← From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America

XL. TALK OF PEACE…

Part 6 of 7 · James Longstreet · Public domain text

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Contents (92)
  1. Opening under 1 min
  2. Preface about 4 min
  3. I. THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR under 1 min
  4. II. FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS under 1 min
  5. III. BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN under 1 min
  6. IV. THE CONFEDERATES HOVERING AROUND WASHINGTON under 1 min
  7. V. ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND under 1 min
  8. VI. THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG under 1 min
  9. VII. SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS under 1 min
  10. VIII. SEQUELAE OF SEVEN PINES under 1 min
  11. IX. ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND under 1 min
  12. X. FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY under 1 min
  13. XI. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL under 1 min
  14. XII. HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND under 1 min
  15. XIII. MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN under 1 min
  16. XIV. SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS (BULL RUN) under 1 min
  17. XV. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN under 1 min
  18. Chapter XVI under 1 min
  19. XVII. PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE under 1 min
  20. XVIII. BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM under 1 min
  21. XIX. BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM (CONTINUED) under 1 min
  22. XX. REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN under 1 min
  23. XXI. REORGANIZATION AND REST FOR BOTH ARMIES under 1 min
  24. XXII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG under 1 min
  25. XXIII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG (CONTINUED) under 1 min
  26. XXIV. PREPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63 under 1 min
  27. XXV. INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA under 1 min
  28. XXVI. GETTYSBURG--FIRST DAY under 1 min
  29. XXVII. GETTYSBURG--SECOND DAY about 1 min
  30. XXVIII. GETTYSBURG--THIRD DAY under 1 min
  31. XXIX. THE WAVE ROLLS BACK under 1 min
  32. XXX. LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA under 1 min
  33. XXXI. BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA under 1 min
  34. XXXII. FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS under 1 min
  35. XXXIII. THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN under 1 min
  36. XXXIV. BESIEGING KNOXVILLE under 1 min
  37. XXXV. CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST under 1 min
  38. XXXVI. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD under 1 min
  39. XXXVII. LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE under 1 min
  40. XXXVIII. BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS under 1 min
  41. XXXIX. AGAIN IN FRONT OF RICHMOND under 1 min
  42. XL. TALK OF PEACE under 1 min
  43. XLI. BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS under 1 min
  44. XLII. PETERSBURG under 1 min
  45. XLIII. APPOMATTOX under 1 min
  46. XLIV. POST-BELLUM PENDANT under 1 min
  47. Appendix about 1 min
  48. I. THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR about 22 min
  49. II. FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS about 17 min
  50. III. BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN about 23 min
  51. IV. THE CONFEDERATES HOVERING AROUND WASHINGTON about 6 min
  52. V. ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND about 10 min
  53. VI. THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG about 12 min
  54. VII. SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS about 28 min
  55. VIII. SEQUELAE OF SEVEN PINES about 12 min
  56. IX. ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND about 9 min
  57. X. FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY about 27 min
  58. XI. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL about 16 min
  59. XII. HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND about 12 min
  60. XIII. MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN about 22 min
  61. XIV. SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS (BULL RUN) about 25 min
  62. XV. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN about 15 min
  63. Chapter XVI about 20 min
  64. XVII. PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE about 14 min
  65. XVIII. BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM about 21 min
  66. XIX. BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM (CONTINUED) about 37 min
  67. XX. REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN about 14 min
  68. XXI. REORGANIZATION AND REST FOR BOTH ARMIES about 9 min
  69. XXII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG about 12 min
  70. XXIII. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG (CONTINUED) about 23 min
  71. XXIV. PREPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63 about 15 min
  72. XXV. INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA about 15 min
  73. XXVI. GETTYSBURG--FIRST DAY about 21 min
  74. XXVII. GETTYSBURG--SECOND DAY about 27 min
  75. XXVIII. GETTYSBURG--THIRD DAY about 1 h 3 min
  76. XXIX. THE WAVE ROLLS BACK about 9 min
  77. XXX. LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA about 15 min
  78. XXXI. BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA about 20 min
  79. XXXII. FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS about 23 min
  80. XXXIII. THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN about 23 min
  81. XXXIV. BESIEGING KNOXVILLE about 16 min
  82. XXXV. CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST about 19 min
  83. XXXVI. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD about 24 min
  84. XXXVII. LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE about 11 min
  85. XXXVIII. BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS about 28 min
  86. XXXIX. AGAIN IN FRONT OF RICHMOND about 13 min
  87. XL. TALK OF PEACE about 10 min
  88. XLI. BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS about 16 min
  89. XLII. PETERSBURG about 21 min
  90. XLIII. APPOMATTOX about 19 min
  91. XLIV. POST-BELLUM PENDANT about 10 min
  92. Appendix about 2 h

Continue:

XL. TALK OF PEACE

Second Federal Move against Fort Fisher and Wilmington Harbor--Confederate Disaffection--Act of Congress appointing a Supreme Commander of the Armies--Montgomery Blair's Peace Conference--Longstreet has a Meeting with General Ord, Commander of the Army of the James--Military Convention proposed--Correspondence between General Grant and General Lee--Longstreet's Suggestions for Measures in the Critical Juncture near the Close of the War.

The second expedition against Wilmington was sent in January, 1865, General Terry commanding the land and Rear-Admiral Porter the naval forces. After very desperate work the fort and outworks were carried, the commander, General Whiting, being mortally and Colonel Lamb severely wounded. All points of the harbor were captured by the enemy, the Confederates losing, besides most of the armaments of the forts, about two thousand five hundred officers and men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Terry's loss was about five hundred. A remarkable success,--the storming of a position fortified during months and years of labor and by most approved engineering.[202]

As the first months of 1865 passed, the Confederate Congress realized the extreme tension of affairs, and provided, among other expedients, for the enrollment of negroes as Confederate soldiers. Other measures for giving confidence and strength to the cause were adopted.

On the 21st of January the Confederate President was informed of disaffection in the Virginia Legislature, and, what was more significant, in the Confederate Congress, where a resolution expressive of want of confidence in the Chief Executive was under informal consideration, and would undoubtedly pass by a large vote if introduced. At this critical juncture it seems that a compromise was effected. It was agreed that Congress should enact a law providing a supreme commander of the Confederate armies, this law to be approved by the President, who should then call General Lee to the exercise of the functions of that office. The intention was to invest him with dictatorial power.

During the early days of February, Hon. Montgomery Blair visited Richmond upon a mission of peace, and brought about a meeting at Hampton Roads between President Lincoln and Secretary Seward and the Confederate Vice-President, Alexander H. Stephens, and the Hon. R. M. T. Hunter and Judge J. A. Campbell. President Lincoln was firm for the surrender of the Confederate armies and the abolition of slavery, which the Confederate President did not care to consider.

About the 15th of February, Major-General J. C. Breckenridge was appointed Secretary of War, and Brigadier-General F. M. St. John was appointed commissary-general of subsistence.

General Ord, commanding the Army of the James, sent me a note on the 20th of February to say that the bartering between our troops on the picket lines was irregular; that he would be pleased to meet me and arrange to put a stop to such intimate intercourse. As a soldier he knew his orders would stop the business; it was evident, therefore, that there was other matter he would introduce when the meeting could be had. I wrote in reply, appointing a time and place between our lines.

We met the next day, and presently he asked for a side interview. When he spoke of the purpose of the meeting, I mentioned a simple manner of correcting the matter, which he accepted without objection or amendment. Then he spoke of affairs military and political.

Referring to the recent conference of the Confederates with President Lincoln at Hampton Roads, he said that the politicians of the North were afraid to touch the question of peace, and there was no way to open the subject except through officers of the armies. On his side they thought the war had gone on long enough; that we should come together as former comrades and friends and talk a little. He suggested that the work as belligerents should be suspended; that General Grant and General Lee should meet and have a talk; that my wife, who was an old acquaintance and friend of Mrs. Grant in their girlhood days, should go into the Union lines and visit Mrs. Grant with as many Confederate officers as might choose to be with her. Then Mrs. Grant would return the call under escort of Union officers and visit Richmond; that while General Lee and General Grant were arranging for better feeling between the armies, they could be aided by intercourse between the ladies and officers until terms honorable to both sides could be found.

I told General Ord that I was not authorized to speak on the subject, but could report upon it to General Lee and the Confederate authorities, and would give notice in case a reply could be made.

General Lee was called over to Richmond, and we met at night at the President's mansion. Secretary-of-War Breckenridge was there. The report was made, several hours were passed in discussing the matter, and finally it was agreed that favorable report should be made as soon as another meeting could be arranged with General Ord. Secretary Breckenridge expressed especial approval of the part assigned for the ladies.

As we separated, I suggested to General Lee that he should name some irrelevant matter as the occasion of his call for the interview with General Grant, and that once they were together they could talk as they pleased. A telegram was sent my wife that night at Lynchburg calling her to Richmond, and the next day a note was sent General Ord asking him to appoint a time for another meeting.

The meeting was appointed for the day following, and the result of the conference was reported. General Ord asked to have General Lee write General Grant for an interview, stating that General Grant was prepared to receive the letter, and thought that a way could be found for a military convention, while old friends of the military service could get together and seek out ways to stop the flow of blood. He indicated a desire on the part of President Lincoln to devise some means or excuse for paying for the liberated slaves, which might be arranged as a condition and part of the terms of the convention, and relieve the matter of political bearing; but those details were in the form of remote probabilities to be discussed when the parties became advanced in their search for ways of settlement.

On the 1st of March I wrote General Lee giving a report of the second interview, and on the 2d he wrote General Grant as follows:

"HEAD-QUARTERS CONFEDERATE STATES ARMIES, "March 2, 1865.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, "Commanding United States Armies:

"GENERAL,--Lieutenant-General Longstreet has informed me that, in a recent conversation between himself and Major-General Ord as to the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappy difficulties by means of a military convention, General Ord states that if I desired to have an interview with you on the subject you would not decline, provided I had authority to act. Sincerely desiring to leave nothing untried which may put an end to the calamities of war, I propose to meet you at such convenient time and place as you may designate, with the hope that upon an interchange of views it may be found practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a convention of the kind mentioned. In such event I am authorized to do whatever the result of the proposed interview may render necessary or advisable. Should you accede to this proposition, I would suggest that, if agreeable to you, we meet at the place selected by Generals Ord and Longstreet for their interview, at eleven A.M. on Monday next.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "R. E. LEE, "General."

The letter was sent to me open, with instructions to read, seal, and forward. I rode into Richmond to ask that some other business should be named as the cause of the call for the interview, but he was not disposed to approach his purpose by diplomacy, and ordered the letter to be delivered.

He sent another letter, however:

"HEAD-QUARTERS CONFEDERATE STATES ARMIES, "March 2, 1865.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, "Commanding United States Armies:

"GENERAL,--Lieutenant-General Longstreet has informed me that in an interview with Major-General Ord, that officer expressed some apprehension lest the general terms used by you with reference to the exchange of political prisoners should be construed to include those charged with capital offences.

"General Ord further stated that you did not intend to embrace that class of cases in the agreement to exchange. I regret to learn that such is your interpretation, as I had hoped that by exchanging those held under charges by each party it would be possible to diminish, to some extent, the sufferings of both without detriment to their interests. Should you see proper to assent to the interview proposed in my letter of this date, I hope it may be found practicable to arrive at a more satisfactory understanding on this subject.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "R. E. LEE, "General."

To which General Grant replied,--

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "March 4, 1865.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE, "Commanding Confederate States Armies:

"Your two letters of the 2d instant were received yesterday. In regard to any apprehended misunderstanding in reference to the exchange of political prisoners, I think there need be none. General Ord and General Longstreet have probably misunderstood what I said to the former on the subject, or I may have failed to make myself understood possibly. A few days before the interview between Generals Longstreet and Ord I had received a despatch from General Hoffman, Commissary-General of Prisoners, stating in substance that all prisoners of war who were or had been in close confinement or irons, whether under charges or sentence, had been ordered to City Point for exchange. I forwarded the substance of that despatch to Lieutenant-Colonel Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange, and presumed it probable that he had communicated it to Colonel Robert Ould. A day or two after, an officer who was neither a prisoner of war nor a political prisoner, was executed, after a fair and impartial trial, and in accordance with the laws of war and the usage of civilized nations. It was in explanation of this class of cases I told General Ord to speak to General Longstreet. Reference to my letter of February 16 will show my understanding on the subject of releasing political or citizen prisoners.

"In regard to meeting you on the 6th instant, I would state that I have no authority to accede to your proposition for a conference on the subject proposed. Such authority is vested in the President of the United States alone. General Ord could only have meant that I would not refuse an interview on any subject on which I have a right to act, which, of course, would be such as are purely of a military character, and on the subject of exchanges which has been intrusted to me.

(Signed) "U. S. GRANT, "Lieutenant-General."

Under the impression that General Lee would construe the act of Congress in its broad sense and proceed to handle the Confederate armies and affairs under his own good judgment, I wrote, begging that he would call General Joseph E. Johnston back to service and command, and presently suggested and then wrote that I was credibly informed that there was plenty of produce in the country which the farmers would cheerfully deliver at Richmond or Petersburg if liberal prices in gold could be paid them; that the authority given to impress bread and meat stuffs should be applied as including gold; that right or wrong the emergency called for it, and that I would undertake to secure the gold upon his authority. I suggested that as Grant's combinations were looking to concentration against the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond, we should use the railways for collecting and drawing detachments from southern points, calling cavalry by the dirt roads, while the farmers were bringing their produce by private conveyance. Furthermore, I cited the fact that there were eight or ten thousand non-combatants in Richmond who could be put in my trenches as conscripts, and officered by the officers of the department on duty there, and twelve hundred in Lynchburg that could be made similarly available; and argued that using them in the trenches would enable him to draw the First Corps out for a movable force to meet flanking efforts of his adversary, and keep open his lines of communication. In that way, I continued, he could collect a hundred thousand men at Richmond, with a good supply of rations, while General Grant was drawing his two hundred thousand together to attack us; that when concentrated Grant would find himself obliged to give speedy battle, as he could not long supply his large force; that our interior lines would enable us to repel and break up the attack and relieve Richmond.

The times were heavy of events, Executive authority intended to be suspended, and it seemed possible that the use of a little gold would so manifest its power as to induce our people to let cotton and tobacco go for foreign exchange which might put us on a gold basis for a twelvemonth. This was the expedient that offered light and hope for the future, and the times called either for heroic methods or the giving over of the forms of war.

General Lee agreed that the provisions were in the country and would be delivered for gold, but did not think the gold could be found. He made his orders assuming command of the armies, but instead of exercising authority on a scale commensurate with the views of Congress and the call of the crisis, applied to the Richmond authorities for instructions under the new assignment, and wrote that he would call General Johnston to command if he could be ordered to report to him for duty.

General Johnston was so ordered, and was assigned to command of such fragments of troops as he could collect in the Carolinas. General Wade Hampton was relieved of duty as chief of cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia and ordered to join General Johnston. After collecting such detachments as he could gather, General Johnston threw them from time to time along the flank of Sherman's march from Georgia for Virginia, and had some spirited affairs with that army, which was gathering strength along the seaboard as it marched.

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XLI. BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS

Various Affairs of the Closing Campaign--The Massing of Grant's Forces--Sortie against Fort Steadman--Captured but quickly retaken--General Grant's Move around the Confederate Right--General Lee anticipates with Aggressive Work--Sheridan makes Battle with his Whole Force at Five Forks--Desperate Situation of the Confederates--Disparity of Numbers--Splendid Stand and Battle of Generals Pickett and Ransom--Colonel Pegram mortally wounded--W. H. F. Lee, the "Noble Son of a Noble Sire"--Corse's Division--Pickett's Generalship--Casualties.

Meanwhile General Grant was drawing forces from the North and West to further strengthen his already overwhelming combinations against Richmond. General Schofield was called from Tennessee to North Carolina to guard and join on, if necessary, the flank of Sherman's column. The cavalry and infantry of the Valley of Virginia were brought down to the Union army about Richmond and Petersburg,--the latter by transports.

General Sheridan marched his cavalry, ten thousand strong, from the Valley to ride across James River, through Lynchburg, to join the northward march of Sherman's column. His divisions were under Generals Custer and Devens; General Wesley Merritt was his chief of cavalry. He was to destroy railroads, canals, bridges, and other works of value as he marched. At Staunton he decided to take in the balance of General Early's command near his route at Waynesboro'. He found that command posted behind field-works, but the line did not cover the left of the position near the river. After some preliminary dashes, General Custer found his way around General Early's left, and, with part of the cavalry dismounted, made a bold, simultaneous charge on the front and flank, breaking up the line and capturing most of the troops.

Some of the Union commanders claimed that the Confederates cheered them as they surrendered. This, however, the Confederates deny. The affair is mentioned in the diary of Major J. Hoskiss, the engineer of the Confederate army of the Valley, in not more creditable terms than General Early gave of his battle of Cedar Run.

Pickett's division, Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, and other detachments were sent to Lynchburg to defend against Sheridan's ride; but the high waters of James River and other obstacles turned Sheridan from his southern course to a sweep down the north side.

Generals Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee were recalled and ordered to the north side to join me at Richmond for a march to intercept Sheridan's forces. General Pickett reported on the 13th, and we marched for Hanover on the 14th. I made requisition for a pontoon bridge, and was delayed a day waiting for it and for the cavalry. The bridge was not sent. As we marched towards the Pamunkey River, General Sheridan heard of the move and crossed to the north bank with his main force, leaving a brigade to watch our march, but presently drew the brigade after him.

General Rosser reported to me with five hundred cavalry, one of the remnants of General Early's army not captured, and was ordered across the Pamunkey River to follow Sheridan's ride. Our artillery and infantry were delayed part of a day and night building a bridge from the timbers of an old barn that stood near the bank of the river, and part of the command crossed early in the morning to find a cold cavalry trail, growing colder. As the prospect of overhauling the march was not encouraging, we retraced our steps, returning to Richmond on the 18th, where Pickett's men rested until the 24th.

As Sherman's army drew towards Richmond, General Grant gave up the thought of taking the city by attack of his strong columns on the north side, lest he should leave open the way of escape of the Confederate army, and give time for it to combine with Johnston's forces before he could overhaul it. He found, too, that the "attrition" policy could not be made effective, even with his superior numbers, unless he could so manoeuvre as to call his adversary from his fortified grounds to make the work of attrition mutual.

On the 14th of March he gave instructions of preparation for a general move by his left, and on the 24th gave definite orders for the move to be made on the 29th.

On the 24th, General Lee gave consent to the making of a sortie from his line at Hare's Hill, in front of Petersburg, against Fort Steadman of the enemy's works. The distance between the lines at that point was one hundred and fifty yards, the distance between the picket lines fifty yards. Union officers had given out that deserters from the Confederate army were permitted to march into the Union lines with their arms.

Under the circumstances it was conceived to be practicable to gain Fort Steadman by surprise, and the Confederate chief was led to believe that there were other forts to the rear of Steadman that could be carried and held until General Grant could be forced to make a longer line to reach our southern communications, and give us time to find dry roads for our march away, or for reinforcements to join us. It was a hazardous adventure at best, but his brave heart usually went with a proposition for a bold fight.

The Second Corps, under Major-General Gordon, was assigned for the sortie, to be reinforced by other troops to be called. Pickett's division of the First Corps, that had been resting on the north side since the 18th, was called to report to General Lee at Petersburg, without intimation of the service proposed, but all calls and orders of the times were looked upon as urgent. The quartermaster was despatched to Richmond to have the transportation at the station as soon as the troops could reach the depot, and the division was ordered to march in anticipation of due preparation for their transit. But the quartermaster found that the railroad company could furnish transportation for three brigades only. General Lee was informed of the fact, and I suggested that his only way to be assured of the service of a division was to draw Mahone's from Bermuda Hundred and have Pickett's march to replace it. He preferred part of Pickett's division,--finding it could not be used as a division, as Pickett, the ranking officer, would be called to command the work during the early morning, for which he had no opportunity to prepare.

General Lee collected about eighteen thousand men near the sallying field, ordered men selected to cut away the fraise and abatis for the storming column that should advance with empty guns (to avoid premature alarms), and ordered a squadron of cavalry ready to dash across the lines to cut the wires about General Grant's lines.

The Army of the Potomac, General Meade commanding, was posted,--the Ninth Corps on the right from James River to Fort Howard, including Fort Steadman, General Parke commanding; next, on Parke's left, was the Sixth Corps, under General Wright; then General Humphreys with the Second Corps, General Warren with the Fifth; General Sheridan's cavalry, armed with repeating rifles, on the extreme left; General Ord, commanding the Army of the James, on the north side, Generals Gibbon and Weitzel commanding corps,--all officers of the highest attainments and veterans in service. The armies of the Potomac and the James and Sheridan's cavalry, constituting General Grant's immediate command, numbered one hundred and eleven thousand soldiers.[203] Colonel W. H. Taylor, chief of staff with General Lee, reports, "Lee had at that time only thirty-nine thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven available muskets for the defence of Richmond and Petersburg."[204]

The stormers advanced before daylight, gained quiet possession of the enemy's picket line, carried his works between Batteries 9 and 10, moved to the right and left, captured Fort Steadman and its garrison, and turned the guns there and at Battery 10 against the enemy. But the alarm spread and the enemy was afield, feeling his way towards the assailants, for it was not yet light enough to see and direct his artillery fire over his own men. Batteries 11 and 12 were taken, and guides sent to conduct the Confederate columns to forts reported to be in rear of Steadman were in search, but there were no forts there. Redoubts constructed on the main line had commanding positions over Fort Steadman, and a sweeping fire along its lines, in anticipation of a surprise attack, but their fire was withheld for daylight to direct it.

Light broke and the fire opened. General Parke called his field artillery under Tidball into practice from high ground over the Confederates, put the divisions of Hartranft and Wilcox against the Confederate flanks, and held them back near the troops crowding in along the breach, and called for a division from the Second Corps.

The Confederate columns were strong enough to repel the attack of two divisions,--were put there for that purpose,--but so far from breaking up and pushing back the ninety thousand men in front of them, they were not so handled as to check two divisions long enough for the forces to get back to their lines.

The artillery fire not only tore the Confederate ranks, but crossed fire in their rear, cutting off reinforcements and retreat. Our side was without artillery, except captured guns, which were handled by infantry. As the sortie was noised along the line, General Humphreys and General Wright advanced the Second and Sixth Corps against the Confederate lines along their fields to learn if troops had been drawn from their fronts to join the attack. Batteries 11 and 12 were recovered before eight o'clock, and General Parke ordered Hartranft's division to regain Fort Steadman and Battery 10, which was done with slight loss before nine o'clock.

Many Confederates got back to their lines in disordered flight, but 1949 prisoners and nine stands of colors were taken by the Ninth Corps.

The aggregate of Union losses was reported as 2107. Confederate losses are not reported in detail or in numbers. General Meade's estimate of our loss was 5000.

General Humphreys captured the intrenched picket line in front of him, but found the Confederate works in front well manned. General Wright got well in on the front of his line to favorable position, from which he assaulted and carried the Confederate works on the 2d of April.

Corse's and Terry's brigades of Pickett's division remained in wait under arms until a late hour of the 25th, but were not called to take part in the sortie.[205]

The result calls for little comment upon the adventure. For an army of forty thousand veterans, without field batteries, to dislodge from their well-chosen and strongly-fortified lines an army of ninety thousand well-armed and thoroughly-appointed veterans was impossible.

Pursuant to previous orders, General Grant started on his move around the Confederate right on the 27th. General Ord was called to the south side with fourteen thousand men of the Army of the James, leaving General Weitzel with twenty thousand on the north side.[206] In front of that force we had ten thousand men of Field's and Kershaw's divisions and G. W. C. Lee's division of local defence troops (not including Gary's cavalry, the sailors and marines) holding the forts at Drury's and Chapin's farms. General Grant's orders were that his troops at all points should be ready to receive orders for assault.

Duly informed of the enemy's movements, and understanding his purpose, General Lee marched to his right on the 29th. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was called in advance to march for Five Forks. General Lee marched with fifteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry (including Fitzhugh Lee's division), and a quota of artillery, along the White Oak road to his right.

The purpose of the enemy was to overreach the fortified grounds and call the Confederates to field work, and General Lee thought to anticipate him by aggressive work as soon as he was in the open field, and ordered battle for the 31st.

General Pickett, with three brigades of his division, two of B. R. Johnson's division (Ransom's and Wallace's), with the cavalry, was ordered to engage Sheridan's cavalry at Five Forks, while General Lee attacked, with McGowan's, Gracie's, Hunton's, and Wise's brigades, the Fifth Army Corps, that was between Pickett and our line of fortifications. The opening of this part of the battle was in favor of the Confederates. General Lee drove back the advance division of the Fifth Corps to the next, and pushed the two back to concentration upon the third, where that part of the battle rested.

General Pickett made his part of the battle by putting W. H. F. Lee's and Rosser's divisions of cavalry on his right, and following that leading by his infantry and artillery, leaving Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division, under General T. T. Mumford, along the right front of Sheridan's cavalry. He pressed his separate battle by his right advance until night, forcing Sheridan back to Dinwiddie Court-House, where the latter reported to General Grant that the force in front of him was too strong, and asked for reinforcements. Pickett prepared to follow his success by early morning battle and rested for the night, but Miles's division of the Second Corps was put against the other end of the battle, and the Fifth Corps rallied and advanced against the brigades that were with General Lee. They were forced back to the White Oak road, then into their fortified lines, leaving an interval of five miles behind Pickett's left.

Responding to General Sheridan's call, General Grant ordered the Fifth Corps, under General Warren, fifteen thousand[207] strong, and Mackenzie's cavalry division (sixteen hundred). The design was that the Fifth Corps should come in on Pickett's left rear and cut off his retreat, but heavy rains of the 30th and morning of the 31st had so flooded the streams and roads that the night march was slow and fatiguing, and Pickett receiving notice during the night of the projected move against his rear, changed his orders for battle, and directed the troops withdrawn for Five Forks before daylight. His retrograde was made in time to escape the Fifth Corps, and was followed by Sheridan's cavalry, but no serious effort was made to delay his movements. He made his march of five miles to Five Forks, put his troops in order of battle by nine o'clock of the morning of the 1st of April, and ordered his well-chosen line examined and put under construction of field-works. Corse's, Terry's, and Steuart's brigades of Pickett's division, and Ransom's and Wallace's brigades of B. R. Johnson's division, were posted from right to left. Of Pegram's artillery, three guns were planted at the Forks, and three more near his right; W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry on his right; Fitzhugh Lee's division on his left,--General T. T. Mumford commanding the latter; Rosser's division in rear guarding trains. General Fitzhugh Lee was chief of cavalry.

As soon as the infantry line was formed, the troops set to work intrenching the position. The line of battle was parallel to and lay along the White Oak road, the left broken smartly to the rear, the retired end in traverse and flanking defence. The extreme right of the infantry line was also refused, but not so much. Four miles east from Pickett's left was the right of the fortified lines of General Lee's army. On the right and outside of those lines was a detachment of cavalry under General Roberts. The division of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was ordered to cover the ground between Roberts's cavalry and Pickett's left by a line of vedettes, and his division was posted on that part of the field.

W. H. F. Lee's cavalry held strong guard on the right, and had the benefit of some swamp lands. His lines formed and field-works under construction, General Pickett rode to the rear for his noon lunch, and was soon followed by the cavalry chief.

Sheridan's cavalry followed close on Pickett's march, but did not attempt to seriously delay it. He made a dash about ten o'clock to measure the strength of the works under construction, and found them too strong to warrant fierce adventure. Delayed by the heavy roads and flooding streams, the Fifth Corps was not in position until four o'clock in the afternoon.

General Sheridan planned for battle to have General Merritt display the cavalry divisions of Custer and Devens against the Confederate front and right, to convey the impression that that was the field from which his battle would be made, while he drew up and massed the Fifth Corps at the other end of the field for the real fight. The corps was arranged, Crawford's division in column on the right, Ayres's on Crawford's left, Griffin's division in support, Mackenzie's cavalry division on the right of the infantry column, at the White Oak road. The Fifth Corps was to wheel in close connection and assault against the face of the return of Confederate works, while the cavalry divisions in front were to assail on that line and the right of the works.

The march and wheel of the Fifth Corps were made in tactical order, and the lines advanced in courageous charge, but staggered and halted under the destructive infantry fire. The charge was repeated, but held in check until Crawford's division found a way under cover of a woodland beyond the Confederate works, and marched to that advantage.

Ransom drew his brigade from the intrenched line to meet that march, but it was one brigade against three--and those supported by part of Griffin's division.

Ransom's horse was killed, falling on him; his adjutant-general, Captain Gee, was killed, and the brigade was forced back.

This formidable move by open field to Pickett's rear made his position untenable. Feeling this, the veteran soldiers of the left brigades realized that their battle was irretrievable. Those who could find escape from that end of the works fell back in broken ranks, while many others, finding the enemy closing in on their rear, thought it more soldierly to surrender to Ayres's brave assaulting columns, and not a few were the captives of Crawford's division.

It was not until that period that General Pickett knew, by the noise of battle, that it was on. He rode through the fire to his command, but his cavalry chief, riding later, was cut off from the field and failed to take part in the action. When Pickett got to the Forks, Colonel Pegram, of the artillery, had been mortally wounded, the battery commander was killed, and many of the cannoneers killed or wounded. He found an artillery sergeant and enough men to man one gun, and used it with effect until the axle broke.

The brigades of Steuart and Terry changed front and received the rolling battle. The cavalry assailants of the front and right had no decided success, but the infantry columns pressing their march, the Confederate brigades were pushed back to their extreme right, where in turn Corse's brigade changed front to receive the march, leaving W. H. F. Lee's cavalry to look to his right.

The Union cavalry essayed to charge the Confederate remnants to dismay, but the noble son of the noble sire seized opportunity to charge against the head of this threatening column before it could pass the swamp lands, drove back its head until Corse's brigade got back to cover of woodland, and night came to cover the disastrous field.[208]

The remnants of the command were collected as soon and as well as they could be in the dead of night and marched towards Exeter Mills, where Pickett proposed to cross the Appomattox and return to the army, but early movements of the next morning changed the face of the military zodiac.

The position was not of General Pickett's choosing, but of his orders, and from his orders he assumed that he would be reinforced. His execution was all that a skilful commander could apply. He reported as to his position and the movements of the enemy threatening to cut his command from the army, but no force came to guard his right. The reinforcements joined him after night, when his battle had been lost and his command disorganized. The cavalry of his left was in neglect in failing to report the advance of the enemy, but that was not for want of proper orders from his head-quarters. Though taken by surprise, there was no panic in any part of the command; brigade after brigade changed front to the left and received the overwhelming battle as it rolled on, until crushed back to the next, before it could deploy out to aid the front,--or flank attack,--until the last right brigade of the brave Corse changed and stood alone on the left of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, fronting at right angle against the enemy's cavalry columns.

It is not claiming too much for that grand division to say that, aided by the brigades of Ransom and Wallace, they could not have been dislodged from their intrenched position by parallel battle even by the great odds against them. As it was, Ayres's division staggered under the pelting blows that it met, and Crawford's drifted off from the blows against it, until it thus found the key of the battle away beyond the Confederate limits.

In generalship Pickett was not a bit below the "gay rider." His defensive battle was better organized, and it is possible that he would have gained the day if his cavalry had been diligent in giving information of the movements of the enemy.[209]

The losses are not found in separate reports. Both sides suffered severely, Pickett losing two thousand. He had nine thousand men of all arms. His adversary had twenty-six thousand.

Reinforcements of Hunton's brigade, and Lieutenant-General R. H. Anderson with the other brigades of B. R. Johnson, were sent him too late, and a telegram came for me at Richmond to march a division to Petersburg to report to General Lee. The hour at which the telegram was received was not noted. As the operations at Five Forks were not decisive until after five o'clock, the telegram may have been received about seven P.M. Field's division was ordered to the railway station, and the quartermaster was sent in advance to have the cars ready to move it.

To give the troops the benefit of our limited transportation I rode with the staff by the dirt road.

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XLII. PETERSBURG

The Fierce Concerted Assault by the Federals--Death of A. P. Hill--General Lee announces to Richmond Authorities that he must retreat--Reception of the News by President Davis at Church Service--Federals take Forts Gregg and Whitworth--The Retreat harassed by Continuous Fighting--Longstreet saves High Bridge, a Vital Point--Ewell and Others compelled to surrender--General Mahone's Account of Interesting Scenes--Magnitude of the Disaster--"Is the Army dissolving?"--General Reed mortally wounded--Panic occurs, but Order is restored--General Gregg and Part of his Cavalry Command captured by Rosser and Mumford.

The darkness of night still covered us when we crossed over James River by the pontoon bridge, but before long land and water batteries lifted their bombs over their lazy curves, screaming shells came through the freighted night to light our ride, and signal sky-rockets gave momentary illumination. Our noble beasts peered through the loaded air and sniffed the coming battle; night-birds fluttered from their startled cover, and the solid pounding upon Mahone's defensive walls drove the foxes from their lairs. If tears and prayers could have put out the light it would not have passed Petersburg,--but it passed by twenty miles. A hundred guns and more added their lightning and thunder to the storm of war that carried consternation to thousands of long-apprehensive people.

The cause was lost, but the end was not yet. The noble Army of Northern Virginia, once, twice conqueror of empire, must bite the dust before its formidable adversary.

The impulse was to stop and guard Mahone, but some of his men had been called to assist in guarding elsewhere, which, with our imperative orders, admonished us that he must be left to his fate, and Weitzel's fire upon the lines we had just left told of his orders to be prepared for the grand enveloping charge. But the order for Weitzel's part in the general charge was afterwards suspended until enough troops could be sent to assure success. Had General Grant known that Field's division was withdrawn during the night, Weitzel's assault would have gone in the general move of the morning of the 2d, and Richmond, with the Confederate authorities, would have been taken before noon.

As morning approached the combat was heavier. The rolling thunder of the heavy metal reverberated along the line, and its bursting blaze spread afar to light the doom of the army once so proud to meet the foe,--matchless Army of Northern Virginia!

General Grant had ordered assault for four o'clock, but it was near five before there was light enough for the men to see their way across the line and over the works. Our night-ride was beyond range of the enemy's batteries. Crossing the Appomattox, we rode through the streets of Petersburg for General Lee's head-quarters, some miles farther west. As no part of the command had reached the station when we passed, orders were left for the detachments to march as soon as they landed.

Before the first rays of morning we found general head-quarters. Some members of the staff were up and dressed, but the general was yet on his couch. When told of my presence, he called me to a seat at his bedside, and gave orders for our march to support the broken forces about Five Forks. He had no censure for any one, but mentioned the great numbers of the enemy and the superior repeating rifles of his cavalry. He was ill, suffering from the rheumatic ailment that he had been afflicted with for years, but keener trouble of mind made him in a measure superior to the shooting pains of his disease.

From the line gained by the Sixth Corps on the 25th it was a run of but two or three minutes across to the Confederate works.

At 4.45, General Wright advanced as the signal for general assault. General Lee was not through with his instructions for our march when a staff-officer came in and reported that the lines in front of his head-quarters were broken. Drawing his wrapper about him, he walked with me to the front door and saw, as far as the eye could cover the field, a line of skirmishers in quiet march towards us. It was hardly light enough to distinguish the blue from the gray.

General Wright drove in our picket line, and in desperate charges crowned the Confederate works. General Gibbon followed the move with his divisions of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Corps, one of his brigades (Harris's) carrying part of the Confederate works. The troops, weary of their all-night watch and early battle, halted to close their ranks and wait for the skirmish line to open up the field. General Lee appealed to have me interpose and stop the march, but not a man of my command was there, nor had we notice that any of them had reached the station at Petersburg.

All staff-officers mounted and rode to find the parts of Heth's and Wilcox's divisions that had been forced from their lines. The display of officers riding in many directions seemed to admonish the skirmishers to delay under cover of an intervening swale. The alarm reached General A. P. Hill, of the Third Corps, who rode off to find his troops, but instead came suddenly upon the enemy's skirmishers in their concealment. He wheeled and made a dash to escape, but the Federal fire had deadly effect, the gallant general fell, and the Southern service lost a sword made bright by brave work upon many heavy fields.

General Humphreys, of the Second, followed the move of the Sixth Corps, and General Parke assaulted on the Bermuda Hundred front and at Petersburg. He had partial success at the former, but was repulsed when he met Mahone's strong line. At Petersburg he had more success, capturing twelve guns.

General Sheridan, reinforced by Miles's division, was ordered to follow up his work on the right bank. The reinforcements sent under Lieutenant-General Anderson joined General Pickett at night of the 1st, and the combined forces succeeded in getting out of the way of the Union infantry, and they gave the cavalry a severe trial a little before night at Amazon Creek, where the pursuit rested; but the Union forces made some important captures of artillery and prisoners. The divisions of Heth and Wilcox moved to the right and left to collect their broken files. General Wright wheeled to the right and massed the Sixth Corps for its march to Petersburg, and was joined by General Gibbon.

Not venturing to hope, I looked towards Petersburg and saw General Benning, with his Rock brigade, winding in rapid march around the near hill. He had but six hundred of his men. I asked for two hundred, and led them off to the canal on our right, which was a weak point, threatened by a small body of skirmishers, and ordered the balance of his troops deployed as skirmishers in front of the enemy's main force.

I rode then to Benning's line of skirmishers, and at the middle point turned and rode at a walk to the top of the hill, took out my glasses, and had a careful view of the enemy's formidable masses. I thought I recognized General Gibbon, and raised my hat, but he was busy and did not see me. There were two forts at our line of works,--Gregg and Whitworth. General Grant rode over the captured works and ordered the forts taken. Upon withdrawing my glasses I looked to the right and left, and saw Benning's four hundred standing in even line with me, viewing the masses preparing for their march to meet us.

During a few moments of quiet, General Lee despatched to Richmond of affairs at Petersburg, and to advise that our troops must abandon their lines and march in retreat as soon as night could cover the move.

It was eleven o'clock of the morning when the despatch reached Richmond. It was the Sabbath-day. The city was at profound worship. The President was at St. Paul's Church. My wife was there (rest her spirit!) and heard the pastor, Mr. Minnegerode, read, "The Lord is in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before him." The full congregation rose, and the air whispered silence. The solemnity was broken as a swift despatch-bearer entered the portals and walked with quiet but rapid steps up the aisle to the chancel. He handed the President a sealed envelope. After reading, the President took his hat and walked with dignity down the aisle. Service was resumed, but presently came another messenger for some of the ladies, then another, and still another, and in a few moments the congregation, followed by the minister, giving up the sacred service, passed out and to their homes to prepare, in silent resignation, for whatever was to come.

The tragic scenes of the south side, in a different way, were as impressive as these. General Gibbon prepared his divisions under Foster and Turner for assault upon Forts Gregg and Whitworth, and when the Sixth Corps lined up with him, he ordered the divisions to their work. As they advanced the other brigades of Field's division came up, were aligned before the enemy's heavy massing forces, and ordered to intrench. General Foster found his work at Fort Gregg called for all the force and skill that he could apply. He made desperate assault, but was checked, and charged again and again, even to the bayonet, before he could mount the parapets and claim the fort. It had been manned by part of Harris's brigade (Twelfth Mississippi Regiment, under Captain J. H. Duncan, three hundred men of Mahone's division). Fifty-five dead were found in the fort; two hundred and fifty, including wounded, were prisoners.

General Turner attacked at Fort Whitworth, and had easier work. General Wilcox, thinking it a useless sacrifice to try to hold it, ordered his troops withdrawn, and many got out in time to escape the heavy assault, but many were taken prisoners. General Gibbon lost ten officers and one hundred and twelve men killed, twenty-seven officers and five hundred and sixty-five men wounded; two pieces of artillery and several colors were captured.

It was my time next. General Meade called Miles's division back to the Second Corps, and prepared to march down upon Petersburg, but General Grant thought that the work might prove hazardous of delay to his plans for the next day; that General Lee was obliged to pull away from his lines during the night to find escape, and standing as he was he would have the start, while at Petersburg he would be behind him. He therefore ordered all things in readiness for his march westward at early light of the next morning.

After A. P. Hill fell his staff and corps were assigned as part of my command. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions were much broken by the losses of the day. Mahone had repulsed the attack made upon his position, and had his division in good order and spirits, except the regiment of Harris's brigade that was at Fort Gregg.

General Lee's order for retreat was out in time to have the troops take up the march as soon as night came. The troops at Petersburg were to cross the Appomattox at the bridge there, Mahone's division to march to Chesterfield Court-House and cover the march of the troops from the north side. General Ewell, commanding on the north side, was to cross his divisions, one at the lower bridge, the other at Richmond. Lieutenant-General Anderson and Major-General Pickett, with the cavalry, were to march up the south bank of the Appomattox.

Field's division and parts of Heth's and Wilcox's crossed the river soon after dark, and were followed by the Second Corps, which wrecked the bridge behind it. G. W. C. Lee's division, including the garrison at Chapin's Bluff, crossed the James at the lower bridge, breaking it when they had passed. The sailors and marines at Drury's Bluff, on the south side, failed to receive orders, but, under advice from General Mahone, got off in good season and marched through Chesterfield Court-House to join G. W. C. Lee's division in its after-march. General Kershaw crossed at Richmond. As the division came over the bridge the structure was fired (supposedly by an incendiary), and Kershaw had to go through the flames at double-quick time. Ewell's command was united near Manchester and pursued its march. General Mahone marched on his line just mentioned.

After a tramp of sixteen miles through mud, my column halted for a short rest, and marched to Goode's Bridge on the 3d. Field's and Wilcox's divisions were put across the Appomattox to guard against threatening moves of cavalry. In the forenoon of the 4th, Mahone's division crossed,--also a part of Heth's that had been cut off, and had marched up on the south side,--and our march was continued to Amelia Court-House, the enemy's cavalry constantly threatening our left flank. At the Court-House the cavalry was more demonstrative and seemed ready to offer battle. Field, Heth, Wilcox, and the artillery were put in position and looked for opportunity to strike the head of the enemy's column and delay his march. But it proved to be only the purpose of the cavalry to delay our march while the enemy was passing his heavier column by us to Jetersville.

Orders had been sent for provisions to meet us at the Court-House, but they were not there, so we lost the greater part of a day gathering supplies from the farmers.

Our purpose had been to march through Burkeville to join our forces to those of General J. E. Johnston in North Carolina, but at Jetersville, on the 5th, we found the enemy square across the route in force and intrenching, where our cavalry under General W. H. F. Lee engaged him. General Field put out a strong line of skirmishers to support the cavalry. Field's, Heth's, and Wilcox's divisions and artillery were prepared for action and awaited orders. General Meade was in front of us with the Second and Fifth Corps and Sheridan's cavalry, but his Sixth Corps was not up. General Fitzhugh Lee had been sent by the Painesville road with the balance of his cavalry to guard the trains raided by detachments of the enemy, which latter made some important captures.

General Lee was with us at Jetersville, and, after careful reconnoissance, thought the enemy's position too strong to warrant aggressive battle. He sent for some of the farmers to get more definite information of the country and the strength of the position in front of us, but they knew nothing beyond the roads and by-roads from place to place. General Meade, finding that his Sixth Corps could not join him till a late hour, decided to wait till next morning for his attack. General Ord rested his column for the night at Burkeville. The enemy was quiet at Jetersville, except for a light exchange of cavalry fire. No orders came, the afternoon was passing, further delay seemed perilous. I drew the command off and filed to the right to cross Flat Creek to march for Farmville. The other infantry and trains and artillery followed and kept the march until a late hour, halting for a short rest before daylight.

Early on the 6th, General Meade advanced for battle, and, not finding us at Jetersville, started towards Amelia Court-House to look for us, but General Humphreys, of his Second Corps, learned that our rear-guard was on the north side of Flat Creek on the westward march. General Griffin, of the Fifth Corps, also had information of troops in march west, and General Meade, therefore, changed direction to pursue with his Second and Sixth Corps, putting the Fifth on the Painesville road. General Sheridan despatched General Ord that we had broken away from him and were marching direct for Burkeville. The latter prepared to receive us, but soon learned that we had taken another route. He had previously detached two regiments of infantry (five hundred men), under Colonel Washburn, with orders to make rapid march and burn High Bridge. To this force he afterwards sent eighty cavalrymen, under Brigadier-General Theodore Reed, of his staff, who conducted the column, and put his command in march to follow by the road through Rice's Station.

After repairing the bridge at Flat Creek, General Humphreys marched in hot pursuit of our rear-guard, followed by the Sixth Corps, Merritt's and Crook's cavalry moving on the left of our column as we marched. General Humphreys, in his account of the pursuit, says,--

"A sharp and running fight commenced at once with Gordon's corps which was continued over a distance of fourteen miles, during which several partially-intrenched positions were carried."[210]

My column marched before daylight on the 6th. The design from the night we left Petersburg was that its service should be to head off and prevent the enemy's infantry columns passing us and standing across our march.

At Sailor's Creek the road "forks,"--one road to the High Bridge crossing of Appomattox River, the other by Rice's Station to Farmville. We had information of Ord's column moving towards Rice's Station, and I was ordered to that point to meet it, the other columns to follow the trains over the bridge. At Rice's Station the command was prepared for action,--Field's division across the road of Ord's march, Wilcox on Field's right; both ordered to intrench, artillery in battery. Heth's division was put in support of Wilcox, Mahone to support Field. Just then I learned that Ord's detachment of bridge-burners had passed out of sight when the head of my command arrived. I had no cavalry, and the head of Ord's command was approaching in sight; but directly General Rosser reported with his division of cavalry. He was ordered to follow after the bridge-burners and capture or destroy the detachment, if it took the last man of his command to do it. General Ord came on and drove in my line of skirmishers, but I rode to meet them, marched them back to the line, with orders to hold it till called in. Ord's force proved to be the head of his column, and he was not prepared to press for general engagement.

General T. T. Mumford reported with his cavalry and was ordered to follow Rosser, with similar directions. Gary's cavalry came and reported to me. High Bridge was a vital point, for over it the trains were to pass, and I was under the impression that General Lee was there, passing with the rest of his army, but hearing our troops engaged at Rice's Station, he had ridden to us and was waiting near Mahone's division. Ord's command was not up till near night, and he only engaged with desultory fire of skirmishers and occasional exchange of battery practice, arranging to make his attack the next morning.

General Ewell's column was up when we left Amelia Court-House, and followed Anderson's by Amelia Springs, where he was detained some little time defending trains threatened by cavalry; at the same time our rear-guard was near him, followed by the enemy. Near Deatonville Crook's cavalry got in on our trains and caused delay of several hours to Anderson's march. Crook was joined by part of Merritt's cavalry and repeated the attack on the trains, but Ewell was up in time to aid in repelling the attack, and the march was resumed, the enemy's cavalry moving on their left flank.

Anderson crossed Sailor's Creek, closely followed by Ewell. The route by which they were to march was by High Bridge, but they were on strange ground, without maps, or instructions, or commander. In the absence of orders Anderson thought to march for the noise of battle, at Rice's Station. They had no artillery or cavalry. The chief of cavalry was there, but his troopers were elsewhere, and he rode away, advising the force to follow him. The rear-guard came up rapidly and essayed to deploy for defence, but the close pursuit of Humphreys's corps forced its continued march for High Bridge, letting the pursuit in upon Ewell's rear. As Anderson marched he found Merritt's cavalry square across his route. Humphreys was close upon Ewell, but the former awaited battle for the arrival of the Sixth Corps.

There was yet a way of escape from the closing clutches of the enemy by filing to their right and marching to the rear of the command at Rice's Station; but they were true soldiers, and decided to fight, even to sacrifice their commands if necessary, to break or delay the pursuit until the trains and rear-guard could find safety beyond High Bridge.

Ewell deployed his divisions, Kershaw's on the right, G. W. C. Lee's on the left. Their plan was, that Anderson should attack and open the way while Ewell defended the rear. As Anderson attacked, Wright's corps was up, Humphreys had matured his plans, and the attack of Anderson hastened that of the enemy upon the Confederate rear. Anderson had some success, and Ewell received the assaults with resolute coolness, and at one moment pushed his fight to aggressive return, but the enemy, finding that there was no artillery with the Confederates, dashed their batteries into closer range, putting in artillery and infantry fire, front and flanks, until the Confederate rear was crushed to fragments. General Ewell surrendered; so also did General G. W. C. Lee with his division. General Kershaw advised such of his men as could to make their escape, and surrendered with his division. General Anderson got away with the greater part of B. R. Johnson's division, and Pickett with six hundred men. Generals Corse and Hunton and others of Pickett's men were captured. About two hundred of Kershaw's division got away.

General R. S. Ewell and General R. H. Anderson are barely known in the retreat, but their stand and fight on that trying march were among the most soldier-like of the many noble deeds of the war.

While waiting near my rear, General Lee received information, through Colonel Venable, of his staff, as to the disaster at Sailor's Creek. He drew Mahone's division away, and took it back to find the field. General Mahone writes of the scenes that he witnessed as follows:

"As we were moving up in line of battle, General Lee riding with me and remonstrating about the severity of my note in respect to Colonel Marshall's interference with my division the night before, up rode Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, and wanted to know if he, General Lee, had received his message. General Lee replied 'No,' when Colonel Venable informed him that the enemy had captured the wagon-trains at Sailor's Creek. General Lee exclaimed, 'Where is Anderson? Where is Ewell? It is strange I can't hear from them.' Then turning to me, he said, 'General Mahone, I have no other troops, will you take your division to Sailor's Creek?' and I promptly gave the order by the left flank, and off we were for Sailor's Creek, where the disaster had occurred. General Lee rode with me, Colonel Venable a little in the rear. On reaching the south crest of the high ground at the crossing of the river road overlooking Sailor's Creek, the disaster which had overtaken our army was in full view, and the scene beggars description,--hurrying teamsters with their teams and dangling traces (no wagons), retreating infantry without guns, many without hats, a harmless mob, with the massive columns of the enemy moving orderly on. At this spectacle General Lee straightened himself in his saddle, and, looking more the soldier than ever, exclaimed, as if talking to himself, 'My God! has the army dissolved?' As quickly as I could control my own voice I replied, 'No, general, here are troops ready to do their duty;' when, in a mellowed voice, he replied, 'Yes, general, there are some true men left. Will you please keep those people back?' As I was placing my division in position to 'keep those people back,' the retiring herd just referred to had crowded around General Lee while he sat on his horse with a Confederate battle-flag in his hand. I rode up and requested him to give me the flag, which he did.

"It was near dusk, and he wanted to know of me how to get away. I replied, 'Let General Longstreet move by the river road to Farmville, and cross the river there, and I will go through the woods to the High Bridge (railroad bridge) and cross there.' To this he assented. I asked him then, after crossing at the High Bridge, what I should do, and his reply was, to exercise my judgment. I wanted to know what should be done with the bridge after crossing it. He said, 'Set fire to it,' and I replied that the destruction of a span would as well retard the enemy as the destruction of the whole half mile of bridge, and asked him to call up Colonel Talcott, of the Engineers' Regiment, and personally direct him in the matter, which he did."

General Mahone withdrew at eleven o'clock at night through the wood, found the bridge, had the fragments of commands over before daylight, and crossed High Bridge. The parties called to fire the bridge failed to appear. He sent a brigade back to do the work, and had a sharp skirmish in checking the enemy long enough to start the fire, after which he withdrew as far as Cumberland Church and deployed for battle, Poague's artillery on his right. General Rosser got up with the detachment sent to burn the bridge, and attacked. General Reed, seeing his approach, found a defensive position, and arranged the command to receive battle. General Mumford got up and deployed his troopers, dismounted, on Rosser's left. Nothing daunted, General Reed received the attack, and in gallant fight made one or two counter-charges with his small cavalry force, but ere long he was mortally wounded, as was Colonel Washburn. Most of his cavalry officers and many of his infantry were killed or wounded, and the rest surrendered. Reed's fight was as gallant and skilful as a soldier could make, and its noise in rear of Sailor's Creek may have served to increase the confusion there. The result shows the work of these remnants of Confederate veterans as skilful and worthy of their old chief who fell at Yellow Tavern.

I heard nothing of the affair at Sailor's Creek, nor from General Lee, until next morning. Our work at Rice's Station was not very serious, but was continued until night, when we marched and crossed the Appomattox at Farmville without loss, some of Rosser's and Mumford's cavalry following. We crossed early in the morning and received two days' rations,--the first regular issue since we left Richmond,--halted our wagons, made fires, got out cooking utensils, and were just ready to prepare a good breakfast. We had not heard of the disasters on the other route and the hasty retreat, and were looking for a little quiet to prepare breakfast, when General Lee rode up and said that the bridges had been fired before his cavalry crossed, that part of that command was cut off and lost, and that the troops should hurry on to position at Cumberland Church.

I reminded him that there were fords over which his cavalry could cross, and that they knew of or would surely find them. Everything except the food was ordered back to the wagons and dumped in.

Meanwhile, the alarm had spread, and our teamsters, frightened by reports of cavalry trouble and approaching fire of artillery, joined in the panic, put whips to their teams as quick as the camp-kettles were tumbled over the tail-boards of the wagons, and rushed through the woods to find a road somewhere in front of them. The command was ordered under arms and put in quick march, but General Lee urged double-quick. Our cavalry was then engaged near Farmville, and presently came a reckless charge of Gregg's troopers towards parts of Rosser's and Mumford's commands. Heth's division of infantry was sent to support them. As the balance of the command marched, General Lee took the head of the column and led it on the double-quick.

I thought it better to let them pass me, and, to quiet their apprehensions a little, rode at a walk. General Mahone received the attack of part of the enemy's Second Corps, like Gregg's cavalry making reckless attack. The enemy seemed to think they had another Sailor's Creek affair, and part of their attack got in as far as Poague's battery, but Mahone recovered it, and then drove off an attack against his front. General Gregg and a considerable part of his command were captured by Rosser and Mumford. At Cumberland Church the command deployed on the right of Poague's battery, but Mahone reported a move by part of Miles's division to turn his left which might dislodge him. G. T. Anderson's brigade of Field's division was sent with orders to get around the threatening force and break it up. Mahone so directed them through a woodland that they succeeded in over-reaching the threatened march, and took in some three hundred prisoners,[211] the last of our trouble for the day. General Lee stopped at a cottage near my line, where I joined him after night; the trains and other parts of his army had moved on towards Appomattox Court-House.

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XLIII. APPOMATTOX

Some of General Lee's Officers say to him that "Further Resistance is Hopeless"--Longstreet does not approve--General Grant calls for Surrender--"Not yet"--The Confederate Chieftain asks Terms--His Response to his Officers as represented by General Pendleton--Correspondence of Generals Lee and Grant--Morning of April 9--General Lee rides to meet the Federal Commander, while Longstreet forms the Last Line of Battle--Longstreet endeavors to recall his Chief, hearing of a Break where the Confederate Troops could pass--Custer demands Surrender of Longstreet--Reminded of Irregularity, and that he was "in the Enemy's Lines"--Meeting with General Grant--Capitulation--Last Scenes.

The beginning of the end was now at hand,--not perhaps necessarily, but, at least, as the sequence of cause and effect actually followed.

"An event occurred on the 7th," says General Long, "which must not be omitted from the narrative. Perceiving the difficulties that surrounded the army, and believing its extrication hopeless, a number of the principal officers, from a feeling of affection and sympathy for the commander-in-chief, and with a wish to lighten his responsibility and soften the pain of defeat, volunteered to inform him that, in their opinion, the struggle had reached a point where further resistance was hopeless, and that the contest should be terminated and negotiations opened for a surrender of the army. The delivery of this opinion was confided to General Pendleton, who, both by his character and devotion to General Lee, was well qualified for such an office. The names of Longstreet and some others, who did not coincide in the opinion of their associates, did not appear in the list presented by Pendleton."[212]

A little after nightfall a flag of truce appeared under torchlight in front of Mahone's line bearing a note to General Lee:

"Head-quarters Armies of the United States, "5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

"General R. E. Lee, "Commanding Confederate States Army:

"GENERAL,--The results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "U. S. GRANT, "_Lieutenant-General, Commanding Armies of the United States_."

I was sitting at his side when the note was delivered. He read it and handed it to me without referring to its contents. After reading it I gave it back, saying, "Not yet."

General Lee wrote in reply,--

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL,--I have received your note of this day. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. Lee, "General.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT, "Commanding Armies of the United States."

I was not informed of the contents of the return note, but thought, from the orders of the night, it did not mean surrender. General Lee ordered my command from forward- to rear-guard, and his cavalry in rear of the march. The road was clear at eleven o'clock, and we marched at twelve. The enemy left us to a quiet day's march on the 8th, nothing disturbing the rear-guard, and our left flank being but little annoyed, but our animals were worn and reduced in strength by the heavy haul through rain and mud during the march from Petersburg, and the troops of our broken columns were troubled and faint of heart.

We passed abandoned wagons in flames, and limbers and caissons of artillery burning sometimes in the middle of the road. One of my battery commanders reported his horses too weak to haul his guns. He was ordered to bury the guns and cover their burial-places with old leaves and brushwood. Many weary soldiers were picked up, and many came to the column from the woodlands, some with, many without, arms,--all asking for food.

General Grant renewed efforts on the 8th to find a way to strike across the head of our march by his cavalry and the Army of the James, pursuing our rear-guard with the Second and Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

In the forenoon, General Pendleton came to me and reported the proceedings of the self-constituted council of war of the night before, and stated that he had been requested to make the report and ask to have me bear it to General Lee, in the name of the members of the council. Much surprised, I turned and asked if he did not know that the Articles of War provided that officers or soldiers who asked commanding officers to surrender should be shot, and said,--

"If General Lee doesn't know when to surrender until I tell him, he will never know."

It seems that General Pendleton then went to General Lee and made the report. General Long's account of the interview, as reported by Pendleton, is as follows:

"General Lee was lying on the ground. No others heard the conversation between him and myself. He received my communication with the reply, 'Oh, no, I trust that it has not come to that,' and added, 'General, we have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms. The enemy do not fight with spirit, while our boys still do. Besides, if I were to say a word to the Federal commander, he would regard it as such a confession of weakness as to make it the condition of demanding an unconditional surrender, a proposal to which I will never listen.... I have never believed we could, against the gigantic combination for our subjugation, make good, in the long run, our independence, unless foreign powers should, directly or indirectly, assist us.... But such considerations really make with me no difference. We had, I was satisfied, sacred principles to maintain, and rights to defend, for which we were in duty bound to do our best, even if we perished in the endeavor.'

"Such were, as nearly as I can recall them, the exact words of General Lee on that most critical occasion. You see in them the soul of the man. Where his conscience dictated and his judgment decided, there his heart was."[213]

The delicate affection that prompted the knights of later days to offer to relieve our grand commander of his official obligations and take upon themselves responsibility to disarm us and turn us over to the enemy is somewhat pathetic, but when to it are applied the stern rules of a soldier's duty upon a field of emergency, when the commander most needs steady hands and brave hearts, their proceeding would not stand the test of a military tribunal. The interesting part of the interview is that in it our great leader left a sufficient testimonial of his regard as a legacy to the soldiers of his column of the right. Though commanders of other columns were in mutinous conduct towards him, he had confidence that we were firm and steady in waiting to execute his last command.

During the day General Grant wrote General Lee in reply to his note of the 7th inquiring as to terms of surrender,--

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE, "Commanding Confederate States Army:

"GENERAL,--Your note of last evening in reply to mine of the same date, asking the conditions on which I will accept surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon,--namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you might name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, "Lieutenant-General."

In reply, General Lee wrote,--

"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL,--I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, "General."

The enemy's movements of the day were impressive of his desire to get by our left flank and make a strong stand across the route of our head of column. At Prospect Station, General Sheridan was informed of four trains of cars at Appomattox Station loaded with provisions for General Lee's army. He gave notice to Merritt's and Crook's cavalry, and rode twenty-eight miles in time for Custer's division to pass the station, cut off the trains, and drive back the guard advancing to protect them. He helped himself to the provisions, and captured besides twenty-five pieces of artillery and a wagon and hospital train.

At night General Lee made his head-quarters near the rear-guard, and spread his couch about a hundred feet from the saddle and blanket that were my pillow and spread for the night. If he had a more comfortable bed than mine I do not know, but I think not.

He sent for his cavalry commander, and gave orders for him to transfer his troopers from the rear to the advanced guard, and called General Gordon, commanding in front, for report and orders. The advance was then at Appomattox Court-House, Wallace's brigade resting in the village. His orders were to march at one o'clock in the morning, the trains and advanced forces to push through the village in time for my column to stand and prepare to defend at that point in case of close pursuit. General Gordon reported, as I remember, less than two thousand men. (General Fitzhugh Lee puts it at sixteen hundred, but he may have overlooked Wallace's brigade, which joined the advance on that day.) My column was about as it was when it marched from Petersburg. Parts of Ewell's, Anderson's, and Pickett's commands not captured on the march were near us, and reported to me, except Wallace's brigade.

On the 9th the rear-guard marched as ordered, but soon came upon standing trains of wagons in the road and still in park alongside. The command was halted, deployed into position, and ordered to intrench against the pursuing army.

It was five o'clock when the advance commands moved,--four hours after the time ordered. To these General Long's batteries of thirty guns were attached. They met Sheridan's cavalry advancing across their route. The column was deployed, the cavalry on the right of the artillery and infantry, as they advanced to clear the way. They reported some success, capturing two pieces of artillery, when General Ord's column came up. He had, besides his Army of the James, the Fifth Army Corps. These commands, with the cavalry, pushed the Confederates back a little, while the two corps of the Army of the Potomac were advancing against my rear-guard.

Of the early hours of this, the last day of active existence of the Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, wrote thus:

"At three o'clock on the morning of that fatal day, General Lee rode forward, still hoping that he might break through the countless hordes of the enemy, who hemmed us in. Halting a short distance in rear of our vanguard, he sent me on to General Gordon to ask him if he could break through the enemy. I found General Gordon and General Fitz Lee on their front line in the dim light of the morning, arranging our attack. Gordon's reply to the message (I give the expressive phrase of the gallant Georgian) was this: 'Tell General Lee I have fought my corps to a frazzle, and I fear I can do nothing unless I am heavily supported by Longstreet's corps.'

"When I bore the message back to General Lee, he said, 'Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths.'

"Convulsed with passionate grief, many were the wild words which we spoke as we stood around him. Said one, 'Oh, general, what will history say of the surrender of the army in the field?'

"He replied, 'Yes, I know they will say hard things of us; they will not understand how we are overwhelmed by numbers. But that is not the question, colonel; the question is, "Is it right to surrender this army?" If it is right, then I will take all the responsibility!'"[214]

Presently General Lee called to have me ride forward to him. He was dressed in a suit of new uniform, sword and sash, a handsomely embroidered belt, boots, and a pair of gold spurs. At first approach his compact figure appeared as a man in the flush vigor of forty summers, but as I drew near, the handsome apparel and brave bearing failed to conceal his profound depression. He stood near the embers of some burned rails, received me with graceful salutation, and spoke at once of affairs in front and the loss of his subsistence stores. He remarked that the advanced columns stood against a very formidable force, which he could not break through, while General Meade was at my rear ready to call for all the work that the rear-guard could do, and, closing with the expression that it was not possible for him to get along, requested my view. I asked if the bloody sacrifice of his army could in any way help the cause in other quarters. He thought not. Then, I said, your situation speaks for itself.

He called up General Mahone, and made to him a similar statement of affairs. The early morning was raw and damp. General Mahone was chilled standing in wait without fire. He pushed up the embers and said to the general he did not want him to think he was scared, he was only chilled. General Mahone sometimes liked to talk a little on questions of moment, and asked several questions. My attention was called to messages from the troops for a time, so that I failed to hear all of the conversation, but I heard enough of it to know that General Mahone thought it time to see General Grant. Appeal was made to me to affirm that judgment, and it was promptly approved.

General Grant had been riding with his column in our rear during the correspondence of the 7th and 8th. So General Lee, upon mounting Traveller, his favorite horse, rode to our rear to meet him, leaving his advanced forces engaged in a lively skirmish. He did not think to send them notice of his intended ride, nor did he authorize me to call a truce. He passed my rear under flag, but General Grant's orders were that his correspondence with General Lee should not interrupt or delay the operations of any of his forces. Our advance troops were in action, and General Humphreys was up with the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac, preparing for action against our rear-guard. The situation was embarrassing. It was plain enough that I should attack the Second Corps before others could be up and prepare for action, though our truce forbade. It could not prevail, however, to call me to quiet while the enemy in plain view was preparing for attack, so we continued at our work constructing our best line of defence, and when strong enough I ordered parts of the rear-guard forward to support the advanced forces, and directed General Alexander to establish them with part of his batteries in the best position for support or rallying line in case the front lines were forced back. That was the last line of battle formed in the Army of Northern Virginia.

While this formation was proceeding, report came from our front that a break had been found through which we could force passage. I called for a swift courier, but not one could be found. Colonel J. C. Haskell had a blooded mare that had been carefully led from Petersburg. Appreciating the signs of the times, he had ordered her saddled, intending a desperate ride to escape impending humiliation, but, learning my need of a swift courier he came and offered his services and his mare. He was asked to take the information just brought in to General Lee, and as he mounted was told to kill his mare but bring General Lee back. He rode like the wind.

General Lee had passed out and dismounted beyond a turn of the road, and was not seen until the gallant rider had dashed by him. The steed swept onward some distance before the rider could pull up. As Colonel Haskell rode back, General Lee walked to meet him, exclaiming, "You have ruined your beautiful mare! why did you do so?" The swift despatch was too late. General Lee's note to General Grant asking an interview had gone beyond recall.

As my troops marched to form the last line a message came from General Lee saying he had not thought to give notice of the intended ride to meet General Grant, and asked to have me send his message to that effect to General Gordon, and it was duly sent by Captain Sims, of the Third Corps staff, serving at my head-quarters since the fall of A. P. Hill.

After delivering the message, Captain Sims, through some informality, was sent to call the truce. The firing ceased. General Custer rode to Captain Sims to know his authority, and, upon finding that he was of my staff, asked to be conducted to my head-quarters, and down they came in fast gallop, General Custer's flaxen locks flowing over his shoulders, and in brusk, excited manner, he said,--

"In the name of General Sheridan I demand the unconditional surrender of this army."

He was reminded that I was not the commander of the army, that he was within the lines of the enemy without authority, addressing a superior officer, and in disrespect to General Grant as well as myself; that if I was the commander of the army I would not receive the message of General Sheridan.

He then became more moderate, saying it would be a pity to have more blood upon that field. Then I suggested that the truce be respected, and said,--

"As you are now more reasonable, I will say that General Lee has gone to meet General Grant, and it is for them to determine the future of the armies."

He was satisfied, and rode back to his command.

General Grant rode away from the Army of the Potomac on the morning of the 9th to join his troops near Appomattox Court-House, so General Lee's note was sent around to him. When advised of the change, General Lee rode back to his front to await there the answer to his note. While waiting, General Lee expressed apprehension that his refusal to meet General Grant's first proposition might cause him to demand harsh terms.

I assured him that I knew General Grant well enough to say that the terms would be such as he would demand under similar circumstances, but he yet had doubts. The conversation continued in broken sentences until the bearer of the return despatch approached. As he still seemed apprehensive of humiliating demands, I suggested that in that event he should break off the interview and tell General Grant to do his worst. The thought of another round seemed to brace him, and he rode with Colonel Marshall, of his staff, to meet the Union commander.

The status of affairs spread through the advance troops of the army, but the work of preparation on my rear line was continued. General Field inquired of a passing officer, "What's up?" but, seeing arrangements going on for attack in our rear, he continued his work of preparation to receive it.

General Grant was found prepared to offer as liberal terms as General Lee could expect, and, to obviate a collision between his army of the rear with ours, ordered an officer sent to give notice of the truce. A ride around the lines would consume time, and he asked to have the officer conducted through our lines. Colonel Fairfax was sent with him. When they reached our rear line it was still at work on the trenches. The officer expressed surprise at the work of preparation, as not proper under truce. Colonel Fairfax ordered the work discontinued, and claimed that a truce between belligerents can only be recognized by mutual consent. As the object of the ride was to make the first announcement of properly authorized truce, the work of preparation between the lines was no violation of the usages of war, particularly when it was borne in mind that the orders of General Grant were that the correspondence should not delay or interrupt military operations.

As General Lee rode back to his army the officers and soldiers of his troops about the front lines assembled in promiscuous crowds of all arms and grades in anxious wait for their loved commander. From force of habit a burst of salutations greeted him, but quieted as suddenly as they arose. The road was packed by standing troops as he approached, the men with hats off, heads and hearts bowed down. As he passed they raised their heads and looked upon him with swimming eyes. Those who could find voice said good-by, those who could not speak, and were near, passed their hands gently over the sides of Traveller. He rode with his hat off, and had sufficient control to fix his eyes on a line between the ears of Traveller and look neither to right nor left until he reached a large white-oak tree, where he dismounted to make his last head-quarters, and finally talked a little.

The shock was most severe upon Field's division. Seasoned by four years of battle triumphant, the veterans in that body stood at Appomattox when the sun rose on the 9th day of April, 1865, as invincible of valor as on the morning of the 31st of August, 1862, after breaking up the Union lines of the second field of Manassas. They had learned little of the disasters about Petersburg, less of that at Sailor's Creek, and surrender had not had time to enter their minds until it was announced accomplished!

The reported opportunity to break through the enemy's lines proved a mistake. General Mumford, suspecting surrender from the sudden quiet of the front, made a dashing ride, and passed the enemy's lines with his division of cavalry, and that caused the impression that we would be able to march on.

Soon after General Lee's return ride his chief of ordnance reported a large amount of United States currency in his possession. In doubt as to the proper disposition of the funds, General Lee sent the officer to ask my opinion. As it was not known or included in the conditions of capitulation, and was due (and ten times more) to the faithful troops, I suggested a pro rata distribution of it. The officer afterwards brought three hundred dollars as my part. I took one hundred, and asked to have the balance distributed among Field's division,--the troops most distant from their homes.

The commissioners appointed to formulate details of the capitulation were assigned a room in the McLean residence. The way to it led through the room occupied as General Grant's head-quarters.

As I was passing through the room, as one of the commissioners, General Grant looked up, recognized me, rose, and with his old-time cheerful greeting gave me his hand, and after passing a few remarks offered a cigar, which was gratefully received.

The first step under capitulation was to deliver to the Union army some fifteen hundred prisoners, taken since we left Petersburg, not all of them by my infantry, Rosser's and Mumford's cavalry having taken more than half of them. Besides these I delivered to General Grant all of the Confederate soldiers left under my care by General Lee, except about two hundred lost in the affairs about Petersburg, Amelia Court-House, Jetersville, Rice's Station, and Cumberland Church. None were reported killed except the gallant officers Brigadier-General Dearing, of Rosser's cavalry, Colonel Bostan, of Mumford's cavalry, and Major Thompson, of Stuart's horse artillery, in the desperate and gallant fight to which they were ordered against the bridge-burning party.

General Grant's artillery prepared to fire a salute in honor of the surrender, but he ordered it stopped.

As the world continues to look at and study the grand combinations and strategy of General Grant, the higher will be his award as a great soldier. Confederates should be foremost in crediting him with all that his admirers so justly claim, and ask at the same time that his great adversary be measured by the same high standards.

On the 12th of April the Army of Northern Virginia marched to the field in front of Appomattox Court-House, and by divisions and parts of divisions deployed into line, stacked their arms, folded their colors, and walked empty-handed to find their distant, blighted homes.

There were "surrendered and paroled" on the last day of our military history over twenty-eight thousand officers and men,--viz.:

General Lee and staff 15 Longstreet's corps[215] 14,833 Gordon's corps[216] 7,200 Ewell's corps 287 Cavalry corps 1,786 Artillery 2,586 Detachments 1,649 ------ Total 28,356

In glancing backward over the period of the war, and the tremendous and terrible events with which it was fraught, the reflection irresistibly arises, that it might perhaps have been avoided and without dishonor. The flag and the fame of the nation could have suffered no reproach had General Scott's advice, before the outbreak, been followed,--"Wayward sisters, depart in peace." The Southern States would have found their way back to the Union without war far earlier than they did by war. The reclaiming bonds would then have been those only of love, and the theory of government formulated by George Washington would have experienced no fracture. But the inflexible fiat of fate seemingly went forth for war; and so for four long years the history of this great nation was written in the blood of its strong men.

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XLIV. POST-BELLUM PENDANT

Old Friends and their Kindness--General Grant--His Characteristic Letter of Introduction to President Johnson--In Business in New Orleans--Political Unfriendliness--Cause of Criticism of Military Career--Appointed Surveyor of Customs--The Old Nurse.

Some weeks after the surrender the newspapers announced that I was to visit Washington City. My old company commander, Bradford P. Alden, who had resigned from the army some years before the war, came down from New York to meet me. Not finding me, he wrote to tell me of his trip, that he was anxious about me, lest I might be in need of assistance; that in that event I should draw on him for such amount of money as I wanted. When ready to return his favor he was not in the country, and it was only through a mutual friend, General Alvord, that his address in Europe was found and the amount returned. A more noble, lovable character never descended from the people of Plymouth Rock.

About the 1st of November, 1865, business of personal nature called me to Washington. I stopped at the Metropolitan Hotel. Upon seeing the arrival in the morning papers, General W. A. Nichols, of the United States army, called and insisted that my visit should be with him and his family. The request was declined with the suggestion that the war-feeling was too warm for an officer of the army to entertain a prominent Confederate, but he insisted and urged that his good wife would not be satisfied unless the visit was made. So it was settled, and I became his guest. He was on duty at the time as assistant adjutant-general at the War Department. As I was stopping with an officer of the army, the usages of military life required that I should call upon the commanding general.

The next morning I walked with General Nichols to make an official call on General Grant. He recognized us as we entered his office, rose and walked to meet us. After the usual brief call, we rose to take leave, when he asked to have us call on his family during the evening. Most of those whom we met during the evening were old-time personal friends, especially the father-in-law, Mr. Dent. When leaving, after a pleasant evening, General Grant walked with us to the gate and asked if I cared to have my pardon. I pleaded not guilty of an offence that required pardon. He said that he meant amnesty,--that he wished to know if I cared to have it. I told him that I intended to live in the country, and would prefer to have the privileges of citizenship. He told me to call at his office at noon next day; that in the mean time he would see the Secretary of War and the President in regard to the matter.

The next day he gave me a letter to the President, and said that he had seen him and thought the matter was arranged; that I should first see the Secretary of War, then the President. His strong and characteristic letter to the President was as follows:

"HEAD-QUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "WASHINGTON, D. C., November 7, 1865.

"HIS EXCELLENCY A. JOHNSON, "President:

"Knowing that General Longstreet, late of the army which was in rebellion against the authority of the United States, is in the city, and presuming that he intends asking executive clemency before leaving, I beg to say a word in his favor.

"General Longstreet comes under the third, fifth, and eighth exceptions made in your proclamation of the 29th of May, 1865. I believe I can safely say that there is nowhere among the exceptions a more honorable class of men than those embraced in the fifth and eighth of these, nor a class that will more faithfully observe any obligation which they may take upon themselves. General Longstreet, in my opinion, stands high among this class. I have known him well for more than twenty-six years, first as a cadet at West Point and afterwards as an officer of the army. For five years from my graduation we served together, a portion of the time in the same regiment. I speak of him, therefore, from actual personal acquaintance.

"In the late rebellion, I think, not one single charge was ever brought against General Longstreet for persecution of prisoners of war or of persons for their political opinions. If such charges were ever made, I never heard them. I have no hesitation, therefore, in recommending General Longstreet to your Excellency for pardon. I will further state that my opinion of him is such that I shall feel it as a personal favor to myself if this pardon is granted.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "U. S. GRANT, "Lieutenant-General."

Supported by this generous endorsement, I called on the Secretary of War, who referred me to the President. After a lengthy interview the President asked to have the matter put off until next day, when I should call at noon. The next day he was still unprepared to make decision, but, after a long, pleasant talk, he said,--

"There are three persons of the South who can never receive amnesty: Mr. Davis, General Lee, and yourself. You have given the Union cause too much trouble."

I replied, "You know, Mr. President, that those who are forgiven most love the most."

"Yes," he said, "you have very high authority for that, but you can't have amnesty."

During a subsequent session of Congress, General Pope sent in a list of names from Georgia for whom he asked relief from their political disabilities. General Grant, after approving it, made request to one of his friends in Congress to have my name put on the list, and I was extended relief soon after it was given to General R. E. Lee.

In January, 1866, I engaged in business in New Orleans with the Owen brothers,--William, Miller, and Edward, old soldiers of the Washington Artillery,--as cotton factors, and speedily found fair prosperity. Before the year was out I was asked to take position in an insurance company, but declined, and repeated applications were refused under plea of limited business experience, but, under promise of ample and competent assistance, I accepted the place with a salary of five thousand dollars, and my affairs were more than prosperous until I was asked an opinion upon the political crisis of 1867.

As the whole animus of the latter-day adverse criticisms upon, and uncritical assertions in regard to, the commander of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia had its origin in this matter of politics, a brief review of the circumstances is in order.

As will be readily recalled by my older readers (while for the younger it is a matter of history), President Johnson, after the war, adopted a reconstruction policy of his own, and some of the States were reorganized under it with Democratic governors and legislatures, and all would have followed. But Congress, being largely Republican, was not satisfied, and enacted that the States could not be accepted unless they provided in their new constitutions for negro suffrage. In case they would not, the State governments should be removed and the States placed in the hands of general officers of the army as military governors, who should see that the States were reorganized and restored to the Union under the laws.

Under the severe ordeal one of the city papers of New Orleans called upon the generals of Confederate service to advise the people of the course that they should pursue,--naming the officers. I thought it better policy to hold the States, as they were organized, under the President's policy, shape their constitutions as directed by Congress, and have the States not yet reorganized follow the same course. My letter upon the subject was as follows:

"NEW ORLEANS, LA., June 3, 1867.

"J. M. G. PARKER, ESQ.:

"DEAR SIR,--Your esteemed favor of the 15th ultimo was duly received.

"I was much pleased to have the opportunity to hear Senator Wilson, and was agreeably surprised to meet such fairness and frankness from a politician whom I had been taught to believe harsh in his feelings towards the people of the South.

"I have considered your suggestion to wisely unite in efforts to restore Louisiana to her former position in the Union 'through the party now in power.' My letter of the 6th of April, to which you refer, clearly indicates a desire for practical reconstruction and reconciliation. There is only one route left open, which practical men cannot fail to see.

"The serious difficulty arises from want of that wisdom so important for the great work in hand. Still, I will be happy to work in any harness that promises relief to our discomfited people and harmony to the nation, whether bearing the mantle of Mr. Davis or Mr. Sumner.

"It is fair to assume that the strongest laws are those established by the sword. The ideas that divided political parties before the war--upon the rights of the States--were thoroughly discussed by our wisest statesmen, and eventually appealed to the arbitrament of the sword. The decision was in favor of the North, so that her construction becomes the law, and should be so accepted.

"The military bill and amendments are the only peace-offerings they have for us, and should be accepted as the starting-point for future issues.

"Like others of the South not previously connected with politics, I naturally acquiesced in the ways of Democracy, but, so far as I can judge, there is nothing tangible in them, beyond the issues that were put to test in the war and there lost. As there is nothing left to take hold of except prejudice, which cannot be worked for good for any one, it seems proper and right that we should seek some standing which may encourage hope for the future.

"If I appreciate the issues of Democracy at this moment, they are the enfranchisement of the negro and the rights of Congress in the premises, but the acts have been passed, are parts of the laws of the land, and no power but Congress can remove them.

"Besides, if we now accept the doctrine that the States only can legislate on suffrage, we will fix the negro vote upon us, for he is now a suffragan, and his vote, with the vote that will go with him, will hold to his rights, while, by recognizing the acts of Congress, we may, after a fair trial, if negro suffrage proves a mistake, appeal and have Congress correct the error. It will accord better with wise policy to insist that the negro shall vote in the Northern as well as the Southern States.

"If every one will meet the crisis with proper appreciation of our condition and obligations, the sun will rise to-morrow on a happy people. Our fields will again begin to yield their increase, our railways and waters will teem with abundant commerce, our towns and cities will resound with the tumult of trade, and we will be reinvigorated by the blessings of Almighty God.

"Very respectfully yours, "JAMES LONGSTREET."

I might have added that not less forceful than the grounds I gave were the obligations under which we were placed by the terms of our paroles,--"To respect the laws of Congress,"--but the letter was enough.

The afternoon of the day upon which my letter was published the paper that had called for advice published a column of editorial calling me traitor! deserter of my friends! and accusing me of joining the enemy! but did not publish a line of the letter upon which it based the charges! Other papers of the Democracy took up the garbled representation of this journal and spread it broadcast, not even giving the letter upon which they based their evil attacks upon me.

Up to that time the First Corps, in all of its parts, in all of its history, was above reproach. I was in successful business in New Orleans as cotton factor, with a salary from an insurance company of five thousand dollars per year.

The day after the announcement old comrades passed me on the streets without speaking. Business began to grow dull. General Hood (the only one of my old comrades who occasionally visited me) thought that he could save the insurance business, and in a few weeks I found myself at leisure.

Two years after that period, on March 4, 1869, General Grant was inaugurated President of the United States, and in the bigness of his generous heart called me to Washington. Before I found opportunity to see him he sent my name to the Senate for confirmation as surveyor of customs at New Orleans. I was duly confirmed, and held the office until 1873, when I resigned. Since that time I have lived in New Orleans, Louisiana, and in Gainesville, Georgia, surrounded by a few of my old friends, and in occasional appreciative touch with others, South and North.

Of all the people alive I still know and meet, probably no one carries me farther back in recollections of my long life than does my "old nurse." Most of the family servants were discharged after the war at Macon, Mississippi, where some of them still reside, among them this old man, Daniel, who still claims the family name, but at times uses another. He calls promptly when I visit Macon and looks for "something to remember you by." During my last visit he seemed more concerned for me than usual, and on one of his calls asked,--

"Marse Jim, do you belong to any church?"

"Oh, yes," I said, "I try to be a good Christian."

He laughed loud and long, and said,--

"Something must have scared you mighty bad, to change you so from what you was when I had to care for you."

In a recent letter he sent a message to say that he is getting to be a little feeble.

Blessings on his brave heart!

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