium), and that from it repentance must begin. 30. From this it follows that these enemies of the Law [Antinomians] must abolish also the Lord's Prayer if they abolish the Law. 31. Indeed, they are compelled to expunge the greatest part of the sermons of Christ Himself from the Gospel-story. 32. For Matt. 5, 17ff. He does not only recite the Law of Moses, but explains it perfectly, and teaches that it must not be destroyed. 34. Everywhere throughout the Gospel He also reproves, rebukes, threatens, and exercises similar offices of the Law. 35. So that there never has been nor ever will be more impudent men than those who teach that the Law should be abolished." (St. L. 20, 1636ff.; E. 4, 430ff.)

From the fourth series of 41 theses directed by Luther against the Antinomians we quote: "12. Therefore we must beware of the doctrine of the Papists concerning repentance as of hell and the devil himself. 13. Much more, however, must we avoid those who leave no repentance whatever in the Church. 14. For those who deny that the Law is to be taught in reality simply wish that there be no repentance. 15. The argument: 'Whatever is not necessary to justification, neither in the beginning, nor in the middle, nor in the end, must not be taught,' etc., amounts to nothing. 17. It is the same as though you would argue: The truth that man is dead in sin is not necessary to justification, neither in the beginning, nor in the middle, nor in the end; hence it must not be taught. 18. To honor parents, to live chaste, to abstain from murders, adulteries, and thefts is not necessary to justification; hence such things must not be taught. 22. Although the Law helps nothing toward justification it does not follow therefrom that it ought to be abolished and not to be taught. 26. Everywhere in Paul [the phrase] 'without the Law' must be understood (as Augustine correctly explains) 'without the assistance of the Law,' as we have always done. 27. For the Law demands fulfilment, but helps nothing toward its own fulfilment. 35. But faith in Christ alone justifies, alone fulfils the Law, alone does good works, without the Law. 37. It is true that after justification good works follow spontaneously, without the Law, i.e., without the help or coercion of the Law. 38. In brief, the Law is neither useful nor necessary for justification, nor for any good works, much less for salvation. 39. On the contrary, justification, good works, and salvation are necessary for the fulfilment of the Law. 40. For Christ came to save that which was lost [Luke 19, 10], and for the restitution of all things, as St. Peter says [Acts 3, 21]. 41. Therefore the Law is not destroyed by Christ, but established, in order that Adam may become such as he was, and even better." (St. L. 20. 1639ff.; E. 4. 433.)

189. Luther's Third Public Disputation against the Antinomians.

Soon after his second disputation Luther obtained evidence of Agricola's relapse into his former errors and ways. The upshot was another disputation on a fifth series of theses held September 13, 1538, in which Luther denounced the Antinomians as deceivers, who lulled their hearers into carnal security. He also explained that the passages culled from his own writings were torn from their historical context, and hence misinterpreted. His former statements, said Luther, had been addressed to consciences already alarmed, and therefore in immediate need of the consolation of the Gospel; while now the Antinomians applied them to secure consciences, who, first of all, were in need of the terrifying power of the Law. (Drews, 421f.; Tschackert, 482.)

From the 70 theses treated by Luther in his third disputation, we submit the following: "1. The Law has dominion over man as long as he lives. [Rom. 7, 1.] 2. But he is freed from the Law when he dies. 3. Necessarily, therefore, man must die if he would be free from the Law. 7. These three: Law, sin, and death, are inseparable. 8. Accordingly so far as death is still in man, in so far sin and the Law are in man. 9. Indeed, in Christ the Law is fulfilled, sin abolished, and death destroyed. 11. That is, when, through faith we are crucified and have died in Christ, such things [the Law fulfilled, sin abolished, and death destroyed] are true also in us. 13. But the fact itself and experience testify that the just are still daily delivered to death. 14. Necessarily, therefore, in as far as they are under death, they are still also under the Law and sin. 15. They [the Antinomians] are altogether inexperienced men and deceivers of souls who endeavor to abolish the Law from the church. 16. For this is not only foolish and wicked, but also absolutely impossible. 17. For if you would abolish the Law, you will be compelled to abolish also sin and death. 18. For death and sin are present by virtue of the Law, as Paul says [2 Cor. 3, 6]: 'The letter killeth,' and [1 Cor. 15, 56]: 'The strength of sin is the Law,' 19. But since you see that the just die daily what a folly is it to imagine that they are without the Law! 20. For if there were no Law, there would be neither sin nor death. 21. Hence they should have first proved that the just are altogether without sin and death. 22. Or that they no longer live in the flesh, but are removed from the world. 23. Then it might justly be taught that also the Law is altogether removed from them and must not be taught in any way. 24. This they cannot prove, but experience itself shows the contrary to their very faces. 25. So, then, the impudence of the teachers who wish to remove the Law from the church is extraordinary. 26. Yet it is a much greater impudence, or rather insanity, when they assert that even the wicked should be freed from the Law, and that it should not be preached to them. 29. If, however, they pretend that their church or their hearers simply are all pious men and Christians, without the Law, 30. Then it is evident that they are altogether of unsound mind and do not know what they say or affirm. 31. For this is nothing else than to imagine that all their hearers have been removed from this life. 35. Thus it [the Law] is also given to the pious, in so far as they are not yet dead and still live in the flesh. 40. Now, in as far as Christ is raised in us, in so far we are without Law, sin, and death. 41. But in as far as He is not yet raised in us, in so far we are under the Law, sin, and death. 42. Therefore the Law (as also the Gospel) must be preached, without discrimination, to the righteous as well as to the wicked. 44. To the pious, that they may thereby be reminded to crucify their flesh with its affections and lusts, lest they become secure. [Gal. 5, 24.] 45. For security abolishes faith and the fear of God, and renders the latter end worse than the beginning. [2 Pet. 2, 20.] 46. It appears very clearly that the Antinomians imagine sin to have been removed through Christ essentially and philosophically or juridically (formaliter et philosophice seu iuridice) 47. And that they do not at all know that sin is removed only inasmuch as the merciful God does not impute it [Ps. 32, 2], and forgives it (solum reputatione et ignoscentia Dei miserentis). 61. For if the Law is removed, no one knows what Christ is, or what He did when He fulfilled the Law for us. 66. The doctrine of the Law, therefore, is necessary in the churches, and by all means is to be retained, as without it Christ cannot be retained. 67. For what will you retain of Christ when (the Law having been removed which He fulfilled) you do not know what He has fulfilled? 69. In brief, to remove the Law and to let sin and death remain, is to hide the disease of sin and death to men unto their perdition. 70. When death and sin are abolished (as was done by Christ), then the Law would be removed happily; moreover, it would be established, Rom. 3, 31." (Drews 423ff.; St. L. 20, 1642ff.; E. 4, 436ff.)

190. Agricola's Retraction Written and Published by Luther.

Seeing his position in the Wittenberg University endangered, Agricola was again ready to submit. And when a public retraction was demanded, he even left it to Luther to formulate the recantation. Luther did so in a public letter to Caspar Guettel in Eisleben, entitled, Against the Antinomians--Wider die Antinomer, which he published in the beginning of January, 1539. (St. L. 20, 1610.) In a crushing manner Luther here denounced "the specter of the new spirits who dare thrust the Law or the Ten Commandments out of the church and relegate it to the courthouse."

Complaining of "false brethren," Luther here says: "And I fear that, if I had died at Smalcald [1537], I should forever have been called the patron of such [antinomian] spirits, because they appeal to my books. And all this they do behind my back, without my knowledge and against my will, not even considering it worth while to inform me with as much as a word or syllable, or at least to ask me regarding the matter. Thus I am compelled to proceed against Magister John Agricola," etc. (1611.) "But since he was afraid that he might not express it in a manner such as would be considered satisfactory, he has fully authorized and also requested me to do it [write the retraction for Agricola] as well as I could, which, he being satisfied, I agreed to do, and herewith have done, especially for the reason that after my death neither Master Eisleben himself nor anybody else might be able to pretend that I had done nothing in this matter and simply allowed everything to pass and go on as fully satisfactory to me." (1612.)

Referring to his former statements appealed to by Agricola, Luther continues: "I have indeed taught, and still teach, that sinners should be led to repentance by the preaching of, and meditation upon, the suffering of Christ, so that they may realize how great God's wrath is over sin, seeing that there is no other help against it than that God's Son must die for it.... But how does it follow from this that the Law must be abandoned? I am unable to discover such an inference in my logic, and would like to see and hear the master who would be able to prove it. When Isaiah says, chap. 53, 8: 'For the transgression of My people was He stricken,' tell me, dear friend, is the Law abandoned when here the suffering of Christ is preached? What does 'for the transgression of My people' mean? Does it not mean: because My people have sinned against, and not kept, My Law? Or can any one imagine that sin is something where there is no law? Whoever abolishes the Law must with it also abolish sins. If he would allow sins to remain, he must much more allow the Law to remain. For Rom. 6, 13 [4, 15] we read: 'Sin is not imputed where there is no law.' If there is no sin Christ is nothing. For why does He die if there be neither Law nor sin for which He was to die? From this we see that by this spiritism [Geisterei] the devil does not mean to take away the Law, but Christ, who fulfilled the Law. [Matt. 5, 17.] For he well knows that Christ may well and easily be taken away, but not so the Law, which is written in the heart." (1613f.) "Therefore I request of you, my dear Doctor [Guettel], that, as you have done heretofore, you would continue in the pure doctrine and preach that sinners should and must be led to repentance not only by the sweet grace and suffering of Christ, who has died for us, but also by the terrors of the Law." (1615.) "For whence do we know what sin is if there is no Law and conscience? And whence shall we learn what Christ is, what He has done for us, if we are not to know what the Law is which He has fulfilled for us, or what sin is, for which He has atoned? And even if we did not need the Law for us and were able to tear it out of our hearts (which is impossible), we nevertheless must preach it for the sake of Christ (as also is done and must be done), in order that we may know what He has done and suffered for us. For who could know what and for what purpose Christ has suffered for us if no one were to know what sin or the Law is? Therefore the Law must certainly be preached if we would preach Christ." (1616.) "This, too, is a peculiar blindness and folly, that they imagine the revelation of wrath to be something else than the Law (which is impossible); for the revelation of wrath is the Law when realized and felt, as Paul says [Rom. 4, 15]: 'Lex iram operatur. The Law worketh wrath.'" (1618.)

By way of conclusion Luther remarked: "Let this suffice at present, for I hope that since Master Eisleben is converted and retracts, the others, too, who received it [the antinomian error] from him, will abandon it, which God may help them to do! Amen." (1619.) At the same time, however he did not withhold the opinion that Agricola's self humiliation would hardly be of long duration. "If he continues in such humility," said Luther, "God certainly can and will exalt him; if he abandons it, then God is able to hurl him down again." (1612.)

191. Luther's Fourth Disputation against the Antinomians.

Luther's distrust was not unfounded, for Agricola continued secretly to teach his antinomianism, abetted in his sentiments among others also by Jacob Schenck [since 1536 first Lutheran pastor in Freiberg, Saxony; 1538 dismissed on account of his antinomianism 1540 professor in Leipzig; later on deposed and finally banished from Saxony]. Indeed in March, 1540, Agricola even lodged a complaint with the Elector, charging Luther with "calumnies." In the first part of the following month Luther answered these charges in a Report to Doctor Brueck Concerning Magister John Eisleben's Doctrine and Intrigues. (St. L. 20, 1648ff.) About the same time; Count Albrecht of Mansfeld denounced Agricola to the Elector as a dangerous, troublesome man. Hereupon the Elector on June 15 1540, opened formal legal proceedings against Agricola, who, as stated above, removed to Berlin in August without awaiting the trial, although he had promised with an oath not to leave before a legal decision had been rendered. (Drews, 611.) Incensed by the treacherous conduct of Agricola, Luther, September 10, 1540, held a final disputation on a sixth series of theses against the Antinomians, charging them with destroying all order human as well as divine. (St. L. 20, 1647; E. 4, 441.)

Regarding Agricola's duplicity, Luther, in his Report to Brueck, said in substance: According to the statements of Caspar Guettel and Wendelin Faber, Agricola had for years secretly agitated against the Wittenbergers and founded a sect at Eisleben calling themselves Minorish [Minorists]; he had branded and slandered their doctrine as false and impure, and this, too, without conferring with them or previously admonishing them; he had come to Wittenberg for the purpose of corrupting and distracting the Church; his adherents had made the statement that Eisleben would teach the Wittenbergers theology and logic; he had inveigled Hans Lufft into printing his Postil by falsely stating that it had been read and approved by Luther; in his dealings with the Wittenbergers he had acted not as an honest man, let alone a pious Christian and theologian, but treacherously and in keeping with his antinomian principles; parading as a loyal Lutheran at public conventions and laughing and dining with them, he had misled "his old, faithful friend" [Luther] to confide in him, while secretly he was acting the traitor by maligning him and undermining his work. In the Report we read: "Agricola blasphemes and damns our doctrine as impure and false (i.e., the Holy Spirit Himself in His holy Law); he slanders and defames us Wittenbergers most infamously wherever he can; and all this he does treacherously and secretly, although we have done him no harm, but only did well by him, as he himself must admit. He deceives and attacks us [me], his best friend and father, making me believe that he is our true friend. Nor does he warn me, but, like a desperate treacherous villain, secretly works behind our back to cause the people to forsake our doctrine and to adhere to him, thus treating us with an ungratefulness, pride, and haughtiness such as I have not frequently met with before." (1656.)

In his charge against Luther, Agricola had said that it was dangerous to preach the Law without the Gospel, because it was a ministry of death (ministerium mortis). Luther answered in his Report to Brueck: "Behold now what the mad fool does. God has given His Law for the very purpose that it should bite, cut, strike, kill, and sacrifice the old man. For it should terrify and punish the proud ignorant, secure Old Adam and show him his sin and death, so that, being humiliated, he may despair of himself, and thus become desirous of grace, as St. Paul says: 'The strength of sin is the Law; the sting of death is sin,'[1 Cor. 15, 56.] For this reason he also calls it bonam, iustam, sanctam--good, just, holy. Again, Jeremiah [23, 29]: 'My Word is like a hammer that breaketh the rock to pieces.' Again: 'Ego ignis consumens, etc.--I am a consuming fire,' Ps. 9, 21 [20]: 'Constitue legislatorem super eos, ut sciant gentes, se esse homines, non deos, nec Deo similes--Put them in fear, O Lord, that the nations may know themselves to be but men.' Thus St. Paul does Rom. 1 and 2 and 3 making all the world sinners by the Law, casting them under the wrath of God, and entirely killing them before God. But here our dear Master Grickel appears on the scene and invents a new theology out of his own mad and reckless fool's head and teaches: One must not kill and reprove the people, i.e., one must not preach the Law. Here he himself confesses publicly in his suit [against Luther] that he has condemned and prohibited the preaching of the Law." (St. L. 20, 1657.)

The Report continues: "Since, now, the little angry devil who rides Master Grickel will not tolerate the Law, i.e., mortificantem, irascentem, accusantem, terrentem, occidentem legem,--the mortifying, raging, accusing, terrifying, killing Law,--it is quite evident what he intends to do through Master Grickel's folly (for he nevertheless wishes to be praised as preaching the Law after and under the Gospel, etc.), viz., to hide original sin and to teach the Law no further than against future actual sins, for such is the manner of his entire Postil; even as the Turks, Jews, philosophers, and Papists teach who regard our nature as sound; but Master Grickel does not see that it is just this which his little spirit [devil] aims at by his bragging and boasting, that he, too, is preaching the Law.... Thus Christ and God are altogether vain and lost. And is not this blindness beyond all blindness that he does not want to preach the Law without and before the Gospel? For are these not impossible things? How is it possible to preach of forgiveness of sins if previously there have been no sins? How can one proclaim life if previously there is no death? Are we to preach to angels who have neither sin nor death concerning forgiveness of sins and redemption from death? But how can one preach of sins or know that there are sins, if the Law does not reveal them? For according to its proper office the Gospel does not say who [is a sinner] and what is sin; it does, however, indicate that there must be some great hurt, since so great a remedy is required; but it does not say how the sin is called, or what it is. The Law must do this. Thus Master Eisleben must in fact (re ipsa) allow the Law to perform its duty (occidere, to kill, etc.) prior to the [preaching of the] Gospel, no matter how decidedly he, with words only, denies it, to spite the Wittenbergers, in order that he also, as novus autor (new author), may produce something of his own and confuse the people and separate the churches." (1658.)

From the 20 theses which Luther treated in his last disputation against the Antinomians we cull the following: "1. The inference of St. Paul: 'For where no law is there is no transgression' [Rom. 4, 15] is valid not only theologically, but also politically and naturally (non solum theologice, sed etiam politice et naturaliter). 2. Likewise this too: Where there is no sin, there is neither punishment nor remission. 3. Likewise this too: Where there is neither punishment nor remission, there is neither wrath nor grace. 4. Likewise this too: Where there is neither wrath nor grace, there is neither divine nor human government. 5. Likewise this too: Where there is neither divine nor human government, there is neither God nor man. 6. Likewise this too: Where there is neither God nor man, there is nothing except perhaps the devil. 7. Hence it is that the Antinomians, the enemies of the Law, evidently are either devils themselves or the brothers of the devil. 8. It avails the Antinomians nothing to boast that they teach very much of God, Christ, grace, Law, etc. 10. This confession of the Antinomians is like the one when the devils cried: 'Thou art the Son of the living God,' [Luke 4, 34; 8, 28.] 12. Whoever denies that the damning Law must be taught in reality simply denies the Law. 14. A law which does not damn is an imagined and painted law as the chimera or tragelaphus. 15. Nor is the political or natural law anything unless it damns and terrifies sinners Rom. 13, 1. 5; 1 Pet. 2, 13ff. 17. What the Antinomians say concerning God, Christ, faith, Law, grace, etc., they say without any meaning as the parrot says its 'chaire, Good day!' 18. Hence it is impossible to learn theology or civil polity (theologiam aut politiam) from the Antinomians. 19. Therefore they must be avoided as most pestilential teachers of licentious living who permit the perpetration of all crimes. 20. For they serve not Christ, but their own belly [Rom. 16, 18], and, madmen that they are, seek to please men, in order that from them, as a man's judgment, they may gain glory." (Drews, 613; St. L. 20, 1647; E. 4, 441.)--Regarding Luther's disputations against the Antinomians Planck pertinently remarks that they compel admiration for his clear and penetrating mind, and rank among the very best of his writings. (1, 18; Frank 2, 311.)

192. "Grickel" Remained Grickel.

At the instance of Elector Joachim, negotiations were begun with Luther, which finally led to a sort of peaceful settlement. Agricola was required to send (which he also did) a revocation to the preachers, the council, and the congregation at Eisleben. However, the new and enlarged edition (1541) of the catechism which Agricola had published in 1527 revealed the fact that also this last recantation was insincere; for in it he repeated his antinomistic teaching, though not in the original defiant manner. Little wonder, then, that despite the formal settlement, cordial relations were not restored between Luther and Agricola. When the latter visited Wittenberg in 1545, Luther refused to see the man whom he regarded incurably dishonest. "Grickel," said he, "will remain Grickel to all eternity, Grickel wird in alle Ewigkeit Grickel bleiben."

And "Grickel" he did remain; for in 1565 he published a sermon in which he said: "Every one who is to be appointed as teacher and preacher shall be asked: What do you intend to teach in the church? He shall answer: The Gospel of Jesus Christ. But when further asked: What does the Gospel preach? he shall answer: The Gospel preaches repentance and forgiveness of sins." Considering this a further evidence that Agricola still adhered to, and was now ready once more to champion, his old errors, the preachers of Mansfeld registered their protest in a publication of the same year. A controversy, however, did not materialize, for Agricola died the following year. (Planck 5, 1, 47; Frank 2, 267.)

193. False Propositions of Agricola.

Following are some of Agricola's radical statements concerning the Law and the Gospel. The first thesis of his Positions of 1537 reads: "Repentance is to be taught not from the Decalog or from any law of Moses, but from the violation of the Son through the Gospel. Poenitentia docenda est non ex decalogo aut ulla lege Mosis, sed ex violatione Filii per evangelium." (E. 4. 420.) Thesis 13: "In order to keep the Christian doctrine pure, we must resist those [Luther and Melanchthon] who teach that the Gospel must be preached only to such whose hearts have previously been terrified and broken by the Law. Quare pro conservanda puritate doctrinae resistendum est iis, qui docent, evangelium non praedicandum nisi animis prius quassatis et contritis per legem." (421.) Thesis 16: "The Law merely rebukes sin, and that, too, without the Holy Spirit; hence it rebukes to damnation." Thesis 17: "But there is need of a doctrine which does not only condemn with great efficacy, but which saves at the same time; this, however, is the Gospel, a doctrine which teaches conjointly repentance and remission of sins." (421.) In his Brief Summary of the Gospel, Agricola says: "In the New Testament and among Christians or in the Gospel we must not preach the violation of the Law when a man breaks or transgresses the Law, but the violation of the Son, to wit that he who does not for the sake of the kingdom of heaven willingly omit what he should omit, and does not do what he should do, crucifies Christ anew." (St. L. 20, 1622ff.; Frank 2, 313, Gieseler 3, 2, 137; Pieper, Dogm. 3, 265ff.)

A commingling of the Law and Gospel always results in a corruption of the doctrines of conversion, faith, and justification. Such was the case also with respect to Agricola, who taught that justification follows a contrition which flows from, and hence is preceded by, love toward God. Turning matters topsy-turvy, he taught: Repentance consists in this, that the heart of man, experiencing the kindness of God which calls us to Christ and presents us with His grace, turns about, apprehends God's grace, thanks Him heartily for having spared it so graciously, begins to repent, and to grieve heartily and sorrowfully on account of its sins, wishes to abstain from them, and renounces its former sinful life. "This," says Agricola, "is repentance (poenitentia, Buessen) and the first stage of the new birth, the true breathing and afflation of the Holy Spirit. After this he acquires a hearty confidence in God, believing that He will condone his folly and not blame him for it, since he did not know any better, although he is much ashamed of it and wishes that it had never happened; he also resolves, since he has fared so well, never to sin any more or to do anything that might make him unworthy of the benefit received as if he were ungrateful and forgetful; he furthermore learns to work out, confirm, and preserve his salvation in fear and trembling...: this is forgiveness of sins." (Frank 2, 247.) These confused ideas plainly show that Agricola had a false conception, not only of the Law and Gospel, but also of original sin, repentance, faith, regeneration, and justification. Essentially, his was the Roman doctrine, which makes an antecedent of what in reality is an effect and a consequence of conversion and justification. Viewed from this angle, it occasions little surprise that Agricola consented to help formulate and introduce the Augsburg Interim in which the essentials of Lutheranism were denied.

194. Poach, Otto, Musculus, Neander.

The antinomistic doctrines rejected, in particular, by Article VI of the Formula of Concord, were represented chiefly by Andrew Poach, Anton Otto, Andrew Musculus, and Michael Neander. Poach, born 1516, studied under Luther and was an opponent of the Philippists, he became pastor in Halle in 1541; in Nordhausen, 1547; in Erfurt, 1550; Uttenbach, near Jena, 1572, where he died 1585. At Erfurt, Poach was deposed in 1572 on account of dissensions due to the antinomistic controversies. He signed the Book of Concord.--Otto [Otho; also called Herzberger, because he was born in Herzberg, 1505] studied under Luther; served as pastor in Graefenthal, and from 1543 in Nordhausen where he was deposed in 1568 for adherence to Flacius. However, when Otto, while antagonizing Majorism and synergism, in sermons on the Letter to the Galatians of 1565 rejected the Third Use of the Law, he was opposed also by Flacius, who reminded him of the fact that here on earth the new man resembles a child, aye, an embryo, rather than a full-fledged man.

In his zealous opposition to the Majorists, Andrew Musculus (Meusel, born 1514; studied at Leipzig 1532-1538, then at Wittenberg; became a zealous and passionate adherent of Luther, whom he considered the greatest man since the days of the apostles; from 1540 till his death, September 29, 1581, professor and pastor, later on, General Superintendent, in Frankfurt-on-the-Oder) also made some extreme statements. Later on, however, he cooperated in preparing and revising the Formula of Concord. Musculus wrote of Luther: "There is as great a difference between the dear old teachers and Luther as there is between the light of the sun and that of the moon; and beyond all doubt, the ancient fathers, even the best and foremost among them, as Hilary and Augustine, had they lived contemporaneously with him, would not have hesitated to deliver the lamp to him, as the saying is." (Meusel, Handl. 4, 709; Richard, 450.)

The most prominent opponents of these Antinomians were the well-known theologians Moerlin, Flacius, Wigand, and Westphal (chiefly in letters to Poach). The controversy was carried on with moderation, and without any special efforts to cause trouble among the people. The main issue was not--as in the conflict with Agricola--whether the Law is necessary in order to effect contrition and prepare men for the Gospel, but the so-called Third Use of the Law (tertius usus legis), i.e., whether the Law is, and is intended to be, of service to Christians after their regeneration; in particular, whether the regenerate still need the Law with respect to their new obedience.

The conflict with Poach arose from the Majoristic controversy. Dealing in particular with the aberrations of Menius, the Synod at Eisenach, 1556, adopted seven theses which Menius was required to subscribe. The first declared: "Although the proposition, Good works are necessary to salvation, may be tolerated hypothetically and in an abstract way in the doctrine of the Law (in doctrina legis abstractive et de idea tolerari potest), nevertheless there are many weighty reasons why it ought and should be avoided no less than this one: Christ is a creature." (Preger 1, 383.) While Flacius, Wigand, and Moerlin defended the thesis, Amsdorf (who first, too, adopted it, but later on withdrew his assent; Seeberg 4, 488), Aurifaber, and especially Poach rejected it. This marked the beginning of the so-called Second Antinomistic Controversy. Poach denied that the Law has any promise of salvation. Even the most perfect fulfilment of the Law, said he, is but the fulfilment of a duty which merits no reward. The only thing one may acquire by a perfect fulfilment is freedom from guilt and punishment. Fulfilment of our duty (solutio debiti) does not warrant any claim on salvation. Yet Poach was careful to declare that this did not apply to the fulfilment of the Law which Christ rendered for us. Why? Poach answered: Because Christ, being the Son of God, was not obliged to fulfil the Law. When, therefore, He did fulfil it in our stead, He rendered satisfaction to divine justice, so that righteousness can now be imputed to us and we become partakers of eternal life.

Poach wrote: "It would not be correct to say: In the doctrine of the Law all the works commanded in the Law are necessary to salvation. In doctrina legis omnia opera mandata in lege sunt necessaria ad salutem." (Schluesselburg 4, 343.) Again: "The works of Christ, which are the fulfilment of the Law, are the merit of our salvation. Our works, which ought to have been the fulfilment of the Law, do not merit salvation, even though they were most perfect, as the Law requires,--which, however, is impossible. The reason is that we are debtors to the Law. Christ, however, is not a debtor to the Law. Even if we most perfectly fulfilled all the commandments of God and completely satisfied the righteousness of God, we would not be worthy of grace and salvation on that account, nor would God be obliged to give us grace and salvation as a debt. He justly demands the fulfilment of His Law from us as obedience due Him from His creature, which is bound to obey its Creator. Etiamsi nos omnia mandata Dei perfectissime impleremus et iustitiae Dei penitus satisfaceremus, tamen non ideo digni essemus gratia et salute, nec Deus obligatus esset, ut nobis gratiam et salutem daret ex debito. Sed iure requirit impletionem legis suae a nobis, ut debitam obedientiam a sua creatura, quae conditori suo obedire tenetur." (274.) Again: "The Law has not the necessity of salvation, but the necessity of obligation (non habet lex necessitatem salutis, sed necessitatem debiti). For, as said, even though a man would most perfectly do the works of the Law, he would not obtain salvation on account of these works. Nor is God under obligation to man, but man is under obligation to God. And in the Law God requires of man the obedience he owes; He does not require an obedience with the promise of salvation." (276.)

As to Otto, he distinguished, in a series of Latin theses a double office of the Law, the ecclesiastical; and political--officium ecclesiasticum and officium politicum. The former is to give knowledge of sin; the latter, to coerce the old man and maintain order among the obstinate. He denied that the Law in any way serves Christians with respect to good works. Otto declared: "The Law is useful and necessary neither for justification nor for any good works. But faith in Christ the Mediator alone is useful and necessary both for justification and the good works themselves. Lex enim non modo ad iustificationem sed neque ad ulla bona opera utilis et necessaria est. Sed sola fides in Christum mediatorem utilis et necessaria est tam ad iustificationem quam ad ipsa bona opera." Quoting Luther, he said: "The highest art of Christians is to know nothing of the Law, to ignore works. Summa ars Christianorum est nescire legem, ignorare opera," i.e., in the article of justification, as Otto did not fail to add by way of explanation. (Luther, Weimar 40, 1, 43; Tschackert, 485.) Seeberg remarks that in reality, Poach and Otto were merely opposed to such an interpretation of the Third Use of the Law as made the Law a motive of good works, and hence could not be charged with antinomianism proper. (4, 488f.)

Planck, Frank, and other historians have fathered upon Otto also a series of radical German theses, which, however, were composed, not by Otto, but probably by some of his adherents. These theses, in which all of the errors of Agricola are revamped, were discussed at the Altenburg colloquy, 1568 to 1569; their author, however, was not mentioned. We submit the following: "1. The Law does not teach good works, nor should it be preached in order that we may do good works. 3. Moses knew nothing of our faith and religion. 5. Evangelical preachers are to preach the Gospel only, and no Law. 7. A Christian who believes should do absolutely nothing, neither what is good nor what is evil. 10. We should pray God that we may remain steadfast in faith till our end, without all works. 14. The Holy Spirit does not work according to the norm or rule of the Law, but by Himself, without the assistance of the Law. 16. A believing Christian is supra omnem obedientiam, above all Law and all obedience. 17. The rebuking sermons of the prophets do not at all pertain to Christians. 21. The Law, good works, and new obedience have no place in the kingdom of Christ, but in the world just as Moses and the government of the Pope. 25. The Law has no place in the Church or in the pulpit, but in the court-house (Rathaus). 28. The Third Use of the Law is a blasphemy in theology and a monstrosity in the realm of nature (portentum in rerum natura). 29. No man can be saved if the Third Use of the Law is true and is to be taught in the Church. The Holy Spirit in man knows nothing of the Law; the flesh, however, is betimes in need of the Law." (Tschackert, 485; Planck 5, 1, 62.) Frank also quotes: "The Christians or the regenerate are deified (vergoettert); yea, they are themselves God and cannot sin. God has not given you His Word that you should be saved thereby (dass du dadurch sollst selig werden); and whoever seeks no more from God than salvation (Seligkeit) seeks just as much as a louse in a scab. Such Christians are the devil's own, together with all their good works." (2, 326. 275.)

Also Musculus is numbered among the theologians who were not always sufficiently discreet and guarded in their statements concerning the necessity of good works and the use of the Law. All expressions of the Apostle Paul regarding the spiritual use of the Law, said Musculus, must be understood as referring to such only as are to be justified, not to those who are justified (de iustificandis, non de iustificatis). But he added: "For these, in as far as they remain in Christ, are far outside of and above every law. Hi enim, quatenus in Christo manent, longe extra et supra omnem legem sunt." (Tschackert. 486.)

Michael Neander of Ilfeld, a friend of Otto was also suspected of antinomianism. He denied that there is any relation whatever between the Law and a regenerate Christian. But he, too, was careful enough to add: "in as far as he is just or lives by the spirit, quatenus est iustus seu spiritu vivit." In a letter, Neander said: "I adhere to the opinion that the Law is not given to the just in any use or office whatsoever, in so far as he is just or lives by the spirit.... 'For the Law,' as Luther says in his marginal note to Jeremiah, chap. 31, 'is no longer over us, but under us, and does not surround us any more.' Love rules and governs all laws, and frequently something is true according to the Law, but false according to love (saepeque aliquid lege verum, dilectione tamen falsum est). For love is the statute, measure, norm, and rule of all things on earth.... The Law only accuses and damns, and apart from this it has no other use or office, i.e., the Law remains the norm of good works to all eternity, also in hell after the Last Day, but for the unjust and reprobate, and for the flesh in every man. To the just, regenerated, and new man, however, it is not the norm of good works, i.e., the Law does not govern, regulate, and teach the just man; i.e., it is not active with respect to him as it is with respect to an unjust man, but is rather regulated and governed and taught by the just man. It no longer drives the just (as it did before conversion and as it still drives the flesh), but is now driven and suffers, since as just men we are no longer under the Law, but above the Law and lords of the Law. How, therefore, can the Law be a norm to the just man when he is the lord of the Law, commands the Law, and frequently does what is contrary to the Law (cum iustus legis sit dominus, legi imperet et saepe legi contraria faciat)?... When the just man meditates in the Law of the Lord day and night, when he establishes the Law by faith, when he loves the Law and admires the inexhaustible wisdom of the divine Law, when he does good works written and prescribed in the Law (as indeed he alone can), when he uses the Law aright,--all these are neither the third, nor the fourth, nor the twelfth, nor the fiftieth use or office of the Law,... but fruits of faith, of the Spirit, or regeneration.... But the Old Man, who is not yet new, or a part of him which is not as yet regenerated, has need of this Law, and he is to be commanded: 'Put on the new man; put off the old.'" (Schluesselburg 4, 61; Tschackert, 484.)

195. Melanchthon and the Philippists.

A further controversy concerning the proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel was caused by the Philippists in Wittenberg whose teaching was somewhat akin to that of Agricola. They held that the Gospel, in the narrow sense of the term, and as distinguished from the Law, is "the most powerful preaching of repentance." (Frank 2, 327.) Taking his cue from Luther, Melanchthon, in his Loci of 1521 as well as in later writings, clearly distinguished between Law and Gospel. (C. R. 21, 139; 23, 49; 12, 576.) True, he had taught, also in the Apology, that, in the wider sense, the Gospel is both a preaching of repentance and forgiveness of sin. But this, as the Formula of Concord explains, was perfectly correct and in keeping with the Scriptures. However, in repeating the statement that the Gospel embraces both the preaching of repentance and forgiveness of sins, Melanchthon was not always sufficiently careful to preclude misapprehension and misunderstanding. Indeed, some of the statements he made after Luther's death are misleading, and did not escape the challenge of loyal Lutherans.

During a disputation in 1548, at which Melanchthon presided, Flacius criticized the unqualified assertion that the Gospel was a preaching of repentance, but was satisfied when Melanchthon explained that the term Gospel was here used in the wider sense, as comprising the entire doctrine of Christ. However, when Melanchthon, during another disputation, 1556, declared: The ministry of the Gospel "rebukes the other sins which the Law shows, as well as the saddest of sins which is revealed by the Gospel (hoc tristissimum peccatum, quod in Evangelio ostenditur), viz., that the world ignores and despises the Son of God." Flacius considered it his plain duty to register a public protest. It was a teaching which was, at least in part, the same error that Luther, and formerly also Melanchthon himself, had denounced when espoused by Agricola, viz., that genuine contrition is wrought, not by the Law, but by the Gospel; by the preaching, not of the violation of the Law, but of the violation of the Son. (C. R. 12, 634. 640.)

These misleading statements of Melanchthon were religiously cultivated and zealously defended by the Wittenberg Philippists. With a good deal of animosity they emphasized that the Gospel in its most proper sense is also a preaching of repentance (praedicatio poenitentiae, Busspredigt), inasmuch as it revealed the baseness of sin and the greatness of its offense against God, and, in particular, inasmuch as the Gospel alone uncovered, rebuked, and condemned the hidden sin (arcanum peccatum) and the chief sin of all, the sin of unbelief (incredulitas et neglectio Filii), which alone condemns a man. These views, which evidently involved a commingling of the Law and the Gospel, were set forth by Paul Crell in his Disputation against John Wigand, 1571, and were defended in the Propositions Concerning the Chief Controversies of These Times (also of 1571), by Pezel and other Wittenberg theologians. (Frank 2, 277. 323.)

As a consequence, the Philippists, too, were charged with antinomianism, and were strenuously opposed by such theologians as Flacius, Amsdorf, and Wigand. Wigand attacked the Wittenberg Propositions in his book of 1571, Concerning Antinomianism, Old and New. Pezel answered in his Apology of the True Doctrine on the Definition of the Gospel, 1571; and Paul Crell, in Spongia, or 150 Propositions Concerning the Definition of the Gospel, Opposed to the Stupid Accusation of John Wigand, 1571. The teaching of the Philippists was formulated by Paul Crell as follows: "Since this greatest and chief sin [unbelief] is revealed, rebuked, and condemned by the Gospel alone, therefore also the Gospel alone is expressly and particularly, truly and properly, a preaching and a voice of repentance or conversion in its true and proper sense. A solo evangelio, cum peccatum hoc summum et praecipuum monstretur, arguatur et damnetur expresse ac nominatim solum etiam evangelium vere ac proprie praedicatio ac vox est poenitentiae sive conversionis vere et proprie ita dictae." (277. 327.)

This doctrine of the Philippists, according to which the Gospel in the narrow and proper sense, and as distinguished from the Law, is a preaching of repentance, was rejected by Article V of the Formula of Concord as follows: "But if the Law and the Gospel, likewise also Moses himself as a teacher of the Law and Christ as a preacher of the Gospel, are contrasted with one another, we believe, teach, and confess that the Gospel is not a preaching of repentance or reproof, but properly nothing else than a preaching of consolation, and a joyful message which does not reprove or terrify, but comforts consciences against the terrors of the Law, points alone to the merit of Christ, and raises them up again by the lovely preaching of the grace and favor of God, obtained through Christ's merit." (803, 7.)

XVIII. The Crypto-Calvinistic Controversy.

196. Contents and Purpose of Articles VII and VIII.

In all of its articles the Formula of Concord is but a reafflrmation of the doctrines taught and defended by Luther. The fire of prolonged and hot controversies through which these doctrines passed after his death had but strengthened the Lutherans in their conviction that in every point Luther's teaching was indeed nothing but the pure Word of God itself. It had increased the consciousness that, in believing and teaching as they did, they were not following mere human authorities, such as Luther and the Lutheran Confessions, but the Holy Scriptures, by which alone their consciences were bound. Articles VII and VIII of the Formula of Concord, too, reassert Luther's doctrines on the Lord's Supper and the person of Christ as being in every particular the clear and unmistakable teaching of the divine Word,--two doctrines, by the way, which perhaps more than any other serve as the acid test whether the fundamental attitude of a church or a theologian is truly Scriptural and fully free from every rationalistic and enthusiastic infection.

The Seventh Article teaches the real and substantial presence of the true body and blood of Christ; their sacramental union in, with, and under the elements of bread and wine; the oral manducation or eating and drinking of both substances by unbelieving as well as believing communicants. It maintains that this presence of the body and blood of Christ, though real, is neither an impanation nor a companation, neither a local inclusion nor a mixture of the two substances, but illocal and transcendent. It holds that the eating of the body and the drinking of the blood of Christ, though truly done with the mouth of the body, is not Capernaitic, or natural, but supernatural. It affirms that this real presence is effected, not by any human power, but by the omnipotent power of Christ in accordance with the words of the institution of the Sacrament.

The Eighth Article treats of the person of Christ, of the personal union of His two natures, of the communication of these natures as well as of their attributes, and, in particular, of the impartation of the truly divine majesty to His human nature and the terminology resulting therefrom. One particular object of Article VIII is also to show that the doctrine of the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper, as taught by the Lutheran Church, does not, as was contended by her Zwinglian and Calvinistic adversaries, conflict in any way with what the Scriptures teach concerning the person of Christ, His human nature, His ascension, and His sitting at the right hand of God the Father Almighty. The so-called Appendix, or Catalogus, a collection of passages from the Bible and from the fathers of the ancient Church, prepared by Andreae and Chemnitz was added to the Formula of Concord (though not as an authoritative part of it) in further support of the Lutheran doctrine particularly concerning the divine majesty of the human nature of Christ.

Both articles, the seventh as well as the eighth, were incorporated in the Formula of Concord in order thoroughly to purify the Lutheran Church from Reformed errors concerning the Lord's Supper and the person of Christ, which after Luther's death had wormed their way into some of her schools and churches, especially those of Electoral Saxony, and to make her forever immune against the infection of Calvinism (Crypto-Calvinism)--a term which, during the controversies preceding the Formula of Concord did not, as is generally the case to-day, refer to Calvin's absolute decree of election and reprobation, but to his doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper, as formulated by himself in the Consensus Tigurinus (Zurich Consensus), issued 1549. The subtitle of this confession reads: "Consensio Mutua in Re Sacramentaria Ministrorum Tigurinae Ecclesiae, et D. Iohannis Calvini Ministri Genevensis Ecclesiae, iam nunc ab ipsis autoribus edita." In this confession, therefore, Calvin declares his agreement with the teaching of Zwingli as represented by his followers in Zurich, notably Bullinger. Strenuous efforts were made by the Calvinists and Reformed everywhere to make the Consensus Tigurinus the basis of a pan-Protestant union, and at the same time the banner under which to conquer all Protestant countries, Lutheran Germany included, for what must be regarded as being essentially Zwinglianism. The Consensus was adopted in Switzerland, England, France, and Holland. In Lutheran territories, too, its teaching was rapidly gaining friends, notably in Southern Germany, where Bucer had prepared the way for it, and in Electoral Saxony where the Philippists offered no resistance. Garnished as it was with glittering and seemingly orthodox phrases, the Consensus Tigurinus lent itself admirably for such Reformed propaganda. "The consequence was," says the Formula of Concord, "that many great men were deceived by these fine, plausible words--splendidis et magnificis verbis." (973, 6.) To counteract this deception, to establish Luther's doctrine of the real presence of the body and blood of Christ, and to defend it against the sophistries of the Sacramentarians: Zwinglians, Calvinists, and Crypto-Calvinists--such was the object of Articles VII and VIII of the Formula of Concord.

197. John Calvin.

Calvin was born July 10, 1509, in Noyon, France. He began his studies in Paris, 1523 preparing for theology. In 1529 his father induced him to take up law in Orleans and Bourges. In 1531 he returned to his theological studies in Paris. Here he experienced what he himself describes as a "sudden conversion." He joined the Reformed congregation, and before long was its acknowledged leader. In 1533 he was compelled to leave France because of his anti-Roman testimony. In Basel, 1535, he wrote the first draft of his Institutio Religionis Christianae. In Geneva where he was constrained to remain by William Farel [born 1489; active as a fiery Protestant preacher in Meaux, Strassburg, Zurich, Bern, Basel, Moempelgard, Geneva, Metz, etc.; died 1565], Calvin developed and endeavored to put into practise his legalistic ideal of a theocratic and rigorous puritanical government. As a result he was banished, 1538. He removed to Strassburg, where he was held and engaged by Bucer. He attended the conventions in Frankfort, 1539; Hagenau, 1540; Worms, 1540; and Regensburg, 1541. Here he got acquainted with the Lutherans notably Melanchthon. September 13, 1541, he returned to Geneva, where, woefully mixing State and Church, he continued his reformatory and puritanical efforts. One of the victims of his theocratic government was the anti-Trinitarian Michael Servetus, who, at the instance of Calvin, was burned at the stake, October 27, 1553. In 1559 Calvin established the Geneva School, which exercised a far-reaching theological influence. He died May 27, 1564.

Calvin repeatedly expressed his unbounded admiration for Luther as a "preeminent servant of Christ--praeclarus Christi servus." (C. R. 37, 54.) In his Answer of 1543 against the Romanist Pighius he said: "Concerning Luther we testify without dissimulation now as heretofore that we esteem him as a distinguished apostle of Christ, by whose labor and service, above all, the purity of the Gospel has been restored at this time. De Luthero nunc quoque sicut hactenus non dissimulanter testamur, eum nos habere pro insigni Christi apostolo, cuius maxime opera et ministerio restituta hoc tempore fuerit Evangelii puritas." (Gieseler 3, 2, 169.) Even after Luther had published his Brief Confession, in which he unsparingly denounces the Sacramentarians (deniers of the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Lord's Supper), and severs all connection with them, Calvin admonished Bullinger in a letter dated November 25, 1544, to bear in mind what a great and wonderfully gifted man Luther was, and with what fortitude, ability, and powerful teaching he had shattered the kingdom of Antichrist and propagated the salutary doctrine. "I am frequently accustomed to say," he declared, "that, even if he should call me a devil I would accord him the honor of acknowledging him to be an eminent servant of God." In the original the remarkable words of Calvin read as follows: "Sed haec cupio vobis in mentem venire, primum quantus sit vir Lutherus, et quantis dotibus excellat, quanta animi fortitudine et constantia quanta dexteritate, quanta doctrinae efficacia hactenus ad profligandum Antichristi regnum et simul propagandam salutis doctrinam incubuerit. Saepe dicere solitus sum, etiamsi me diabolum vocaret, me tamen hoc illi honoris habiturum, ut insignem Dei servum agnoscam, qui tamen, ut pollet eximiis virtutibus, ita magnis vitiis laboret." (Gieseler 3, 2, 169; C. R. 39 [Calvini Opp. 11], 774.)

However, though he admired the personality of Luther, Calvin, like Zwingli and Oecolampadius at Marburg 1529, revealed a theological spirit which was altogether different from Luther's. In particular, he was violently opposed to Luther's doctrines of the real presence in the Lord's Supper and of the majesty of the human nature of Christ. Revealing his animus, Calvin branded the staunch and earnest defenders of these doctrines as the "apes" of Luther. In his Second Defense against Westphal, 1556, he exclaimed: "O Luther, how few imitators of your excellences, but how many apes of your pious ostentation have you left behind! O Luthere, quam paucos tuae praestantiae imitatores, quam multas vero sanctae tuae iactantiae simias reliquisti!" (Gieseler 3, 2, 209.)

True, when in Strassburg, Calvin signed the Augsburg Confession (1539 or 1540), and was generally considered a Lutheran. However, in his Last Admonition to Westphal, of 1557 and in a letter of the same year to Martin Schalling, Calvin wrote: "Nor do I repudiate the Augsburg Confession, to which I have previously subscribed, in the sense in which the author himself [Melanchthon in the Variata of 1540] has interpreted it. Nec vero Augustanam Confessionem repudio, cui pridem volens ac libens subscripsi, sicut eam auctor ipse interpretatus est." (C. R. 37, 148.) According to his own confession, therefore, Calvin's subscription to the Augustana, at least as far as the article of the Lord's Supper is concerned, was insincere and nugatory. In fact Calvin must be regarded as the real originator of the second controversy on the Lord's Supper between the Lutherans and the Reformed, even as the first conflict on this question was begun, not by Luther, but by his opponents, Carlstadt, Zwingli, and Oecolampadius. For the adoption of the Consensus Tigurinus in 1549, referred to above, cannot but be viewed as an overt act by which the Wittenberg Concord, signed 1536 by representative Lutheran and Reformed theologians, was publicly repudiated and abandoned by Calvin and his adherents, and whereby an anti-Lutheran propaganda on an essentially Zwinglian basis was inaugurated. Calvin confirmed the schism between the Lutherans and the Reformed which Carlstadt, Zwingli, and Oecolampadius had originated.

198. Calvin's Zwinglianism.

The doctrine of Calvin and his adherents concerning the Lord's Supper is frequently characterized as a materially modified Zwinglianism. Schaff maintains that "Calvin's theory took a middle course, retaining, on the basis of Zwingli's exegesis, the religious substance of Luther's faith, and giving it a more intellectual and spiritual form, triumphed in Switzerland, gained much favor in Germany and opened a fair prospect for union." (Creeds 1, 280.) As a matter of fact, however, a fact admitted also by such Calvinists as Hodge and Shedd, Calvin's doctrine was a denial in toto of the real presence as taught by Luther. (Pieper, Dogm. 3, 354.) Calvin held that after His ascension Christ, according to His human nature, was locally enclosed in heaven, far away from the earth. Hence he denied also the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Holy Supper. In fact, Calvin's doctrine was nothing but a polished form of Zwingli's crude teaching, couched in phrases approaching the Lutheran terminology as closely as possible. Even where he paraded as Luther, Calvin was but Zwingli disguised (and poorly at that) in a seemingly orthodox garb and promenading with several imitation Lutheran feathers in his hat.

In the Formula of Concord we read: "Although some Sacramentarians strive to employ words that come as close as possible to the Augsburg Confession and the form and mode of speech in its churches, and confess that in the Holy Supper the body of Christ is truly received by believers, still, when we insist that they state their meaning properly, sincerely, and clearly, they all declare themselves unanimously thus: that the true essential body and blood of Christ is absent from the consecrated bread and wine in the Holy Supper as far as the highest heaven is from the earth.... Therefore they understand this presence of the body of Christ not as a presence here upon earth, but only respectu fidei (with respect to faith), that is, that our faith, reminded and excited by the visible signs, just as by the Word preached, elevates itself and ascends above all heavens, and receives and enjoys the body of Christ, which is there in heaven present, yea, Christ Himself, together with all His benefits, in a manner true and essential, but nevertheless spiritual only;... consequently nothing else is received by the mouth in the Holy Supper than bread and wine." (971, 2f.) This is, and was intended to be, a presentation of Calvinism as being nothing but Zwinglianism clothed in seemingly orthodox phrases.

That this picture drawn by the Formula of Concord is not a caricature or in any point a misrepresentation of Calvinism appears from the Consensus Tigurinus itself, where we read: "In as far as Christ is a man, He is to be sought nowhere else than in heaven and in no other manner than with the mind and the understanding of faith. Therefore it is a perverse and impious superstition to include Him under elements of this world. Christus, quatenus homo est, non alibi quam in coelo nec aliter quam mente et fidei intelligentia quaerendus est. Quare perversa et impia superstitio est, ipsum sub elementis huius mundi includere." Again: "We repudiate those [who urge the literal interpretation of the words of institution] as preposterous interpreters." "For beyond controversy, they are to be taken figuratively,... as when by metonymy the name of the symbolized thing is transferred to the sign--ut per metonymiam ad signum transferatur rei figuratae nomen." Again: "Nor do we regard it as less absurd to place Christ under, and to unite Him with, the bread than to change the bread into His body. Neque enim minus absurdum iudicamus, Christum sub pane locare vel cum pane copulare, quam panem transubstantiare in corpus eius." Again: "When we say that Christ is to be sought in heaven, this mode of speech expresses a distance of place,... because the body of Christ,... being finite and contained in heaven, as in a place, must of necessity be removed from us by as great a distance as the heaven is removed from the earth--necesse est, a nobis tanto locorum intervallo distare, quanto caelum abest a terra." (Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, 196.) Such was the teaching cunningly advocated by Calvin and his adherents the Crypto-Calvinists in Germany included but boldly and firmly opposed by the loyal Lutherans, and finally disposed of by Articles VII and VIII of the Formula of Concord.

199. Melanchthon's Public Attitude.

As stated, Calvin's doctrine of the Lord's Supper was received with increasing favor also in Lutheran territories, notably in Southern Germany and Electoral Saxony, where the number of theologians and laymen who secretly adopted and began to spread it was rapidly increasing. They were called Crypto-Calvinists (secret or masked Calvinists) because, while they subscribed to the Augsburg Confession, claimed to be loyal Lutherans, and occupied most important positions in the Lutheran Church, they in reality were propagandists of Calvinism, zealously endeavoring to suppress Luther's books and doctrines, and to substitute for them the views of Calvin. Indeed, Calvin claimed both privately and publicly that Melanchthon himself was his ally. And, entirely apart from what the latter may privately have confided to him, there can be little doubt that Calvin's assertions were not altogether without foundation. In fact, theologically as well as ethically, Melanchthon must be regarded as the spiritual father also of the Crypto-Calvinists.

True, originally Melanchthon fully shared Luther's views on the Lord's Supper. At Marburg, 1529, he was still violently opposed to the Zwinglians and their "profane" teaching in an Opinion on Carlstadt's doctrine, of October 9, 1625, he affirms that Christ, both as God and man, i.e., with His body and blood is present in the Supper. (C. R. 1, 760.) In September of the following year he wrote to Philip Eberbach: "Know that Luther's teaching [concerning the Lord's Supper] is very old in the Church. Hoc scito, Lutheri sententiam perveterem in ecclesia esse." (823.) This he repeats in a letter of November 11, also to Eberbach. In an Opinion of May 15 1529: "I am satisfied that I shall not agree with the Strassburgers all my life, and I know that Zwingli and his compeers write falsely concerning the Sacrament." (1067.) June 20 1529, to Jerome Baumgaertner: "I would rather die than see our people become contaminated by the society of the Zwinglian cause. Nam mori malim, quam societate Cinglianae causae nostros contaminare. My dear Jerome, it is a great cause, but few consider it. I shall be lashed to death on account of this matter." (C. R. 1, 1077; 2, 18.) November 2, 1529, to John Fesel: "I admonish you most earnestly to avoid the Zwinglian dogmas. Your Judimagister [Eberbach], I fear, loves these profane disputations too much. I know that the teaching of Zwingli can be upheld neither with the Scriptures nor with the authority of the ancients. Concerning the Lord's Supper, therefore, teach as Luther does." (1, 1109.) In February, 1530, he wrote: "The testimonies of ancient writers concerning the Lord's Supper which I have compiled are now being printed." (2, 18.) In this publication Melanchthon endeavored to show by quotations from Cyril, Chrysostom Vulgarius, Hilary, Cyprian, Irenaeus, and Augustine that Zwingli's interpretation of the words of institution does not agree with that of the ancient Church. (23, 732.) According to his own statement, Melanchthon embodied Luther's doctrine in the Augsburg Confession and rejected that of the Zwinglians. (2, 142. 212.)

At Augsburg, Melanchthon was much provoked also when he heard that Bucer claimed to be in doctrinal agreement with the Lutherans. In his Opinion Concerning the Doctrine of the Sacramentarians, written in August, 1530, we read: "1. The Zwinglians believe that the body of the Lord can be present in but one place. 2. Likewise that the body of Christ cannot be anywhere except locally only. They vehemently contend that it is contrary to the nature of a body to be anywhere in a manner not local; also, that it is inconsistent with the nature of a body to be in different places at the same time. 3. For this reason they conclude that the body of Christ is circumscribed in heaven in a certain place, so that it can in no way be elsewhere at the same time and that in truth and reality it is far away from the bread, and not in the bread and with the bread. 4. Bucer is therefore manifestly wrong in contending that they [the Zwinglians] are in agreement with us. For we say that it is not necessary for the body of Christ to be in but one place. We say that it can be in different places, whether this occurs locally or in some other secret way by which different places are as one point present at the same time to the person of Christ. We, therefore, affirm a true and real presence of the body of Christ with the bread. 5. If Bucer wishes to accept the opinion of Zwingli and Oecolampadius, he will never dare to say that the body of Christ is really with the bread without geometric distance. 9. Here they [the Zwinglians] wish the word 'presence' to be understood only concerning efficacy and the Holy Spirit. 10. We, however, require not only the presence of power, but of the body. This Bucer purposely disguises. 11. They simply hold that the body of Christ is in heaven, and that in reality it is neither with the bread nor in the bread. 12. Nevertheless they say that the body of Christ is truly present, but by contemplation of faith, i.e., by imagination. 13. Such is simply their opinion. They deceive men by saying that the body is truly present, yet adding afterwards, 'by contemplation of faith,' i.e., by imagination. 14. We teach that Christ's body is truly and really present with the bread or in the bread. 15. Although we say that the body of Christ is really present, Luther does not say that it is present locally, namely, in some mass, by circumscription; but in the manner by which Christ's person or the entire Christ is present to all creatures.... We deny transubstantiation, and that the body is locally in the bread," etc. (2, 222. 311. 315.)

Such were the views of Melanchthon in and before 1530. And publicly and formally he continued to adhere to Luther's teaching. In an Opinion written 1534, prior to his convention with Bucer at Cassel, he said: "If Christ were a mere creature and not God, He would not be with us essentially, even if He had the government; but since He is God, He gives His body as a testimony that He is essentially with us always. This sense of the Sacrament is both simple and comforting.... Therefore I conclude that Christ's body and blood are truly with the bread and wine, that is to say, Christ essentially, not figuratively. But here we must cast aside the thoughts proffered by reason, viz., how Christ ascends and descends, hides Himself in the bread, and is nowhere else." (2. 801.) In 1536 Melanchthon signed the Wittenberg Concord, which plainly taught that the body and blood of Christ are received also by unworthy guests. (CONC. TRIGL. 977, 12ff.) In 1537 he subscribed to the Smalcald Articles, in which Luther brought out his doctrine of the real presence in most unequivocal terms, declaring that "bread and wine in the Supper are the true body and blood of Christ, and are given and received not only by the godly, but also by wicked Christians." (CONC. TRIGL. 493, 1.) In his letter to Flacius of September 5, 1556, Melanchthon solemnly declared: "I have never changed the doctrine of the Confession." (C. R. 8, 841.) September 6, 1557, he wrote: "We all embrace and retain the Confession together with the Apology and the confession of Luther written previous to the Synod at Mantua." (9, 260.) Again, in November of the same year: "Regarding the Lord's Supper, we retain the Augsburg Confession and Apology." (9, 371.) In an Opinion of March 4, 1558, Melanchthon declared that in the Holy Supper the Son of God is truly and substantially present in such a manner that when we use it, ["]He gives us with the bread and wine His body," etc., and that Zwingli was wrong when he declared "that it is a mere outward sign, and that Christ is not essentially present in it, and that it is a mere sign by which Christians know each other." (9, 472f.) Several months before his death, in his preface to the Corpus Philippicum, Melanchthon declared that in the Holy Supper "Christ is truly and substantially present and truly administered to those who take the body and blood of Christ," and that in it "He gives His body and blood to him who eats and drinks." (Richard. 389.)

200. Melanchthon's Private Views.

While Melanchthon in a public and formal way, continued, in the manner indicated, to maintain orthodox appearances till his death, he had inwardly and in reality since 1530 come to be more and more of a stranger to Luther's firmness of conviction, also with respect to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. Influenced by an undue respect for the authority of the ancient fathers and misled by his reason or, as Luther put it, by his philosophy, he gradually lost his firm hold on the clear words of the institution of the Holy Supper. As a result he became a wavering reed, driven to and fro with the wind, now verging toward Luther, now toward Calvin. Always oscillating between truth and error, he was unable to rise to the certainty of firm doctrinal conviction, and the immovable stand which characterized Luther. In a letter dated May 24, 1538, in which he revealed the torments of his distracted and doubting soul, he wrote to Veit Dietrich: "Know that for ten years neither a night nor a day has passed in which I did not reflect on this matter," the Lord's Supper. (C. R. 3, 537.) And his doubts led to a departure from his own former position,--a fact for which also sufficient evidences are not wholly lacking. "Already in 1531," says Seeberg, "Melanchthon secretly expressed his opinion plainly enough to the effect that it was sufficient to acknowledge a presence of the divinity of Christ in the Lord's Supper, but not a union of the body and the bread. Ep., p.85." (Dogg. 4, 2, 447.)

That Melanchthon's later public statements and protestations concerning his faithful adherence to the doctrine of the Augsburg Confession must be more or less discounted, appears, apart from other considerations, from his own admission that he was wont to dissimulate in these and other matters; from his private letters, in which he favorably refers to the symbolical interpretation of the words of institution; from his communication to Philip of Hesse with regard to Luther's article on the Lord's Supper at Smalcald, referred to in a previous chapter; from the changes which he made 1540 in Article X of the Augsburg Confession; from his later indefinite statements concerning the real presence in the Holy Supper; from his intimate relations and his cordial correspondence with Calvin; from his public indifference and neutrality during the eucharistic controversy with the Calvinists; and from his unfriendly attitude toward the champions of Luther in this conflict.

201. Misled by Oecolampadius and Bucer.

That Melanchthon permitted himself to be guided by human authorities rather than by the clear Word of God alone, appears from the fact that Oecolampadius's Dialogus of 1530--which endeavored to show that the symbolical interpretation of the words of institution is found also in the writings of the Church Fathers, notably in those of St. Augustine, and which Melanchthon, in a letter to Luther (C. R. 2, 217), says, was written "with greater exactness (accuratius) than he is otherwise wont to write"--made such a profound impression on him that ever since, as is shown by some of his private letters, to which we shall presently refer, he looked with increasing favor on the figurative interpretation. As a result, Melanchthon's attitude toward the Southern Germans and the Zwinglians also underwent a marked change. When he left to attend the conference with Bucer at Cassel, in December, 1534, Luther in strong terms enjoined him to defend the sacramental union and the oral eating and drinking; namely, that in and with the bread the body of Christ is truly present, distributed, and eaten. Luther's Opinion in this matter, dated December 17, 1534, concludes as follows "Und ist Summa das unsere Meinung, dass wahrhaftig in und mit dem Brot der Leib Christi gegessen wird, also dass alles, was das Brot wirkt und leidet, der Leib Christi wirke und leide, dass er ausgeteilt [ge]gessen und mit den Zaehnen zerbissen werde." (St. L. 17, 2052.) Self-evidently, when writing thus, Luther had no Capernaitic eating and drinking in mind, his object merely being, as stated to emphasize the reality of the sacramental union. January [1]0, 1535, however, the day after his return from Cassel, Melanchthon wrote to his intimate friend Camerarius that at Cassel he had been the messenger not of his own, but of a foreign opinion. (C. R. 2, 822)

As a matter of fact, Melanchthon returned to Wittenberg a convert to the compromise formula of Bucer, according to which Christ's body and blood are truly and substantially received in the Sacrament, but are not really connected with the bread and wine, the signs or signa exhibitiva, as Bucer called them. Stating the difference between Luther and Bucer, as he now saw it, Melanchthon said: "The only remaining question therefore is the one concerning the physical union of the bread and body,--and of what need is this question? Tantum igitur reliqua est quaestio de physica coniunctione panis et corporis, qua quaestione quid opus est?" (C. R. 2, 827. 842; St. L. 17, 2057.) To Erhard Schnepf he had written: "He [Bucer] confesses that, when these things, bread and wine, are given, Christ is truly and substantially present. As for me I would not demand anything further." (C. R. 2, 787.) In February he wrote to Brenz: "I plainly judge that they [Bucer, etc.] are not far from the view of our men; indeed in the matter itself they agree with us (reipsa convenire); nor do I condemn them." (2, 843; St. L. 17, 2065.) This, however, was not Luther's view. In a following letter Melanchthon said: "Although Luther does not openly condemn it [the formula of Bucer], yet he did not wish to give his opinion upon it as yet. Lutherus, etsi non plane damnat, tamen nondum voluit pronuntiare." (C. R. 2, 843; St. L. 17, 2062.) A letter of February 1, 1535, to Philip of Hesse and another of February 3, to Bucer, also both reveal, on the one hand, Melanchthon's desire for a union on Bucer's platform and, on the other, Luther's attitude of aloofness and distrust. (C. R. 2, 836. 841.)

202. Secret Letters and the Variata of 1540.

In the letter to Camerarius of January 10, 1535, referred to in the preceding paragraph, Melanchthon plainly indicates that his views of the Holy Supper no longer agreed with Luther's. "Do not ask for my opinion now," says he, "for I was the messenger of an opinion foreign to me, although, forsooth, I will not hide what I think when I shall have heard what our men answer. But concerning this entire matter either personally or when I shall have more reliable messengers. Meam sententiam noli nunc requirere; fui enim nuntius alienae, etsi profecto non dissimulabo, quid sentiam, ubi audiero, quid respondeant nostri. Ac de hac re tota aut coram, aut cum habebo certiores tabellarios." (2, 822.) Two days later, January 12, 1535, Melanchthon wrote a letter to Brenz (partly in Greek, which language he employed when he imparted thoughts which he regarded as dangerous, as, e.g., in his defamatory letter to Camerarius, July 24, 1525, on Luther's marriage; C. R. 1, 754), in which he lifted the veil still more and gave a clear glimpse of his own true inwardness. From this letter it plainly appears that Melanchthon was no longer sure of the correctness of the literal interpretation of the words of institution, the very foundation of Luther's entire doctrine concerning the Holy Supper.

The letter reads, in part, as follows: "You have written several times concerning the Sacramentarians, and you disadvise the Concord, even though they should incline towards Luther's opinion. My dear Brenz, if there are any who differ from us regarding the Trinity or other articles, I will have no alliance with them, but regard them as such who are to be execrated.... Concerning the Concord, however, no action whatever has as yet been taken. I have only brought Bucer's opinions here [to Wittenberg]. But I wish that I could talk to you personally concerning the controversy. I do not constitute myself a judge, and readily yield to you, who govern the Church, and I affirm the real presence of Christ in the Supper. I do not desire to be the author or defender of a new dogma in the Church, but I see that there are many testimonies of the ancient writers who without any ambiguity explain the mystery typically and tropically [peri tupou kai tropikos], while the opposing testimonies are either more modern or spurious. You, too, will have to investigate whether you defend the ancient opinion. But I do wish earnestly that the pious Church would decide this case without sophistry and tyranny. In France and at other places many are killed on account of this opinion. And many applaud such judgments without any good reason, and strengthen the fury of the tyrants. To tell the truth, this matter pains me not a little. Therefore my only request is that you do not pass on this matter rashly, but consult also the ancient Church. I most fervently desire that a concord be effected without any sophistry. But I desire also that good men may be able to confer on this great matter in a friendly manner. Thus a concord might be established without sophistry. For I do not doubt that the adversaries would gladly abandon the entire dogma if they believed that it was new. You know that among them are many very good men. Now they incline toward Luther, being moved by a few testimonies of ecclesiastical writers. What, then, do you think, ought to be done? Will you forbid also that we confer together? As for me, I desire that we may be able frequently to confer together on this matter as well as on many others. You see that in other articles they as well as we now explain many things more skilfully (dexterius) since they have begun to be agitated among us more diligently. However, I conclude and ask you to put the best construction on this letter, and, after reading it, to tear it up immediately, and to show it to nobody." (C. R. 2, 823f.; Luther, St. L. 17, 2060.)

In a letter to Veit Dietrich, dated April 23, 1538, Melanchthon declares: "In order not to deviate too far from the ancients, I have maintained a sacramental presence in the use, and said that, when these things are given, Christ is truly present and efficacious. That is certainly enough. I have not added an inclusion or a connection by which the body is affixed to, concatenated or mixed with, the bread. Sacraments are covenants [assuring us] that something else is present when the things are received. Nec addidi inclusionem aut coniunctionem talem, qua affigeretur to arto, to soma, aut ferruminaretur, aut misceretur. Sacramenta pacta sunt, ut rebus sumptis adsit aliud.... What more do you desire? And this will have to be resorted to lest you defend what some even now are saying, viz., that the body and blood are tendered separately--separatim tradi corpus et sanguinem. This too, is new and will not even please the Papists. Error is fruitful, as the saying goes. That physical connection (illa physica coniunctio) breeds many questions: Whether the parts are separate; whether included; when [in what moment] they are present; whether [they are present] apart from the use. Of this nothing is read among the ancients. Nor do I, my dear Veit, carry these disputations into the Church; and in the Loci I have spoken so sparingly on this matter in order to lead the youth away from these questions. Such is in brief and categorically what I think. But I wish that the two most cruel tyrants, animosity and sophistry, would be removed for a while, and a just deliberation held concerning the entire matter. If I have not satisfied you by this simple answer, I shall expect of you a longer discussion. I judge that in this manner I am speaking piously, carefully, and modestly concerning the symbols, and approach as closely as possible to the opinion of the ancients." (C. R. 3, 514f.) A month later, May 24, Melanchthon again added: "I have simply written you what I think, nor do I detract anything from the words. For I know that Christ is truly and substantially present and efficacious when we use the symbols. You also admit a synecdoche. But to add a division and separation of the body and blood, that is something altogether new and unheard of in the universal ancient Church." (3, 536; 7, 882.)

Evidently, then, Melanchchton's attitude toward the Reformed and his views concerning the Lord's Supper had undergone remarkable changes since 1530. And in order to clear the track for his own changed sentiments and to enable the Reformed, in the interest of an ultimate union, to subscribe the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon, in 1540, altered its Tenth Article in the manner set forth in a previous chapter. Schaff remarks: Calvin's view of the Lord's Supper "was in various ways officially recognized in the Augsburg Confession of 1540." (1, 280.) Such at any rate was the construction the Reformed everywhere put on the alteration. It was generally regarded by them to be an essential concession to Calvinism. Melanchthon, too, was well aware of this; but he did absolutely nothing to obviate this interpretation--no doubt, because it certainly was not very far from the truth.

203. Not in Sympathy with Lutheran Champions.

When Westphal, in 1552, pointed out the Calvinistic menace and sounded the tocsin, loyal Lutherans everywhere enlisted in the controversy to defend Luther's doctrine concerning the real presence and the divine majesty of Christ's human nature. But Melanchthon again utterly failed the Lutheran Church both as a leader and a private. For although Lutheranism in this controversy was fighting for its very existence, Master Philip remained silent, non-committal, neutral. Viewed in the light of the conditions then prevailing, it was impossible to construe this attitude as pro-Lutheran. Moreover, whenever and wherever Melanchthon, in his letters and opinions written during this controversy, did show his colors to some extent, it was but too apparent that his mind and heart was with the enemies rather than with the champions of Lutheranism. For while his letters abound with flings and thrusts against the men who defended the doctrines of the sacramental union and the omnipresence of the human nature of Christ, he led Calvin and his adherents to believe that he was in sympathy with them and their cause.

Melanchthon's animosity ran high not only against such extremists as Saliger (Beatus) and Fredeland (both were deposed in Luebeck 1568 and Saliger again in Rostock 1569) who taught that in virtue of the consecration before the use (ante usum) bread and wine are the body and blood of Christ, denouncing all who denied this as Sacramentarians (Gieseler 3, 2, 257), but also against all those who faithfully adhered to, and defended, Luther's phraseology concerning the Lord's Supper. He rejected the teaching of Westphal and the Hamburg ministers, according to which in the Lord's Supper, the bread is properly called the body of Christ and the wine the blood of Christ, and stigmatized their doctrine as "bread-worship, artolatreia." (C. R. 8, 362. 660. 791; 9, 470. 962.)

In a similar manner Melanchthon ridiculed the old Lutheran teaching of the omnipresence of Christ according to His human nature as a new and foolish doctrine. Concerning the Confession and Report of the Wuerttemberg Theologians, framed by Brenz and adopted 1559, which emphatically asserted the real presence, as well as the omnipresence of Christ also according to His human nature, Melanchthon remarked contemptuously in a letter to Jacob Runge, dated February 1, 1560 and in a letter to G. Cracow, dated February 3, 1560, that he could not characterize "the decree of the Wuerttemberg Fathers (Abbates Wirtebergenses) more aptly than as Hechinger Latin (Hechingense Latinum, Hechinger Latein)," i.e., as absurd and insipid teaching. (9, 1035f.; 7, 780. 884.)

204. Melanchthon Claimed by Calvin.

In 1554 Nicholas Gallus of Regensburg republished, with a preface of his own, Philip Melanchthon's Opinions of Some Ancient Writers Concerning the Lord's Supper. The timely reappearance of this book, which Melanchthon, in 1530, had directed against the Zwinglians, was most embarrassing to him as well as to his friend Calvin. The latter, therefore, now urged him to break his silence and come out openly against his public assailants. But Melanchthon did not consider it expedient to comply with this request. Privately, however, he answered, October 14, 1554: "As regards your admonition in your last letter that I repress the ignorant clamors of those who renew the strife concerning the bread-worship, know that some of them carry on this disputation out of hatred toward me in order to have a plausible reason for oppressing me. Quod me hortaris, ut reprimam ineruditos clamores illorum, qui renovant certamen peri artolatreias, scito, quosdam praecipue odio mei eam disputationem movere, ut habeant plausibilem causam ad me opprimendum." (8, 362.)

Fully persuaded that he was in complete doctrinal agreement with his Wittenberg friend on the controverted questions, Calvin finally, in his Last Admonition (Ultima Admonitio) to Westphal, 1557, publicly claimed Melanchthon as his ally, and implored him to give public testimony "that they [the Calvinists and Zwinglians] teach nothing foreign to the Augsburg Confession, nihil alienum nos tradere a Confessione Augustana." "I confirm," Calvin here declared, "that in this cause [concerning the Lord's Supper] Philip can no more be torn from me than from his own bowels. Confirmo, non magis a me Philippum quam a propriis visceribus in hoc causa posse divelli." (C. R. 37 [Calvini Opp. 9], 148. 149. 193. 466; Gieseler 3, 2, 219, Tschackert, 536.) Melanchthon, however, continued to preserve his sphinxlike silence, which indeed declared as loud as words could have done that he favored the Calvinists, and was opposed to those who defended Luther's doctrine. To Mordeisen he wrote, November 15, 1557: "If you will permit me to live at a different place, I shall reply, both truthfully and earnestly to these unlearned sycophants, and say things that are useful to the Church." (C. R. 9, 374.)

After the death of Melanchthon, Calvin wrote in his Dilucida Explicatio against Hesshusius, 1561: "O Philip Melanchthon! For it is to you that I appeal, who art living with Christ in the presence of God and there waiting for us until we shall be assembled with you into blessed rest. A hundred times you have said, when, fatigued with labor and overwhelmed with cares, you, as an intimate friend, familiarly laid your head upon my breast: Would to God I might die on this bosom! But afterwards I have wished a thousand times that we might be granted to be together. You would certainly have been more courageous to engage in battle and stronger to despise envy, and disregard false accusations. In this way, too, the wickedness of many would have been restrained whose audacity to revile grew from your pliability, as they called it. O Philippe Melanchthon! Te enim appello, qui apud Deum cum Christo vivis, nosque illic exspectas, donec tecum in beatam quietem colligamur. Dixisti centies, quum fessus laboribus et molestiis oppressus caput familiariter in sinum meum deponeres: Utinam, utinam moriar in hoc sinu! Ego vero millies postea optavi nobis contingere, ut simul essemus. Certe animosior fuisses ad obeunda certamina et ad spernendam invidiam falsasque criminationes pro nihilo ducendas fortior. Hoc quoque modo cohibita fuisset multorum improbitos, quibus ex tua mollitie, quam vocabant, crevit insultandi audacia." (C. R. 37 [Calvini Opp. 9], 461f.) It was not Melanchthon, but Westphal, who disputed Calvin's claim by publishing (1557) extracts from Melanchthon's former writings under the title: Clarissimi Viri Ph. Melanchthonis Sententia de Coena Domini, ex scriptis eius collecta. But, alas, the voice of the later Melanchthon was not that of the former!

205. Advising the Crypto-Calvinists.

In various other ways Melanchthon showed his impatience with the defenders of Luther's doctrine and his sympathy with their Calvinistic opponents. When Timann of Bremen, who sided with Westphal, opposed Hardenberg, a secret, but decided Calvinist, Melanchthon admonished the latter not to rush into a conflict with his colleagues, but to dissimulate. He says in a letter of April 23, 1556: "Te autem oro, ne properes ad certamen cum collegis. Oro etiam, ut multa dissimules." (C. R. 8, 736.) Another letter (May 9, 1557), in which he advises Hardenberg how to proceed against his opponents, begins as follows: "Reverend Sir and Dear Brother. As you see, not only the controversy, but also the madness (rabies) of the writers who establish the bread-worship is growing." (9, 154.) He meant theologians who, like Timann and Westphal, defended Luther's doctrine that in the Lord's Supper the bread is truly the body of Christ and the wine truly the blood of Christ and that Christ is truly present also according to His human nature. Again, when at Heidelberg, in 1569, Hesshusius refused to acknowledge the Calvinist Klebitz (who had publicly defended the Reformed doctrine) as his assistant in the distribution of the Lord's Supper, and Elector Frederick III, the patron of the Crypto-Calvinists, who soon after joined the Reformed Church, demanded that Hesshusius come to an agreement with Klebitz, and finally deposed the former and dismissed the latter, Melanchthon approved of the unionistic methods of the Elector, and prepared ambiguous formulas to satisfy both parties.

In the Opinion requested by the Elector, dated November 1, 1559, Melanchthon said: "To answer is not difficult, but dangerous.... Therefore I approve of the measure of the illustrious Elector, commanding silence to the disputants on both sides [Hesshusius and the Calvinist Klebitz], lest dissension occur in the weak church.... The contentious men having been removed, it will be profitable that the rest agree on one form of words. It would be best in this controversy to retain the words of Paul: 'The bread which we break is the communion (koinonia) of Christ.' Much ought to be said concerning the fruit of the Supper to invite men to love this pledge and to use it frequently. And the word 'communion' must be explained: Paul does not say that the nature of the bread is changed, as the Papists say; He does not say, as those of Bremen do, that the bread is the substantial body of Christ; he does not say that the bread is the true body of Christ, as Hesshusius does; but that it is the communion, i.e., that by which the union occurs (consociatio fit) with the body of Christ, which occurs in the use, and certainly not without thinking, as when mice gnaw the bread.... The Son of God is present in the ministry of the Gospel, and there He is certainly efficacious in the believers, and He is present not on account of the bread, but on account of man, as He says, 'Abide in Me and I in you,' Again: 'I am in My Father, and you in Me, and I in you,' And in these true consolations He makes us members of His, and testifies that He will raise our bodies. Thus the ancients explain the Lord's Supper." (C. R. 9, 961.) No doubt, Calvin, too, would readily have subscribed to these ambiguous and indefinite statements. C. P. Krauth pertinently remarks: "Whatever may be the meaning of Melanchthon's words in the disputed cases, this much is certain, that they practically operated as if the worse sense were the real one, and their mischievousness was not diminished, but aggravated, by their obscurity and double meaning. They did the work of avowed error, and yet could not be reached as candid error might." (Cons. Ref., 291.)

206. Historians on Melanchthon's Doctrinal Departures.

Modern historians are generally agreed that also with respect to the Lord's Supper the later Melanchthon was not identical with the earlier. Tschackert: "Melanchthon had long ago [before the outbreak of the second controversy on the Lord's Supper] receded from the peculiarities of the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper; he was satisfied with maintaining the personal presence of Christ during the Supper, leaving the mode of His presence and efficacy in doubt." (532.) Seeberg, who maintains that Melanchthon as early as 1531 departed from Luther's teaching concerning the Lord's Supper, declares: "Melanchthon merely does not want to admit that the body of Christ is really eaten in the Supper, and that it is omnipresent as such." (4, 2, 449.) Theo. Kolde: "It should never have been denied that these alterations in Article X of the Augustana involved real changes.... In view of his gradually changed conception of the Lord's Supper, there can be no doubt that he sought to leave open for himself and others the possibility of associating also with the Swiss." (25.) Schaff: "Melanchthon's later view of the Lord's Supper agreed essentially with that of Calvin." (1, 280.)

Such, then, being the attitude of Melanchthon as to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, it was but natural and consistent that his pupils, who looked up to Master Philip with unbounded admiration, should become decided Calvinists. Melanchthon, chiefly, must be held responsible for the Calvinistic menace which threatened the Lutheran Church after the death of Luther. In the interest of fraternal relations with the Swiss, he was ready to compromise and modify the Lutheran truth. Sadly he had his way, and had not the tendency which he inaugurated been checked, the Lutheran Church would have lost its character and been transformed into a Reformed or, at least, a unionistic body. In a degree, this guilt was shared also by his older Wittenberg colleagues: Caspar Cruciger, Sr., Paul Eber, John Foerster, and others, who evidently inclined toward Melanchthon's view and attitude also in the matter concerning the Lord's Supper. Caspar Cruciger, for example, as appears from his letter to Veit Dietrich, dated April 18, 1538, taught the bodily presence of Christ in the use of the Lord's Supper, but not "the division or separation of the body and blood." (C. R. 3, 610.) Shortly before his death, as related in a previous chapter, Luther had charged these men with culpable silence with regard to the truth, declaring: "If you believe as you speak in my presence then speak the same way in church, in public lectures, in sermons, and in private discussions, and strengthen your brethren, and lead the erring back to the right way, and contradict the wilful spirits; otherwise your confession is a mere sham and will be of no value whatever." (Walther, 40.) Refusal to confess the truth will ultimately always result in rejection of the truth. Silence here is the first step to open denial.

207. Westphal First to Sound Tocsin.

Foremost among the men who saw through Calvin's plan of propagating the Reformed doctrine of the Lord's Supper under phrases coming as close as possible to the Lutheran terminology, and who boldly, determinedly and ably opposed the Calvinistic propaganda was Joachim Westphal of Hamburg [born 1510; 1527 in Wittenberg; since 1541 pastor in Hamburg; died January 16, 1574]. Fully realizing the danger which threatened the entire Lutheran Church, he regarded it as his sacred duty to raise his voice and warn the Lutherans against the Calvinistic menace. He did so in a publication entitled: "Farrago Confusanearum et inter se Dissidentium Opinionum de Coena Domini--Medley of Confused and Mutually Dissenting Opinions on the Lord's Supper, compiled from the books of the Sacramentarians," 1552. In it he proved that in reality Calvin and his adherents, despite their seemingly orthodox phrases, denied the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper just as emphatically and decidedly as Zwingli had done. At the same time he refuted in strong terms the Reformed doctrine in the manner indicated by the title, and maintained the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence, the oral eating and drinking (manducatio oralis), also of unbelievers. Finally he appealed to the Lutheran theologians and magistrates everywhere to guard their churches against the Calvinistic peril. "The Farrago," says Kruske, "signified the beginning of the end of Calvin's domination in Germany." Schaff: "The controversy of Westphal against Calvin and the subsequent overthrow of Melanchthonianism completed and consolidated the separation of the two Confessions," Lutheran and Reformed. (Creeds 1, 280.)

Thus Westphal stands preeminent among the men who saved the Lutheran Church from the Calvinistic peril. To add fuel to the anti-Calvinistic movement, Westphal, in the year following, published a second book: "Correct Faith (Recta Fides) Concerning the Lord's Supper, demonstrated and confirmed from the words of the Apostle Paul and the Evangelists," 1553. Here he again called upon all true disciples of Luther to save his doctrine from the onslaughts of the Calvinists, who, he declared, stooped to every method in order to conquer Germany for Zwinglianism.

Westphal's fiery appeals for Lutheran loyalty received a special emphasis and wide publicity when the Pole, John of Lasco (Laski), who in 1553, together with 175 members of his London congregation, had been driven from England by Bloody Mary, reached the Continent. The liberty which Lasco, who in 1552 had publicly adopted the Consensus Tigurinus, requested in Lutheran territories for himself and his Reformed congregation, was refused in Denmark, Wismar, Luebeck and Hamburg, but finally granted in Frankfort-on-the-Main. Soon after, in 1554, the Calvinistic preacher Micronius, who also sought refuge in Hamburg, was forbidden to make that city the seat of Reformed activity and propaganda. As a result, Calvin decided to enter the arena against Westphal. In 1555 he published his Defensio Sanae et Orthodoxae Doctrinae de Sacramentis, "Defense of the Sound and Orthodox Doctrine Concerning the Sacraments and Their Nature, Power, Purpose, Use, and Fruit, which the pastors and ministers of the churches in Zurich and Geneva before this have comprised into a brief formula of the mutual Agreement" (Consensus Tigurinus). In it he attacked Westphal in such an insulting and overbearing manner (comparing him, e.g., with "a mad dog") that from the very beginning the controversy was bound to assume a personal and acrimonious character.

208. Controversial Publications.

After Calvin had entered the controversy Westphal was joined by such Lutherans as John Timann, Paul v. Eitzen, Erhard Schnepf, Alber, Gallus, Flacius, Judex, Brenz, Andreae and others. Calvin, on the other hand, was supported by Lasco, Bullinger, Ochino, Valerandus Polanus, Beza (the most scurrillous of all the opponents of Lutheranism), and Bibliander. In 1555 Westphal published three additional books: Collection (Collectanea) of Opinions of Aurelius Augustine Concerning the Lord's Supper, and Faith (Fides) of Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria, Concerning the Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ, and Adversus cuiusdam Sacramentarii Falsam Criminationem Iusta Defensio, "Just Defense against the False Accusation of a Certain Sacramentarian." The last publication was a personal defense against the insults and invectives of Calvin and a further proof of the claim that the Calvinists were united only in their denial of the real presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. Coming to the support of Westphal, John Timann, Pastor in Bremen, published in 1555: "Medley (Farrago) of Opinions Agreeing in the True and Catholic Doctrine Concerning the Lord's Supper, which the churches of the Augsburg Confession have embraced with firm assent and in one spirit according to the divine Word."

In the following year Calvin wrote his Secunda Defensio ... contra J. Westphali Calumnias, "Second Defense of the Pious and Orthodox Faith, against the Calumnies of J. Westphal," a vitriolic book, dedicated to the Crypto-Calvinists, viz., "to all ministers of Christ who cultivate and follow the pure doctrine of the Gospel in the churches of Saxony and Lower Germany." In it Calvin declared: "I teach that Christ, though absent according to His body, is nevertheless not only present with us according to His divine power, but also makes His flesh vivifying for us." (C. R. 37 [Calvini Opp. 9], 79.) Lasco also wrote two books against Westphal and Timann, defending his congregation at Frankfort, and endeavoring to show the agreement between the Calvinian doctrine of the Lord's Supper and the Augsburg Confession. In 1556 Henry Bullinger appeared on the battlefield with his Apologetical Exposition, Apologetica Expositio, in which he endeavored to show that the ministers of the churches in Zurich do not follow any heretical dogma in the doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper.

In the same year, 1556, Westphal published Epistola, qua Breviter Respondet ad Convicia I. Calvini--"Letter in which He [Westphal] Answers Briefly to the Invectives of J. Calvin," and "Answer (Responsum) to the Writing of John of Lasco, in which he transforms the Augsburg Confession into Zwinglianism." In the same year Westphal published "Confession of Faith (Confessio Fidei) Concerning the Sacrament of the Eucharist, in which the ministers of the churches of Saxony maintain the presence of the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ in the Holy Supper, and answer regarding the book of Calvin dedicated to them." This publication contained opinions which Westphal had secured from the ministeriums of Magdeburg (including Wigand and Flacius), of Mansfeld, Bremen, Hildesheim, Hamburg, Luebeck, Lueneburg, Brunswick (Moerlin and Chemnitz), Hannover, Wismar, Schwerin, etc. All of these ministeriums declared themselves unanimously and definitely in favor of Luther's doctrine, appealing to the words of institution as they read. In 1557 Erhard Schnepf [born 1595; active in Nassau, Marburg, Speier, Augsburg; attended convents in Smalcald 1537; in Regensburg 1546, in Worms 1557; died 1558], then in Jena, published his Confession Concerning the Supper. In the same year Paul von Eitzen [born 1522; died 1598; refused to sign Formula of Concord] published his Defense of the True Doctrine Concerning the Supper of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Westphal also made a second attack on Lasco in his "Just Defense against the Manifest Falsehoods of J. A. Lasco which he spread in his letter to the King of Poland against the Saxon Churches," 1557. In it he denounces Lasco and his congregation of foreigners, and calls upon the magistrates to institute proceedings against them.

Calvin now published his Ultima Admonitio, "Last Admonition of John Calvin to J. Westphal, who, if he does not obey (obtemperet) must thenceforth be held in the manner as Paul commands us to hold obstinate heretics; in this writing the vain censures of the Magdeburgians and others, by which they endeavored to wreck heaven and earth, are also refuted" 1557. Here Calvin plainly reveals his Zwinglianism and says: "This is the summary of our doctrine, that the flesh of Christ is a vivifying bread because it truly nourishes and feeds our souls when by faith we coalesce with it. This, we teach, occurs spiritually only, because the bond of this sacred unity is the secret and incomprehensible power of the Holy Spirit." (C. R. 37 [Calvini Opp. 9], 162.) In this book Calvin also, as stated above, appeals to Melanchthon to add his testimony that "we [the Calvinists] teach nothing that conflicts with the Augsburg Confession."

Though Calvin had withdrawn from the arena, Westphal continued to give public testimony to the truth. In 1558 he wrote several books against the Calvinists. One of them bears the title: "Apologetical Writings (Apologetica Scripta) of J.W., in which he both defends the sound doctrine concerning the Eucharist and refutes the vile slanders of the Sacramentarians," etc. Another is entitled: Apology of the Confession Concerning the Lord's Supper against the Corruptions and Calumnies of John Calvin. In 1559 Theodore Beza donned the armor of Calvin and entered the controversy with his "Treatise (Tractatio) Concerning the Lord's Supper, in which the calumnies of J. Westphal are refuted." Lasco's Reply to the Virulent Letter of That Furious Man J. Westphal, of 1560, appeared posthumously, he having died shortly before in Poland.

209. Brenz and Chemnitz.

Foremost among the influential theologians who besides Westphal, took a decided stand against the Calvinists and their secret abettors in Lutheran territories were John Brenz in Wuerttemberg and Martin Chemnitz in Brunswick. John Brenz [born 1499, persecuted during the Interim, since 1553 Provost at Stuttgart, died 1570], the most influential theologian in Wuerttemberg, was unanimously supported in his anti-Calvinistic attitude by the whole ministerium of the Duchy. He is the author of the Confession and Report (Bekenntnis und Bericht) of the Theologians in Wuerttemberg Concerning the True Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Holy Supper, adopted at the behest of Duke Christopher by the synod assembled in Stuttgart, 1559. The occasion for drafting and adopting this Confession had been furnished by Bartholomew Hagen, a Calvinist. At the synod in Stuttgart he was required to dispute on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper with Jacob Andreae, with the result that Hagen admitted that he was now convinced of his error, and promised to return to the Lutheran teaching.

The Confession thereupon adopted teaches in plain and unmistakable terms that the body and blood of Christ are orally received by all who partake of the Sacrament, and that Christ, by reason of the personal union, is omnipresent also according to His human nature, and hence well able to fulfil the promise He gave at the institution of the Holy Supper. It teaches the real presence (praesentia realis), the sacramental union (unio sacramentalis), the oral eating and drinking (manducatio oralis), also of the wicked (manducatio impiorum). It holds "that in the Lord's Supper the true body and the true blood of our Lord Jesus Christ are, through the power of the word [of institution], truly and essentially tendered and given with the bread and wine to all men who partake of the Supper of Christ; and that, even as they are tendered by the hand of the minister, they are at the same time also received with the mouth of him who eats and drinks it." Furthermore, "that even as the substance and the essence of the bread and wine are present in the Lord's Supper, so also the substance and the essence of the body and blood of Christ are present and truly tendered and received with the signs of bread and wine." (Tschackert, 541.) It protests: "We do not assert any mixture of His body and blood with the bread and wine, nor any local inclusion in the bread." Again: "We do not imagine any diffusion of the human nature or expansion of the members of Christ (ullam humanae naturae diffusionem aut membrorum Christi distractionem), but we explain the majesty of the man Christ by which He, being placed at the right hand of God, fills all things not only by His divinity, but also as the man Christ, in a celestial manner and in a way that to human reason is past finding out, by virtue of which majesty His presence in the Supper is not abolished, but confirmed." (Gieseler 3, 2, 239f.) Thus, without employing the term "ubiquity," this Confession prepared by Brenz restored, in substance, the doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper and the person of Christ which Luther had maintained over against Zwingli, Carlstadt, and the Sacramentarians generally.

As stated above, Melanchthon ridiculed this Confession as "Hechinger Latin." In 1561 Brenz was attacked by Bullinger in his Treatise (Tractatio) on the Words of St. John 14. In the same year Brenz replied to this attack in two writings: Opinion (Sententia) on the Book of Bullinger and On the Personal Union (De Personali Unione) of the Two Natures in Christ and on the Ascension of Christ into Heaven and His Sitting at the Right Hand of the Father, etc. This called forth renewed assaults by Bullinger, Peter Martyr, and Beza. Bullinger wrote: "Answer (Responsio), by which is shown that the meaning concerning 'heaven' and the 'right hand of God' still stands firm," 1562. Peter Martyr: Dialogs (Dialogi) Concerning the Humanity of Christ, the Property of the Natures, and Ubiquity, 1562. Beza: Answers (Responsiones) to the Arguments of Brenz, 1564. Brenz answered in two of his greatest writings, Concerning the Divine Majesty of Christ (De Divina Maiestate Christi), 1562, and Recognition (Recognito) of the Doctrine Concerning the True Majesty of Christ, 1564. In the Dresden Consensus (Consensus Dresdensis) of 1571 the Philippists of Electoral Saxony also rejected the omnipresence (which they termed ubiquity) of the human nature of Christ.

In order to reclaim the Palatinate (which, as will be explained later, had turned Reformed) for Lutheranism the Duke of Wuerttemberg, in April, 1564, arranged for the Religious Discussion at Maulbronn between the theologians of Wuerttemberg and the Palatinate. But the only result was a further exchange of polemical publications. In 1564 Brenz published Epitome of the Maulbronn Colloquium ... Concerning the Lord's Supper and the Majesty of Christ. And in the following year the Wuerttemberg theologians published Declaration and Confession (Declaratio et Confessio) of the Tuebingen Theologians Concerning the Majesty of the Man Christ. Both of these writings were answered by the theologians of the Palatinate. After the death of Brenz, Jacob Andreae was the chief champion in Wuerttemberg of the doctrines set forth by Brenz.

In his various publications against the Calvinists, Brenz, appealing to Luther, taught concerning the majesty of Christ that by reason of the personal union the humanity of Christ is not only omnipotent and omniscient, but also omnipresent, and that the human nature of Christ received these as well as other divine attributes from the first moment of the incarnation of the Logos. Following are some of his statements: "Although the divine substance [in Christ] is not changed into the human, and each has its own properties, nevertheless these two substances are united in one person in Christ in such a manner that the one is never in reality separated from the other." "Wherever the deity is, there is also the humanity of Christ." "We do not ascribe to Christ many and various bodies, nor do we ascribe to His body local extension or diffusion; but we exalt Him beyond this corporeal world, outside of every creature and place, and place Him in accordance with the condition of the hypostatic union in celestial majesty, which He never lacked, though at the time of His flesh in this world He hid it or, as Paul says, He humbled Himself (quam etsi tempore carnis suae in hoc saeculo dissimulavit, seu ea sese, ut Paulus loquitur, exinanivit, tamen numquam ea caruit)." According to Brenz the man Christ was omnipotent, almighty, omniscient while He lay in the manger. In His majesty He darkened the sun, and kept alive all the living while in His humiliation He was dying on the cross. When dead in the grave, He at the same time was filling and ruling heaven and earth with His power. (Gieseler 3, 2, 240f.)

In Brunswick, Martin Chemnitz (born 1522; died 1586), the Second Martin (alter Martinus) of the Lutheran Church, entered the controversy against the Calvinists in 1560 with his Repetition (Repetitio) of the Sound Doctrine Concerning the True Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Supper, in which he based his arguments for the real presence on the words of institution. Ten years later he published his famous book Concerning the Two Natures in Christ (De Duabus Naturis in Christo), etc.,--preeminently the Lutheran classic on the subject it treats. Appealing also to Luther, he teaches that Christ, according to His human nature was anointed with all divine gifts; that, in consequence of the personal union, the human nature of Christ can be and is present where, when, and in whatever way Christ will; that therefore in accordance with His promise, He is in reality present in His Church and in His Supper. Chemnitz says: "This presence of the assumed nature in Christ of which we now treat is not natural or essential [flowing from the nature and essence of Christ's humanity], but voluntary and most free, depending on the will and power of the Son of God (non est vel naturalis vel essentialis, sed voluntaria et liberrima, dependens a voluntate et potentia Filii Dei); that is to say, when by a definite word He has told, promised, and asseverated that He would be present with His human nature, ... let us retain this, which is most certainly true, that Christ can be with His body wherever, whenever, and in whatever manner He wills (Christum suo corpore esse posse, ubicunque, quandocunque et quomodocunque vult). But we must judge of His will from a definite, revealed word." (Tschackert, 644; Gieseler 3, 2, 259.)

The Formula of Concord plainly teaches, both that, in virtue of the personal union by His incarnation, Christ according to His human nature possesses also the divine attribute of omnipresence, and that He can be and is present wherever He will. In the Epitome we read: This majesty Christ always had according to the personal union, and yet He abstained from it in the state of His humiliation until His resurrection, "so that now not only as God, but also as man He knows all things, can do all things, is present with all creatures, and has under His feet and in His hand everything that is in heaven and on earth and under the earth. ... And this His power He, being present, can exercise everywhere, and to Him everything is possible and everything is known." (821, 16. 27. 30.) The Thorough Declaration declares that Christ "truly fills all things, and, being present everywhere, not only as God, but also as man, rules from sea to sea and to the ends of the earth." (1025, 27ff.) Again: "We hold ... that also according to His assumed human nature and with the same He [Christ] can be, and also is, present where He will, and especially that in His Church and congregation on earth He is present as Mediator, Head, King, and High Priest, not in part, or one-half of Him only, but the entire person of Christ, to which both natures, the divine and the human, belong, is present not only according to His divinity, but also according to, and with, His assumed human nature, according to which He is our Brother, and we are flesh of His flesh and bone of His bone." (1043 78f.) In virtue of the personal union Christ is present everywhere also according to His human nature; while the peculiarly gracious manner of His presence in the Gospel, in the Church, and in the Lord's Supper depends upon His will and is based upon His definite promises.

210. Bremen and the Palatinate Lost for Lutheranism.

The indignation of the Lutherans against the Calvinistic propaganda, roused by Westphal and his comrades in their conflict with Calvin and his followers, was materially increased by the success of the crafty Calvinists in Bremen and in the Palatinate. In 1547 Hardenberg [Albert Rizaeus from Hardenberg, Holland, born 1510] was appointed Dome-preacher in Bremen. He was a former priest whom Lasco had won for the Reformation. Regarding the doctrine of the Lord's Supper he inclined towards Zwingli. Self-evidently, when his views became known, the situation in Bremen became intolerable for his Lutheran colleagues. How could they associate with and fellowship, a Calvinist! To acknowledge him would have been nothing short of surrendering their own views and the character of the Lutheran Church. The result was that John Timann [pastor in Bremen; wrote a tract against the Interim, died February 17, 1557], in order to compel Hardenberg to unmask and reveal his true inwardness, demanded that all the ministers of Bremen subscribe to the Farrago Sententiarum Consentientium in Vera Doctrina et Coena Domini which he had published in 1555 against the Calvinists. Hardenberg and two other ministers refused to comply with the demand. In particular, Hardenberg objected to the omnipresence of the human nature of Christ taught in Timann's Farrago. In his Doctrinal Summary (Summaria Doctrina) Hardenberg taught: "St. Augustine and many other fathers write that the body of Christ is circumscribed by a certain space in heaven, and I regard this as the true doctrine of the Church." (Tschackert, 191.) Hardenberg also published the fable hatched at Heidelberg (Heidelberger Landluege, indirectly referred to also in the Formula of Concord, 981, 28), but immediately refuted by Joachim Moerlin, according to which Luther is said, toward the end of his life, to have confessed to Melanchthon that he had gone too far and overdone the matter in his controversy against the Sacramentarians; that he, however, did not want to retract his doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper himself, because that would cast suspicion on his whole teaching; that therefore after his death the younger theologians might make amends for it and settle this matter.... In 1556 Timann began to preach against Hardenberg, but died the following year. The Lower Saxon Diet, however, decided February 8, 1561, that Hardenberg be dismissed within fourteen days, yet "without infamy or condemnation, citra infamiam et condemnationem." Hardenberg submitted under protest and left Bremen February 18, 1561 (he died as a Reformed preacher at Emden, 1574). Simon Musaeus who had just been expelled from Jena, was called as Superintendent to purge Bremen of Calvinism. Before long, however, the burgomaster of the city, Daniel von Bueren, whom Hardenberg had secretly won for the Reformed doctrine, succeeded in expelling the Lutheran ministers from the city and in filling their places with Philippists, who before long joined the Reformed Church. Thus ever since 1562 Bremen has been a Reformed city.

A much severer blow was dealt Lutheranism when the Palatinate, the home of Melanchthon, where the Philippists were largely represented, was Calvinized by Elector Frederick III. Tileman Hesshusius [Hesshusen, born 1527; 1553 superintendent at Goslar; 1556 professor and pastor at Rostock; 1557 at Heidelberg; 1560 pastor at Magdeburg; 1562 court-preacher at Neuburg; 1569 professor at Jena; 1573 bishop of Samland, at Koenigsberg; 1577 professor at Helmstedt where he died 1588] was called in 1557 by Elector Otto Henry to Heidelberg both as professor and pastor and as superintendent of the Palatinate. Here the Calvinists and Crypto-Calvinists had already done much to undermine Lutheranism; and after the death of Otto Henry, February 12, 1559, Hesshusius who endeavored to stem the Crypto-Calvinistic tide, was no longer able to hold his own. Under Elector Frederick III, who succeeded Otto Henry, the Calvinists came out into the open. This led to scandalous clashes, of which the Klebitz affair was a typical and consequential instance. In order to obtain the degree of Bachelor of Divinity, William Klebitz, the deacon of Hesshusius, published, in 1560 a number of Calvinistic theses. As a result Hesshusius most emphatically forbade him henceforth to assist at the distribution of the Holy Supper. When Klebitz nevertheless appeared at the altar, Hesshusius endeavored to wrest the cup from his hands. Elector Frederick ordered both Hesshusius and Klebitz to settle their trouble in accordance with the Augustana (Variata). Failing to comply with this unionistic demand, Hesshusius was deposed, September 16, 1559, and Klebitz, too was dismissed. In a theological opinion, referred to above, Melanchthon approved of the action. Hereupon Hesshusius entered the public controversy against Calvinism. In 1560 he published Concerning the Presence (De Praesentia) of the Body of Christ in the Lord's Supper and his Answer (Responsio) to the Prejudicial Judgement (Praeiudicium) of Philip Melanchthon on the Controversy Concerning the Lord's Supper [with Klebitz].

After the dismissal of Hesshusius, Elector Frederick III, who had shortly before played a conspicuous role in endeavoring to win the day for Melanchthonianism at the Lutheran Assembly of Naumburg, immediately began to Calvinize his territory. In reading the controversial books published on the Lord's Supper, he suffered himself to be guided by the renowned physician Thomas Erastus [died 1583], who was a Calvinist and had himself published Calvinistic books concerning the Lord's Supper and the person and natures of Christ. As a result the Elector, having become a decided Reformedist, determined to de-Lutheranize the Palatinate in every particular, regarding practise and divine service as well as with respect to confessional books, doctrines, and teachers. The large number of Philippists, who had been secret Calvinists before, was increased by such Reformed theologians as Caspar Olevianus (1560), Zacharias Ursinus (1561), and Tremellius (1561). Images, baptismal fonts, and altars were removed from the churches; wafers were replaced by bread, which was broken; the organs were closed; the festivals of Mary, the apostles, and saints were abolished. Ministers refusing to submit to the new order of things were deposed and their charges filled with Reformed men from the Netherlands. The Calvinistic Heidelberg Catechism, composed by Olevianus and Ursinus and published 1563 in German and Latin, took the place of Luther's Catechism. This process of Calvinization was completed by the introduction of the new Church Order of November 15, 1563. At the behest of Frederick III the Swiss Confession (Confessio Helvetica) was published in 1566, in order to prove by this out-and-out Zwinglian document, framed by Bullinger, "that he [the Elector of the Palatinate] entertained no separate doctrine, but the very same that was preached also in many other and populous churches, and that the charge was untrue that the Reformed disagreed among themselves and were divided into sects." Thus the Palatinate was lost to the Lutheran Confession, for though Ludwig VI (1576-1583), the successor of Frederick III, temporarily restored Lutheranism, Frederick IV (1583 to 1610) returned to Calvinism.

211. Saxony in the Grip of Crypto-Calvinists.

It was a severe blow to the Lutheran Church when Bremen and the Palatinate fell a prey to Calvinism. And the fears were not unfounded that before long the Electorate of Saxony would follow in their wake, and Wittenberg, the citadel of the Lutheran Reformation, be captured by Calvin. That this misfortune, which, no doubt, would have dealt a final and fatal blow to Lutheranism, was warded off, must be regarded as a special providence of God. For the men (Melanchthon, Major, etc.) whom Luther had accused of culpable silence regarding the true doctrine of the Lord's Supper, were, naturally enough, succeeded by theologians who, while claiming to be true Lutherans adhering to the Augsburg Confession and, in a shameful manner deceiving and misleading Elector August zealously championed and developed the Melanchthonian aberrations, in particular with respect to the doctrines concerning the Lord's Supper and the person of Christ, and sedulously propagated the views of Calvin, at first secretly and guardedly, but finally with boldness and abandon. Gieseler says of these Philippists in Wittenberg: "Inwardly they were out-and-out Calvinists, although they endeavored to appear as genuine Lutherans before their master," Elector August. (3, 2, 250.)

The most prominent and influential of these so-called Philippists or Crypto-Calvinists were Dr. Caspar Cruciger, Jr., Dr. Christopher Pezel, Dr. Frederick Widebram, and Dr. Henry Moeller. The schemes of these men were aided and abetted by a number of non-theological professors: Wolfgang Crell, professor of ethics, Esrom Ruedinger, professor of philosophy; George Cracow, professor of jurisprudence and, later, privy councilor of Elector August; Melanchthon's son-in-law, Caspar Peucer, professor of medicine and physician in ordinary of the Elector, who naturally had a great influence on August and the ecclesiastical affairs of the Electorate. He held that Luther's doctrine of the real presence had no more foundation in the Bible than did the Roman transubstantiation. To these must be added John Stoessel, confessor to the Elector and superintendent at Pirna; Christian Schuetze, court-preacher at Dresden, Andrew Freyhub and Wolfgang Harder professors in Leipzig, and others. The real leaders of these Philippists were Peucer and Cracow. Their scheme was to prepossess the Elector against the loyal adherents of Luther, especially Flacius, gradually to win him over to their liberal views, and, at the proper moment, to surrender and deliver Electoral Saxony to the Calvinists. In prosecuting this sinister plan, they were unscrupulous also in the choice of their means. Thus Wittenberg, during Luther's days the fountainhead of the pure Gospel and the stronghold of uncompromising fidelity to the truth, had become a veritable nest of fanatical Crypto-Calvinistic schemers and dishonest anti-Lutheran plotters who also controlled the situation in the entire Electorate.

The first public step to accomplish their purpose was the publication of the Corpus Doctrinae Christianae, or Corpus Doctrinae Misnicum, or Philippicum, as it was also called. This collection of symbolical books was published 1560 at Leipzig by Caspar Peucer, Melanchthon's son-in-law, with a preface to both the German and Latin editions written by Melanchthon and dated September 29, 1559, and February 16, 1560, respectively,--an act by which, perhaps without sufficiently realizing it, Melanchthon immodestly assumed for himself and his views the place within the Lutheran Church which belonged not to him, but to Luther. The title which reveals the insincerity and the purpose of this publication, runs as follows: "Corpus Doctrinae, i.e., the entire sum of the true and Christian doctrine ... as a testimony of the steadfast and unanimous confession of the pure and true religion in which the schools and churches of these Electoral Saxon and Meissen territories have remained and persevered in all points according to the Augsburg Confession for now almost thirty years against the unfounded false charges and accusations of all lying spirits, 1560." As a matter of fact, however, this Corpus contained, besides the Ecumenical Symbols, only writings of Melanchthon, notably the altered Augsburg Confession and the altered Apology of 1542, the Saxon Confession of 1551, the changed Loci, the Examen Ordinandorum of 1554, and the Responsiones ad Impios Articulos Inquisitionis Bavaricae.

Evidently this Corpus Philippicum, which was introduced also in churches outside of Electoral Saxony, particularly where the princes or leading theologians were Melanchthonians, was intended to alienate the Electorate from the old teaching of Luther, to sanction and further the Melanchthonian tendency, and thus to pave the way for Calvinism. It was foisted upon, and rigorously enforced in, all the churches of Electoral Saxony. All professors, ministers, and teachers were pledged by an oath to teach according to it. Such as refused to subscribe were deposed, imprisoned, or banished. Among the persecuted pastors we find the following names: Tettelbach, superintendent in Chemnitz; George Herbst, deacon in Chemnitz and later superintendent in Eisleben; Graf, superintendent in Sangerhausen; Schade, Heine, and Schuetz, pastors in Freiberg. When ministers who refused their signatures appealed to Luther's writings, they were told that Luther's books must be understood and explained according to Melanchthon's Corpus. At Wittenberg the opposition to Luther and his teaching bordered on fanaticism. When, for example, in 1568 Conrad Schluesselburg and Albert Schirmer, two Wittenberg students, entered a complaint against Professors Pezel and Peucer because of their deviations from Luther in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper and refused to admit that Peucer and his colleagues represented the pure doctrine in this matter, they were expelled from the university, anathematized, and driven from the city. (Schluesselburg 13, 609. 730; Gieseler 3, 2, 250.)

Immediately after its appearance, the Corpus Philippicum was denounced by loyal Lutherans, notably those of Reuss, Schoenfeld, and Jena. When the charges of false teaching against the Wittenberg theologians increased in number and force, Elector August arranged a colloquy between the theologians of Jena and Wittenberg. It was held at Altenburg and lasted from October, 1568, to March, 1569 because the Wittenbergers, evidently afraid of compromising themselves, insisted on its being conducted in writing only. The result of this colloquy was a public declaration on the part of Wigand, Coelestinus, Kirchner Rosinus, and others to the effect that the Wittenberg and Leipzig theologians had unmistakably revealed themselves as false teachers. At the colloquy the Jena theologians objected in particular also to the Corpus Misnicum because it contained the altered Augustana, concerning which they declared: Melanchthon "has changed the said Augsburg Confession so often that finally he has opened a window through which the Sacramentarians and Calvinists can sneak into it. One must watch carefully, lest in course of time the Papists also find such a loophole to twist themselves into it." (Gieseler 3, 2, 252.)

The Philippists of Leipzig and Wittenberg in turn, denounced the Jena theologians as Flacian fighting cocks (Flacianische Haderkatzen). They also succeeded in persuading Elector August to adopt more rigorous measures against the malcontents in his territories. For in addition to the adoption of the Corpus Philippicum the ministers were now required to subscribe to a declaration which was tantamount to an endorsement of all of the false doctrines entertained by the Wittenbergers. The declaration read: "I do not adhere to the dangerous Flacian Illyrian errors, contentions, poisonous backbitings, and fanaticism (zaenkischem Geschmeiss, giftigem Gebeiss und Schwaermerei) with which the schools and churches of this country are burdened [by Flacius] concerning the imagined adiaphorism, synergism, and Majorism and other false accusations, nor have I any pleasure in it [the quarreling], and in the future I intend, by the help of God, to abstain from it altogether, to damn, flee, and avoid it, and as much as I am able, to prevent it." (Gieseler 3, 2, 253; Walther, 49.)

212. Bold Strides Forward.

Feeling themselves firm and safe in the saddle, the Wittenberg Philippists now decided on further public steps in the direction of Calvinism. In 1570 they published Propositions (Propositiones) Concerning the Chief Controversies of This Time, in which the Lutheran doctrine regarding the majesty of the human nature of Christ was repudiated. In the following year they added a new Catechism, entitled: "Catechesis continens explicationem simplicem et brevem decalogi, Symboli Apostolici, orationis dominicae, doctrinae Christianae, quod amplectuntur ac tuentur Ecclesiae regionum Saxonicarum et Misnicarum quae sunt subiectae editioni Ducis Electoris Saxoniae, edita in Academia Witebergensi et accommodata ad usum scholarum puerilium. 1571."

This Catechism, written, according to Wigand, by Pezel, appeared anonymously. Its preface, signed by the Wittenberg theological faculty, explains that the new Catechism was an epitome of the Corpus Doctrinae Misnicum and merely intended as a supplement of Luther's Catechism for progressed scholars who were in need of additional instruction. As a matter of fact, however, its doctrine concerning the person of Christ and the Lord's Supper was in substantial agreement with the teaching of Calvin. Under the odious name of "ubiquity" it rejected the omnipresence of Christ according to His human nature, and sanctioned Calvin's teaching concerning the local inclusion of Christ in heaven. Acts 3, 21 was rendered in Beza's translation: "Quem oportet coelo capi. Who must be received by the heaven."

The Catechism declares: "The ascension was visible and corporeal; the entire Antiquity has always written that Christ's body is restricted to a certain place, wherever He wishes it to be; and a bodily ascension was made upwards. Ascensio fuit visibilis et coporalis, et semper ita scripsit tota antiquitas, Christum corporali locatione in aliquo loco esse, ubicumque vult, et ascensio corporalis facta est sursum." Concerning the real presence, the Catechism merely states: "The Lord's Supper is the communication of the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ as it is instituted in the words of the Gospel; in which eating (sumptione) the Son of God is truly and substantially present, and testifies that He applies His benefits to the believers. He also testifies that He has assumed the human nature for the purpose of making us, who are ingrafted into Him by faith, His members. He finally testifies that He wishes to be in the believers, to teach, quicken and govern them." (Gieseler 3, 2, 263.) The sacramental union, oral eating and drinking, and the eating and drinking of the wicked are not mentioned. Tschackert remarks that every Calvinist would readily have subscribed to the teaching of this Catechism. (545.)

When the Wittenberg Catechism was warned against and designated as Calvinistic by Chemnitz, Moerlin, and other theologians of Brunswick, Lueneburg, Mansfeld, Jena, and Halle, the Wittenbergers answered and endeavored to defend their position in the so-called Grundfeste, Firm Foundation, of 1571. It was a coarse and slanderous publication, as even the title indicates, which reads: "Firm Foundation of the True Christian Church Concerning the Person and Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ against the Modern Marcionites, Samosatenes, Sabellians, Arians, Nestorians, Eutychians, and Monothelites among the Flacian Rabble Published by the Theologians in Wittenberg." In this Grundfeste the Wittenbergers present the matter as though the real issue were not the Lord's Supper, but Christology. They enumerate as heretics also the "Ubiquitists," including Brenz, Andreae, and Chemnitz. With respect to their own agreement with Calvin, they remark that their teaching is the doctrine of the early Church, in which point, they said, also Calvin agreed. (Tschackert, 546.)

This daring Calvinistic publication again resulted in numerous protests against the Wittenbergers on the part of alarmed Lutherans everywhere outside of Electoral Saxony, which induced Elector August to require his theologians to deliver at Dresden, October 10, 1571, a definite statement of their faith. The confession which they presented was entitled: "Brief Christian and Simple Repetition of the Confession of the Churches of God in the Territories of the Elector of Saxony Concerning the Holy Supper," etc. The Consensus Dresdensis, as the document was called, satisfied the Elector at least temporarily, and was published also in Latin and low German. Essentially, however, the indefinite and dubious language of the Catechism was here but repeated. Concerning the majesty of Christ the Dresden Consensus declares that after the resurrection and ascension the human nature of Christ "was adorned with higher gifts than all angels and men." In His ascension, the Consensus continues, Christ "passed through the visible heavens and occupied the heavenly dwelling, where He in glory and splendor retains the essence, property, form, and shape of His true body, and from there He, at the last day, will come again unto Judgment in great splendor, visibly."

In a similar vague, ambiguous, and misleading manner Christ's sitting at the right hand of God is spoken of. Omitting the oral eating and drinking and the eating and drinking of the wicked, the Consensus states concerning the Lord's Supper that "in this Sacrament Christ gives us with the bread and wine His true body sacrificed for us on the cross, and His true blood shed for us, and thereby testifies that He receives us, makes us members of His body, washes us with His blood, presents forgiveness of sins, and wishes truly to dwell and to be efficacious in us." (Tschackert, 546.) The opponents of the Wittenbergers are branded as unruly men, who, seeking neither truth nor peace, excite offensive disputations concerning the real presence in the Lord's Supper as well as with regard to other articles. Their doctrine of the real communication ("realis seu physica communicatio") is characterized as a corruption of the article of the two natures in Christ and as a revamping of the heresies of the Marcionites, Valentinians, Manicheans, Samosatenes, Sabellians, Arians, Nestorians, Eutychians, and Monothelites. (Gieseler 3, 2, 264f.)

213. Apparently Victorious.

All the Crypto-Calvinistic publications of the Wittenberg and Leipzig Philippists were duly unmasked by the Lutherans outside of Electoral Saxony, especially in Northern Germany. Their various opinions were published at Jena, 1572, under the title: "Unanimous Confession (Einhelliges Bekenntnis) of Many Highly Learned Theologians and Prominent Churches 1. concerning the New Catechism of the New Wittenbergers, and 2. concerning their New Foundation (Grundfeste), also 3. concerning their New Confession (Consensus Dresdensis), thereupon adopted." However, all this and the repeated warnings that came from every quarter outside of his own territories, from Lutheran princes as well as theologians, do not seem to have made the least impression on Elector August. Yet he evidently was, and always intended to be a sincere, devoted, true-hearted, and singleminded Lutheran. When, for example, in 1572 Beza, at the instance of the Wittenberg Philippists, dedicated his book against Selneccer to Elector August, the latter advised him not to trouble him any further with such writings, as he would never allow any other doctrine in his territory than that of the Augsburg Confession.

However, blind and credulous as he was, and filled with prejudice and suspicion against Flacius and the Jena theologians generally, whom he, being the brother of the usurper Maurice, instinctively feared as possibly also political enemies, Elector August was easily duped and completely hypnotized, as it were, by the men surrounding him, who led him to believe that they, too, were in entire agreement with Luther and merely opposed the trouble-breeding Flacians, whom they never tired of denouncing as zealots, fanatics, bigots, wranglers, barkers, alarmists, etc. While in reality they rejected the doctrine that the true body and blood of Christ is truly and essentially present in the Holy Supper, these Crypto-Calvinists pretended (and Elector August believed them) that they merely objected to a local presence and to a Capernaitic eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. And while in reality they clearly repudiated Luther's teaching, according to which the divine attributes (omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.) are communicated to the human nature of Christ, they caused the Elector to believe that they merely opposed a delusion of the "Ubiquitists," who, they said, taught that the body of Christ was locally extended over the entire universe. This crass localism, they maintained, was the teaching of their opponents, while they themselves faithfully adhered to the teachings of Luther and Philip, and, in general, were opposed only to the exaggerations and excrescences advocated by the bigoted Flacians. (Walther, 43.)

Such was the manner in which the Elector allowed himself to be duped by the Philippists who surrounded him,--men who gradually developed the art of dissimulation to premeditated deceit, falsehood, and perjury. Even the Reformed theologian Simon Stenius, a student at Wittenberg during the Crypto-Calvinistic period, charges the Wittenbergers with dishonesty and systematic dissimulation. The same accusation was raised 1561 by the jurist Justus Jonas in his letters to Duke Albrecht of Prussia. (Gieseler 3, 2, 249.) And evidently believing that Elector August could be fooled all the time, they became increasingly bold in their theological publications, and in their intrigues as well.

To all practical purposes the University of Wittenberg was already Calvinized. Calvinistic books appeared and were popular. Even the work of a Jesuit against the book of Jacob Andreae on the Majesty of the Person of Christ was published at Wittenberg. The same was done with a treatise of Beza, although, in order to deceive the public, the title-page gave Geneva as the place of publication. Hans Lufft, the Wittenberg printer, later declared that during this time he did not know how to dispose of the books of Luther which he still had in stock, but that, if he had printed twenty or thirty times as many Calvinistic books, he would have sold all of them very rapidly.

Even Providence seemed to bless and favor the plans of the plotters. For when on March 3, 1573, Duke John William, the patron and protector of the faithful Lutherans, died, Elector August became the guardian of his two sons. And fanaticized by his advisers, the Elector, immediately upon taking hold of the government in Ducal Saxony, banished Wigand, Hesshusius, Caspar Melissander [born 1540; 1571 professor of theology in Jena; 1578 superintendent in Altenburg; died 1591] Rosinus [born 1520; 1559 superintendent in Weimar 1574 superintendent in Regensburg; died 1586], Gernhard, court-preacher in Weimar, and more than 100 preachers and teachers of Ducal Saxony. The reason for this cruel procedure was their refusal to adopt the Corpus Philippicum, and because they declined to promise silence with respect to the Philippists.

214. "Exegesis Perspicua."

In 1573, the Calvinization of Electoral and Ducal Saxony was, apparently, an accomplished fact. But the very next year marked the ignominious downfall and the unmasking of the dishonest Philippists. For in this year appeared the infamous Exegesis, which finally opened the eyes of Elector August. Its complete title ran: "Exegesis Perspicua et ferme Integra Controversiae de Sacra Coena--Perspicuous and Almost Complete Explanation of the Controversy Concerning the Holy Supper." The contents and make-up of the book as well as the secret methods adopted for its circulation clearly revealed that its purpose was to deal a final blow to Lutheranism in order to banish it forever from Saxony. Neither the author, nor the publisher, nor the place and date of publication were anywhere indicated in the book. The paper bore Geneva mark and the lettering was French. The prima facie impression was that it came from abroad.

Before long, however, it was established that the Exegesis had been published in Leipzig by the printer Voegelin, who at first also claimed its authorship. But when the impossibility of this was shown, Voegelin, in a public hearing, stated that Joachim Curaeus of Silesia, a physician who had left Saxony and died 1573, was the author of the book. Valentin Loescher, however, relates (Historia Motuum 3, 195) that probably Pezel and the son-in-law of Melanchthon, Peucer, had a hand in it; that the Crypto-Calvinist Esram Ruedinger [born 1523, son-in-law of Camerarius, professor of physics in Wittenberg, died 1591] was its real author; that it was printed at Leipzig in order to keep the real originators of it hidden, and that, for the same purpose, the Silesian Candidate of Medicine Curaeus had taken the responsibility of its authorship upon himself. (Tschackert, 547.)

Self-evidently, the Wittenberg theologians disclaimed any knowledge of, or any connection with, the origin of the Exegesis. However, they were everywhere believed to share its radical teachings, and known to have spread it among the students of the university, and suspected also of having before this resorted to tactics similar to those employed in the Exegesis. As early as 1561, for example, rhymes had secretly been circulated in Wittenberg, the burden of which was that faith alone effects the presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper, and that the mouth receives nothing but natural bread. One of these ran as follows: "Allein der Glaub' an Jesum Christ Schafft, dass er gegenwaertig ist, Und speist uns mit sei'm Fleisch und Blut Und sich mit uns einigen tut. Der Mund empfaeht natuerlich Brot, Die Seel' aber speist selber Gott." (Walther, 46.) Of course, the purpose of such dodgers was to prepare the way for Calvinism. And on the very face of it, the Exegesis Perspicua was intended to serve similar secret propaganda.

The chief difference between the preceding publications of the Philippists and the Exegesis was that here they came out in clear and unmistakable language. The sacramental union, the oral eating and drinking (manducatio oralis), and the eating and drinking of the wicked, which before were passed by in silence, are dealt with extensively and repudiated. The Exegesis teaches: The body of Christ is inclosed in heaven; in the Holy Supper it is present only according to its efficacy, there is no union of the body of Christ with the bread and wine; hence, there neither is nor can be such a thing as oral eating and drinking or eating and drinking of unbelievers. The "ubiquity," as the Exegesis terms the omnipresence of Christ's human nature, is condemned as Eutychian heresy. The Exegesis declared: "In the use of the bread and wine the believers by faith become true and living members of the body of Christ, who is present and efficacious through these symbols, as through a ministry inflaming and renewing our hearts by His Holy Spirit. The unbelieving, however, do not become partakers, or koinonoi, but because of their contempt are guilty of the body of Christ." (Seeberg, Grundriss 146.)

After fulsome praise of the Reformed, whose doctrine, the Exegesis says, is in agreement with the symbols of the ancient Church, and who as to martyrdom surpass the Lutherans, and after a corresponding depreciation of Luther, who in the heat of the controversy was said frequently to have gone too far, the Exegesis recommends that the wisest thing would be to follow the men whom God had placed at the side of Luther, and who had spoken more correctly than Luther. Following Melanchthon, all might unite in the neutral formula, "The bread is the communion of the body of Christ," avoiding all further definition regarding the ubiquity [the omnipresence of Christ's human nature] and the eating of the true body of Christ, until a synod had definitely decided these matters. (Tschackert, 547.)

All purified churches (all churches in Germany, Switzerland, etc., purified from Roman errors), the Exegesis urges, "ought to be in accord with one another; and this pious concord should not be disturbed on account of this difference [regarding the Holy Supper]. Let us be united in Christ and discontinue those dangerous teachings concerning the ubiquity, the eating of the true body on the part of the wicked, and similar things. The teachers should agree on a formula which could not create offense. They should employ the modes of speech found in the writings of Melanchthon. It is best to suppress public disputations, and when contentious men create strife and disquiet among the people, the proper thing to do, as Philip advised [in his opinion to the Elector of the Palatinate], is to depose such persons of either party, and to fill their places with more modest men. The teachers must promote unity, and recommend the churches and teachers of the opposite party." (Walther, 51.) Such was the teaching and the theological attitude of the Exegesis. It advocated a union of the Lutherans and the Reformed based on indifferentism, and a surrender in all important doctrinal points to Calvinism, the Lutherans merely retaining their name. This unionistic attitude of the Exegesis has been generally, also in America, termed Melanchthonianism.

215. Plotters Unmasked.

The plain and unmistakable language of the Exegesis cleared the atmosphere, and everywhere dispelled all doubts as to the real nature of the theological trend at Wittenberg and Leipzig. Now it was plain to everybody beyond the shadow of a doubt that Electoral Saxony was indeed infested with decided Calvinists. And before long also the web of deceit and falsehood which they had spun around the Elector was torn into shreds. The appearance of the Exegesis resulted in a cry of indignation throughout Lutheran Germany against the Wittenberg and Leipzig Philippists. Yet, in 1574, only few books appeared against the document, which, indeed, was not in need of a special refutation. Wigand published Analysis of the New Exegesis, and Hesshusius: Assertion (Assertio) of the True Doctrine Concerning the Supper, against the Calvinian Exegesis. At the same time Elector August was again urged by Lutheran princes notably the King of Denmark and Duke Ludwig of Wuerttemberg, also by private persons, to proceed against the Calvinists in his country and not to spare them any longer. (Gieseler 3, 2, 267.) The aged Count of Henneberg made it a point to see the Elector personally in this matter. But there was little need for further admonitions, for the Exegesis had opened the Elector's eyes. And soon after its publication discoveries were made which filled August with deep humiliation and burning indignation at the base deception practised on him by the very men whom he had trusted implicitly and placed in most important positions. By lying and deceit the Philippists had for a long period succeeded in holding the confidence of Elector August; but now the time for their complete and inglorious unmasking had arrived.

Shortly after the Exegesis had appeared, Peucer wrote a letter to the Crypto-Calvinist Christian Schuetze, then court-preacher in Dresden [who studied at Leipzig; became superintendent at Chemnitz in 1550, court-preacher of Elector August in 1554; when he was buried, boys threw a black hen over his coffin, crying, 'Here flies the Calvinistic devil;' Joecher, Lexicon 4, 372], which he had addressed to the wife of the court-preacher in order to avoid suspicion. By mistake the letter was delivered to the wife of the court-preacher Lysthenius [born 1532; studied in Wittenberg; became court-preacher of Elector August in 1572 and later on his confessor; opposed Crypto-Calvinism; was dismissed 1590 by Chancellor Crell; 1591 restored to his position in Dresden, died 1596]. After opening the letter and finding it to be written in Latin, she gave it to her husband, who, in turn, delivered it to the Elector. In it Peucer requested Schuetze dexterously to slip into the hands of Anna, the wife of the Elector, a Calvinistic prayer-book which he had sent with the letter. Peucer added: "If first we have Mother Anna on our side, there will be no difficulty in winning His Lordship [her husband] too."

Additional implicating material was discovered when Augustus now confiscated the correspondence of Peucer, Schuetze, Stoessel, and Cracow. The letters found revealed the consummate perfidy, dishonesty, cunning, and treachery of the men who had been the trusted advisers of the Elector, who had enjoyed his implicit confidence, and who by their falsehoods had caused him to persecute hundreds of innocent and faithful Lutheran ministers. The fact was clearly established that these Philippists had been systematically plotting to Calvinize Saxony. The very arguments with which Luther's doctrine of the Lord's Supper and the Person of Christ might best be refuted were enumerated in these letters. However, when asked by the Elector whether they were Calvinists, these self-convicted deceivers are said to have answered that "they would not see the face of God in eternity if in any point they were addicted to the doctrines of the Sacramentarians or deviated in the least from Dr. Luther's teaching." (Walther, 56.) The leaders of the conspiracy were incarcerated. Cracow died in prison, 1575; Stoessel, 1576. It was as late as 1586 that Peucer regained his liberty, Schuetze in 1589.

216. Lutheranism Restored.

In all the churches of Saxony thanksgiving services were held to praise God for the final triumph of genuine Lutheranism. A memorial coin celebrating the victory over the Crypto-Calvinists, bearing the date 1574, was struck at Torgau. The obverse exhibits Elector August handing a book to Elector John George of Brandenburg. The inscription above reads: "Conserva Apud Nos Verbum Tuum, Domine. Preserve Thy Word among Us, O Lord." Below, the inscription runs: "Augustus, Dei Gratia Dux Saxionae et Elector. Augustus, by the Grace of God Duke of Saxony and Elector." The reverse represents Torgau and its surroundings, with Wittenberg in the distance. The Elector, clad in his armor, is standing on a rock bearing the inscription: "Schloss Hartenfels" (castle at Torgau). In his right hand he is holding a sword, in his left a balance, whose falling scale, in which the Child Jesus is sitting, bears the inscription: "Die Allmacht, Omnipotence." The lighter and rising pan, in which four Wittenberg Crypto-Calvinists are vainly exerting themselves to the utmost in pulling on the chains of their pan in order to increase its weight, and on the beam of which also the devil is sitting, is inscribed: "Die Vernunft, Reason." Above, God appears, saying to the Elector, "Joshua 1, 5. 6: Confide, Non Derelinquam Te. Trust, I will not forsake thee." Below we read: "Apud Deum Non Est Impossibile Verbum Ullum, Lucae 1. Conserva Apud Nos Verbum Tuum, Domine. 1574. Nothing is impossible with God, Luke 1. Preserve Thy Word among us, Lord. 1574."

The obverse of a smaller medal, also of 1574 shows the bust of Elector August with the inscription: "Augustus, Dei Gratia Dux Saxoniae Et Elector." The reverse exhibits a ship in troubled waters with the crucified Christ in her expanded sails, and the Elector in his armor and with the sword on his shoulder, standing at the foot of the mast. In the roaring ocean are enemies, shooting with arrows and striking with swords, making an assault upon the ship. The fearlessness of the Elector is expressed in the inscription: "Te Gubernatore, Thou [Christ] being the pilot." Among the jubilee medals of 1617 there is one which evidently, too, celebrates the victory over Zwinglianism and Calvinism. Its obverse exhibits Frederick in his electoral garb pointing with two fingers of his right hand to the name Jehovah at the head of the medal. At his left Luther is standing with a burning light in his right hand and pointing with the forefinger of his left hand to a book lying on a table and bearing the title: "Biblia Sacra: V[erbum] D[ei] M[anet] I[n] Ae[ternum]." The reverse represents the Elector standing on a rock inscribed: "Schloss Hartenfels, Castle Hartenfels." In his right hand he is holding the sword and in his left a balance. Under the falling scale, containing the Child Jesus, we read: "Die Allmacht, Omnipotence," and under the rising pan, in which the serpent is lying: "Die Vernunft, Reason." The marginal inscription runs. "Iosua 1: Confide. Non Derelinquam Te. Joshua 1: Trust. I will not forsake thee." (Ch. Junker, Ehrengedaechtnis Dr. M. Luthers, 353. 383.)

Self-evidently, Elector August immediately took measures also to reestablish in his territories Luther's doctrine of the Lord's Supper. The beginning was made by introducing a confession prepared by reliable superintendents and discussed, adopted, and subscribed at the Diet of Torgau, September, 1574, and published simultaneously in German and Latin. Its German title ran: "Brief Confession (Kurz Bekenntnis) and Articles Concerning the Holy Supper of the Body and Blood of Christ, from which may clearly be seen what heretofore has been publicly taught, believed, and confessed concerning it in both universities of Leipzig and Wittenberg, and elsewhere in all churches and schools of the Elector of Saxony, also what has been rebuked and is still rebuked as Sacramentarian error and enthusiasm." The Torgau Confession, therefore, does not reject the Corpus Doctrinae Misnicum of 1560 nor even the Consensus Dresdensis of 1571, and pretends that Melanchthon was in doctrinal agreement with Luther, and that only a few Crypto-Calvinists had of late been discovered in the Electorate. This pretense was the chief reason why the Confession did not escape criticism. In 1575 Wigand published: "Whether the New Wittenbergers had hitherto always taught harmoniously and agreeably with the Old, and whether Luther's and Philip's writings were throughout in entire harmony and agreement."

As for its doctrine, however, the Torgau Confession plainly upholds the Lutheran teaching. Article VII contends that in the distribution of the Lord's Supper the body and blood of Christ "are truly received also by the unworthy." Article VIII maintains the "oral eating and drinking, oris manducatio." Calvin, Beza, Bullinger, Peter Martyr and the Heidelberg theologians are rejected, and their names expressly mentioned. On the other hand, the "ubiquity [local extension] of the flesh of Christ" is disavowed and a discussion of the mode and possibility of the presence of the body and blood of Christ is declined as something inscrutable. The Latin passage reads: "Ac ne carnis quidem ubiquitatem, aut quidquam, quod vel veritatem corporis Christi tollat, vel ulli fidei articulo repugnet, propter praesentiam in Coena fingimus aut probamus. Denique de modo et possibilitate praesentiae corporis et sanguinis Domini plane nihil disputamus. Nam omnia haec imperscrutabilia statuimus." (Gieseler 3, 2, 268.)

Caspar Cruciger, Jr., Henry Moeller, Christopher Pezel, and Frederick Widebram, who refused to subscribe the Brief Confession, were first arrested, then, after subscribing with a qualification, released, but finally (1574) banished. Widebram and Pezel removed to Nassau, Moeller to Hamburg, and Cruciger to Hesse. At Leipzig, Andrew Freyhub, who appealing to the Consensus Dresdensis, taught that Christ was exalted according to both natures, that divine properties were not communicated to His humanity, and that His body was inclosed in a certain place in heaven was deposed in 1576.

Thus ended the Crypto-Calvinistic drama in Electoral Saxony. Henceforth such men as Andreae, Chemnitz, and Selneccer were the trusted advisers of August, who now became the enthusiastic, devoted, and self-sacrificing leader of the larger movement for settling all of the controversies distracting the Lutheran Church, which finally resulted in the adoption of the Formula of Concord.

217. Visitation Articles.

Elector August, the stanch defender of genuine Lutheranism, died 1586. Under his successor, Christian I, and Chancellor Nicholas Crell, Crypto-Calvinism once more raised its head in Electoral Saxony. But it was for a short period only, for Christian I died September 25, 1591, and during the regency of Duke Frederick William, who acted as guardian of Christian II, Lutheranism was reestablished. In order effectually and permanently to suppress the Crypto-Calvinistic intrigues, the Duke, in February of 1592, ordered a general visitation of all the churches in the entire Electorate. For this purpose Aegidius Hunnius [born 1550; 1576 professor in Marburg and later superintendent and professor in Wittenberg; attended colloquy at Regensburg 1601; wrote numerous books, particularly against Papists and Calvinists, died 1603], Martin Mirus [born 1532, died 1593], George Mylius [born 1544; 1584 expelled from Augsburg because he was opposed to the Gregorian almanac, since 1585 professor in Wittenberg and Jena, died 1607], Wolfgang Mamphrasius [born 1557; superintendent in Wurtzen; died 1616], and others, who were to conduct the visitation, composed the so-called Visitation Articles which were printed in 1593. The complete title of these articles runs: "Visitation Articles in the Entire Electorate of Saxony, together with the Negative and Contrary Doctrines of the Calvinists and the Form of Subscription, as Presented to be Signed by Both Parties."

As a result of the visitation, the Crypto-Calvinistic professors in Wittenberg and Leipzig were exiled. John Salmuth [born 1575; court-preacher in Dresden since 1584; died 1592] and Prierius, also a minister in Dresden, were imprisoned. As a bloody finale of the Crypto-Calvinistic drama enacted in Electoral Saxony, Chancellor Crell was beheaded, October 9, 1601, after an imprisonment of ten years. Crell was punished, according to his epitaph, as "an enemy of peace and a disturber of the public quiet--hostis pacis et quietis publicae turbator," or, as Hutter remarks in his Concordia Concors, "not on account of his religion, but on account of his manifold perfidy--non ob religionem, sed ob perfidiam multiplicem." (448. 1258.) For a long period (till 1836) all teachers and ministers in Electoral Saxony were required to subscribe also to the Visitation Articles as a doctrinal norm. Self-evidently they are not an integral part of the Book of Concord.

XIX. Controversy on Christ's Descent into Hell.

218. Luther's Doctrine.

While according to medieval theologians the descent into hell was regarded as an act by which Christ, with His soul only, entered the abode of the dead; and while according to Calvin and the Reformed generally the descent into hell is but a figurative expression for the sufferings of Christ, particularly of His soul, on the cross, Luther, especially in a sermon delivered 1533 at Torgau, taught in accordance with the Scriptures that Christ the God-man, body and soul, descended into hell as Victor over Satan and his host. With special reference to Ps. 16, 10 and Acts 2, 24. 27, Luther explained: After His burial the whole person of Christ, the God-man, descended into hell, conquered the devil, and destroyed the power of hell and Satan. The mode and manner, however, in which this was done can no more be comprehended by human reason than His sitting at the right hand of the Father, and must therefore not be investigated, but believed and accepted in simple faith. It is sufficient if we retain the consolation that neither hell nor devil are any longer able to harm us. Accordingly, Luther did not regard the descent into hell as an act belonging to the state of humiliation, by which He paid the penalty for our sins, but as an act of exaltation, in which Christ, as it were, plucked for us the fruits of His sufferings which were finished when He died upon the cross.

Luther's sermon at Torgau graphically describes the descent as a triumphant march of our victorious Savior into the stronghold of the dismayed infernal hosts. From it we quote the following: "Before Christ arose and ascended into heaven, and while yet lying in the grave, He also descended into hell in order to deliver also us from it, who were to be held in it as prisoners.... However I shall not discuss this article in a profound and subtle manner, as to how it was done or what it means to 'descend into hell,' but adhere to the simplest meaning conveyed by these words, as we must represent it to children and uneducated people." "Therefore whoever would not go wrong or stumble had best adhere to the words and understand them in a simple way as well as he can. Accordingly, it is customary to represent Christ in paintings on walls, as He descends, appears before hell, clad in a priestly robe and with a banner in His hand, with which He beats the devil and puts him to flight, takes hell by storm, and rescues those that are His. Thus it was also acted the night before Easter as a play for children. And I am well pleased with the fact that it is painted, played, sung and said in this manner for the benefit of simple people. We, too, should let it go at that, and not trouble ourselves with profound and subtle thoughts as to how it may have happened, since it surely did not occur bodily inasmuch as He remained in the grave three days."

Luther continues: "However since we cannot but conceive thoughts and images of what is presented to us in words, and unable to think of or understand anything without such images, it is appropriate and right that we view it literally, just as it is painted, that He descends with the banner, shattering and destroying the gates of hell; and we should put aside thoughts that are too deep and incomprehensible for us." "But we ought ... simply to fix and fasten our hearts and thoughts on the words of the Creed, which says: 'I believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, dead, buried, and descended into hell,' that is, in the entire person, God and man, with body and soul, undivided, 'born of the Virgin, suffered, died, and buried'; in like manner I must not divide it here either, but believe and say that the same Christ, God and man in one person, descended into hell but did not remain in it; as Ps. 16, 10 says of Him: 'Thou wilt not leave My soul in hell nor suffer Thine Holy One to see corruption.' By the word 'soul,' He, in accordance with the language of the Scripture, does not mean, as we do, a being separated from the body, but the entire man, the Holy One of God, as He here calls Himself. But how it may have occurred that the man lies there in the grave, and yet descends into hell--that, indeed, we shall and must leave unexplained and uncomprehended; for it certainly did not take place in a bodily and tangible manner although we can only paint and conceive it in a coarse and bodily way and speak of it in pictures." "Such, therefore is the plainest manner to speak of this article, that we may adhere to the words and cling to this main point, that for us, through Christ, hell has been torn to pieces and the devil's kingdom and power utterly destroyed, for which purpose He died, was buried, and descended,--so that it should no longer harm or overwhelm us, as He Himself says, Matt. 16, 18...." (CONC. TRIGL., 1050)

219. Aepinus in Hamburg.

The two outstanding features of Luther's sermon are that Christ descended into hell body and soul, and that He descended as a triumphant Victor, and not in order to complete His suffering and the work of atonement. The denial of these two points, in particular, caused a new controversy, which however, was of brief duration only, and practically confined to the city of Hamburg, hence also called the Hamburg Church Controversy, der Hamburger Kirchenstreit. Its author was John Aepinus [Huck or Hoeck; born 1499; studied under Luther; persecuted in Brandenburg and banished; rector in Stralsund; 1532 pastor and later superintendent in Hamburg; wrote 1547 against the Interim; sided with Flacius against the Philippists; published books in Latin and Low German; dealt with Christ's descent to hell especially in his Commentary on Psalm 16, of 1544, and in his Explanation of Psalm 68, of 1553; died May 13, 1553].

Aepinus taught that Christ's descent is a part of His suffering and atonement. While the body was lying in the grave, His soul descended into hell in order to suffer the qualms and pangs required to satisfy the wrath of God, complete the work of redemption, and render a plenary satisfaction, satisfactio plenaria. The descent is the last stage of Christ's humiliation and suffering, His triumph first beginning with the resurrection. Though we know His sufferings in hell to have been most sad and bitter, yet we are unable to say and define what they were in particular, or to describe them concretely, because Scripture is silent on this question.

But while Aepinus originally held that the soul of Christ suffered in hell the punishment of eternal death, he later on distinguished between the first and the second death (eternal damnation) asserting the suffering Christ endured in hell to have been a part of the punishment of the first death, and that He did not suffer the cruciatus AETERNI tartarei ignis.--Such were the views advocated, developed, and variously modified by Aepinus in his theological lectures and publications. From the Latin "Consummatum est, It is finished," the teaching that Christ finished His suffering and the work of atonement by His death on the cross was stigmatized by Aepinus as "error consummaticus," and its advocates as "Consummatists," while these, in turn, dubbed Aepinus and his adherents "Infernalists." (Frank 3,440.)

Among the statements of Aepinus are the following: "I believe that hell is a place prepared by divine justice to punish the devils and wicked men according to the quality of their sins." (437.) "On account of our redemption Christ descended to hell, just as He suffered and died for us." (437.) "Theologians who either deny that the soul of Christ descended into hell, or say that Christ was present in hell only in effect and power, and not by His presence, deprive the Church of faith in the sufficient, complete, and perfect satisfaction and redemption of Christ and leave to Satan the right over pious souls after their separation from the body. For by denying that Christ sustained and bore those punishments of death and hell which the souls were obliged to bear after their separation from the body, they assert that complete satisfaction has not been made for them." (439.) "I believe that the descent of the soul of Christ to hell is a part of the Passion of Christ, i.e., of the struggles, dangers, anguish, pains, and punishments which He took upon Himself and bore in our behalf; for, in the Scriptures, to descend to hell signifies to be involved in the highest struggles, pain, and distress. I believe that the descent of Christ to hell is a part of His obedience foretold by the prophets and imposed on Him because of our sins." (440.) "I believe that the descent of Christ pertains to His humiliation, not to His glorification and triumph." (441.) "The descent to hell was by God's judgment laid upon Christ as the last degree of His humiliation and exinanition and as the extreme part of His obedience and satisfaction." (441.) "Peter clearly teaches, Acts 2, that the soul of Christ felt the pangs of hell and death while His body was resting in the sepulcher." (441.) "What Christ experienced when He descended into hell is known to Himself, not to us; may we acknowledge and accept with grateful minds that He descended into hell for us. But let us not inquire what it was that He experienced for us in His descent, for we may piously remain ignorant of matters which God did not reveal to His Church, and which He does not demand that she know." (444.)

220. Opposed by His Colleagues.

The views of Aepinus, first presented in lectures delivered 1544 before the ministers of Hamburg, called forth dissent and opposition on the part of his colleagues. Before long, however (1549), the controversy began to assume a virulent character. While the conduct of Aepinus was always marked by dignity, moderation, and mildness, his opponents Tileman Epping, John Gartz, and Caspar Hackrott, ventilated and assailed his teaching in their pulpits.

The chief argument against Aepinus was that his doctrine conflicted with, and invalidated, the words of Christ, "It is finished," "To-day shalt thou be with Me in Paradise." Aepinus rejoined that the word "to-day" is an ambiguous term, denoting both the immediate presence and the indefinite near future (pro praesenti et imminente tempore indefinito). (414.) However, it was not in every respect Luther's position which was occupied by some of the opponents of Aepinus. Gratz is reported to have taught that the article concerning the descent of Christ was not necessary to salvation that descendere (descend) was identical with sepeliri (to be buried), that the descent to hell referred to the anguish and temptation of Christ during His life; that Christ immediately after His death entered paradise together with the malefactor, that the work of atonement and satisfaction was completed with His death. (446.)

In 1550 the city council of Hamburg asked Melanchthon for his opinion. But Melanchthon's answer of September, 1550, signed also by Bugenhagen, was rather indefinite, vague, and evasive. He said, in substance: Although we have frequently heard the Reverend Doctor Luther speak on this matter and read his writings, yet, since a controversy has now been raised, we have written also to others for their views, in order to present a unanimous opinion, and thus avoid dissensions later on. In his Commentary on Genesis and in his Torgau sermon, Luther referred Descent only to the victory of the Son of God, indicating that the rest must not be searched out. The Son of God did indeed overcome the torments of hell; but the Psalms show that the pains of hell are not to be restricted only to the time after the separation of the soul (dolores inferorum non restringendos esse tantum ad tempus post animae separationem). Luther, said Melanchthon, expressed it as his opinion "that this article concerning the Descent must be retained even when referred only to the victory of Christ, confessing that the tyranny of the devil and hell is destroyed i.e., that all who believe in Christ are liberated from the power of the devil and hell, according to the word: 'No one shall pluck My sheep out of My hands.' And in a certain way the Son of God manifested this victory to the devils, and, no doubt, the devils felt that their power was broken by this Victor, and that the head of the serpent was truly bruised by the Seed of the Woman, by Christ, God and man. And among the signs of His victory was the resurrection of many dead." With respect to the controverted point, concerning the sufferings of the soul of Christ after its separation from the body, Melanchthon advised that the council of Hamburg "enjoin both parties to await the opinions of others also, and in the mean time to avoid mentioning this question in sermons, schools, or other public meetings." Not the article concerning the Descent itself, but "only the investigation of this particular point, concerning the suffering of His departed soul in hell, is to be omitted, an inquiry which also Dr. Luther did not consider necessary." (C. R. 7, 667.)

Before this Melanchthon had written in a similar vein of compromise to Aepinus and his colleague, John Gartz. "I wish," said he in a letter of April 4, 1550, "that there would be an amnesty between you in this entire strife" about the descent of Christ. "Let us cultivate peace with one another, and cover up certain wounds of ours, lest sadder disputations originate." (7, 569; compare 6, 116.) In the following year the Hamburg Council, acting on the advice of Melanchthon, deposed and expelled the leaders of the opposition to Aepinus, which, however, was not intended as a decision in favor of the doctrine of Aepinus, but merely as a measure to restore peace and silence in the city.

221. Other Participants in This Controversy.

Though the controversy was suppressed in Hamburg, and Aepinus died May 13, 1553, the theological questions involved were not settled, nor had all of the advocates of the views set forth by Aepinus disappeared from the scene. Even such theologians as Westphal, Flacius, Gallus, and Osiander were partly agreed with him. Osiander says in an opinion: "I am asked whether the descent of Christ pertains to the satisfaction made for us or only to His triumph over the enemies. I answer briefly that the descent of Christ into hell pertained to the satisfaction He merited for us as well as to the triumph over the enemies, just as His death on the cross does not belong to the one only, but to both.... Thus by descending into hell He rendered satisfaction for us who merited hell, according to Ps. 16." On the other hand, a synod held July 11, 1554, at Greifswald made it a point expressly to deny that the descent of Christ involved any suffering of His soul, or that it was of an expiatory nature, or that this article referred to the anguish of His soul before His death, or that it was identical with His burial. They affirmed the teaching of Luther, viz., that the entire Christ, God and man, body and soul, descended into hell after His burial and before His resurrection, etc. (Frank, 446f.; 416.)

Furthermore, in a letter to John Parsimonius, court-preacher in Stuttgart, dated February 1, 1565 John Matsperger of Augsburg taught that, in the article of the descent of Christ, the word "hell" must not be taken figuratively for torments, death, burial, etc., but literally, as the kingdom of Satan and the place of the damned spirits and souls wherever that might be, that the entire Christ descended into this place according to both divinity and humanity, with His body and soul, and not only with the latter, while the former remained in the grave; that this occurred immediately after His vivification or the reunion of body and soul in the grave and before His resurrection; that the Descent was accomplished in an instant, viz., in the moment after His vivification and before His resurrection; and that Christ descended, not to suffer, but, as a triumphant Victor, to destroy the portals of hell for all believers. Parsimonius, too, maintained that Christ did not in any way suffer after His death, but denied emphatically that "hell" was a definite physical locality or place in space, and that the descent involved a local motion of the body. Brenz assented to the views of Parsimonius, and the preachers of Augsburg also assented to them. In order to check his zeal against his opponents, Matsperger was deposed and imprisoned. (Frank, 450 f.)

Such being the situation within the Lutheran Church concerning the questions involved in the Hamburg Controversy, which by the way, had been mentioned also in the Imperial Instruction for the Diet at Augsburg, 1555, the Formula of Concord considered it advisable to pass also on this matter. It did so, in Article IX, by simply reproducing what Luther had taught in the sermon referred to above. Here we read: "We simply believe that the entire person, God and man after the burial, descended into hell, conquered the devil, destroyed the power of hell and took from the devil all his might." (1051, 3.) "But how this occurred we should [not curiously investigate, but] reserve until the other world, where not only this point [this mystery], but also still others will be revealed, which we here simply believe, and cannot comprehend with our blind reason." (827, 4.) Tschackert remarks: "Ever since [the adoption of the Ninth Article of the Formula of Concord] Lutheran theology has regarded the Descent of Christ as the beginning of the state of exaltation of the human nature of the God-man." (559.)

XX. The Eleventh Article of the Formula of Concord: On Predestination.

222. Why Article XI was Embodied in the Formula.

The reason why Article XI was embodied in the Formula of Concord is stated in the opening paragraph of this article: "Although among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession there has not occurred as yet any public dissension whatever concerning the eternal election of the children of God that has caused offense, and has become wide-spread, yet since this article has been brought into very painful controversy in other places, and even among our theologians there has been some agitation concerning it; moreover, since the same expressions were not always employed concerning it by the theologians: therefore in order, by the aid of divine grace, to prevent disagreement and separation on its account in the future among our successors, we, as much as in us lies, have desired also to present an explanation of the same here, so that every one may know what is our unanimous doctrine, faith, and confession also concerning this article." (1063, 1.)

The statements contained in these introductory remarks are in agreement with the historical facts. For, while serious dissensions pertaining to election did occur in Reformed countries, the Lutheran Church, ever since the great conflict with Erasmus on free will, in 1525 had not been disturbed by any general, public, and offensive controversy on this question, neither ad intra among themselves, nor ad extra with the Calvinists. Hence the chief purpose for embodying Article XI in the Formula was not to settle past or present disputes, but rather, as stated in the paragraph quoted, to be of service in avoiding future differences and conflicts.

This earnest concern for the future peace of our Church, as well as for the maintenance of its doctrinal purity, was partly due to apprehensions, which, indeed, were not without foundation. As a matter of fact, long before the Formula was drafted, the theological atmosphere was surcharged with polemical possibilities and probabilities regarding predestination,--a doctrine which is simple enough as long as faith adheres to the plain Word of God, without making rationalistic and sophistical inferences, but which in public controversies has always proved to be a most intricate, crucial, and dangerous question.

Calvin and his adherents boldly rejected the universality of God's grace, of Christ's redemption, and of the Spirit's efficacious operation through the means of grace, and taught that, in the last analysis, also the eternal doom of the damned was solely due to an absolute decree of divine reprobation (in their estimation the logical complement of election), and this at the very time when they pretended adherence to the Augsburg Confession and were making heavy inroads into Lutheran territory with their doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper and the person of Christ,--which in itself was sufficient reason for a public discussion and determined resentment of their absolute predestinarianism. The Synergists, on the other hand, had long ago been busy explaining that the only way to escape the Stoic dogma of Calvinism, and to account for the difference why some are accepted and elected, while the rest are rejected, was to assume a different conduct in man--aliqua actio dissimilis in homine. And as for their Lutheran opponents, it cannot be denied that some of their statements were not always sufficiently guarded to preclude all misapprehensions and false inferences.

Thus controversial material had been everywhere heaped up in considerable quantities. Considering these factors, which for decades had been making for a theological storm, one may feel rather surprised that a controversy on predestination had not arisen long ago. Tschackert says: "They [the Lutheran theologians] evidently feared an endless debate if the intricate question concerning predestination were made a subject of discussion." (559.) Sooner or later, however, the conflict was bound to come with dire results for the Church, unless provisions were made to escape it, or to meet it in the proper way. Well aware of this entire critical situation and the imminent dangers lurking therein, the framers of the Formula of Concord wisely resolved to embody in it also an article on election in order to clear the theological atmosphere, maintain the divine truth, ward off a future controversy, and insure the peace of our Church.

223. Unguarded Statements of Anti-Synergists.

That the occasional dissimilar and inadequate references to eternal election and related subjects made by some opponents of the Synergists were a matter of grave concern to the authors of the Formula of Concord appears from the passage quoted from Article XI, enumerating, among the reasons why the article on predestination was embodied in the Formula, also the fact that "the same expressions were not always employed concerning it [eternal election] by the theologians." These theologians had staunchly defended the sola gratia doctrine, but not always without some stumbling in their language. In their expositions they had occasionally employed phrases which, especially when torn from their context, admitted a synergistic or Calvinistic interpretation. The framers of the Formula probably had in mind such inadequate and unguarded statements of Bucer, Amsdorf, and others as the following.

Bucer had written: "The Scriptures do not hesitate to say that God delivers some men into a reprobate mind and drives them to perdition. Why, then, is it improper to say that God has afore-determined to deliver these into a reprobate mind and to drive them to perdition? Scriptura non veretur dicere, Deum tradere quosdam homines in sensum reprobum et agere in perniciem. Quid igitur indignum Deo, dicere, etiam statuisse antea, ut illos in sensum reprobum traderet et ageret in perniciem?" (Frank 4, 264.) The Formula of Concord, however, is careful to explain: "Moreover, it is to be diligently considered that when God punishes sin with sins, that is, when He afterwards punishes with obduracy and blindness those who had been converted, because of their subsequent security, impenitence, and wilful sins this should not be interpreted to mean that it never had been God's good pleasure that such persons should come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved." (1001, 83.)

Brenz had said: "To the one of the entire mass of the human race God gives faith in Christ, whereby he is justified and saved, while He leaves the other in his incredulity that he may perish. Deus ex universa generis humani massa alteri quidem donat fidem in Christum, qua iustificetur et salvetur, alterum autem relinquit in sua incredulitate, ut pereat." (Frank 4, 256.) Again: It was God's will to elect Jacob and to leave Esau in his sin. What is said of these two must be understood of the election and rejection of all men in general. "Potuisset Deus optimo iure ambos abiicere;... sed sic proposuerat Deus, sic visum est Deo, sic erat voluntas Dei, sic erat bene placitum Dei, ut Iacobum eligeret, Esau autem in peccato suo relinqueret; quod de his duobus dictum est, hoc intelligendum erit generaliter de omnium hominum electione et abiectione." (256.) Hesshusius: "In this respect God does not will that all be saved, for He has not elected all. Hoc respectu Deus non vult, ut omnes salventur; non enim omnes elegit." (Schluesselburg 5, 320. 548.) Such statements, when torn from their context, gave color to the inference that God's grace was not universal. The Formula of Concord, therefore, carefully urges that God earnestly endeavors to save all men, also those who are finally lost, and that man alone is the cause of his damnation.

In his Sententia de Declaratione Victorini of 1562 Nicholas Amsdorf said: "God has but one mode of working in all creatures.... Therefore God works in the same way in man who has a will and intellect as in all other creatures, rocks and blocks included, viz., through His willing and saying alone.... As rocks and blocks are in the power of God, so and in the same manner man's will and intellect are in the will of God, so that man can will and choose absolutely nothing else than what God wills and says, be it from grace or from wrath. Non est nisi unus modus agendi Dei cum omnibus creaturis.... Quare eodem modo cum homine volente et intelligente agit Deus, quemadmodum cum omnibus creaturis reliquis, lapide et trunco, per solum suum velle et dicere.... Sicut lapides et trunci sunt in potestate Dei, ita et eodem modo voluntas et intellectus hominis sunt in voluntate Dei, ut homo nihil prorsus velle et eligere possit nisi id, quod vult et dicit Deus, sive ex gratia, sive ex ira, derelinquens eum in manu consilii eius." (Schlb. 5, 547; Gieseler 3, 2, 230; Frank 4, 259.) This, too, was not embodied in the Formula of Concord, which teaches that, although man before his conversion has no mode of working anything good in spiritual things, God nevertheless has a different way of working in rational creatures than in irrational and that man is not coerced, neither in his sinning nor in his conversion. (905, 60ff.)

224. Synergistic Predestination.

The connection between the doctrines of conversion and election is most intimate. A correct presentation of the former naturally leads to a correct presentation of the latter, and vice versa. Hence Melanchthon, the father of synergism in conversion, was also the author of a synergistic predestination. In his first period he speaks of predestination as Luther did, but, as Frank puts it, "with less of mysticism conformably to reason, following the same line of thought as Zwingli (mit weniger Mystik, auf verstandesmaessige, Zwinglis Ausfuehrungen aehnliche Weise." [transcriber: sic on punctuation] (1, 125; C. R. 21, 88. 93.) In reality he probably had never fully grasped the truly religious and evangelical view of Luther, which, indeed, would account for his later synergistic deviations as well as for the charges of Stoicism he preferred against Luther. After abandoning his former doctrine, he, as a rule, was noncommittal as to his exact views on election. But whenever he ventured an opinion, it savored of synergism. September 30, 1531, he wrote to Brenz: "But in the entire Apology I have avoided that long and inexplicable disputation concerning predestination. Everywhere I speak as though predestination follows our faith and works. And this I do intentionally, for I do not wish to perturb consciences with these inexplicable labyrinths. Sed ego in tota Apologia fugi illam longam et inexplicabilem disputationem de praedestinatione. Ubique sic loquor, quasi praedestinatio sequatur nostram fidem et opera. Ac facio hoc certo consilio; non enim volo conscientias perturbare illis inexplicabilibus labyrinthis." (C. R. 2, 547.)

In the third, revised edition of his Explanation of the Epistle to the Romans, 1532, he suggests "that divine compassion is truly the cause of election, but that there is some cause also in him who accepts, namely, in as far as he does not repudiate the grace offered. Verecundius est, quod aliquamdiu placuit Augustino, misericordiam Dei vere causam electionis esse, sed tamen eatenus aliquam causam in accipiente esse, quatenus promissionem oblatam non repudiat, quia malum ex nobis est." (Gieseler 3, 2, 192; Seeberg 4, 2, 442.) In an addition to his Loci in 1533, Melanchthon again speaks of a cause of justification and election residing in man, in order to harmonize the statements that the promise of the Gospel is both gratis and universal. (C. R. 21, 332.) In the Loci edition of 1543 we read: "God elected because He had decreed to call us to the knowledge of His Son, and desires His will and benefits to be known to the human race. He therefore approves and elected those who obey the call. Elegit Deus, quia vocare nos ad Filii agnitionem decrevit et vult generi humano suam voluntatem et sua beneficia innotescere. Approbat igitur ac elegit obtemperantes vocationi." (21, 917.)

The bold synergistic views concerning conversion later on developed by Melanchthon plainly involve the doctrine that there must be in man a cause of discrimination why some are elected while others are rejected. In his Loci of 1548 he had written: "Since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory wills in God, some cause of discrimination must be in us why Saul is rejected and David accepted (cur Saul abiiciatur David recipiatur), that is, there must be some dissimilar action in these two." (21, 659.) Self-evidently Melanchthon would not have hesitated to replace the phrase "why Saul was rejected and David accepted," with "why Saul was rejected and David elected."

Melanchthon held that the sole alternative of and hence the only escape from, the doctrine of absolute necessity (Stoica anagke) and from the absolute decree, which makes God responsible also for sin and eternal damnation, was the synergistic assumption of man's "ability to apply himself to grace--facultas applicandi se ad gratiam." Accordingly, as he dubbed those who opposed his Calvinizing views on the Lord's Supper as "bread-worshipers," so he stigmatized as Stoics all Lutherans who opposed his synergistic tendencies. (C. R. 8, 782. 783. 916; 9, 100. 565. 733; 23, 392.) Seeberg summarizes Melanchthon's doctrine as follows: "Grace alone saves, but it saves by imparting to man the freedom to decide for himself. This synergistic element reappears in his doctrine of election." (4, 2, 446.) "God elects all men who desire to believe." (Grundriss, 144.)

Naturally the Synergists of Wittenberg and other places followed Master Philip also in the doctrine of election. In 1555, John Pfeffinger declared in his Quaestiones Quinque (extensively quoted from in the chapter on the Synergistic Controversy), thesis 17: "If the will were idle or purely passive [in conversion], there would be no distinction between the pious and the impious, or the elect and the damned, as between Saul and David, between Judas and Peter. God would become a respecter of persons and the author of contumacy in the wicked and damned. Moreover, contradictory wills would be ascribed to God which conflicts with the entire Scripture. Hence it follows that there is in us some cause why some assent while others do not assent." Thesis 23: "For we are elected and received because we believe in the Son. (Ideo enim electi sumus et recepti, quia credimus in Filium.) But our apprehension must concur. For since the promise of grace is universal, and we must obey the promise, it follows that between the elect and the rejected some difference must be inferred from our will, viz., that those are rejected who resist the promise while contrariwise those are accepted who embrace the promise."

The Synergists argued: If in every respect grace alone is the cause of our salvation, conversion, and election, grace cannot be universal. Or, since man's contempt of God's Word is the cause of his reprobation, man's acceptance of God's grace must be regarded as a cause of his election. Joachim Ernest of Anhalt, for instance, in a letter to Landgrave William of Hesse, dated April 20, 1577, criticized the Formula of Concord for not allowing and admitting this argument. (Frank 4, 135. 267.)

225. Calvinistic Predestination.

While the Synergists, in answering the question why only some are saved, denied the sola gratia and taught a conversion and predestination conditioned by the conduct of man, John Calvin and his adherents, on the other hand, made rapid progress in the opposite direction, developing with increasing clearness and boldness an absolute, bifurcated predestination, i.e., a capricious election to eternal damnation as well as to salvation, and in accordance therewith denied the universality of God's grace, of Christ's redemption, and of the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit through the means of grace. In his "Institutio Religionis Christianae, Instruction in the Christian Religion," of which the first edition appeared 1535, the second in 1539, and the third in 1559, Calvin taught that God created and foreordained some to eternal life, others to eternal damnation. Man's election means that he has been created for eternal life, man's reprobation, that he has been created for eternal damnation. We read (Lib. 3, cap. 21, 5): "Praedestinationem vocamus aeternum Dei decretum, quo apud se constitutum habuit, quid de unoquoque homine fieri vellet. Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes; sed aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna praeordinatur. Itaque prout in alterutrum finem quisque conditus est, ita vel ad vitam, vel ad mortem praedestinatum dicimus." (Tholuck, Calvini Institutio 2, 133.) In the edition of 1559 Calvin says that eternal election illustrates the grace of God by showing "that He does not adopt all promiscuously unto the hope of salvation, but bestows on some what He denies to others--quod non omnes promiscue adoptat in spem salutis, sed dat aliis, quod aliis negat." (Gieseler 3, 2, 172.) Again: "I certainly admit that all the sons of Adam have fallen by the will of God into the miserable condition of bondage, in which they are now fettered; for, as I said in the beginning, one must always finally go back to the decision of the divine will alone, whose cause is hidden in itself. Fateor sane, in hanc qua nunc illigati sunt conditionis miseriam Dei voluntate cecidisse universos filios Adam; atque id est, quod principio dicebam, redeundum tandem semper esse ad solum divinae voluntatis arbitrium, cuius causa sit in ipso abscondita." (173.) Calvin's successor in Geneva, Theodore Beza, was also a strict supralapsarian. At the colloquy of Moempelgard (Montbeliard), 1586, in disputing with Andreae, he defended the proposition "that Adam had indeed of his own accord fallen into these calamities, yet, nevertheless, not only according to the prescience, but also according to the ordination and decree of God--sponte quidem, sed tamen non modo praesciente, sed etiam iuste ordinante et decernente Deo." (186.) "There never has been, nor is, nor will be a time," said he, "when God has wished, wishes, or will wish, to have compassion on every individual person. Nullum tempus fuit vel est vel erit, quo voluerit, velit aut voliturus sit Deus singulorum misereri." (Pieper, Dogm. 2, 25. 50.)

In foisting his doctrine of election on the Reformed churches, Calvin met with at least some opposition. The words in the paragraph of the Formula of Concord quoted above: "Yet, since this article [of predestination] has been brought into very painful controversy in other places," probably refer to the conflicts in Geneva and Switzerland. October 16, 1551, Jerome Bolsec [a Carmelite in Paris, secretly spread Pelagianism in Geneva; sided with the Protestants in Paris and Orleans after his banishment from Geneva; reembraced Romanism when persecution set in; wrote against Calvin and Beza, died 1584] was imprisoned in Geneva because of his opposition to Calvin's doctrine of predestination. Melanchthon remarks in a letter of February 1, 1552: "Laelius [Socinus] wrote me that in Geneva the struggle concerning the Stoic necessity is so great that a certain one who dissented from Zeno [Calvin] was incarcerated. What a miserable affair! The doctrine of salvation is obscured by disputations foreign to it." (C. R. 7, 932.) Although the German cantons (Zurich, Bern, Basel) advised moderation, Bolsec was banished from Geneva, with the result however, that he continued his agitation against Calvin in other parts of Switzerland. In Bern all discussions on predestination were prohibited by the city council. Calvin complained in a letter of September 18, 1554: "The preachers of Bern publicly declare that I am a heretic worse than all the Papists." (Gieseler 3, 2, 178.) January 26, 1555, the council of Bern renewed its decree against public doctrinal discussions, notably those on predestination--"principalement touchant la matiere de la divine predestination, qui nous semble non etre necessaire," etc. (179.) Later on the doctrine of Calvin was opposed by the Arminians from Semi-Pelagian principles.

226. Calvinistic Confessions.

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