Opening…

I. MY DEBUT IN WALL STREET

Results of the Panic of 1857.—Creating a Revolution in 5 the Methods of Doing Business in Wall Street.—The Old “Fogies” of the Street, and How They were Surprised.—Their Prejudices and How they Originated.—The Struggle of the Young Bloods for Membership.—The Youthful Element in Finance Peculiar to this Country.—The Palmy Days of Little, Drew and Morse.—The Origin of “Corners,” and the “Option” Limit of Sixty Days

II. WALL STREET AS A CIVILIZER

Clerical Obliquity of Judgment About Wall Street 13 Affairs.—The Slanderous Eloquence of Talmage.—Wall Street a Great Distributor, as Exhibited in the Clearing House Transactions.—Popular Delusions in Regard to Speculation.—What Our Revolutionary Sires Advised About Improving the Industrial Arts, Showing the Striking Contrast Between Their Views and the Way Lord Salisbury Wanted to Fix Things for This Country

III. HOW TO MAKE MONEY IN WALL STREET

How to Take Advantage of Periodical Panics in Order to 19 Make Money.—Wholesome Advice to Young Speculators.—Alleged “Points” from Big Speculators End in Loss or Disaster.—Professional Advice the Surest and Cheapest, and How and Where to Obtain It

IV. IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS TRAINING

Sons of Independent Gentlemen make very bad 25 Clerks.—They become Unpopular with the Other Boys, and must Eventually Go.—Night Dancing and Late Suppers don’t Contribute to Business Success.—Give Merit its True Reward.—Keeping Worthless Pretense in its True Position.—Running Public Offices on Business Principles.—A Piece of Gratuitous Advice for the Administration.—A College Course not in General Calculated to make a Good Business Man.—The Question of Adaptability Important.—Children should be Encouraged in the Occupation for which they show a Preference.—Thoughts on the Army and Navy

V. PERSONAL HONOR OF WALL STREET MEN

Breach of Trust Rare Among Wall Street Men.—The English 33 Clergyman’s Notion of Talmage’s Tirades Against Wall Street.—Adventurous Thieves Have No Sympathizers Among Wall Street Operators.—Early Training Necessary for Success in Speculation.—Ferdinand Ward’s Evil Genius.—A Great Business can only be Built up on Honest Principles.—Great Generals Make Poor Financiers, Through Want of Early Training.—Practical Business is the Best College

VI. WALL STREET DURING THE WAR

The Financiers of Wall Street Assist the Government in 39 the Hour of the Country’s Peril.—The Issue of the Treasury Notes.—Jay Cooke’s Northern Pacific Scheme Precipitates the Panic of 1873.—Wall Street Has Played a Prominent Part in the Great Evolution and Progress of the Present Age

VII. MORE WAR REMINISCENCES—BRITISH AND NAPOLEONIC DESIGNS

How Napoleon Defied the Monroe Doctrine.—The Banquet to 45 Romero.—Speeches by Eminent Financiers, Jurists and Business Men.—The Eloquent Address of Romero Against French Intervention.—Napoleon shows his Animus by Destroying the Newspapers Containing the Report of the Banquet.—The Emperor Plotting with Representatives of the English Parliament to Aid the Confederates and Make War on the United States

VIII. FOREIGN INTRIGUES AGAINST AMERICAN LIBERTY

How the Imperial Pirates of France and England Were 59 Frightened Off Through the Diplomacy of Seward.—Ominous Appearance of the Russian Fleet in American Waters.—Napoleon Aims at the Creation of an Empire West of the Mississippi, and the Restoration of the Old French Colonies.—Plotting with Slidell, Benjamin, Lindsay, Roebuck and Others.—Urging England to Recognize the Confederacy.—Disraeli Explains England’s Designs and Diplomacy.—After the Naval Victory of Farragut and the Capture of New Orleans England Hesitates Through Fear, and Napoleon Changes His Tactics.—Renewal of Intrigues Between England and France.—Their Dastardly Purposes Defeated by the Victories of Gettysburg, Vicksburg and the General Triumph of the Union Arms

IX. SECRETARY CHASE AND THE TREASURY

The Depleted Condition of the Treasury when Mr. Chase 73 took Office.—Preparations for War and Great Excitement in Washington.—Chivalrous Southerners in a Ferment.—Officials Up in Arms in Defence of their Menaced Positions.—Miscalculation with Regard to the Probable Duration of the War.—A Visit to Washington and an Interview with Secretary Chase.—Disappointment about the Sale of Government Bonds.—A Panic Precipitated in Wall Street.—Millionaires Reduced to Indigence in a Few Hours.—Miraculously Saved from the Wreck.—How it Happened

X. THE NATIONAL BANKS

Secretary Chase Considers the Problem of Providing a 81 National Currency.—How E. G. Spaulding takes a Prominent Part in the Discussion of the Bank Act.—The Act Founded on the Bank Act of the State of New York.—Effect of the Act upon the Credit of the Country.—A New System of Banking Required

XI. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE

History of the Organization for Ninety-four Years.—From 87 a Button-Wood Tree to a Palace Costing Millions of Dollars.—Enormous Growth and Development of the Business.—How the Present Stock Exchange was Formed by the Consolidation of other Financial Bodies.—Patriotic Action During the War Period.—Reminiscences of Men and Events

Chapter XII

“CORNERS” AND THEIR EFFECT ON VALUES.

The Senate Committee on “Corners” and 95 “Futures.”—Speculation Beneficial to the Country at Large.—A Regulator of Values, and an Important Agent in the Prevention of Panics.-“Corners” in all kinds of Business.—How A. T. Stewart made “Corners.”—All Importing Firms deal in “Futures.”—Legislation Against “Corners” would stop Enterprise and cause Stagnation in Business.—Only the Conspirators themselves get hurt in “Corners.”—The Black Friday “Corner.”—Speculation in Grain Beneficial to Consumers

XIII. THE COMMODORE’S “CORNERS.”

The Great Hudson “Corner.”—Commodore Vanderbilt the 107 “Boss” of the Situation.—The “Corner” Forced upon Him.—How he Managed the Trick of getting the Bears to “Turn” the Stock, and then caught them.—His able Device of Unloading while Forcing the Bears to Cover at High Figures.—The Harlem “Corner.”—The Common Council Betrayed the Commodore, but were Caught in their own Trap, and Lost Millions.—The Legislature Attempt the same Game, and meet with a Similar Fate

XIV. DANIEL DREW

Drew, like Vanderbilt, an Example of Great Success 117 without Education.—Controlled more Ready Cash than any man in America.—Drew goes Down as Gould Rises.-“His Touch is Death.”—Prediction of Drew’s Fall.—His Thirteen Millions Vanish.—How he caught the Operators in “Oshkosh” by the Handkerchief Trick.—The Beginning of “Uncle Daniel’s” Troubles.—The Convertible Bond Trick.—The “Corner” of 1866.—Millions Lost and Won in a Day.—Interesting Anecdote of the Youth who Speculated outside the Pool, and was Fed by Drew’s Brokers

XV. DREW AND VANDERBILT

Vanderbilt Essays to Swallow Erie, and Has a Narrow 127 Escape from Choking.—He Tries to make Drew Commit Financial Suicide.—Manipulating the Stock Market and the Law Courts at the Same Time.—Attempts to “Tie Up” the Hands of Drew.—Manufacturing Bonds with the Erie Paper Mill and Printing Press.—Fisk Steals the Books and Evades the Injunction.—Drew Throws Fifty Thousand Shares on the Market and Defeats the Commodore.—The “Corner” is Broken and Becomes a Boomerang.—Vanderbilt’s Fury Knows no Bounds.—In his Rage he Applies to the Courts.—The Clique’s Inglorious Flight to Jersey City.—Drew Crosses the Ferry with Seven Millions of Vanderbilt’s Money.—The Commodore’s Attempt to Reach the Refugees.—A Detective Bribes a Waiter at Taylor’s Hotel, who Delivers the Commodore’s Letter, which Brings Drew to Terms.—Senator Mattoon gets on the right side of Both Parties

XVI. DREW AND THE ERIE “CORNERS.”

A Harmonious Understanding with the Commodore.—How the 137 Compromise was Effected.—An Interesting Interview with Fisk and Gould in the Commodore’s Bed-Room.—How Richard Schell Raised the Wind for the Commodore.—Drew’s Share of the Spoils.—He Tries to Retire from Wall Street, but Can’t.—The Settlement that Cost Erie Nine Millions.—Gould and Fisk “Water” Erie again, to the Extent of Twenty-three Millions, but leave Drew out.-“Uncle Daniel” Returns to the Street.—He is Inveigled into a Blind Pool by Gould and Fisk, Loses a Million and Retreats from the Pool.—He then Operates Alone on the “Short” Side and Throws Away Millions.—He Tries Prayer but it “Availeth Not.”-“It’s no Use, Brother, the Market Still Goes Up.”—Praying and Watching the Ticker.—Hopelessly “Cornered” and Ruined by his Former Pupils and Partners

XVII. INTERESTING EPISODES IN DREW’S LIFE

Incidents in the Early Life of Drew; and How he Began 147 to Make Money.—He Borrows Money from Henry Astor, Buys Cattle in Ohio and Drives them over the Alleghany Mountains under Great Hardship and Suffering.—His Great Career as a Steamboat Man, and his Opposition to Vanderbilt.—His Marriage and Family.—He Builds and Endows Religious and Educational Institutions.—Returns to his Old Home after his Speculative Fall, but can find No Rest so Far away from Wall Street.—His Hopes through Wm. H. Vanderbilt of another Start in Life.—His Bankruptcy, Liabilities and Wardrobe.—His Sudden but Peaceful End.—Characteristic Stories of his Eccentricities

XVIII. PANICS.—THEIR CAUSES.—HOW FAR PREVENTABLE

Not Accidental Freaks of the Market.—We are Still a 157 Nation of Pioneers.—The Question of Panics Peculiarly American.—Violent Oscillations in Trade Owing to the Great Mass of New and Immature Undertakings.—Uncertainty about the Intrinsic Value of Properties.—Sudden Shrinkage of Railroad Properties a Fruitful Cause of Panics.—Risks and Panics Inseparable from Pioneering Enterprise.—We are Becoming Less Dependent on the Money Markets of Europe.—In Panics much Depends upon the Prudence and Self-control of the Money-Lenders.—The Law which Compels a Reserve Fund in the National Banks is at Certain Crises a Provocative of Panics.—George I. Seney.—John C. Eno.—Ferdinand Ward.—The Clearing House as a Preventive of Panics

XIX. OLD-TIME PANICS

The Panic of 1837.—How it was Brought About.—The State 175 Banks.—How they Expanded their Loans under Government Patronage.—Speculation was Stimulated and Values Became Inflated.—President Jackson’s “Specie Circular” Precipitates the Panic.—Bank Contractions and Consequent Failures.—Mixing up Business and Politics.—A General Collapse, with Intense Suffering

Chapter XX

THE TRUE STORY OF BLACK FRIDAY TOLD FOR THE FIRST TIME.

The Great Black Friday Scheme originates in patriotic 181 motives. Advising Boutwell and Grant to sell Gold.—The part Jim Fisk played in the Speculative Drama.-“Gone where the Woodbine Twineth.”—A general state of Chaos in Wall Street.—How the Israelite Fainted.-“What ish the prish now?”—Gould the Head Centre of the Plot to “Corner” Gold.—How he Managed to Draw Ample Means from Erie.—Gould and Fisk Attempt to Manipulate President Grant and Compromise him and his Family in the Plot.—Scenes and Incidents of the Great Speculative Drama

XXI. CAUSES OF LOSS IN SPECULATION

Inadequate Information.—False Information.—Defects of 201 News Agencies.—Insufficiency of Margins.—Dangers of Personal Idiosyncrasies.—Operating in Season and out of Season.—Necessity of Intelligence, Judgment and Nerve.—An Ideal Standard.—What Makes a King Among Speculators?

XXII. VILLARD AND HIS SPECULATIONS

Return of the Renowned Speculator to Wall 209 Street.—Recalling the Famous “Blind” Pool in Northern Pacific.—How Villard Captured Northern Pacific.—Pursuing the Tactics of Old Vanderbilt.—Raising Twelve Million Dollars on Paper Credit.—Villard Emerges from the “Blind” Pool a Great Railroad Magnate.—He Inflates his Great Scheme from Nothing to One Hundred Million Dollars.—His Unique Methods of Watering Stock as Compared with those of George I. Seney

XXIII. FERDINAND WARD

Peculiar Power and Methods of the Prince of 215 Swindlers.—How he Duped Astute Financiers and Business Men of all Sorts, and Secured the Support of Eminent Statesmen and Leading Bank Officers, whom he Robbed of Millions of Money.—The most Artful Dodger of Modern Times.—The Truth about the Swindle Practiced upon General Grant and his Family.

XXIV. HENRY N. SMITH

How Mr. Smith Started in Life and became a Successful 223 Operator.—His connection with the Tweed “Ring,” and how he and the Famous “Boss” made Lucky Speculations, through the use of the City Funds, in Making a Tight Money Market.—On the Verge of Ruin in a Pool with W. K. Vanderbilt.—He is Converted to the Bear Side by Woerishoffer, and Again Makes Money, but by Persistence in his Bearish Policy Ruins himself and Drags Wm. Heath & Co. down also

XXV. KEENE’S CAREER

He Starts in Speculation as a “Curbstone” Broker.—A 229 Lucky Hit in a Mining Stock Puts Him on the Road to be a Millionaire.—His Speculative Encounter with the Bonanza Kings.—He Makes Four Millions, and Major Selover brings him to Wall Street, where they Form an Alliance with Gould, Who “Euchres” Both of Them.—Selover Drops Gould in an Area Way.—Keene Goes Alone and Adds Nine Millions More to His Fortune.—He Then Speculates Recklessly in Everything.—Suffers a Sudden Reversal and Gets Swamped.—Overwhelming Disaster in a Bear Campaign, Led by Gould and Cammack, in which Keene Loses Seven Millions.—His Desperate Attempts to Recover a Part Entail Further Losses, and He Approaches the End of His Thirteen Millions.—His Princely Liberality and Social Relations with Sam Ward and Others

XXVI. OUR RAILROAD METHODS

Deceptive Financiering.—Over-Capitalization.—Stock 241 “Watering.”—Financial Reconstructions.—Losses to the Public.—Profits of Constructors.—Bad Reputation of our Railroad Securities.—Unjust and Dangerous Distribution of the Public Wealth

XXVII. THE GEORGIA BOND REPUDIATION

How a Sovereign Southern State Cheated the Northern Men 255 who Helped Her in Distress.—A New Way to Pay Old Debts.—Cancellation by Repudiation of Just Claims for Cash Loaned to Sustain the State Government, Build Public Schools and Make Needed Improvements.—Bottom Facts of the Outrage.—The Recent Attempt to Place a New Issue of Georgia Bonds on the Market while the Old ones Remain Unpaid.—The Case before the Attorney-General of the State of New York.—He Examines the Legal Status of the Bonds in Connection with the Savings Banks.—His Decision Prohibits these Institutions from Investing the Hard Earnings of the Working People in these Doubtful and Dangerous Securities.—A Bold Effort to have the Fresh Issue of Georgia Paper put upon the List of Legitimate Securities of the New York Stock Exchange Firmly Opposed and Eventually Frustrated

XXVIII. ANDREW JOHNSON’S VAGARIES

“Swinging Around the Circle.”—How Mr. Johnson Came to 289 Visit New York on His Remarkable Tour.—The Grand Reception at Delmonico’s.—The President Loses His Temper at Albany and Becomes an Object of Public Ridicule.—His Proclamation of “My Policy” Ironically Received.—Returns to Washington Disgraced.—The Massacre of New Orleans.—The Impeachment of the President

XXIX. THE DIX CONVENTION

How the War Democrat, General Dix, was Elected Governor 297 by the Republican Party.—The Candidates of Senator Conkling Rejected.—How Dix was Sprung on the Convention, to the Consternation of the Caucus.—Judge Robertson’s Disappointment.—Exciting Scenes in the Convention.—General Dix declines the Nomination, but Reconsiders and Accepts on the Advice of His Wife and General Grant.—How Dix’s Election Ensures Grant’s Second Term as President

XXX. CONSEQUENCES OF THE UTICA (DIX’S) CONVENTION

A Chapter of Secret History.—Conkling gets the Credit 307 for Dix’s Nomination and His “Silence Gives Consent” to the Honor.—Robertson Regards Him as a Marplot.—The Senator Innocently Condemned.—The Misunderstanding which Defeated Grant for the Third Term, and Elected Garfield.—How the Noble “306” were Discomfited.-“Anything to Beat Grant.”—The Stalwarts and the Half Breeds.-“Me Too.”—The Excitement which Aroused Guiteau’s Murderous Spirit to Kill Garfield

XXXI. GRANT’S SECOND TERM

The Best Man for the Position and Most Deserving of the 313 Honor.—How the “Boom” was Worked up in Favor of Grant.—The Great Financiers and Speculators all Come to the Front in the Interest of the Nation’s Prosperity and of the Man who had Saved the Country.—The Great Mass Meeting at Cooper Union.—Why A. T. Stewart Refused to Preside.—The Results of the Mass Meeting and how they were Appreciated by the Friends of the Candidate, Leading Representatives of the Business Community and the Public Press Generally, Irrespective of Party

XXXII. THE TWEED RING, AND THE COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY

The Ring Makes Itself Useful in Speculative Deals.—How 327 Tweed and His “Heelers” Manipulated the Money Market.—The Ring Conspiring to Organize a Panic for Political Purposes.—The Plot to Gain a Democratic Victory Defeated and a Panic Averted Through President Grant and Secretary Boutwell, who were Apprised of the Danger by Wall Street Men.—How the Committee of “Seventy” Originated.—The Taxpayers Terrorized by Boss Tweed and his Minions.—How “Slippery Dick” got Himself Whitewashed.—Offering the Office of City Chamberlain as a Bribe to Compromise Matters.—How the Hon. Samuel Jones Tilden, as Counsel to the Committee, Obtained His Great Start in Life

XXXIII. HON. SAMUEL J. TILDEN

How Tilden began to make His Fortune in Connection with 337 William H. Havemeyer.—Tilden’s great Fort in Politics.—He Improves His Opportunity with the Discernment of Genius.—How Tilden became one of the Counsel of the “Committee of Seventy.”—His Political Elevation and Fame dating from this Lucky Event.—The Sage of Greystone a Truly Great Man.—Attains Marvellous Success by His own Industry and Brain Power.—He not only Deserved Success and Respect, but Commanded them.—How his Large Generosity was Manifested in His Last Will and Testament.—The Attempt to Break that Precious Public Document

Chapter XXXIV

COMMODORE VANDERBILT.—HOW HIS MAMMOTH FORTUNE WAS ACCUMULATED.

Ferryman.—Steamboat Owner.—Runs a Great Commercial 345 Fleet.—The First and Greatest of Railroad Kings.—The Harlem “Corner.”—Reorganization of N. Y. Central.—How He Milked the Street, and Euchred His Co-Speculators.—His Fortune.—Its Vast Increase by Wm. H.

XXXV. WM. H. VANDERBILT

A Builder instead of a Destroyer of Public Values.—His 355 Respect for Public Opinion on the Subject of Monopolies.—His first Experience in Railroad Management.—How he Improved the Harlem Railroad Property.—His great Executive Power manifested in every stage of advance until he became President of the Vanderbilt Consolidated System.—An Indefatigable Worker.—His habit of Scrutinizing Every Detail.—His Prudent Action in the Great Strike of 1877, and its Good Results.—Settled all misunderstandings by Peace and Arbitration.—Makes Princely Presents to his Sisters.—The Singular Gratitude of a Brother-In-Law.—How he Compromises by a Gift of a Million with Young Corneel.—Gladstone’s idea of the Vanderbilt Fortune.—Interview of Chauncey M. Depew with the G. O. M. on the subject.—The great Vanderbilt Mansion and the Celebrated Ball.—The Immense Picture Gallery.—Mr. Vanderbilt Visits some of the Famous Artists.—His Love of Fast Horses.—A Patron of Public Institutions.—His Gift to the Waiter Students.—While Sensitive to Public Opinion, has no fear of Threats or Blackmailers.—The Public be Damned.—Explanation of the rash Expression.—The Purchase of “Nickel Plate.”—His Declining Health and Last Days.—His Will, and Wise Method of Distributing 200 Millions.—Effects of this Colossal Fortune on Public Sentiment

Chapter XXXVI

“YOUNG CORNEEL.”

The Eccentricities of Cornelius Jeremiah Vanderbilt, 375 and his Marvellous Power for Borrowing Money.—He Exercises Wonderful Influence over Greeley and Colfax.—A Dinner at the Club with Young “Corneel” and the Famous “Smiler.”-“Corneel” tries to make himself Solid with Jay Cooke.—The Commodore Refuses to Pay Greeley.-“Who the Devil Asked You?” retorted Greeley.-“Corneel’s” marriage to a Charming and Devoted Woman.—How She Softened the Obdurate Heart of her Father-in-Law

XXXVII. THE YOUNG VANDERBILTS AND THEIR FORTUNES

Remarkable for Physical and Intellectual Ability.—The 387 Mixture of Races and the Law of Selection.—The Wonderful Will and the Wise Distribution of Two Hundred Millions.—Tastes, Habits and Social Proclivities of the Young Vanderbilts.—The Married Relations of Some of Them.—Being Happily Assorted they Make Good Husbands.—Their Property Regarded as a Great Trust.—Their Railroad System and its Great Army of Employes.—The Young Men Cautious About Speculating, and Conservative in their Expenses Generally

XXXVIII. THE ROTHSCHILDS

The Beginning of the Financial Career of the Great 397 House of Rothschild.—The Hessian Blood Money was the Great Foundation of their Fortune.—How the Firm of the Five Original Brothers was Constituted.—Nathan the Greatest Speculator of the Family.—His Career in Great Britain, and how he Misrepresented the Result of the “Battle of Waterloo” for Speculative Purposes.—Creating a Panic on the London Stock Exchange.—His Terror of being Assassinated.—His Death Causes a Panic on the London Exchange and the Bourses

XXXIX. TRAVERS

The Unique Character of Travers.—His Versatile 407 Attainments.—Although of a Genial and Humorous Disposition, He was Always a Bear.—How He was the Means of Preserving the Commercial Supremacy of New York.—He Squashes the English Bravado, and Saves the Oratorical Honor of Our Country.—Has the Oyster Brains?—It Must have Brains, for it Knows Enough to Sh-sh-shut Up.—The Dog and the Rat.—I d-d-don’t want to Buy the D-d-dog; I will Buy the R-r-rat.—Travers on the Royal Stand at the Derby.—How He was Euchred by the Pool-Seller.—My Proxy in a Speech at the Union Club.—If You are a S-s-self-made Man, Wh-wh-y the D-devil didn’t You put more H-hair on the Top of Your Head?—Other Witticisms, &c.—Death of the Great Wit and Humorist, and some of His Last Witty Sayings

XL. CHARLES F. WOERISHOFFER

The Career of Charles F. Woerishoffer and the Resultant 425 Effect upon Succeeding Generations.—The Peculiar Power of the Great Leader of the Bear Element in Wall Street.—His Methods as Compared with Those of Other Wreckers of Values.—A Bismarck Idea of Aggressiveness the Ruling Element of His Business Life.—His Grand Attack on the Villard Properties, and the Consequence Thereof.—His Benefactions to Faithful Friends

XLI. WOMEN AS SPECULATORS

Wall Street no Place for Women.—They Lack the Mental 437 Equipment.—False Defenses of Feminine Financiers.—The Claflin Sisters and Commodore Vanderbilt.—Fortune and Reputation Alike Endangered

XLII. WESTERN MILLIONAIRES IN NEW YORK

Eastward the Star of Wealth and the Tide of Beauty Take 447 their Course.—Influence of the Fair Sex on this Tendency, and Why.—New York the Great Magnet of the Country.—Swinging into the Tide of Fashion.—Collis P. Huntington.—His Career from Penury to the Possessor of Thirty Millions.—Leland Stanford.—first a Lawyer in Albany, and afterward a Speculator on the Pacific Coast.—Has Rolled Up nearly Forty Millions.—D. O. Mills.—An Astute and Bold Financier.—Courage and Caution Combined.—His Rapid Rise in California.—He Makes a Fortune by Investing in Lake Shore Stock.—Princes of the Pacific Slope.—Mackay, Flood and Fair.—Their Rise and Progress.—William Sharon.—A Brief Account of His Great Success.—Wm. C. Ralston and His Daring Speculations.—Begins a Poor New York Boy, and Makes a Fortune in California.—John P. Jones.—His Eventful Career and Political Progress.-“Lucky” Baldwin.—His Business Ability and Advancement.—Lucky Speculations.—Amasses Ten or fifteen Millions.—William A. Stewart.—Discovers the Eureka Placer Diggings.—His Success as a Lawyer and in Mining Enterprises.—James Lick.—One of the Most Eccentric of the California Magnates.—Real Estate Speculations.—His Bequest to the Author of the “Star Spangled Banner.”—John W. Shaw, Speculator and Lawyer

XLIII. RAILROAD INVESTMENTS

Vastness of our Railroad System.—Its Cost.—Fall in the 475 Rate of Interest.—Tendency to a Four Per Cent. Rate on Railroad Bonds.—Effect of the Change on Stocks.—Prospective Speculation.—Some Social Inequities to be Adjusted through Cheaper Transportation

XLIV. THE SILVER QUESTION

Its Fundamental Importance.—Dangers of Neglecting 481 it.—Attempts at Evasion.—How it must be Finally met.—Silver Paper Currency Schemes, and their Futility

XLV. THE LABOR QUESTION

Harmony Between the Representatives of Capital and 491 Labor Necessary for Business Prosperity.—If Manufacturers should Combine to Regulate Wages the Arrangement could only be Temporary.—The Workingmen are Taken Care of by the Natural Laws of Trade.—Competition among the Capitalists Sustains the Rate of Wages.—Opinion of John Stuart Mill on this Subject.—Compelling a Uniform Rate of Pay is a Gross Injustice to the Most Skilful Workmen.—The Tendency of the Trades Unions to Debar the Workingman from Social Elevation.—The Power of the Unions Brought to a Test.—The Universal Failure of the Strikes.—Revolutionary Demands of the Knights of Labor.—Gould and the Strikes on the Missouri Pacific, &c., &c.

XLVI. AN IMPORTANT SYNOPSIS

A Resume in Brief of the Leading Events Connected with 503 Wall Street Affairs for Seventy-seven Years

XLVII. INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BARTHOLDI STATUE

Great as an Achievement of Art, but Greater as the 525 Embodiment of the Idea of Universal Freedom the World Over.—It is a Poetic Idea of a Universal Republic.—Enlightenment of the World Must Result in the Freedom of Man

XLVIII. LARGE FORTUNES AND THEIR DISPOSITION

How the Fortunes of the Astors were Made.—George 529 Peabody and His Philanthropic Schemes.—Johns Hopkins and his Peculiarities.—A. T. Stewart and his Abortive Plans.—A Sculptor’s Opinion of his Head.—Eccentricities of Stephen Girard, and How he Treated his Poor Sister.—His Penurious Habits and Great Donations.—James Lenox and the Library which he Left.—How Peter Cooper Made his Fortune, and his Liberal Gifts to the Cause of Education.—Samuel J. Tilden’s Munificent Bequests.—The Vanderbilt Clinic.—Lick, Corcoran, Stevens and Catharine Wolf

XLIX. SOUTHERN AFFAIRS IN SPECULATION

The Preservation of the Union a Great Blessing.—To Let 541 them “Secesh” would have been National Suicide.—How Immigration has Assisted National Prosperity.—Rescued from the Dynastic Oppression of European Governments.—Showing Good Fellowship towards the Southern People and Aiding them in their Internal Improvements.—The South, Immediately after the War, had Greater Advantages than the North for Making Material Progress.—The Business of the North was Inflated.—The States of Georgia and Alabama Offered Inviting Fields for Investment.—Issuing State Securities, Cheating and Repudiating.—President Johnson Chiefly to Blame for the Breach of Faith with Investors who were Swindled out of their Money.—Revenge and Avarice Unite in Financial Repudiation

L. WESTERN AND SOUTHERN FINANCIAL LEADERS

Alfred Sully, his Origin and Successful Career.—Calvin 553 S. Brice, a Financier of Ability.—General Samuel Thomas, Prominent in the Southern Railroad System.—General Thomas M. Logan, a Successful Man in Railroading and Mining.—Financial Chieftains of Baltimore.—The Garretts.—Their Great Success as Railroad Managers.—Portrait of Robert Garrett

LI. ARBITRATION

How the System of Settling Disputes and 561 Misunderstandings by Arbitration has Worked in the Stock Exchange.—Why not Extend the System to Business Matters Generally?—Its Great Advantages over Going to Law.—It is Cheap and has no Vexatious Delays.—Trial by Jury a Partial Failure.—Some Prominent Cases in Point.—Jury “Fixing” and its Consequences.—How Juries are Swayed by their Sympathies.—A Curious Miscarriage of Justice before a Referee.—The Little Game of the Diamond Broker

LII. NEW YORK AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE

Its Past, Its Present, Its Future.—Banking 577 Decadence.—Growth of Interior Centres.—Obstruction from the National Bank Laws.—Relief Demanded.—Requirements of the Future

LIII. EARTHQUAKE THEORIES AND WALL STREET AFFAIRS

The Shock of Every Calamity Felt in Wall 589 Street.—Earthquakes the only Disasters which seem to Defy the Power of Precaution.—Becoming a Subject of Serious Thought for Wall Street Men and Business Men.—The Volcanic Theory of Earthquakes.—Other Causes at Work Producing these Terrific Upheavals.—Why Charleston was more Severely Shaken Up than New York.—Why the Southern Earthquake did not Strike Wall Street with Great Force.—Earthquakes Likely to Become the Great Disasters of the Future

LIV. AUGUST BELMONT

The American Representative of the Rothschilds.—Begins 595 Life in the Rothschilds’ House in Frankfort.—Consul General to Austria and Minister to the Hague.—A Great Financier and a Connoisseur in Art

Chapter LV

THE SOCIALIST OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENT ORDER OF SOCIETY EXAMINED.

Increase of Population and the Growing Pressure upon 599 the Means of Subsistence.—Education and Moral Improvement the True Remedy for Existing or Threatened Evils.—Errors of Communism and Socialism.—How Socialistic Leaders and Philosophers Recognize the Truth.—Growth of Population Does Not Mean Poverty

LVI. STOCK EXCHANGE CELEBRITIES

How Wall Street Bankers’ Nerves are Tried.—Fine Humor, 603 Jocular Dispositions, and Scholarly Taste of Operators.—George Gould as a Future Financial Power.—American Nobility Compared with European Aristocracy.—How the Irish Can Assist to Purge Great Britain of her Bilious Incubus of Nobility.—The Natural Nobility of Our Own Country and Their Destiny

LVII. A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE

What We Are.—What We are Preparing For.—What We are 611 Destined to Do and to Become.—We are Entering on an Era of Seeming Impossibilities.—Yet the Inconceivable Will be Realized

LVIII. JAY GOULD

His Birth and Early Education.—Clerk in a Country 619 Store.—He Invents a Mouse Trap.—Becomes a Civil Engineer and Surveys Delaware County.—Writes a Book and Sells it.—Gets a Partnership in a Pennsylvania Tannery and soon Buys his Partner Out.—He comes to New York to Sell his Leather, falls in Love with a Leather Merchant’s Daughter and Marries her.—Settles in the Metropolis and begins to Deal in Railroads.—Buys a Bankrupt Road from his Father-in-law, Reorganizes it and Sells it at a Considerable Profit.—Henceforth he makes his Money Dealing in Railroads.—His Method of Buying, Reorganizing and Selling Out at a Large Profit.—How he Managed Erie in connection with Fisk and Drew.—His Operations on Black Friday.—Checkmated by Commodore Vanderbilt and obliged to Settle.—He makes Millions out of Wabash and Kansas & Texas.—His Venture in Union Pacific.—His Construction Companies.—Organization of American Union Telegraph, and his Method of Absorbing and Getting Control of Western Union.—The Strike of the Telegraphers and his Great Encounter with the Knights of Labor and Trades Unionist.—Gould’s First Yachting Expedition.—An exceedingly Humorous Story of his early Experience on the Water.—His Status as a Factor in Railroad Management

LIX. MEN OF MARK

Cyrus W. Field.—Russell Sage.—Addison Cammack.—The 659 Jerome Brothers.—Moses Taylor.—Chauncey M. Depew.—Austin Corbin.—Anthony J. Drexel.—John A. Stewart.—Hon. Levi P. Morton.—Philip D. Armour.—Stedman, the Poet.—Stephen V. White.—H. Victor Newcombe.—James M. Brown.—Former Giants of the Street.—Henry Keep.—Anthony W. Morse

Chapter LX

James B. and John H. Clews 683

Chapter LXI

A Remarkable Chapter of History 685

Chapter LXII

Booms in Wall Street 700

Chapter LXIII

A Glimpse into the Future 716

Chapter LXIV

My Christmas Address to Customers, December 24, 1906 724

Chapter LXV

Edward H. Harriman 726

Chapter LXVI

The Ups and Downs of Wall Street 728

Chapter LXVII

Recent Wall Street Booms 744

Chapter LXVIII

Wall Street’s Wild Speculation, 1900-1904 755

Chapter LXIX

Review of the Panic Year, 1903 771

Chapter LXX

Leading Wall Street Events up to the Fall of 1907 774

Chapter LXXI

The Great Crisis of 1907 790

Chapter LXXII

The Causes of the Crisis of 1907 797

LXXIII. RECENT MEN OF MARK

Charles M. Schwab.—Daniel Gray Reid.—Thomas Fortune 801 Ryan.—John Warne Gates.—August Belmont.—William H. Moore.—Anthony Nicholas Brady.—Stuyvesant Fish

Chapter LXXIV

Needed Publicity and Reform in Corporations 807

Chapter LXXV

The Monetary Situation and its Remedies 822

Chapter LXXVI

Individuality versus Socialism 836

Chapter LXXVII

Great Wealth and Social Unrest 855

Chapter LXXVIII

The Financial Situation 879

Chapter LXXIX

Table showing Dates of Admission of the Members of the 913 New York Stock Exchange

Chapter LXXX

England and Russia in our Great Civil War and the War 917 between Russia and Japan

Chapter LXXXI

The Crisis of 1907 and its Causes. Was President 927 Roosevelt to Blame?

Chapter LXXXII

Our Great American Panics from First to Last 943

Chapter LXXXIII

Wall Street as It Really Is. A Vindication 955

Chapter LXXXIV

The Financial and Trade Situation, Past, Present and 964 Future, Reviewing the Crisis of 1907, with Causes and Remedies

Chapter LXXXV

American Social Conditions 1001

Chapter LXXXVI

Financial and Trade Situation and Prospects 1014

Chapter LXXXVII

Peace Assurances from Japan 1033

Chapter LXXXVIII

The Emperor of Japan 1037

Chapter LXXXIX

The National Corporation Problem 1045

Conclusion 1063

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ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE.

Henry Clews Frontispiece

Mills Building 5

Parents of Henry Clews 7

Birthplace of Henry Clews 9

Map of U. S. by Henry Clews 11

Jacob Little 13

Salmon P. Chase 39

John Sherman 73

E. G. Spaulding 81

New York Stock Exchange 87 (exterior)

New York Stock Exchange 91 (interior)

Daniel Drew 117

George I. Seney 175

Henry Villard 209

Georgia State Bond 255

Samuel J. Tilden 337

Commodore Vanderbilt 345

W. H. Vanderbilt 355

Cornelius Vanderbilt 387

W. K. Vanderbilt 389

F. W. Vanderbilt 393

Three Rothschilds 397

Nathan Rothschild 401

W. R. Travers 407

C. P. Huntington 451

Leland Stanford 455

D. O. Mills 457

Charles Crocker 459

John W. Mackay 461

James C. Flood 463

James G. Fair 465

Robert Garrett 553

August Belmont 595

George J. Gould 607

Jay Gould 619

Cyrus W. Field 659

P. D. Armour 661

Levi P. Morton 663

J. A. Stewart 665

A. J. Drexel 667

Leonard W. Jerome 669

Addison Cammack 671

Russell Sage 673

Chauncey M. Depew 675

James M. Brown 677

E. C. Stedman 679

H. Victor Newcombe 681

Moses Taylor 683

Thomas L. James 685

John H. Clews 687

James B. Clews 689

Roswell P. Flower 691

J. Pierpont Morgan 693

John D. Rockefeller 701

William Rockefeller 713

Henry H. Rogers 729

John D. Archbold 735

Edward H. Harriman 793

Wm. H. Moore 821

Daniel G. Reid 843

Thomas F. Ryan 849

John W. Gates 853

Chas. M. Schwab 869

August Belmont 879

Anthony N. Brady 881

Stuyvesant Fish 903

William E. Gladstone 921

Fac-simile, Gladstone letter 923

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DEDICATION TO THE VETERANS OF WALL STREET,

MOST OF WHOM I HAVE KNOWN PERSONALLY.

--------------

MY DEAR FRIENDS:

I have attempted, in the following pages, to relate in a simple and comprehensive manner, without any aim at elaboration, the leading features of the most prominent events that have come within the sphere of my personal knowledge and experience during the twenty-eight years of my busy life in Wall street. I have never kept a diary regularly, but have been occasionally in the habit of preserving certain memoranda in the form of letters, and a few scraps from the newspapers at various times. With these imperfect mementoes, I have revived my recollection to dictate to my stenographer the matter which these pages contain, in a somewhat crude form and unfinished style. In fact, I have not aimed at either finish or effect, not having time for it, but have simply made a collection of important facts in my own experience that may help the future historian of Wall Street to preserve for the use, knowledge and edification of posterity some of the most conspicuous features and events in the history of the place that is yet destined to be the great financial centre of the world.

If I can only succeed, out of all the poorly-arranged material I have gathered, in furnishing the historian of the future with a few facts for a portion of one of his chapters, I shall have some claim upon the gratitude of posterity.

In my description of Drew, Vanderbilt, Gould, Travers, Keene, Conkling and others, I have followed the advice which Oliver Cromwell gave his portrait painter: “Paint me as I am,” he said. “If you leave out a scar or a wrinkle, I shall not pay you a farthing.” I have given my opinion of men and things also without any superstitious regard for the proverb de mortuis nil nisi bonum.

I have also endeavored to refrain from setting down aught in malice. Many of those referred to are now dead.

When any of those gentlemen of whom I have had occasion to speak, who still survive, shall write a book, they can indulge in the same privilege with my name that I have done with theirs, whether I am living or dead at the time.

I shall ask no indulgence for myself that I don’t accord to others.

I have expressed my opinions freely from a Wall Street point of view, from the standpoint of the much-abused operator and broker, and “bloated bondholder.”

I have endeavored to enlighten the public on the true status of Wall Street, as the very backbone of the country’s progress and prosperity, instead of misrepresenting it as a den of gamblers, according to the ignorant and somewhat popular prejudice of the majority who have attempted to write or speak on the subject. This feeling has been largely fostered by clergymen, on hearsay evidence, as well as by the practices of professional swindlers, who have been smuggled into Wall Street from time to time, but who have no legitimate connection therewith any more than they have with the church, which repudiates them as soon as it discovers them.

In fact, the great aim of the book is to place Wall Street in its true light before the eyes of the world, and help to efface the many wrong impressions the community have received regarding the method of doing business in the great financial mart to which the settlement of accounts in all our industry, trade and commerce naturally converges.

I have endeavored to correct the utterly erroneous impression that prevails outside Wall Street, in regard to the nature of speculation, showing that it is virtually a great productive force in our political and social economy, and that without it railroad enterprise and other branches of industrial development which have so largely increased the wealth of the nation, would have made but slow progress.

To preserve and inculcate these ideas by putting them in what I hope may be a permanent form, is another object of publishing this volume. I know you can sympathize with me in this effort to set public opinion right, as many of you have long been making strenuous endeavors after success in the same direction.

To put the whole matter, then, into one short and comprehensive clause, my cardinal object in this book is to give the general public a clearer insight of the reputed mystery and true inwardness of Wall Street affairs.

In my relation of certain reminiscences of Wall Street, and in discussing the checkered career of certain brokers, operators and politicians, I have endeavored to be guided by a historic aphorism of Lord Macaulay:

“No past event has any intrinsic importance,” says the great essayist, litterateur, historian and statesman. “The knowledge of it is valuable,” he adds, “only as it leads us to form just calculations with respect to the future.”

In the samples of my experience which I have given in this book I have aimed, to some extent, at this rendition of the noble purposes of history and biography in their philosophic and scientific application of teaching by example. If I have fallen far short of this high ideal of the British Essayist, as I humbly feel that I have, I must throw myself on the kind indulgence of the readers, and ask them to take the will for the deed. For the presentation of the facts themselves I crave no indulgence. They are gems worthy of preservation in the light of the above definition. I only submit that the setting might be much better.

My chapters on politics may be considered foreign to the main issue, but as many of the events therein described were intimately connected with my business career, I think they are not much of a digression.

HENRY CLEWS.

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INTRODUCTORY.

MY PART IN MARKETING THE UNITED STATES CIVIL WAR LOANS.

BY HENRY CLEWS, LL.D.

To a very large majority of Americans now living the great Civil War—waged from 1861 to 1865—between the North and the South is only known as a matter of history. But it was the greatest war the world ever witnessed, involving the loss of nearly a million of men, and I have a vivid recollection of it, for I was an actor in it, from its beginning to its end, to the extent of providing some of the sinews of war for the United States Government, without which it could not have defeated the armies of secession, and preserved the Union.

From the time that Abraham Lincoln was elected to the Presidency of the United States, in November, 1860, the South began to prepare for secession from the North, peaceably if the North consented, but by war if it resisted. It was bent on this course because it foresaw in a Republican administration at Washington its practical loss of control of Congress and the spoils of office—in fact, of the Government itself—that it had so long enjoyed under Democratic administrations. James Buchanan’s term as President having expired on March 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln was then inaugurated as his successor. It angered the South to see a Republican succeed a Democrat in the White House, and it precipitated the tremendous conflict that followed, by seizing Fort Moultrie, in Charleston Harbor, and firing on Fort Sumter. Fort Moultrie’s guns awoke the North to action, and made it a determined unit in defense of the flag that had been fired upon, and its cry was, “The Union must and shall be preserved!”

As this was the most eventful and critical period in our national history since 1776, and so many know it only by what they have read of it, I will give a general idea of its salient features bearing upon the Government finances and the war loans.

When, after the bombardment of Fort Sumter by Fort Moultrie, on April 14, 1861, Major Robert Anderson, the Union commander, accepted, under the stern necessities of the situation, General Beauregard’s terms of evacuation, the die was cast.

The North picked up the gauntlet of war with patriotic enthusiasm, and the great conflict had begun. But when our troops marched out of that dismantled stronghold of the Union, with drums beating and colors flying, it is safe to say that few or none, either in the North or the South, foresaw the long and mighty struggle that would, for four eventful years, follow the bombardment of Fort Sumter, during which gold would become demonetized before the end of the year. It did so on December 30, 1861, and in the darkest days of the conflict commanded a premium as high as one hundred and eighty-five per cent. over United States legal tender notes, making these worth only 54 1/20 cents in gold, while United States bonds were selling for about 60 cents on the dollar in gold.

When the New York Clearing House agreed, on the date named, to suspend specie payments, the example was at once followed by all the banks in the country, and gold immediately began to command a small premium. None supposed then that the suspension would continue for eighteen years.

In England, during the long suspension from 1797 to 1821—through the Napoleonic wars—the premium on gold never rose above forty-one per cent., and that was in 1814, the year before the end of hostilities. This was owing to the policy of William Pitt and his successors in the management of the British finances. They raised all the money needed for war purposes by taxation and loans, thus restricting the paper money issues, so as to prevent currency inflation, whereas we pursued the opposite course.

When Fort Sumter was fired upon, my firm—Livermore, Clews & Co.—was already prominent in Wall Street, and I immediately began to devise ways and means to help the Government to raise the money that I saw would be necessary to prosecute the war for the Union which this bombardment made inevitable. Fort Moultrie’s guns had united the North in a call to arms, and men by tens of thousands left the farm, the loom, the office, and the store, from Maine to Indiana, to join the Union army.

Money, therefore, was needed by the United States Government, and very large amounts of it, to equip troops and purchase munitions of war.

As James Buchanan was then President, and, like a long line of his predecessors, a Democrat, he had several Southerners in his Cabinet. These promptly resigned their places and went South, including the Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb, who left with surprising suddenness, and the office was filled for a brief period by General John A. Dix, as acting Secretary.

But before leaving, Howell Cobb had offered and sold to Wall Street bankers $20,000,000 of United States five per cent. bonds at 105, authorized, of course, by an old law. Owing, however, to the heavy decline in securities, and general depression following the outbreak of the war, only about one-quarter of these bonds were taken and paid for by those who had subscribed for them; and nothing was done by the Government to enforce the completion of the purchase by those who had defaulted under the severe stress of the times.

Their default was a serious matter for the Government at that time, as it left the funds in the Treasury in a very depleted condition, and interest payments on the public debt were about to fall due, which it had no money in its vaults to provide for. At this crisis John J. Cisco, the United States Sub-treasurer in New York, was instructed, from Washington, to call a meeting of the principal Wall Street bankers at the Sub-treasury, and after stating the situation to them, to ask for an emergency loan on one-year United States notes, and let them fix the rate of interest themselves to correspond with the state of the money market.

Money was then loaning at about twelve per cent. per annum in Wall Street. So when the bankers who responded to Mr. Cisco’s call, myself among the number, assembled at the Sub-treasury, they, after full discussion, agreed to take the amount of notes offered, and at this rate of interest. It was a very high rate for the Government to pay, too high under ordinary circumstances, but the emergency justified it; and Mr. Cisco approved of it, in view of the market rate and the notes running for one year only. My firm took a considerable amount of them and induced others to do so also, and we did so, presumably like the rest of the buyers, not merely because the rate agreed upon was so high, but because we felt it a duty to help the Government; and at all times thereafter during that critical period we worked no less diligently to uphold the public credit.

The Government recognized that a default in its interest payments would have been disastrous to the public credit, and a stumbling block in the way of raising money to prosecute the war, besides causing general depression of business. It therefore had to be prevented at all hazards.

Had these notes not been taken, the Treasury would undoubtedly have been left without the means of paying this interest when due. Consequently, it gratified me to feel that I had been instrumental in inducing others to subscribe for a part of this urgently needed loan.

Soon afterwards Mr. Salmon P. Chase was appointed Secretary of the Treasury by President Lincoln.

Not long afterwards Secretary Chase came to the Sub-treasury and invited bids for $20,000,000 of six per cent. United States bonds maturing in 1884. These were authorized by an old law. He accepted all bids at 94 and over, but rejected all under 94, the result of which was that considerably more than a third of the 1884’s remained unsold. This was to be regretted, because the Treasury was in great need of money. I therefore quickly bestirred myself to form a combination to purchase the unsold bonds of 1884 at 94, my firm being willing to take a liberal share of them, and I succeeded in getting subscriptions from banks and capitalists who had not bought any of those sold, for the unsold amount, subject to my own discretion as to the advisability of taking the bonds, after going to Washington and conferring with Secretary Chase.

So I immediately went there by night train and saw the Secretary early in the morning at the Treasury, and told him I had come on behalf of the combination I had formed, to make him a direct offer at his own price—94—for the unsold 1884 bonds. He was evidently pleased and surprised by the apparent improvement in the demand for them. He said, however, with a fine sense of probity, and consideration for the rights of others, that while he was glad I had come to Washington, and made the proposition to take the balance, he did not think it would be fair to those who had bid and whose bids were thrown out, to sell the rest of the issue without first notifying them of the new offer, and giving them the option of taking what they wanted at the price I offered—94.

He asked me to call again the next morning, after he had given the matter further consideration, and I did so. But meanwhile I had talked with many Southern politicians and office-holders, Peter G. Washington, one of the Virginia Washingtons, among them, and seen so much of the extensive war preparations which were being made in and about Washington, that I came to the conclusion that a long and very bitter war lay before us, notwithstanding that Mr. Chase had the day previously assured me that it would all blow over, with peace restored, within sixty days, a prediction that was echoed by Secretary of State Seward a little later. I was particularly impressed by what Mr. Washington, himself a prominent Government official, had told me of Southern sentiment and Southern determination to fight till all was lost or gained, and by his and other Southerners’ absolute but mistaken confidence that the South would establish its own Confederacy, however long a war it might take to do it. The South in seceding from the Union expected to be able to establish a slave oligarchy, for in Lincoln’s election it foresaw the doom of slavery, as both he and the Republican party were pledged to work for its abolition. Yancey and the other leading Southern “fire eaters” were responsible for this false view.

When I made my second call upon Mr. Chase, I said: “Since I saw you yesterday, Mr. Secretary, I have heard so much in conversation with Southern politicians and office-holders at the hotels, and seen and heard so much of the extensive war preparations on both sides, that I am convinced the war will be a long one, and I fear we shall see much lower prices for Government bonds and securities of all kinds. Feeling as I do, therefore, in justice to those I represent and who have given me full power to use my own discretion in the matter, I must withdraw the offer I made you yesterday. Had you accepted my offer at the time, of course I would have considered the transaction closed, and taken the bonds without question, but as it is, you will admit I am under no obligation, and free to retire.”

“Oh, certainly,” said Mr. Chase, “but I think you are making a mistake, for the war will be over in sixty days and these bonds will go to par!”

But my sober second thought and foresight, based upon what I had seen and heard, and the information I had gleaned in Washington, served me well, and my associates in the combination had reason to thank me for my sagacious action, as the bonds soon afterwards declined to 84; and the Union disaster at the battle of Bull Run, fought at Manassas on July 21, 1861, aroused the North to a realization of the gravity and vastness of the conflict far more than any of the warfare that had preceded it had done; at the same time it made it more determined than before to prosecute the war till the South was conquered into submission to the Union forces.

Mr. Chase’s second act, in replenishing the Treasury’s funds, was to offer for subscription six per cent. United States notes, receivable for all payments, including customs duties, authority to issue which already existed. He found difficulties in the way, however, and, after conferring with the Sub-treasurer, Mr. John J. Cisco, who recommended the appointment of three Wall Street banking houses to act as Government agents for their sale, on commission, namely, Morris Ketchum & Co., Read, Drexel & Van Vleck, and Livermore, Clews & Co., he appointed them. These were the first and sole Government agents for the sale of its securities that had been thus far selected, and they all appreciated the compliment, and did their work well, for they promptly sold all the notes, of this issue, the Secretary had offered.

Mr. Chase throughout made strenuous efforts to supply the Government with the means for carrying on the war, and he was loyally aided by the banking interests of New York, a fact which he recognized and acknowledged to me and others in appreciative terms.

On a subsequent memorable occasion, in the summer of 1861, Secretary Chase appeared at the Sub-treasury after Sub-treasurer John J. Cisco had called, at his request, a number of leading bankers and capitalists to meet and confer with him. When we assembled there he said to us, in his stately and impressive manner, “Gentlemen, the Government needs and must have fifty millions of dollars, and it wants it at once to meet war expenses. For this I am prepared to issue that amount of Treasury notes of the two hundred and fifty million issue just authorized by Congress—by the act of July 17, 1861—bearing interest at 7 3/10 per cent. I am no financier, so I cannot tell you how to raise the money, but you distinguished leaders in the world of finance well know what means to adopt to get it. So I leave it in your hands entirely. All I need say further is to repeat that the Government must have fifty millions of dollars, and I leave it to you to find the way to procure it.”

Then Mr. Chase sat down, and all of us who were present compared notes with each other in conversation about the room; that is, we talked the matter over for nearly twenty minutes. The result of the conference was then announced by our spokesman, Moses Taylor, who said, addressing Mr. Chase:

“Mr. Secretary, we have decided to subscribe for the fifty millions of United States Government securities that you offer, and to place that amount at your disposal immediately! So you can begin to draw against it to-morrow!”

A general clapping of hands followed this prompt announcement, and Mr. Chase responded by saying:

“Gentlemen, I thank you on behalf of the Government for your public spirit in helping it so generously and so promptly in this emergency.”

The whole scene was of rare and stirring interest, and momentous consequences hinged upon its result. As a drama drawn from real life it would have been effective if represented on the stage, with the large and portly form and massive head of Secretary Chase as its leading feature.

This was the first lot, or installment, of the $250,000,000 issue of 7-30 Treasury notes put on the market.

Of these, the Secretary had the privilege of issuing $50,000,000, payable in coin at the Sub-treasuries in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, without interest, to be used as currency.

After disposing of the first 50,000,000 of 7-30 notes, as I have described, Secretary Chase communicated with the banks concerning the sale of the remainder, with the view chiefly of saving the payment of commission to the agents. But he was unable in that way to make sales on satisfactory terms to them. So he added to the three Government agents originally appointed for the sale of its securities, Fisk & Hatch, and Vermilye & Co., of New York, and Jay Cooke & Co., of Philadelphia, and told them the “7-30” notes would be delivered to them as fast as called for at the New York Sub-treasury.

Thereupon the New York agents held a meeting, at which it was agreed that Jay Cooke, of Philadelphia, should be at the head of the agency system and take charge of the advertising of the 7-30 loan, or, in other words, that Jay Cooke should act as Chairman of the agency system. The agreement also specified the commission rates and other details for the purpose of avoiding cutting, or clashing, between the agents. To this organization and agreement Mr. Chase assented; and all the agents made strenuous efforts to make sales from the word go.

Jay Cooke & Co. had no office in New York at that time, nor did they establish one till after the end of the war. This really led to their designation as the head of the agency system, as the selection of a New York firm would have created jealousy among the New York firms.

After all the 7-30s authorized to be issued were sold, came the 5-20 loans, which were sold through the same Government agency system, and the 5-20s were as successful as the 7-30s had been.

Mr. Munson B. Field, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under Salmon P. Chase, had an examination made of the books at Washington, at my request, to see which individual firm of the Government agents sold the most United States 7-30s and 5-20s, and he reported that Livermore, Clews & Co. had the highest record. But I am willing that the credit should be shared equally by the four United States war loan banking firms, viz.: Jay Cooke & Co.; Livermore, Clews & Co.; Vermilye & Co., and Fisk & Hatch, as all did equally good and earnest work in financing the Government during the Civil War. Certainly the four firms are entitled to equal credit, and no one to a greater extent than the others. There was sufficient glory achieved by the magnificently patriotic work done by these four firms to admit of dividing the honors, so that I do not hesitate to say that they did immensely valuable service to the Nation, and made for themselves a proud National record, which should be always greatly appreciated by the American people, as it was at the time by the Government authorities in Washington. The Government was thus enabled to clothe and feed a million of soldiers in arms on the battlefield, fighting for the salvation of the Nation, and these finally brought the war to a victorious end, thus perpetuating the best form of government known to man.

I may here mention that Secretary Chase said:

“If it had not been for Jay Cooke and Henry Clews, I should never have been able to sell enough of the 7-30 notes and 5-20 bonds to carry on the war.”

This remark of his was generally published at the time in the newspapers.

The Government had sold through its agents $150,000,000 of the 7-30 notes before the suspension of specie payments, an event that was hastened by the Secretary’s withdrawal from the banks into the Sub-treasuries of most of the proceeds of the sales, his call for payment from the agents to the Treasury being in three installments: on August 19th, October 1st, and November 2d. Moreover, the hoarding and exportation of gold were largely stimulated by the anticipation of specie suspension, and, after it occurred, gold suddenly disappeared from circulation.

This obviously involved a corresponding contraction of the circulating medium, and Mr. Chase, to neutralize it, and supply the place of the demonetized coin, issued the $50,000,000 of non-interest-bearing notes, which were called United States Demand Notes. He did this also to obviate the necessity of the State Banks issuing more of their own notes, as well as to raise money to meet the rapidly increasing demands of the Treasury.

Congress, seeing that this contraction tended to produce stringency in the money market, and handicapped the Government’s agents in the sale of its securities, had, on August 5, 1861, suspended the act of August 6, 1846, “providing for the better organization of the Treasury, and for the collection, safe-keeping, and disbursement of the public revenue.” It did this so as to permit the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit any of the money obtained on authorized loans in such solvent specie-paying banks as he might select, and, in addition, it expressed this in a resolution. The resolution was promptly acted upon by Secretary Chase, and this, and a later law, governed the policy of the Treasury ever afterwards. Monetary stringency was thus avoided by the Treasury keeping as much of its money in the banks as it could, and so locking up as little as possible in the Treasury and Sub-treasuries. The evil effects of the Sub-treasuries system in locking money out of circulation was thus practically acknowledged and guarded against.

When the sale of the 7-30s had been completed by the Government agents, there was great pressure brought to bear by the banks throughout the country, who were backed by many influential newspapers, in favor of giving the sale of the 5-20s to the banks instead of to the Government agents. The pressure upon Secretary Chase became so great that he concluded to try the experiment, and authorized all the banks throughout the country to sell the 5-20s. After giving them every opportunity to supersede the agency system, as previously adopted with the six per cent. and the 7-30 Treasury notes, the Secretary was finally compelled to abandon the banks and go back again to the agents, who took hold with vigor and made the sale of the 5-20s as brilliant a success as they had previously made that of the 7-30s. We were friendless in Europe, but we overcame this by patriotism and energy at home.

After a time, some of the banks, and there were only State Banks then, threw out the Demand Notes, and so it became necessary to enforce their circulation. To accomplish this, Secretary Chase asked Congress to make them a legal tender for the payment of all debts, public and private, excepting customs duties, and interest on the public debt, payable in coin.

Congress, therefore, on February 25, 1862, remedied the difficulty by passing the Legal Tender Act, making these and all the United States notes lawful money. In the same act it authorized the issue of $150,000,000 of new non-interestbearing legal tender notes. The provision for the payment in coin of customs duties and interest on the bonded debt was obviously as necessary as it was wise, as customs duties furnished the means for paying the interest in specie; and the fact of its being payable in gold created a demand for our bonds in other countries, as well as at home, which would not have existed on paper money interest.

Before long, the whole of the authorized $250,000,000 of 7-30 notes had been sold to the public through the Government agents; and later, from time to time, Congress authorized large additional amounts of these till finally they reached their maximum, in August, 1865, when $830,000,000 of them were outstanding.

At the same date, also, the Government bond issues, which had kept pace with the 7-30 note issues, and simultaneously reached their maximum, showed immense totals. There were then outstanding $514,880,500, of 5-20 bonds, and $172,770,100 of 10-40 bonds. Among our own people patriotism and profit combined to make these great United States loans doubly attractive, and the Government agents used their best efforts to stimulate the demand for them both at home and abroad. Livermore, Clews & Co., in particular, sold large amounts of these in England and other foreign countries, where they ultimately proved extremely profitable investments. To meet the demands of the war, we—the Government agents—were as anxious as the Secretary of the Treasury himself, and never were men more successful in accomplishing their object and doing good work than we were. There was patriotism worthy of Patrick Henry, as well as profit, in this, and Wall Street can lay the flattering unction to its soul that it rendered, through the Government agents, the best of good service to the Government in this time of peril to the Union.

As General Grant said long afterwards to me, we were not fighting for the Union as soldiers in the field, but we served it equally well by helping it in its struggle for money to prosecute the war; and I felt proud of the active part I took in thus helping to preserve the Union as one of its army in civil life.

The campaign in Virginia having proved prolific of disaster to the Union army, Congress, on July 11, 1862, authorized the issue of a hundred and fifty millions more of non-interest-bearing United States legal tender notes, and on January 17, 1863, another hundred millions to which it added $50,000,000 on March 3d, in the same year, making $450,000,000 of legal tender notes, or greenbacks, fifty of which were to be held as a Treasury reserve, for the redemption of temporary loan certificates.

This was the maximum issue of non-interest-bearing legal tender notes at any time, and by the act of January 28, 1865 Congress restricted the total to $400,000,000, and there it remained till Hugh McCulloch became Secretary of the Treasury, early in 1865.

Secretary Chase had meanwhile become Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and Thomas Fessenden, who succeeded him as Secretary, had resigned. Mr. McCulloch began to contract the legal tender notes, and had withdrawn $44,000,000 before Congress interfered to prohibit any further contraction. It did this in response to a general protest against any further curtailment of the greenbacks in circulation.

From that time until the panic of 1873 their amount remained at $356,000,000. In the interval Mr. Boutwell had succeeded Mr. McCulloch, and Mr. Richardson had succeeded Mr. Boutwell as Secretary. Mr. Richardson, under diminished customs and revenue receipts, and the stress of the panic, restored to circulation $26,000,000 of the $44,000,000 of legal tender notes that had been withdrawn by Mr. McCulloch, whereupon Congress, on June 22, 1874, provided that the greenbacks in circulation should remain fixed at the then existing total of $382,000,000.

The same law which thus legalized the reissue of the $26,000,000 of legal tender notes by Secretary Boutwell abolished the National Bank reserve, previously required to be kept on bank-note circulation, and for this substituted the provision that the banks were to deposit five per cent. in legal tender notes of the amount of their own note issues with the United States Treasurer at Washington for the redemption of their notes.

This law is still in force, and the establishment of the Redemption Bureau at Washington has resulted, ever since, in daily receipts by it of mutilated bank notes to be replaced by new notes, in addition to the ebb and flow caused by banks increasing or reducing their circulation. The five per cent. in legal tender deposited is counted by them as part of their legal reserve. But the necessity of sending the notes to Washington, and of receiving them therefrom, involves trouble and loss of time to the banks, and also prevents the banks from contracting their circulation when the demand for it is light and increasing it when heavy, as freely and promptly as they would if every Sub-treasury was made a redemption point for National Banks. Congress ought therefore to authorize the equipment of the Sub-treasuries with redemption bureaus for the banks in their respective districts, in order to facilitate this ebb and flow of bank-note issues, and so increase the much needed elasticity of the currency.

In addition to United States legal tender notes, large amounts of interest-bearing legal tender notes were issued during the war. On September 1, 1865, when the currency, like the whole National debt, reached its greatest amount of inflation, the noninterest-bearing legal tender notes and fractional currency stood at $459,505,311, the three years six per cent. compound interest legal tender notes at more than $217,000,000, and the one and two years five per cent. legal tender notes at nearly $34,000,000, the whole aggregating $685,236,269 issued by the Treasury.

There were also outstanding $107,000,000 of temporary loan certificates. These, being payable after ten days’ notice, were treated as greenbacks by the banks, and counted as part of their lawful money reserve, while the remainder circulated as currency, and so practically increased the volume of paper money. At the same time the new National Bank law had put in circulation $170,000,000 of National Bank notes; and more than $70,000,000 of State Bank notes were still circulating. The last named were, however, soon taxed out of existence by Congress. The grand total of the issues enumerated was ten hundred and sixty-seven millions of paper money in circulation. Nor was this all, for there were then outstanding $85,000,000 of one-year certificates of indebtedness; and the $830,000,000 of 7-30 notes, called 7-30s, outstanding were extensively used as money, and so tended to increase the inflation of the currency and prices.

It will be seen therefore that the inflation of the currency was really much larger than it appeared to be by the Public Debt statements at that time. But so rapid was the contraction during the eight years following, through the maturity and cancellation of interest-bearing notes and certificates, that it is safe to say we had from sixty to seventy-five per cent. less paper, used as money, in circulation when the panic of 1873 commenced than we had in September, 1865, and to this enormous contraction of our medium of exchange that disastrous panic, the worst this country ever had, was largely due. It was, I repeat, the worst in its effects that this country ever experienced, not excepting the panics of 1837 and 1857, and was aggravated by the Franco-German War, that practically shut American securities out of the European markets, which had previously taken them freely. This was a severe blow to the American bankers who had undertaken to finance the railways then in process of construction in different parts of the country, and who had relied upon finding both home and foreign markets for the sale of the bonds issued against the completed mileage of these railways, and it led to much embarrassment and a number of failures. The depression following this panic of 1873—in which Jay Cooke & Co. failed owing to their having undertaken to finance the Northern Pacific—was prolonged, and prosperity did not really return to us as a Nation till after the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Meanwhile, nearly all the uncompleted railways in the country had been reorganized through foreclosures that wiped out hundreds of millions.

Our National debt, which had increased from $64,000,000 on June 30, 1860, and $88,409,387 on June 30, 1861, to $2,845,907,626 on September 1, 1865, had then been very largely reduced, for it was only $2,140,695,365 on September 1, 1873. The debt and the currency had gone up and down together under the influence of a common cause. Not till specie payments were resumed by the Government and the banks did gold cease to command a premium. With this the Gold Room became a thing of the past.

The great activity and the enormous sales of the Government agents may be inferred from the maximum amounts I have quoted, of the 7-30 notes, and the 5-20 and 10-40 bonds outstanding five months after Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox on April 9, 1865.

The total debt on which interest was payable in coin then amounted to $1,116,658,100, while that bearing interest in lawful money was $1,874,478,100, the first calling for $65,001,570 in gold annually, and the other for $72,527,646 of greenback currency.

That great event—Lee’s surrender to Grant—that ended the war, was the fitting prelude to General Grant’s election to the Presidency. It made it certain that no other Republican candidate for the office of President of the United States would have any chance of success at the next general election, and, of course, no Democratic candidate could be elected. Grant became our great National hero, and the country glorified him for his splendid war record.

But soon after the memorable historical scene at Appomattox, while the country was rejoicing over the advent of peace, with the Union restored, there came that terrible tragedy at Ford’s Theater in Washington, when President Lincoln, on April 14, 1865, was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth, and on the following day Vice President Andrew Johnson was sworn in as President.

Then, indeed, the Nation was plunged into mourning, and mourning emblems from ocean to ocean testified to the National grief.

I will not dwell on the stormy career of Andrew Johnson as President, and the impeachment proceedings against him, that for a long time made both branches of Congress seething cauldrons of excitement. But it was a happy relief to the country when his term expired and General Grant succeeded to the Presidency on March 4, 1869, with Schuyler Colfax as Vice President. The Democratic candidates who had run against General Grant in the campaign in which he was elected in November, 1868, were Horatio Seymour and General Francis P. Blair, Jr. But the popularity of Grant was so overwhelming that his election was a foregone conclusion.

Till within a short time of its final termination the duration of the war was a matter of much uncertainty, and its ultimate result had long been the subject of doubt and gloomy forebodings by many who failed to see that the superior money power and resources of the North were sure to conquer and crown the Union with victory in the end. Our currency, greatly inflated though it was, remained good throughout the trying ordeal, whereas that of the Confederate States became utterly discredited and worthless, thus repeating the history of the French assignats.

A new era opened in our history with the ending of the war, and our currency, which, of course, had previously no circulation in the South, began to circulate there. This, of itself, was equivalent to extensive contraction. The currency of one section had now to supply the currency needs of both sections, and for a long time the drain of money from the North to the South was felt in the money market.

The country was somewhat like a sick man accustomed to and dependent on stimulants, to withdraw which suddenly would have been perilous. Many in Congress recognized this danger, for it was a noticeable feature of the debates on the subject that not a few of those who had been strongly opposed to our excessive issues of paper money during the war, and warned the country against them, were among those who opposed violent contraction as being a remedy worse than the disease. The radical contractionists, however, failed to see, or refused to acknowledge, that the arguments which would have applied to the rising tide of the currency while the war continued, and there was danger of indefinite further inflation, did not apply with equal force to the altered condition of affairs.

Although schemes of radical contraction were rejected, even the moderate measure of contraction that was adopted proved too severe to be endured without much complaining from business interests, so hard and painful is the process of contraction, whereas that of inflation is always pleasant and easy.

In later years I became very well acquainted with General Grant, and toward the end of his first term of the Presidency, when a good deal of opposition was manifested to his renomination by the press, including the New York Evening Post, I made strenuous efforts to secure his renomination. To that end I organized a public meeting at the Cooper Institute, and induced William E. Dodge to act as Chairman. It was a great popular success, and Grant’s renomination was unanimously advocated with immense enthusiasm. The Evening Post then said that after such an overwhelming demonstration it was evident that public sentiment was on the side of Grant, and that it was useless to oppose his renomination. He was accordingly renominated by the Republican Party and triumphantly reëlected. His second term as President began on March 4, 1873, and he retired from the Presidency four years later.

General Grant was well aware of the part I took at this meeting, which, many said, turned the scale in favor of his renomination when it was doubtful and trembling in the balance, and he also knew of my services in connection with the Government war loans, and in organizing various public meetings to celebrate Union victories and stimulate recruiting for the army. He said that I deserved some public recognition of my public services in supplying the sinews of war, and asked me how I would like to be Secretary of the Treasury, but I said I preferred Wall Street. Therefore, later on, he appointed me Fiscal Agent for the United States Government in all foreign countries, in place of Baring Brothers, of London, who had been its fiscal agents up to that time, since the Bank of England had acted in that capacity.

When it became certain that General Grant’s death was very near, I was anxious to see him once more, and also a strong advocate of his burial in the city of New York, where his tomb would be a conspicuous monument, to be seen by all, instead of burying him almost out of sight in Arlington Cemetery or at West Point, which places were strongly urged. The States of Ohio and Illinois also claimed him, as did the city of St. Louis. They all made strenuous efforts to obtain the family’s consent, as well as his, through committees sent to Mount McGregor for that purpose.

So I went to Mount McGregor, where he was, and as delicately as possible urged this upon him and his family. All of the members of the family assented, and the General, being unable to speak, nodded his assent also to what I said. Then when he was wheeled out in his chair, on the veranda, on his way to take his regular afternoon sun bath on the mountain side, accompanied by Dr. Douglas, he wrote on a pad that all he demanded was that his wife should be buried by his side when her own time came. Knowing them all well, I remained there two hours, talking with the General and the family, and my visit, when I made its result known, led to the selection of New York as the great soldier’s burial place, on the conditions mentioned by him. Within three days after I had seen him, the great General died. I had visited him on a Monday afternoon, and he died on the following Wednesday. His death threw the Nation into mourning.

Incidentally, I may mention that I started the organization of the famous Committee of Seventy, that brought about the overthrow of the corrupt Tweed Ring, that had robbed the city of New York of about a hundred millions of dollars. I nominated sixty-five of its members, and for my instrumentality in forming that Committee of eminent and public-spirited citizens I received many congratulations. That Committee not only drove the thieves out of office, but caused the prosecution of all of them who had not fled the country, and ultimately brought back and convicted Tweed, who died in prison. Meanwhile, it had reorganized the City Departments, and put new men in office, with Andrew H. Green as Comptroller. It purified, and, for a time, virtually ruled the city, through controlling its government.

But above everything else in my business life, I regard with most satisfaction the work I did in marketing the Civil War loans of the Government of this great and glorious country of ours—the United States of America—and in other ways strengthening the hands of the Government to the best of my ability and with all my heart and soul, not only as a banker but a patriotic American citizen; and I felt that I had my reward when, after the memorable four years’ war, peace came bringing with it Victory for the Union and a reunited country, a victory which gave permanence to the best government ever known to man—a government “of the people, for the people, and by the people,” which bids fair to be everlasting.

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FIFTY YEARS IN WALL STREET

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BY HENRY CLEWS, LL.D.

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I. MY DEBUT IN WALL STREET

MY advent in Wall Street was on the heels of the panic of 1857. That panic was known as the “Western blizzard.” It was entitled to the name, as its destructive power and chilling effects had surpassed all other financial gales that had swept over Wall Street. The first serious result of its fatal force was the failure of the Ohio Life and Trust Company, a concern of gigantic dimensions in those days.

The Company had an office in Wall Street, and on the announcement of the collapse, business became completely paralyzed. This failure was immediately followed by the suspension of many large firms that had withstood the shock of all ordinary collisions and had successfully weathered many financial storms.

The panic was due in part to excessive importations of foreign goods, and also to the rapid construction of railroads, to a large extent on borrowed capital. There were other contributing causes. The crops were bad that year, and the country was unable to pay for its imports in produce, and coin was brought to the exporting point. In October, the New York City banks suspended payments, and their example was followed throughout the country. Bank credits had been unduly expanded everywhere, and the time had naturally arrived for contraction. It came with a bound, and financial disaster spread like a whirlwind, becoming general.

The Stock Exchange had been a moderately growing concern for the ten years previous to this calamity, and the securities there dealt in had been rapidly accumulating in number and appreciating in value. Its members were wealthy and conservative, with a strong infusion of Knickerbocker blood, an admixture of the Southern element and a sprinkling of Englishmen and other foreigners.

The effect of the crisis on the majority of Stock Exchange properties was ruinous. Prices fell fifty per cent. in a few days, and a large proportion of the Board of Brokers were obliged to go into involuntary liquidation. There was a great shaking up all around.

Then came the work of rehabilitation and reorganization. Confidence gradually returned. The Young Republic had great recuperative powers, and they were thoroughly exerted in the work of resuming business. Much of the old conservative element had fallen in the general upheaval, to rise no more. This element was eliminated, and its place supplied by better material, and with young blood, and in December the banks resumed business.

This panic and its immediate results created an entire revolution in the methods of doing business in Wall Street. Prior to this time, the antique element had ruled in things financial, speculative and commercial. This crisis sounded the death knell of old fogyism in the “street.” A younger race of financiers arose and filled the places of the old conservative leaders.

The change was a fine exemplification of the survival of the fittest, and proved that there was a law of natural selection in financial affairs that superseded old conservatism and sealed its doom.

Until that time, the general idea prevailed that those engaged in financial matters must be people well advanced in years, even to the verge of infirmity. It is the same idea that has been handed down, as if by divine right, from old world prejudices, especially in the learned professions. No doctor was considered a safe prescriber unless his hoary locks, bald head and wrinkled brow proclaimed that he had almost passed the period of exercising human sympathy. The same rule of judgment was applied to the lawyer and the clergyman.

These unworthy prejudices were fostered by the character of the Government of the old country, and nurtured by the surroundings of the venerable monarchies of Europe, where they exist largely even to the present day. So tenacious of life are these old-fashioned ideas, that many of them were found in full vigor, dominating Wall Street affairs up to the crash of 1857, fostering the antique element and choking off salutary enterprise.

Hence the process of decay of these archaic notions and our gradual development.

This struggle for new life in Wall Street was not successfully developed without a serious effort to attain it. The old potentates of the street fought hard to prolong their obstructive power, and their tenacious vitality was hard to smother, reminding one of the nine lives attributed to the feline species. The efforts of the young and enterprising men to gain an entrance to the Stock Exchange were regarded by the older members as an impertinent intrusion on the natural rights of the senior members. It was next to impossible for a young man, without powerful and wealthy patrons, to obtain membership in the New York Stock Exchange at the time of which I speak.

The old fellows were united together in a mutual admiration league, and fought the young men tooth and nail, contesting every inch of ground when a young man sought entrance to their sacred circle.

The idea then struck me that there was a chance for young men to come to the front in Wall Street. I was then engaged in the dry goods importing trade, in which I received my early training. I had been kept out of the Exchange for several years by the methods to which I have alluded. My fate was similar to that of many others. It was only by an enterprising effort, and by changing the base of my operations, that I finally succeeded.

The commissions charged at that time were an eighth of one per cent. for buying and selling, respectively.

After numerous efforts to gain admission to the Exchange, without success, I finally made up my mind to force it. I at once inserted an advertisement in the newspapers, and proposed to buy and sell stocks at a sixteenth of one per cent. each way. This was such a bombshell in the camp of these old fogies that they were almost paralyzed. What rendered it more distasteful to them still was the fact that, while they lost customers, I steadily gained them. The result was that they felt compelled to admit me to their ranks, so that I could be kept amenable to their rules and do business only in their own conventional fashion. My membership cost me, in all, initiation fee and other trifling expenses in connection therewith, $500. This presents a striking contrast to the recent price of a seat, $35,000, but though this difference seems very large, yet the changes in every other respect connected with Wall Street affairs have been in similar proportion. Among some of the old members of that day were Jacob Little, John Ward, David Clarkson and others whose names may be found in the archives of the Stock Exchange.

As an instance of the way in which membership was then appreciated, it may be mentioned that speculators frequently offered $100 a week, or ten times the cost of membership, for the privilege of listening at the keyhole during the calls.

Although the prostration growing out of this panic was very great and of long continuance throughout the country, general confidence being shaken to its very foundation, yet, on the whole, it was a great gain, and marked an era of financial and speculative progress. It was the chief cause in drawing out the young element in the business of Wall Street, which might have lain dormant for a much longer period without this sudden and somewhat rude awakening. It not only brought Young America to the front in speculation, commerce and general business, but it imparted an impetus of genuine enterprise to every department of trade and industry, from the good effects of which the country has never since receded.

This new element, emanating from the throes of one of the greatest business revolutions that any country has ever experienced, has continued to grow and thrive with marvellous rapidity. It is now getting so large that the Exchange will soon require a whole block instead of a basement as at its origin for its headquarters. The Governing Committee of the Stock Exchange are now looking forward to arrangements for this consummation. How the ancient fathers of my early days in Wall Street would have been shocked at the bare idea of such amazing progress!

It is not the least singular phase of this evolution in Wall Street, that the youthful element to which I have referred stands alone as compared with the progress achieved by the same class of men in any other nation. In America only does the youthful element predominate in financial affairs; and results have justified the selection, which perhaps in no other nation is possible. Thanks to the freedom of our Republican institutions, which, in spite of some individual deductions and the occasional obstructions of “crankdom,” make way for that progress, in the wake of which the other nations of the world are emulous to follow.

The Exchange was at this time situated on William street between Beaver street and Exchange Place. That place is rich in speculative reminiscences. It was there that Jacob Little made and lost his nine fortunes. It was there that Anthony Morse, the lightning calculator, operated. He could foot up four columns of figures as easily as the ordinary accountant could run up one. He had been a clerk, and having saved seven hundred dollars by close economy, began to deal in stocks. His career at that time was more marvellous even than that of Keene of a recent date. Morse made a fortune of several millions in a year, and became bankrupt during the same period, without any available assets to speak of. It was all honorably lost, however. There was no Ferdinand Ward game connected with it.

Youthful speculators had not then learned the “crooked” methods of the young idea of modern times. It was there also that Daniel Drew began to accumulate those millions that afterward were subject to such a rude scattering. It was there that the celebrated “corners” in Rock Island, Prairie du Chien and Harlem were concocted. It was there that the wealth was accumulated which built twenty thousand miles of Western railroads, causing many millions of acres, that would otherwise have been a wilderness, to blossom like the rose, in spite of Mr. Powderly’s opinion that no material good can come out of speculation, and thus adding immense wealth in real estate to the country, besides conferring incalculable benefits on trade and commerce, and preparing comfortable homes not only for the pioneers and surplus population of the Eastern States, but a teeming soil that has attracted the down-trodden of every nation to come and partake of the blessings of freedom and prosperity.

One of Jacob Little’s speculative ventures has been rendered historically famous through the rule of limitation of sixty days for option contracts. The necessity for this limit was brought about by one of his celebrated attempts to manipulate the market. He was one of the most prominent speculators in Erie in the early days of Drew’s transactions with that property and its stocks. Mr. Little had been selling large blocks of Erie on seller’s option, to run from six to twelve months. This was in the early history of “corners,” before the method of managing them scientifically had been fully developed and while “blind pools” were yet in embryo.

The leading members of the Erie Board formed a pool to “corner” Mr. Little, and ran Erie shares up to a considerable height. They imagined that he was in blissful ignorance of their purpose, and had everything arranged for a coup d’etat which was to reach its crisis at two o’clock on a certain day, when Little was to be completely overwhelmed and hopelessly ruined. An hour prior to the time appointed by the clique for his disaster he walked into the Erie office, opened a bag filled with convertible bonds, and requested an exchange of stock for the same. He had purchased the bonds in London and had them safely locked up for the emergency, which he promptly met on its arrival. He got the stock, settled his contracts, broke the “corner,” and came out triumphantly.

The option limit of sixty days was afterwards adopted in order to prevent similar triumphs in manipulation on the “short” side.

As will be illustrated more fully in subsequent chapters, Mr. Little’s convertible bond trick was used with signal advantage by his speculative successors in Erie, who practically demonstrated on several occasions that there were millions in it.

Mr. Little was generous and liberal to a fault with his brother speculators who had experienced misfortune. He used to say that he could paper his private office with notes he had forgiven to the members of the Board. He was also remarkable for his great memory. He could easily remember all the operations he made in the course of a day without making a note or a mistake.

Like Drew, he was careless in his attire, wearing a hat like that of a farmer, and not a very prosperous one, but he had no compeer in his day at calculating ahead in a speculative venture.

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II. WALL STREET AS A CIVILIZER

CLERICAL OBLIQUITY OF JUDGMENT ABOUT WALL STREET AFFAIRS.—THE SLANDEROUS ELOQUENCE OF TALMAGE.—WALL STREET A GREAT DISTRIBUTOR, AS EXHIBITED IN THE CLEARING HOUSE TRANSACTIONS.—POPULAR DELUSIONS IN REGARD TO SPECULATION.—WHAT OUR REVOLUTIONARY SIRES ADVISED ABOUT IMPROVING THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS, SHOWING THE STRIKING CONTRAST BETWEEN THEIR VIEWS AND THE WAY LORD SALISBURY WANTED TO FIX THINGS FOR THIS COUNTRY.

The dense ignorance displayed by men outside of Wall Street, in regard to the business of that great mart, is almost incredible. Even the most intelligent men I meet in other professions and walks of life have the most utterly crude and undefined notions about the methods of doing business at the Stock Exchange. Many good and pious clergymen are under the impression that Wall Street is a name for the sum total of all kinds of infamy, and solemnly exhort their devoted flocks not to touch the unclean thing.

Clerical obliquity of judgment is not quite so bad, nor popular ignorance so dense in this respect, as it has been, but there is a large field for improvement yet. The business activity of the country, and the spirit of intercourse being so rapidly infused throughout all ranks of the community, have demonstrated that this antipathy to Wall Street has been simply an unworthy prejudice, in spite of the high moral authority from which it has emanated.

I don’t wish to throw any aspersion on the noble purposes of the clergy. The end they have been seeking has been good, but it has not always justified the means employed. These good men have unwittingly misrepresented Wall Street, to the great detriment of the business interests of the country.

There is no excuse, however, for a man in this enlightened age, who professes to be a Shepherd in Israel and a spiritual leader of the people, to remain ignorant of an important fact, or to continue to see that fact through a false medium, when he has the opportunity of coming into Wall Street and seeing for himself. He has no right to set himself up as a censor, a public detractor, and a public libeller upon a set of men and merchants who are the bone and sinew of the commercial and industrial interests and prosperity of the country. It is not only a personal wrong but a public injury.

The Rev. T. De Witt Talmage has perhaps done more than any other clergyman to make our speculators, investors and business men ridiculous in the eyes of the rest of the community and in the estimation of John Bull, in whose dominion his so-called sermons are extensively read. Talmage has employed his flashing wit and mountebank eloquence to bring financial disgrace on the business methods of the whole country by the manner in which he has ignorantly vilified Wall Street.

He can go to the Cremorne Garden, Billy McGlory’s, Harry Hill’s and other places of dubious reputation, and make himself acquainted with the real condition of things there.

How far he has penetrated into the green rooms and behind the scenes in these places it is not my business to know, but why should he not treat Wall Street as fairly, where everything is open to inspection, as he does these dens of vice, where midnight scenes of villainous revelry and reckless dissipation reign supreme? Why does he misrepresent Wall Street without knowing anything about it? He can come here and go wherever he wishes without a bodyguard of detectives or fear of molestation. Why is he so particular about doing justice to the brothel and the gaming den, while he airs his ludicrous eloquence to the highest pitch to falsify the respectable business methods of Wall Street?

I recollect the time that men in the higher walks of life, and among the higher classes (if I may use the expression, in opposition to the opinion of the New York Sun, whose editor maintains that we have no classes in this country) would have been ashamed to be seen in Wall Street. Now, men in the same sphere are proud of the distinction, both socially and financially. In fact Wall Street has become a necessity as a healthy stimulant to the rest of the business of the country. Everything looks to this centre as an index of its prosperity. It moves the money that controls the affairs of the world.

Take the Clearing House, for example, with its 50 billions of transactions annually. All but a fraction of this wonderful wealth, compared with which the stupendous pile of Crœsus was a mere pittance, passes through Wall Street, continually adding to its mighty power. This great power, in comparison with which the influence of monarchies is weak, is not, like the riches of these, concentrated chiefly on itself. It is imparted to all the industries and productive forces of the country. Wall Street is a great distributor. It is also universal in its benevolent effects, practically unlimited by either creed or geography.

It has taken greater advantage, for the general good, of scientific discovery than all the scientific societies combined. Wherever the electric wires have penetrated the Wall Street broker has followed. The members of the Stock Exchange are, through the power of electricity, in closer sympathy with the great heart of civilized humanity than all the missionaries and philanthropic societies in the world. They are the great cosmopolitans of the age. In practical sympathy they outshine the most devoted efforts of the benevolent associations of half the continent. They have the means to do it, and this comes chiefly from being practical, and from their strong antipathy as a body to cant and hypocrisy.

There are many popular delusions outside the ranks of the clergy connected with the effort to form a correct estimate of Wall Street affairs by the general public. It is a popular delusion that it is a place where people who are in the “ring” take something for nothing. No idea could be further wide of the mark in regard to Wall Street men as a class, however true it may be of some individual instances, as in other departments of business. Wall Street gives full value for everything it receives, and the country at large is deeply its debtor. Some people may think this a paradox, but there is nothing more easily demonstrated to those who have observed the commercial and industrial progress of the country and the age.

Wall Street has furnished the money that has set the wheels of industry in motion over the vast continent, and in one century has brought us abreast, in the industrial arts, of countries that had from one to two thousand years the start of us. In this respect it has assisted nobly to carry out the ideas of the fathers of the Constitution. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin and Hamilton laid down the doctrine that it would be a betrayal of the interests of posterity to limit the productive energies of this country to raw material. With our present experience we may think it strange that this question should ever have been debated, but it was, even after the old tyranny had been obliged to loosen its grasp on the struggling enterprise of the young Republic. Our old revolutionary sires deserve credit for their foresight, but what would have been the fate of their commercial philosophy if Wall Street had not supplied the sinews of war to cope with the forces of nature, to work our mines and build our railroads, and through these and other means, to attract the teeming population from every clime to cultivate our virgin soil and develop our wonderful industries and resources?

Apropos of the above observations, I may add that during the debate in the British Parliament, on the recognition of the Confederacy, the great manufacturing power in our industrial, financial and commercial progress was clearly exhibited and thoroughly appreciated by British statesmen. It was made one of the strongest arguments, too, by some of the representatives of our jealous and envious cousins on the other side of the “pond,” why Great Britain should recognize and aid the South in the war. Lord Salisbury, then Lord Robert Cecil, at present the leader of the Tory party in England, and the advocate of twenty years’ coercion for Ireland, was one of the bitterest foes of the Union, chiefly on this account. He was one of the Vice-Presidents of the “Southern Independent Association,” for the promotion of the cause of the Rebellion, and for supplying the Confederates with money and arms, and for the ultimate object of founding an empire of slavery on this continent.

In his speech then, on the Southern blockade, the future Lord Salisbury made the following touching allusion to our dangerous prosperity on this side: “The plain matter of fact is, as every one who watches the current of history must know, that the Northern States of America never can be our sure friends, for this simple reason—not merely because the newspapers write at each other, or that there are prejudices on both sides, but because we are rivals—rivals politically, rivals commercially. We aspire to the same position. We both aspire to the government of the seas. We are both manufacturing people, and in every port as well as at every court we are rivals to each other. With respect to the Southern States the case is entirely reversed. The population are an agricultural people. They furnish the raw material of our industry, and they consume the products which we manufacture from it. With them, therefore, every interest must lead us to cultivate friendly relations, and we have seen that when the war began they at once recurred to England as their natural ally.”

Thus we see how anxious Great Britain was to take the place which the North has reserved for itself, and so proudly maintained in commerce and industry.

The great coming man, Salisbury, wanted to reduce us all to the position of hewers of wood, drawers of water and planters and pickers of cotton, for the special accommodation of Great Britain, as the mighty centre of the world’s manufacturing industries. This would have given a set-back to our civilization, causing us to make a retrogressive move to the dark ages. Since then we have afforded this noble lord and his nation ample proof that we are very far advanced in the manufacturing arts ourselves, and that in many things we are far ahead of England, and they are no doubt greatly surprised that the arrangement by which England was to have all the profit and America all the hard work, has not been carried out.

In this wonderful development of the industrial arts, Wall Street money, enterprise and speculation have played by far the most conspicuous and progressive part, thus enabling us, in little more than two decades, to outstrip the old nations that were so anxious to enslave us, in spite of the fact that they had centuries upon centuries the start of us. It must be galling to some of these people that we are now the most available candidates for the commercial and industrial supremacy of the world, and we have attained this position, in a great measure, through the instrumentality of Wall Street as a civilizer.

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III. HOW TO MAKE MONEY IN WALL STREET

HOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PERIODICAL PANICS IN ORDER TO MAKE MONEY.—WHOLESOME ADVICE TO YOUNG SPECULATORS.—ALLEGED “POINTS” FROM BIG SPECULATORS END IN LOSS OR DISASTER.—PROFESSIONAL ADVICE THE SUREST AND CHEAPEST, AND HOW AND WHERE TO OBTAIN IT.

But few gain sufficient experience in Wall Street to command success until they reach that period of life in which they have one foot in the grave. When this time comes these old veterans of the Street usually spend long intervals of repose at their comfortable homes, and in times of panic, which recur sometimes oftener than once a year, these old fellows will be seen in Wall Street, hobbling down on their canes to their brokers’ offices.

Then they always buy good stocks to the extent of their bank balances, which have been permitted to accumulate for just such an emergency. The panic usually rages until enough of these cash purchases of stock is made to afford a big “rake in.” When the panic has spent its force, these old fellows, who have been resting judiciously on their oars in expectation of the inevitable event, which usually returns with the regularity of the seasons, quickly realize, deposit their profits with their bankers, or the overplus thereof, after purchasing more real estate that is on the up grade, for permanent investment, and retire for another season to the quietude of their splendid homes and the bosoms of their happy families.

If young men had only the patience to watch the speculative signs of the times, as manifested in the periodical egress of these old prophetic speculators from their shells of security, they would make more money at these intervals than by following up the slippery “tips” of the professional “pointers” of the Stock Exchange all the year round, and they would feel no necessity for hanging at the coat tails, around the hotels, of those specious frauds, who pretend to be deep in the councils of the big operators and of all the new “pools” in process of formation. I say to the young speculators, therefore, watch the ominous visits to the Street of these old men. They are as certain to be seen on the eve of a panic as spiders creeping stealthily and noiselessly from their cobwebs just before rain. If you only wait to see them purchase, then put up a fair margin for yourselves, keep out of the “bucket shops” as well as the “sample rooms,” and only visit Delmonico’s for light lunch in business hours, you can hardly fail to realize handsome profits on your ventures.

The habit of following points which are supposed to emanate from the big operators, nearly always ends in loss and sometimes in disaster to young speculators. The latter become slavish in their methods of thought, having their minds entirely subjected to others, who are presumed to do the thinking for them, and they consequently fail to cultivate the self-reliance that is indispensable to the success of any kind of business.

To the question often put, especially by men outside of Wall Street, “How can I make money in Wall Street?” there is probably no better answer than the one given by old Meyer Rothschild to a person who asked him a similar question. He said, “I buys ‘sheep’ and sells ‘dear.’”

Those who follow this method always succeed. There has hardly been a year within my recollection, going back nearly thirty years, when there have not been two or three squalls in “the Street,” during the year, when it was possible to purchase stocks below their intrinsic value. The squall usually passes over in a few days, and then the lucky buyers of stocks at panic prices come in for their profits ranging from five to ten per cent. on the entire venture.

The question of making money, then, becomes a mere matter of calculation, depending on the number of the squalls that may occur during any particular year.

If the venture is made at the right time—at the lucky moment, so to speak—and each successive venture is fortunate, as happens often to those who use their judgment in the best way, it is possible to realize a net gain of fifty per cent. per annum on the aggregate of the year’s investments.

In this way it is easy to see how the rich will get richer, and the poor poorer.

Sometimes men make money in Wall Street by strange turns in their fortunes that appear like having been governed by a special Providence, and this sometimes occurs when men appear to be utter wrecks.

One of the strangest examples of this kind, in my personal experience, occurred in the summer of 1885.

A man called at my office utterly broken down in spirit, but with a few hundred dollars left out of many thousands that he had possessed a few months previously.

“I read your letter of the third of July,” he said, “and had some mind to act on the advice which it contained, but was unfortunately dissuaded therefrom by reading an article in a city paper by a very able writer, who had got the bearish mania, then prevalent, on the brain, and who, I am informed, is now, like myself, almost ruined.”

“I hardly know what to do,” he continued. “I have a few hundred dollars left, which I will leave with you, and you can use your pleasure with it. I am going out to the country for the remainder of the summer. I will leave my address with you, and, if there is any good result, you can let me know of it. I really don’t hope for much, and of course, I need hardly tell you that, in the event of being ‘wiped out,’ you need not apply to me for more margin. Let this go with the rest,” he added, in a despairing tone.

The man walked sadly out, and I did not see him again for months. I invested his pittance on the carte blanche order which he had given me, to the best of my judgment. The result was favorable, and his account began to accumulate. He was duly advised, according to our business methods, of his good luck, but I did not hear anything from him personally for several months.

One day, a portly gentleman, with rosy health beaming in his face, stepped into my private office, and was quite profuse in his thanks to me.

“Well,” I said; “I have but a hazy recollection of your acquaintance, if I know you at all.”

“Don’t you recollect,” he said, “the time I went to the country in summer, when I told you my case, and how I had been unfortunate in speculation?”

“And are you the man who went to the country in despair to die?” I asked, in surprise at his changed appearance.

“I am,” he replied, “and I owe the wonderful change which you now see to your timely advice. I staked almost my last dollar on that counsel, and now I am comfortably fixed through your management of the small fund placed at your disposal.”

How, this was an example of a man who did make money simply by taking the advice that was freely tendered him.

There are others who lose, in spite of all that the most honest judgment can do to prevent them.

Some men, when they have money, are so fearfully perverse that all attempts to get them to do the right thing only have the opposite effect, and they prefer to follow every wild rumor.

One day, for instance, a man gave me an order to buy a thousand shares of Erie without limit. The order was executed at 94. I had no sooner bought it than the stock went down.

My customer returned in a short time and ordered the stock to be sold. It was then 92½.

In half an hour afterwards he returned again and ordered it bought back again, without any limit as before. It was bought back at 95.

After consulting with other friends for some time he ordered it sold again. The market by that time was 90.

He then came back the fifth time, and said: “I first saw one man who told me to buy, and then another who told me to sell. I understand one is called a ‘bull’ and the other a ‘bear.’ About these names I don’t know much, but I do know now that I am a — jackass.”

This affords a good illustration of the way the average speculator is managed and perplexed in Wall Street. There is a means of avoiding such a peck of trouble, however, if he would only take a little wholesome advice, wait patiently for a proper opportunity, and not rush headlong to purchase on the “tips” of the delusive rumor mongers. He would then begin to learn how to make money in Wall Street.

As I have pointed out in another chapter, speculation is a business that must be studied as a specialty, and though it is popularly believed that any man who has money can speculate, yet the ordinary man, without special training in the business, is liable to make as great a mistake in this attempt, as the man who thinks he can act as his own lawyer, and who is said “to have a fool for a client.”

The common delusion, that expert knowledge is not required in speculation, has wrecked many fortunes and reputations in Wall Street, and is still very influential in its pernicious and illusory achievements.

When a man wants correct advice in law he goes to a professional lawyer in good standing, one who has made a reputation in the courts, and who has afforded other evidence to the public that he is thoroughly reliable. No man of average common sense would trust a case in law to a bar room “bummer” who would assert that he was well acquainted with Aaron J. Vanderpoel, Roscoe Conkling, and Wm. M. Evarts, and had got all the inside “tips” from these legal lights on the law relating to the case in question. The fellow would be laughed at, and, in all probability, if he persisted in this kind of talk, would be handed over to the city physician to be examined in relation to his sanity, but in Wall Street affairs men can every day make similar pretensions and pass for embodiments of speculative wisdom.

If speculators are caught and fleeced by following such counsel, the professional brokers who are members of the Stock Exchange, are no more to blame than the eminent lawyers to whom I have referred would be for the upshot of a case that had been taken into court on the advice which some irresponsible person had pretended to receive from these celebrities of the New York Bar.

Professional advice in Wall Street, as in legal affairs, is worth paying for, and costs far less in the end than the cheap “points” that are distributed profusely around the Street, thick as autumn leaves in Vallombrosa, and which only allure the innocent speculator to put his money where he is almost certain to lose it.

My advice to speculators who wish to make money in Wall Street, therefore, is to ignore the counsel of the barroom “tippers” and “tipplers,” turn their backs on “bucket shops,” and when they want “points” to purchase, let them go to those who have established a reputation for giving sound advice in such matters, and who have ample resources for furnishing correct information on financial topics, as well as a personal interest in making all the money they can for their clients.

There is no difficulty in finding out such reliable men and firms in the vicinity of Wall Street, if speculators will only read the newspapers, or make inquiry of the first messenger boy they may happen to meet.

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IV. IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS TRAINING

SONS OF INDEPENDENT GENTLEMEN MAKE VERY BAD CLERKS.—THEY BECOME UNPOPULAR WITH THE OTHER BOYS, AND MUST EVENTUALLY GO.—NIGHT DANCING AND LATE SUPPERS DON’T CONTRIBUTE TO BUSINESS SUCCESS.—GIVE MERIT ITS TRUE REWARD.—KEEPING WORTHLESS PRETENSE IN ITS TRUE POSITION.—RUNNING PUBLIC OFFICES ON BUSINESS PRINCIPLES.—A PIECE OF GRATUITOUS ADVICE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION.—A COLLEGE COURSE NOT IN GENERAL CALCULATED TO MAKE A GOOD BUSINESS MAN.—THE QUESTION OF ADAPTABILITY IMPORTANT.—CHILDREN SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED IN THE OCCUPATION FOR WHICH THEY SHOW A PREFERENCE.—THOUGHTS ON THE ARMY AND NAVY.

I have usually found that the sons of independent gentlemen, who have great expectations, make very poor clerks and don’t develope into Good Wall Street men.

Their expectations seem to dwarf the ability that might develope under the more favorable auspices of being obliged to paddle their own canoe. Like the light under a bushel, referred to in the Good Book, their brilliant qualities are obscured and circumscribed by the paternal protection in prospect. They have not a sufficient incentive to work, because they know that all they require for their natural wants will fall easily into their laps. The motives, therefore, which usually develope the greatest mental qualities are absent and the qualities themselves lie dormant, and frequently decay like poppy seeds in their seed vessels, without being productive of the fruits which are the result of industrial habits and the desire for acquisition. Such young men, instead of being a help to an office into which they happen to be thrust, often through friendship and favoritism, are a great hindrance and a stumbling block in the path to promotion of other young men.

After many ineffectual attempts to reform and remodel them, they have generally to be discarded, as the drone bees are ejected from the rest of the industrious hive. And they usually become as unpopular with the other boys as the drone does with his comrades who make the honey and will not suffer the idle fellow to feast on the fruits of their labor.

Young men who have nothing but their own resources to depend upon will be found far more meritorious than this higher class. There are some eminent exceptions, but it takes a large amount of good sense to counteract the conceit instilled by the idea of financial independence by birth.

The latter are more liable to youthful and enervating excesses, as they have the means to indulge in nocturnal amusements that are not conducive either to clear brains or active habits during the day.

Night dancing and late suppers, with some of their social concomitants, when habitually indulged, don’t contribute to business success. I know how this is myself, and therefore speak feelingly; but I don’t lay myself open to the charge of egotism when I say that I have never permitted the habit to get the better of me.

I am not setting myself up as a censor of other men’s habits, nor attempting to utter mere moral or religious cant. I am simply discussing the question from a scientific and physical standpoint, and I say that these habits don’t contribute to business success, but, on the contrary, form one of the greatest hindrances to it. They make any man, no matter how strong he may be, physically unfit for ordinary business. These “recreations” up town, however attractive and delightful they may be, don’t fit a young man for business down town. The line must be drawn somewhere. Let us draw it, say, at Fourteenth street.

There has been much said and written about Civil Service Reform by various authorities from President Cleveland down to Dorman B. Eaton and the Custom House officials. The great rule to follow is to give merit its true reward This draws out the best efforts of the recipient, where real merit is found, and keeps the drones beyond the pale of competition. It develops the qualities that are worthy of being encouraged, and keeps worthless pretense in its true position. This is the role I have adhered to in my office, and it works like a charm. My office, though not quite so large as the Custom House or Post Office of New York city, I think affords a fair test of what could be done on the largest possible scale.

If public office is a public trust, and we have the high authority of President Cleveland and of the New York Tribune for saying so, I think it can be administered on the same business principles that have contributed to the success of some of the largest and most successful firms in the world; and among these, I think I can say without egotism, as the matter is capable of demonstration, that the house of which I have the honor to be the head, stands second to none in the attributes to which I have referred.

The reader may say, “This is a puff for his own house.” Well, even so. If it is, it is true, and will bear the strictest investigation. So I don’t see why I should feign any false modesty about the assertion. It would be sheer affectation to do so.

Collegiate education is a great question for debate among literary men, journalists and business men, as to its utility in forming the character of youth for business life. As the college curriculum and training stand at present, the ordinary course is not in general calculated to make a good business man. It is erroneously regarded by some people as a kind of substitute for business training in the earlier years of a young man’s life. There could be no greater mistake in the beginning of a business career. It is in many instances not only a hindrance, but absolutely fatal to success. To put a young man in an office fresh from college, on a level with one of the same age who has been training in business methods since he left the common school, is demoralizing to both.

I wish to have it distinctly understood that in the foregoing remarks I have not made any attempt to cast the slightest reflection on the personal attributes and abilities of any young man in any line of life or status of society, and I make this statement perfectly independent of the mere social incident as to whether the young man in question may part his hair in the middle or assume other dudish airs. That is his business, and I have no right to trench on the sacred precincts of his individuality, nor do I mean to do so. As a rule I stick to my own business. I simply intend to imply that when a dude happens to come into my office, where I think he will find the most æsthetic appointments in the way of furniture and the business arrangements, if he should, upon thus entering into my employment, come to the sudden conclusion that this æstheticism of office furnishing implied any plea for idleness or assumption of airs on his part, he would very soon experience a rude awakening from his charmed lethargy of conceit, and if he were not prepared to undertake in a calm and appreciative tone of mind the first lessons of business industry, I would politely bid him an affectionate adieu, and on parting tell him very kindly that though his great natural gifts might be thoroughly adapted to shine in another sphere of life, he was both by nature and education totally unfitted to play the most humble part in a business career, such as that of which my firm affords a fair and most successful example.

The same remarks will apply to any other young man who does not appreciate his vocation, and try to know himself as old Seneca taught.

I don’t insidiously single out the dude for an odious comparison. The remark will apply just as appropriately to the young man who is better fitted for a blacksmith or a farmer, or perhaps a preacher, than a business man or a financier.

“All blacksmiths,” says the Rev. Robert Collyer, “can’t become preachers, and it would be bad for the world if they did.” There is a good deal of philosophy in the remark of this popular preacher, and quite to the point on the subject which I am now attempting to handle.

In fact, there is nothing in this world would grieve me more than the prospect of being obliged to reflect in future years on the fact that I had been instrumental in keeping a young man’s “nose to the grind-stone,” so to speak, in my office, where he would make a very poor employee without the chance of attaining average success, while in a career for which nature and education had fitted him, he might not only be happy and successful, but make his mark as a star of the first magnitude.

When viewed in this light, the question of adaptability becomes a serious affair, for young men starting in life, and for their parents, who often sacrifice a great deal of their worldly comforts and peace of mind to launch their fond offspring.

The best thing for parents to do, then, as a general rule, is to encourage their children in that occupation or avocation for which they show a decided preference. Whatever young men do voluntarily, as a rule, they do well. This is especially illustrated in the lives of youths who exhibit an inclination for a military pursuit, which offers the least inducement to human avarice, and attracts the mind through the more sentimental motives of patriotism and the love of glory. But in our present civilization there are national feelings that must be inculcated and encouraged.

I entertained at my Newport residence, during the past Summer, the officers of the 23d Brooklyn regiment of the National Guard of the State of New York, because I felt it a matter of duty to do so, as well as a privilege to do my part in contributing to the encouragement of the young men who have taken it upon themselves voluntarily to be members of that militia company.

These young men visit Newport at very great cost to each one, as they themselves have to contribute to the expenses attending the trip, and their presence in Newport in going through, regularly each day, their drills and parades with as much precision and correctness as though they all had been graduates of West Point, all well equipped and well attired in plain but most becoming military apparel, made a most interesting scene to witness, contributing not a little to the amusement and gratification of the residents of that famous watering place. They are becoming disciplined to be soldiers. They are mostly young men of good families, of profitable occupation, many in business for themselves and others trustworthy clerks in the employ of others, with good salaries; consequently they make a great sacrifice to themselves in the time that they thus bestow upon such excursions as well as ordinarily in the drills which they have to go through, when at home, once or twice each week, frequently oftener. What is the incentive in this personal sacrifice on their part?

The answer is, the spirit of patriotism, and that really is what it means, for in the event of a foreign invasion or internal disturbances, their services are pledged to the State and to the Government. They are therefore liable to receive at a moment’s notice a call from any quarter to go to the front with their lives in their hands, leaving their families, their wives, their children, their old parents, their business, leaving all and requiring a farewell at their departure, as the dangers they may have to encounter are threatening in character and, not unlikely, may prevent their ever returning alive.

Taking this view of the subject, therefore, these young men should be encouraged by all who have the means and power at their hand, and to the full extent of their ability. Whenever they go on missions of State defense, it is only just and fair that they should be received as soldiers, and accorded the honors which soldiers merit. They are entitled to it to a greater extent than the regular soldiers of the United States standing army. These men do not make one-half the sacrifice that the young militia do, nor do they make any better soldiers on the battle-field.

These militia soldiers, when they go to the front, leave behind them enough, in the way of properly, good homes and families, to make them more enthusiastic to fight for victory, than the regular army, so that they may return to their own domestic circles with the laurels that victory gives.

In thin country we do not desire standing armies, for we do not wish the expense entailed upon the Government to sustain them, but we do want the young men encouraged to do military duty and be prepared for action when it comes. The only money, therefore, that the Government need expend to protect our continent is a good militia force in each of the various States, to be well disciplined. In that case our country will be prepared to meet foreign foes.

I am also opposed to a large standing naval force, not only on account of the expense, but also because our country is less likely to get into trouble with other nations, providing we have no ships to send into their waters. Naval officers are often very impetuous and chivalrous and sometimes fancy they have grievances to repel, which are largely imaginary, and with them it is a word and a blow.

With a thoroughly equipped and largely efficient naval force, we might thus not unlikely be driven into a conflict without cause or reason with some friendly power. Our country is happily located far in the distance from the quarrelling nations of Europe, and our being so removed is our protection. It is not desirable to be brought in closer contact by sending our naval vessels into their waters, to be under their fire. The policy of this nation is peace and good will to all mankind. What gain would it be to America to have a conflict with England, even though we should conquer in the end, or France, or Germany, or Russia? We couldn’t tow any of these countries to ours, nor could we hold on to our conquest as a permanent possession; neither should we desire to do so, as we have territory enough in the 38 States which comprise the United States of America, already, without desiring to annex that of any of our far-off neighbors.

And if an emergency should arise in what has been called the last resort of kings, namely, the necessity of going to war, it would be found that the importance of this training in the special business of war could then be appreciated at its true value.

The importance of business training, that is, training for the special occupation in which a man’s energies are to be developed, is always made apparent when those energies are put to the test of competition, or are called upon to put forth an extraordinary effort. If a man has not got the special training, whether in the army or in civil life, he is never reliable in an emergency, but is like that weak and vacillating friend which old Solomon compared to a broken ankle.

I say, therefore, to the young man of the rising generation, while you don’t relax any effort to procure all the education that your time and means will afford, above all things, don’t neglect the paramount importance of business training.

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V. PERSONAL HONOR OF WALL STREET MEN

BREACH OF TRUST RARE AMONG WALL STREET MEN.—THE ENGLISH CLERGYMAN’S NOTION OF TALMAGE’S TIRADES AGAINST WALL STREET.—ADVENTUROUS THIEVES HAVE NO SYMPATHIZERS AMONG WALL STREET OPERATORS.—EARLY TRAINING NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS IN SPECULATION.—FERDINAND WARD’S EVIL GENIUS.—A GREAT BUSINESS CAN ONLY BE BUILT UP ON HONEST PRINCIPLES.—GREAT GENERALS MAKE POOR FINANCIERS, THROUGH WANT OF EARLY TRAINING.—PRACTICAL BUSINESS IS THE BEST COLLEGE.

There is no place in the world where people are trusted so much on faith as they are in Wall Street; not even in the Church.

The business is one of mutual confidence, and each day there are numerous opportunities for men to secure many millions of dollars of other people’s money and take themselves safely off to that Paradise of defaulters and absconders over the Border. Yet instances of this nature are comparatively rare when we consider the large number of transactions and the immense amount of money handled in Wall Street.

The men of Wall Street have, therefore, become world-renowned for straightforward dealing, and have thus obtained the first position as leading spirits in the speculative affairs not only of their own country, but of the entire world. Wherever the speculative spirit of the age has obtained a foothold, there Wall Street is a household word, and Wall Street men are held in the highest esteem. It has become a term familiar to the ears of those even who know nothing about the business which has made its name almost universal.

“What is that Wall Street?” said an English curate to a friend of mine who recently visited Liverpool. “What a queer place,” he continued, “for Mr. Talmage to have his Tabernacle.”

The English divine, evidently only having “caught on” to isolated sketches of the Brooklyn preacher’s calumnious invectives, thought they were actually delivered among the bulls and bears, and that Talmage had the boldness to beard these ferocious animals in their den.

It is true the honor of Wall Street is sometimes slightly tarnished, especially in the eyes of those who reside at a great distance, owing to the occasional delinquencies of dishonorable men, who consider Wall Street men and Wall Street money fair game for swindling operations. These are for the most part outsiders, who pounce upon the Street as their illegitimate prey, after probably making a show of doing business there.

There is no place, of course, where confidence men have the opportunity of reaping such a rich harvest when they can succeed in establishing the confidential relations that help them to secure their swag. But Wall Street proper is not any more responsible for such men than the Church, whose sacred precincts are used and abused by the same social pariahs in a similar manner. The Street is the victim of these adventurers, and has no more to do with nurturing and aiding them than the Church has.

What should be said of a financier who would have the temerity to assert that the Church was an asylum for swindlers, and that thence they issued forth to commit their lawless depredations on society? He would be tabooed by all intelligent people. Yet there would be about as much truth in such a statement as in most of the eloquent anathemas and objurations launched from the pulpit every Sunday against Wall Street.

There is no place on this earth where adventurous thieves have fewer sympathizers than in Wall Street, except perhaps in Pinkerton’s and Byrnes’ detective bureaux.

There is another popular delusion with regard to those who don’t succeed in Wall Street. Their failure is frequently attributed to sharp practice on the part of the old habitues of the Street. People forget that the business of speculation requires special training, and every fool who has got a few hundred dollars cannot begin to deal in stocks and make a fortune. The men who don’t succeed are usually those who have spent their early life elsewhere, and whose habits have been formed in other grooves of thought.

The business of Wall Street requires long and close training in financial affairs, so that the mind may attain a flexible facility with the various ins and outs of speculative methods. If this training is from youth upward, all the better. It is among this class that many of our most successful men are to be found, though there are some eminent examples of success among those who began late in life. It will be found, however, that the latter must have a special genius for the business, and genius, of course, discounts all the usual conditions and auxiliaries; but among ordinary intellects early training is generally indispensable to financial success.

It seldom happens, moreover, that the early trained man from youth up does any great wrong.

Ferdinand Ward may seem an exception to this rule, but he had a born genius for evil, and though he had all the early advantages of Timothy and Samuel the Prophet, with a higher civilization thrown in, so utterly incorrigible was his nature that nothing but prison walls and iron bars could prescribe bounds to his rascality. He is an extraordinary exception, a genius of the other extreme, against whose subtle operations society must always be on its guard; but he is only one of the dangerous exceptions that prove the rule for which I am contending, the rule that early training in finance more, perhaps, than in any other field of human energy, is the great desideratum.

If such a man is unsuccessful, dishonor seldom accompanies his misfortunes. He may pass through the whole catalogue of financial disasters and their natural results. He may fall to the gutter through over-indulgence in liquor and the despair attendant on a run of bad lack or unfortunate connection with wicked partners, but he is still capable of rising from the very ashes of his former self. He will never stoop to swindle, no matter how low the rest of his moral condition may be brought.

No great business can be built up except upon honest and moral principles. It may flourish for a time, but it will topple down eventually. The very magnitude to which the business of Wall Street has grown is a living proof of its moral stamina. It is impossible, in the social and moral nature of things, to unite a large number of men, representing important material interests, except on principles of equity and fair dealing. A conspiracy to cheat must always be confined to a small number.

The most successful men of Wall Street, to my own personal knowledge, are those who came to the Street young and have “gone through the mill,” so to speak; those who have received severe training, who have had some sledgehammer blows applied to their heads to temper them, like the conversion of iron into steel.

These are some of the prerequisites of a successful financial career.

One of the most common delusions incident to human nature in every walk of life is that of a man who has been successful in one thing imagining he can succeed in anything and everything he attempts. In general, overweening conceit of this kind can be cured by simple experiments that bring men to a humiliating sense of their mortal condition and limited capacity. When the experiment is tried in Wall Street, however, to these healthy admonitions are frequently added irreparable disaster and overwhelming disgrace.

I shall note a few examples within the memory of newspaper readers still living. The brief panic of 1884 brought several instances of this character to the surface. Some of them had fought our battles for national existence and preserved the Union when this achievement seemed almost hopeless. Their fame as generals was as extensive as history itself. They had planned and executed projects with success on which the destiny of a great nation, and perhaps the destiny of other nations, had impended, yet when they attempted to manage banks, railroads and financial operations they became hopelessly entangled.

The great captain of the Union’s salvation was as helpless as a babe when Ferdinand Ward and James D. Fish moved upon his works. The eye that took in the whole situation at a glance at Vicksburg, Richmond and Appomatox was totally unable to penetrate the insidious and speculative designs of the “Young Napoleon of finance.”

General Grant was a victim, not so much to the sincere, veracious and unsuspecting attributes which were so largely predominant in that great man, as to his want of early training in financial business affairs, and to the fact that he was unable to appreciate its necessity in dealing with sharp business men of loose morals. Generals Winslow and Porter fell into a similar error of judgment in the West Shore Railroad matter. Their mistake came near being a serious blow to the railroad interests of this country. General Wilson, of the New York and New England, and General Gordon were similarly unfortunate. The common mistake committed by these worthy men, to whom the country owes an inestimable debt of gratitude, was the chief cause of the “general demoralization,” to which Treasurer Jordan facetiously but indignantly alluded when denouncing railroad methods, and which from time to time has played sad havoc with some of the best securities in the country.

Therefore, I say to all who have sons destined for a business career, let your cherished offspring have the advantage of early practical training in the particular line of business for which you may consider them best adapted, and do so, even to the partial neglect of their school and college education. Practical business is the best school and college in which they can possibly graduate. I shall attempt to make this point clearer in another chapter.

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VI. WALL STREET DURING THE WAR

THE FINANCIERS OF WALL STREET ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUR OF THE COUNTRY’S PERIL.—THE ISSUE OF THE TREASURY NOTES.—JAY COOKE’S NORTHERN PACIFIC SCHEME PRECIPITATES THE PANIC OF 1873.—WALL STREET HAS PLAYED A PROMINENT PART IN THE GREAT EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS OF THE PRESENT AGE.

Wall Street came to the rescue of the country when the war broke out. The Government then did not have money enough to pay the interest on the debt, and was sorely embarrassed for a time. The Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, sent word to Mr. Cisco, the Sub-Treasurer in New York, to do everything in his power to raise the money required to sustain the nation’s credit.

Mr. Cisco apprised the “Street” of the instructions he had received from Washington concerning the empty condition of the Treasury. He showed a number of the leading operators and financiers that within a few days the interest on the accruing obligations would have to be paid, or the Government paper should go to protest. It was clearly demonstrated that if funds could not be raised the Government should be placed in a perplexing position, that would, in all probability, greatly complicate and prolong the struggle for national existence. It was one of the most critical moments in the whole history of the Republic, and the emergency required clear, decisive judgment, and promptitude of action.

Wall Street men perceived the gravity of the situation at a glance. If the Government’s credit should collapse, it was feared that the whole framework of our political system would be endangered.

The foundation of all securities was threatened with a destructive upheaval, and most serious consequences were likely to ensue, menacing a contraction of all values. The prospect was very dark. Not a ray of hope shone through the sombre clouds that hung dismally over the Union. The internal dissensions of our people, and the apparent destruction of our national life, were watched with the deepest interest by European friends and foes—the latter being then largely in the majority, and only waiting a favorable opportunity to pounce upon what they considered their destined prey.

Manifest destiny seemed to have leagued all her forces in opposition to us. The stoutest hearts quailed at the prospect of our dissolution as a nation.

At this momentous juncture, when there was no eye to pity, and when no other arm seemed mighty enough to save, the Wall Street men were equal to the occasion. They put their heads together, came to the front, and resolved to extricate the Government from its perilous position. It is true that they were well paid for it. They charged twelve per cent. for the loan, but that was nothing when the risk is taken into account. It was then almost impossible to get a loan at any rate of interest. By some of the great nations of Europe the risk then involved in such a loan was regarded in about the same light as the people of this country now estimate the present chances for realizing on Confederate paper money, or Georgia bonds of the old issue.

In this state of public feeling, Lombard Street was not in a favorable mood to negotiate loans with this country, and, the whole fraternity of the Rothschilds shut their fists on their shining shekels and shook their heads negatively and ominously at the bare mention of advancing money to the once great but now doomed Republic.

Money was dear at the time, and the Government was only obliged to pay what could have been obtained in other quarters. Curiously enough, private property then was considered better security than the Government endorsement, on the principle—which was not a very patriotic one, though in reality true—that the country could survive its form of government. That form, however, the best the world has yet seen, survived the shock and maintained its autonomy. That it did so was in a large measure due to the prompt action of Wall Street men in raising the sinews of war at the incipient stage of the rebellion. Had they failed to do so, it is not improbable that the repulse at Bull Run might have proved a decisive blow to the Union, and plunged the country into a state of anarchy from which nothing but a despotism almost as bad could have retrieved it.

The negotiation of this loan brought out the twelve per cent. Treasury notes. After this issue the rates fell. Then came the 11 and the 10¾ per cent. issues, and subsequently the well-known and long to be remembered 7 3-10 Treasury notes.

After this issue had been popularized, successfully disposed of, and finally taken up at maturity by the 5-20 loan, Jay Cooke was quick to issue, after their pattern, his famous 7 3-10 Northern Pacific Railroad bonds. Evidently he had a patent for negotiating that famous 7 3-10 per cent. railroad loan, as almost every clergyman, Sunday-school teacher and public benefactor were found to have invested in them, when the crash came, and although the road was the means of his financial downfall, with the ruin of an innumerable number of others besides, who were dragged into the same speculative whirlpool, this unfortunate event was not entirely an unmixed evil.

It is true that this was the main and visible cause of precipitating the panic of 1873, of which I shall speak more fully in another chapter, but the Pacific road was the great pioneer in opening up the Far West, and developing its material resources, the great artery of the Western railroad system, conveying vigorous and durable vitality to the industrial life of the expansive regions beyond the Rockies.

Thus, in taking a retrospect of my twenty-eight years in Wall Street, I find that what sometimes appeared to be great evils have been succeeded by compensating good, fate counter-balancing fate, as the Latin poet has it. It was so, as I have previously observed, after the panic of 1857. It was so after the convulsion of 1873, and though I have only historic evidence to guide me in regard to the earlier history of the Street, I find it was so after 1837. So, the maxim that history repeats itself has been fully verified in Wall Street.

So, now that I have relapsed into a reflective mood on this subject, a host of important associations connected with the main issue rush upon me. The prominent idea that stands out in bold relief is the rapid and wonderful progress made in Wall Street during the period that I have undertaken to chronicle. And not only so, but the rapid strides that have been made in everything, almost universally, during that time, present a vast theme for consideration. The part that Wall Street men have taken in this mighty evolution is the topic that concerns me most at present. As I attempt to progress with my subject, I observe this division of it becoming more expansive, so that I find myself in the position of the Irishman when he ascended to the top of a mountain. After recovering from the first effects of his surprise, he exclaimed: “I never thought the world was so large!”

So it is with me. I never thought that Wall Street was so big, nor that Wall Street affairs were so extensive, until I began to write about them. They expand, as well as improve, surprisingly on closer acquaintance. I only hope I shall be able to impress this idea more vividly on the minds of my clerical friends, and others who have been misguided in this respect, chiefly on hearsay and irresponsible evidence, and who, I am sorry to say, have been the well-meaning, but over-zealous instruments of misleading others.

To come to an approximate deduction of facts, then, it is, I think, a fair estimate of the general progress of humanity, to say that there has been greater material advance in everything that relates to a higher civilization, and the greatest good to the greatest number, during the last thirty years, than in all the previous time that has elapsed since the period that the father of history, old Herodotus, began to chronicle, in his racy style, the real and imaginary events of the human family.

The part that Wall Street has played in this amazing progress has been comparatively large, and would, if thoroughly investigated and fully discussed, make a larger book than I have time to write at present.

I can only glance at the prominent topics and leading events in the extensive and somewhat sensational history of Wall Street, and sketch briefly the conspicuous features in the lives of certain celebrities who have been conspicuous in the history of speculation, and of those who have been prominent in the financial affairs of the country.

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Chapter VII

MORE WAR REMINISCENCES—BRITISH AND NAPOLEONIC DESIGNS.

HOW NAPOLEON DEFIED THE MONROE DOCTRINE.—THE BANQUET TO ROMERO.—SPEECHES BY EMINENT FINANCIERS, JURISTS AND BUSINESS MEN.—THE ELOQUENT ADDRESS OF ROMERO AGAINST FRENCH INTERVENTION.—NAPOLEON SHOWS HIS ANIMUS BY DESTROYING THE NEWSPAPERS CONTAINING THE REPORT OF THE BANQUET.—THE EMPEROR PLOTTING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT TO AID THE CONFEDERATES AND MAKE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES.

There were other critical periods during the war when Wall Street came to the front, besides the one in which it rendered such timely aid to the Government in its financial embarrassment. One of these was when the Emperor of the French, Napoleon III., showed his cloven foot and exhibited anew the rancorous disposition which ten years previously had crushed the Republican hopes of La Belle France by the murderous Coup d’Etat. He made a bold attempt to plant that blood-stained foot on this fair soil, in open defiance of the Monroe doctrine, and to crush the liberties that his immortal uncle, even in the full flush of his great conquests, dared not attack and was forced to respect.

I shall here relate an incident of this period, which, I think, has not obtained the prominence in our national history to which, I believe, it is justly entitled.

Senor Romero, then Mexican Minister at Washington, was invited to a public dinner in New York, in order that proper occasion might be found to discuss the situation with regard to the intentions of Napoleon the Little concerning Mexico, and with a view of preventing foreign intrusion, which was only the entering wedge for future invasion, at a time when our nation was engaged in a family struggle to maintain its own existence, and demonstrate the durability of Republicanism.

The dinner, at which there was a grand manifestation of sympathy in favor of the Mexican cause against French invasion, took place on the evening of March 29, 1864, at Delmonico’s, Fifth Avenue and Fourteenth street. The banquet was held in four of the largest rooms. The large dining hall was illuminated as a promenade for the families of the hosts and guests, and a large concourse of ladies and gentlemen who were invited to see the table and be presented to the distinguished envoy. The rooms were elegantly decorated with flowers, grouped and festooned with artistic skill, and the doorways arrayed with fragrant wreaths and garlands. One room was set apart for the orchestra, and Helmsmuller furnished the music.

Senor Don Juan N. Navarro, Consul-General of the Mexican Republic, Ignacio Mariscal, an eminent jurist of Mexico, and Don Fernando De La Cuesta, Assistant-Secretary of the Legation, were invited guests. Following are the names of the Committee of Invitation:

WILLIAM C. BRYANT, WILLIAM H. ASPINWALL, HAMILTON FISH, JOHN W. HAMERSLEY, JONATHAN STURGES, JAMES W. BEEKMAN, J. J. ASTOR, JR., SMITH CLIFT, W. E. DODGE, JR., DAVID HOADLEY, FREDERICK DE PEYSTER, W. BUTLER DUNCAN, WILLIAM CURTIS NOYES, HENRY CLEWS, FREDERICK C. GEBHARD, JAMES T. BRADY, GEORGE T. STRONG, HENRY DELAFIELD, HENRY E. PIERREPONT, GEORGE OPDYKE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, GEORGE BANCROFT, C. A. BRISTED, ALEXANDER VAN RENSSELAER, GEORGE FOLSOM, WASHINGTON HUNT, CHARLES KING, WILLARD PARKER, ADRIAN ISELIN, ROBERT J. LIVINGSTON, SAMUEL B. RUGGLES.

Hon. James W. Beekman presided. The stewards were John Jacob Astor, John W. Hamersley and Henry Clews.

When full justice had been done to the large variety of sumptuous dishes, the chairman called the company to order, and explained that the object of the meeting was to do honor to the great cause of religions and political freedom contended for by the Republic of Mexico. The chair gave the first regular toast, “The President of the United States,” and called upon David Dudley Field to respond, who did so in his usual eloquent style, stating that the sentiment of the whole country was united in sympathy with the cause of the Mexicans, and that the Executive Department of the Government was simply the agent and exponent of the popular will. He dwelt at some length on the French invasion of Mexico as one of the greatest crimes of the age, and predicted the brief reign of Maximilian. Mr. Field wound up his discourse with the following grand peroration:

Maximilian may come with the Austrian eagle and the French tricolor; he may come with a hundred ships; he may march on the high road from Vera Cruz to the capital, under the escort of French squadrons; he may be proclaimed by French trumpets in all the squares of the chief cities; but he will return, at some earlier or later day, a fugitive from the New World back to the Old, from which he came; his followers will be scattered and chased from the land; the titles and dignities which he is about to lavish on parasites and apostates will be marks of derision; the flag of the republic will wave from all the peaks of the Cordilleras, and be answered from every mountain-top, east and west, to either ocean; and the renewed country, purified by blood and fire, will resume its institutions, and be free.

The second toast was, “Don Benito Juarez, Constitutional President of the Mexican Republic,” to which Mr. Charles King, President of Columbia College, responded. He spoke of Mexico as the friend and ally of the Union as opposed to European hostility.

His Excellency, Senor Matias Romero, the honored guest of the evening, then made a brilliant speech on the situation, from which I take the following extracts:

“I am very happy to say that the kind of feeling you express for Mexico is fully reciprocated. In Mexico there are now but the sentiments of regard and admiration for the United States, and the desire to pursue such a course as will draw more closely all those powerful ties by which both nations should be united.

“The Emperor of the French pretends that the object of his interference in Mexican affairs is to prevent the annexation of Mexico to the United States; and yet that very thing would, most likely, be ultimately accomplished if a monarchy were established in Mexico. Fortunately for us, that scheme is by no means a feasible one.

“We were willing to grant to the United States every commercial facility that will not be derogatory of our independence and sovereignty. This will give to the United States all possible advantages that could be derived from annexation, without any of its inconveniences. That once done, our common interests, political as well as commercial, will give us a common whole American continental policy which no European nation would dare disregard.

“The bright future which I plainly see for both nations had made me forget for a moment the present troubles in which they are now involved. I consider these troubles of so transitory a nature as not to interfere materially with the common destiny I have foreshadowed; but, as they have the interest of actuality, I beg to be allowed to make a few remarks in regard to them.

“Every careful observer of events could not help noticing, when the expedition against Mexico was organized in Europe, that it would, sooner or later, draw the United States into the most serious complications, and involve them in the difficulty. The object of that expedition being no less than a direct and armed interference in the political affairs of an American nation, with a view to overthrow its republican institutions and establish on their ruins a monarchy, with a European prince on the throne—the only question to be determined by the United States and the other nations concerned, was as to the time when they would be willing or ready to meet the issue thus boldly and openly held out by the antagonistic nations of Europe.

“This, in my opinion, is the situation in which the United States are placed with regard to Mexico. Taking into consideration the well-known sagacity of American statesmen the often-proved devotion of the American people to republican institutions, and the patriotism and zeal of the Administration that presides over the destinies of the country, I cannot entertain the slightest doubt that the United States will act in this emergency as will conduce to the best interests they and mankind at large have at stake in the Mexican question.

“The United States may find that they are brought squarely to the issue in the Mexican question sooner than they expected, should the report, lately reached here, of any understanding between Maximilian, as so-called Emperor of Mexico, and the insurgents in this country, prove correct. The archduke, it is stated, will inaugurate his administration by acknowledging the independence of the South, and, perhaps, he will go further; and this, of course, by the advice, consent and support of the French Government, whose satellite, and nothing else, will the archduke be in Mexico.

“Among the many events calculated to terminate immediately French intervention in Mexico, the European complications which threaten to cause a general war on that continent should be particularly mentioned. It is certainly wonderful that while Europe is in so insecure and agitated a condition, menaced by revolutions everywhere, and wrestling to recover its own existence and independence, the French Emperor should be thinking about arranging other people’s affairs, as if his own did not require his immediate and most particular attention.”

Mr. George Bancroft, the eminent historian, was next called upon to reply to the toast, “The Eminent Statesmen of Mexico,” among whom the chair named Guatimotzin, Hidalgo, Morelos, Ocampo, Lerdo and Degollado. Mr. Bancroft said:

MR. BANCROFT.

GENTLEMEN—Although I am not prepared to deliver an address worthy of this auditory, I can not refrain from replying and expressing my sentiments, as I have been called to reply to the toast which our president has just proposed to the statesmen of our neighboring sister republic. The struggle which for many long years the Mexican people have sustained against their interior tyrants has been an heroic struggle, worthy of a civilized and cultivated people, and in which the sympathies of the whole civilized world—of all the friends of political and religious liberty—ought to have been manifested in a frank and decided manner in behalf of the Mexican people, directed by the liberal party. I believe, gentlemen, that the cause of civil wars, not only in Mexico, but throughout all Spanish America, has been the clergy alone, who, when they come to acquire power in the State, always strive to overturn the government and to subordinate the temporal interests of society to their own. This attribute seems to belong principally to the Catholic clergy.

“The struggle, then, in which up to this time the patriotic Mexicans have been engaged, was a holy struggle, and the sympathy of the whole people of the United States was with them—a people who, whatever may be their religious creeds, adopts as a fundamental principle the most complete religious liberty, and the absolute independence of the Church from the State.

“But now the sympathy of the United States is increased for the Mexican people, when, in addition to the facts already mentioned, we find this people struggling for their independence and nationality against a European nation, which, taking advantage of the civil strife in which we were engaged, has sought to establish before our eyes a form of Government in open antagonism to our own. We can not do less than receive this project in the same way as Europe would receive it, were we to foment revolutions and establish republics on that continent.

“Then it is that those statesmen in the United States who aid us to emerge from our present difficulties, and to restore our power and legitimate influence, and those who in Mexico not only consummate the great work of establishing religious liberty on a solid basis, but who succeed in driving from their country the foreign invader, or at least keep the sacred fire of patriotism and of resistance to the invader burning, while we disembarrass ourselves of our complications, deserve, in the highest degree, our success and ardent homage.

“Gentlemen, the Egyptians used to place a burning lamp at the feet of their royal corpses. On descending the steep vaults in which the corpses were deposited, the lamp was naturally extinguished.

“Let Europe place at Maximilian’s feet the weak lamp of monarchial power. It will not burn in the atmosphere of our continent.”

Mr. William Cullen Bryant was then called upon, and said, in part:

“We of the United States have constituted ourselves a sort of police of the New World. Again and again have we warned off the highwaymen and burglars of the Old World who stand at the head of its governments, styling themselves conquerors. We have said to them, that if they attempted to pursue their infamous profession here they did it at their peril. But now, when the police is engaged in a deadly conflict with a band of ruffians, comes this Frenchman, knocks down an unoffending bystander, takes his watch and purse, strips him of his clothing, and makes off with the booty. This act of the French monarch is as base, cowardly and unmanly as it is criminal and cruel. There is no person, acquainted, even in the slightest degree, with the political history of the times, who does not know that it would never have been perpetrated had not the United States been engaged in an expensive and bloody war within their own borders.

“We thought that we saw the dawn of an era of enlightened government in the administration of Juarez. That dawn has been overcast by the clouds of a tempest wafted hither from Europe. May the darkness which has gathered over it be of short continuance; may these clouds soon be dispelled by the sunshine of liberty and peace, and Mexico, assured of her independence, take the high place which belongs to her in the family of nations.” (Continued applause.)

Senor Don Ignacio Mariscal responded to “Our Guest and the Bar of Mexico.”

Mr. George Folsom, formerly envoy from the United States to the Netherlands, responded on behalf of the diplomacy, making special reference to Don Jose Lopez Uraga, Mexican Minister to Berlin.

Dr. Willard Parker responded to the health of Dr. Navarro, formerly Chief of the Medical Staff of the Mexican Army.

Mr. George Opdyke responded on behalf of the merchants.

Senor De La Cuesta replied to the Commerce of Mexico.

Mr. Jonathan Sturges spoke for the fine arts of Mexico.

Mr. Washington Hunt spoke, protesting strongly against the French invasion of Mexico.

Mr. Frederick De Peyster, President of the New York Historical Society, responded on behalf of the historians of Mexico. He also made some eloquent remarks on the tyranny of French intervention.

Mr. Henry E. Pierrepont spoke, as the representative of Brooklyn, against the French policy in Mexico.

Mr. Smith Clift responded on behalf of the Bar.

Mr. Charles Astor Bristed replied on behalf of the Literary Men.

Mr. William E. Dodge, Jr., spoke on behalf of the Young Men of America. “The tread of a French invasion,” he said, “is to them a direct insult, and were our own sad war over, I believe there is not a town, or village, or hamlet, where a full company would not spring to arms to aid our sister republic in her glorious struggle. I give, as a sentiment in which I know all will heartily join, the “Monroe Doctrine”-“Americans can never allow the heel of European despotism to place its imprint upon the soil of our Western continent.”

The Chair then said, “Let us now recognize the services of our commissariat, who have so nobly discharged their stewardship. I propose the health of the stewards. I beg Mr. John W. Hamersley to speak in their behalf.” Three cheers were then given for the stewards.

Mr. Hamersley delivered an eloquent address, from which I take the following excerpts:

“It is hardly fair, sir, to call on us while our hearts are beating with fervid thoughts, and your ears ringing with burning words. Had this toast been on the programme, one of my coadjutors would have prepared an address worthy of the compliment and the occasion. This Committee was not chosen for their gifts of utterance, but for those humbler tastes, which only lend a grace to eloquence. Our duties are æsthetic, industrial and artistic. We have compassed the ends of the earth, the depths of the sea; we have levied contributions on the four winds of heaven, to cluster here all that can tempt the appetite, or fascinate the ear and eye, and we fancied our mission accomplished.

“However, there is the post-prandial law; the despotism of the wine cup, to which we all owe allegiance—the only despotism which the descendants of the Huguenots, or Pilgrim Fathers, will ever tolerate on this continent. We are here, sir, in menace to none, but firmly and respectfully, in the majesty of manhood, and in consciousness of power, to reassert a principle, imbibed with our mother’s milk, a household word, a dogma of American faith; but while we cordially grasp our neighbor’s hand, in the darkest hour of her trial, the grasp has due emphasis and significance.

“With her, we have kindred traditions; each of us has hewn an empire from the wilderness; each of us has expelled the oppressor; and both of us, with tattered banners drenched in the gore of hero martyrs, are now appealing from treachery to the God of Battles.

“We have a common future; for who can doubt that our successes and the death-knell of treason is already rung?—who can doubt that the triumph of our arms will be the signal for the eagles of Austerlitz “to change their base,” from the pyramids of Puebla for their perch on the towers of Notre Dame? And permit me here, sir, to express a hope, suggested by the season (God grant it may be a prophecy), that the Easter chimes of Mexico, of the coming year, with the glad tidings of a Saviour risen, shall peal from sierra to sierra, from ocean to ocean, with the glad tidings of a nation risen, a nation born again. (Cheers.)

“Sir [to the Chair], it is fitting, while the accents of sweet music recall tender and happy memories (man, imaged by that armed cactus; woman, by that graceful palm), it is holy to consecrate the hour to her who was “last at the cross and first at the sepulchre.” I propose, sir, a toast, to which your heart’s pulse will echo:

‘The daughters of Mexico—Fair as her sons are brave.’”

(Enthusiastic and prolonged applause. Music—Viva Republica.)

THE CHAIR.

“We must not permit the modesty of our banker and steward, Mr. Clews, to outweigh our desire to hear from the Bourse.”

MR. HENRY CLEWS.

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN—Enough has already been said, in the speeches made this evening, to indicate most conclusively the depth of sympathy which pervades this community in behalf of the cause of Mexico, and I rise to express my cordial concurrence with the sentiments which have been avowed.

The unanimous and determined voices of this company clearly show that public opinion in this country will not submit to the encroachments of foreign powers upon any portion of the territory of the continent.

The principles of free republican government are so strongly implanted in the hearts of the people both of Mexico and the United States, that they will never consent to surrender them.

“Human freedom and the rights of man make common cause between Mexico and all other American States.

“I do not utter these words in prejudice against any government. In my judgment, European nations will best promote the welfare of their own people by carefully abstaining from all interference with the declared will of those who dwell on this continent.

“The doctrine has been solemnly asserted, and will be maintained inviolate against all alliances which seek to impede the progress of liberal institutions, or to impair the strength of governments founded on the rights and intelligence of the people.

“This is the doctrine of the United States, and, under the shield of its power and influence, the safety, prosperity and independence of Mexico will be maintained and made perpetual.” (Cheers.)

The meeting then separated, marching out to the inspiring strains of the Marseillaise.

A few days after this meeting the House of Representatives unanimously resolved that the United States would never consent to the establishment of a monarchy which would arise under the auspices of Europe, upon the ruins of a republic on the American continent.

The speeches at the Romero banquet, followed by this resolution, were the premonitory sounds of the death knell of Maximilian’s empire, even before he took formal possession of his evanescent throne.

To show the animus of the Emperor regarding this meeting, and how closely he was watching the struggle, I may state that when the New York Herald, which had a full account of the meeting, arrived in Paris it was promptly seized by Napoleon’s censors and shared the fate of La Lantern and some of Victor Hugo’s most vigorous productions. It was committed to the flames on account of the speeches made by some of our representative men. It will be seen by reference to this incident that our representatives in Wall Street were among the first to perceive this threatened danger to the nation, and that they manifested their business tact and capacity in promptly meeting it. They acted literally on the maxim of Sir Boyle Roche, that “the best way to shun danger is to meet it half way.”

Wall Street men were the first to make the move that checkmated the tyrant who was ambitious to prove before the eyes of the world that Republicanism was a failure.

A volume might be written by the student of universal history, and probably will be by some future Herodotus, Macaulay, or Prescott, on the far-reaching influences of this original move on the part of the Wall Street men. There is a large field for speculative theorizing, containing much important truth in the way the Republican spirit was reflected in the political thought of Mexico, as the result of the feeling manifested at this public dinner in New York. It was undoubtedly the active precursor of the events that sealed the fate of that unfortunate cat’s paw, Maximilian. It gave birth to the idea that reverberated across the Atlantic, created distrust in Napoleon’s schemes of conquest as visionary with his own people, and alarmed their Teutonic foes, who urged forward those mighty preparations that culminated in the terrible overthrow at Sedan.

To the mere reader of our local newspapers the connection between cause and effect of these great events may seem far-fetched, but it is all plain sailing to the student of general history.

In this connection it would be unjust to the genius of history to omit the part which England played on the same chessboard with her former political refugee, constable and Imperial protégé. Although Mr. Disraeli has done considerable justice to the case in Endymion, he has not dealt with it from this side of the Atlantic. And I am now going to touch on some points of hitherto unwritten history.

There was a secret alliance formed between Napoleon and the British Cabinet—an international conspiracy on a large scale—to demolish the liberties of this country, pounce upon the wreck and then share the spoils between these two powerful pirates. How this was planned and subsequently averted would form, if fully written up, one of the most interesting chapters in the voluminous library of statecraft, and would take most of the political sensation out of the best efforts of Macchiavelli, Talleyrand and Prince Metternich. I can only glance at the leading features of the diabolical scheme, and show how Wall Street men were again promptly in the breach at the proper moment.

The New York riots of 1863 were fomented by British, French and Southern influence combined, as a part of the villainous plot. The design was to give our troops enough to do in quelling local riots, so that they should have no opportunity of going to the front. Southern passion was predominant, and could not discern at the time that their would-be allies were their bitterest enemies. It was hoped that the “draft riots” would be so widespread as to afford Southern chivalry a chance to march unimpeded to Washington and capture the Capitol, when the allied foes of liberty, by virtue of their entente cordiale, should seize upon their prey.

Everything was in readiness for raising the blockade and pouring in armaments from Europe to complete the conquest. England had acted with more caution than Napoleon, and was slow to move, though he was constantly urging her forward. It is due to the villainy of his great conception to state, that, had he been able to move his more sluggish ally in crime with greater celerity, the result might have been overwhelmingly disastrous to this country.

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