III. THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued)…

III. THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued)

Attitude of the German Powers--The Lines at Boulair--The Campaign on the Danube--The Siege of Silistria--It is raised--Evacuation of the Principalities--The British Fleet in the Black Sea--Arrival of the Allied Armies--A Council of War--The Movement on Varna--Unhealthiness of the Camp--An Attack on the Crimea resolved on--Doubts of the Military Authorities--Despatch to Lord Raglan--Lord Lyndhurst's Speech--Raglan's reluctant Assent--The Expedition sails--Debarkation in the Crimea--Forays of the French Troops--Composition of the Allied Armies--The Start--The first Skirmish--St. Arnaud's Plan--Slowness of the British--Battle of the Alma--Menschikotf's Position--The Disposal of his Troops--Final Arrangements of the Allies--A British Blunder--Partial Failure of the French--The British Advance--Evans's Division--Exploits of Sir George Brown--Lord Raglan on the Hill--The Duke of Cambridge hesitates--Attack of the Vladimirs--Crisis of the Battle--Final Advance of the Allies--St. Arnaud declines to pursue.

Thus by a series of complex events, beginning in 1850 with the restless interference of the French, met with corresponding readiness by Russia, who, out of a political quarrel with the French Emperor, developed a large and aggressive design against Turkish independence--a series of events which culminated in 1854--the Czar found himself at war, not with Turkey only, but with France and Britain. And what was the attitude of the German Powers, whose arms and influence should have exercised so great a pressure in this quarrel? The offence committed by Nicholas was an offence not only against Turkey, but against Europe. By Europe, no doubt, it should have been met and defeated, and the common disturber should have been punished, if need were, by the common force. But, although Britain and France were prompt in pledging themselves to meet force by force, the German Powers would not pledge themselves to more than the meeting of force by diplomacy. The concert was incomplete. Austria was more willing than Prussia to adopt strong measures; but Austria did not do more than take up a negative and neutral position during the winter and spring of 1853-4. Yet she could not evade the danger which grew every day; and, therefore, on the 9th of April, Austria--Prussia going with her so far--signed, in common with the Western Powers, a protocol taking note of the existence of war, and declaring that the summons addressed to Russia was "founded on right;" that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was and remained an essential condition of peace; that means should be found of bringing that empire within the European system; and that the Four Powers would not enter into any arrangement with Russia, or any other Power, which did not accord with these principles, without previously deliberating in common. So far there was union; but there was no union in arms. Yet the very requirements of the protocol were those which, as every fact had shown, Russia would not agree to without an application of adequate force. A wide chasm separated the Western from the German Powers--the gulf of war.

The Allies do not appear to have entered on the war with any very definite notions. Britain and France formed an alliance together, and then allied themselves with the Sultan. In defending the Sultan, they were to defend a fundamental principle of European policy in the concrete, and they were to take no advantage to themselves by the act. But their earlier notions were limited even from the defensive point of view. They determined to secure a line of retreat for their ships, and a base of operations from which, in the event of the Turkish army being driven over the Balkan, they could effectively defend Constantinople. At this time there was existent an exaggerated dread of Russian power. The Czar was so strong, the Sultan so weak, so men thought, that it was deemed possible the Russians might force both the Danube and the Balkan by the rapid marches of an overwhelming force, and thus confront the Sultan in his capital. To provide against this, and also to cover their weakness, the Allies determined to land their troops at Gallipoli at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Therefore, as the allied troops began to arrive in March and April, they were employed in throwing up entrenchments, known as the lines of Boulair, extending from the Gulf of Saros to the Sea of Marmora. It was in the camps near Gallipoli that the whole of the French and part of the British army were organised for active service; but while they were assembling there, the Turks were fighting so manfully on the Danube, and so effectually thwarting Russia, that the lines became useless, and the Allies found it needful to take post on the northern instead of the southern slopes of the Balkans.

When it grew certain that war would ensue, the Emperor Nicholas reinforced his army in the Principalities, and raised it to the strength of about 150,000 men, including an immense force of cavalry, and no fewer than 520 guns. Against this mass the Sultan could barely array a nominal force of 120,000 men, and a number of guns far inferior to that of his foe. The bulk of the Russians were in Wallachia, posted in detachments from Kalafat to Galatz. Their plan of operations was to concentrate a mass of troops opposite Silistria, to hold in check the Turks at Kalafat, on one flank, while on the other they invaded the Dobrudscha. It was then intended that the main body should cross the Danube at Kalarasch, and joining the troops coming up the river upon Silistria, invest and capture that fortress. This done, they hoped to capture or mask Varna, and forcing Shumla, debouch through the passes of the rugged Balkans upon the plains of Roumelia. Marshal Prince Paskiewitch had been appointed to command the army, and such is assumed to have been his plan of operations. But the plan was essentially vicious. They could not fail to lose men in the pestiferous Dobrudscha. So long as the Turks held Kalafat the Russians were never secure on that flank. Then, assuming that they kept the Kalafat army at bay, and even captured Silistria, it was in the highest degree improbable that they could force Shumla, and impossible that they could take Varna, so long as the allied fleets held the Black Sea. Nor were these the only dangers incurred by the Czar. The plains of Wallachia lie between the ridges of the Carpathians and the Danube. On their northern slopes Austria was collecting a formidable army. Austria, though not resolved to fight, was growing more menacing in her language and in her attitude. It was true that she trammelled herself by a treaty with Prussia, laying down the march of the Russians on the Balkans as a casus belli. But Russia had no security that circumstances might not occur to produce a change in Austrian councils, or that the very success of her preliminary movements might not bring Austria to act. And if she acted, she would move across the Russian line of communications, and the mere threat to do that would almost ruin the Russian plan.

Nevertheless the first operations were successful, and on the 20th of May Prince Paskiewitch crossed the Danube, and inspected the attack on Silistria. He brought with him Prince Gortschakoff, who took the command of the besieging force. It so happened that two Englishmen, Lieutenant Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth, travelling for pleasure, had entered Silistria, and had volunteered to aid in the defence. They took their posts in the advanced works, and their presence and bearing produced such an effect on the Turks that the latter never thought of yielding, but fought with a steadfastness and devotion equal to any troops in the world. After the failure of the seventh and last assault the Russians began to mine. By sap and mine they had taken the place in 1829. They fell back upon the old methods. Unable to storm over the low rampart, they sought to blow it up from below. Here again the British officers frustrated them, for they caused the Turks to cut a fresh entrenchment in rear of the first; and, if need were, another behind that, and then another, but always, whatever happened, to stand fast and fight with them. The Turks did as they were bidden, and their coolness under fire, and indifference to danger, provoked the warm admiration of the British officers whose confidence was so liberally repaid. And thus the siege went on.

The investment was so imperfect that General Cannon, an Englishman in the service of the Porte, contrived to pass between the Russian covering armies, and enter the place, to the great joy of the besieged. In the meantime the enemy had come so close that a Turk dared not speak above a whisper without drawing upon himself a Russian bullet. It is to a remark in too loud a tone that the death of Lieutenant Butler is attributed. He was speaking to General Cannon, when a Russian bullet, passing obliquely through the earthwork, gave him a wound, of which he died. Shortly afterwards General Cannon, obeying, it is supposed, an order, withdrew from the fortress with the troops he had brought, and carried Lieutenant Nasmyth with him, but left behind another British officer, Lieutenant Ballard. The middle of June had now arrived. The siege had lasted five weeks. The Russian army had lost thousands of men from disease as well as wounds, yet, except that their works were close to those of the Turks, nothing had been gained. They resolved to abandon the enterprise. On the 22nd of June they opened a tremendous fire on the place from all their batteries. When daylight dawned on the 23rd the Turks became aware that the trenches were tenantless, and soon saw that the bulk of the army had repassed the bridge, and had encamped about Kalarasch. The siege was at an end. A fortnight later a chance reconnaissance, which brought Omar Pasha across the Danube at Giurgevo, induced Gortschakoff to attack him with another army. But the Turks, supported by British gunboats, beat off the Russians at every point, and Gortschakoff in despair evacuated the Principalities. The object of the campaign was won.

The causes which led to this failure of the Russian arms were, first, the shining valour and noble resolution of the Turkish soldiers, and, next, the arrival of the Allies at Varna, the operations of their fleets in the Black Sea, and the new position taken up by Austria. For Austria, eager for the evacuation of the Principalities, had, on the 14th of June, while yet the issue of the siege of Silistria was uncertain, made a separate treaty with the Porte, whereby the Emperor engaged "to exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other means, to obtain the evacuation of the Principalities" by the foreign army which occupied them. In other words, Austria undertook to occupy the Principalities herself--an engagement which, if the Russians did not withdraw, rendered it incumbent on Austria to use force for their expulsion. It is easy to see that, unless the Czar was ready to incur the hazards of a war with Austria, in addition to a war with the Allies, this pressure put upon him, coming at the back of a defeat before Silistria, and the gathering strength of Britain and France ashore and afloat, would compel him to yield up the material guarantee which he had so recklessly seized. And it did so. But now we must glance at the incidents which preceded it in the Black Sea, and on the shores of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont.

On the Black Sea the combined fleet had ridden triumphant. In a cruise of twenty days they met no foe, but picked up prizes in considerable numbers. One incident had occurred which added to the wrath and mortification of the Czar. The Furious was sent to Odessa to bring away the British Consul. As her boat, bearing a flag of truce, was returning to the ship, she was fired upon; and no satisfactory explanation being given, Admirals Dundas and Hamelin appeared off Odessa on the 21st of April with a combined squadron and demanded redress. General Osten-Sacken having refused to grant any redress, the admirals sent in a steam squadron the next morning and bombarded the war-port, but tried to spare the town. In twelve hours they had blown up a powder-magazine, destroyed, by shot and shell, a goodly number of ships, and many buildings containing stores. The loss of the Allies was three killed and twelve wounded. After inflicting this chastisement for a breach of the usages of war, the squadron cruised off Sebastopol, but met no enemy; and on the 5th of May Sir Edmund Lyons with a squadron steamed away for the Circassian coast, where his presence caused the Russians to abandon all their forts, except those of Anapa and Sujak Kaleh, lying at the northern end of the coast, near the straits of Kertch. The Circassians took immediate advantage of this, and confined the garrisons of the two forts within the walls; while the Turks occupied Redut Kaleh and Sukhum Kaleh, in Mingrelia and Abasia.

During the spring the troops of the Allies gradually assembled in the dominions of the Sultan; and in the month of March, and for many subsequent months, the blue waters of the Mediterranean were ploughed by the fleet of transports, under steam and sail, all bound eastward; while the straits which divide Europe from Asia were almost as crowded as the Thames. The pressing question at the beginning of May was to organise the military machine; to put it into fighting and marching order; to provide more for its future than its present wants; to lay up stores of provisions and depôts of ammunition; and, above all, to gather together the means of setting the military machine in motion when it was completed. This was no easy task. The French, by habit, were better prepared for war than the British, but the former found it difficult to give legs to their transport corps. As to the latter, they had been hurried into action almost totally unprepared. They had neither a military train, nor even the nucleus of such a corps; they had no effective medical staff; they had an inexperienced and undermanned commissariat. They had magnificent regiments, individually perfect; but they had no army. Everything had to be done on the spot; and being done in a hurry, and by men not accustomed to the work, it was imperfectly done. The British had not been a week in Turkey before there was an outcry for transport. Lord Raglan had a splendid collection of soldiers; but he could not have marched them fifty miles.

Marshal St. Arnaud was, to judge from his letters, in a state of feverish impatience for action; but, according to the statements of Kinglake, he was also in a disturbed as well as ambitious frame of mind. It is said that he tried first to obtain the command of the Turkish army, next to effect an arrangement which would have given him a control over that of Britain. These vagaries of a vain and ambitious man were frustrated by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Lord Raglan, and they did not meet with the approval of the Emperor. But events pressed. The Russians were certain not to wait until the Allies had devised some plan. It became imperative to see the facts a little more clearly than they could be seen at Constantinople; and, in the middle of May, Lord Raglan and the marshal went to Varna, to meet the Turkish general, and hear from Omar Pasha his view of the situation, and his conception of its requirements. Omar Pasha told them he had 45,000 in Shumla, and with these he could defend it. He had 18,000 in Silistria; but these, he believed, could not hold the place longer than six weeks, that is, to the end of June. He had about 20,000 at Kalafat. The rest of his forces were scattered in detachments. He naturally suggested Varna as the point of concentration for the Allies. The two generals agreed to bring up their troops to Varna.

Owing to St. Arnaud's abrupt changes of plan, the movement on Varna, begun on the 29th of May, was not completed until the 4th of July. The camps were pitched in beautiful places. The white tents crowned a green knoll, or extended along a sandy plateau, and looked out upon broad sweeps of turf broken by groups of fine trees, and overlooking a shining lake skirted by meadow lands, and backed by the rugged outlines of the Balkans. But the peculiarity of the country was the absence of inhabitants. Except those in the service of the commissariat, drivers of mule carts and bullock drays, and now and then a wandering Bulgarian, none were to be seen. Fear had driven them to desert their homes; and it was not one of the least disadvantages attending the armies of the Allies that they had to operate in a country practically deserted. The want of transport, felt even at Scutari and Gallipoli, became a positive evil in Bulgaria. The porter and ale sent out for the consumption of the troops could not be carried inland for want of carts and horses; the water was bad, and the men drank the red wine of the country, and, in consequence, fell victims to disease. Diarrhœa, dysentery, cholera, made their appearance in the camps, and the graveyards began to fill. Then the air was polluted with horrid exhalations, and in addition the men pined for action. So that, although the sites of the camps looked healthy, bad management, imperfect food and drink, intemperance, a burning sun by day and chilling dews by night, and ennui, soon reduced the physical and moral stamina of the troops.

Though the object of the campaign had been gained when the Russians recrossed the Pruth, the allied Powers, active agents in the war, had resolved on a mode of reaching Russia. They had determined to carry the war into the Crimea, and capture Sebastopol. This was no sudden resolve. It grew naturally, and, one may say, inevitably out of the war itself. The object of the war was, first, the defence of the Sultan's territory; next, the placing of the territory in security. But there were other means essential to complete success. For a quarter of a century all military observers had seen the military importance of the Crimea. This peninsula, united to the mainland only by the Isthmus of Perekop, and the sandy ledge of Arabat, was the seat of enormous power. At its southern extremity, within a few hours' sail of Constantinople, stood Sebastopol, upon an inlet of the sea forming an excellent harbour. The Russian Government had spent millions in constructing here a series of fortresses impregnable to a maritime attack, and within the harbour and on the shores of a creek running southward they had built vast docks, overlooked by extensive barracks for sailors and soldiers. Long before the phrase was used in Parliament or by statesmen, soldiers had come to regard Sebastopol as a "standing menace" to the Turkish empire; and at the very outbreak of war, the Duke of Newcastle, British War Minister, had directed the attention of Lord Raglan to this point. But the military men, knowing how precarious are operations based on the sea, were doubtful of success. Very little trustworthy information respecting the obstacles in the way, and the numerical strength of the Russian army in the Crimea, could be obtained. Lord Raglan could get none. The French had none. The British Cabinet, looking to all the circumstances, seeing that the allied fleets had entire control of the Black Sea, and that any reinforcements sent to the Crimea must march thither by Perekop, sure that Austrian battalions would cover the road to Constantinople, pressed upon their ally the project of an invasion of the Crimea. The nation went entirely with them in this. Being responsible, they naturally hesitated longer than those who were not responsible; but it is not true to say, as Mr. Kinglake says, either that the Times brought about the decision, or that the Government merely obeyed the popular voice. Those who were responsible for the expedition were the Cabinet, the Parliament, the people--in short, the British nation. And the nation was right. For unless Sebastopol and the naval power of Russia in the Euxine were destroyed, a treaty of peace would have been a mere truce devoid of any sound security either to Turkey or to Europe. It is really puerile to contend that Russia could determine the war by relinquishing the Principalities. The wrongful act which led her there was only a symbol, a manifestation of the existence of a state of things injurious to Europe. When she retired, that state of things was not changed; Russia was still the domineering Power, and still held in her hands the means of disquieting, threatening, nay, of attacking Turkey. No doubt the object of the war enlarged with its progress; but that, within certain limits, is common to all wars. Having gone to the vast expense of sending armies and fleets to Turkey, the Allies would have been culpable had they neglected to obtain the amplest possible security for the independence and integrity of Turkey.

Towards the end of June the British Cabinet were engaged in considering the important project submitted by the Duke of Newcastle. After some deliberation, all parties assented, and the terms of the despatch to Lord Raglan were finally agreed to on the 28th. In this despatch Lord Raglan was instructed "to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol, unless," so the terms ran, "with the information in your possession, but at present unknown in this country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it could not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success.... If, upon mature reflection, you should consider that the united strength of the two armies is insufficient for this undertaking, you are not to be precluded from the exercise of the discretion originally vested in you, though her Majesty's Government will learn with regret that an attack from which such important consequences are anticipated must be any longer delayed." He was further informed that, as no safe and honourable peace could be obtained until the fortress was reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed, nothing but "insuperable impediments" was to prevent an early decision. These are what have been called the "stringent instructions" directing the invasion of the Crimea. They were supported by the voice of the nation and its Parliament. Before the Cabinet had taken its decision, before it was known that the siege of Silistria had been raised, Lord Lyndhurst in his place, on the 19th of June, declared that "in no event, except that of extreme necessity, ought we to make peace without previously destroying the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and laying prostrate the fortifications by which it is defended." And in answer, Lord Clarendon, with more reticence of language, spoke to the same effect.

The attitude of France was not so precise. Concurring with the British Cabinet in its views respecting the necessarily enlarged objects of the war, the slow and cautious character of the Emperor led him to acquiesce in the proposed invasion of the Crimea rather than urge it forward. His general in Turkey was instructed to support the decision Lord Raglan might come to, and not by any means to plead for the invasion; but if the council of war decided in favour of the British project, then, of course, Marshal St. Arnaud was to give his amplest co-operation. Practically, therefore, the decision rested with Lord Raglan; for although Admiral Dundas was not under his orders, yet it was not to be supposed that he could or would stand out against the wishes of his Government. Lord Raglan did not delay his decision. The despatch of the War Minister reached him on the 16th of July; on the 18th he called a council of war; on the 19th he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle that he accepted the task imposed upon him; but accepted it, as he did not fail to express, "more in deference to the views of the British Government, and to the known acquiescence of the Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views," than in deference to his own opinion: for he frankly stated that neither he nor the admiral had been able to obtain any information upon which an opinion could be founded. Indeed, there were not in the council any ready supporters of the project except Admirals Lyons and Bruat. Dundas and Hamelin were both opposed to it; but, as we have seen, St. Arnaud and his admirals were directed to acquiesce. Dundas was not likely to do more than express an opinion; and hence the council took its tone from Lord Raglan, and proceeded to consider how and when the enterprise should be carried out. After two months' delay caused partly by the sickness of the troops, partly by the necessity for preparation, the allied troops sailed. They would never have started had not Roberts, a master in the navy, devised means for the transport of the cavalry and artillery, by buying up the boats of the country and building rafts upon them. Yet this man was allowed to die unhonoured and unpromoted.

The expedition reached the Crimea on the 13th of September, and the armies lay four days in position off the points of debarkation. Each day there was work enough to be done in completing the operation of landing. On the 15th the wind blew heavily on shore, and sent a rough surf dashing over the shingle and sand. But, later in the day, the wind went down a little, and the British were enabled to put on shore more guns and the greater part of the cavalry; and the French landed more guns and their 4th division. Lord Raglan also went on shore, and established his headquarters on a rising ground, and rode round the outposts. The men and officers slept once more in the open air. They made beds of fern and lavender; but, although the rain did not descend in steady streams, a heavy dew saturated beds, and blankets, and kits. On the 16th the tents were landed, in the hope that transport for them could be found in the country. It was not found, and all the tents were taken on shipboard before the army marched.

And why could not transport be found? When the Allies first landed, the country people, simple farmers and shepherds, quiet and inoffensive, came into the camp; and brought fowls, and eggs, and sheep, and were glad to sell them. They also were willing to let out their carts and bullocks. According to the British system, these men were well treated and well paid. Wellington, even in France, could always secure a well-supplied market, and even transport, by treating the people civilly and paying them well. So it would have been here. But the French acted on a different system. It is allowed in all countries that stores belonging to the Government of your enemy are good prize. You may, by the strict rules of war, take private property if you need it. Yet, as a general rule, it is prudent to respect private property; or, if you take it, to pay for it. The French took both alike. On going his rounds on the evening of the 16th Lord Raglan learnt that a body of Zouaves had entered and plundered the village of Baigaili, within the British lines, and had even abused the villagers, men and women. Of course a speedy end was put to such brutalities. At the same time Captain de Moleyns, with a squadron of Spahis, went out of the French camp, and returned driving before him flocks of sheep and cattle, a few camels, a number of arabas, or country carts, and a group of natives, the captives of his spearmen. The effect of these predatory forays was to reduce to a minimum the supplies of all kinds, animate and inanimate, to be derived from the country. While these Zouaves and Spahis were ravaging the villages, it was remarked that the Turks, who had landed on the 15th and 16th, "the much-abused Turks, remained quietly in their well-ordered camp, living contentedly on the slender rations supplied from their fleet." Nevertheless, the Commissary-General, by aid of military force and money, ultimately managed to get together about 350 country waggons, with bullocks and drivers, for the supply of the British section of the invading army.

The operation of landing occupied four entire days, and the fifth was spent in terminating the preparations for the march. The 4th British division, under Sir George Cathcart, except two battalions, arrived and were put ashore. The French landed 26,500 men, 72 guns, and a few Spahis. The Turks landed 7,000 men, all infantry, and no mention is made of their field artillery. The British landed 26,800 men, including 2,100 artillerymen, 60 guns, and 1,100 horsemen. The total force was, therefore, in round numbers, 61,000 men and 132 guns. The French force consisted of four divisions, under Canrobert, Bosquet, Prince Napoleon, and Forey. The Turks were under Selim Pasha.

The British army was composed as follows:--

LIGHT DIVISION, SIR GEORGE BROWN.--1st Brigade, 7th, 33rd, 23rd, Brigadier Codrington; 2nd Brigade, 19th, 88th, 77th, Brigadier Buller; 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade.

1ST DIVISION, THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE.--1st Brigade, Grenadier, Fusilier, and Coldstream Guards, Brigadier Bentinck; 2nd Brigade, 42nd, 93rd, 79th Highlanders, Brigadier Colin Campbell.

2ND DIVISION, SIR DE LACY EVANS.--1st Brigade, 41st, 47th, 49th, Brigadier Adams; 2nd Brigade, 30th, 55th, 95th, Brigadier J. Pennefather.

3RD DIVISION, SIR R. ENGLAND.--1st Brigade, 4th, 50th, 38th, Brigadier J. Campbell; 2nd Brigade, 1st, 44th, 28th, Brigadier Eyre.

4TH DIVISION, SIR G. CATHCART.--1st Brigade, 20th, 57th, Rifle Brigade 1st Battalion, 50th, Brigadier Goldie (who, with 57th, had not arrived); 2nd Brigade, 21st, 63rd, 46th, Brigadier Torrens.

CAVALRY, THE EARL OF LUCAN.--4th Light Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, 13th Light Dragoons, and 17th Lancers, Brigadier the Earl of Cardigan.

ARTILLERY, Colonel Strangways. ENGINEERS, Brigadier Tylden. Adjutant-General, Estcourt; Quartermaster-General, Airey; Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan.

The French preparations were completed by the morning of the 18th. They had far less to land than the British. The weather was no real obstacle to the landing of infantry, or even of stores; but it materially delayed the debarkation of the horses; and independently of the artillery and baggage animals, and chargers for the staff of all the divisions and brigades, the British had to land 1,100 troop horses. In spite of his knowledge of all these facts, Marshal St. Arnaud grew impatient of the delay. On the following day the British were ready. The troops arose from their damp beds at an early hour on the 19th, and paraded in marching order. Much time was still spent in accommodating the baggage and stores of so many thousands to the limited number of carts at the disposal of the Commissariat. Everything not indispensable in a military point of view was left behind. There was so much scattered on the beach, that Sir George Cathcart had to part with his only brigadier, Torrens--for Goldie had not arrived--and also part of his division; and Lord Lucan had to detach the 4th Light Dragoons from his weak brigade of cavalry to guard the beach, and see all the stores, and tents, and baggage safely on shipboard. Time wore on, the sun was high in the cloudless heavens before the word was given to move. It was about nine o'clock. Marshal St. Arnaud, according to the French writers, had then been two hours on the march.

The French were the first to cross the river Bulganâk. When our troops came up, the French had halted in position and were at rest. But it was our lot to fire the first gun. The divisions were crossing the river when the Cossacks showed themselves on the slope which ascends from its bank. The cavalry were ordered to look after them; and as they retired over the ridge, Lord Cardigan followed. As he descended into the next valley, he found himself face to face with a tolerably strong force of horsemen. The skirmishers on each side began firing; but, as the Cossacks did not come on, Lord Lucan ordered our squadrons to retire alternately. Suddenly the enemy opened fire from horse artillery, and kept it up pretty smartly upon the British, now halted, waiting for the guns. They had not to wait long, for over the ridge came bounding Maude's troop of horse artillery. Famous for rapidity, our gunners instantly came into action, and replied to the enemy with such spirit and accuracy that the Russians quickly ceased firing, and sheered off over the next ridge. By this time the Rifles and part of the leading divisions had crowned the ridge in rear of our cavalry; and our horsemen, with a loss of five wounded, and the guns together with the infantry, returned to the position on the Bulganâk, where they rested for the night. The Russians were a reconnoitring party, strong in infantry, which kept out of sight. The cavalry present could not have been less than 2,000. Some of them visited the French, but were driven off by the artillery. So ended the first day's march. The Allies bivouacked on the south bank of the Bulganâk; and, in order to guard against a flank attack, the British divisions faced to the eastward, that is, nearly at right angles to their line of march.

During the evening Marshal St. Arnaud visited Lord Raglan, whose headquarters were in a posthouse on the Bulganâk. What passed at this interview is painfully uncertain. It is said that the French marshal brought with him a plan for attacking a position he had not seen; that he proposed to turn both flanks; one division of his own army and the Turks sweeping round the Russian left, and the whole of the British round their right, while the remainder of the French fell upon and demolished the centre. It is said also that Lord Raglan did not assent to or dissent from this plan, yet that the French marshal left with an impression that it was to be executed. How he came by the impression, one can never know; but this one can know, that Lord Raglan ought not to have allowed Marshal St. Arnaud to leave him with any doubts on his mind. He ought to have distinctly explained that he could assent to no plan until he knew what was to be attacked. He ought to have said in plain language--and he could use plain language--that the plan of a battle must be determined by the nature of the enemy's position, the number of troops by which it was held, and the mode in which they were distributed. The allied commanders were seven miles from the enemy. Neither had seen him, nor his position, nor how he held his position. In these circumstances the proceeding of Marshal St. Arnaud was absurd; and in plain, but polite language, he should have been told so.

The dawn of the 20th of September was soft, balmy, and sunny. The troops were afoot early, and soon under arms. Far away on the right the smoke above the cliffs showed that the war-steamers were on the alert, and prepared to work on that flank. Next to the sea, in execution of that part of the marshal's plan not open to objection, General Bosquet, about six o'clock, began to lead forth his division in two columns, followed by four Turkish battalions. He moved on for an hour, and then halted, just as the centre should have moved, to be followed by the British. But the British were not ready. It is said they should have been in line about seven. Whence arose the delay? Some of it must, no doubt, be set down to the constitutional slowness of the British temperament; some to that imperfect concert which is the bane of a divided command. The remainder was caused, undoubtedly, by the fact that the British, in consequence of the arrangements made overnight, had to effect a great change in their array before they could begin to march. Then, that the two armies might be in close proximity, so as to present an unbroken front, the whole had to move obliquely to the right. These evolutions necessarily took up a great deal of time.

Prince Menschikoff was the Commander-in-Chief of the naval and military forces of the Czar in the Crimea. It seems that Nicholas did not believe the Allies would venture upon the daring exploit of invading that peninsula, or else that their rapidity of movement, slow as it seemed to lookers-on, anticipated the arrival of his reinforcements; or he may have thought that British and French armies and navies would not long act in concert, and that some incident would bring about the abandonment of the expedition. If so, he miscalculated the strength of will of those who held in their hands the public forces of the Western Powers--the Emperor and the British people. At all events, the Czar had comparatively few troops in the Crimea--perhaps not altogether 50,000 men, including the sailors and marines. These troops, in the early days of September, were partly encamped at different places around and to the north of Sebastopol. By the 14th the lights of the fleet were visible from the heights of the Alma. He might take up a position on the left flank of the line of march the Allies would be compelled to follow, and thus force them to quit the sheltering sea-coast in search of him; or he might take up the strongest position he could find across the road they must follow, and thus try to impede their march until reinforcements could reach him from Odessa. By adopting the former plan he could have evaded an action or accepted one far from the sea, for the Allies would not have dared to pass him, and thus he might have played with them until reinforced. But he adopted the second plan, believing that he had found a position which he could hold for several weeks. That position was on the south bank of the Alma, fifteen miles from Sebastopol; and on this point he directed the march of every disposable bayonet, sabre, and gun. It was indeed a strong position. Facing the north, the left seemed secured from attack by the steepness of the cliffs; the centre afforded excellent ground for artillery on its terraces and knolls, and the dips in the hills might be used to conceal the defenders; on the right the Kourgané height overlooked all, and bending backwards, offered protection to that flank. The lower slopes were quite open, and fell down to the river with sufficient rapidity to try the fortitude of an assailant, and yet not so abruptly as to deprive artillery of a full command of the ascent, the river, and the plain beyond. There was one path up the cliff practicable for infantry, and where the precipice ended there were two up which guns could be got with great difficulty. Beyond this troops of all arms could pass the stream and ascend the position. On a point of the highest ground, to the west of the post road, and about two miles from the sea, stood a tower, unfinished, for war had interrupted the workmen, called the Telegraph station, as the peak became known as the Telegraph Hill. The strength of the position lay in the wall of cliff, the steep open downs to the east and west of the road to Sebastopol, and in the river, with its high banks and enclosures. Its weakness lay in its extent, compared with the number of troops at Prince Menschikoff's disposal.

Here the Prince hoped to stop the march of the Allies, with the troops he had, until the divisions from the army of the Danube came up and drove them to their ships. To occupy the position he had 42 battalions, 16 squadrons of cavalry, 11 sotnias of Cossacks (1,100 lances), and 96 guns; that is, about 38,000 men of all arms. His infantry was 31,500, and his cavalry 3,400 strong, including the Cossacks. The remainder were artillerymen and sappers. In disposing of his forces, Prince Menschikoff placed the bulk on the right and centre. To strengthen the position the Prince had devised two fieldworks of the humblest kind. On the extreme right, just below the brow of the great hill there, he had thrown up an entrenchment, in the form of a flattened arrow-head; and on the lower slope of the same hill, nearer to the centre, he had constructed another fieldwork, the embrasures of which were formed by throwing up the earth on each hand. This he armed with the twelve (some say fourteen) heavy guns brought from Sebastopol. These two works were improperly called redoubts. The regiments were formed in column, chequer-wise, on each flank of the fieldworks, and were not all visible to the approaching army. The right of the Russian line was commanded by General Kvetzinsky, the centre by Prince Gortschakoff, the left by General Kiriakoff. It will be seen that the bulk of the troops and artillery were in position to the east of Telegraph Hill, that is, on the Russian right of the great road, while only one-third of the troops and one-fifth of the guns were on or in front of the Telegraph Hill, and towards the sea. Against this force and this position marched, in round numbers, about 63,000 men and 128 guns.

The allied army now came slowly nearer to the Alma, visible in its whole extent to the Russians. The fleet of war-steamers, eight French and one British, went on ahead towards Cape Lookout and the mouth of the Alma. The direction taken by the French brought General Bosquet opposite the village of Almatamak, towards which one of his brigades wended its way, covered by skirmishers in thick rows, while the other, with the Turks, under General Bouat, made for the mouth of the Alma. Next on the left came the divisions of Canrobert and Prince Napoleon, the latter almost in contact with the right of our 2nd Division, and a little to the west of Bourliouk. In rear, as a support, was General Forey. These three divisions of the French army halted, while Bosquet continued to move on. Lord Raglan had had a final conference with Marshal St. Arnaud. They had seen the enemy and the enemy's position. The great accumulation of Russian troops on their right and centre was manifest. It was plain that the French force was not adequate to show a front to the whole Russian line, while the British turned the right, and when the question was pointedly put to him, would he turn the right or attack in front, Lord Raglan declined to undertake the flank movement. It was arranged that the French should turn the Russian left, covered by the fire of the ships, and that when this movement had shaken the Russian line, the British should assail the right and centre. The two commanders parted, and the whole line from right to left drew nearer to the Alma. The steamers opened fire between twelve and one.

While Bosquet's first brigade was ousting the Russian skirmishers from the river and the clefts in the hills leading upwards, the whole army moved still nearer to the foe, and halted in readiness to close. The French divisions remained in columns. They were not to advance until Bosquet's diversion had made itself felt. The British divisions had deployed into line, and had moved on until warned, about half-past one, that they had come within range, when the men were ordered to lie down. It was about half-past one. The 1st French division was crossing the river and swarming up the steeps, when the Cossacks simultaneously fired the corn stacks about Bourliouk. Instantly the waving sheets of flame leaped up, and a stifling smoke rising on a lazy wind spread over the meadows. For a time the centre of the Russian position was hidden from view, and the smoke long continued to curl over the ground. This fiery village and dense cloud of smoke proved a great inconvenience to Evans's division, in whose front it was; for, pressed on one side by Prince Napoleon's division, on the other by the Light, and deprived of a large space in front by the conflagration, Sir De Lacy Evans was compelled to divide his brigades, and encroach on the ground occupied by Sir George Brown, so that when they were deployed, the left front of the 2nd overlapped the right of the Light Division. This was a great fault. While the regiments lay prone under a severe fire, the French were executing their share of the plan on the right.

According to the plan agreed upon, the British were not to attack until the French columns were firmly established on the heights. Bosquet's 1st brigade, under D'Autemarre, had easily swept before them the handful of light troops which alone were placed on the extreme flank of the Russian line. Having gained the plateau with his infantry, he next brought in succession two batteries of artillery, and posted them in front of the brigade which had deployed, resting its left on the verge of the cliff. Bouat and the Turks were so distant that they could lend no aid, and the brigade and its guns were thus practically alone. At the same time the Russian batteries, towards the centre of their position, cannonaded the bulk of Prince Napoleon's division, which still lingered in the valley on the left bank, unable to get on. For the want of guns seemed to paralyse the advance of General Canrobert, and D'Aurelles' brigade of Forey's division had passed round the right of Prince Napoleon, and had jammed itself into a steep and narrow track on the left of Canrobert; so that while Bosquet, although alone on the heights, made play with his batteries and steadily gained ground, Canrobert and D'Aurelles, and the bulk of Prince Napoleon's troops, were lying inactive, unable to strike for want of artillery. For the rest, the Russian guns on the right and centre continued to pour an incessant storm of shot and shell upon the British soldiers lying exposed in line upon their faces, and our gunners, it is said, did not fire because their shot, they found, fell short.

At this time Lord Raglan, himself riding up and down near the British right, and watching the progress of the French, seems to have grown impatient. We have no very clear account of his views and frame of mind; but Mr. Kinglake's version, if it be true, leads to the direct inference that Lord Raglan, who, it seems, had been frequently appealed to by the French, could no longer bear to see his soldiers prostrate and inactive, especially as there was an appearance of tardiness and inability to push forward on the part of his ally. He therefore gave the order to assault the front of the position; and Captain Nolan, a genuine soldier, swiftly bore it to the combatants. First the 2nd Division and then the Light started to their feet, and in a moment the red line, extending far to the east, was gliding across the meadows which intervened between them and the stream. As they descended the slope towards its banks, the guns followed, and, drawing up on both sides of the great road, began to reply to the fire of the enemy. All the time they moved under a heavy fire from the Russian batteries, and the Russians were amazed that the islanders should approach their dark columns and destructive artillery in a two-deep line. The passage of some vineyards and enclosures disordered the troops, and the beautiful symmetry of the first advance was soon broken far more by these inert obstacles than by the bounding shot and bursting shells. In spite of their disorder they reached the river, and plunging into its shot-torn waters, scrambled through and gained the shelter of the opposite bank. Here they halted and hung in clusters, no longer presenting the fine parade spectacle visible to admiring eyes a short time before. The bank was eight or nine feet high; and while it afforded shelter from the artillery, it did not prevent daring Russian skirmishers from approaching the edge, and firing down into the groups below. Here, under such fiery leaders as were with them, the British troops could not long remain.

The parts of the Russian position they fronted were these. Evans's division extended across the entrance to the ravine up which ran the great road. This road passing the river by a wooden bridge, partially destroyed by the enemy, climbed a low ridge between two higher ridges, and on these higher ridges were two Russian batteries supported by six battalions. It was not only their fire, but that of the left shoulder of the field work on the slope of the Kourgané Hill, to which they were exposed; for while the guns on each side of the road swept the front, the heavier metal searched the left flank. The Light Division fronted the steep sides of the Kourgané Hill itself, and had to bear the fire of the big guns and of two batteries--that is, sixteen pieces posted on both sides of the entrenchment,--to meet the musketry and bayonets of sixteen battalions, and to stand prepared for the dense columns of cavalry which showed themselves on their left. Before Evans was rough and broken ground; before Sir George Brown, a bare hill-side. The troops were not allowed to cling long to the protection of the bank. On the right Evans's colonels got their men up to the mouths of the ravine; but there were only three battalions to contend with six; and although they were aided somewhat by the fire of the artillery massed on the east of Bourliouk, it required all the fortitude of officers and men to stand fast. For the battalions had been rent by the heavy artillery fire, and Evans himself had been wounded; yet he kept his place in the midst, and held his men together as became a veteran who had ridden in the thick of great battles thirty years before; and now his weak force was opposed to heavy odds, and had to endure, without flinching, shot, shell, and musketry.

On their left the four regiments of the Light Division, and the 95th, were about to perform a most daring exploit. Nearly at the same moment Sir George Brown, Brigadier Codrington, and Colonel Yea forced their horses up the bank, and found themselves almost in the midst of the Russian skirmishers. Their men, unformed as they were, crowded up, and presented to the view of the Russian gunners an extended line, indeed, but in so much disorder that the Russian generals, in their reports, described them as a cloud of skirmishers. Once at the foot of the slope, they were face to face, not only with the battery, but with two heavy columns, one on the right, the other on the left of the rude fieldwork, whose weighty guns had done so much mischief. There was no manœuvring, no order, no neat soldiership. The advance of the Light Division was the steady rush of a fierce crowd into and through the jaws of death; for though hundreds strewed the hill-side, the survivors were not to be dismayed, but were resolute to win. Such a sight, except at a deadly breach, in some bloody siege, had rarely been seen in war. The line wavered and surged to and fro, but it gained ground. And now it reaped the fruits of its daring. The great battery fired one tremendous volley, and when the smoke grew thin, it was seen that the enemy were carrying off the guns! The four regiments had carried the battery, and forced the enemy to hurry away his guns by sheer hardihood and will; and now came the question--could they keep their prize, or would the Guards and Highlanders come up in time to relieve or sustain them?

When Lord Raglan had given the order to advance, he rode off with his staff along a pathway leading round the western side of Bourliouk, in the track followed by Brigadier Adams, with the 41st and 49th Regiments and Turner's battery. Probably the British commander wished to gain a nearer view of the French operations, and also to get a glimpse of the Russian line of battle unobscured by the smoke of Bourliouk. While he was cantering across the meadows the Light and 2nd Divisions were working up to the river under that heavy fire we have described. Approaching its banks, he came under a sharp fire from the Russian guns on his left front, the guns which faced Evans's troops, a fire which became heavier as the whole staff plunged into the river at the ford, and two officers were wounded. Lord Raglan had not been unobservant of the country which rose before him. He saw a hill in the heart of the Russian position, but unoccupied by the enemy, a hill whence he would see in profile the whole of our own and of the Russian line opposed to it. The use to which it could be put occurred to him immediately. Turning to one of his staff, he was heard to say, "Ah, if they can enfilade us here, we can certainly enfilade them from the rising ground beyond [pointing to the knoll]. Order up Turner's battery." His presence on the hill undoubtedly scared the Russians; at the same time his troops were out of his control.

Now the scene was about to change. The force possessed by the Allies was about to be applied with irresistible vigour in all parts of the field. But before this force fell with all its weight upon the enemy, he was destined to snatch a momentary success. For the four regiments of the Light Division which had so hardily stormed the breastwork had remained unsupported! Either because he was too diffident of his own ability, or because he did not really see that it was time to strike, and strike hard, the Duke of Cambridge hesitated. General Evans, seeing that the Light Division was outstripping the supports, sent Colonel Steele to urge an immediate advance. General Airey himself rode up and explained how needful it was that the 1st should be within striking distance of the Light Division. At one moment some officer, whose name is not mentioned, said, "The brigade of Guards will be destroyed; ought it not to fall back?" When Sir Colin Campbell, says Mr. Kinglake, "heard this saying, his blood rose so high that the answer he gave--impassioned and far-resounding--was of a quality to govern events! 'It is better, sir, that every man of her Majesty's Guards should be dead upon the field, than that they should turn their backs upon the enemy!'" Doubts and questionings ceased. The division went forward, but not soon enough to prevent a disaster. The four regiments holding the Russian breastwork were now in the presence of a powerful force of infantry. For the four battalions of the Vladimir Regiment, marshalled by Prince Gortschakoff, were descending upon the work and had already begun to open fire. The British soldiers lying under the parapet, and looking over, were able to throw a storm of shot into the mighty mass, which, solid and close, came down the hill. Soon its front ranks began to fire, and officers and men began to fall. This was a most trying moment for General Evans, waging an unequal fight, and for Colonel Yea, with his shattered battalion waging a more unequal fight. General Codrington sent down an aide-de-camp to urge the advance of the Scots Fusiliers, the central battalion, and soon the whole brigade rushed up on to the slope. The Grenadiers on the right, under Colonel Hood, formed up in regular order before they moved. The Coldstreams did the same. But, urged by Codrington's message, the Scots Fusiliers sprang forward and began to ascend the hill with eager steps. It was too late. The Vladimirs had persisted in moving on, regardless of the fire from our straggling line; and suddenly, none knows exactly why, the British soldiers rose, and quitting the shelter of the entrenchment, began to descend the hill. The fire of the Russians redoubled; the disordered masses of red-coated men, who hate retreating, halted in clusters, more or less dense, and flung back a dropping shower of bullets. This could not go on long. Presently the pace became brisker, and the men getting massed in heavier groups, and hurrying down the hill, came full upon the Scots Fusiliers, broke the order of the regiment, and compelled what should have been a support to withdraw with them. But the Grenadiers and Coldstreams, separated for a time by a wide interval, went on; and farther on their left came the Highlanders, with what fortune we shall presently see. For now of the battery ordered up to the knoll by Lord Raglan, two guns had arrived. The men had not reached the spot, and Colonel Dickson and other officers loaded, laid, and fired the guns. The effect, it is said, was instantaneous. The guns were trained to bear upon the batteries which checked the advance of Evans's men; and it so happened that at the same time the British artillery of the 2nd, Light, and 3rd Divisions came powerfully into action against the batteries on the road; so that assailed at once in front and flank, and uncertain what new strength the flank fire might gain, the Russian commander limbered up all his guns, and withdrew them to a higher and distant ridge. Then Sir De Lacy Evans pushed forward his three battalions, and these, bringing up their right shoulders, came up to the relief of the 7th just as the Grenadier Guards were approaching on the other flank. The 7th, which had so nobly stood its ground, and suffered very great loss, now, by order of Sir George Brown, allowed the Grenadiers to pass them. The spectacle along the whole line was at this moment magnificent. For the masses of the French on the Telegraph Hill were now rapidly coming into action. Bosquet's artillery had shaken the huge column with which Kiriakoff had threatened the troops of Canrobert. Bouat and Lourmel showed themselves on the hills towards the sea, ever gaining on the Russian left rear. Canrobert had got his guns up, and his lines and columns were moving on to assault the Russians gathered round the Telegraph. Lord Raglan's presence and Turner's artillery must have deeply alarmed Prince Gortschakoff and General Kvetzinski for the safety of their line of retreat. Evans's forward movement, the fire of thirty guns, many of them over the river, combined with the proud march of the Grenadiers and Coldstreams and the Highland Brigade--all these co-operating causes contributed to the catastrophe. It was the crisis of the battle. In vain the battalions of Suzdal endeavoured to succour their comrades of Kazan and Vladimir, standing stiffly behind and about the breastwork. The Highlanders, coming up in succession from the right, smote each column in flank as it passed its front, while every moment the rigid line of red coats and black bearskins and busy rifles crept closer and closer and fired with deadlier effect. The discomfited Light Division also partially reformed, and the Scots Fusiliers were rapidly filling up the interval between the Grenadiers and Coldstreams. Active artillery officers had brought their guns into action nearly on the site occupied by the Russian batteries which so long vexed the 2nd Division. At length the Russian battalions, unable to bear any longer the pressure brought upon them, yielded, when, with a loud shout, the Guards brought down their bayonets, and came steadily on. In a brief space the breastwork was again carried; the Highlanders, most skilfully led, disposed of the Russian reserves; and as Lord Raglan, who had quitted his knoll, came riding up, he found the field his own and the enemy in retreat.

By this time, also, the Russian left was getting away from the French. When the Guards were half way up the hill, and the 2nd Division was crowning the ridges in its front, Canrobert advanced, and bringing his guns into play, swept up the bare hill; and after some severe fighting with the Russian troops, disposed so as to cover the retreat, captured the Telegraph Station. Prince Napoleon and Marshal St. Arnaud now appeared on the plateau, and the horse artillery, hurrying to the front, cannonaded the retreating enemy. The 41st and 49th British Regiments had also moved up into that part of the field which lies between the great road and the Telegraph Hill, and thus formed the extreme right of the British line. So that the whole allied front, from the peak of the Telegraph Station to the eastern slopes of the Kourgané Hill, crowned the Russian position. The Russians fell back in pretty good order, although they were pounded in retreat by the artillery of the Allies, which had hurried up to the front. Lord Cardigan brought his cavalry over the Alma, and rode in upon the stragglers who formed the rear, but could effect little, as the Russians halted on the next ridge, and for a short time showed a bold front. Then they went about, and, unpursued, disappeared from view.

Lord Raglan had desired an immediate pursuit, such a pursuit as would have brought the French upon the flank of the yielding columns, while the British, with horse, foot, and artillery, burst in upon their rear. He had two divisions which had not fired a shot; he had more than a thousand lances and sabres; he was ready to go on. But although the French had suffered comparatively little loss, whether it were that his illness clouded his mind, or that he feared to compromise his army, or that he did not relish a request to pursue coming from the English commander, Marshal St. Arnaud declined to move any men from the field. So the victorious soldiers took up their quarters on the line of hills, and began to gather up the wounded. The battle, which reflects little credit on the commanders-in-chief, had been won by the leaders of divisions. It was not decisive, and it did not bring about the attainment of the great end of the invasion--the immediate capture of Sebastopol.

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IV. THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued)

Two Days on the Alma--Retreat of the Russians--Raglan proposes a Flank Movement--Korniloff scuttles his Ships--The Russian Retreat--Korniloff and Todleben--The Flank March decided--The Armies Intersect--Death of St. Arnaud--The Allies in Position--Menschikoff reinforces Sebastopol--Todleben's Preparations--The Point of Attack--French and English Opinions--The Opposing Batteries--The Sea--Defences of Sebastopol--Doubts of the Admirals--Opening of the Bombardment--The French Fire silenced--Success of the British--Failure of the Fleets--The Bombardment renewed--Wild Rumours at Home--Menschikoff determines to Raise the Siege--The Attack on Balaclava--Lord Lucan's Warning--Liprandi's Advance--Capture of the Redoubts--The 93rd--Lord Lucan's Advance--Charge of the Heavy Brigade--A Pause in the Battle--Raglan, Lucan, and Nolan--Charge of the Light Brigade--The Valley of Death--The Goal--Colonel Shewell--The Retreat covered--The Loss--End of the Battle.

The allied armies spent two days on the battle-field of the Alma. There were the wounded to tend and carry on board ship--the wounded of each army, for the Russians left hundreds on the ground--and the dead to bury. All through the evening, nay, throughout the night, our soldiers were groping about in search of comrades, and carrying water to assuage their thirst, and at dawn officers and men streamed over the hills and into the ravines on this errand of mercy. Surgeons were landed from the fleet to aid the scanty medical staff, and sailors to bear away those whose wounds had been dressed; but, looking to the resources of the fleet, one is surprised that these labours should have occupied eight-and-forty hours. Time was precious; it was always believed that the Allies must fight at least one battle before they reached Sebastopol, yet the means of moving swiftly, after it had been won, had not been prepared. So while the Allies were engaged in tending their wounded, burying their dead, replenishing their ammunition stores, reorganising the regiments that had suffered the most, and even taking care of the Russian wounded, the Russian army, retiring hurriedly and in alarm, had relinquished successively the strong positions on the Katcha and the Belbek, had abandoned all the open country north of Sebastopol, and, passing the bridge of Inkermann, had entered the place itself.

During the halt of the armies there had arisen a grave doubt in the mind of Lord Raglan. Even on the beach of Kamishli, pondering on the task before him, he had come to question the practicableness of assailing Sebastopol from the north, and feared that "a flank movement to the south side would be necessary." Here, on the heights of the Alma, he seems to have felt the pressure of doubt more strongly; for on the 21st of September, probably at his suggestion, Sir John Burgoyne--who shared, if he did not originate his doubts--drew up a formal memorandum, setting forth all the advantages of a march round the head of the harbour to Balaclava on the south coast. And when the short march to the Katcha ended, a singular incident, reported at headquarters, gave the British officers fresh arguments. On the 22nd, steamers of both fleets had looked into Sebastopol harbour, and had reported that all the vessels of war were still there. They were, however, so posted as to attract the attention of naval men, who took particular note of a line of ships moored across the entrance to the harbour, from north to south. The next day, when the fleet came up from Cape Loukoul to the Katcha, the whole line of Russian ships was observed to settle down in the water until only their tops were visible. The enemy, at the suggestion of Admiral Korniloff, had thus disposed of part of a fleet with which he could not keep the sea, and a wise measure it proved to be. The news was sent at once to the headquarter camps on the Katcha, and it probably gave Lord Raglan an additional argument in favour of a march to the south side. The Allies halted on the Katcha until late on the 24th, when they advanced to the Belbek.

Meanwhile the Russian army had quitted its position at an early hour. There was considerable disorder in some parts of the field, where battalions falling back came under the fire of the Allied guns; but there were others untouched and unsubdued, and these, with the Hussars and artillery, had made that show of covering the retreat. The Russians did not halt. Night overtook them among the hills; still they plodded along. They left behind them the steep banks of the Katcha, the steeper banks and rougher ridges of the Belbek, and moving to the head of the harbour of Sebastopol, crossed the bridge of Inkermann on the morning of the 21st, and encamped to the south-west of the town. Some battalions were left on the north side, destined to be the garrison of the largest work on the plateau, called the Star Fort. There, we are told, all was confusion and dismay; but this may be doubted. Two or three very firm men were at that time in Sebastopol--the Admirals Korniloff and Nachimoff, and the German engineer Todleben. This remarkable soldier had been sent to the Crimea in the month of August, at a time when the Czar was just beginning to believe in the probability of a descent. He arrived there at the end of the month, a few days after the Malakoff, or White Tower, on the south side had been completed. Prince Menschikoff requested the engineer to report upon the defences, and it is recorded that the substance of his report was that with two divisions of infantry, say 24,000 men, and field artillery, he would undertake to be master of the town in three hours. This was not a pleasant report, nor does it appear that much was done to supply the deficiency of defence until the Allies were almost before the place. On the 21st Prince Menschikoff held a council. It was then that the sturdy admirals and the great engineer showed their metal. They resolved to extemporise earthen defences on the south side, and sink a part of the fleet across the mouth of the harbour--a task which they executed with promptitude and skill. But Prince Menschikoff seems to have been uncertain what part his army should play; and had the Allies appeared on the Belbek on the evening of the 21st they would have found the extra defences not begun, the army still under the influence of the staggering blow delivered at the Alma, and its chief perplexed and vacillating. Even at the moment when they crowned the heights of the Belbek, and could see from the loftier elevations the white forts on the margin of the water, the works on the northern side had only just received their garrisons, and were in a most weak condition. This the Allies knew not, nor did they know that when they were discussing the propriety of the flank march to the south, Prince Menschikoff had just begun a flank march from the south, so as to gain the main road leading to Russia. Had the Allies been quicker, they would have caught the Russians in their moment of weakness and doubt, and Sebastopol would have been theirs.

It was the morning of the 25th. The Allied camp spread out over the plateau, within three miles and a half of the nearest defences of Sebastopol. The question to be resolved was, Should they at once attack the northern works, or should they file through the rough woods and appear suddenly on the southern plateau? We have seen that Lord Raglan, as early as the 15th or 16th, doubted the ability of the Allies to carry the northern forts by a coup de main, and contemplated the other alternative; and that, the day after the battle of the Alma, he had set Sir John Burgoyne to draw up a memorandum, showing the advantages of the latter course. It is probable that these arguments were first placed before Marshal St. Arnaud at the bivouac on the Katcha; but the ultimate decision was not taken until the morning of the 25th, at the bivouac on the Belbek. After that St. Arnaud had declined to risk an assault. Early on the 25th Lord Raglan went to the quarters of Marshal St. Arnaud, who was now attacked by cholera, and too much broken to be able to take an active part; and in his presence, and that of General Canrobert and others, debated the project of Sir John Burgoyne. Certainly, all were not agreed; but Canrobert was not made of that stuff which leads a general to take upon himself the burden of a heavy responsibility, and he yielded to the arguments of the English. It was therefore ordered that the flank march should be undertaken forthwith; and for four-and-twenty hours the Allied armies were at the mercy of their opponents. Had Menschikoff possessed a spark of genius, he would have cut his enemies to pieces on the 25th of September; but he was employed on a movement of his own, when he ought to have been watching the enemy.

About noon the march began. The artillery--so little was apprehended from the enemy--took the lead; then the English cavalry and infantry, then the baggage, and, next, the French. The 4th British Division was left on the heights "to maintain the communication with the Katcha," until the new base had been secured. The march was most painful and harassing; but, leaving the infantry to tear their way through the low forest by compass, let us follow Lord Raglan. According to his wont, he rode on towards the front, taking the narrow bridle-path. The guns had halted when he came up, because they were entirely without support. Half a battalion of skirmishers might have destroyed all the horses, and killed the gunners. When Lord Raglan rode up, he sharply ordered them to resume their march, and passed on to the front. Suddenly he came softly back. As he emerged from the trees he saw a strange sight--a body of Russians, with a baggage-train, were moving northward along the road. It was the rear guard of Prince MenschikofF, on its way to join the army at Batchiserai. Lord Raglan eagerly inquired for the cavalry, and the cavalry were not to be found. Some time elapsed; the Russians, ignorant of the nearness of their foes, continued to march quietly along. Lord Raglan grew impatient, and sent officers in search of his light horse, while he placed his own escort and a troop of horse artillery in readiness to act. After some time, parts of two Hussar regiments were brought up, and the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade; but the Russians had now detected the presence of an enemy on their left flank, and had begun to run. Then the guns opened, and the horsemen and light infantry went at the enemy, who, abandoning his waggons, fled hastily away. Neither Menschikoff nor Raglan had the slightest notion of one another's intentions during this extraordinary chapter of blunders.

Next day the British army took up a position in front of Balaclava; but the French remained on the Tchernaya. Marshal St. Arnaud, who had been carried from the Belbek in a carriage captured at the Alma, now became, in the opinion of those around him, incapable of commanding the army any longer. He was, indeed, at the point of death, and on the morning of the 26th he formally handed his command over to General Canrobert. In a day or two he embarked in the Bertholet, but died at sea, midway between Balaclava and the Bosphorus. Marshal St. Arnaud was not a soldier of the stamp to which our forefathers were accustomed in the great wars against Napoleon. He was gifted with a showy, yet still genuine courage; he was impetuous and daring. His long and painful sickness, and the peculiarity of his position, no doubt, ought to be taken into account when we judge of his soldiership; but, having made allowance for these obstructions to the display of military ability, we are bound to say that we do not find in the marshal any faculties of a high order. His ambition, his vanity, his assumption, are as conspicuous as his frankness, warmth of heart, and readiness to yield under pressure, whether it came from Paris or the British headquarters; but, on the whole, he was a flashy and insubstantial man. His successor, General Canrobert, came of the same Algerian stock, and he had at least as much ability as Marshal St. Arnaud, and one quality the marshal had not--modesty.

The French army crossed the plain on the 28th, and encamped in front of Balaclava. The day before Lord Raglan had sent the Light and 2nd Divisions up to the slopes which overlook Sebastopol; on the 29th the French army followed, and by the 1st of October all the infantry of the Allies, except the 93rd, the Turks, and some Marines landed from the fleet, were on those hills. Here, then, for many months, was to be the scene of their mighty labours and cruel sufferings: these rugged heights, and ravine-riven plains, and sheltered valleys, were to be the mute witnesses of the most extraordinary siege of modern times, and one of the most remarkable recorded in military annals.

The Russians had profited by the change in the plans of the Allies. Prince Menschikoff had moved his army upon Batchiserai on the 24th and 25th, in order to regain his communications with Perekop and the eastern part of the Crimea, whence, as he knew, large reserves were approaching to succour the cherished city of the Czar. He hoped to place himself in rear of the Allied armies, which, he supposed, would attack the northern works of Sebastopol, and preserve his position there until he was strong enough to fight a battle for the relief of the place. When the attack of the Allies on his rear-guard, and intelligence from Sebastopol of the capture of Balaclava, revealed to him the change of plan, he was persuaded by Korniloff's remonstrances to move at once from Batchiserai and take up a position on the Katcha, whence, on the 1st of October, he marched his army through the village of Belbek, and rested for the night on the left bank of the stream. The next morning the army was moved up to the northern works, and thence transported across the harbour to aid in throwing up the defences; so that, two days after the Allies had planted their camps on the southern plateau, 20,000 men of Prince Menschikoff's beaten army had re-entered Sebastopol.

During the fortnight that had elapsed since the battle of the Alma a striking change had been made in the landward defences of Sebastopol. When the Allies landed the defensive works were few and disconnected. On the eastern face--that is, from the Careening Bay to the great ravine--there were but three works, the centre of which was the Malakoff tower on its commanding hillock. On the western face there was a long loop-holed wall, running from the sea in front of Artillery Bay to a stone tower, called the Central Bastion, opposite a cemetery, and a second work made of earth, called the Flagstaff Bastion, crowning a hill at the southern apex of the town, and on the western side of the great ravine. Not more than fifty guns were mounted on these works at that time. In the interval, the genius of Todleben had converted the place into a strongly entrenched camp. The sailors and soldiers, the civilians, and even women, were employed, without stint, in throwing up earthworks and in mounting guns. Inspired by the energy of Korniloff, a tough Russian, directed by the skill of Todleben, supplied by the vast resources of an arsenal crammed with means and appliances of all kinds, the workers, in a few days, surrounded the city with powerful defences. Batteries, connected by entrenchments, arose on all sides; so that when the Allies sat down before the place, and looked out over the waste towards the goal of their efforts, instead of finding an open town, they found an entrenched camp, which grew stronger under the gazer's eye. They had shrunk from the northern works, because they were too strong; they marched up to the southern works, and discovered that these were stronger. They had come thither to take a town by a coup de main, and, in the opinion of Sir George Cathcart, could have walked into the place on the 28th of September without the loss of a soldier. They soon found that they were in front of an entrenched position which no troops could assail and live. Therefore the siege guns were landed with all practicable speed, and it was resolved to raise batteries, not to breach the works, but to silence the fire of the guns, and then to storm in on all sides.

But the more minutely the Allies looked into the ground they would have to take up, and the works they would have to execute, the less likely did it appear that they would readily reduce the place. The plateau occupied by the British sloped down to the Russian works. It was broken into ridges by five deep ravines, whose sides became more precipitous as they fell towards the South Bay or Dockyard Creek. The left ravine was the largest and the most profound. Towards its termination in the South Bay, the two next ravines towards the right ran into it, leaving flat slopes between. The second, on the right, was the larger and more important, and along its bottom ran the Woronzoff road, whence it became known as the Woronzoff ravine. Next, on the right, was a smaller ravine, called Karabelnaia, because it led to that suburb; and the next, having its source near Inkermann, ended in the Careening Bay. The Malakoff tower, with its surrounding entrenchments, stood between the Careening and Karabelnaia ravines. Then on the south-west of the Malakoff, but on the opposite bank of the Karabelnaia, stood the now famous Redan, and the works known as the Barrack batteries. In order to attack these, the engineers were forced to trace their parallels on the flats between the ravines; but such was the nature of the ground that the batteries raised to fire on the Redan were obliged to be erected, not on the plateau which descended to it, but on the opposite side of the Woronzoff ravine; while those intended to batter the Malakoff were placed, not on the plateau which ran down to the Malakoff, but on that which ran down to the Redan. Thus the two systems of attack were separated by these deep gullies. They were called the right and left attacks, and were the scenes of the principal labours and loss of the British.

It was the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne and the engineers that the proper point of attack was the Malakoff. On the ridge leading down to this work was a remarkable mound, first called Gordon's Hill, but afterwards known as the Mamelon. It afforded a good site for batteries directed against the Malakoff, and as the hill on which this work was placed commanded the city and the anchorage, Sir John wished to make this the principal point of attack, and direct the main efforts of the besiegers to its mastery; while the French held the enemy in check on their side, and a battery west of the Woronzoff ravine--that is, our left attack--kept down the fire of the Redan. But the French engineer, General Bizot, did not agree with Sir John Burgoyne. In his opinion, the Flagstaff Battery, a bold salient work on the west of the South Bay, was the key of the position. Sir John desired to employ our 3rd Division against the Malakoff, but the French objected, and it could not be done. Wherefore, the imperfect plan of attack which we have indicated was resolved upon.

The landing of the siege train occupied eight days, and on the 16th of October, 41 pieces of ordnance, including five 10-inch mortars, had been mounted in batteries on the left attack, and 32 pieces of ordnance, including five 10-inch mortars, had been mounted on the right attack. The guns and mortars in these batteries were to direct a cross fire on the Malakoff, the Redan, and the Barrack batteries, or to search the flank of the Flagstaff on one side, and the men-of-war in the Careening creek on the other. Thus in less than a week the British had put these 73 guns into position; but in the meantime Todleben had shown such amazing industry and skill, that he had brought no less than 107 guns to bear upon the British attack alone, 82 of which were heavy siege guns, and 130 against the French. The garrison was augmented daily; first by Menschikoff's army, then by troops from Taman and Kertch, then by battalions from Odessa; so that in a few days there were in Sebastopol no fewer than 23,000 soldiers, and 12,000 sailors armed and drilled as soldiers; and about the heights of Mackenzie's Farm and Inkermann, a corps of observation, numbering 25,000 men, giving a total of 60,000 men, a force equal to that of the Allies.

No place in the world could be more impregnable to an attack from the sea. At the mouth of the roadstead there were three mighty forts. On a low point of land, under the cliff on the northern side, rose the immense work named Fort Constantine, showing 110 guns, in three casemated tiers, with another tier on the roof. On the south shore, also low down, and having a good command of the sea, first the Quarantine Fort, with its sixty guns, and beyond that, Fort Alexander, with its ninety guns, defied all assailants, so that in first line, an invading fleet would have to encounter the fire of 260 guns, securely placed in solid works. Looking from the sea, these three forts impressed the beholder with the strength of the place. But these were not all. Beyond Alexander rose Fort Nicholas, armed with 110 guns; and beyond this, Fort Paul, with its eighty-six guns, standing at the mouth of the south bay. Altogether, there were no fewer than 700 guns looking towards the sea from their secure casemates. Nor should the small work, called the Wasp Battery, above Fort Constantine, improvised on the spur of the moment, be overlooked. It deserved its name. Such were the formidable defences which the allied fleets were to attack in wooden ships, and which some sanguine persons expected them to reduce to helplessness. No greater delusion could exist.

The real hour of trial had now come. The batteries of the Allies were ready to open fire, and on the night of the 16th of October orders went forth from both headquarters that the embrasures should be unmasked in the obscurity of the dawn; that the troops in camp should be held in readiness to fall in at a moment's notice ready to storm; that the fire of the land batteries should open soon after six; and that the fleet, moving up, should assail the great forts overlooking the sea. Both admirals, it is understood, were opposed to this proceeding. They held the sound opinion that the fleet could not effect anything against the forts. The safety of the army, they said, depended on the safety of the fleet, and it would be imprudent to risk the fleet in an encounter with forts so well placed and so heavily armed. The mouth of the harbour was closed by the sunken ships. A shoal, running out in front of Fort Constantine, prevented the great men-of-war from placing themselves near enough to batter the walls with effect. The sailing ships must be towed or propelled by steamers, and would fight at a disadvantage. These arguments did not prevail. Admiral Hamelin was under the absolute command of General Canrobert, and not at liberty to disobey. Admiral Dundas was not under the absolute command of Lord Raglan; but he could not well refrain from executing his wishes, or look on while the French attacked. The allied generals were pressing in their orders, as they held that an attack from the sea would operate as a diversion, and favour the attack from the land. Therefore it was decided that the ships should go in, take the risk, and do their utmost to damage the enemy.

The first spectacle that arrested the eye when the first cloud of smoke rolled away was the broken Malakoff. The 68-pounders, in Peel's battery, more than 2,000 yards from the work, had dismounted the guns and ruined the tower. Then it was seen that the French were inferior to their foes. Their light brass guns and hastily constructed works were no match for the heavier metal of the Russians. The batteries were beginning to look deformed, their fire wanted the force and continuity of ours. The Russians pounded them in front, and sent their heavy shot and shell into their left flank; and, seeing the effect, redoubled their energy. Our magazines were small, and the rapid firing soon exhausted the supply; but the artillerymen drove down to the trenches, under a fierce cannonade; and their daring was rewarded, for they met with few casualties. Then, freshly supplied, the gunners went to work with renewed vigour. About twenty minutes to nine there was an explosion, so loud that it struck everyone with amazement, and caused a perceptible slackening of the fire. A Russian shell had broken through the great magazine of the principal French battery. In a moment all the guns were dismounted, 100 men were killed and wounded, and the battery rendered absolutely useless. A shout of triumph arose in the town, and its roar reached even the lines of the besiegers. The French guns were now nearly silenced, so heavy had been the storm directed upon them when it was found that they were giving way; and between eleven and twelve, with one battery destroyed and two silenced, General Canrobert gave orders to cease firing. Thus before noon the French had retired from the contest altogether.

The British hardly relaxed a moment. Their batteries were mauled, but their gunners never ceased to hurl forth their shot and shell. We had, by this time, so reduced the fire from the Barrack batteries, on the Russian right of the Redan, and from the earthwork round the Malakoff, that these batteries were regarded as silenced. But, when the French ceased, the left flank guns of the Flagstaff and Garden batteries, a little in its rear, but facing our trenches, and the Redan, went on as furiously as ever. The Russians fought their guns with a skill and persistence deserving the greatest praise. They were now testing the worth of all their defences. The costly casemated forts were replying to the allied ships; two steamers and a line-of-battle ship in the harbour were exchanging shots with our Lancaster guns and 68-pounders; while Todleben's extemporised batteries were in full play. But the British fire was so good that, about three o'clock, a shell found its way into the magazine of the Redan, and, setting it on fire, caused an explosion which silenced that work for half-an-hour. Then they got one or two guns to work, and with these they kept up a fire all the rest of the day. But this earthwork suffered so severely that its garrison was replaced three times between sunrise and sunset. Along the whole line opposed to our batteries we had, by the evening, established a complete superiority over the fire of the enemy; and had the French been equally successful, it is probable that an assault would have been hazarded. During the day we had demolished the Malakoff tower, exploded its magazine, the magazine in the Redan, and a magazine in the town; we had killed Admiral Korniloff, and killed or wounded 500 men, and dismounted thirty-five guns; and we had driven the line-of-battle ships out of the creek, and damaged a steamer in the harbour. In return our whole loss was 130 men killed and wounded, one Lancaster gun burst, and seven guns disabled in consequence of injuries to wheels and carriages.

The operation of the fleets had been a glorious display of courage, and that was all. The fleets were divided into three squadrons. The British took the left, the Turks the centre, and the French the right. In order to carry the great sailing ships into action, steamers were lashed to the side next the offing, and one hour was occupied in turning the Britannia, in order to place her in the proper position. The French were drawn up in two lines, eight ships of the line with one Turkish ship, in the first line, and eight, with a Turk, in the second. These were the first, about 1,800, the second about 2,000 yards from the Quarantine Fort and Forts Nicholas and Alexander on the south shore of the harbour. The British fleet consisted of twenty-six ships of war, but some of the steamers were used to carry the large sailing ships into position. They had to contend with Fort Constantine and the batteries on the cliff, notably the Wasp. A shoal running out from the spit on which the fort is built prevented a nearer approach than 800 yards; but the Agamemnon and Sanspareil, the first with only two feet of water under her keel, did not hesitate to run within that distance of the 130 guns of Fort Constantine. There was no wind, and the sea was smooth. About a quarter past one the conflict began, and it did not cease until dark. And what was the upshot? The forts looked "speckled." It is stated that the gunners were driven from their guns more than once, and that some pieces were dismounted; but the Russians again steadily resumed their fire, and fired on to the end. The superiority of stone forts, and even earthworks, over ships, remained as firmly established as ever. The fleets did not venture again to attack the great forts at Sebastopol.

At dawn, on the 18th, the cannonade was resumed. This time it was a duel between the British and the Russians, for the French had not recovered from the destructive blows they received on the 17th. The Russian fire was far heavier than on the preceding day. The batteries round the Malakoff, the Redan, the Barrack, the Garden, and left face of the Flagstaff batteries, were more vigorous than ever. But our fire did not equal in intensity and weight the fire of the first day. Then, our gunners were lavish of ammunition; now, they hoarded the slender store. Each gun fired once in ten minutes. But the enemy, having behind them the best stocked arsenal in the world, pitched in every kind of missile without stint. Although they could not touch our magazines, again we blew up one of theirs--this time in the Malakoff. The first day we fired as fast as we could, in the hope of subduing their fire and storming in; but on the second day all idea of instant storming had been given up. We fired to continue the bombardment and enable the French to recover. One ominous sign marked the 18th--the Russians made a reconnaissance from the Tchernaya in the forenoon, upon the lines of Balaclava. Their heavy masses appeared above Tchorgoun, and on the Fedoukine heights, but did not approach nearer. It was the first instalment of the great bodies on the road from Bessarabia. The superiority of the Russians was now established. They had more men, more guns, more supplies of all kinds. On the 19th they fired more shots; they fired steadily, and they had increased their number of guns. The artillery of the besieged was double that of the besiegers. It was all artillery of great weight and great range. The Russian general had men enough to serve all his guns, and to keep very strong parties on guard. Each night he more than repaired the damage done in the day. Todleben seemed to be sleepless. In short, the whole character of the operation, so far as the Allies were concerned, had become changed, not by their will, but by time and the will of the Russians. On the morning of the 20th the British store of ammunition had been so reduced that very few rounds per gun remained. They had fired 20,000 the first day. Moreover, the enemy was evidently gathering in force in the valley of the Tchernaya. Therefore the generals took counsel together, and determined to await the arrival of reinforcements, both of men and means, and then to recommence a fresh bombardment, with a greatly increased force of artillery.

The expedition to the Crimea was undertaken on the idea that Sebastopol could be taken by a landing, a battle, a march, and a coup de main. The Allies landed on the 14th. The news of the battle of the Alma reached Paris and London on the 30th of September. On the 1st and 2nd of October came a report that the place had been taken on the 25th. This report was believed by most people, including the British Government, and it was believed by them because they were cognisant of the real nature of the plan. Those who felt and expressed doubts respecting the truth of the story were indignantly silenced. The French Emperor shared in the general delusion, and it was not until the 4th of October that it was dispelled by the arrival of Lord Raglan's despatch of the 28th, stating that he had only just reached Balaclava. In the midst of their labours in the trenches, and when the grave fact, that Sebastopol could not be taken without a regular siege, was becoming more apparent every hour, this wild story reached the allied camp with the English journals, and excited feelings of the warmest indignation. This incident is narrated to show how great were the expectations of the people and the Governments, and how little either knew of the real nature of the enterprise which they had promoted and sanctioned. In England there was a passion to take Sebastopol, and it cannot be doubted that the failure of the original plan, while it intensified that passion, also made the people angry with the heads of the army and the heads of the State.

The Czar Nicholas was also angry at the invasion of his dominions and the defeat of his troops; and anger and prudence alike dictated the reinforcement of Prince Menschikoff and the resumption of offensive operations. Accordingly, he gave orders for the march of the 3rd and 4th Corps d'Armée to the Crimea, and by the end of October the Russians outnumbered the Allies by two to one. Prince Menschikoff meanwhile was meditating a counter-stroke, and devising plans to force the Allies to raise the siege. Surveying their position, he deemed it assailable on two points; from the Tchernaya, in front of Balaclava, and from the head of the harbour on the British right flank opposite Inkermann. Perhaps the feasibility of the latter operation was then only germinating in his mind. He was seduced into another operation. The apparent weakness of the British position about Balaclava made him impatient to attack it. From the lofty ridge of Mackenzie, on the north, and from the heights to the east, which on one side look towards the Baidar valley and the road to the Crimean undercliff, and on the other into Kamara and the Balaclava plain, he saw the weak-looking defences of the Allies in front and flank. The little knolls crowned by the Turkish redoubts lay exposed in the plains, nearly two miles from any support. They ran in a curved line north-west from Kamara--No. 1, on a mound called Canrobert's Hill, being nearest to Kamara; and No. 5 being almost under the ridge of Mount Sapoune. Between them and Balaclava and Kadikoi, and on to the Col and the fortified ridge, there was nothing except the Marines on the eastern Balaclava heights, the 93rd in front of the gorge leading to the harbour, the sailors' gun-battery above Kadikoi, and the camps of the British Cavalry Brigades, north-west of that village. Could he not by a rapid and vigorous movement sweep through these defences, expel the Turks, destroy the 93rd, seize Balaclava, destroy the shipping, and cut off the British from their road out to the sea? Having won Balaclava and the heights on both sides, could he not next carry the Col, and so break into the rear of the allied camps, and place them between his guns and bayonets and those of Sebastopol? General Liprandi had arrived with the 12th Division and four regiments of horse and 44 field-guns, and reinforcing these from his over-abundant garrison, Menschikoff determined to attempt the enterprise.

Sir Colin Campbell, who commanded at Balaclava, feared an attack from Kamara and on this side, and he had done all that was possible, with the scanty means at his disposal, to provide against it. As he watched daily, his keen eye detected the increasing symptoms of the coming storm, but so weak was our force that we could do little, except place guns in the Turkish redoubts, a measure which did not meet with general approval; and in case of attack to rely for safety upon the arrival of troops from the main body in time to give battle to the assailants. General Liprandi, as early as the 23rd, had collected on the Tchernaya his own 12th Infantry Division, and he was then reinforced by seven battalions and fourteen guns from Sebastopol. This gave him a force of about 21,000 men, including 3,200 cavalry and 52 guns. The 24th was spent in reconnoitring the position, and Sir Colin Campbell heard the same evening, from a spy, that an attack in force would be made at dawn; information which Lord Lucan sent by his own aide-de-camp to headquarters. But it does not appear that any measures were taken in consequence. Perhaps no trust was placed in the spy. Perhaps Lord Lucan did not enjoy that confidence at headquarters which a really good cavalry commander would not have failed to inspire. In any case it does not appear that special measures were taken to meet the attack.

Long before dawn of the 25th of October the Russians stood to their arms. The valley of the Tchernaya, the plain beyond, and the hill sides were shrouded in a thick clammy mist. This was favourable to the assailants. The plan of General Liprandi was to move in three separate columns upon the redoubts occupied by the Turks. The Turks were alarmed. They opened fire, but as the enemy's troops rolled on towards them they lost heart. Arrived within a hundred yards, the Russian infantry made a rush over the intervening space, and the first redoubt was won. The Turks fled, some over the valley, some into the next redoubt; but some fought, for the Russian general reports that 170 were slain in the work. The English artilleryman in charge of the 12-pounders had spiked them. Moving swiftly forward, bringing up his right and pushing his horsemen along on the flank, Liprandi forced the Turks to flee from the next two redoubts; and the Cossacks were soon over the slopes, dashing among the fugitives, and spearing them as they ran. The Turks still fled. Panic ran along the whole line. The last redoubt was abandoned, and the Russians occupied the whole line of outposts, and bringing up their artillery, opened a heavy fire. But General Liprandi, fearful of thrusting his men under the fire of the heavy guns about Balaclava and Kadikoi, halted in full career, and refrained from pressing an attack which, at one moment, seemed likely to sweep like a tide through the whole valley.

Nevertheless, he resolved to continue his offensive movement, but with his horsemen alone. When the Russians were first seen advancing through the mist, Lord Lucan, who expected them, was in one of the redoubts. He immediately rode off to join his division, and to send the unwelcome news to Sir Colin Campbell and Lord Raglan. The cavalry were soon in the saddle and in fighting order, the Heavy Brigade on the right, the Light on the left. Sir Colin Campbell drew out the 93rd, under Colonel Ainslie, and posted them on a rising ground in front of the gorge leading to the port. He had no other force except Captain Barker's 9-pounder foot battery, with which he covered his right. Some of the fugitive Turks were rallied by Sir Colin, and placed on his right flank, but no dependence could be put on them. The only staunch infantry on the plain were the 93rd, drawn up in line along a little ridge--a mere streak of red compared with the dark compact masses of the impending foe.

They came down with a gallop and a yell. The few Turks on the right of the Highlanders fired a volley at once and ran, crying, "Ship, Johnny, ship!" The Cossacks were elated, and they swung round their left flank as if they would roll up "the thin, red streak, tipped with a line of steel." But Sir Colin threw back his right flank company, and when the screaming horsemen were within 600 yards, he threw in a volley. The guns on the heights sent in heavy shots, yet the Cossacks were not to be deterred. In a short space, instead of fleeing, the 93rd poured in another volley from their rifles, a volley heard afar, as it rang out clear and compact, and echoed among the hills. The Cossacks found that the men in red were not to be scared away like Turks, although they stood alone far out in the plain, and only two deep. So, when the great column was closing with our heavy horse, the mere fire and steadfastness of the Highlanders drove the lesser column back to the redoubts, while the guns of Barker's battery smote them as they fled.

When the British cavalry fell back, Lord Lucan placed them near the two most westerly redoubts. His object in doing this was twofold. He desired, first, to give a clear and unobstructed range to Sir Colin Campbell's guns; and secondly, to post the cavalry at a point whence, if the Russians moved directly on Balaclava, he could take them in flank. For this reason he made them front to the east. Now Lord Raglan did not approve of the disposition of the cavalry, and, being Commander-in-Chief, he had the audacity to direct a change of position. Lord Lucan was "discomfited." He seems to have thought that Lord Raglan did wrong to interfere with him. But he obeyed, and changed the front from east to north. Then Lord Raglan appears to have thought that the infantry near Balaclava should not be wholly without the support of the horse, and he directed Lord Lucan to send eight squadrons of the Heavy Brigade towards Balaclava. He obeyed. There was a long orchard running north and south, round which, on the western side, the cavalry had to move. It so chanced that, coincidently with this order from the English general, Liprandi had also given an order. He had massed his cavalry behind the redoubts, and he now directed them, with a force of Cossacks on the left flank, to push over the ridge and pour the larger body into the cavalry camps that lay to the south-east of the orchard, and the flanking Cossacks to attack the 93rd. As Lord Lucan was riding along, he saw, through a break in the fruit-trees, the head of the huge column of Russian cavalry, some glittering in blue and silver uniforms, crown the ridge and descend the slope. He rode at speed, and joined the Greys and Enniskillens, as they were rounding the south end of the orchard. He wheeled them into line, almost in the cavalry camp, and placing them under General Scarlett, he directed them to anticipate the Russian charge. All this was visible to the men and officers who swarmed on Mount Sapoune. They sat or stood, French and British, looking down with breathless interest on the scene below. They saw the Russian horse, nearly 3,000 strong, sweep majestically over the rising ground, the front of their broad and deep column protected by outstretched wings on each flank; and they saw--at first in something like disorder, apparent not real--the little squadrons of the Heavy Brigade, which altogether did not equal a fifth of the force swooping down upon them. No British soldier could have desired a fairer occasion for a display of valour and skill.

As the Russians rolled over the ridge, they instinctively fronted towards the tiny squadrons which they saw entangled in their standing camp. "They," wrote Mr. W. H. Russell, who witnessed the scene, "advanced down the hill at a slow canter, which they changed to a trot, and at last nearly halted. Their first line was nearly double the length of ours, and it was at least three times as deep. Behind them was a similar line equally strong and compact. They evidently despised their insignificant-looking enemy, but their time was come. The trumpets rang out through the valley, and the Greys and Enniskilleners went right at the centre of the Russian cavalry. The space between them was only a few hundred yards; it was scarce enough to let the horses 'gather way,' nor had the men quite space enough for the play of their sword arms. The Russian line brought forward each wing as our cavalry advanced, and threatened to annihilate them as they passed on. Turning a little to their left, so as to meet the Russian right, the Greys rushed on with a cheer that thrilled every heart. The wild shout of the Enniskilleners rose through the air at the same instant. As lightning flashes through a cloud, the Greys and Enniskilleners pierced through the dark masses of Russians. The shock was but for a moment. There was a clash of steel, and a light play of sword blades in the air, and then the Greys and dragoons disappeared in the midst of the shaken and quivering columns. In another moment we saw them emerging with diminished numbers and in broken order, charging against the second line." In less than five minutes, by the vigorous attack in front, and a well-timed assault in flank, and the dash upon the wings as they were closing in upon our first line less than 700 British swordsmen had beaten 3,000 Russian horse in compact and close array into a disorderly crowd, and had driven them off so completely that they did not draw rein until two miles from the scene of the combat and well behind their own guns and between their own infantry. Fortunately, General Scarlett, who had the conduct of this brilliant charge, kept his men in hand, and brought them up before they came under the range of the enemy's guns. Thus were exemplified before the eyes of our allies the highest and the rarest qualities of cavalry--the swift, unhesitating charge, and the faculty for stopping ere it is too late. But the British general must have seen with regret, as the French officers saw with astonishment, the inactivity of the Light Brigade. One word from their leader, a few strides round the north of the orchard, and the brigade might have buried itself deep in the Russian right rear, and have taken hundreds of prisoners, if it had not half destroyed Liprandi's cavalry. But fear of responsibility kept Lord Cardigan's lips closed. He had been "placed there," and until he was ordered to move, there he must remain. Few men have ever thrown away a more fortunate moment, and in battle such moments fly never to return.

So far the conflict. The Russians had surprised a line of outposts, and had taken seven guns, and now held the greater part of the line they had surprised; but their cavalry had suffered a deep disgrace, and had been driven in, and their general was compelled to form a strong line of battle, not for offence, but defence. He placed seven battalions and eight guns on the south and south-west slopes of the Fedoukine heights. In the valley leading to the Tchernaya were the rallied horse, with their flanks thrown forward, and guns in their front; and on the redoubt ridge, and on both sides of it, and in three of the redoubts, was the remainder of the infantry in column, as far as Kamara, supported by strong lines of guns. He seemed to wait an opportunity, and was tempted again, by the weak appearance of the defence of Balaclava, to try and debouch from Kamara; but the steady fire of Barker and the Marines daunted him effectually. Thus stood the aspect of the field between nine and ten o'clock, when the action cooled down to a cannonade, and the Russians, who were proud of their victory over the Turks seemed to entertain no desire whatever for a further acquaintance with their other foes at close quarters.

Lord Raglan, from his post of vantage, had watched the enemy's disposition, and he thought he saw a chance of recapturing the redoubts. He gave an order to Cathcart to that effect, but it was executed with great slowness. He, therefore, no doubt again to the discomfiture of Lord Lucan, directed him to move his cavalry, and take advantage of any opportunity that might present itself to prevent the removal of the guns. The infantry divisions had not yet entered the valley. The order sent to Lord Lucan was not well constructed, but the sense was plain. It ran thus:--"Cavalry to advance, and take any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by the infantry, which have been ordered. Advance on two fronts." Lord Lucan, who resented interference with him, put upon it the construction that he was to attack the guns at the eastern end of the valley, and being out of humour, asked for no explanation. Soon afterwards, feeling that Lord Lucan had not advanced far enough according to his view, Lord Raglan directed Quarter-master-General Airey to send the following instructions to Lord Lucan: "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate." These instructions were placed in the hands of Captain Nolan, a far-famed cavalry officer, who believed British horsemen, well led, could ride over anything. Nolan galloped swiftly down the slope and over the plain, and drawing rein, presented the paper to Lord Lucan. "After carefully reading this order," writes Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan afterwards, "I hesitated, and urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it. The aide-de-camp [Nolan], in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's orders, that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked [in a very complaining tone] 'Where, and what to do?' [a sensible question], neither enemy nor guns being in sight. He [Nolan] replied, in a most disrespectful but significant manner, pointing to the farther end of the valley, 'There, my lord, is your enemy; there are the guns!'" Here is a dramatic interlude on a bare plain in the Crimea; Nolan's blunder had confirmed Lucan's misconception.

After the fierce dialogue we have recorded, Lord Lucan rode over to the Light Brigade. He found them dismounted, and orders were given to mount. "Lord Lucan," says Lord Cardigan, in a sworn affidavit, "then came to our front and ordered me to attack the Russians in the valley. I replied, 'Certainly, sir; but allow me to point out to you that the Russians have a battery in our front, and batteries and riflemen on each flank.' Lord Lucan said, 'I cannot help that; it is Lord Raglan's positive order that the Light Brigade attacks immediately.'" Well might a thrill of horror run through the spectators on the heights, when they saw the Light Cavalry speed off to their glorious doom.

For at this moment the Russians presented a strong line of battle. The Fedoukine hills were black with heavy masses of infantry, no fewer than sixteen guns looked into the valley, and a body of foot Cossack riflemen were extended as skirmishers on the lower slopes; all this force of artillery and musketry being on the left flank of the valley down which Lord Lucan was about to hurl the Light Brigade. Across the mouth of the valley leading to the bridge over the Tchernaya and to Tchorgoun, with both flanks thrown well forward, stood the cavalry defeated by the Heavy Brigade, having in front, and parallel to the line of attack, a battery of guns belonging to a Cossack regiment. On the right of the line of advance two redoubts were occupied, and more than half the Russian infantry and a body of lancers were in position. Riflemen were extended along both sides of the valley. But, on our right flank, the artillery, except that in the second redoubt, fronted towards Balaclava. It was through a valley thus defended on the flanks, and thus barred at the end, that our Light Brigade were ordered to ride. The feat they accomplished is, perhaps, unparalleled in war.

Lord Cardigan had formed his ten squadrons in two lines, numbering from the right, the 13th Light Dragoons, the 17th Lancers, and the 11th Hussars; in the second, the 8th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons. Lord Lucan did not approve of this arrangement, and, drawing the 11th Hussars from the first line, he placed them in the left rear of the 17th Lancers. Thus the brigade formed three lines. The whole did not amount to many more than 600 men. Lord Cardigan took post in front of the centre of the first line. He was conspicuous, for he wore the uniform of the 11th Hussars, with its bright cherry-coloured trousers and gorgeous jacket, and he rode a strong and beautiful chestnut horse, with white heels. The signal was given, and--

"Into the valley of death Rode the six hundred."

The brigade went over the shoulder of the hill at a trot. At once they came under the fire of the guns on the Fedoukine heights. The brave Nolan was in the van. He had not gone far when a piece of shell struck him, ripping open his chest. On went the brigade. In the race of death they had to run the course was more than a mile long. The guns on their left, the battery in front, served by Cossacks--who only sponged out after every sixth round, so that their fire might be rapid--the guns from the redoubt on their right, sent shot, and shell, and grape into the brilliant and swiftly gliding lines, the thunder of whose trampling hoofs was heard afar. The ranks were broken. The valley was strewn with heroes. The mere sight of this steadfast band swooping down upon them, made upon the Russians an impression so terrible that they instinctively drew back. "Their fierce attack," wrote Liprandi, "forced General Rijoff to retire by the road that leads to Tchorgoun." The infantry on the left went back nearer to Kamara, and ran into squares. "The enemy's attack," continued Liprandi, "was most pertinacious. He charged our cavalry in spite of the grape fired with great precision from six guns of the light battery, No. 7, in spite of the fire of the skirmishers of the regiment 'Odessa' [on the Russian left], and of a company of riflemen on the right wing, and even unheeding the guns of General Yabrokritski," on the slopes of the Fedoukine heights. Ignoring all this mass of destructive machinery, the Light Brigade swept on. The steadfast artillerymen fired their last round as the first line, rent and torn, closed upon the muzzles and, with a fierce cheer, dashed in. The gunners were caught before they could retire, and only those escaped who crept under the guns and waggons. Some Cossacks charged to save their guns. Lord Cardigan had encounters with several, but escaped with a lance thrust through his sleeve, and then he "rode away apparently unhurt." After the first line came Colonel Douglas, with the 11th, and then the 4th and 8th. In a short space, the first line, which had charged home so impetuously, was now broken into groups, and began to straggle back; but, some of them meeting the 11th, faced about once more and went on. All the regiments had passed the battery. Some of the men were even galloping right into the Russian cavalry, who had fallen back towards Tchorgoun.

The British horse were thus for a moment far within the enemy's position. The Russians were almost stunned by the hardihood of the charge. But General Liprandi, who was watching the fight, gathered up a body of Lancers on his own left, and poured them into the space in front of the battery, between our troopers and their line of retreat. Fortunately, Colonel Shewell, of the 8th Hussars, had kept his regiment well in hand throughout. He had come on at a steady, deliberate pace, on the right of the 3rd line, but not so fast as the 4th. He had charged through the battery, and had shown front to the Russians beyond; but, like a good officer, he still kept his men in hand. His skill was rewarded. Across the rear came the Russian Lancer regiment, and some of our men and some officers thought for a moment it was the 17th, and proposed to form upon it. They were soon undeceived. Colonel Shewell did not hesitate. He wheeled about his squadrons just as Major Mayou, who had brought back a knot of the 17th from their charge towards Tchorgoun, joined him; and, leading the way, Shewell carried his men clear through the Russians, and thus removed the worst danger from the path of the little groups and single men, some wounded, some with wounded horses, some without horses, who were struggling back over the corpse-strewn valley, still under that terrible cross-fire.

Lord Lucan had brought up the Heavy Brigade to the crest of the ridge to protect the retreat, and they came under fire and lost men, and his lordship himself was slightly wounded. The Chasseurs d'Afrique had made a most daring and skilful charge on a battery on the Fedoukine heights, and had silenced its fire, with great loss to themselves. This was an admirable feat, deserving all the praise it received. While the Heavy Brigade was under fire, Lord Cardigan rode up and began to complain. At this time the remnants of his brigade were still in the Russian position, or just passing from it; for he had passed Lord Lucan, who was in advance of his brigade, before the returning heroes of the Light Cavalry were within Lord Lucan's sight. So deponeth Lord Lucan and his statement was amply confirmed. From which, taken in connection with Lord Cardigan's sworn statements, we learn that Lord Cardigan rode well into the battery, and fought with the Cossacks, but that he never had the brigade well in hand, and though alive, was not in the midst of his men at the moment when they required a guide and leader to extricate them from the heart of the Russian position.

Far from the guns of the enemy, the remnant of that valorous band re-formed. Lord Cardigan rode up to the front, and said, "Men, this is a great blunder; but it is no fault of mine." And the men cheered and replied, "Never mind, my lord, we are ready to go back again." And this was the charge of the Light Brigade, such a grievous waste of life, yet so sublime, and of such sterling quality, that its fame has rung through all lands, and its influence still permeates all armies. Out of the 670 who rode into the valley, there were left only 195 mounted men. The brigade had lost 12 officers killed and 11 wounded; 147 men killed and 110 wounded or missing; and 325 horses killed in the charge. All this devotion and daring had been shown, all this havoc wrought, within the short period of twenty minutes! Well might Lord Raglan say to Lord Lucan, "Why, you have lost the Light Brigade!" Let us be just. The responsibility, whatever it may be, for ordering that dreadful charge must be divided between three men. The whole blame should not fall on Lord Lucan. General Airey and Captain Nolan must share it with him.

The charge of the Light Brigade virtually terminated the battle. The Guards, indeed, the 4th Division, and a French division did advance farther eastward, and this, with the fire of the British guns, forced the Russians successively out of all the redoubts, and compelled Liprandi to take up a contracted position on the high ground between Kamara and Tchorgoun. Lord Raglan and General Canrobert debated the propriety of a further attack; but decided that it would be undesirable to waste life in the attempt, as, if regained, the heights could not be reoccupied. So the battle ended about one o'clock with a cannonade. At dusk the French troops and the British infantry divisions, save the Highland Brigade, which remained to reinforce the garrison of Balaclava, returned to the plateau. The Russians admit a loss of 550 men in their cavalry alone, but admit also that this was a hasty report. There is no other. The whole British loss in cavalry was 37 officers and 353 men killed, wounded, and missing.

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V. THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued.)

Effects of Balaclava--Attack on Mount Inkermann--Evans defeats the Russians--Menschikoff is Reinforced--His Plan of Attack--The Advance in the Fog--Soimonoff and Pauloff--Pennefather's Mistake--Repulse of Soimonoff--The Guards to the Rescue--Arrival of Lord Raglan--Bosquet's Help refused--The Guns ordered up--The Fight at the Sandbag Battery--The Coldstreams--The Guards' Charge--Defeat of Cathcart--Ammunition falls short--Arrival of the French--Charges of the Zouaves--The Russians slowly retreat--Canrobert hesitates to pursue--Loss of the Allies--Their Plight--The Baltic Fleet--Its real Objects--Capture of Merchant Vessels and Destruction of Stores--Sveaborg and Cronstadt reconnoitred--Bomarsund--Capture of the Fortress--End of the Naval Campaign--Changed Position of the Allies--Determination of the British Nation--Storm of November 14th--Destruction of the Transports--Sufferings of the Troops--Conduct of the War--Unpreparedness of the Army--The Duke of Newcastle--Timidity of the Government--Enlistment of Boys--Autumn Session--The Paper Warfare--Hostile Motions in Parliament--Lord John Russell's Resignation--His factious Conduct--Palmerston forms a Ministry--Resignation of the Peelites.

The lower range of heights in front of Balaclava, and the seven British guns taken from the Turks, were the only material advantages gained by the enemy on the 25th of October. Moral advantages, beyond those implied in the capture of guns, he gained none. In order to strike a severe blow, Liprandi should have carried Balaclava as well as the Turkish redoubts; and had the British cavalry or the 93rd Regiment shown the least hesitation, the slightest symptom of wavering, it is most probable that the Russians would have instantly overrun the valley, and have swept like a torrent through the gorge into the little port. The charges of the cavalry and the steadfastness of the 93rd balked the Russian general. The Russian horse and Russian infantry fell again under that moral ascendency established at the Alma, and never lost. Therefore the moral advantages of the combat of Balaclava were with the Allies.

Prince Menschikoff, who still commanded the Russian army, seems to have had no clear, decisive views of the course he ought to adopt; for, having alarmed the Allies at Balaclava, he now determined to rouse their suspicions on the side of Inkermann. On the 26th, accordingly, the very day after the capture of the Turkish redoubts, he directed a force of 5,000 or 6,000 men, and abundance of guns, to attack the 2nd Division. These troops quitted the fortress by the Russian left of the Malakoff, and ascended the right bank of the Careening ravine. Their skirmishers were soon heard exchanging shots with the pickets of the 49th and 30th. These, falling back to a good defensible post, kept the Russians at bay for some time; so that the whole of the 2nd Division, under Sir De Lacy Evans, had time to form. But numbers prevailed, and the pickets were driven in; and the Russians soon showed a mass of columns on and about Shell Hill, and presently eighteen or twenty guns were brought to the front on that height. By this time the regiments of the 2nd Division were lying down in line on the crest in front of their camp; and their twelve guns were in action, while the skirmishers were busy on the slope between the two hills. At first the Russians threw some spirit into their advance. Under cover of their artillery on the hill they sent a heavy column down the slope which, by its steadiness and weight, looked as if it intended to sweep all before it. But a great calamity befell these brave men. The fire of our artillery, concentrated on the Russian guns, was so quick, precise, and severe, that the whole of the Russian batteries disappeared over the brow. Then the British artillerymen, with ready energy, turned their eighteen pieces full on the column of infantry which had so manfully come forward towards our line. The effect of the fire was immediate. The Russian infantry, thus deserted by their artillery, and exposed to the shot from our guns and to the bullets of our skirmishers, turned to the left and hurriedly sought the shelter of one of the many deep hollows. While they were thus concealed, the second column was seen to rise above the brow, and on them the guns poured their shot and shell. The officer commanding, observing what had befallen the first column, immediately withdrew his second over the ridge. All this time the Russian skirmishers in the scrub which roughened the hill side kept up the conflict. Presently the column which had fled into the ravine on the left emerged in broken order, and was seen climbing the slopes to rejoin the main body in rear of Shell Hill, and our artillery once more visited them with shot and shell and quickened their pace; while our right skirmishers, under Colonel Herbert, plied them with musketry. The 2nd Division, led by Major Mauleverer and Major Champion, Major Eman, and Major Hume, were now let loose upon the skirmishers in the space between the ridges; and they fell on with so much vigour and effect, and with such eagerness, that General Pennefather had great difficulty in arresting their fiery march. In an hour the action was over, and the enemy in full retreat.

Signs of the presence of the enemy in great strength were now visible almost daily. The two remaining infantry divisions of Dannenberg's corps arrived at Batchiserai on the 28th of October. The 10th Division, under General Soimonoff, entered Sebastopol on the 3rd of November, and on the same day, the 11th, under General Pauloff, took up its quarters among the hills about the ruins of Inkermann. The arrival of these troops had been seen by the Allies, and the generals became convinced that, it might be in a few hours, the enemy would make an attack upon some point or points. Yet not a single change was made in the arrangements, except that the British cavalry--the wreck of two splendid brigades--were marched up to the plateau, and posted in the rear of the French lines upon Mount Sapoune. The Allies, had, for all purposes, little more than 60,000 men. Prince Menschikoff had under his orders, exclusive of the sailors, 70,000 infantry, 9,000 horse, 3,000 artillery, and 282 guns. What use should he make of a force which exceeded that of the Allies by one-fourth?

According to the Russian accounts, Prince Menschikoff had been informed that the Allies intended to open fire once more upon the place from all their batteries, and, after a short and sharp bombardment, storm. His information was correct. In order to anticipate the Allies, he determined to assume the offensive himself, and, if possible, force them to raise the siege. Two Grand-Dukes, sons of the Czar, were on their way to the army, hoping to arrive in time to witness the total defeat of the arrogant Western Powers. It was decided that there should be one real and two false attacks--the real attack from Inkermann, the false attacks from the Tchernaya valley upon Mount Sapoune, and from the Quarantine Bay upon the left of the French siege works. Thus, to begin with, Prince Menschikoff divided his disposable force into three parts, separated from each other by such wide intervals that neither could aid the other. Thus, it will be seen, Prince Menschikoff devised a very wide plan for the destruction of the Allies. He hoped that the attacks from the town and from the Tchernaya would entirely occupy the French; and that General Dannenberg would be able to catch the British alone and unaware, and deliver the fortress by passing over their bodies. Had Prince Gortschakoff attacked the French with energy, this might have happened, for there were, counting everything, only 22,343 British troops effective, and of these 16,308 were infantry, rank and file--that is, in technical language, bayonets. The consequence was that the immense lines they had to guard were thinly manned, and so scarce were labourers that there were none to repair the trenches in the night attack.

In November the sun rises earlier in the Crimea than it does in England. The rays of the dawn shoot up behind the snows of the Caucasus about five o'clock; hence this hour was selected for the movement of the Russian troops on the 5th of the month. But although the upper air was growing brighter, a thick white fog overspread the hills around Sebastopol, and settled down in heavier masses in the valleys. Hidden within its folds the Russian columns stole unobserved out of Sebastopol, and Pauloff began to throw a bridge over the Tchernaya, close to its mouth. As soon as it was completed, the infantry poured over and the guns followed. The fog deadened the sound of the hundreds of wheels emerging from the east and west, and the grey-coated infantry, in silence and obscurity, tramped along. The pickets of the 2nd Division were in the hollow between their camp and Shell Hill and on the old post road, and those of the Light Division were in the Careening ravine and on both its banks. There was not more than usual watchfulness, for the Russian secrets had been kept, and no attack was expected that morning more than any other. General Codrington had ridden out at dawn to visit the outposts, and was riding back to camp when the report of a rifle struck on his ear, and he halted and listened. A sputter of musketry followed, and seemed to come from the Careening ravine; and soon after the same ominous sound, its natural, sharp, angry note being muffled by the fog, was heard on the right. The skirmishers of the two Russian columns had touched the line of British pickets. Codrington galloped off to turn out the Light Division. The battle of Inkermann had begun.

Soimonoff, moving out of the Russian lines, had quitted the plateau on which stood the Malakoff, and instead of resting his left on the Careening ravine, by some mistake, crossed; and thus carried his twenty-nine battalions along the proper right bank of the ravine towards the heights, where Pauloff's troops had begun to assemble. It was his advanced parties who came in contact with the outposts of the Light Division, whom they drove into and over the Careening ravine, and whom they followed. Pauloff had not got all his force up the heights; but as soon as the British pickets were thrust back, he had hastened to put his heavy guns in battery on the highest ground, and his lighter guns on the slopes beneath them, within twelve hundred yards of the camp of the 2nd Division. He at once opened fire to cover an assault of infantry and thus it happened that Evans's British regiments had no sooner formed than they were exposed to an iron shower of shot, shell, and grape. Evans, who had been disabled by an accident, was on board a ship at Balaclava, and Sir John Pennefather commanded the division. Protected by the fire of fifty guns, Soimonoff directed a strong column to cross the Careening ravine; while Pauloff threw forward by the old post road the two rifle regiments of Borodino and Taroutino; so that both flanks of the English position were about to be assailed at once.

The British troops at this moment in the front line were those of the 2nd and Light Divisions. General Pennefather, instead of relying on his artillery, rashly rushed to the support of the pickets, sending Adams's Brigade to the right of the post road with three guns, and keeping his own on the left of the road. Sir George Brown brought up the Light Division. Codrington's gallant soldiers were arrayed on the left bank of the Careening ravine, not far from the 68-pounder battery, and Buller moved up into the space between the left of Pennefather and the right of Codrington. The front was contracted; but narrow as it was, the troops were so few that there were gaps between the four brigades. At the first onset of the enemy, the other brigades were not present. Soon after six an orderly rode into headquarters with the news that the right flank was assailed in force; and, indeed, the sound of cannon, not only at Inkermann, but from the fortress and from the Balaclava front, told the Allies with emphasis that the enemy was upon them. Lord Raglan soon convinced himself that the real attack was at Inkermann, and he determined to ride thither after issuing such orders as seemed expedient. The Guards had not even reached the front when the Russian columns began to surge up against our thin, straggling line.

The British guns had come into action on the crest as fast as they arrived, and were at once exposed to an unequal combat with the heavier guns of the enemy. And now the dense fog was made more dense by the volumes of smoke which, breaking out from the guns in clouds, unfolded itself, and lay almost motionless close to the surface of the miry ground. Through this thick atmosphere the opposing troops made their dubious way, and thus it happened that our men, hastening up to the front, came suddenly upon enemies, who seemed to spring out of the hill side. Soimonoff, on reaching the scene of action, found himself trenching upon the ground apportioned to the columns of Pauloff. The huge masses had converged upon a comparatively narrow front, and the Russians complain that they had not room to range their men for a powerful and simultaneous onset. Soimonoff had taken the wrong road, and instead of effecting a junction with Pauloff at the head of the Careening ravine on the site of the 2nd Division camp, he had joined Pauloff on the east of the ravine, and found that hollow way between him and the troops he had been directed to overwhelm--the Light Division. An ambiguous order had caused this mistake. To retrieve his error, while the Taroutino and Borodino regiments were climbing the hills to attack the Sandbag Battery, Soimonoff plunged into the ravine, and led his men to the charge. Thus he came full on the front of Codrington's Brigade, deployed on the left bank. The heroes of the 7th, 19th, and 23rd were not dismayed by the masses which loomed large and portentous in the fog, but opened upon them such a heavy fire that the Russians heaped together in the deep hollows, and descending the steep sides, never reached the opposite bank, but fell into disorder, recoiled, and receded from view. These early combats rudely disarranged the Russian plans.

In the centre the regiments of the 2nd Division had come upon enemies as soon as they had formed. These were the leading companies of the Borodino battalions, and they were at once set upon by Pennefather's brigade, and pushed back. On the extreme right, half-way down the spur, whose crags drop on one side into the Tchernaya valley, and on the other into the Quarry ravine, Pennefather had posted the 41st and 49th, with three guns, under Captain Hamley. They had no sooner arrived than heavy Russian columns were seen indistinctly moving down the opposite slope. The guns opened on them, but the Russians turned their artillery to that side, and our guns, though steadfastly served, were too weak to contend with the heavy metal opposed to them. The columns went down into the hollow, and soon reappeared, flocking up the British side of the hill. The Taroutino regiment turned upon the Sandbag Battery, and part of the Borodino went with them up the road to break against Pennefather's brigade. The Russians came on without faltering. Our troops were outnumbered and outflanked; our guns were in danger of being taken. The 41st and 49th, quitting the Sandbag Battery, fell back, and the hill seemed in danger of being lost; but at this moment the bearskins of the Guards were becoming visible. The Duke of Cambridge, when he had turned out his brigade, moved it to the right of Pennefather, and went to succour the hardly-pressed 41st and 49th. The Guards came steadily down the slope of the spur, and, passing to the right and left of the guns, cheered and charged, checked the advance of the enemy, and recovered the battery. Hitherto they had only used the bayonet; they now brought their rifles into play, and smote the retreating Russians with deadly precision. The regiment Taroutino was so broken that it retired even into the Inkermann valley to re-form. The brigade was not complete when the Guards charged into the battery; but the Coldstreams came up at once, and the three regiments took ground, the Grenadiers on the right, the Coldstreams in the centre, and the Fusiliers on the left of the recovered work.

It was at this time--about seven o'clock--that Lord Raglan arrived. The fog had cleared somewhat, but the smoke of battle had taken its place. He rode down the spur towards the Sandbag Battery just as the Guards had recovered it; and he sought to penetrate the thick mist, and discern the numbers and intentions of the foe. He could see but little through the rifts in the smoke. He saw enough to make him feel the peril of his position, and that of the whole army. Upon his tenacity hung the fate of every soul on the plateau. Lord Raglan was a calm and steadfast man. If danger rose high, his resolution rose higher; and knowing that his soldiers were like himself, children of a proud and obstinate race, he felt that he could do his duty, and hold fast to that narrow strip of rugged ground, which formed, as it were, the gate into the lines drawn about the southern defences of Sebastopol. He therefore resolved to stand on the defensive, and dispute for the gate with the enemy until he won or his troops were destroyed. The British soldiers actually before the enemy at the end of this first heavy onset of Soimonoff and Pauloff did not number more than 6,000 men. The 4th Division on the march would bring the number up to 8,000, and beyond this he could not array a bayonet, for the 3rd Division had to guard the trenches, and the Highland Brigade was at Balaclava. Lord Raglan knew he could rely on aid from General Bosquet. That officer at the first had offered several battalions to the Duke of Cambridge and Sir George Brown, but these two, though ignorant of the serious character of the attack, took upon themselves to refuse. Had it not been for this proud unwillingness to accept French aid, or this fear of responsibility, Bosquet would have been earlier in the field; for Gortschakoff had so feebly acted on the side of Balaclava that the quick Frenchman soon saw through his weak devices. As soon as he received a request for troops from Lord Raglan he at once put three battalions in motion. But he had two miles to march; the earth was soaked with a night's rain, and part of the way lay through thick scrub. Some time, therefore, was required to force the troops along. Two battalions were directed upon the right rear of the 2nd Division, and the third was ordered to take post near the Canrobert Redoubt at the extremity of the entrenchments on the Sapoune ridge.

During the pause of the fight, while the artillery maintained the combat and the infantry were merely keeping up a brisk skirmish in the bush, Lord Raglan became sensible that his 9-pounders were over-matched by the Russian guns, which, besides being many of them of heavier metal, were nearly twice as numerous. Moreover, as fast as guns were disabled the Russians supplied their places with fresh pieces from their immense train of artillery. Lord Raglan soon remembered that there were in the artillery park two 18-pounders, the same guns which had been used in the Sandbag Battery to crush the Russian guns, mounted among the Inkermann ruins. These he ordered to be brought up. Before they came into action the infantry battle had been renewed. As Codrington's brigade of the Light Division, fighting on the left bank of the Careening ravine, often within it, and sometimes over it, protected effectually the left of Buller, and as the occupation of the spur, on which was the Sandbag Battery, covered the right flank of Pennefather, General Dannenberg saw that he could not force the centre and break through on to the plateau until he had cleared the Sandbag Battery spur. Between eight and nine he had rallied two of Soimonoff's regiments, Tomsk and Kolyvan, and he counted on these, supported by the Boutirsk regiment in reserve, to maintain the fight with the left of Buller and the whole of Codrington. Then he sent forward the infantry of the 11th Division--three regiments, each of four battalions, Yakutsk, Okhotsk, and Selenginsk--with two rifle companies, to act as skirmishers. They were ordered to carry the Sandbag Battery, clear the whole of the slope, and sweep up the post road into the camp. Gallant soldiers, and opposed to the British for the first time, they made their way up to the battery with great spirit and unusual speed. It may be remembered that the Guards occupied the battery, and the ground to the right and left of it, and that Cathcart, with Torrens's brigade, was in support on the right rear.

Now began a contest about the battery which has been truly called sublime. The Russians were nearly 6,000 strong, quite fresh, full of fight, and very resolute. They came on in successive columns of regiments, making loud and rude noises which our men called yells. The first to rush at the battery were the Okhotsk men. As they came up the rifles of the Guards told severely upon them, but did not arrest their course. A fierce combat ensued, first heavy firing, then hand to hand fights, then a fearful pressure of men on both flanks of the battery which it was hard to resist. The heavy guns on Shell Hill took the British defenders almost in reverse, yet they still clung to the ground. The regiment in the battery was the Coldstreams. And now the enemy had swept round the flanks. For a moment the Coldstreams fronted their foes on all sides, and kept them at bay on the open rear of the battery. Then, with a cheer and a rush, they dashed through, scattering their enemies right and left, and, bleeding, broken, but unconquered, made their way up the slope to rejoin the British line. But they had fourteen officers killed or wounded in that bloody Sandbag Battery, and one or two, simply wounded, were murdered by the enraged enemy. They had, however, slain many of the barbarous Okhotsk, and wounded their colonel; and better than this, they had maintained their good name.

The fight at this time seemed going dead against the handful of British. The other two regiments were coming on, Yakutsk up the post road, and Selenginsk in reserve. On their right the rallied battalions of Soimonoff were fighting with the British centre; while the fifty or sixty Russian cannon on the heights never ceased hurling their iron shower into the British lines. Unless the new attack were repelled at once, the Russians would emerge from the ravines, and gaining the more open ground, deploy their masses and sweep over the plateau. To prevent this, the Guards were led once more to regain the Sandbag Battery. The three regiments formed a line of no great length, but they went into the fight with their usual decision. With a steady rush they came down upon their foes. The Russians met them bayonet to bayonet. There was a brief conflict at close quarters. Steel glistened in the air and muskets were brandished as clubs, and men loaded and fired on the flanks, but still the Guards bored their way into and through the mass, and passing over the slain, cheered as they stood once more in the battery--now a charnel-house--and resumed their deadly fire.

During this charge part of the Yakutsk regiment had halted on the post road, and had turned to its left to aid its comrades. The Selenginsk men had moved also to their left and had passed down the slope to outflank the battery on the Inkermann side. The Russians were resolute to win. The fierce charge of the Guards had made them angry, and they desired revenge. While these two bodies were moving upon the little redan, the Okhotsk rallied, so that the Russians renewed the contest for the battery with a larger force than ever. It so chanced that Sir George Cathcart, thinking he could take the enemy in flank, of his own accord carried Torrens's brigade down the slope to the right. Thus the hostile forces were converging on the same point, Selenginsk intent on the same object as Cathcart. But Selenginsk mustered 3,000 men and Cathcart 400, for part of Torrens's brigade was on the flank of Pennefather. And now, while the Guards once more withstood the shock of the Russian infantry in front, the Selenginsk men suddenly discovered the little band that Cathcart had led below them. They at once opened a crushing fire on our men. Instead of flanking the Russians, Sir George found himself in danger of being cut off and destroyed. His men, too, were short of ammunition. To extricate himself from this position, Cathcart ordered the men to charge, but the ground did not admit of that, and the men fell back. Torrens then rallied the 68th, and prepared to try once more a charge up hill. Sir George called out to him, "Nobly done, Torrens; nobly done!" But it availed nothing. Torrens was shot down, and the men halted. Indeed, the movement was hopeless. The fire of the Russians was so close that Sir George Cathcart was shot dead, and Colonel Seymour, who rushed up to him, was shot also. The men were led back through the greatest perils.

Simultaneously with the defeat of Cathcart, the Russians had rolled in heavy masses on the Guards. It was only the fringe of the left of the Selenginsk battalions which had slain and driven the men of the 4th Division. The right of that regiment, the Okhotsk, and the left of the Yakutsk, were pressing upon the Guards in numbers that were irresistible. Our men fell sullenly back. At this crisis the Duke of Cambridge rode along in front of the line of the Guards, and between them and the foe, and urged his soldiers to stand firm and fire. "We have no ammunition," was the unanswerable reply; and without ammunition, but with a firm countenance, and slowly, the Guards gave ground until they reached the line of the 2nd Division. Had the enemy then come resolutely on, he might have won the day, for the spur at length was his. He had now room to deploy. He might ascend the post road, and the slope he had conquered, and burst out upon the plain. We were in great straits, but the soldiers were as stubborn as ever, and the officers as cheerful and daring. But the loss had been terrible. The only cheering feature in the battle at this time, apart from the pluck of the men, was the execution done by the two 18-pounders which had been brought into action and were hammering effectually the Russian guns on Shell Hill. Bosquet, too, was approaching, and General Canrobert was at Lord Raglan's side. Fresh ammunition had been served out to the men; and although they were in disorder, men of different regiments being mixed together, yet fight they did, and in the crisis of the engagement held fast.

The two French battalions, the 6th and 7th Light Infantry, which had been sent forward by Bosquet at the request of Lord Raglan, were now brought over the crest to support the right. It is said that when they came first into the storm of shot and shell which fell upon the ridge they blenched, as if amazed, halted, wavered and gave ground. But the hesitation of the Frenchmen did not last long. Recovering their presence of mind, they went over the ridge and into the battle, and, side by side with our men, and sometimes mixed with them, stood as stoutly and charged as bravely as the best. Behind them came other French battalions. Dannenberg was preparing for a thundering attack along the whole line; but before he could assume the offensive with decision he found himself assailed. The French were about to win back the Sandbag Battery spur, which innumerable foes had torn from the grasp of our exhausted men. The clarion of the Zouaves and the drums of the Light Infantry were heard; 3,000 Frenchmen were about to prolong the line to the right, and contend with the enemy for possession of the ground, now strewn thickly with British and Russian dead.

Three French batteries had come up, and had taken their places in line with ours; but still the worst enemies of the Russian gunners were our two 18-pounders, fired with steadiness and deadly precision. The Russians were forming for an assault in force, when Bourbaki took them in flank by an impetuous charge. The gallant Russians were surprised, and thrust right and left. The British centre, still in front of their camp, had quite enough to do to keep back the foes who were pressing up the road; and, as the Russians had been smitten but not subdued, driven over the brow but not defeated, they turned, extended, and enveloped the flanks of the French in turn, so that those had to give ground. At this time D'Autemarre came up with his brigade, a regiment of Zouaves, one of Algerians, and one of the Line. These fresh troops brought the enemy to a stand, and as Bosquet pushed them into the thick of the combat, they fought their way down the spur beyond the Sandbag Battery. The charge of the Zouaves was a magnificent spectacle; they swept the Russians from the hill. But on their left the enemy held his ground. The French light infantry regiments of Bourbaki, and the little groups of British soldiers, could scarcely keep their place, under the fire of artillery and musketry from Shell Hill and the post road. For a moment the Russians wrested a gun from the 6th French Regiment, and its colours; but Colonel Camas roused his men, and by a desperate charge, in which he fell, Camas recovered both colours and gun. Bosquet was nearly captured; and the resistance of the Russians was so fierce that the French had to fall back a pace, and re-form. The Chasseurs d'Afrique had been brought up, and our light cavalry approached within fire, but both were sent back and held in reserve.

But practically the battle was won. The Russian infantry only resisted in order to cover the retreat of the heavy guns, which could no longer bear up against the 18-pounders. According to the French accounts, the Russian regiments made one more charge, in which they were repelled, but it was only the effort of men determined to prevent a close pursuit. General Dannenberg had still several untouched battalions, and these he formed up to protect the retreat of the brave men who had so nobly borne the brunt of this bloody battle. Two war-steamers at the head of the harbour also began to throw huge shells into the allied position. As the French followed the retreating enemy, he turned repeatedly and fired with both cannon and musketry. The slowness and order of the Russian retreat had, at its commencement, an air of majesty in its movement which drew expressions of admiration from those who witnessed it. But as the fire of their artillery slackened, the Russian masses nearest the Allies fell into confusion and hurried away; followed at a distance by a crowd of skirmishers in similar confusion, Guards and Zouaves, French Linesmen and English Linesmen, all mingled together. The battle was at an end.

The Russians fell back as fast as they could. Part of their infantry and artillery took the road to Sebastopol; the remainder crossed the Tchernaya bridge. Lord Raglan, it is said, was anxious that the enemy should be pursued as soon as the artillery left Shell Hill. He had not a man to spare for this purpose himself, for our troops were worn out with their tough, enduring struggle, and all the more so as officers and men alike had gone into action fasting. But General Canrobert had Monet's brigade of Prince Napoleon's division, which had been sent up from the Siege Corps, and kept up to this time in reserve. Not a man had seen or felt the enemy. But Canrobert hesitated to use them. He is said to have asked that the Guards should go with them, if they went, for his troops had great confidence in "les Black Caps." But to this Lord Raglan, of course, could not consent, for the Guards were a mere handful. At length Canrobert agreed to push forward two battalions of Zouaves and a battery of 12-pounders, and these, with the two Commanders-in-chief, ascended the heights abandoned by the Russians, and arrived in time to see that the enemy had escaped beyond range. The guns opened fire and did some mischief to the stragglers; but the main force had made good its retreat. The Russian Grand Dukes and Prince Menschikoff had the mortification to witness the ruin of those splendid dreams in which they had indulged with such confidence when their great army moved out at dawn. The battle of Inkermann won for Lord Raglan the bâton of a British Field Marshal, which he deserved for his valour, though hardly for his strategy. The losses of the Allies were very great. The British lost 2,816 men of all ranks. Of these three generals and 43 officers were killed, and six generals and 100 officers were wounded; 586 men were killed, and 2,078 were wounded. The French lost 1,800 men killed and wounded at Inkermann and in front of their trenches. Their exact loss at Inkermann is not stated, but is roughly put at 900 men. Among the wounded was Canrobert. The Russian loss was some 12,000. Prince Menschikoff was slightly hurt. The field of battle presented a more than usually horrible spectacle, for the dead and wounded lay within a space about a mile and a half long and half a mile deep, while about the Sandbag Battery the corpses were piled in heaps.

No one alive on that bloody field, except Lord Raglan, had ever seen so sad a spectacle. The Duke of Cambridge was so deeply affected by the loss of the Guards alone that he fell sick, and shortly afterwards went home. Sir De Lacy Evans, ill though he was, had come up from Balaclava in time to see the crisis and the close of the fight; and he is said to have taken the gloomiest views of the prospects of the Allies, and even to have advised the abandonment of the whole enterprise. And, indeed, the Allies were in a dreadful plight. They had won a victory, but at a cost which forbade all further progress with the siege for some time.

But now we must quit the Black Sea and its shores for a space, and narrate the proceedings of the fleet in the Baltic; and then proceed to blend together the winter incidents in the Crimea and the astonishing proceedings of the British Parliament and the British people.

The British nation is naturally and justly proud of its navy; but, considering that they are a maritime people, they are--or were in 1854--singularly ignorant of the true functions of a fleet. When Queen Victoria led the squadron under Sir Charles Napier out of Spithead, on the 11th of March, the popular impression was that the admiral, with eight screw line-of-battle ships, four screw frigates, and three paddle-wheel steamers, would be able, not only to keep the Russian fleet in harbour, but demolish Cronstadt and Sweaborg, and this impression Ministers and admiral did their best to strengthen by vainglorious speeches at a public banquet.

The real fact is, that the Government prescribed to themselves very limited and reasonable but highly useful objects. The Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland consisted of no less than twenty-seven sail of the line, seventeen lesser men-of-war, frigates, and corvettes, and an unknown number of gunboats--perhaps one hundred and fifty. These ships and boats were well manned, and mounted upwards of 3,000 guns; but their situation was peculiar. They were all in the Gulf of Finland, except a few gunboats; and the Gulf of Finland was frozen. Supposing they could get out of the Gulf of Finland, they would have been able to cruise in the Baltic, menace both Copenhagen and Stockholm (if that were deemed expedient policy), and send their lighter ships, and some of the heavier, through the Great Belt or the Sound into the North Sea, to prey on the commerce of the Allies. It was therefore of the last importance that this Russian fleet should be prevented from leaving the Gulf of Finland. That was the primary object of the occupation of the Baltic to be effected by Sir Charles Napier. If he did this, and could do no more, much would be done.

It would be tedious and profitless to follow the British men-of-war in their wanderings to and fro in these northern seas. As the Russians would not come out and fight, all that could be done, even after the French arrived, was to maintain a blockade of the ports, and inflict such damage on the coasts of the enemy as the means at the disposal of the admirals would permit. Before the French arrived Admiral Plumridge had reconnoitred the Åland Islands, and had swept the Finnish coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, taking within a month forty-six merchant ships, and destroying immense quantities of pitch and tar and naval stores. He had visited the important ports, and, by the aid of his boats, had done this damage between Abo and Brahestad. The stores destroyed were public property, for private property he respected.

In the meantime Sir Charles Napier went up the Gulf of Finland to look at Sweaborg. On the 13th of June Admiral Parseval-Deschenes joined him at Bomarsund, bringing twenty-eight ships, of which six were sailing line-of-battle ships and only one a screw line-of-battle ship. The allied fleet, exclusive of the ships doing duty as blockaders, now amounted to forty-seven sail. The Russian fleet lay in two divisions, one at Cronstadt, the other at Sweaborg; and although Sir Charles gave them plenty of opportunities, neither of them would come out and fight him together or singly. As there was so great a clamour in England for an attack upon the fortresses, it is supposed that the Russians hoped the admirals would attack one or the other, so that while they were suffering from the fire of the forts, the Russian fleets might sail out, fall upon and destroy them. The two admirals, however, were not to be so caught. They went together, in the middle of June, to reconnoitre Cronstadt, and, as was anticipated, found it out of their reach. The water was so shallow and so commanded by forts that a direct attack would have been a criminal folly, while the enemy had blocked up with sunken obstructions the passage on the northern side by which, it was just possible, the lighter ships might have got into the rear of the place. The fact is, that without gunboats and light ships, and, above all, without an army, neither Cronstadt nor Sweaborg could be attacked with success.

But there was one place within their power. At the southern end of the Gulf of Bothnia, over against Stockholm, and within a few miles of the Swedish coast, lie the Åland Islands. On one of these islands, the Czar, at great cost, had built the fortress of Bomarsund. It was to Stockholm what Sebastopol was to Constantinople--a "standing menace." Built on an island, it lay within reach of the Allies, and they resolved to capture and destroy it. But this could not be done without troops. So the French Government agreed to supply 10,000 men; and they were embarked at Boulogne in British ships, and commanded by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. The plan of the Allies was to land the troops, and, taking the outworks, breach the main fort from the rear. This was practicable, with the force in hand, because our ships commanded the sea and no army could march to succour the place.

The Allies resolved to land on the western shore of the bay and on the northern shore of the island on the 8th of August. Day breaks early in those high latitudes, and at two o'clock some French and British ships opened fire on the woods to cover the landing, while others attacked the battery and shelled Fort Tzee to occupy their attention. In a short time the battery was abandoned, and the Allies were in possession of it. All this time the troops had been pouring ashore, and by eight o'clock 10,000 men were marching through the woods, turning the enemy's works. They encamped about two miles from Fort Tzee, on the north of a glen affording plenty of water, while the fir groves furnished wood. The French battery opened fire on Fort Tzee on the 13th; and while the shot from the heavy guns and the shells from the mortars tore down the walls, the riflemen lying among the rocks threw into the embrasures a fire so searching, that the enemy's gunners found it difficult to load their pieces. In the afternoon the Russians hung out a white flag. It is said they asked an hour to bury their dead, and that the boon being granted, they used the time to replenish their store of ammunition. The fire was renewed, and later another flag of truce was displayed. This time General Baraguay d'Hilliers refused to parley, because of the abuse of the previous suspension of the cannonade. The next morning, the guns of the fort being silent, the French riflemen dashed in and captured the work with fifty prisoners. The British battery had been constructed under a heavy fire. It was finished on the 14th, but not being wanted, its guns were turned upon Fort Nottich on the 15th; and at six in the evening, one side of the tower being demolished, the garrison surrendered. On the morning of the 16th the main fort and the Presto tower alone held out. They had been under the fire of the ships for some days, and now the great fort was entirely commanded from the rear by the shore batteries. General Bodisco, having no hope of succour, was without warrant for a bloody defence. So at noon he hung out a white flag and surrendered. It was resolved to blow up all the works--a resolution carried out very completely by the beginning of September.

With this exploit the showy work of the naval campaign in the Baltic ended. The blockade was maintained until the ice interposed an utterly impassable barrier; Sweaborg was reconnoitred, and very antagonistic schemes were propounded for its capture; some misunderstandings arose between Admiral Napier and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham; but in the end the ice and the fierce tempests came, and arrested the cruising of ships, although they could not stop the squabbling of men. The British fleet was the first to enter and the last to leave the Baltic, and the frigates did not reach home until November.

We have already stated that after the battle of Inkermann the British general found himself compelled, with diminished forces, to maintain a purely defensive attitude in the face of a weakened, but still numerous and vigilant enemy. The character of the expedition had wholly changed. It was intended to be a temporary operation, swift and complete. It became a permanent invasion. Not only the enemy, but the winter had to be fronted. The Czar counted on his generals, January and February, as well as on Todleben and Gortschakoff. He trusted to rain, mud, and snow to weaken the forces, and wear out the hardihood of the British, and exhaust the spirit of the French. Like many others he cradled himself in delusions. For, whatever may have been the effect of suspense on the French soldier, the French Emperor could not afford to fail; and it so happened that the British nation, with astonishing unanimity, had set its heart on the destruction of Sebastopol; and rarely in history can you find an instance of failure to accomplish a settled purpose really formed by the British nation. In this present case they were severely tried; but, though they were truculent, and angry, and irrational because Sebastopol had not been taken in October; though they turned furiously upon the Government at home and the general in the Crimea; yet not for one moment did they relent or shrink from their fixed resolve; rather did they insist, with a vehemence without parallel, on the full achievement of the main object, until the phrase--"vigorous prosecution of the war," heard on every lip, became a tedious but still vital commonplace.

The general and the troops who were working out their resolve in the Crimea were tried more severely than they. With November had come, not only a bloody battle, but a painful change in the climate. The soft, calm, sunny days of October faded away. The Black Sea began to show the appropriateness of the name it bore. Thick mists covered the surface of its dark grey waters; heavy clouds overspread the clear blue sky. Rain fell, sometimes in drenching showers, sometimes in thick, small drops; and the earth absorbing the moisture, began to change into mud. Then, with a fierceness gathered from a triumphant rush over the whole breadth of the Black Sea, there came swooping upon the southern shores of the Crimea a tempest memorable for its potency and destructiveness--the famous storm of the 14th of November.

The wind came from the south. First came heavy squalls and pelting rain; then the wind became more continuous and stronger, and the rain thicker, beating on the earth with a hoarse sound, and forcing its way through the canvas of the tents. It was early morning, and weary sleepers were awakened by the uproar. In a few minutes nearly every tent on the plateau was down. No fires could be lighted, no food cooked. All around was one common desolation; for the hospital tents had shared the fate of the others, and the sick lay exposed to all the violence of the tempest. The wooden structures erected by the French for their sick went down before the gale, and only a few planks remained. Generals, officers, soldiers, sick and wounded, hale and well, were in a like predicament. And when the wind fell a little--that is, became a little less violent--the air became colder, and the rain became sleet and snow, men and horses perished from exposure.

But the horrors of that day were most horrible off Balaclava. There hundreds of lives were lost in a few hours. Outside the port, at anchor in deep water, were twenty-two ships. Among them were the four war-steamers Retribution, Niger, Vulcan, and Vesuvius; four fine steam transports, including the Prince, whose hold was filled with warm clothing for the troops; ten sailing transports, and four freight ships. Caught by the full violence of the storm, some were washed ashore, others, including the Prince, went down.

This terrible tempest was the climax of our misfortunes. The battle of Inkermann had proved that the army must winter on those desolate hills; the effects of the storm made it manifest that the troops would have to face the winter without adequate supplies. No fewer than 2,500 watch coats, 16,000 blankets, 3,700 rugs, 53,000 woollen frocks, 19,000 lamb's-wool drawers, 35,700 socks, 12,880 pairs of boots, 1,800 pairs of shoes, and stores of drugs and other necessaries were lost in the Prince. Fourteen of the wrecked transports were laden with forage and provisions--namely, 359,714 pounds of biscuit, 74,880 pounds of salt meat, 157 head of cattle, 645 sheep, 8,000 gallons of rum, 73,986 pounds of rice, 11,200 pounds of green coffee, 1,116,172 pounds of forage corn, and 800,000 pounds of pressed hay. With the Resolute were engulfed several million rounds of ball cartridge, and the reserve ammunition for the artillery. Even these losses do not measure the extent of the calamity, for many ships were injured so much that the army was for a long time deficient in sea transport, and consequently in the means of repairing the ravages inflicted by the storm on stores of all kinds. Although the harbour of Balaclava was, after the 25th of October, in danger of being seized by the enemy, there seems to have been no good reason why that risk should not have been incurred, and the Prince and the Resolute allowed to anchor inside. Lord Raglan, immediately after the battle of Inkermann, had taken steps to obtain clothing and shelter, and ample supplies of food. But in the interval the troops suffered greatly. For the remainder of November it rained almost without cessation, and the plains became one vast quagmire. So the road to the camps became a track of liquid mud; the valley of Balaclava desolated and melancholy; the town as muddy as the plains, and the tideless harbour a common sewer. For several weeks the men were without proper clothing, fuel, or food, and the result was an outbreak of cholera. In the camp hospitals men lay down to die upon the bare ground; in the hospitals at Scutari, ignorance, dirt, and confusion prevailed, besides a want of ambulance to carry the invalid soldier from camp to port, and of accommodation on board ship.

When the people heard of the sufferings of their soldiers in the Crimea and at Scutari they became indignant and unreasonable: they ascribed the failure of the expedition and the distresses of the troops to the wrong causes, and they demanded the recall of the general and the dismissal of the Government. To understand how this came about, we must consider how the Government conducted the war, and the means at hand wherewith to conduct it.

For nearly forty years the British nation had not taken any part in a war in Europe. The vast expense of the war against the first Napoleon, the suffering it caused, the habits of despotic government which it induced, the obstinate resistance of a great party to needful reforms, had all served to inspire a dread of a standing army. The consequences were most serious. The nation was in danger of having no army at all. At no period subsequently to 1815 was Britain in a condition to go to war. The pith of the army, the infantry, consisted of a number of very fine regiments, kept down at the lowest numerical condition. The cavalry regiments were good, but in numbers they were each barely equal to two good squadrons. There were in England but a very few guns in fighting order. There was a weak commissariat; there was no land transport corps or military train. Such a thing as a camp of exercise was unknown until 1853. There were no opportunities for handling large masses of all arms. The militia even was suffered to fall into abeyance for many years. There were men in England fully alive to the consequences of this neglect of the military machine; but their voices were not heeded until the revolutions of 1848 and the success of Louis Napoleon in 1851 roused the whole nation from its apathy. An improved tone in public feeling, a better estimate of the real value of a good army, and a real dread of danger from without, led to some improvements. The militia force was revived. Lord Hardinge had the courage to insist on the adoption of the Minié rifle, and Mr. Sidney Herbert prevailed on his colleagues to establish a camp. The artillery was placed in a state of great efficiency. But that man would, in 1852-3, have been regarded as mad who proposed a military train, an ambulance corps, and an effective military staff. These necessary parts of an army were not in existence.

The army in 1853 consisted of little more than 102,000 men for the service of the British Empire, exclusive of India. In 1854 Ministers proposed and carried, in February, an augmentation of 10,000, bringing up the total to 112,000. These men they had to obtain by enlistment, for the militia then was young, and little more than a paper force. It was not embodied, nor had the Government power to embody a single regiment; for the militia had been raised to resist invasion only, so jealous were the Commons; and Ministers, before they could call out a man, except for the annual training, were obliged to obtain an Act of Parliament. Moreover, just on the threshold of war, so rotten was the system of promotion and retirement, that they were compelled to appoint a Royal Commission to report on the best mode of enabling the Queen to avail herself of the services of officers in the full vigour of life. Thus Europe was astonished at the spectacle of a great Power remodelling its military system, enlarging it, and strengthening it, on the brink of a conflict with the vast and well-appointed armies of Russia. For it was soon found that the Ministry of War must be separated from that of the Colonies; and when this was done, no minute defining the powers and functions of the new department was framed; so that the Duke of Newcastle, who left the Colonies for the new War department, had to grope his way towards the vital work he had undertaken to do. The duke was a man of some hardihood, and great energy and industry; but he was new to the business, he had not sufficient weight in the Cabinet; one at least of his colleagues envied him the place he filled; and it may be surmised that with all his good intentions, Lord Aberdeen's innate repugnance to war exercised, unconsciously, a paralysing influence over the whole Cabinet. A more vigorous and decided mind at the head of the executive would have begun in 1853 to make those preparations which, made then, would have prevented so much suffering in the winter of 1854. A man of greater weight at the War Office would, even in 1854, have been able to impress his colleagues with a sense of the magnitude of the impending conflict, and have obtained their assent to the most vigorous exertions, made with a distinct perception of all that was required to enable Britain to carry on her share of the war in a manner consistent with the wishes of the people and her character as a great Power.

The Government doubted--at least the Aberdeen section--if the House of Commons would sanction the policy which they had pursued. There was one man in the Cabinet who had what the first Napoleon called "popular fibre" in his constitution, but he was in the Home Office. Lord Palmerston understood the crisis better than any of his colleagues, and would, in 1853, have taken means to back up his diplomacy. Lord Aberdeen was afraid of appearing to threaten, or to do anything which might lay him open to the factious charge of provoking hostilities. So timid were the Government that, as we have said, they allowed 1853 to slip by without obtaining power to embody the militia, except in the improbable event of an invasion; and when Parliament met, they only asked for an addition to the army of 10,000 men, because they thought the House of Commons should sanction their policy before they brought the army, even on paper, up to a reasonable strength. Such was the fruit of an unwholesome dread of war, a lingering belief that peace was still probable, and a misapprehension of the character of the Czar.

Yet, although at the opening of the Session it was manifest that the Ministry had nothing to fear from the Opposition beyond the usual criticism, and that, as a set-off against this, they had the cordial support of the people, it was not until March that they asked for 15,000 more men, and not until May that they demanded an additional 15,000, and obtained the ready assent to the embodiment of the militia, and power to accept the offer of their services for the Mediterranean and colonial garrisons. But this was too late, for it was found that only boys enlisted; and although, in two months, so far as mere drill goes, you can make a good infantry soldier, in two months a boy does not grow into a man. The Duke of Newcastle drew off from the colonies every man he could lay his hands on, and formed a reserve, which, in June, went to the East under Sir George Cathcart. He then formed another reserve, by abstracting more regiments from the colonies, and denuding the Mediterranean fortresses of regular troops. This second reserve went to the Crimea after the battle of Inkermann. Then the supplies of real soldiers were quite exhausted. We had nothing to send but raw youths, unfit to sustain the hardships of a winter campaign. We could only send gristle, instead of bone and sinew. This was the consequence of not augmenting the army in 1853. Correctly speaking, it was a consequence of the neglect to maintain an efficient and numerous army for many years.

The violence of national feeling was rising, thanks chiefly to the graphic reports sent home by the correspondent of the Times, Mr. Russell, when Ministers found it necessary to summon Parliament that they might obtain power to raise a Foreign Legion, and power to accept the offers of militia regiments to do garrison duty abroad--two measures due to suggestions of the Prince Consort. The two Houses met on the 12th of December, and sat until the 23rd. The whole policy of the war was discussed as well as the state of the army in the Crimea; but although the Opposition, led by Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli, tried to defeat both measures, they were carried by considerable majorities. The speeches delivered during this short Session served to herald the storm that was about to burst over the Government in January.

The virulence of the paper war at home increased during the recess. Every victim on the muddy and half-frozen plains of the Crimea sent home doleful and indignant accounts of his sufferings. Many of these terrible stories were pure inventions; but everything, without discrimination, was printed and believed. Many were the pieces of foolish advice tendered to the Government. But next to a genuine desire to relieve the suffering of the soldiers, was a desire to punish somebody. The attacks in the newspapers became more fierce when it was known or surmised that there were members of the Cabinet who reeled under this storm of public censure; and it was soon manifest that when Parliament again assembled the Ministers would be driven from power.

Parliament met on the 23rd of January, 1855, and Lord Ellenborough, Mr. Roebuck, and Lord Lyndhurst at once put hostile notices of motion on the paper. Mr. Roebuck proposed an inquiry, by a committee of the House, into the condition of the army in the Crimea, and the conduct of the departments whose duty it was to minister to the wants of that army. Lord Ellenborough intended to ask for returns showing the number of the force sent out, and the number of killed, wounded, and sick. Lord Lyndhurst's notice of motion embodied a censure on the Government. These were symptoms of the exasperated state of public feeling. More than this, there was a statesman who flinched from sharing with his colleagues the responsibilities of the moment. On the very day, the 25th, set apart for the discussion of Mr. Roebuck's motion, it became known that Lord John Russell had resigned. From that moment the fate of the Ministry was decided. On the 26th Lord John stated why he had abandoned his colleagues. His reasons were twofold:--First, he could not resist Mr. Roebuck's motion for inquiry, because it was notorious that the condition of the army in the Crimea was melancholy--nay, horrible and heart-rending; but he failed to show how inquiry would better its condition. Next, in a tone of complaint, he insinuated that he had long been dissatisfied with the management of the War department, and that his suggested reforms had not been adopted. It appeared that, although he had concurred in the appointment of the Duke of Newcastle, he had, in November, that is, when the tide seemed flowing against the Allies, thought that there should be a strong Minister of War, and that Lord Palmerston should be that Minister. To this Lord Aberdeen demurred. Lord John gave up his point at the suggestion of Lord Palmerston, and dropped the subject. But when Mr. Roebuck made his motion, he saw the danger it involved and ran away. Lord Palmerston very properly said that the course taken by his noble friend was not in correspondence with the usual practice of public men. He ought to have given his colleagues the option of considering whether they would accept his views or lose his services. Lord John had attended in his place on the 23rd; he had walked from the House with a colleague, giving no hint of his intention. At midnight he sent a note tendering his resignation. The Government, he added, would not run away from Mr. Roebuck's motion. "It would be disgraceful not to meet it standing in the position which we now occupy--minus my noble friend." They did meet it, and it was carried by 305 to 148. Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues immediately resigned, and, as it was justly and shrewdly said, the Duke of Newcastle was made the "Byng" of the day. The sole object of the motion was to turn out the Ministry, and that object was accomplished. The public demanded a victim, and, as usual, one was provided. In the meantime those measures which remedied the evils in the Crimea were already in operation, and the committee about to sit became a committee for the gratification of curiosity, and for the raking together of materials to form a bill of indictment against the Duke of Newcastle and the Aberdeen Government. It was absolutely powerless to do a single act for the bettering of the condition of the soldier, or the promoting of the success of our arms.

Lord John Russell's conduct on this occasion was a blot upon a very bright escutcheon. He had all along been jealous of the Duke of Newcastle. He had, and it was a right thing to do, forced on a division of the Ministries of War and the Colonies, but he had done so without providing a definite plan for the conduct of the new department. When the Cabinet determined to separate the two secretaryships, he was annoyed that the Duke of Newcastle selected the post of danger--the War department. He had actually thought of occupying it himself, thus justifying the famous remark of Sydney Smith, that Lord John would not hesitate to take the command of a Channel fleet. When the duke was seated, with the full consent of his colleagues, Lord John pursued him with foolish criticisms, which were immediately disposed of as they deserved. When all seemed to be going well, Lord John wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, "You have done all that could be done, and I am sanguine of success." When calamity began to fall upon the army, Lord John revived the old exploded criticisms, and wished to substitute Lord Palmerston for the duke. But the whole Cabinet dissented. Lord John retained his opinion, and intended to insist upon it; but before Parliament met in December, he told Lord Aberdeen that, having consulted his friends, he had changed his views, and no longer wished to oust the duke from his office. From that time to the meeting of Parliament in January he gave no sign. But public opinion was loud and fierce, and Lord John could not bear its anger; and in the dead of the night, from his domestic hearth, he wrote the hurried and brief announcement of his intention to fly from a sinking ship.

There were some difficulties in forming a new Ministry. The Queen sent for Lord Derby; he accepted her Majesty's commission to frame a Cabinet, and he invited the co-operation of Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sidney Herbert--the very Ministers whom his party had just censured! They declined; and as Lord Derby, much to the chagrin of Mr. Disraeli, would not venture without them, he threw up his commission. Lord Lansdowne declined the Premiership. As the contingent led into the Opposition ranks by Lord John formed part of the majority, her Majesty then commanded him to form a Cabinet. But in the circumstances he could get no one to back him, and then her Majesty called in Lord Palmerston. But few days had elapsed since he and others had fallen under a vote of censure. Yet he now was able to construct a new Ministry out of old materials. Lord Aberdeen, Lord John Russell, and the Duke of Newcastle, of course, could not well form part of the new Cabinet. Lord Palmerston succeeded Lord Aberdeen; Lord Panmure replaced the Duke of Newcastle; Earl Granville succeeded Lord John as President of the Council; and Lord Canning obtained a seat in the Cabinet. These were the only material changes. It was understood that the policy of the new Cabinet should be the policy of the old one. So that nothing was gained except the exclusion of two men by a vote of the House, and the self-exclusion of a third. This Government, however, lasted only a few days. Lord Palmerston declared that he was still opposed to the Committee of Inquiry as unconstitutional and inefficient for its purpose. The Government, he said, had already begun the needed reforms--had remodelled the War department, established a transport board at the Admiralty, and were about to send commissioners to the Crimea and reorganise the medical department at home. But Mr. Roebuck insisted on appointing his committee; and as Lord Palmerston was not willing to run counter to the desire of the public, which found expression in Mr. Roebuck's motion, and would no longer resist the appointment of the committee, Mr. Sidney Herbert, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Cardwell, and Sir James Graham resigned. So the committee was appointed, and Lord Palmerston formed a fresh Ministry.

The new members were Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord John Russell, Colonial Secretary; Mr. Vernon Smith, India Board; the Earl of Harrowby, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; while Sir Charles Wood, quitting the India Board, became First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord Carlisle went to Ireland in the room of Lord St. Germans. The object of the original movers in this business had now been accomplished: the Peelites had been driven out of the Government altogether. So much of the home history of England it seemed needful to introduce here. We must now return to the Crimea, and endeavour to describe what really happened there, and show how far the popular outcry was justified.

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VI. THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued)

State of the Army--Food, Clothing, and Shelter--Absence of a Road--Want of Transport--Numbers of the Sick--State of the Hospitals--Miss Nightingale--Mr. Roebuck's Committee--Military Operations--The French Mistake--Improvement of the Situation--Arrival of General Niel--Attack upon the Malakoff Hill approved--The Russian Redoubt constructed--Attacks and Counter-Attacks--Death of Nicholas--Todleben's Counter-Approaches--The 23rd of March--Raglan and Canrobert disagree--The second Bombardment--Egerton's Pit--Night Attack of General de Salles--The Emperor's Interference--Canrobert's Indecision--The Kertch Project--Orders and Counter-Orders--Recall of the Expedition--It is finally abandoned--Arrival of the Sardinian Contingent--The Emperor's Visit to Windsor--The Emperor's Plan of Campaign--It is rejected by Raglan and Omar--Resignation of Canrobert.

The state of the army in the Crimea after the battle of Inkermann was most painful. The troops had to preserve their own existence, and to defend the ground they occupied in the face of a watchful enemy. Their base of operations, their source of supply, was Balaclava; and the road, or, rather track, from that place to the camp was a mere quagmire. As we have already stated, the numbers of the army were inadequate to the work imposed upon them, and the suffering they endured arose in a great part from that cause, but not entirely. The men were not "starved," as stated at the time. Up to the middle of November no army had ever been better fed. The rations were large and varied, and the troops received them just as regularly as if they had been at home. After November, parts of the extra rations were not always delivered; but not a day passed on which the men did not obtain a good supply of the necessaries of life. But then it was said they were not clothed. Now, although the Government did not anticipate that the army would winter in the Crimea, they did, in the summer, make provision for supplying that army, which must winter somewhere, with winter clothing. The requisitions were made upon proper departments as early as July. The ships freighted therewith sailed from England in October, and of these the Prince only was lost. When the news of that calamity arrived in England, while Lord Raglan had sent to Constantinople for warm clothing, the Duke of Newcastle issued fresh orders at home, and saw that they were executed. There never was a time after the end of November when there was not more warm clothing at Balaclava than the means at the disposal of the army could carry to the front. In the same way there was a deficiency of shelter. The troops, when covered, were covered only by single canvas, except in some rare instances where old campaigners had made themselves imperfect huts out of stones and branches of trees. But from the end of November there was a large quantity of wood at Balaclava. It was the same with fuel. There was always charcoal to be had at Balaclava by those who could fetch it. Moreover, there were enormous magazines of provisions and large herds of cattle at Constantinople. Nor were forage and chopped straw ever deficient; and even the supply of hay, which had to be sent all the way from England, was only interrupted for a short time. So that the supplies of these essentials--food, clothing, shelter, fuel, forage--were duly provided for the army. Private benevolence had come in to supplement public exertion; and Balaclava, in the winter, was choked up with luxuries and essentials.

But there were two things which had not been provided, and these were also essentials. No road had been made; and, in the absence of a road, no transport able to overcome the tremendous difficulties of the transit from Balaclava to the camp had been collected. Here were the sources of the greater part of the suffering and loss endured by the army. What was called the road was a mere track across the open country. While the fine weather lasted, it was hard and sound. When the rain fell continuously, it broke up; that is, became a strip of deep mud, varied by deep holes full of water, impassable to carts and waggons, passable only by men and horses with great labour and fatigue. But why not repair it? The thing was tried and failed. Turks were employed to mend this road, but they could not do it. The truth is that the road required to be made; that is, built upon a good foundation, and kept in order by constant attention. Why was this not done? For a plain and sufficient reason. It is usual for an army to find its own labourers. An army makes its own roads, builds its own bridges, erects its own batteries, constructs its own depôts. The army in the Crimea was too weak to make a road from Balaclava to the front, and no one had sufficient resource to send for labourers from England.

In these circumstances the horrors of the winter could only be mitigated by an ample supply of mules and horses. By the breaking up of the road, the land transport at the disposal of Commissary-General Filder was reduced to one-sixth; for whereas a horse and cart could transport six hundred pounds' weight to the front, a horse alone could only carry two hundred pounds'. It follows that the supplies could only be maintained by extra work on the part of the animals, or by an extra number of animals. At a critical moment, when he wanted more horse power, Mr. Filder sent a steamer to fetch animals from his depôt; but, by some cause unexplained, the steamer was detained at Constantinople for three weeks. Then, although there was a large park of ponies and horses on the Bosphorus, they not being forthcoming, the valuable chargers of the cavalry, and even the teams of the artillery and the horses belonging to the officers, were put in requisition. Still all this was not enough. The horses, from hard usage by their drivers and keepers, from overwork and exposure, from neglect to feed them, although forage was at hand, died by scores. The drivers, imported from Turkey, died, deserted, refused to work: they could not stand the exposure and fatigue. The consequence was that, during the most critical period, there was never more transport than was sufficient to feed the troops irregularly and from hand to mouth, and to keep the men and guns supplied with the minimum of ammunition consistent with safety. The burden of responsibility, the amount of work required from the commissariat, was too heavy and too vast for a body so imperfectly organised and so undermanned. The harbour of Balaclava was too small, its shores were too confined, for the service demanded at an emergency. Months of labour were required to make it suitable. But making every allowance--and the exceptional position of the commissariat, with large extra labours imposed upon it, requires in justice large allowance--it is plain that, from some cause never fully explained, the commissariat failed to import and keep in the Crimea a supply of transport adequate to the extraordinary demands of the army. When the perilous position of the army dawned upon them, Ministers thought of an Army Works Corps, employed Messrs. Peto & Co. to make a railway, and instructed Colonel M'Murdo to raise a Land Transport Corps. But then it was too late. So we come round again to the original sources--not of all the suffering, for war and suffering are inseparable--but of the peculiar kind of suffering endured by the army in the Crimea, namely, inadequate and unorganised military establishments; and the responsibility for this rested not upon one Government alone, but upon all Governments from 1830 up to that time, and not upon all Governments only, but also upon the nation.

Had there been a good road from Balaclava to the camp--had there been plenty of transport, plenty of clothing, plenty of shelter, plenty of fuel--the sufferings of the army from hard work and exposure would have been very great; for war is not a condition of existence conducive to health and long life, even in the most favourable circumstances; and when war is carried on through the winter, when the form of that war is a siege, when the army carrying on the siege is itself besieged by the enemy, and restricted to one narrow pass leading to a little bay for all its supplies, for everything to keep it alive except water, the ordinary miseries and hardships of war become intense, terrible, and destructive. So it was in the Crimea. Scantily clothed, irregularly fed, existing, when on duty, in the mud and water of the trenches, sleeping, when they returned to their tents, in wet clothes on a wet floor, improvident of the little means within their reach which would have lessened their sufferings, none but the most iron constitutions could endure this and live. Our brave, obstinate, hardy soldiers were like children in all that lies beyond the range of their regular duties, and many perished because they were ignorant and reckless. But the bulk of the sickness and mortality was caused by overwork and exposure, necessarily consequent upon the discharge of their duty. A few figures will suggest better than pages of writing how much this army suffered. On the 1st of October--that is, just after the arrival of the army before Sebastopol--the number of men and officers in a state fit for duty was 23,000; and the number sick, including the wounded, was 6,713. On the 3rd of November the number fit for duty had fallen to 22,343, the number of sick had increased to 7,116. Then came the battle of Inkermann. On the 14th of November the effective force was 20,780, the number of sick and wounded 8,366. The force of "bayonets"--that is, privates and corporals of infantry, "rank and file," as the technical term is--had fallen to 14,874; and it is on the bayonets that a quartermaster-general relies for his working and fatigue parties. But now reinforcements began to trickle in. Troops to the number of 3,480 men arrived. Yet so severe was the pressure, even in the middle of November, that this augmentation only raised the effective force from 20,780 to 22,825. The next item explains this. The roll of sick had risen from 8,366 to 9,170, an increase of 804 in one week. A week later, on the 30th of November, in spite of the reinforcements, the effective force had fallen to 21,895; the sick had increased to 10,095, although 640 men had landed in the interval. Let us pass over a month--a month in which nearly 5,000 men landed at Balaclava. What do we find? That on the 1st of January, 1855, the effective force stands at only 21,973, or 78 more than it stood on the 30th of November; while the number of sick had increased to 13,915. A fortnight later, and the effective force was 20,444; the sick 16,176; while the force of bayonets was actually fewer by 36 than it was on the 14th of November, before any of the 10,000 reinforcements had arrived. Nor must it be forgotten that all this time the dead were being buried, and the convalescents were returning to duty, and going again into the hospital. These figures are the measure of the unspeakable sufferings of the army in the Crimea, the main and unavoidable causes of which we have described.

But these figures do not convey a full idea of the agonies of that winter campaign, except to those gifted with a lively imagination. It was the treatment of the sick and wounded, both in and out of the Crimea, that occasioned the worst of these agonies. The medical department utterly broke down under the burden thrown upon it. Although more medical men and more medicines and medical comforts were sent out to the East than ever were supplied to a force of similar strength, yet, in consequence of want of foresight, want of faculty, want of administrative skill, the medicines and medical comforts were so badly arranged and distributed, that, especially in the Crimea, they were not at hand when most required. The state of the hospitals at Scutari was the first thing that roused the public indignation. Government, having failed to organise a medical staff corps, had recourse to Miss Nightingale and a number of trained nurses collected by her, and sent them to the East; and the brightest picture in the dark story of the winter of 1854-5 is that of Florence Nightingale bringing order out of chaos, and tending the sick and wounded soldiers of England, in those far-off hospitals on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. That was the work of Government. The public feeling showed itself in another form. Sir Robert Peel proposed to raise £10,000 for supplying the sick with comforts, to be called the Times Fund, and put down £200 towards it; and in a few days the whole amount demanded had reached Printing House Square. Three gentlemen were sent to superintend the expenditure, and it is to Miss Nightingale principally, and to these private persons, that we are bound to attribute the alleviation of the sad state of the sick and wounded at Scutari in the winter of 1854-5. The truth is, that Government had been kept in the dark as to the condition of the hospitals. Knowing that amply sufficient supplies had been sent to the East, they were confounded when they heard that not comforts only, but actual necessaries, were wanting. When we look into the facts, it is manifest that the medical department in the East had not been well organised on a scale sufficiently large, and that it had not been governed by men of energy, foresight, and decision. Hence the horrible condition of the tent-hospitals in the Crimea, and the various hospitals on the Bosphorus. It is impossible to exonerate Government from censure, but it is equally impossible not to see the evil influence of a system adapted to a state of peace suddenly applied to a state of war. By slow degrees all the hospitals were improved, and finally brought up to a state of high efficiency; but in the meantime thousands had died, and hundreds had become permanent invalids; and it is this loss of life which is the heaviest charge that lies at the door of the Aberdeen Administration.

Hence grew the demand for the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol. Those who originated it used, throughout the inquiry, the great power it gave them as a means of obtaining grounds, real and colourable, to sustain the preconceived conclusions with which they began their inquisition. It was a most imperfect investigation. "The fulness of the investigation," as the Committee had the candour to confess, "has been restricted by considerations of State policy, so that in the outset of this report, your Committee must admit that they have been compelled to aid an inquiry which they have been unable satisfactorily to complete." Indeed, to have probed the matter to the bottom, the Committee should have called at least General Canrobert and the Emperor of the French from the ranks of our allies, and in no case could any investigation be fair which did not include the evidence of Lord Raglan, General Airey, Mr. Filder, Miss Nightingale, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Yet, without having examined any of these, Mr. Roebuck coolly asked the Committee to endorse the most sweeping and arrogant charges against the principal persons concerned, including those who were absent, and unable to say a word in their own defence. And although the report drawn up by Mr. Roebuck and Mr. Layard was rejected by all the other members of the Committee, by his casting vote Mr. Roebuck was enabled to append a paragraph replete with epigrammatic assertions that were untrue. By the time this Committee had ended an inquiry that they could not, from the very character of the investigation, complete, the army had recovered its health, strength, and efficiency, and the new Minister of War, Lord Panmure, had, in his place, candidly ascribed the change in the army, in great part, to the measures of the very Minister, the Duke of Newcastle, who had been made the victim of the national fury.

It is a relief to turn from party conflicts and the exhibition of national wrath, not in the wisest form, to the military operations of that grievous winter campaign. The first renewed sign of military activity was seen on the 20th of November. In the vicious plan of siege adopted the British played a wholly secondary part. The French theory was, that by assailing and carrying the Flagstaff Bastion at the southern apex of the town, they would obtain possession of a commanding position, which would necessitate an abandonment of the place by the enemy. To this end they worked. But as the batteries on the eastern face of the enemy's lines took their approaches almost in flank, our engineers had to construct batteries intended to draw off and keep down the fire of these Russian works. Thus the British attacks were subordinate and supplementary to the great French attack. The British theory was that the Malakoff was the key of the whole position on the southern side of the great harbour; but the French engineers could not see the justness of this theory, and General Canrobert was not a man of sufficient moral strength to overrule his engineers, even supposing that he had sufficient military insight to comprehend the views of Sir John Burgoyne. Therefore the French persisted in their original error; and a dreary period ensued, during which the Russians made frequent sorties with partial success, while on the side of the Allies the chief success was the capture of the Russian rifle-pits by Lieutenant Tryon on the 20th of November. And so the winter wore away.

January, during which the troops suffered most from disease, was nevertheless the turning-point from gloom to brighter days. For huts and warm clothing had arrived in superabundance, and transport was improved. The shores of Balaclava bay had been rendered passable by roads on both sides, and wharves had been built. The railway was creeping out of the port and ascending the hills towards the front; and as the French had at last sent a brigade to reinforce the right at Inkermann, our men got less labour and more rest. The French had as yet no huts. They were still sheltered only in dog-tents. But they were tolerably fed and clothed, and large reinforcements, including a brigade of the new Imperial Guard, had brought their numbers up to 80,000 men. The resolve of the Allies to take Sebastopol, far from suffering any abatement, had become stronger, and every energy and resource was applied to secure its fulfilment. The Russian Emperor, the cause of this heroic conflict, was not less resolute, and day and night his thoughts were bent upon frustrating at any and every cost the designs of the Allies. The government of Lord Aberdeen had obtained from the King of Sardinia the promise that he would join the alliance, and furnish 15,000 men for service in the Crimea, and there was some reason to suppose that Austria would at length take the field; but whether it was that Austria resented the entry of Sardinia into the Western league, or whether timid counsels prevailed at Vienna, Austria did not change her position from that of a passive to that of an active ally.

The month of February was marked by many important incidents. On both sides there were renewed vigour and activity, in spite of the severity of the weather. For the French Emperor, discontented with General Canrobert, who had failed to realise the expectations formed of him, had sent out the Duke of Montebello to examine the state of the siege, and report thereon. The consequence was that General Niel, one of the first engineers in the French service, received orders to hasten to the Crimea and direct the engineering operations. Niel had not been long in the French camp before he justified the early and oft-repeated counsels of Sir John Burgoyne, and declared that the Malakoff Hill was the key of Sebastopol. It was at once determined to break ground on that side. By every fair consideration, the right of doing so should have been made over to the English. But no. There were two overmastering reasons. The British had fewer numbers by almost one-half, and the French are always greedy of glory. Lord Raglan could not insist--the alliance depended on submission. The French Emperor was bent on reaping the lion's share of the glory. He needed it for himself and his army. Thus, by force of circumstances, the British were left in their old positions, one of which, the left attack, led no whither, the other led to the Redan, which it was impossible to reach; while the French took up their ground on the plateau leading to the Malakoff, and on the heights on the right of the Careening Ravine.

Having once determined on the right point of attack, the French began to work with their usual industry, and by the middle of the month they had formed their first parallel from the Careening Ravine to the steep cliffs of the Great Harbour, had connected that parallel with the British right, and had constructed a strong redoubt and place of arms, called the Victoria Redoubt, on the upper part of the slope running down to the Malakoff. The Russians, seeing these works in progress, began to pull down the ruined tower on the Malakoff Hill, and to construct around its site that enormous redoubt which so long defied its assailants. On its right and left they were equally busy, and soon they took the daring and wise resolution of constructing counter-approaches in this quarter.

In the middle of the month, while these works of preparation were in progress, Omar Pasha won fresh laurels by repelling a vigorous attack on Eupatoria. The Allies lost 107 killed and 294 wounded. The Russian loss was estimated at 500 men. This success served to raise the reputation of the Turks and dispirit and vex the enemy, who could not feel altogether at ease with 20,000 good soldiers within two or three marches of his great north road. The day after this combat, and while the news of it was ringing through the allied camp, Lord Raglan and General Canrobert agreed upon a plan for surprising the Russians on the Tchernaya at Tchorgoun; for Prince Gortschakoff had again sent only small bodies over the river, and it was believed that the whole force on both sides of the stream might be captured. It was therefore arranged that on the 20th, while yet dark, General Bosquet should lead 12,000 men from the French camp, to co-operate with 3,000 from the British force at Balaclava, under Sir Colin Campbell, in this enterprise. But Bosquet did not move, and the affair miscarried. Nothing of importance took place during the remainder of February.

On the 2nd of March an event occurred which sanguine men thought would bring the war to a speedy end; and they thought this the more because negotiations for peace were at that moment pending in Vienna. The event was the rather sudden death of Nicholas, Czar of all the Russias. He died in the middle of the day, and five hours afterwards the news had been flashed along the electric wire to every European capital. His heir, Alexander II., who immediately ascended the throne, was described as mild and pacific by nature; nevertheless, he did not fail to tell his awe-stricken subjects that he would incessantly pursue the aims of Peter, of Catherine, of Alexander I., and of his father; aims incompatible with the peace of Europe, and the independence and integrity of Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, as well as Turkey. The news reached the allied camp on the 6th, and perhaps the "sensation" in this quarter was greater than in the capitals of Europe, for here were men engaged in frustrating one of the grandest of the comprehensive aims of Catherine and Nicholas. But really, it was not the Czar only with whom Europe was contending; it was the ambition of the Russian nobles and the traditional policy of the house of Romanoff. There was a kind of poetical justice in this sudden death of the man whose arrogance had brought calamity on his subjects.

The month of March was spent by the Allies in making preparations for a second bombardment, and by the enemy in prodigious efforts to meet and frustrate it. Far from reviving operations against the new Russian works on the Careening Ridge called by the Allies the White Works, the French allowed the enemy to strengthen and complete them. General Todleben had devised a system of counter-approaches. As the operations against Sebastopol were mainly of the nature of an attack by one army on another posted in a strongly entrenched position, the Russian engineer saw the great assistance he would derive from solid outposts, as by that method he would not only anticipate the Allies in the occupation of commanding points, but would seriously injure and annoy them. Knowing also the importance of the Mamelon, which was higher than the Malakoff Hill, the Russian general caused the Mamelon to be occupied in greater strength, and began to dig and delve upon its crest. First making rifle-pits and then connecting and enlarging these, he soon raised the nucleus of a very formidable work right in the path of the French advance on the Malakoff. Had the army been under one commander, this hill would have been seized in October. Now the French could not even sap up to it, much less assault it, because the enemy had been allowed to become so strong on our right of the Malakoff Ridge. The British immediately framed a battery with guns bearing on the Mamelon; but although they obstructed the working parties by day, at first, their fire at night was little heeded, and this outpost, set up in the face of the Allies with great hardihood, grew into a stronghold.

Having plenty of men--for they, too, had been reinforced--the Russians supported their system of counter-approaches by energetic sorties. In the month of March these fell principally upon the French. In addition to the redoubt on the Mamelon, the enemy had formed his rifle-pits in advance, like skirmishers in front of a column. The riflemen within them were very troublesome; and two or three nights in succession the French assaulted these pits. Two or three companies of Zouaves would leap out of the trenches, dash into the pits, and drive off the defenders. Then the supports would hurry up on the Russian side, and the Zouaves would have to fly before they could make good their hold. From the French trenches more men would issue. The rattle of musketry would raise the camp; horses would be saddled at headquarters, and aides would stumble hither and thither in the gloom. Suddenly the firing would die away and cease. The French had been frustrated. Determined to succeed, they began to sap towards the rifle-pits and took the outworks on the 21st. This led to something like a general action on the night of the 23rd of March.

It was about eleven o'clock when the Russians, issuing from both flanks of the Mamelon, dashed into the lodgments held by the French. They came on in such numbers and with so much resolution that the French were forced out of the pits and chased into the parallel. The Russians followed, leaping over the parapet and forming up within the trench, and continuing the fight. At the same time the batteries of the place opened a hot fire upon our lines, by way of diversion, and the right of Chruleff's heavy column of counter-assault burst in on the extreme right of our line. Then the French supports, coming down with suddenness and decision, drove the enemy over the parapet. Surprised, but not discouraged, the Russians charged again, and deadly hand to hand combats followed along the whole front. This fierce combat, lighted up by the incessant flashes of opposing musketry, and rendered bloody by the free use of the bayonet, was maintained for nearly two hours. The French not only kept the Russians at bay, but perceiving signs of yielding, they assumed the offensive and, charging, forced their foes to retire into the Mamelon. Towards the close of this fight the second and third Russian columns fell suddenly, one on the left of the right, the other on the left of the left attack. In both cases they forced their way into the British trenches. After a rough contest the enemy was driven out of our lines. This was the most severe action that had yet been fought in the trenches. The Russians lost 1,500 men killed and wounded, according to their own returns. The Allies lost 727, of whom 85 were British, so that the French must have borne the brunt of the fighting.

After the fierce combat on the 23rd of March the Allies busied themselves with preparations for a second bombardment of Sebastopol. Enormous masses of shot and shell and powder were brought up from Balaclava and Kamiesch, and deposited in the magazines. The forwardness of the railway had greatly diminished the labours of the British, and the French were so numerous that they found no difficulty in getting fatigue parties to carry on the works of approach, and to supply their guns with ample store of munitions. It was about this time that Lord Raglan and General Canrobert began to disagree on essential points. The French commander, naturally afraid of responsibility, was also much embarrassed by the perpetual interference of the Emperor Napoleon in the conduct of the war. That potentate, newly seated on the throne, was ambitious of commanding an army in the field. He had formed the plan of proceeding himself to the Crimea. The news thereof was bruited abroad throughout Europe, and of course it was known in the camp of the Allies, where, creating a state of expectation, it did not tend to impart vigour to the proceedings at the French headquarters. General Canrobert leaned to his master's views, and was afraid of doing anything which might be disapproved of at Paris. The Emperor wanted to operate in the field, and the French general, apparently desirous of keeping the army in a high state of numerical efficiency, was indisposed to thorough measures before the place. So from day to day the opening of the bombardment was deferred; sometimes at the instance of the French, sometimes at the instance of the English general. The first would be desirous of reinforcing the army by bringing up 14,000 Turks from Eupatoria, and the second, having acquiesced in the necessary delay, would begin fresh batteries, and then require further time to complete them. At length, on the 8th, Omar Pasha and his troops landed at Kamiesch, and Lord Raglan, although two of his newest and most advanced batteries were not complete, willingly gave his consent to the opening of the second bombardment on Easter Monday, the 9th of April, exactly six months from the date of the first bombardment.

During the morning of the 9th, while it was yet dark, the batteries and trenches were manned. There were in the magazines 500 rounds per gun, and 300 per mortar. The orders were to fire as soon as the enemy's works became visible. At half-past five the officers in command decided that the moment had come, and five minutes later the report of a solitary gun gave the signal so eagerly desired. In a moment the whole of our guns were in action; and in another the French began to fire; so that by a quarter to six on that dreary morning, the missiles of five hundred guns, showing a line of fire from the head of the Quarantine Bay to Inkermann, were pouring into the defences and the town of Sebastopol. No second elapsed without a shot or shell. Day after day, night after night, for a whole week, the bombardment went on with a dreadful monotony; and although our fire inflicted evidently serious damage upon the enemy, he managed to repair his works and mount fresh guns at night. The Russian writers admit a loss of fourteen guns disabled every day; yet this was comparatively of little moment to him, as he had such a boundless store of artillery. Besides the guns in the arsenal, there were all the guns of the fleet, and these resources were used unsparingly. On our side the resources of the Allies in guns and ammunition were limited. The object of the bombardment was definite. It was to reduce the fire so far as to permit of an assault. Very early in the week this effect had been produced to the utmost extent possible. Still the assault was delayed. The British alone had fired 47,000 projectiles into the enemy's works, and the French must have fired three times that number. Yet the enemy, though shattered and weakened, was unsubdued, and it was plain that this duel of opposing ordnance might go on till doomsday without a decisive result. Lord Raglan, from the first, had always proposed a heavy bombardment to be followed by a prompt and unflinching assault. To this the French general could not be got to agree.

In the meantime the British had pushed on towards the Redan. There were three large rifle-pits on the left of the third parallel of the right attack, whence the enemy annoyed our working parties and our gunners. Colonel Egerton, with a party of the 77th, was directed to carry these pits, and on the night of the 19th he moved his men out of the parallel, followed by some companies of the 33rd in support. Egerton was a very fine soldier; and although his movement was detected by the enemy, he did not give his own men time to reply to their fire, but led them on with the bayonet. The Russians, surprised, turned and hurried away; and our working parties at once began to turn the faces of the pits towards the Redan, and to connect them by the sap with the third parallel. This labour was carried on under a smart fire of shot and musketry, but it was quite successful. Colonel Egerton unhappily was killed. We retained one pit, and the next night destroyed the other two, carrying a demi-parallel in rear of them through Egerton's pit. Equally brilliant was the storming on May 1st of the pits in front of the central bastion by a French force under General de Salles. Both sides lost many hundred officers and men; but the gain of ground on the part of the French was the more important to them because it put a limit to the daring system of counter-approaches on that side. The Russians showed great jealousy of the progress of the British attacks, and on the 9th and 11th of May they made two sorties upon our parallels. The first was directed against the right attack, the second against the left. On both occasions they were met stoutly by the British troops on guard, and after a good deal of firing, driven away. In the second sortie, however, they got into one battery, and had to be expelled by the bayonet. These sorties presented splendid pyrotechnic spectacles, as they usually finished with a boisterous cannonade. They cost both sides many men, but did not stay the advance of the assailants.

We have now cleared the way for the narration of a series of very remarkable facts which occurred between the last week in April and the middle of May, and ended in a change of the chief command of the French army.

The French Emperor desired to take the most conspicuous place in the allied camp. He desired to command the allied army, and to try his skill in strategy. Early in the year he sent part of his Guard to the Crimea, and later, giving out that he intended to join the army, he directed the whole of the Guard, except the depôts, to proceed to Maslak, near Constantinople, and hold themselves ready for active service. The dominant idea in the mind of the Emperor at this time was sound enough in principle. He thought that Sebastopol could best be taken after an army operating in the field had driven the Russians beyond the Putrid Sea, and enabled the Allies to invest the place on all sides. There can now be no doubt he designed to lead that army in person. General Canrobert was allowed to have some, perhaps not very complete, glimpse of this plan. He was warned not to neglect a favourable moment, but not to risk anything. The knowledge that the Emperor was planning and scheming in Paris how he could compass the command of the Allies, weighed upon the mind of Canrobert, and greatly increased his natural shrinking from responsibility. Lord Raglan was decidedly for a general assault of Sebastopol. For a moment, on the 24th of April, Canrobert gave way before his arguments, and General Pélissier, nothing loth, received orders to prepare a force sufficient to storm the principal works, and the British plan of attack was decided on in detail. But no sooner had this been settled in council, than Canrobert recurred to his secret instructions; his doubts began as soon as he left the presence of Lord Raglan. Moreover he got fresh news from Paris that the Emperor would certainly arrive in the Crimea early in May. On the 25th, therefore, he sent two generals to Lord Raglan, to tell him that he no longer agreed with the plan of an assault, and, in consequence, all the orders given were withdrawn, and the siege relapsed into its ordinary posture.

While General Canrobert was in this dubious and painful frame of mind, Lord Raglan proposed a subsidiary project. He asked his colleague to join in an expedition having for its object the capture of the town and straits of Kertch, with the ulterior aim of naval operations in the Sea of Azoff. This project had the hearty support of Admiral Bruat and Admiral Lyons. General Canrobert unable to resist the force of the arguments addressed to him, yielded his assent, then recalled it, then, on the 1st of May, once more fell in with Lord Raglan's views. It was arranged that General d'Autemarre should take 8,000 French, and that the British should furnish 3,000, including a troop of horse, with one British and two French batteries; the whole under Sir George Brown, who was nominated for the command by Canrobert himself. These troops were collected, marched to Kamiesch, and embarked on the 3rd. They sailed away with great ostentation, going north, to bewilder the enemy; and, at night, or when out of sight of land, they went about and steered for Kertch. But, in the evening, just as our headquarters were congratulating themselves on the fact that the expedition was well on its way, General Canrobert appeared, and said he must recall the French troops at once. Why? Because he had received a peremptory order from the Emperor's Cabinet, direct by electric telegraph, to concentrate his troops. Lord Raglan said that the Emperor, when he gave that order, was not aware that the expedition had sailed, and for a moment the French general consented reluctantly to take the view it implied. But two hours later, that is, about midnight, he sent Colonel Trochu, the chief of his staff, to say that, on considering the dispatch once more he must recall and had recalled the French part of the expedition by a special steamer. Lord Raglan was vexed at this vacillation, but he could show no resentment. The expedition, if it returned, would reveal its object. The enemy might prepare to parry a similar blow. Feeling this, in his despatches to Admiral Lyons and Sir George Brown, he informed them of the falling off of their allies; but he told them they might go on alone, if they deemed it expedient, and he would shoulder the responsibility. The French steamer caught up the fleet just as it sighted Kertch, and General d'Autemarre, with some chagrin, found he must desert his comrades. Then the British steamer came up, and Lyons and Brown, considering Lord Raglan's hardy offer, thought it inexpedient to go on alone. So, to the amazement of both armies, and the profound astonishment of the Russians, the expedition returned, after revealing its object.

The French Emperor, finding he had unwittingly spoiled a fine design, sent another telegraphic message, ordering Canrobert to resume the expedition, if Lord Raglan assented. Lord Raglan, thinking the enemy, apprised of the intended attack, might have strengthened the place, said it would now be prudent to employ a larger force. To this Canrobert demurred. The fact was, he had lost a good many men in the trenches, and he was employing a whole division in perfecting the lines at Kamiesch, that essential prelude, according to Imperial views, of the Imperial plan of campaign. Omar Pasha was willing to spare 14,000 of his best troops for the Kertch expedition, but Lord Raglan did not deem it expedient to accept this offer. About this time the Sardinian contingent, under General la Marmora, landed in the Crimea. The far-sighted policy of Count Cavour had led him to join the Western League. Austria, who had not fulfilled her qualified pledge to engage in active war, was now less inclined than ever to do so. By sending her contingent to the Crimea, under the flag of Italian unity, Sardinia took rank among the effective Powers of Europe, and won that place in the general councils of Europe which Cavour knew so well how to use for the profit of his country. The Sardinian troops were under the orders of Lord Raglan. The British force now numbered 32,600 men, effective; the arrival of the Sardinian troops raised it to 47,600 men, not counting the sick.

The troubles of General Canrobert now reached a climax. His Emperor found that he could not go to command the allied army in the Crimea. The "voice" of the French people, the "prayers" of the French people, and we suspect something more potent than either, showed the Emperor that he must abandon this dream of ambition. But he was eminently gratified by the realisation of another. Louis Napoleon, Emperor of the French, and Eugénie, his Empress, became the guests of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert at Windsor Castle--recognition of royalty more precious than the glory of commanding a huge army in the Crimea.

When it was decided that his Imperial Majesty must refrain from his projected adventure in the East, he sent an aide-de-camp with a grand plan of campaign; and poor General Canrobert, already harassed by Imperial interference, had to submit this scheme of operations to Lord Raglan, and press it upon his acceptance. This he did about the 12th of May. The Emperor's proposal was to divide the armies into three. One he proposed should consist of 60,000 men, half French and half Turks. This, under Pélissier, was to hold Kamiesch and the trenches, not with the object of continuing the siege, but of blockading the south side. The French were to guard their own batteries; the Turks were to hold ours. The second army, 55,000 strong, composed of the British, with the Sardinians and certain French and Turks, the whole under Lord Raglan, was to hold the Tchernaya in front of Balaclava. Behind these, 40,000 Frenchmen were to gather ready to pour into the valley of Baidar, while 25,000 from Maslak landed at Alouchta, forced the pass of Ayen, and being joined by the 40,000 men from the valley of Baidar, moved in a compact body upon Simpheropol. Then, if the Russians advanced towards Batchiserai, Lord Raglan was to storm the heights of Mackenzie, and seize the "position" of Inkermann; but if the Russians awaited an attack on the north side, then Lord Raglan was to file through the Baidar valley, and joining Canrobert at Albat, the combined force was to advance and throw the Russians into Sebastopol or into the sea. If the pass of Ayen could not be forced, the 25,000 men sent to Alouchta were to return to Balaclava, and in that case the whole disposable force of 65,000 men was to enter the Baidar valley, and break through the mountain chain by Albat. Such was the pretty paper plan sent by the Emperor. The alternative plan was an advance from Eupatoria upon Simpheropol; but this he only discussed to destroy by numberless objections. Napoleon early in his reign acquired the habit of meddling in matters of which he was ignorant.

When General Canrobert unfolded his scheme before Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha, both the English and the Turkish chief deemed it impracticable. The immense extent of the works before Sebastopol rendered it impossible of execution in their eyes; for they rightly judged that 60,000 men, one-half Turkish, could not hold the trenches, now crowded with artillery. Lord Raglan would not entrust British guns to the guardianship of the Turks. He preferred to go on with the siege; but if he adopted any plan of field operations, he would have chosen an advance from Eupatoria or the mouth of the Alma, and, failing that, an attempt to turn the heights of Mackenzie by Baidar and Albat. The council of war broke up without coming to any decision. On the 16th, unable to face the difficulties that beset him, General Canrobert resigned; the Emperor accepted his resignation, and General Pélissier was appointed to the command of the army of the East. By carrying out the will of the Emperor, Canrobert felt, as he said, that he had got into a false position, and he withdrew, much to his credit. But, more to his credit, he begged that he might remain with the army and that he might be reinstated in the command of his old division. This request was granted. From the 19th of May to the end of the siege, Pélissier commanded the French army in the Crimea and Canrobert resumed his position of general of division.

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