X. SOPHISTICI ELENCHI
The Sophist (according to Aristotle) is one whose professional occupation it is to make money by a delusive show of wisdom without the reality--by contriving to make others believe falsely that he possesses wisdom and knowledge. The abstract substantive noun Sophistic, with the verb to practice as a Sophist ([Greek: sophisteu/ein]), expresses such profession and purpose.[1] This application of the term is derived from Plato, who has in various dialogues (Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydêmus, &c.) introduced Sokrates conversing with different professional Sophists, and who has, in a longer dialogue called Sophistes, attempted an elaborate definition of the intellectual peculiarities of the person so named. It is the actual argumentative procedure of the Sophist that Aristotle proposes to himself as the theme of this little treatise, appended to his general theory of the Syllogism; a treatise which, though forming properly the Ninth and concluding Book of the Topica, is commonly known as a separate appendix thereto, under the title of Sophistici Elenchi, or Sophistical Refutations.
[Footnote 1: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 21, 28, 32: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r ê( sophistikê\ phainome/nê sophi/a ou)=sa d' ou)/, kai\ o( sophistê\s chrêmatistê\s a)po\ phainome/nês sophi/as a)ll' ou)k ou)/sês;--a)na/gkê ou)=n tou\s boulome/nous sophisteu/ein to\ tô=n ei)rême/nôn lo/gôn ge/nos zêtei=n;--o(/ti me\n ou)=n e)/sti ti toiou=ton lo/gôn ge/nos, kai\ o(/ti toiau/tês e)phi/entai duna/meôs ou(\s kalou=men sophista/s, dê=lon.] Also xi. p. 171, b. 27.]
The Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation, being a delusive semblance of refutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept it as real, cannot be properly understood without the theory of Elenchus in general; nor can this last be understood without the entire theory of the Syllogism, since the Elenchus is only one variety of Syllogism.[2] The Elenchus is a syllogism with a conclusion contradictory to or refutative of some enunciated thesis or proposition. Accordingly we must first understand the conditions of a good and valid Syllogism, before we study those of a valid Elenchus; these last, again, must be understood, before we enter on the distinctive attributes of the Pseudo-elenchus--the sophistical, invalid, or sham, refutation. In other words, an enumeration and classification of Fallacies forms the closing section of a treatise on Logic--according to the philosophical arrangement originating with Aristotle, and copied by most logicians after him.
[Footnote 2: Ibid. x. p. 171, a. 1-5.]
Aristotle begins by distinguishing reality and mere deceptive appearance; and by stating that this distinction is found to prevail not less in syllogisms than in other matters. Next he designates a notorious class of persons, called Sophists, who made it their profession to study and practise the deceptive appearance of syllogizing; and he then proceeds to distinguish four species of debate:--(1) Didactic; (2) Dialectic; (3) Peirastic; (4) Eristic or Sophistic.[3] In this quadruple arrangement, however, he is not consistent with his own definitions, when he ranks the four as distinct and co-ordinate species. The marked and special antithesis is between Didactic and Dialectic. Both Peirastic and Eristic fall as varieties or sub-species under the species Dialectic; and there is under the species Didactic a variety called Pseudo-graphic or Pseudo-didactic, which stands to Didactic in the same relation in which Eristic stands to Dialectic.[4]
[Footnote 3: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38: [Greek: e)/sti dê\ tô=n e)n tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn te/ttara ge/nê, didaskalikou\ kai\ dialektikoi\ kai\ peirastikoi\ kai\ e)ristikoi/.]]
[Footnote 4: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 34.]
Didactic discourse is not applicable to all matters indiscriminately, but only to certain special sciences; each of which has its own separate, undemonstrable principia, from which its conclusions, so far as true and valid, must be deduced. It supposes a teacher acquainted with these principia and deductions, talking with some one who being ignorant of them wishes to learn. The teacher puts questions, to which the learner makes the best answers that he can; and, if the answers are wrong, corrects them and proceeds to draw, according to syllogistic canons, conclusions from premisses which he himself knows to be the truth. These premisses the learner must believe upon the teacher's authority. Properly speaking, indeed, the didactic process is not interrogative (in the same sense that Dialectic is): the teacher does not accept the learner's answer and reason from it, if he thinks it wrong.[5]
[Footnote 5: Ibid. xi. p. 172, a. 11: [Greek: nu=n d' ou)k e)/stin o( dialektio\s peri\ ge/nos ti ô(risme/non, ou)de\ deiktiko\s ou)deno/s, ou)de\ toiou=tos oi(=os o( katho/lou. ou)/te ga/r e)stin a(/panta e)n e(ni/ tini ge/nei, ou)/te ei) ei)/ê, oi(=o/n te u(po\ ta\s au)ta\s a)rcha\s ei)=nai ta\ o)/nta. ô(/st' ou)demi/a te/chnê tô=n deiknuousô=n tina\ phu/sin e)rôtêtikê/ e)stin; ou) ga\r e)/xestin o(poteronou=n tô=n mori/ôn dou=nai; sullogismo\s ga\r ou) gi/netai e)x a)mphoi=n. ê( de\ dialektikê\ e)rôtêrikê/ e)stin; ei) d' e)dei/knuen, ei) kai\ mê\ pa/nta, a)lla\ ta/ ge prô=ta kai\ ta\s oi)kei/as a)rcha/s, ou)k a)\n ê)rô/ta. mê\ dido/ntos ga\r ou)k a)\n e)/ti ei)=chen e)x ô(=n e)/ti diale/xetai pro\s tê\n e)/nstasin.]
When Aristotle, therefore, reckons [Greek: lo/gous didaskalikou/s] as one of the four species [Greek: tô=n e)n tô=| diale/gesthai lo/gôn] (Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 38), we must understand [Greek: to\ diale/gesthai] in a very wide and vague sense, going much beyond the derivative noun [Greek: dialektikê/].]
Dialectic, on the contrary, is applicable to all matters universally and indiscriminately, including even the undemonstrable principia which the teacher assumes as the highest premisses of his didactic syllogisms. It supposes, in place of teacher and learner, an interrogator (or opponent) and a respondent. The respondent declares a problem or thesis, which he undertakes to defend; while the other puts questions to him respecting it, with the purpose of compelling him either to contradict the thesis, or to contradict himself on some other point. The interrogator is allowed only to ask questions, and to deduce legitimate conclusions from the premisses granted by the respondent in answer: he is not permitted to introduce any other premisses. The premisses upon which the debate turns are understood all to be probable--opinions accredited either among an ordinary multitude or among a few wise men, but to have no higher authority. Accordingly there is often a conflict of arguments pro and con, much diversified. The process is essentially controversial; and, if the questioner does not succeed in exposing a contradiction, the respondent is victorious, and remains in possession of the field.
Such is the capital antithesis, much dwelt upon by Aristotle, between Didactic and Dialectic. But that which he calls Peirastic, and that which he calls Eristic, are not species co-ordinate with and distinguished from Dialectic: they are peculiar aspects, subordinate varieties or modes, of Dialectic itself. Aristotle himself, indeed, admits Peirastic to be a mode or variety of Dialectic;[6] and the like is equally true respecting what he terms Eristic or Sophistic.
[Footnote 6: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 4-9: [Greek: ê( ga\r peirastikê/ e)sti dialektikê/ tis], &c.--p. 172, a. 35: [Greek: o( te/chnê| sullogistikê=| peirastiko/s, dialektiko/s].--viii. p. 169, b. 25: [Greek: e)/sti d' ê( peirastikê\ me/ros tê=s dialektikê=s.]]
These subordinate distinctions turn upon the manner, the limitations, and the purpose, for and under which the dialectical process is conducted. Dialectic is essentially gymnastic and peirastic:[7] it may be looked at either as gymnastic, in reference to the two debaters, or as peirastic, in reference to the arguments and doctrines brought forward; intellectual exercise and stimulation of the two speakers and the auditors around being effected by testing and confronting various probable doctrines. It is the common purpose ([Greek: koino\n e)/rgon])[8] of the two champions, to improve and enlarge this exercise for the instruction of all, by following out a variety of logical consequences and logical repugnancies, bearing more or less directly on the thesis which the respondent chooses and undertakes to defend against a testing cross-examination. Certain rules and limitations are prescribed both for questioner and respondent; but, subject to these rules, each of them is bound to exert all his acuteness for the purpose of gaining victory; and, though one only can gain it, the debate may be well and creditably conducted on both sides. If the rules are not observed, if the assailing champion, bent upon victory at all cost, has recourse to dishonest interrogative tricks, or the defensive champion to perverse and obstructive negations, beyond the prescribed boundary, in that case the debate is called by Aristotle eristic or contentious, from the undue **predominance of the controversial spirit and purpose; also sophistic, from the fact that there existed (as he asserts) a class or profession of persons called Sophists, who regularly studied and practised these culpable manoeuvres, first with a view to reputation, and ultimately with a view to pecuniary profit, being pretenders to knowledge and wisdom without any reality to justify them.[9]
[Footnote 7: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26, b. 2: [Greek: pro\s gumnasi/an--e)xetastikê\ ga\r ou)=sa], &c. Compare also Topica, VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25; xiv. p. 163, a. 29, p. 164, b. 1: [Greek: to\ de\ gumna/zesthai duna/meôs cha/rin, kai\ ma/lista peri\ ta\s prota/seis kai\ e)nsta/seis; e)/sti ga\r ô(s a(plô=s ei)pei=n dialektiko\s o( protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s.]]
[Footnote 8: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 20, 37.]
[Footnote 9: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35: [Greek: oi( me\n ou)=n tê=s ni/kês au)tê=s cha/rin toiou=toi e)ristikoi\ a)/nthrôpoi kai\ phile/rides dokou=sin ei)=nai, oi( de\ do/xês cha/rin tê=s ei)s chrêmatismo\n sophistikoi/;--kai\ tô=n lo/gôn tô=n au)tô=n me/n ei)sin oi( phile/rides kai\ sophistai/, a)ll' ou) tô=n au)tô=n e(/neken. kai\ lo/gos o( au)to\s me\n e)/stai sophistiko\s kai\ e)ristiko/s, a)ll' ou) kata\ tauto/n, a)ll' ê(=| me\n ni/kês phainome/nês, e)ristiko/s, ê(=| de\ sophi/as, sophistiko/s.] &c.]
We thus see plainly that Peirastic and Eristic are not to be ranked as two distinct species of discourse, co-ordinate with Didactic and Dialectic; but that peirastic is in fact an epithet applicable generally to Dialectic, bringing to view one of its useful and appropriate functions; while eristic designates only a peculiar mode of conducting the process, the essential feature of which is that it is abusive or that it transgresses the rules and regulations. Still less ought Sophistic to be ranked as a distinct species; since it involves no intrinsic or intellectual differentia, but connotes only ethical and personal peculiarities ascribed to the Sophist, who is treated as an impostor practising dishonest tricks for the sake of pecuniary profit.[10]
[Footnote 10: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, b. 17: [Greek: o( ga\r sophistiko\s ou)k e)n tê=| duna/mei, a)ll' e)n tê=| proaire/sei;--sophistê\s me\n kata\ tê\n proai/resin, dialektiko\s d' ou) kata\ tê\n proai/resin a)lla\ kata\ tê\n du/namin.] To the same purpose he speaks in Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 25, distinguishing the Sophist by his [Greek: proai/resis] from the Dialectician, but recognizing that in point of [Greek: du/namis] both are alike. Mr. Poste observes justly (in Transl. of the Soph. El., notes, p. 99):--"[Greek: du/namis], capacity, is in the intellect; [Greek: proai/resis], purpose, in the will. The antithesis between these terms may throw light on what Aristotle conceived to be the relation between Sophistic and Dialectic. . . The power plus the will to deceive is called Sophistic; the power without the will, Dialectic (p. 100)."]
While, however, we recognize as main logical distinctions only the two heads Didactic and Dialectic, we note another way that Aristotle has of bringing in what he calls Sophistic as a variety of the latter. Both in Didactic and Dialectic (he tells us) the speakers enunciate and prove their propositions by Syllogism; the didactic syllogism is derived from the principia belonging specially to one particular science, and proceeds from premisses that are true to conclusions that are true; while the dialectic syllogism starts from probable premisses (i.e., accredited by the ordinary public or by a few wise men), and marches in correct form to conclusions that are probable. Now, corresponding to each of these two, Aristotle recognizes farther a sort of degenerate counterpart. To the didactic syllogism there corresponds the pseudographic syllogism or the paralogism: which draws its premisses (as the didactic syllogism does) from the special matters of some given science,[11] yet which nevertheless has only the appearance of truth without the reality; either because it is incorrect in syllogistic form, or because the matter of the premisses (the major, the minor, or both) is untrue. To the dialectic syllogism in like manner, there corresponds the eristic or sophistic syllogism: which is a good syllogism in appearance, but not in reality; either because it is incorrect in form, or because its premisses, in respect of their matter, appear to be probable without being really probable.[12]
[Footnote 11: Topic. I. i. p. 101, a. 5-15. [Greek: oi( e)k tô=n peri/ tinas e)pistê/mas oi)kei/ôn gino/menoi paralogismoi/, katha/per e)pi\ tê=s geômetri/as kai\ tô=n tau/tê| suggenô=n sumbe/bêken e)/chein;--e)k tô=n oi)kei/ôn me\n tê=| e)pistê/mê| lêmma/tôn, ou)k a)lêthô=n de/, to\n sullogismo\n poiei=tai.]]
[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 100, a. 31-p. 101, a. 16; Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 20-b. 21.]
One would suppose that the relation between the pseudo-didactic and the didactic syllogism, was the same as that between the pseudo-dialectic and the dialectic; so that, if the pseudo-dialectic deserved to be called sophistic or eristic, the pseudo-didactic would deserve these appellations also; especially, since the formal conditions of the syllogism are alike for both. This Aristotle does not admit, but draws instead a remarkable distinction. The Sophist (he says) is a dishonest man, making it his professional purpose to deceive; the pseudo-graphic man of science is honest always, though sometimes mistaken. So long as the pseudo-graphic syllogism keeps within the limits belonging to its own special science, it may be false, since the geometer may be deceived even in his own science geometry,[13] but it cannot be sophistic or eristic; yet, whenever it transgresses those limits, even though it be true and though it solves the problem proposed, it deserves to be called by those two epithets. Thus, there were two distinct methods proposed for the quadrature of the circle--one by Hippokrates, on geometrical principles, the other by Bryson, upon principles extra-geometrical. Both demonstrations were false and unsuccessful; yet that of Hippokrates was not sophistic or eristic, because he kept within the sphere of geometry; while that of Bryson was so, because it travelled out of geometry. Nay more, this last would have been equally sophistic and eristic, and on the same ground, even if it had succeeded in solving the problem.[14] If indeed the pseudo-graphic syllogism be invalid in form, it must be considered as sophistic, even though within the proper scientific limits as to matter; but, if it be correct in form and within these same limits, then, however untrue its premisses may be, it is to be regarded as not sophistic or eristic.[15]
[Footnote 13: Topic. V. iv. p. 132, a. 32.]
[Footnote 14: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 12-20: [Greek: ta\ ga\r pseudographê/mata ou)k e)ristika/ (kata\ ga\r ta\ u(po\ tê\n te/chnên oi( paralogismoi/), ou)de/ g' ei)/ ti/ e)sti pseudogra/phêma peri\ a)lêthe/s, oi(=on to\ I(ppokra/tous ê)\ o( tetragônismo\s o( dia\ tô=n mêni/skôn. a)ll' ô(s Bru/sôn e)tetragô/nize to\n ku/klon, ei) kai\ tetragôni/zetai o( ku/klos, a)ll' o(/ti ou) kata\ to\ pra=gma, dia\ tou=to sophistiko/s.] Also p. 172, a. 1-8.]
[Footnote 15: Ibid. xi. p. 171, b. 19-20. Compare Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 33: [Greek: dei= de\ to\n kalô=s metabiba/zonta dialektikô=s kai\ mê\ e)ristikô=s metabiba/zein, katha/per to\n geôme/trên geômetrikô=s, a)/n te pseu=dos a)/n t' a)lêthe\s ê)=| to\ sumperaino/menon.] Also Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 10.]
Such is the test whereby Aristotle distinguishes the sophistication of the didactic process from the legitimate working of that process. Now this same test cannot be applied to Dialectic, which has no appropriate or exclusive specialty of matters, but deals with Omne Scibile, universally and indiscriminately. Aristotle therefore puts the analogy in another way. Both in Didactic and in Dialectic the Sophist is one who sins against the fundamental conditions of the task which he undertakes; these conditions being, that in Didactic he shall confine himself to the matters and premisses of a given science,--in Dialectic, to matters probable of whatever kind they may be. Transgression of these conditions constitutes unfair and dishonest manoeuvre, whether of teacher or questioner; like breach of the regulations on the part of competitors, bent on victory at all price, in the Olympic games. Aristotle ranks this dishonesty as a species, under the name of Sophistic or Eristic, admitting of being analysed and defined;[16] and his treatise on Sophistical Refutations is intended to describe and illustrate the Loci belonging to it, and contributing to its purpose.[17]
[Footnote 16: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 22: [Greek: ô(/sper ga\r ê( e)n a)gô=ni a)diki/a ei)=do/s ti e)/chei kai\ e)/stin a)dikomachi/a tis, ou(/tôs e)n a)ntilogi/a| a)dikomachi/a ê( e)ristikê/ e)stin; e)kei= te ga\r oi( pa/ntôs nika=n proairou/menoi pa/ntôn a(/ptontai, kai\ e)ntau=tha oi( e)ristikoi/.]]
[Footnote 17: Soph. El. ix. p. 170, a. 34: [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti ou) pa/ntôn tô=n e)/legchôn a)lla\ tô=n para\ tê\n dialektikê\n lêpte/on tou\s to/pous.]]
Fallacious dialectical refutation being thus referred altogether to dishonesty of purpose (either contentious or profit-seeking) and being assumed as unknown in fair dialectical debate, we have to see by what characteristic Aristotle discriminates fallacious premisses from fair and admissible premisses. Dialectic (he tells us) has for its appropriate matter probable premisses--beliefs accredited either by the multitude or by a wise few. But (he goes on to say) not everything which appears probable is really probable. Nothing that is really probable is a mere superficial fancy; wherever this last is the case, the probabilia are apparent only and not real; they have the character of falsehood stamped upon them, so as to be immediately manifest and obvious, even to persons of very narrow intelligence. It is such apparent probabilia as these, which make up the premisses of eristic or sophistic discourse, and upon which the sophistical or fallacious refutations turn.[18]
[Footnote 18: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\s d' e)/sti sullogismo\s o( e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn mê\ o)/ntôn de/, kai\ o( e)x e)ndo/xôn ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. ou) ga\r pa=n to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon, kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\n ga\r tô=n legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/ toi=s kai\ mikra\ sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\ phu/sis.] Compare Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 7.]
Aristotle thus draws a broad and marked line between Dialectic on the one hand, and Eristic or Sophistic on the other; and he treats the whole important doctrine of Logical Fallacies as coming under this latter department. The distinction that he draws between them is two-fold: first as to purpose, next as to subject-matter. On the part of the litigious or sophistical debater there is the illicit purpose of victory at all cost, or for profit; and probabilities merely apparent--such as any one may see not to be real probabilities--constitute the matter of his syllogisms.
Now, as to the distinction of purpose, we may put aside the idea of profit as having no essential connection with the question. It is quite possible to suppose the fair Dialectician, not less than the Sophist, as exhibiting his skill for pecuniary reward; while the eagerness for victory on both sides is absolutely indispensable even in well-conducted debate, in order that the appropriate stimulus and benefit of dialectical exercise may be realized. But, if the distinction of purpose and procedure, between the Dialectician and the Sophist, is thus undefined and unsatisfactory, still more unsatisfactory is the distinction of subject-matter. To discriminate between what is really probable (i.e., accredited either by the multitude or by a wise few), and what is only probable in appearance and not in reality--is a task of extreme difficulty. The explanation given by Aristotle himself[19]--when he describes the apparently probable as that which has only superficial show, and which the most ordinary intelligence discerns at once to be false--includes only the more gross and obvious fallacies, but leaves out all the rest. Nothing can be more incorrect than the assumption, in regard to fallacies generally, that the appearance of probability is too faint to impose upon any ordinary man. If all fallacies could be supposed to come under this definition, the theory of Fallacies would undoubtedly be worthless (as Mr. Poste suggests that it is, in the Preface to his translation of the Sophistici Elenchi); and the most dishonest Sophist would at any rate be harmless. But, in fact, Aristotle himself departs from this definition even in the beginning of the Sophistici Elenchi; for he there treats the sophistic syllogism and refutation as having a semblance of validity plausible enough to impose upon many persons, and to be difficult of detection; like base metals having the exterior appearance of gold and silver, and like men got up for the purpose of looking finer and stronger than they really are.[20] Here we have the eristic or sophistic syllogism presented as fallacious, yet as very likely to be mistaken for truth, by unprepared auditors, unless warning and precaution be applied; not (as it was set forth in the definition above cited) as bearing the plain and obvious stamp of falsehood, recognizable even by the vulgar. At the time when Aristotle constructed that definition, he probably had present to his mind such caricatures of dialectical questions as Plato (in the dialogue Euthydêmus) puts into the mouth of the Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus. And, since Aristotle chose to connect fallacious reasoning with dishonest purposes, and to announce it as employed exclusively by dishonest debaters, he seems to have found satisfaction in describing it as something which no honest man of ordinary understanding could accept as true: the Sophist being thus presented not merely as a knave but as a fool.
[Footnote 19: Topic. I. i. p. 100, b. 24, seq.]
[Footnote 20: Soph. El. i. p. 164, a. 23-b. 27. [Greek: to\n au)to\n de\ tro/pon kai\ sullogismo\s kai\ e)/legchos o( me\n e)/stin, o( d' ou)k e)/sti me/n, phai/netai de\ dia\ tê\n a)peiri/an; oi( ga\r a)/peiroi ô(/sper a)\n a)pe/chontes po/r)r(ôthen theôrou=sin.]]
I think it a mistake on the part of Aristotle to treat the fallacies incidental to the human intellect as if they were mere traps laid by Sophists and litigants; and as if they would never show themselves, assuming dialectical debate to be conducted entirely with a view to its legitimate purposes of testing a thesis and following out argumentative consequences. It is true that, if there are infirmities incident to the human intellect, a dishonest disputant will be likely to take advantage of them. So far it may be well to note his presence. But the dishonest disputant does not originate these infirmities: he finds them already existing, and manifested undesignedly not merely in dialectical debate, but even in ordinary discourse. It is the business of those who theorize on the intellectual processes to specify and discriminate the Fallacies as liabilities to intellectual error among mankind in general, honest or dishonest, with a view to precaution against their occurrence, or correction if they do occur; not to present them as inventions of a class of professional cheats,[21] or as tares sown by the enemy in a field where the natural growth would be nothing but pure wheat.
[Footnote 21: Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 19, seq.]
In point of fact the actual classification of Fallacies given by Aristotle is far sounder than his announcement would lead us to expect. Though he entitles them Sophistical Refutations, describing them as intentionally cultivated and exclusively practised by professional Sophists for gain, or by unprincipled litigants for victory, yet he recognises them as often very difficult of detection, and as an essential portion of the theory of Dialectic generally.[22] The various general heads under which he distributes them are each characterized by intellectual or logical marks.
[Footnote 22: Ibid. xi. p. 172, b. 7.]
His first and most general observation is, that language is the usual medium and instrument through which fallacies are operated.[23] Names and propositions are of necessity limited in number; but things named or nameable are innumerable; hence it happens inevitably that the same name or the same proposition must have several different meanings. Since we cannot talk of things except by means of their names, the equivocation inseparable from these names is a constant source of false conclusions.[24]
[Footnote 23: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 5.]
[Footnote 24: Ibid. a. 10: [Greek: ta\ me\n ga\r o)no/mata pepe/rantai kai\ to\ tô=n lo/gôn plê=thos, ta\ de\ pra/gmata to\n a)rithmo\n a)/peira/ e)stin. a)nagkai=on ou)=n plei/ô to\n au)to\n lo/gon kai\ tou)/noma to\ e(\n sêmai/nein.]]
In dialectical procedure, the Sophist and the litigious debater aim at the accomplishment of five distinguishable ends:--(1) To refute, or obtain the false appearance of refuting, the thesis; (2) To catch, or appear to catch, the opponent in affirming something false or contradictory; (3) Or in affirming something paradoxical; (4) Or in uttering incorrect and ungrammatical speech; (5) Or in tautological repetition. The first of these five ends is what the Sophist most desires; where that cannot be had, then, as secondary purposes, the succeeding four, in the order in which they are enumerated.[25]
[Footnote 25: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 12-22.]
The syllogism whereby the Sophist appears to refute without really refuting, is either faulty in form, or untrue in matter, or irrelevant to the purpose. The Fallacies that he employs to bring about this deceitful appearance of refutation are various, and may be distributed first under two great divisions:--
I. Fallaciæ Dictionis. II. Fallaciæ Extra Dictionem.
I. The first division--Fallaciæ Dictionis--includes all those cases wherein, under the same terms or propositions, more than one meaning is expressed. Six heads may be distinguished:--
1. Homonymy (Equivocation): where the double meaning resides in one single term--noun or verb. 2. Amphiboly: where the double meaning resides, not in a single word but, in a combination of words--proposition, phrase, or sentence. 3. Conjunction (hardly distinguishable from that immediately preceding--Amphiboly). 4. Disjunction: where what is affirmed conjunctively is not true disjunctively, or the reverse. (E.g., Five are two and three; but you cannot say, Five are even and odd. The greater is equal and something besides; but you cannot say, The greater is equal.) 5. Accentuation: where the same word differently accentuated has a different meaning. 6. Figura Dictionis: where two words, from being analogous in form, structure, or conjugation, are erroneously supposed to be analogous in meaning also.[26]
[Footnote 26: Ibid. iv. p. 165, b. 23-p. 166, b. 19.]
Such are the six heads of Fallaciæ Dictionis--Fallacies or Paralogisms arising from words as such, or something directly appertaining to them.
II. Under the second division--Fallacies or Paralogisms Extra Dictionem--there are seven heads:
1. Fallacia Accidentis. 2. Fallacia a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter. 3. Ignoratio Elenchi. 4. Fallacia Consequentis 5. Petitio Principii. 6. Non Causa pro Causâ. 7. Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum.[27]
[Footnote 27: Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 20-27.]
1. The first of these varieties, called Fallacia Accidentis, arises when a syllogism is made to conclude that, because a given predicate may be truly affirmed of a given subject, the same predicate may also be truly affirmed respecting all the accidents of that subject: as when Koriskus is denied to be a man, because he is not Sokrates, who is a man; or is denied to be Koriskus, because he is a man, while a man is not Koriskus.
In the title given to this general head of Fallacy,[28] we must understand Accident, not in its special logical sense as opposed to Essence, but in a far larger sense, including both Genus when predicated separately from Differentia, and Differentia when predicated separately from Genus; including, in fact, every thing which is distinguishable from the subject in any way, and at the same time predicable of it--every thing except the Definition, which conjoins Genus and Differentia together, and is thus identical and convertible with the definitum.
[Footnote 28: Ibid. b. 29: [Greek: oi( para\ to\ sumbebêko\s paralogismoi/]. Every man is an animal; but, because a predicate is true of the subject man, you cannot infer that the same predicate is true of the subject animal. This title comprehends within its range another, which is presently announced as distinct and separate--Fallacia Consequentis.]
2. The second general variety arises when a proposition is affirmed with qualification or limitation in the premisses, but is affirmed without qualification, simply and absolutely, in the conclusion. The Ethiopian is white in his teeth and black in his skin; therefore, he is both white and not white--both white and black. In this example the fallacy is obvious, and can hardly escape any one; but there are many other cases in which the distinction is not so conspicuous, and in which the respondent will hesitate whether he ought to grant or refuse a question simply and absolutely.[29] One example given by Aristotle deserves notice on its own account: Non-Ens est opinabile, therefore Non-Ens est; or, again, Ens non est homo, therefore, Ens non est. This is one among Aristotle's ways of bringing to view what modern logicians describe as the double function of the substantive verb--to serve as copula in predication, and to predicate existence.[30] He regards the confusion between these two functions as an example of the Fallacy now before us--of passing a dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter.[31]
[Footnote 29: Ibid. b. 37, seq. [Greek: o(/tan to\ e)n me/rei lego/menon ô(s a(plô=s ei)rême/non lêphthê=|--to\ de\ toiou=ton e)p' e)ni/ôn me\n panti\ theôrê=sai r(a/|dion--e)p' e)ni/ôn de\ lantha/nei polla/kis.]]
[Footnote 30: The same double or multiple meaning of Est is discriminated by Aristotle in the Metaphysica, but in a different way--[Greek: to\ o)\n ô(s a)lêthe/s, kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n ô(s pseu=dos]--[Greek: D].] vii. p. 1017, a. 31; E. iv. p. 1027, b. 18-36. Bonitz (ad. Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 310) says:--"Quid quod etiam illud esse huc refert, quo non existentiam significamus, sed predicati cum subjecto conjunctionem." Aristotle is even more precise than modern logicians in analysing the different meanings of [Greek: to\ o)/n]: he distinguishes four of them.]
[Footnote 31: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 1: [Greek: oi(=on ei) to\ mê\ o)/n e)sti doxasto/n, o(/ti to\ mê\ o)\n e)/stin; ou) ga\r tau)to\n ei)=nai te/ ti kai\ ei)=nai a(plô=s.]
Compare Metaphys. Z. iv. p. 1030, a. 25, and De Interpretatione, p. 21, a. 25-34: [Greek: ô(/sper O(/mêro/s e)sti/ ti, oi(=on poiêtê/s; a)=r' ou)=n kai\ e)/stin, ê) ou)/? kata\ sumbebêko\s ga\r katêgorei=tai tou= O(mê/rou to\ e)/stin; o(/ti ga\r poiêtê/s e)stin, a)ll' ou) kath' au(to/, katêgorei=tai kata\ tou= O(mê/rou to\ e)/stin.]
It is clear from the above passages that Aristotle was thoroughly aware of the logical fact which Hobbes, James Mill, and Mr. John Stuart Mill, have more fully brought out and illustrated, as the confusion between the two distinct functions of the substantive verb. Many excellent remarks on the subject will be found in the 'System of Logic,' by Mr. J. S. Mill (Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 1); also in the 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' by James Mill, especially in the recent edition of that work, containing the explanatory notes by Mr. J. S. Mill and Dr. Findlater (Vol. I. ch. iv. p. 174, seq.). Mr. J. S. Mill, however, speaks too unreservedly of this confusion as having escaped the notice of Aristotle, and as having been brought to light only by or since Hobbes. He says (in a note on the 'Analysis,' p. 183):--"As in the case of many other luminous thoughts, an approach is found to have been made to it by previous thinkers. Hobbes, though he did not reach it, came very close to it; and it was still more distinctly anticipated by Laromiguière, though without any sufficient perception of its value . . . in the following words:--'Quand on dit, l'être est, &c., le mot est, ou le verbe, n'exprime pas la même chose que le mot être, sujet de la définition. Si j'énonce la proposition suivante: Dieu est existant, je ne voudrais pas dire assurément, Dieu existe existant: cela ne ferait pas un sens: de même, si je dis que Virgile est poète, je ne veux pas donner à entendre que Virgile existe. Le verbe est dans la proposition n'exprime dont pas l'existence réelle; il n'exprime qu'un rapport spécial entre le sujet et l'attribut, &c.'" The passages above cited from Aristotle show that he had not only enunciated the same truth as Laromiguière, but even illustrated it by the same example (Homer instead of Virgil). I shall in another place state more fully the views of Aristotle respecting Existence.]
3. The third of these heads of Fallacy--Ignoratio Elenchi--is, when the speaker, professing to contradict the thesis, advances another proposition which contradicts it in appearance only but not in reality, because he does not know what are the true and sufficient conditions of a valid Elenchus. In order to be valid, it must be real, not merely verbal; it must be proved by good syllogistic premisses, without any Petitio Principii; and it must deny the same matter, in the same relations, and at the same time, as that which the thesis affirmed. Thus, it is no contradiction to affirm and deny doubleness of the same body; both affirmation and denial may be true, if you take the comparison against different numbers or different bodies, or at different times. Sometimes persons neglect some of these conditions, and fancy that they have contradicted the thesis, when they have not: this is Ignoratio Elenchi.[32] (If the thesis be an affirmative universal, it is sufficient contradiction if you prove a negative particular against it.)
[Footnote 32: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 21-35: [Greek: oi( de\ para\ to\ mê\ diôri/sthai ti/ e)sti sullogismo\s ê)\ ti/ e)/legchos, a)lla\ para\ tê\n e)/lleipsin gi/nontai tou= lo/gou.]
We may remark, by the way, that it is not very consistent in Aristotle to recognize one general head of Sophistical Refutation called Ignoratio Elenchi, after the definition that he has given of the Sophist at the beginning of this treatise. He had told us that the Sophist was a dishonest man, who made it his profession to study and practise these tricks, for the purpose of making himself pass for a clever man, and of getting money. According to this definition, there is no Ignoratio Elenchi in the Sophist, though there may be in the person who supposes himself refuted. The Sophist is assumed to know what he is about, and to be aware that his argument is a fallacious one.]
4. The fourth head includes what are called Fallaciæ Consequentis: when a man inverts the relation between predicate and subject in a categorical proposition affirmative and universal, thinking that it may be simply converted or that the subject may be truly affirmed of the predicate; or when, in an hypothetical proposition, he inverts the relation between antecedent and consequent, arguing that, because the consequent is true, the antecedent must for that reason be true also. Honey is of yellow colour; you see a yellow substance, and you infer for that reason that it must be honey. Thieves generally walk out by night; you find a man walking out by night, and you infer that he must be a thief. These are inferences from Signs, opinions founded on facts of sense, such as are usually employed in Rhetoric; often or usually true, but not necessarily or universally true, and therefore fallacious when used as premisses in a syllogism.[33]
[Footnote 33: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 1-18. This head (Fallacia Consequentis) is not essentially distinguishable from the first (Fallacia Accidentis), being nothing more than a peculiar species or variety thereof, as Aristotle himself admits a little farther on--vi. p. 168, a. 26; vii. p. 169, b. 7; viii. p. 170, a. 3. Compare also xxviii. p. 181, a. 25.]
5. The fifth head is that of Petitio Principii: a man sometimes assumes for his premiss what is identical with the conclusion to be proved, without being aware of the identity.[34]
[Footnote 34: Ibid. v. p. 167, a. 38: [Greek: dia\ to\ mê\ du/nasthai sunora=n to\ tau)to\n kai\ to\ e(/teron].]
6. The sixth head of Fallacy--Non Causa pro Causâ--is, when we mistake for a cause that which is not really a cause; or, to drop the misleading word cause, and to adopt the clearer terms in which this same fallacy is announced in the Analytica Priora[35]--Non per Hoc--Non propter Hoc, it arises when we put forward, as an essential premiss of a given conclusion, something that is not really an essential premiss thereof. When you intend to refute a given thesis by showing, that, if admitted, it leads to impossible or absurd conclusions, you must enunciate that thesis itself among the premisses that lead to such absurdities.[36] But, though enunciated in this place, it may often happen that the thesis may be an unnecessary adjunct--not among the premisses really pertinent and essential: and that the impossible conclusion may be sufficiently proved, even though the thesis were omitted. Still, since the thesis is declared along with the rest, it will appear falsely to be a part of the real proof. It will often appear so even to yourself the questioner; you not detecting the fallacy.[37] Under such circumstances the respondent meets you by Non propter Hoc. He admits your conclusion to be impossible, and at the same time to be duly proved, but he shows you that it is proved by evidence independent of his thesis, and not by reason or means of his thesis. Accordingly you have advanced a syllogism good in itself, but not good for the purpose which you aimed at;[38] viz., to refute the thesis by establishing that it led to impossible consequences. You will fail, even if the impossible consequence which you advance is a proposition conjoined with the thesis through a continuous series of intermediate propositions, each of them having one common term with the next. Much more will you fail, if your impossible consequence is quite foreign and unconnected with the thesis; as we sometimes find in Dialectic.
[Footnote 35: Ibid. b. 21; vii. p. 169, b. 13. Compare Analyt. Prior. II. xvii. p. 65.
In commenting on the above chapter of the Analytica Priora, I have already remarked (Vol. I. p. 258, note) how much better is the designation there given of the present fallacy--Non per Hoc ([Greek: ou) para\ tê\n the/sin to\ pseu=dos])--than the designation here given of the same fallacy--Non Causa pro Causâ. Aristotle is speaking of a syllogistic process, consisting of premisses and a conclusion; the premisses being the reasons or grounds of the conclusion, not the cause thereof, as that term is commonly understood. The term cause is one used in so many different senses that we cannot be too careful in reasoning upon it. See Whately's remarks on this subject, Bk. iii. Sect. 14, of his Logic: also his Appendix I. to that work, under article Reason.]
[Footnote 36: Soph. El. v. p. 167, b. 24: [Greek: e)a\n ou)=n e)gkatarithmê/thê| e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois e)rôtê/masi pro\s to\ sumbai=non a)du/naton, do/xei para\ tou=to gi/nesthai polla/kis o( e)/legchos.]]
[Footnote 37: Ibid. b. 35: [Greek: kai\ lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch ê(=tton au)tou\s tou\s e)rôtô=ntas to\ toiou=ton.]]
[Footnote 38: Ibid. b. 34: [Greek: a)sullo/gistoi me\n ou)=n a(plô=s ou)k ei)si\n oi( toiou=toi lo/goi, pro\s de\ to\ prokei/menon a)sullo/gistoi.]]
7. The seventh and last of these heads of Fallacy is, when the questioner puts two distinct questions in the same form of words, as if they were one--Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum ut Unius. In well-conducted Dialectic the respondent was assumed to reply either Yes or No to the question put; or, if it was put in the form of an alternative, he accepted distinctly one term of the alternative. Under such conditions he could not reply to one of these double-termed questions without speaking falsely or committing himself. Are the earth and the sea liquid? Is the heaven or the earth sea? The questions are improperly put, and neither admits of any one correct answer. You ought to confine yourself to one question at a time, with one subject and one predicate, making what is properly understood by one single proposition. The two questions here stated as examples ought properly to be put as four.[39]
[Footnote 39: Ibid. b. 38-p. 168, a. 16; vi. p. 169, a. 6-12. [Greek: ê( ga\r pro/tasi/s e)stin e(\n kath' e(no/s.--ei) ou)=n mi/a pro/tasis ê( e(\n kath' e(no\s a)xiou=sa, kai\ a(plô=s e)/stai pro/tasis ê( toiau/tê e)rô/têsis.]
The examples given of this fallacy by Aristotle are so palpable--the expounder of every fallacy must make it clear by giving examples that every one sees through at once--that we are tempted to imagine that no one can be imposed on by it. But Aristotle himself remarks, very justly, that there occur many cases in which we do not readily see whether one question only, or more than one, is involved; and in which one answer is made, though two questions are concerned. To set out distinctly all the separate debateable points is one of the most essential precautions for ensuring correct decision. The importance of such discriminating separation is one of the four rules prescribed by Descartes in his Discours de la Méthode. The present case comes under Mr. Mill's Fallacies of Confusion.]
Aristotle has thus distinguished and classified Fallacies under thirteen distinct heads in all--six In Dictione, and seven Extra Dictionem; among which last one is Ignoratio Elenchi. He now proceeds to show that, in another way of looking at the matter, all the Fallacies ranged under the thirteen heads, may be shown to be reducible to this single one--Ignoratio Elenchi. Every Fallacy, whatever it be, transgresses or fails to satisfy, in some way or other, the canons or conditions which go to constitute a valid Elenchus,[40] or a valid Syllogism. For a true Elenchus is only one mode of a true Syllogism; namely, that of which the conclusion is contradictory to some given thesis or proposition.[41] With this particular added, the definition of a valid Syllogism will also be the definition of a good Elenchus. And thus Ignoratio Elenchi--misconception or neglect of the conditions of a good Elenchus--understood in its largest meaning, is rather a characteristic common to all varieties of Fallacy, than one variety among others.[42]
[Footnote 40: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, a. 19: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r a(/pantas a)nalu=sai tou\s lechthe/ntas tro/pous ei)s to\n tou= e)le/gchou diorismo/n.]]
[Footnote 41: Ibid. a. 35.]
[Footnote 42: Ibid. p. 169, b. 15.]
In regard to two among the thirteen heads--Fallacia Accidentis and Fallacia Consequentis (which however ought properly to rank as only one head, since the second is merely a particular variety of the first)--Aristotle's observations are remarkable. After having pointed out that a Syllogism embodying this fallacy will not be valid or conclusive (thus showing that it involves Ignoratio Elenchi), he affirms that even scientific men were often not aware of it, and conceived themselves to be really refuted by an unscientific opponent urging against them such an inconclusive syllogism. To take an example:--Every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; every triangle is a figure; therefore, every figure has its three angles equal to two right angles.[43] Here we have an invalid syllogism; for it is in the Third figure, and sins against the conditions of that figure, by exhibiting an universal affirmative conclusion: it is a syllogism properly concluding in Darapti, but with conclusion improperly generalized. Yet Aristotle intimates that a scientific geometer of his day, in argument with an unscientific opponent, would admit the conclusion to be well proved, not knowing how to point out where the fallacy lay: he would, if asked, grant the premisses necessary for constructing such a syllogism; and, even if not asked, would suppose that he had already granted them, or that they ought to be granted.[44]
[Footnote 43: Ibid. p. 168, a. 40: [Greek: ou)d' ei) to\ tri/gônon duoi=n o)rthai=n i)/sas e)/chei, sumbe/bêke d' au)tô=| schê/mati ei)=nai ê)\ prô/tô| ê)\ a)rchê=|, o(/ti schê=ma ê)\ a)rchê\ ê)\ prô=ton tou=to.]
Here we have Figure reckoned as an accident of Triangle. This is a specimen of Aristotle's occasional laxity in employing the word [Greek: sumbebêko/s]. He commonly uses it as contrasted with essential, of which last term Mr. Poste says very justly (notes, p. 129):--"To complete the statement of Aristotle's view, it should be added, that essential propositions are those whose predicate cannot be defined without naming the subject, or whose subject cannot be defined without naming the predicate." Now figure is the genus to which triangle belongs, and triangle cannot be defined without naming its genus figure. But to include Genus as a predicable under the head of [Greek: sumbebêko/s]or Accident, is in marked opposition to Aristotle's own doctrine elsewhere: see Topic. I. v. p. 102, b. 4; iv. p. 101, b. 17; Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9; Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 32. It is a misfortune that Aristotle gave to this general head of Fallacy the misleading title of Fallacia Accidentia--[Greek: para\ to\ sumbebêko/s]. When he gave this title, he probably had present to his mind only such examples as he indicates in Soph. El. v. p. 166, b. 32. Throughout the Topica and elsewhere, Genus is distinguished pointedly from [Greek: sumbebêko/s], though examples occur occasionally in which the distinction is neglected. The two Fallacies called Accidentis and Consequentis, would both be more properly ranked under one common logical title--Supposed convertibility or interchangeableness between Subject and Predicate--[Greek: ei) to/de a)po\ tou=de mê\ chôri/zetai, mêd' a)po\ thate/rou chôri/zesthai tha/teron] (vii. p. 169, b. 8).]
[Footnote 44: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 6: [Greek: a)lla\ para\ tou=to kai\ oi( techni=tai kai\ o(/lôs oi( e)pistê/mones u(po\ tô=n a)nepistêmo/nôn e)le/gchontai; kata\ sumbebêko\s ga\r poiou=ntai tou\s sullogismou\s pro\s tou\s ei)do/tas; oi( d' ou) duna/menoi diairei=n ê)\ e)rôtô/menoi dido/asin ê)\ ou) do/ntes oi)/ontai dedôke/nai.]]
The passage affords us a curious insight into the intellectual grasp of the scientific men contemporary with Aristotle. Most of them were prepared to admit fallacious inferences (such as the above) which assumed the interchangeability of subject and predicate. They had paid little or no attention to the logical relations between one proposition and another, and between the two different terms of the same proposition. The differences of essential from accidental predication, and of each among the five Predicables from the others, must have been practically familiar to them, as to others, from the habit of correct speaking in detail; but they had not been called upon to consider correct speaking and reasoning in theory, nor to understand upon what conditions it depended whether the march of their argumentative discourse landed them in true or false results. And, if even the scientific men were thus unaware of logical fallacies, we may be sure that this must have been still more the case with unscientific men, of ordinary intelligence and education. Aristotle tells us here, in more than one passage, how widespread such illogical tendencies were: to fancy that two subjects which had one predicate the same must be the same with each other in all respects;[45] to understand each predicate applied to a subject as being itself an independent subject, implying a new Hoc Aliquid or Unum;[46] to treat the universal, not as a common epithet but, as a substantive and singular apart;[47] to use equivocal words or phrases, even the most wide and vague, without any attempt to discriminate their various meanings.[48] Such insensibility to the conditions of accurate reasoning prevailed alike among ordinary men and among the men of special science. A geometer would be imposed upon by the inconclusive syllogism stated in the last paragraph, which, as being founded on the Fallacia Accidentia (or interchangeability of subject and predicate), Aristotle numbers among Sophistical Refutations. Such a refutation, however, even when successful, would not at all prove that the geometer was deficient in knowledge of his own science;[49] for it would puzzle the really scientific man as well as the pretender.
[Footnote 45: Soph. El. vi. p. 168, b. 31: [Greek: ta\ ga\r e(ni\ tau)ta/, kai\ a)llê/lois a)xiou=men ei)=nai tau)ta/.]--vii. p. 169, b. 7: [Greek: e)/ti kai\ e)pi\ pollô=n phai/netai kai\ a)xiou=tai ou(/tôs, ei) to/de a)po\ tou=de mê\ chôri/zetai, mêd' a)po\ thate/rou chôri/zesthai tha/teron.]]
[Footnote 46: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 33: [Greek: o(/ti pa=n to\ katêgorou/meno/n tinos u(polamba/nomen to/de ti kai\ ô(s e(\n u(pakou/omen; tô=| ga\r e(ni\ kai\ tê=| ou)si/a| ma/lista dokei= pare/pesthai to\ to/de ti kai\ to\ o)/n.]]
[Footnote 47: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p. 179, a. 10.]
[Footnote 48: Ibid. vii. p. 169, a. 22.]
[Footnote 49: Ibid. viii. p. 169, b. 27: [Greek: oi( de\ sophistikoi\ e)/legchoi, a)\n kai\ sullogi/zôntai tê\n a)nti/phasin, ou) poiou=si dê=lon ei) a)gnoei=; kai\ ga\r to\n ei)do/ta e)mpodi/zousi tou/tois toi=s lo/gois.] Compare vi. p. 168, b. 6.]
We must always recollect that Aristotle was the first author who studied the logical relations between Terms and Propositions, with a view to theory and to general rules founded thereupon. The distinctions which he brought to view were in his time novelties; even the simplest rules, such as those relating to the Conversion of propositions, or to Contraries and Contradictories, had never been stated in general terms before. Up to a certain point, indeed, acquired habit, even without these generalities, would doubtless lead to correct speech and reasoning; yet liable to be perverted in many cases by erroneous tendencies, requiring to be indicated and guarded against by a logician. When we are told that even a professed geometer was imposed upon by these fallacies, we learn at once how deep-seated were such illogical deficiencies, how useful was Aristotle's theoretical study in marking them out, and how insufficient was his classification when he described the Fallacies as obvious frauds, broached only by dishonest professional Sophists. As he himself states, the cause of deceit turns upon a quite trifling difference; having its root in the imperfection of language and in our frequent habit of using words without much attention to logical distinctions.[50]
[Footnote 50: Soph. El. vii. p. 169, b. 14: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\r ê( a)pa/tê dia\ to\ para\ mikro/n; ou) ga\r diakribou=men ou)/te tê=s prota/seôs ou)/te tou= sullogismou= to\n o(/ron dia\ tê\n ei)rême/nên ai)ti/an.] Compare v. p. 167, a. 5-14; i. p. 165, a. 6-19.]
Under one or other, then, of the thirteen general heads above enumerated, all Paralogisms must be included--merely apparent syllogisms, or refutations, which are not real and valid;[51] and all of them designated by Aristotle as sophistic or eristic. Besides these, moreover, he includes, as we saw, under the same designation, syllogisms or refutations valid in form, and true as to conclusion, yet founded on premisses not suited to the matter in debate; i.e., not suited to Dialectic. Now, here it is that difficulty arises. Dialectic and Rhetoric are carefully distinguished by Aristotle from all the special sciences (such as Geometry, Astronomy, Medicine, &c.); and are construed as embracing every variety of authoritative dicta, current beliefs, and matters of opinion, together with all the most general maxims and hypotheses of Ontology and Metaphysics, of Physics and Ethics, and the common Axioms assumed in all the sciences, as discriminated from what is special and peculiar to each. Construed in this way, we might imagine that the subject-matter of Dialectic was all-comprehensive, and that every thing without exception belonged to it, except the specialties of Geometry and of the other sciences; and such is the usual language of Aristotle. Yet in the treatise before us we find him exerting himself to establish another classification, and to part off Dialectic from a certain other science or art which he acknowledges under the title of Sophistic or Eristic.[52] Elsewhere he describes Sophistic as occupied in the study of accidents or occasional conjunctions; and this characteristic feature parts it off from Demonstration and Science. But there is greater difficulty when he tries to part it off from Dialectic. Where are we to find a clear line of distinction between the matter of dialectic debate (gymnastic or testing) on the one hand, and the matter of debate sophistic or litigious, on the other? At the beginning of the Topica Aristotle assigned, as the distinction, that the Dialectician argues upon premisses really probable, while the litigious Sophist takes up premisses which are probable in appearance only, and not in reality; such apparent probabilia (he goes on to say) having only the most superficial semblance of truth, and being seen immediately to be manifest falsehoods by persons of very ordinary intelligence.[53] But I have already pointed out that this description of apparent probabilia, if considered as applying to fallacious reasoning generally, is both untenable in itself, and contradicted by Aristotle himself elsewhere. The truth is, that there is no clear distinction between the matter of Dialectic and the matter of Sophistic. And so, indeed, Aristotle must be understood to admit, when he falls back upon an alleged distinction of aim and purpose between the practitioners of one and the other. The litigious man (he tells us) is bent upon nothing but victory in debate, per fas et nefas: the Sophist aims at passing himself off falsely for a wise or clever man, and making money thereby.[54]
[Footnote 51: Ibid. viii. p. 170, a. 10.]
[Footnote 52: Metaphys. K. viii. p. 1064, b. 26: [Greek: tou=to de\ (to\ sumbebêko/s) ou)demi/a zêtei= tô=n o(mologoume/nôs ou)sô=n e)pistêmô=n, plê\n ê( sophistikê/; peri\ to\ sumbebêko\s ga\r au(/tê mo/nê pragmateu/etai.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p. 71, b. 10.]
[Footnote 53: Topic. I, i. p. 100, b. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\r pa=n to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\n ga\r tô=n legome/nôn e)/ndoxôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an, katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\ sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseudou=s e)sti\ phu/sis.] It is by reference to this distinction between [Greek: e)/ndoxa] which are genuine and [Greek: e)/ndoxa] which are only such in appearance that the Scholiast (p. 306, b. 40) explains the meaning of Aristotle in the eleventh chapter of Sophistici Elenchi: [Greek: o( me\n ou)=n kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrô=n ta\ koina\ dialektiko/s, o( de\ tou=to phainome/nôs poiô=n sophistiko/s] (p. 171, b. 6-20). I confess that I attach no distinct meaning to the words [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrô=n ta\ koina\], which characterizes the Dialectician as contrasted with the Sophist; nor can I learn much from the notes either of Waitz, or of Mr. Poste (p. 129, seq.) on the passage. Take for example the last half of the Parmenides of Plato, or Book B. of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Are we to say that in these two compositions Plato and Aristotle speculate on to [Greek: ta\ koina\ kata\ to\ pra=gma], or that they do so only in appearance?]
[Footnote 54: Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 25-35; i. p. 165, a. 21-31.]
Now, in regard to the distinction of aim or disposition drawn by Aristotle between the dialectical disputant and the litigious or sophistic disputant, we see at once, as was before suggested, that it lies apart from the critical estimate of art, science, or philosophy; and that it belongs, so far as it is well founded, to the estimate of individuals ethically and politically, as worthy men or patriotic citizens. Whether Euripides or Sophokles composed finer tragedies (as we find argued in the Ranæ of Aristophanes), must be decided by examining the tragedies themselves, not by enquiring whether one of them was vain and greedy of money, the other free from these blemishes. A theorist who is laying down general principles of Rhetoric, and illustrating them by the study of Æschines and Demosthenes, will appreciate the oration against Ktesiphon and the oration De Coronâ in their character of compositions intended for a particular purpose. For Rhetoric it is of no moment whether Æschines was venal or disinterested--a malignant rival or an honest patriot; this is an enquiry important indeed, but belonging to the historian and not to the rhetorical theorist. Whether Aristotle was or was not guided, in his animadversions on Plato, by an unworthy and captious jealousy of his master, is an interesting question in reference to his character; but our appreciation of his philosophy must proceed upon an examination, not of his motives but, of his doctrines and reasonings as we find them. A good argument is not deprived of its force when enunciated by a knave, nor is a bad argument rendered good because it proceeds from a virtuous man. Indeed, so far as the character of the speaker counts at all, in falsifying the fair logical estimate of an argument, it operates in a direction opposite to that here indicated by Aristotle. The same argument in the mouth of one who is esteemed and admired counts for more than its worth; in the mouth of a person of low character it counts for less than it is worth.[55] To distribute arguments into two classes--those employed by persons of dishonourable character and those employed by honourable men--is a departure from the scientific character of Logic.
[Footnote 55: Eurip. Hecub. 293.
[Greek: to\ d' a)xi/ôma, ka)\n kaô=s le/gê|s, to\ so\n pei/sei; lo/gos ga\r e)/k t' a)doxou/ntôn i)ô\n ka)\k tô=n dokou/ntôn au)to\s ou) tau)to\n sthe/nei.]
Aristot. Rhetoric. I. ii. p. 1356, a. 5-15.]
As to the other part of the case (if it is still necessary to recur to it), touching the peculiarity of the matter of sophistical arguments, the inconsistency of Aristotle is most apparent. In enumerating the Sophistical Refutations he tells us that these fallacies are indeed sometimes palpable and easily detected, but that they are often very difficult to detect and very misleading; that an unprepared hearer will generally be imposed upon by several of them, and even a scientific hearer by some; and that, even where the fallacy does not actually deceive, the proper mode of meeting and exposing it will not occur unless to one previously exercised in Dialectic.[56] That Fallacies In Dictione, taken as a class (though these are what he declares to be the most usual modus operandi of the sham dialecticians called Sophists[57]), often passed unperceived, and were hard to solve and elucidate even when perceived--we know to have been his opinion; for it is not only in the Topica and Sophistici Elenchi, but also in the Metaphysica and other works,[58] that he takes pains to analyse and discriminate the several distinct meanings borne by terms familiar to every one, such as idem, unum, pulchrum, bonum, amare, album, acutum, &c., which terms therefore, when employed in argument, were always liable to introduce a fallacy of Equivocation or Amphiboly. He tells us the like in specifying the seven Fallacies Extra Dictionem: that they also were often unnoticed, and required vigilant practice to see through and solve. The description in detail, therefore, which Aristotle gives (in Sophistici Elenchi) of the working process peculiar to the litigious Sophist, is completely at variance with the definition which he had given of the sophistic syllogism at the commencement of the Topica. That definition is indeed suitable for the type-specimens which he and other logicians give to illustrate this or that class of Fallacies: the type-specimen produced must carry absurdity on the face of it, so that the reader may at first sight recognize it as a fallacy; and he may even find difficulty in believing that any one can really be imposed upon by such trifling. But, though suitable for the type-specimen taken separately, this definition fails in the essential character which Aristotle postulates for a definition, since it is quite untrue and unsuitable for numerous instances of the class intended to be illustrated.[59] Aristotle was the first who attempted to distribute Fallacies into classes, such that, while in each class there were certain specimens palpably stamped with the fallacious character, there were also in each class an indefinite multitude of analogous cases wherein the fallacious character did not reveal itself openly or easily, but required attentive consideration to detect it, often indeed remaining undetected, and producing its natural fruit of error and confusion. This was one of his many great merits in regard to Logic; and the classification of Fallacies (modified as to details) has passed to all subsequent logicians, so that we find difficulty in understanding that the contemporaries of Sokrates and Plato had no idea of it. But the value of his service to Logic would be much lessened, if all fallacies were sophistic syllogisms, intended to deceive but never really deceiving, corresponding to his definition at the beginning of the Topica; if (as he tells us in the Sophistici Elenchi) they were only impudent forgeries put in circulation by a set of professional knaves called Sophists; and if all non-sophistical dialecticians, and all the world without, could be trusted as speaking correctly by nature and as never falling into them.
[Footnote 56: Soph. El. v. p. 167, a. 5-15, b. 5-35. [Greek: kai\ lantha/nei polla/kis ou)ch ê(=tton au)tou\s tou\s e)rôtô=ntas to\ toiou=ton.]--vii. p. 169, a. 22-30, b. 8-15: [Greek: e)n a(/pasi ga\r ê( a)pa/tê dia\ to\ para\ mikro/n].--xv. p. 175, a. 20.]
[Footnote 57: Ibid. i. p. 165, a. 2-20.]
[Footnote 58: Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39; p. 106, b. 3-9; p. 107, a. 12, b. 7: [Greek: polla/kis de\ kai\ e)n au)toi=s toi=s lo/gois lantha/nei parakolouthou=n to\ o(mô/numon.] Cf. Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 33; V. ii. p. 129, b. 30, seq.; VI. x. p. 148, a. 23, seq. Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 17.
Compare also Book [Greek: D]. of the Metaphysica, and the frequent recognition and analysis [Greek: tô=n polla/kô=s legome/nôn] throughout the other Books of the Metaphysica.]
[Footnote 59: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 26: [Greek: dei= ga\r to\n tou= a)nthrô/pou o(rismo\n kata\ panto\s a)nthrô/pou a)lêtheu/esthai.]--VI. x. p. 148, x. p. 148, b. 2: [Greek: dei= ga\r e)pi\ pa=n to\ sunô/numon e)pharmo/ttein.]
Whoever reads the Sixth Book of the Topica, wherein Aristotle indicates to the questioner Loci for impugning a definition, will see how little this definition of the Sophistic Syllogism will stand such attacks.]
The appeal made by Aristotle to a difference of character and motives as the distinction between the Dialectician and the Sophist is all the more misplaced, because he himself lays down as the essential feature of Dialectic generally, that it is a match or contention between two rivals, each anxious to obtain the victory. It is like a match at chess between two expert players, or a fencing-match between two celebrated masters at arms. Its very nature is to be an attack and defence, in which each combatant resorts to stratagem, and each outwits the other if he can. Whether the match is played for money or for nothing--whether the contentious spirit is more or less intense--does not concern the theorist on dialectical procedure. It is indispensable that both the questioner and the respondent should exert their full force, the one in thrusting, the other in parrying: if they do not, the purpose of Dialectic, which is the common business of both, will not be attained. That purpose is clearly declared by Aristotle. It is not didactic: he distinguishes it expressly from teaching,[60] where one man who knows communicates such knowledge to an ignorant pupil. It is gymnastic, exercising the promptitude and invention of both parties; or peirastic, testing whether the respondent knows a given thesis in such manner as to avoid being driven into answers inconsistent with each other or notoriously false.[61] Each party seeks, not to help or enlighten but, to puzzle and defeat the other. As at chess or in fencing, to mask one's projects and deceive the adversary is essential to the work and to its purpose; each expects it from the other, and undertakes to meet and parry it. The theses debated were always such that arguments might be found both for the affirmative and for the negative.
[Footnote 60: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, b. 1-5; x. p. 171, a. 32-b. 2. Cf. Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 25.]
[Footnote 61: Topic. I. i. p. 100, a. 20; VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10-28.]
According to Aristotle himself, therefore, the Dialectician is agonistic and eristic, just as much as the Sophist. If the one tries to entrap his opponent for the purpose of victory, so also does the other: the line which Aristotle draws between them is one not founded upon any real distinction between two purposes and modes of procedure, but is merely verbal and sentimental; putting aside under a discredited title what he himself disliked. He admits that the dialectical questioner, whenever the thesis which he undertakes to refute is true, can never refute it except by inducing the respondent to concede what is false; that, even where the thesis is false, he often can only refute it by some other incompatible falsehood, because he cannot obtain from the respondent better premisses; that, where the thesis is probable and conformable to received opinion, his only way of refuting it is by entrapping the respondent into concessions paradoxical and contrary to received opinion.[62] But these ends--fallacious refutation, falsehood, and paradox--are the very same as those which Aristotle (in the Sophistici Elenchi)[63] sets forth as the peculiar characteristics of the litigious Sophist. And the improving intellectual tendencies which he ascribes to Sophistic, are almost identical with those attributed to Dialectic, being declared in very similar words.[64] That there were dialecticians of every degree of merit, in the time of Aristotle, cannot be doubted; some clever and ready, others stupid and destitute of invention. But that there were any two classes of dialecticians such as he describes and contrasts--one heretical class, called Sophists, who purposely and habitually employed the thirteen fallacious refutations, and another orthodox class who purposely avoided or habitually abstained from them--we may most reasonably doubt. If the argument in the Sophistici Elenchi is good at all, it is good against all Dialectic. The Sophist, as Aristotle describes him, is only the Dialectician looked at on the unfavourable side and painted by an enemy. We know that there were in Greece many enemies of Dialectic generally; the intense antipathy inspired by the cross-examining colloquy of Sokrates, and attested by his own declarations, is a sufficient proof of this. The enemies of Sokrates depicted him--as Aristotle depicts the Sophist in the Sophistici Elenchi--as a clever fabricator of fallacious contradictions and puzzles; to which Aristotle adds the farther charge (advanced by Plato before him) against the Sophist, of arguing for lucre--which is an irrelevant charge, travelling out of the region of art, and bearing on the personal character of the individual. If the sophistical stratagems were discreditable and mischievous when exhibited for money, they would be no less such if exhibited gratuitously. The sophistical discourse is not (as Aristotle would have us believe) generically distinguishable from the dialectical;[65] nor is Sophistic an art distinct from Dialectic while adjoining to it, but an inseparable portion of the tissue of Dialectic itself.[66] If the Sophist passed himself off as knowing what he did not really know, so also did the Dialectician; as we know from the testimony of Sokrates, the most consummate master of the art. The conflict of two minds each taking advantage of the misconceptions, short-comings, and blindness of the other, is the essential feature of Dialectic as Aristotle conceives it; to which the eight books of his Topica are adapted, with their multiplicity of distinctions and precepts both for attack and defence. There cannot be a game of chess without stratagems, nor a fencing-match without feints; the power of such aggressive deception is one characteristic mark of a good player. Those who teach or theorize on the game do not seek to exclude stratagem, but furnish precautions to prevent it from succeeding. Mastery of the art assumes skill in defence as well as in attack.
[Footnote 62: Topic. VIII. xi. p. 161, a. 24.]
[Footnote 63: Soph. El. iii. p. 165, b. 14.]
[Footnote 64: Compare Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26-b. 4, with Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16.]
[Footnote 65: Soph. El. ii. p. 165, a. 32; xxxiv. p. 183, b. 1.]
[Footnote 66: Plato, Apol. Sokrat. p. 23, A.
Compare this with Aristot. Soph. El. i. p. 165, a. 30.]
Doubtless there are rules that require to be observed in the dialectical attack and defence, as there are rules for all other matches such as chess or fencing. I should have been glad if Aristotle had given a precise and tenable explanation what these rules were. He describes the Sophist as one who plays the game unfairly; but we have already seen that the ends pursued by the Dialectician generally are hardly at all distinguishable from those aimed at by the Sophist. If we look to the account of the means employed by one and the other, we shall in like manner fail to see how any real line can be drawn between them.
Thus, one proceeding declared to be characteristic of the Sophist is--that he puts multiplied questions apparently at random, without any visible bearing on the thesis; practising a sort of fishing examination, in order to obtain some answer of which he may take advantage.[67] But, when we turn to the Eighth Book of the Topica, we find Aristotle expressly recommending the like manoeuvre to the Dialectician; advising him to conceal as much as possible the scheme and intended series of his questions--to begin as far as possible apart from the thesis, to put the questions in a succession designedly incoherent and unintelligible, and to obtain (what, if obtained, ensured complete success) the full extent of premisses necessary for his final refutative syllogism, without the respondent being aware that he had conceded them.[68] The questioner is farther advised to throw the respondent off his guard by affecting indifference whether each question is answered affirmatively or negatively, and by occasionally taking objection against himself, in order that he may create the impression of a strictly honest purpose.[69] If we compare the interrogative procedure which Aristotle recommends to the Dialectician with that which he blames in the Sophist, we shall find that the former is even a greater refinement of deception than the latter.
[Footnote 67: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 9-25.
Aristotle treats the Sophists as guilty of dishonourable proceeding herein--[Greek: du/nantai de\ nu=n ê(=tton katourgei=n dia\ tou/tôn ê)\ pro/teron.] The very same charge was urged against the dialectic of Sokrates by his opponents: Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 373--[Greek: a)lla\ Sôkra/tês a)ei\ tara/ttei e)n toi=s lo/gois kai\ e)/oiken ô(/sper kakourgou=nti.] Compare Plato, Gorgias, pp. 461, B., 482, E., 483, A.]
[Footnote 68: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 1.-p. 155, b. 30; p. 156, a. 5-22. Compare Analyt. Priora, II. xix. p. 66, a. 33.]
[Footnote 69: Topic. VIII. i. p. 156, b. 3, 17. Compare VIII. i. pp. 155-156, with Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 28.]
The next trick which we find ascribed to the Sophist is--that he conducts the train of interrogation in such manner as to bring it upon a ground on which his memory is abundantly furnished with topics. Aristotle adds that this may be done well and honourably, or ill and dishonourably.[70] From his own admission we see that this practice was not peculiar to Sophists, but was common also to those whom he calls Dialecticians: like every other part of the procedure, it might be done well or ill; but wherein this difference consisted he does not further explain. Indeed, when we recollect that the elaborate details and classification of the Topica are mainly intended to furnish the memory with an abundant store of premisses well-arranged and ready for interrogation,[71] we may be sure that every Dialectician who had gone through the trouble of learning them would be impatient to apply them; and would make an opportunity for doing so, if none were spontaneously tendered to him. But, if the answers obtained were totally irrelevant to his final purpose of refuting the thesis, they would be nothing but embarrassment to him.[72] We must, therefore, understand that the questions put would be such as tended ultimately to introduce that refutative Syllogism which the questioner was bound to conclude with. If they were not, he was of course punished by failure.
[Footnote 70: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 26. In Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 20, Aristotle prescribes the same procedure to the Dialectician. See also Waitz's note on the passage.
Alexander (in Scholia, p. 267, b. 8) tells us that it was customary for the Sophists to put questions lying away from the thesis, and he shows this by mentioning the Platonic Protagoras, in which he says that the Sophist Protagoras does so. But the illustration here produced does not serve Alexander's purpose. The Sophist Protagoras (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is represented, not as shifting dialectic from one point to another, but as running away from it altogether into long discourse and continuous rhetoric (Plato, Protagor. pp. 333, 334, 335). In respect to the thesis started for debate, the dialectic of Sokrates departs from it as widely as that of Protagoras, and this is acknowledged at the close of the dialogue, p. 361. Compare 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates', Vol. II. pp. 53, 59, 70.]
[Footnote 71: Topic. I. v. p. 102, a. 13; I. xiii. p. 105, a. 22; VIII. xiv. p. 163, a. 31-b. 2.]
[Footnote 72: Aristotle himself observes this, Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 14.]
A third manoeuvre treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he takes account of the particular philosophical sect to which the respondent belongs, and endeavours to bring out by interrogations whatever there may be paradoxical in the tenets of that sect.[73] But would not any expert Dialectician do just the same? What else would be done by Sokrates, if cross-examining an Anaxagorean or a Herakleitean? or by Aristotle himself, if interrogating a Platonist?
[Footnote 73: Soph. El. xii. p. 172, b. 29.]
Another proceeding treated as peculiar to the Sophist is--that he seeks to drive the respondent into a paradox, by bringing out in cross-examination certain well-known antitheses or contradictions which subsist together in the opinions of mankind. Thus, men profess in their public talk high principles of virtue; but secretly and at the bottom of their hearts they desire to get wealth or power per fas et nefas. Again, there are two kinds of justice: one, that which is just by nature and in truth, such as wise men or philosophers approve; the other, that which is just according to law or custom, such as the multitude in this or in in some other society approve. There is, also, conflict between the authority of a father, and that of the wise; between justice and expediency; and as to whether it is more eligible to suffer wrong or to do wrong.[74] All these antitheses are presented to us in the Platonic Gorgias, to which (i.e., to the speech of Kallikles therein) Aristotle here makes reference; and he numbers it among the vices distinguishing the Sophist from the genuine Dialectician--to dwell upon such antitheses for the purpose of forcing the respondent into paradoxical answers. But, surely, the antitheses here fastened upon that obnoxious name are of a class utterly opposed to the class of pseudo-probabilia, which he tells us are the peculiar game of the litigious Sophist, though every man of ordinary intelligence detects them at first sight as fallacies. They are all real and serious issues,[75] having plausible arguments pro and con, debateable without end, and settled by every man for himself according to his own sentiment and predisposition. They are exactly the subject-matter best fitted for the acute Dialectician. No man would be allowed by Aristotle to deserve that title, if he omitted to raise and argue them, the thesis being supposed suitable.[76] Aristotle himself speaks often of the equivocal sense of the term justice--of the distinction between what is just by nature and what is just according to some local or peculiar sentiment.[77] The manoeuvre which Aristotle imputes to the Sophist being exactly the same as that which Kallikles imputes to Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias,[78] it is Sokrates, and not Kallikles, who serves here as illustrating what Aristotle calls a Sophist. Indeed, if we read the Gorgias, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates there represented as neglecting the difference between what is probable (conformable to received opinion) and what is paradoxical. He admits that he stands alone in his opinion, against all the world, and his opponents even imagine that he is bantering them; but he confides in his own individual reason and consistency, so as to be able to reduce all opponents dialectically to proved contradiction with themselves.[79] Himself maintaining a paradox, he constrains his respondent by acute dialectic to assent to it; which is exactly what Aristotle imputes to the Sophists of his day as a reproach.
[Footnote 74: Ibid. b. 36-p. 173, a. 30.]
[Footnote 75: Rhetoric. II. xxv. p. 1402, a. 33: [Greek: oi( me\n ga\r sullogismoi\ e)k tô=n e)ndo/xôn, dokou=nta de\ polla\ e)nanti/a a)llê/lois e)sti/n.]
A disputant who argued about these memorable ethical antitheses, must be allowed [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma theôrei=n ta\ koina/], which is the characteristic feature assigned by Aristotle to the Dialectician, as contrasted with the Sophist (Soph. El. xi. p. 171, b. 5), in so far us I can understand the words [Greek: kata\ to\ pra=gma]. See note b p. 394 supra.]
[Footnote 76: Topic. I. iii. p. 101, a. 5-10. [Greek: e)k tô=n e)ndechome/nôn poiei=n a(\ proairou/metha.]]
[Footnote 77: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 25. Ethic. Nikom. V. x. p. 1134, b. 18; I. i. p. 1094, b. 15. Rhetoric. I. xiii. p. 1373, b. 5.]
[Footnote 78: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-483. [Greek: o(\ dê\ kai\ su\] (Sokrates) [Greek: tou=to to\ sopho\n katanenoêkô\s kakourgei=s e)n toi=s lo/gois, e)a\n me/n tis kata\ no/mon le/gê|, kata\ phu/sin u(perôtô=n, e)a\n de\ ta\ tê=s phu/seôs, ta\ tou= no/mou.]]
[Footnote 79: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 470, 472, 481, 482.]
Some predecessors of Aristotle had distinguished arguments or discourses into two separate classes--those addressed to the name, and those addressed to the thought.[80] This distinction Aristotle disapproves, denying certainly its pertinence and almost its reality. There can be no arguments addressed to the thought only, apart from the name: all of them must be addressed to the name, and through it to the thought.[81] Whether an argument is addressed to the thought or not, depends not upon any thing in the argument itself, but upon the meaning which one respondent or other may happen to attach to the words: if the respondent understands it as the questioner intended, it is addressed to the thought; if not, not.[82] To require that the questioner shall distinguish accurately the sense in which he puts the question, would, according to Aristotle, convert him into a teacher--would confound the line between Dialectic and Didactic.[83] And this may be granted; but not less, if Dialecticians are to refrain from all those proceedings which Aristotle notes and condemns as peculiar to the Sophist, must they be held to pass into the attitude of teacher and learner; the questioner doing what he can, not to embarrass but, to enlighten and assist the respondent. The purpose of victory, and the stimulus of competition in the double function of question and answer (while entirely absent from Didactic), are quite as essential to the Dialectician as to the Sophist. That the Sophist seeks victory unscrupulously and at all cost, while the Dialectician respects certain rules and limits of the procedure--is a difference well deserving to be noticed; yet not a differentia giving name and essence to a new species. The unfair Dialectician is a Dialectician still; all his purposes remain the same, though the means whereby he pursues them are altered. This distinction of means between the two, Aristotle has taken very insufficient pains to point out. Rude and provocative manner, either on the part of questioner or respondent, and impudent assumption of concessions which have neither been asked nor granted,--these are justly enumerated as illustrations of unfair Dialectic.[84] But the enumeration is most incompletely performed; because Aristotle, in his anxiety to erect Sophistic into an art or procedure by itself, distinct from and alongside of Dialectic, has transferred to it much that belongs to fair and and admissible Dialectic. Hence the really unfair and objectionable means are not often brought into the foreground.
[Footnote 80: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 12: [Greek: ou)k e)/sti de\ diaphora\ tô=n ê(\n le/gousi tines, to\ ei)=nai tou\s me\n pro\s tou)/noma lo/gous, e(te/rous de\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian.]
From this allusion (and other allusions also xvii. p. 176, a. 6; xx. p. 177, b. 8; xxii. p. 178, b. 10) to the doctrines of predecessors, we see that the assertion made by Aristotle (in the last chapter of Sophistici Elenchi) of his own originality, and of the absence of prior researches, must be taken with some indulgence.]
[Footnote 81: Soph. El. x. p. 170, b. 23.]
[Footnote 82: Ibid. b. 28: [Greek: ou) ga\r e)n tô=| lo/gô| e)/sti to\ pro\s tê\n dia/noian ei)=nai, a)ll' e)n tô=| to\n a)pokrino/menon e)/chein pôs pro\s ta\ dedome/na.]]
[Footnote 83: Ibid. p. 171, a. 28, seq.]
[Footnote 84: Soph. El. xv. p. 174, a. 22, b. 10.]
Though Aristotle speaks so contemptuously about Sophistic, he nevertheless indicates Loci (or general heads of subjects) to assist the sophistical questioner in attacking, and precepts to the sophistical respondent for warding off attack. On the whole, these precepts are not materially different from those laid out in the Topica for Dialectic; except that he gives greater prominence to Solecism and Tautology, as thrusts practised by the sophistical questioner. He insists upon the intellectual usefulness of practice in sophistical debate, hardly less than in what he calls dialectical, and, as was remarked, upon similar grounds.[85] He recommends it as valuable not only for imparting readiness and abundance in argument, but also for solitary meditation and for investigation of scientific truths. Without it (he declares) we cannot become familiar with the equivocations of terms and propositions, nor acquire the means of escaping them. If we allow ourselves to be entangled in them, without being aware of it, by others, we shall also be entangled in them when we pursue reflections of our own.[86] It is not enough to see generally that there is a fallacy; we must farther learn to detect at once the precise seat of the fallacy, and to point out rapidly how it may be cleared up. This is the more difficult to do, because fallacies that we are thoroughly aware of will often escape our notice under inversion and substitution of words.[87] Unless we acquire promptitude by frequent exercise in such debates, we shall find ourselves always unprepared and behind-hand in each particular case of confusion. If we complain and condemn such debates generally, we shall appear to do so upon no better grounds than our own stupidity and incompetence.[88]
[Footnote 85: Ibid. xvi. p. 175, a. 5-16. Compare Topica**, I. ii. p. 101, a. 30, seq.]
[Footnote 86: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 9: [Greek: deu/teron de\ pro\s ta\s kath' au(to\n zêtê/seis (chrê/simoi); o( ga\r u(ph' e(te/rou r(a|diôs paralogizo/menos kai\ tou=to mê\ ai)sthano/menos ka)\n au)to\s u(ph' au(tou= tou=to pa/thoi polla/kis.]]
[Footnote 87: Ibid. a. 20: [Greek: ou) tau)to\ d' e)sti\ labo/nta te to\n lo/gon i)dei=n kai\ lu=sai tê\n mochthêri/an, kai\ e)rôtô/menon a)panta=n du/nasthai tache/ôs. o(\ ga\r i)/smen, polla/kis metatithe/menon a)gnoou=men.] Compare xxxiii. p. 182, b. 7.]
[Footnote 88: Soph. El. xvi. p. 175, a. 25: [Greek: ô(/ste, a)\n dê=lon me\n ê(mi=n ê)=|, a)mele/têtoi d' ô)=men, u(sterou=men tô=n kairô=n polla/kis.]]
Accordingly the Sophistici Elenchi contains precepts, at considerable length,[89] to the respondent in a sophistical debate, how reply or solution is to be given to the fallacies involved in the questions; all the thirteen Fallacies, (the six In Dictione, and the seven Extra Dictionem) being treated in succession. In conducting his defensive procedure, the respondent must keep constantly in mind what the Sophistical Refutation really is. He must treat it not as a real or genuine refutation, but as a mere simulation of such; and he must so arrange his reply as to bring into full evidence this fact of simulation. What he has to guard against is, not the being really refuted but, the seeming to be refuted.[90] The refutative syllogism constructed by the sophistical questioner, including as it does Equivocation, Amphiboly, or some other verbal fallacy, and therefore yielding no valid conclusion, does not settle whether the respondent is really refuted or not. If indeed the questioner, in putting his interrogation, discriminates the double meaning of his words, where they have a double meaning, the respondent ought to answer plainly and briefly Yes, or No; either affirming or denying what is tendered. But, if the questioner does not so discriminate, the respondent cannot reply simply Yes, or No: he must himself discriminate the two meanings, and affirm or deny accordingly.[91] Unless he guards himself by such discrimination, he cannot avoid falling into a contradiction, at least in appearance. The equivocal wording of the question will be tantamount to the fallacy of putting two questions as one.[92]
[Footnote 89: From xvi. p. 175, to xxxiii. p. 183, of Soph. El.]
[Footnote 90: Soph. El. xvii. p. 175, a. 33: [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r pro\s tou\s e)ristikou\s machete/on, ou)k ô(s e)le/gchontas, a)ll' ô(s phainome/nous; ou) ga/r phamen sullogi/zesthai/ ge au)tou/s, ô(/ste pro\s to\ mê\ dokei=n diorthôte/on.]]
[Footnote 91: Ibid. b. 1-14. Compare Topica, VIII. vii. p. 160, a. 29.
Aristotle tells us that this demand for a reply brief and direct, without any qualifying additions or distinctions, was advanced by dialecticians in former days much more emphatically than in his own--[Greek: o(/ t' e)pizêtou=si nu=n me\n ê(=tton pro/teron de\ ma=llon oi( e)ristikoi/, to\ ê)\ nai\ ê)\ ou)\ a)pokri/nesthai to\n e)rôtô/menon, e)gi/net' a)/n.] I presume that he makes comparison with the Platonic dialogues--Euthydemus, p. 295; Gorgias, pp. 448-449; Protagoras, pp. 334-335.]
[Footnote 92: Soph. El. xvii. 175, b. 15-p. 176, a. 18.]
As the questioner may propound as refutation what seems to be such but is not so in reality, so the respondent may meet it by what is an apparent solution but no solution in reality, There occur various cases, in sophistic or agonistic debate, wherein a simulated solution of this kind is even preferable to a real one.[93] If the question is plausible, the respondent may answer, "Be it so"; but, if it involves any paradox in answering, he will answer by saying, "So it would appear": he will thus not be supposed to have granted what amounts to refutation or paradox.[94] Where the question put is such that, while involving falsehood or paradox if answered in the affirmative, it is at the same time closely or immediately connected with the thesis set up,--the respondent may treat it as equivalent to a Petitio Principii, and make answer in the negative. Also, where the questioner, trying to establish an universal proposition by Induction, puts the final question, not under an universal term but, as the general result of the particulars conceded (and such like),--the respondent may refuse to admit this last step, and may say that his antecedent concessions have been misunderstood.[95]
[Footnote 93: Ibid. p. 176, a. 21.]
[Footnote 94: Ibid. a. 25.]
[Footnote 95: Ibid. a. 27-35.]
If a question is put in plain and appropriate language, answer must be made plainly or with some clear distinction; but, where the question is put obscurely and elliptically, leaving part of the meaning unexpressed, the respondent must not concede it unreservedly. If he does, fallacious refutation may very possibly be the result:[96] he may appear to be refuted by that which is no real refutation. If, of two propositions, the second follows upon the first, but the first does not follow upon the second, the respondent, where he has the choice, ought to grant the second only, and not the first. He ought not to make a greater concession when he can escape with a less;[97] e.g., he ought to concede the particular rather than the universal.
[Footnote 96: Ibid. a. 38-b. 7.]
[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 8-13.]
Again, among opinions generally received, there are some which the public recognize as matters of more or less doubt and uncertainty; others, on which they are firmly assured that every one who contradicts them speaks falsely. When it is uncertain to which of these two classes the question put is referable, the respondent will be safer in answering neither affirmatively nor negatively, but simply, "I go with the received opinions."[98] In cases where opinions are divided, he may find opportunity for changing the terms, and for substituting a metaphorical equivalent as what he concedes. Such change of terms may pass without protest, in consequence of the doubtful character of the matter; while it will embarrass the questioner in constructing his refutation.[99] The respondent may further embarrass him by anticipating questions that seem likely to be put, and by objecting against them beforehand.[100]
[Footnote 98: Soph. El. **xvii. p. 176, b. 14-20.
Both the text and the meaning of this difficult clause are differently given by various commentators. The text and construction of Waitz appears to me the best, and I have followed him. I cannot agree with Mr. Poste when he declares (notes, p. 143) [Greek: a)popha/neis] to be the true reading, instead of [Greek: a)popha/seis], which last is adopted both by Bekker and in the edition of **Firmin Didot.]
[Footnote 99: Ibid. b. 20-25.]
[Footnote 100: Ibid. b. 26.]
When the questioner has obtained the premisses which he thinks necessary, and has drawn from them a refutative syllogism, the respondent must see whether he can properly solve that syllogism or not.[101] A good and proper solution is, to point out on which premiss the fallacy of the conclusion depends. First, he must examine whether it is formally correct, or whether it has only a false appearance of being so: if the last be the case, he must distinguish in which of the premisses and in what way such false appearance has arisen. If on the other hand the syllogism is formally correct, he must look whether the conclusion is true or false. Should it be true, he cannot solve the syllogism except by controverting one or both of the premisses; but should the conclusion be false, two modes of solution are open to him. One mode is, if he can point out an equivocation or amphiboly in the terms of the conclusion; another mode will be, to controvert, or exhibit a fallacy in, one of the premisses.[102] The respondent, however, must learn to apply this examination rapidly and unhesitatingly: to do so at once is very difficult, though it may be easily done if he has leisure to reflect.[103]
[Footnote 101: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 29: [Greek: ê( me/n o)rthê\ lu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(poi/an e)rô/têsin sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos.]]
[Footnote 102: Soph. El. xviii. p. 176, b. 38: [Greek: tou\s me\n kata\ to\ sumpe/rasma pseudei=s dichô=s e)nde/chetai lu/ein; kai\ ga\r tô=| a)nelei=n ti tô=n ê)rôtême/nôn, kai\ tô=| dei=xai to\ sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch ou(/tôs.]
Mr. Poste translates these last words--"or by a counterproof directed against the conclusion:" and he remarks in his note (pp. 145-147), "that this assertion--disproof of the conclusion of the refutative syllogism is one mode of solution--is both manifestly inadmissible, and flatly contradicted by Aristotle himself elsewhere." The words of Aristotle doubtless seem to countenance Mr. Poste's translation; yet the contradiction pointed out by Mr. Poste (and very imperfectly explained, p. 147) ought to make us look out for another meaning; which is suggested by the chapter immediately following (xix. p. 177, a. 9), where Aristotle treats of the Fallacies of Equivocation and Amphiboly. He tells us that equivocation may be found either in the conclusion or in the premisses; and that to show it in the conclusion is one mode of solving or invalidating the refutation. This is what Aristotle means by the words cited at the beginning of this note: [Greek: tô=| dei=xai to\ sumpe/rasma e)/chon ou)ch o)rthô=s]. In Mr. Poste's translation these words mean the same as [Greek: a)nelei=n] used just before, which Aristotle obviously does not intend.]
[Footnote 103: Soph. El. xviii. p. 177, a. 7.]
Aristotle then proceeds to indicate the modes in which the respondent may provide solutions for each of the thirteen heads of fallacious refutation above enumerated. For these thirteen classes, he pronounces that one and the same solution will be found applicable to all fallacies contained in one and the same class.[104]
[Footnote 104: Scholia, p. 312, a. 4, Br.; Soph. El. 20, p. 177, b. 31: [Greek: tô=n ga\r para\ tau)to\n lo/gôn ê( au)tê\ lu/sis], &c.]
Thus, in the two first of them--Equivocation of Terms and Amphiboly of Propositions--duplicity of meaning must be either in the conclusion, or in the premisses, of the refutative syllogism. If it be in the conclusion, the refutation must at once be rejected, unless the respondent has previously admitted some proposition containing the equivocal word as one of its terms, so that the refutation may appear to contradict it expressly and distinctly. But, if it be in the premisses, then there is no necessity that the respondent should have previously admitted such a proposition; for the equivocal word may form the middle term of the refutative syllogism, and may thus not appear in the conclusion thereof.[105] The proper way for the respondent to deal with these questions, involving equivocation or amphiboly, is to answer them, at the outset, with a reserve for the double meaning, thus: "In one sense, it is so; in another sense, it is not." If he does not perceive the double meaning until he has already answered the first question, he must recover himself, when he answers the second, by pointing out the equivocation more distinctly, and by specifying how much he is prepared to concede.[106] Even if he has been taken unawares, and has not perceived the equivocation until the refutative syllogism has been constructed simply and absolutely, he should still contend that he never meant to concede what has been apparently refuted, and that the refutation tells only against the name, not against the thing meant;[107] so that there is no genuine refutation at all.
[Footnote 105: Soph. El. xix. p. 177, a. 18: [Greek: o(/sois d' e)n toi=s e)rôtê/masin, ou)k a)na/gkê proapophê=sai to\ ditto/n; ou) ga\r pro\s tou=to a)lla\ dia\ tou=to o( lo/gos.]]
[Footnote 106: Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: e)a\n de\ la/thê|, e)pi\ te/lei prostithe/nta tê=| e)rôtê/sei diorthôte/on;] &c.]
[Footnote 107: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: o(/lôs te machete/on, a)\n kai\ a(plô=s sullogi/zêtai, o(/ti ou)ch o(\ e)/phêsen a)pe/phêse pra=gma, a)ll' o)/noma; ô(/st' ou)k e)/legchos.]
Instead of [Greek: a)\n kai/], Julius Pacius reads [Greek: ka)/n]: the meaning is much the same.]
In the next two Fallacies--those of Composition and Division, or Conjunction and Disjunction--when the questioner draws up his refutative syllogism as if one of the two had been conceded, the respondent will retort by saying that his concession was intended only in the other construction of the words. This fallacy is distinct from Equivocation; and it is a mistake to try (as some have tried) to reduce all fallacies to Equivocation or Amphiboly.[108] The respondent will distinguish, in each particular case, that construction of the words which he intended in his admission, from that which the questioner assumes in his pretended refutation.[109]
[Footnote 108: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, a. 33-b. 9. [Greek: ou) pa/ntes oi( e)/legchoi para\ to\ ditto/n, katha/per tine/s phasin.]
This is another of the evidences showing that there were theorists prior to Aristotle on logical proof; and that his declaration of originality (in the concluding chapter of Sophist. Elenchi) must be taken with reserve.]
[Footnote 109: Soph. El. xx. p. 177, b. 10-26: [Greek: diairete/on ou)=n tô=| a)pokrinome/nô|;] &c.]
The Fallacies of Accent rarely furnish sophistical refutations,[110] but those of Figura Dictionis furnish a great many. When two words have the like form and structure, it may naturally be imagined that the signification of one belongs to the same Category as that of the other. But this is often an illusion; and in such cases a sophistical refutation may be founded thereupon. The respondent will solve it by denying the inference from similarity of form to similarity of meaning, and by distinguishing accurately to which among the ten Categories the meaning of each several word or each proposition belongs. When two words thus seem, by their form, to belong to the same Category, the questioner will often take it for granted, without expressly asking, that they do belong to the same, and will found a confutation thereupon; but the respondent must not admit the confutation to be valid, unless this question has been explicitly put to him and conceded.[111] A question is put which, in its direct and obvious meaning, bears only on the category of Quantity, of Quality, of Relation, of Action, or of Passion; but the respondent, not aware of the equivocation, answers it in such a manner as to comprehend the Category of Substance, and is so understood by the questioner when he constructs his refutative syllogism. The respondent will secure himself from being thus confuted, by keeping constantly in view to which of the Categories his answer is intended to refer.[112]
[Footnote 110: Ibid. xxi. p. 177, b. 35.]
[Footnote 111: Ibid. xxii. p. 178, a. 4-28. [Greek: to\ ga\r loipo\n au)to\s prosti/thêsin o( a)kou/ôn ô(s o(moi/ôs lego/menon; to\ de\ le/getai me\n ou)ch o(moi/ôs, phai/netai de\ dia\ tê\n le/xin.]]
[Footnote 112: Several illustrative examples of this mode of sophistical refutation, founded on the Fallacy called Figura Dictionis, are indicated in this chapter by Aristotle. The indication however, is often so brief and elliptical, that there is great difficulty in restoring the fallacies in full, and still greater difficulty in translating them into any modern language.
1. Is it possible at the same time to do and to have done the same thing?--No. To see something is to do something; to have seen something is to have done something?--Yes. Is it possible at the same time to see and to have seen the same thing?--Yes.
The respondent has thus contradicted himself. The form of the word [Greek: o(ra=n] appears to rank it under the Category [Greek: poiei=n]. However, I think that the mistake really made here was, that the respondent returned an answer universally negative to the first question.
2. Does anything coming under the Category Pati come under the Category Agere?--No. But [Greek: te/mnetai, kai/etai, ai)stha/netai], all show by their form that they belong to the Category Pati?--Yes. Again, [Greek: le/gein, tre/chein, o(ra=n], show by their form that they belong to the Category Agere?--Yes. You will admit, however, that [Greek: to\ o(ra=n] is [Greek: ai)stha/nesthai/ ti]?--Certainly. Therefore something that belongs to the Category Agere belongs also to that of Pati.
If we turn back to Aristot. Categ. viii. p. 11, a. 37, we shall find that he admits the possibility that the same subject may belong to two distinct Categories.
3. Did any one write that which stands here written?--Yes. It stands here written that you are standing up--a false statement; but when it was written the statement was true?--Yes. Therefore the writer has written a statement both true and false?--Yes.
Here true and false belong to the Category Quality; the statement or matter written belongs to that of Substance. What the writer wrote had nothing to do with the former of the two Categories; and no contradiction has been made out by admitting that the statement was once true and is now false.
4. Does a man tread that which he walks?--Yes. But he walks the whole day?--Yes. Therefore he treads the whole day.
Here the Category of Quando is confused with that of Substance.
5. But the most interesting illustration of this confusion of one Category with another, is furnished by Aristotle in respect of the difference between himself and Plato as to Ideas or Universals. According to Plato the universal term denoted a separate something apart from the particulars, yet of which each of these particulars partook. According to Aristotle it denoted nothing separate from the particulars, but something belonging (essentially or non-essentially) to all and each of the particulars. In the Platonic theory it was an Hoc Aliquid ([Greek: to/de ti]), or had an existence substantive and separate: in the Aristotelian it was a Quale or Quale Quid ([Greek: poio/n]), having an existence merely adjective or predicative. Aristotle maintains that Plato or the Platonists placed it in the wrong Category--in the Category of Substance instead of in that of Quality.
Now it is by rectifying this confusion of Categories that Aristotle solves two argumentative puzzles which he ranks as sophistical:--(1) The argument concluding in what was called the 'Third Man;' (2) The following question: Koriskus, and the musical Koriskus--are these the same, or is the second different from the first?
What is called the 'Third Man' was a refutation of the Platonic theory of Ideas. Because Plato recognized a substantive existence, corresponding to each common denomination connoting likeness, apart from all the similar particulars denominated, e.g., a Self-man, or separate self-existent man, corresponding to the Idea, and apart from all individual men, Caius, &c.--opponents argued against him, saying:--If this is recognized, you must also recognize that the Self-man, and the individual man called Caius, have also a common denomination and similarity, which (upon your principles) corresponds to another Ideal Man, or a Third Man. You must, therefore, go on inferring upwards to a Fourth Man, a Fifth Man, &c., and so onwards to an indefinite number of Ideal Men, one above the other. This was intended as a refutation, by Reductio ad Impossibile, of the Platonic view of Ideas as separate Entities, each of them One and Universal. But Aristotle here treats it as a Sophistical Refutation; and he indicates what he calls the solution of it by saying that it confounds the Categories of Substance and Quality, putting the Universal (which ought to be under the Category of Quality) under the Category of Substance. He has no right, however, to include this among Sophistical Refutations, which are (as he himself defines them) not real but fallacious refutations, invented by a dishonest money-getting profession called Sophists, and which are solved by pointing out the precise seat of the fallacy. The refutation called the 'Third Man' is so far from being fallacious, that it is valid, and is recited as such elsewhere by Aristotle himself (Metaphs. A. ix. p. 990, b. 17**); while the solution tendered by Aristotle, instead of being a solution, is a confirmation, pointing out, not where the fallacy of the refutation resides but, where the fallacy of the doctrine refuted resides. Moreover, if we are to treat the refutation called the 'Third Man' as sophistical, we must number Plato himself among the dishonest class called Sophists. Here is one among the many proofs that the strong line drawn by Aristotle between the Dialectician and the Sophist is quite untenable. The argument is distinctly enunciated in the Platonic Parmenides (pp. 131-133).
The meaning of the Universal (Aristotle maintains) must be considered as predicative only, tacked on to some Hoc Aliquid, and belonging to Quale or some other of the nine latter Categories. It may be set out as a distinct subject for logical consideration and reasoning: but it cannot be set out as a distinct existence beyond and apart from its particulars ([Greek: para\ tou\s pollou\s e(/n ti]). It is [Greek: poio/n], and it cannot even be recognized as [Greek: o(/per poio/n] or [Greek: au)to-poio/n], for this would put it apart from all the other [Greek: poia/], and would be open to the refutation above noticed called the 'Third Man.' Such is the drift of the very difficult passage of the Sophistici Elenchi (xxii. p. 178, b. 37-p. 179, a. 10**). I differ from Mr. Poste's translation (p. 71) of part of this passage, and still more from the explanation given in the latter part of his note (p. 155). I think that the doctrine of [Greek: to\ e(\n para\ ta\ polla/] is produced by Aristotle here and elsewhere in his work as untrue and inadmissible, not as his own doctrine. Mr. Poste understands this passage differently from the previous translators, with whom I agree for the most part, though M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire appears to me to have missed the hinge upon which Aristotle's argument turns, by translating [Greek: o(/per poio/n]--id ipsum, quod quale est (J. Pacius)--"une qualité:" the argument turns upon the distinction between [Greek: o(/per poio/n] and [Greek: poio/n].
I come now to the second sophistical refutation given by Aristotle: Koriskus, and the musician Koriskus--are the two the same or different? This is what Aristotle calls a sophistical or fallacious argument (compare Metaphys. E. ii. p. 1026, b. 15); but it can hardly be so called with propriety, for the only solution that Aristotle himself gives of it is, that the two are idem numero, but in an improper or secondary sense (Topic. I. vii. p. 103, a. 30); i. e., that they are in one point of view the same, in another point of view different--they are [Greek: e(\n kata\ sumbebêko/s]. See Arist. Metaph. [Greek: D]. vi. p. 1015, b. 16; Scholia, p. 696, a. 22, seq.; and Alexand. Aphrodis. ad Metaph. pp. 321, 322, 414, 415, ed. Bonitz. I understand Aristotle to say that [Greek: Ko/riskos mousiko/s] cannot be properly set out or abstracted ([Greek: ou)k e)/stin au)to\ e)kthe/sthai]), because it includes two Categories (Substance and Quality) in one; wherefore it cannot be properly compared either with [Greek: Ko/riskos] simply (Category of Substance) or with [Greek: mousiko/s] simply (Category of Quality). It seems strange that Aristotle does not notice this argumentative difficulty in the discussion which he bestows on [Greek: tau)to/n] in the Seventh Book of the Topica. The subtle reasonings, very hard to follow, which Aristotle employs (Physic. V. iv. p. 227) might have made him cautious in treating the difficulties of opponents as so many dishonest cavils. It is curious that Alexander, in reciting the sophistical argument, assumes as a matter of course that [Greek: o( grammatiko\s Sôkra/tês] is [Greek: o( au)to\s tô=| Sôkra/tei] (Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 736, b. 26, Brand.).]
As a general rule, in all the refutations founded on the seven Fallacies In Dictione, the respondent will solve the refutation by distinguishing the double meaning of the words or of the phrase, and by adopting as his own the one opposite to that which the questioner proceeds upon. If the Fallacy is of Conjunction and Disjunction, and if the questioner assumes Conjunction, the respondent will adopt Disjunction; if it be a Fallacy of Accent, and if the questioner assumes the grave accent, the respondent will adopt the acute.[113]
[Footnote 113: Soph. El. xxiii. p. 179, a. 11-25.]
Passing to the Fallacies Extra Dictionem, where the sophistical refutation is founded upon a Fallacy of Accident, the respondent ought to apply one and the same solution to all. He will say: "The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premisses"; and he will be prepared with an example, in which the conclusion obtained under this fallacy is notoriously untrue.[114] "Do you know Koriskus?"--"Yes." "Do you know the distant person coming this way?"--"No." "That distant person is Koriskus: therefore you know, and you do not know, the same person." The inference here is not necessary. To be coming this way--is an accident of Koriskus; and, because you do not know the accident, we cannot infer that you do not know the subject; such may or may not be the case.[115]
[Footnote 114: Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, a. 30: [Greek: r(ête/on ou)=n sumbibasthe/ntas o(moi/ôs pro\s a(/pantas o(/ti ou)k a)nagkai=on; e)/chein de\ dei= prophe/rein to\ oi(=on.]]
[Footnote 115: Ibid. a. 35-b. 7.]
The major premiss upon which the preceding sophistical refutation must rest, is, That it is impossible both to know and not to know the same thing. This must be put as a direct question by the questioner, and must be conceded by the respondent, before the intended refutation can be made good. Now there are some persons who solve the refutation by answering this question in the negative, and by saying that it is possible both to know and not to know the same thing, only not in the same respect: such is the case when we know Koriskus, but do not know Koriskus approaching from a distance.[116] Aristotle disapproves this mode of solution, as well as another mode which refers the fallacy to equivocation of terms. He points out that there are many other sophistical refutations, coming under the general head of Fallaciæ Accidentis, to which such solution will not apply; and that there ought to be one uniform mode of solution applicable to every fallacy coming under the same general head; though he admits at the same time that particular sophistical refutations may be vicious in more than one way. He says, moreover, that this contradiction or negation of the premiss is no true solution; for a solution ought to bring to view clearly the reason why the fallacious refutation appears to be a real refutation. Thus the Fallacia Accidentis consists in an inference that what is true of an accident is true also of the subject thereof: you explain that such inference, though apparently cogent, has no real cogency, and in that explanation consists the only proper solution of the fallacy.[117]
[Footnote 116: Ibid. b. 7, 18, 37: [Greek: lu/ousi de/ tines a)nairou=ntes tê\n e)rô/têsin; phasi\ ga\r e)nde/chesthai tau)to\ pra=gma ei)de/nai kai\ a)gnoei=n, a)lla\ mê\ kata\ tau)to/.]
Mr. Poste (pp. 152-157) translates [Greek: a)nairou=ntes tê\n e)rô/têsin]--"contradicting the thesis," and he expresses his surprise at the assertion, observing (very truly) that contradiction of the thesis is the very opposite of a solution; it helps in the very work which the refutation aims at accomplishing. But I cannot think that [Greek: e)rô/têsis] does mean "the thesis," either here or in the other passage to which Mr. Poste refers (xxii. p. 178, b. 14). I think it means a premiss which the respondent has conceded, or must be presumed to have conceded, essential to the validity of the refutation. The term [Greek: e)rô/têsis] cannot surely, with any propriety, be applied to the thesis. It means either a question, or what is conceded in reply to a question; and the thesis cannot come under either one meaning or the other, being the proposition which the respondent sets out by affirming and undertakes to defend.]
[Footnote 117: Soph. El. xxiv. p. 179, b. 23: [Greek: ê)=n ga\r ê( lu/sis e)mpha/nisis pseudou=s sullogismou=, par' o(\ pseudê/s.]]
In like manner, all those Fallacies which come under the general head of A dicto Secundum Quid ad dictum Simpliciter, can only be solved by pointing out, in each particular case, in what terms this confusion is concealed--wherein resides the inference apparently cogent which is mistaken for one really cogent. The respondent is driven to an apparent contradiction, by having granted premisses from which the inference is derivable that both sides of the Antiphasis are true--that the same predicate A may be both affirmed and denied of the same subject B. He solves the contradiction by analysing the Antiphasis, and by showing that affirmation is secundum quid, while denial is simpliciter; and that there is a contradiction not real, but only apparent, between the two.[118]
[Footnote 118: Ibid. xxv. p. 180, a. 23-31.]
In like manner, the Fallacy Ignoratio Elenchi will be solved by analysing the two supposed counter-propositions of the Antiphasis, and by showing that there is no real contradiction or inconsistency between them.[119]
[Footnote 119: Ibid. xxvi. p. 181, a. 1-14.]
In regard to the Fallacies under Petitio Principii, the respondent if he perceives that the premiss asked of him involves such a fallacy, must refuse to grant it, however probable it may be in itself. If he does not perceive this until after he has granted it, he must throw back the charge of mal-procedure upon the questioner; declaring that an Elenchus involving assumption of the matter in question is null, and that the concession was made under the supposition that some separate and independent syllogism was in contemplation.[120]
[Footnote 120: Ibid. xxvii. p. 181, a. 15-21.]
There are two distinct ways in which the Fallacia Consequentis may be employed. The predicate may be an universal, comprehending the subject: because animal always goes along with man, it is falsely inferred that man always goes along with animal; or it is falsely inferred that not-animal always goes along with not-man. The fallacy is solved when this is pointed out. The last inference is only valid when the terms are inverted; if animal always goes along with man, not-man will always go along with not-animal.[121]
[Footnote 121: Ibid. xxviii. p. 181, a. 22-30. [Greek: a)na/palin ga\r ê( a)kolou/thêsis].]
If the sophistical refutation includes more premisses than are indispensable to the conclusion, the respondent, after having satisfied himself that this is the fact, will point out the mal-procedure of the questioner, and will say that he conceded the superfluous premiss, not because it was in itself probable but, because it seemed relevant to the debate; while nevertheless the questioner has made no real or legitimate application of it towards that object.[122] This is the mode of solution applicable in the case of the Fallacies coming under the head Non Causa pro Causâ.[123]
[Footnote 122: Soph. El. xxix. p. 181, a. 31-35.]
[Footnote 123: Schol. p. 318, a. 36, Br.]
Where the sophistical questioner tries to refute by the Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum (i.e., by putting two or more questions as one), the respondent should forthwith divide the complex question into its component simple questions, and make answer accordingly. He must not give one answer, either affirmative or negative, to that which is more than one question. Even if he does give one answer, he may sometimes not involve himself in any contradiction; for it may happen that the same predicate is truly affirmable, or truly deniable, of two or more distinct and independent subjects. Often, however, the contrary is the case: no one true answer, either affirmative or negative, can be given to one of these complex questions: the one answer given, whatever it be, must always be partially false or inconsistent.[124] Suppose two subjects, A and B, one good, the other bad: if the question be, Whether A and B are good or bad, it will be equally true to say--Both are good, or, Both are bad, or, Both are neither good nor bad. There may indeed be other solutions for this fallacy: Both or All may signify two or more items taken individually, or taken collectively; but the only sure precaution is--one answer to one question.[125]
[Footnote 124: Soph. El. xxx. p. 181, a. 38: [Greek: ou)/te plei/ô kath' e(no\s ou)/te e(\n kata\ pollô=n, a)ll' e(\n kath' e(no\s phate/on ê)\ a)pophate/on.]]
[Footnote 125: Ibid. b. 6-25.]
Suppose that, instead of aiming at a seeming refutation, the Sophist tries to convict the respondent of Tautology. The source of this embarrassment is commonly the fact that a relative term is often used and conveys clear meaning without its correlate, though the correlate is always implied and understood. The respondent must avoid this trap by refusing to grant that the relative has any meaning at all without its correlate; and by requiring that the correlate shall be distinctly enunciated along with it. He ought to treat the relative without its correlate as merely a part of the whole significant expression--as merely syncategorematic; just as ten is in the phrase--ten minus one, or as the affirmative word is in a negative proposition.[126] Thus he will not recognize double as significant by itself without its correlate half, nor half without its correlate double; although in common parlance such correlate is often understood without being formally enunciated.
[Footnote 126: Soph. El. Xxxi. p. 181, b. 26: [Greek: ou) dote/on tô=n pro/s ti legome/nôn sêmai/nein ti chôrizome/nas kath' au(ta\s ta\s katêgori/as.]
Mr. Poste observes in his note:--"The sophistic locus of tautology may be considered as a caricature of a dialectic locus. One fault which dialectic criticism finds with a definition is the introduction of superfluous words." He then cites Topic. VI. ii. (p. 141, a. 4, seq.); but in this passage we find that the repetition of the same word is declared not to be an argumentative impropriety, so that the Sophist would gain nothing by driving his opponent into tautology.]
Lastly, another purpose which Aristotle ascribes to the Sophist, is that of driving the respondent into a Solecism--into some grammatical or syntactical impropriety, such as, using a noun in the wrong case or gender, using a pronoun with a different gender or number from the noun to which it belongs, &c. He points out that the solution of these verbal puzzles must be different for each particular case; in general, when thrown into a regular syllogistic form, even the questioner himself will be found to speak bad Greek. The examples given by Aristotle do not admit of being translated into a modern language, so as to preserve the solecism that constitutes their peculiarity.[127]
[Footnote 127: Soph. El. xxxii. p. 182, a. 7-b. 5.]
After having thus gone through the different artifices ascribed to the Sophist, and the ways of solving or meeting them, Aristotle remarks that there are material distinctions between the different cases which fall under one and the same general head of Sophistical Paralogism. Some cases there are in which both the fallacy itself, and the particular point upon which it turns, are obvious and discernible at first sight. In other cases, again, an ordinary person does not perceive that there is any fallacy at all; or, if he does perceive it, he often does not detect the seat of the fallacy, so that one man will refer the case to one general head, and another, to a different one.[128] Thus, for example, Fallacies of Equivocation are perhaps the most frequent and numerous of all fallacies; some of them are childish and jocular, not really imposing upon any one; but there are others again in which the double meaning of a word is at first unnoticed, and is disputed even when pointed out, so that it can only be brought to light by the most careful and subtle analysis. This happens especially with terms that are highly abstract and general: which are treated by many, including even **philosophers like Parmenides and Zeno, as if they were not equivocal at all, but univocal.[129] Again, the Fallaciæ Accidentis, and the other classes Extra Dictionem, are also often hard to detect. On the whole, it is often hard to determine, not merely to which of the classes any case of fallacy belongs, but even whether there is any fallacy at all--whether the refutation is, or is not, a valid one.[130]
[Footnote 128: Ibid. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 6-12.]
[Footnote 129: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 13-25: [Greek: ô(/sper ou)=n e)n toi=s para\ tê\n o(mônumi/an, o(/sper dokei= tro/pos eu)êthe/statos ei)=nai tô=n paralogismô=n, ta\ me\n kai\ toi=s tuchou=si/n e)sti dê=la--ta\ de\ kai\ tou\s e)mpeirota/tous phai/netai lantha/nein; sêmei=on de\ tou/tôn o(/ti ma/chontai polla/kis peri\ o)noma/tôn, oi(=on po/teron tau)to\ sêmai/nei kata\ pa/ntôn to\ o)\n kai\ to\ e(\n ê)\ e(/teron.]]
[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 27: [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ peri\ tou= sumbebêko/tos kai\ peri\ tô=n a)/llôn e(/kaston, oi( me\n e)/sontai r(a/|ous i)dei=n oi( de\ chalepô/teroi tô=n lo/gôn; kai\ labei=n e)/n tini ge/nei, kai\ po/teron e)/legchos ê)\ ou)k e)/legchos, ou) r(a/|dion o(moi/ôs peri\ pa/ntôn.]]
The pungent arguments in debate are those which bite most keenly, and create the greatest amount of embarrassment and puzzle.[131] In dialectical debate a puzzle arises, when the respondent finds that a correct syllogism has been established against him, and when he does not at once see which among its premisses he ought to controvert, in order to overthrow the conclusion. In the eristic or sophistic debate the puzzle of the respondent is, in what language to enunciate his propositions so as to keep clear of the subtle objections which will be brought against him by the questioner.[132] It is these pungent arguments that most effectually stimulate the mind to investigation. The most pungent of all is, where the syllogistic premisses are highly probable, yet where they nevertheless negative a conclusion which is also highly probable. Here we have an equal antithesis as to presumptive credibility, between the premisses taken together on one side and the conclusion on the other.[133] We do not know whether it is in the premisses only, or in the conclusion, that we are to look for untruth: the conclusion, though improbable, may yet be true, while we may find that the true conclusion has been obtained from untrue premisses; or the conclusion may be both improbable and untrue, in which case we must look for untruth in one of the premisses also--either the major or the minor. This is the most embarrassing position of all. Another, rather less embarrassing, is, where our thesis will be confuted unless we can show the confuting conclusion to be untrue, but where each of the premisses on which the conclusion depends is equally probable, so that we do not at once see in which of them the cause of its untruth is to be sought. These two are the most pungent and perplexing argumentative conjunctures of dialectical debate.
[Footnote 131: Ibid. 32: [Greek: e)/sti de\ drimu\s lo/gos o(/stis a)porei=n poiei= ma/lista; da/knei ga\r ou(=tos ma/lista.]]
[Footnote 132: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 33: [Greek: a)pori/a d' e)sti\ dittê/, ê( me\n e)n toi=s sullelogisme/nois, o(/ ti a)ne/lê| tis tô=n e)rôtêma/tôn, ê( d' e)n toi=s e)ristikoi=s, pô=s ei)/pê| tis to\ protathe/n.] The difficulty here pointed out, of finding language not open to some logical objection by an acute Sophist, is illustrated by what he himself states about the caution required for guarding his definitions against attack; see De Interpret. vi. p. 17, a. 34: [Greek: le/gô de\ a)ntikei=sthai tê\n tou= au)tou= kata\ tou= au)tou=, mê\ o(mônu/môs de/, kai\ o(/sa a)/lla prosdiorizo/metha pro\s ta\s sophistika\s e)nochlê/seis.] What is here meant by [Greek: sophistikai\ e)nochlê/seis] is expressed elsewhere by [Greek: pro\s ta\s logika\s duscherei/as]--Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 21; N. i. p. 1087, b. 20. See the Scholia (pp. 112, 651, Br.) of Ammonius and Alexander upon the above passages of De Interpr. and Metaphys.]
[Footnote 133: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 182, b. 37-p. 183, a. 4: [Greek: e)/sti de\ sullogistiko\s me\n lo/gos drimu/tatos, a)\n e)x o(/ti ma/lista dokou/ntôn o(/ti ma/lista e)/ndoxon a)nairê=|; ei(=s ga\r ô)\n o( lo/gos, metatitheme/nês tê=s a)ntipha/seôs, a(/pantas o(moi/ous e(/xei tou\s sullogismou/s; a)ei\ ga\r e)x e)ndo/xôn o(moi/ôs e)/ndoxon a)nairê/sei [ê)\ kataskeua/sei]; dio/per a)porei=n a)nagkai=on. ma/lista me\n ou)=n o( toiou=tos drimu/s, o( e)x i)/sou to\ sumpe/rasma poiô=n toi=s e)rôtê/masi.] I transcribe this text as it is given by Bekker, Waitz, Bussemaker, and Mr. Poste. The editions anterior to Bekker had the additional words [Greek: ê)\ kataskeua/zê|] after [Greek: a)nairê=|] in the fourth line; and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his translation defends and retains them. Bekker and the subsequent editors have omitted them, but have retained the last words [Greek: ê)\ kataskeua/sei] in the seventh line. To me this seems inconsistent: the words ought either to be retained in both places or omitted in both. I think they ought to be omitted in both. I have enclosed them in brackets in the fifth line.
This difficult passage (not well explained by Alexander, Schol. p. 320, b. 9) requires the explanations of Waitz and Mr. Poste. The note of Mr. Poste is particularly instructive, because he expands in full (p. 164) the three "similar syllogisms" to which Aristotle here briefly alludes. The phrase [Greek: metatitheme/nês tê=s a)ntipha/seôs] is determined by a passage in Analyt. Priora, II. viii. p. 59, b. 1: it means "employment of the contradictory of the conclusion, in combination with either one of the premisses, to upset the other." The original syllogism is assumed to have two premisses, each highly probable, while the conclusion is highly improbable, being the negation of a highly probable proposition. The original syllogism will stand thus: All M is P; All S is M; Ergo, All S is P: the two premisses being supposed highly probable, and the conclusion highly improbable. Of course, therefore, the contradictory of the conclusion will be highly probable--Some S is not P. We take this contradictory and employ it to construct two new syllogisms as follows:--"All M is P; Some S is not P; Ergo Some S is not M. And again, Some S is not P: All S is M; Ergo, Some M is not P. All these three syllogisms are similar in this respect: that each has two highly probable premisses, while the conclusion is highly improbable.]
But in eristic or sophistic debate our greatest embarrassment as respondents will arise when we do not at once see whether the refutative syllogism brought against us is conclusive or not, and whether it is to be solved by negation or by distinction.[134] Next in order as to embarrassment stands the case, where we see in which of the two processes (negation or distinction) we are to find our solution, yet without seeing on which of the premisses we are to bring the process to bear; or whether, if distinction be the process required, we are to apply it to the conclusion, or to one of the premisses.[135] A defective syllogistic argument is silly, when the deficient points are of capital importance--relating to the minor or to the middle term, or when the assumptions are false and strange; but it will sometimes be worthy of attention, if the points deficient are outlying and easily supplied; in which cases it is the carelessness of the questioner that is to blame, rather than the argument itself.[136] Both the line of argument taken by the questioner, and the mode of solution adopted by the respondent, may be directed towards any one of three distinct purposes: either to the thesis and main subject discussed; or to the adversary personally (i.e., to the particular way in which he has been arguing); or to neither of these, but simply to prolong the discussion (i.e., against time). The solution may thus be sometimes such that it would take more time to argue upon it than the patience of the auditors will allow.[137]
[Footnote 134: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 7.]
[Footnote 135: Ibid. a. 9: [Greek: deu/teros de\ tô=n a)/llôn o( dê=los me\n o(/ti para\ diai/resin ê)\ a)nai/resi/n e)sti, mê\ phanero\s d' ô)\n dia\ ti/nos tô=n ê)rôtême/nôn a)nai/resin ê)\ diai/resin lute/os e)sti/n, a)lla\ po/teron au(/tê para\ to\ sumpe/rasma ê)\ para/ ti tô=n e)rôtêma/tôn e)sti/n.]
Mr. Poste translates these last words very correctly:--"Whether it is one of the premisses or the conclusion that requires distinction." Here Aristotle again speaks of a mode of solution furnished by applying distinction ([Greek: diai/resis]) to the conclusion as well as to the premisses, though he does not say that solution can be furnished by applying disproof ([Greek: a)nai/resis]) to the conclusion. See my remarks, a few pages above, on Mr. Poste's note respecting ch. xviii. (supra, p. 406).]
[Footnote 136: Soph. El. xxxiii. p. 183, a. 14-20.]
[Footnote 137: Ibid. a. 21.]
The last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi is employed by Aristotle in recapitulating the scope and procedure of the nine Books of Topica (reckoning the Sophistici Elenchi as the Ninth, as we ought in propriety to do); and in appreciating the general bearing and value of that treatise, having regard to the practice and theory of the day.
The business of Dialectic and Peirastic is to find and apply the syllogizing process to any given thesis, with premisses the most probable that can be obtained bearing on the thesis. This Aristotle treats as the proper function of Dialectic per se and of Peirastic; considering both--the last, of course--as referring wholly to the questioner. His purpose is to investigate and impart this syllogizing power--the power of questioning and cross-examining a respondent who sets up a given thesis, so as to drive him into inconsistent answers. It appears that Aristotle would not have cared to teach the respondent how he might defend himself against this procedure, if there had not happened to be another art--Sophistic, closely bordering on Dialectic and Peirastic. He considers it indispensable to furnish the respondent with defensive armour against sophistical cross-examination; and this could not be done without teaching him at the same time modes of defence against the cross-examination of Dialectic and Peirastic. For this reason it is (Aristotle **tells us[138]) that he has included in the Topica precepts on the best mode of defending the thesis by the most probable arguments, as well as of impugning it. The respondent professes to know (while the questioner does not), and must be taught how to maintain his thesis like a man of knowledge. Sokrates, the prince of dialecticians, did nothing but question and cross-examine: he would never be respondent at all; for he explicitly disclaimed knowledge. And if it were not for the neighbourhood of Sophistic, Aristotle would have thought it sufficient to teach a procedure like that of Sokrates. It was the danger from sophistical cross-examination that led him to enlarge his scheme--to unmask the Sophists by enumerating the paralogisms peculiar to them, and to indicate the proper scheme of the responses and solutions whereby the respondent might defend himself against them. We remember that Aristotle treats all paralogisms and fallacies as if they belonged to a peculiar art or profession called Sophistic, and as if they were employed by Sophists exclusively; as if the Dialecticians and the Peirasts, including among them Sokrates and Plato, put all their questions without ever resorting to or falling into paralogisms.
[Footnote 138: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 183, a. 37-b. 8: [Greek: proeilo/metha me\n ou)=n eu(rei=n du/nami/n tina sullogistikê\n peri\ tou= problêthe/ntos e)k tô=n u(parcho/ntôn ô(s e)ndoxota/tôn; tou=to ga\r e)/rgon e)sti\ tê=s dialektikê=s kath' au(tê\n kai\ tê=s peirastikê=s. e)pei\ de\ proskataskeua/zetai pro\s au)tê\n dia\ tê\n tê=s sophistikê=s geitni/asin, ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ ô(s ei)dô/s, dia\ tou=to ou) mo/non to\ lechthe\n e)/rgon u(pethe/metha tê=s pragmatei/as to\ lo/gon du/nasthai labei=n, a)lla\ kai\ o(/pôs lo/gon u(pe/chontes phula/xomen tê\n the/sin ô(s di' e)ndoxota/tôn o(motro/pôs. tê\n d' ai)ti/an ei)rê/kamen tou/tou, e)pei\ kai\ dia\ tou=to Sôkra/tês ê)rô/ta a)ll' ou)k a)pekri/neto; ô(molo/gei ga\r ou)k ei)de/nai.]
It appears to me that in one line of this remarkable passage a word has dropped out which is necessary to the sense. We now read (about the middle) [Greek: ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ ô(s ei)dô/s]. Now the words [Greek: pei=ran labei=n] as the passage stands, must be construed along with [Greek: ô(s ei)dô/s], and this makes no meaning at all, or an inadmissible meaning. I think it clear that the word [Greek: u(pe/chein] or [Greek: dou=nai] has dropped out before [Greek: ei)dô/s]. The passage will then stand:--[Greek: ô(s ou) mo/non pei=ran du/natai labei=n dialektikô=s, a)lla\ kai\ u(pe/chein] (or [Greek: dou=nai) ô(s ei)dô/s]. When this verb is supplied the sense will be quite in harmony with what follows, which at present it is not. [Greek: Pei=ran labei=n] applies to the questioner, but not to the respondent; [Greek: ô(s ei)dô/s] applies to the respondent, but not to the questioner; [Greek: pei=ran u(pe/chein] applies to the respondent, and is therefore the fit concomitant of [Greek: ô(s ei)dô/s]. The translation given by Mr. Poste first (p. 93):--"professing not only to test knowledge with the resources of Dialectic, but also to maintain any thesis with the infallibility of science" appears to me (excepting the word infallibility, which is unsuitable) to render Aristotle's thought, though not his words as they now stand; but Mr. Poste has given what he thinks an amended translation (p. 175):--"Since it claims the power of catechizing or cross-examining not only dialectically but also scientifically." This second translation may approach more nearly to the present words of Aristotle, but it departs more widely from his sense and doctrine. Aristotle does not claim for either Dialecticians or Sophists the power of cross-examining scientifically. He ascribes to the Sophists nothing but cavil and fallacy--verbal and extra-verbal--the pretence and sham of being wise or knowing (Soph. El. i., ii. p. 165).]
Aristotle, we have already more than once seen, asserts emphatically his claim to originality as having been the first to treat these subjects theoretically, and to suggest precepts founded on the theory. On all important subjects (he remarks) the elaboration of any good theory is a gradual process, the work of several successive authors. The first beginnings are very imperfect and rudimentary; upon these, however, subsequent authors build, both correcting and enlarging, until, after some considerable time, a tolerably complete scheme or system comes to be constructed. Such has been the case with Rhetoric and other arts. Tisias was the first writer and preceptor on Rhetoric, yet with poor and insufficient effect. To him succeeded Thrasymachus, next Theodorus, and various others; from each of whom partial improvements and additions were derived, until at length we have now (it is Aristotle that speaks) a copious body of rhetorical theory and precept, inherited from predecessors and accumulated by successive traditions. Compared with this, the earliest attempt at theory was indeed narrow and imperfect; but it was nevertheless the first step in a great work, and, as such, it was the most difficult and the most important. The task of building on a foundation already laid, is far easier.[139]
[Footnote 139: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 17-26: [Greek: tô=n ga\r eu(riskome/nôn a(pa/ntôn ta\ me\n par' e(te/rôn lêphthe/nta pro/teron peponême/na kata\ me/ros e)pide/dôken u(po\ tô=n paralabo/ntôn u(/steron; ta\ d' e)x u(parchê=s eu(risko/mena mikra\n to\ prô=ton e)pi/dosin lamba/nein ei)/ôthe, chrêsimôte/ran me/ntoi pollô=| tê=s u(/steron e)k tou/tôn au)xê/seôs; me/giston ga\r i)/sôs a)rchê\ panto/s, ô(/sper le/getai; dio\ kai\ chalepô/taton; o(/sô| ga\r kra/tiston tê=| duna/mei, tosou/tô| mikro/taton o(\n tô=| mege/thei chalepô/tato/n e)stin o)phthê=nai; tau/tês d' eu(rême/nês r(a=|on prostithe/nai kai\ sunau/xein to\ loipo/n e)stin.]]
While rhetorical theory has thus been gradually worked up to maturity, the case has been altogether different with Dialectic. In this I (Aristotle) found no basis prepared; no predecessor to follow; no models to copy. I had to begin from the beginning, and to make good the first step myself. The process of syllogizing had never yet been analysed or explained by any one; much less had anything been set forth about the different applications of it in detail. I worked it out for myself, without any assistance, by long and laborious application.[140] There existed indeed paid teachers, both in Dialectic and in Eristic (or Sophistic); but their teaching has been entirely without analysis, or theory, or system. Just as rhetoricians gave to their pupils orations to learn by heart, so these dialectical teachers gave out dialogues to learn by heart upon those subjects which they thought most likely to become the topics of discourse. They thus imparted to their pupils a certain readiness and fluency; but they communicated no art, no rational conception of what was to be sought or avoided, no skill or power of dealing with new circumstances.[141] They proceeded like men, who, professing to show how comfortable covering might be provided for the feet, should not teach the pupil how he could make shoes for himself, but should merely furnish him with a good stock of ready-made shoes--a present valuable indeed for use, but quite unconnected with any skill as an artificer. The syllogism as a system and theory, with precepts founded on that theory for Demonstration and Dialectic, has originated first with me (Aristotle). Mine is the first step, and therefore a small one, though worked out with much thought and hard labour: it must be looked at as a first step, and judged with indulgence. You, my readers, or hearers of my lectures, if you think that I have done as much as can fairly be required for an initiatory start, compared with other more advanced departments of theory, will acknowledge what I have achieved, and pardon what I have left for others to accomplish.[142]
[Footnote 140: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 8: [Greek: kai\ peri\ me\n tô=n r(êtorikô=n u(pê=rche polla\ kai\ palaia\ ta\ lego/mena, peri\ de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo le/gein, a)ll' ê)\ tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non e)ponou=men.]]
[Footnote 141: Ibid. a. 1: [Greek: dio/per tachei=a me\n a)/technos d' ê)=n ê( didaskali/a toi=s mantha/nousi par' au)tô=n; ou) ga\r te/chnên a)lla\ ta\ a)po\ tê=s te/chnês dido/ntes paideu/ein u(pela/mbanon.]
Cicero, in describing his own treatise De Oratore, insists upon the marked difference between his mode of treatment and the common rhetorical precepts; he claims to have followed the manner of the Aristotelian Dialogues:--"Scripsi Aristoteleo more, quemadmodum quidem volui, tres libros in disputatione ac dialogo de Oratore, quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutiles. Abhorrent enim a communibus præceptis, atque omnem antiquorum et Aristoteleam et Isocrateam rationem oratoriam complectuntur" (Cicero, Epist. ad Famill. i. 9).]
[Footnote 142: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 3: [Greek: ei) de\ phai/netai theasame/nois u(mi=n ô(s e)k toiou/tôn e)x a)rchê=s u(parcho/ntôn e)/chein ê( metho/dos i(kanô=s para\ ta\s a)/llas pragmatei/as ta\s e)k parado/seôs ê)uxême/nas, loipo\n a)\n ei)/ê pa/ntôn u(mô=n ê)\ tô=n ê)kroame/nôn e)/rgon toi=s me\n paraleleimme/nois tê=s metho/dou suggnô/mên toi=s d' eu(rême/nois pollê\n e)/chein cha/rin.]
It would seem that by [Greek: toi=s theasame/nois] Aristotle means to address the readers of the present treatise, while by [Greek: tô=n ê)kroame/nôn] he designates those who had heard his oral expositions on the same subject.]
Such is the impressive closing chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi. It is remarkable in two ways: first, that Aristotle expressly addresses himself to hearers and readers in the second person; next, that he asserts emphatically his own claim to originality as a theorist on Logic, and declares himself to have worked out even the first beginnings of such theory by laborious application. I understand his claim to originality as intended to bear, not simply on the treatise called Sophistici Elenchi and on the enumeration of Fallacies therein contained, but, in a larger sense, on the theory of the Syllogism; as first unfolded in the Analytica Priora, applied to Demonstration in the Analytica Posteriora, applied afterwards to Dialectic in the Topica, applied lastly to Sophistic (or Eristic) in the Sophistici Elenchi. The phrase, "Respecting the process of syllogizing,[143] I found absolutely nothing prepared, but worked it out by laborious application for myself"--seems plainly to denote this large comprehension. And, indeed, in respect to Sophistic separately, the remark of Aristotle that nothing whatever had been done before him, would not be well founded: we find in his own treatise of the Sophistici Elenchi allusion to various prior doctrines, from which he dissents.[144] In these prior doctrines, however, his predecessors had treated the sophistical modes of refutation without reference to the Syllogism and its general theory.[145] It is against such separation that Aristotle distinctly protests. He insists upon the necessity of first expounding the Syllogism, and of discussing the laws of good or bad Refutation as a corollary or dependant of the syllogistic theory. Accordingly he begins this treatise by intimating that he intends to deduce these laws from the first and highest generalities of the subject;[146] and he concludes it by claiming this method of philosophizing as original with himself.
[Footnote 143: Soph. El. xxxiv. p. 184, b. 1: [Greek: peri\ de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo le/gein], &c. (cited in a preceding note).]
[Footnote 144: See note p. 402.]
[Footnote 145: Soph. El. x. p. 171, a. 1: [Greek: o(/lôs te a)/topon, to\ peri\ e)le/gchou diale/gesthai, a)lla' mê\ pro/teron peri\ sullogismou=; o( ga\r e)/legchos sullogismo/s e)stin, ô(/ste chrê\ kai\ peri\ sullogismou= pro/teron ê)\ peri\ pseudou=s e)le/gchou.]]
[Footnote 146: Ibid. i. p. 164, a. 21: [Greek: le/gômen, a)rxa/menoi kata\ phu/sin a)po\ tô=n prô/tôn.]]
XI. PHYSICA AND METAPHYSICA
Aristotle distinguishes, in clear and explicit language, a science which he terms Wisdom, Philosophy, or First Philosophy; the subject-matter of which he declares to be _Ens quatenus _Ens__, together with the concomitants belonging to it as such. With this Ontology the treatise entitled Metaphysica purports to deal, and the larger portion of it does really so deal. At the same time, the line that parts off Ontology from Logic (Analytic and Dialectic) on the one hand, and from Physics on the other, is not always clearly marked. For, though the whole process of Syllogism, employed both in Analytic and Dialectic, involves and depends upon the Maxim of Contradiction, yet the discussion of this Maxim is declared to belong to First Philosophy;[1] while not only the four Aristotelian varieties of Cause or Condition, and the distinction between Potential and Actual, but also the abstractions Form, Matter and Privation, which play so capital a part in the Metaphysica, are equally essential and equally appealed to in the Physica.[2]
[Footnote 1: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 19-b. 11. Whether that discussion properly belongs to Philosophia Prima, or not, stands as the first [Greek: A)pori/a] enumerated in the list which occupies Book B. in that treatise, p. 995, b. 4-13; compare K. i. p. 1059, a. 24.]
[Footnote 2: Physica, I. pp. 190-191; II. p. 194, b. 20, seq.; Metaph. A. p. 983, a. 33; Alexander ad Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 306, ed. Bonitz; p. 689, b. Schol. Br.]
If we include both what is treated in the Analytica Posteriora (the scientific explanation of Essence and Definition) and what is treated in the Physica, we shall find that nearly all the expository processes employed in the Metaphysica are employed also in these two treatises. To look upon the general notion as a cause, and to treat it as a creative force (der schöpferische Wesensbegriff, to use the phrase of Prantl and other German logicians[3]), belongs alike to the Physica and to the Analytica Posteriora. The characteristic distinction of the treatise entitled Metaphysica is, that it is all-comprehensive in respect to the ground covered; that the expository process is applied, not exclusively to any separate branch of Ens, but to Ens as a whole quatenus Ens--to all the varieties of Ens that admit of scientific treatment at all;[4] that the same abstractions and analytical distinctions, which, both in the Analytica and in the Physica, are indicated and made to serve an explanatory purpose, up to a certain point--are in the Metaphysica sometimes assumed as already familiar, sometimes followed out with nicer accuracy and subtlety.[5] Indeed both the Physica and the Metaphysica, as we read them in Aristotle, would be considered in modern times as belonging alike to the department of Metaphysics.
[Footnote 3: See ch. viii. pp. 240 seq. of the present work, with the citations in note b, p. 252, from Prantl and Rassow.]
[Footnote 4: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. i. p. 1003, a. 21: [Greek: e)/stin e)pistê/mê tis ê(\ theôrei= to\ o)\n ê(=| o)\n kai\ ta\ tou/tô| u(pa/rchonta kath' au(to/. Au(/tê d' e)sti\n ou)demi/a| tô=n e)n me/rei legome/nôn ê( au)tê/. ou)demi/a ga\r tô=n a)/llôn e)piskopei= katho/lou peri\ tou= o)/ntos ê(=| o)/n, a)lla\ me/ros au)tou= ti a)potemo/menai], &c.]
[Footnote 5: Metaphys. [Greek: L]. vii. p. 1073, a. with Bonitz's Comment. pp. 504-505. Physica, I. ix. p. 192, a. 34: [Greek: peri\ de\ tê=s kata\ to\ ei)=dos a)rchê=s, po/teron mi/a ê)\ pollai\ kai\ ti/s ê)\ ti/nes ei)si/, di' a)kribei/as tê=s prô/tês philosophi/as e)/rgon e)sti\ diori/sai, ô(/st' ei)s e)kei=non to\n kairo\n a)pokei/sthô.] Compare Physic. I. viii. p. 191, b. 29, and Weisse, Aristoteles Physik, p. 285.
About the Metaphysica, as carrying out and completing the exposition of the Analytica Posteriora, see Metaphys. Z. xii. p. 1037, b. 8: [Greek: nu=n de\ le/gômen prô=ton, e)ph' o(/son e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s peri\ o(rismou= mê\ ei)/rêtai] (Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 32; see note b, p. 243).]
The primary distinction and classification recognized by Aristotle among Sciences or Cognitions, is, that of (1) Theoretical, (2) Practical, (3) Artistic or Constructive.[6] Of these three divisions, the second and third alike comprise both intelligence and action, but the two are distinguished from each other by this--that in the Artistic there is always some assignable product which the agency leaves behind independent of itself, whereas in the Practical no such independent result remains,[7] but the agency itself, together with the purpose (or intellectual and volitional condition) of the agent, is every thing. The division named Theoretical comprises intelligence alone--intelligence of principia, causes and constituent elements. Here again we find a tripartite classification. The highest and most universal of all Theoretical Sciences is recognized by Aristotle as Ontology (First Philosophy, sometimes called by him Theology) which deals with all Ens universally quatenus Ens, and with the Prima Moventia, themselves immoveable, of the entire Kosmos. The two other heads of Theoretical Science are Mathematics and Physics; each of them special and limited, as compared with Ontology. In Physics we scientifically study natural bodies with their motions, changes, and phenomena; bodies in which Form always appears implicated with Matter, and in which the principle of motion or change is immanent and indwelling (i.e., dependent only on the universal Prima Moventia, and not impressed from without by a special agency, as in works of human art). In Mathematics, we study immoveable and unchangeable numbers and magnitudes, apart from the bodies to which they belong; not that they can ever be really separated from such bodies, but we intellectually abstract them, or consider them apart.[8]
[Footnote 6: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1025, b. 25.]
[Footnote 7: Ibid. b. 22.]
[Footnote 8: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1026; K. vii. p. 1064, a. 28-b. 14; M. iii. pp. 1077-1078; Bonitz, Commentar. p. 284.]
Such is Aristotle's tripartite distribution of Theoretical or Contemplative Science. In introducing us to the study of First Philosophy, he begins by clearing up the meaning of the term Ens. It is a term of many distinct significations; being neither univocal, nor altogether equivocal, but something intermediate between the two, or multivocal. It is not a generic whole, distributed exhaustively among correlative species marked off by an assignable difference:[9] it is an analogical whole, including several genera distinct from each other at the beginning, though all of them branches derivative from one and the same root; all of them connected by some sort of analogy or common relation to that one root, yet not necessarily connected with each other by any direct or special tie.
[Footnote 9: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. ii. p. 1003, a. 33-p. 1004, a. 5: [Greek: to\ d' o)\n le/getai me\n pollachô=s, a)lla\ pro\s e(\n kai\ mi/an tina\ phu/sin, kai\ ou)ch o(mônu/m ôs--u(pa/rchei ga\r eu)thu\s ge/nê e)/chonta to\ o)\n kai\ to\ e(/n.]
Compare K. iii. p. 1060, b. 32. See also above, ch. iii. p. 60, of the present work.]
Of these various significations, he enumerates, as we have already seen, four:--(1) Ens which is merely concomitant with, dependent upon, or related to, another Ens as terminus; (2) Ens in the sense of the True, opposed to Non-Ens in the sense of the False; (3) Ens according to each of the Ten Categories; (4) Ens potentially, as contrasted with Ens actually. But among these four heads, the two last only are matters upon which science is attainable, in the opinion of Aristotle. To these two, accordingly, he **confines Ontology or First Philosophy. They are the only two that have an objective, self-standing, independent, nature.
That which falls under the first head (Ens per Accidens) is essentially indeterminate; and its causes, being alike indeterminate, are out of the reach of science. So also is that which falls under the second head--Ens tanquam verum, contrasted with Non-Ens tanquam falsum. This has no independent standing, but results from an internal act of the judging or believing mind, combining two elements, or disjoining two elements, in a way conformable to, or non-conformable to, real fact. The true combination or disjunction is a variety of Ens; the false combination or disjunction is a variety of Non-Ens. This mental act varies both in different individuals, and at different times with the same individual, according to a multitude of causes often unassignable. Accordingly, it does not fall under Ontological Science, nor can we discover any causes or principles determining it.[10] When Aristotle says that the two first heads are out of the reach of science, or not proper subjects of science, he means that their first principia, causes, or deepest foundations, cannot be discovered and assigned; for it is in determining these principia and causes that true scientific cognition consists.[11]
[Footnote 10: Aristot. Met. E. iv. p. 1027, b. 17; [Greek: Th]. p. 1051, b. 2; p. 1052, a. 17-30; K. viii. p. 1065, a. 21.
There remains much obscurity about this meaning of Ens (Ens [Greek: ô(s a)lêthe/s]), even after the Scholia of Alexander (p. 701, a. 10, Sch. Brand.), and the instructive comments of Bonitz, Schwegler, and Brentano (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, ch. iii. pp. 21-39).
The foundation of this meaning of Ens lies in the legitimate Antiphasis, and the proper division thereof ([Greek: to\ de\ su/nolon peri\ merismo\n a)ntipha/seôs], p. 1027, b. 20). It is a first principle (p. 1005, b. 30) that, if one member of the Antiphasis must be affirmed as true, the other must be denied as false. If we fix upon the right combination to affirm, we say the thing that is: if we fix upon the wrong combination and affirm it, we say the thing that is not (p. 1012, b. 10). "Falsehood and Truth (Aristotle says, E. iv. p. 1027, b. 25) are not in things but in our mental combination; and as regards simple (uncombined) matters and essences, they are not even in our mental combination:" [Greek: ou) ga/r e)sti to\ pseu=dos kai\ to\ a)lêthe\s e)n toi=s pra/gmasin, oi(=on to\ me\n a)gatho\n a)lêthe/s, to\ de\ kako\n eu)thu\s pseu=dos, a)ll' e)n dianoi/a|; peri\ de\ ta\ a(pla= kai\ ta\ ti/ e)stin ou)d' e)n tê=| dianoi/a|.] Compare Bonitz (ad Ar. Metaph. Z. iv. p. 1030, a.), p. 310, Comm.
In regard to cogitabilia--simple, indivisible, uncompounded--there is no combination or disjunction; therefore, strictly speaking, neither truth nor falsehood (Aristot. De Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26; also Categor. x. p. 13, b. 10). The intellect either apprehends these simple elements, or it does not apprehend them; there is no [Greek: dia/noia] concerned. Not to apprehend them is ignorance, [Greek: a)/gnoia], which sometimes loosely passes under the title of [Greek: pseu=dos] (Schwegler, Comm. Pt. II., p. 32).]
[Footnote 11: Metaphys. E. i. p. 1025, b. 3: [Greek: ai( a)rchai\ kai\ ta\ ai)/tia zêtei=tai tô=n o)/ntôn, dê=lon d' o(/ti ê(=| o)/nta.--o(/lôs de\ pa=sa e)pistê/mê dianoêtikê\ ê)\ mete/chousa/ ti dianoi/as peri\ ai)ti/as kai\ a)rcha/s e)stin ê)\ a)kribeste/ras ê)\ a(plouste/ras.]
Compare Metaph. K. vii. p. 1063, b. 36; p. 1065, a. 8-26. Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9.]
There remain, as matter proper for the investigation of First Philosophy, the two last-mentioned heads of Ens; viz., Ens according to the Ten Categories, and Ens potential and actual. But, along with these, Aristotle includes another matter also; viz., the critical examination of the Axioms and highest generalities of syllogistic proof or Demonstration. He announces as the first principle of these Axioms--as the highest and firmest of all Principles--the Maxim of Contradiction:[12] The same predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the same subject, at the same time and in the same sense; or, You cannot both truly affirm, and truly deny, the same predicate respecting the same subject; or, The same proposition cannot be at once true and false. This Axiom is by nature the beginning or source of all the other Axioms. It stands first in the order of knowledge; and it neither rests upon nor involves any hypothesis.[13]
[Footnote 12: Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 7, 17, 22, 34: [Greek: au(/tê dê\ pasô=n e)sti\ bebaiota/tê tô=n a)rchô=n--phu/sei ga\r a)rchê\ kai\ tô=n a)/llôn a)xiôma/tôn au(/tê pa/ntôn.]--p. 1011, b. 13: [Greek: bebaiota/tê do/xa pasô=n to\ mê\ ei)=nai a)lêthei=s a(/ma ta\s a)ntikeime/nas pha/seis]--(He here applies the term [Greek: do/xa] to designate this fundamental maxim. This deserves notice, because of the antithesis, common with him elsewhere, between [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê]).]
[Footnote 13: Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 13-14: [Greek: gnôrimôta/tên--a)nupo/theton].]
The Syllogism is defined by Aristotle as consisting of premisses and a conclusion: if the two propositions called premisses be granted as true, a third as conclusion must for that reason be granted as true also.[14] The truth of the conclusion is affirmed conditionally on the truth of the premisses; and the rules of Syllogism set out those combinations of propositions in which such affirmation may be made legitimately. The rules of the Syllogism being thus the rules for such conditional affirmation, the Principle or Axiom thereof enunciates in the most general terms what is implied in all those rules, as essential to their validity. And, since the syllogistic or deductive process is applicable without exception to every variety of the Scibile, Aristotle considers the Axioms or Principles thereof to come under the investigation of Ontology or First Philosophy. Thus it is, that he introduces us to the Maxim of Contradiction, and its supplement or correlative, the Maxim of the Excluded Middle.
[Footnote 14: Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 18-20, et alib.]
His vindication of these Axioms is very illustrative of the philosophy of his day. It cannot be too often impressed that he was the first either to formulate the precepts; or to ascend to the theory, of deductive reasoning; that he was the first to mark by appropriate terms the most important logical distinctions and characteristic attributes of propositions; that before his time, there was abundance of acute dialectic, but no attempt to set forth any critical scheme whereby the conclusions of such dialectic might be tested. Anterior to Sokrates, the cast of Grecian philosophy had been altogether either theological, or poetical, or physical, or at least some fusion of these three varieties into one. Sokrates was the first who broke ground for Logic--for testing the difference between good and bad ratiocination. He did this by enquiry as to the definition of general terms,[15] and by dialectical exposure of the ignorance generally prevalent among those who familiarly used them. Plato in his Sokratic dialogues followed in the same negative track; opening up many instructive points of view respecting the erroneous tendencies by which reasoners were misled, but not attempting any positive systematic analysis, nor propounding any intelligible scheme of his own for correction or avoidance of the like. If Sokrates and Plato, both of them active in exposing ratiocinative error and confusion, stopped short of any wide logical theory, still less were the physical philosophers likely to supply that deficiency. Aristotle tells us that several of them controverted the Maxim of Contradiction.[16] Herakleitus and his followers maintained the negative of it, distinctly and emphatically;[17] while the disciples of Parmenides, though less pronounced in their negative, could not have admitted it as universally true. Even Plato must be reckoned among those who, probably without having clearly stated to himself the Maxim in its universal terms, declared doctrines quite incompatible with it: the Platonic Parmenides affords a conspicuous example of contradictory conclusions deduced by elaborate reasoning and declared to be both of them firmly established.[18] Moreover, in the Sophistes,[19] Plato explains the negative proposition as expressing what is different from that which is denied, but nothing beyond; an explanation which, if admitted, would set aside the Maxim of Contradiction as invalid.
[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaph. A. vi. p. 987, b. 1: [Greek: S ôkra/tous de\ peri\ me\n ta\ ê)thika\ pragmateuome/nou, peri\ de\ tê=s o(/lês phu/seôs ou)the/n, e)n me/ntoi tou/tois to\ katho/lou zêtou=ntos, kai\ peri\ o(rismô=n e)pistê/santos prô/tou tê\n dia/noian.]]
[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1005, b. 35: [Greek: ei)si\ de/ tines, oi(/, katha/per ei)/pomen, au)toi/ te e)nde/chesthai/ phasi to\ au)to\ ei)=nai kai\ mê\ ei)=nai, kai\ u(polamba/nein ou(/tôs. chrô=ntai de\ tô=| lo/gô| tou/tô| polloi\ kai\ tô=n peri\ phu/seôs.]]
[Footnote 17: Ibid. iii. p. 1005, b. 25; v. p. 1010, a. 13; vi. p. 1011, a. 24.]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic. v. p. 479, A.; vii. p. 538, E. Compare also the conclusion of the Platonic Parmenides, and the elaborate dialectic or antinomies by which the contradictions involved in it are proved.]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Sophistes, p. 257, B.]
While Aristotle mentions these various dissentients, and especially Herakleitus, he seems to imagine that they were not really in earnest[20] in their dissent. Yet he nevertheless goes at length into the case against them, as well as against others, who agreed with him in affirming the Maxim, but who undertook also to demonstrate it. Any such demonstration Aristotle declares to be impossible. The Maxim is assumed in all demonstrations; unless you grant it, no demonstration is valid; but it cannot be itself demonstrated. He had already laid down in the Analytica that the premisses for demonstration could not be carried back indefinitely, and that the attempt so to carry them back was unphilosophical.[21] There must be some primary, undemonstrable truths; and the Maxim of Contradiction he ranks among the first. Still, though in attempting any formal demonstration of the Maxim you cannot avoid assuming the Maxim itself and thus falling into Petitio Principii, Aristotle contends that you can demonstrate it in the way of refutation,[22] relatively to a given opponent, provided such opponent will not content himself with simply denying it, but will besides advance some affirmative thesis of his own, as a truth in which he believes; or provided he will even grant the fixed meaning of words, defining them in a manner significant alike to himself and to others,--each word to have either one fixed meaning, or a limited number of different meanings, clear and well defined.[23] It is impossible for two persons to converse, unless each understands the other. A word which conveys to the mind not one meaning, but a multitude of unconnected meanings, is for all useful purposes unmeaning.[24] If, therefore, the opponent once binds himself to an affirmative definition of any word, this definition may be truly predicated of the definitum as subject; while he must be considered as interdicting himself from predicating of the same subject the negative of that definition. But when you ask for the definition, your opponent must answer the question directly and bonâ fide. He must not enlarge his definition so as to include both the affirmative and negative of the same proposition; nor must he tack on to the real essence (declared in the definition) a multitude of unessential attributes. If he answers in this confused and perplexing manner, he must be treated as not answering at all, and as rendering philosophical discussion impossible.[25] Such a mode of speaking goes to disallow any ultimate essence or determinate subject, and shuts out all predication; for there cannot be an infinite regress of predicates upon predicates, and accidents upon accidents, without arriving at an ultimate substratum--Subject or Essence.[26] If, wherever you can truly affirm a predicate of any subject, you can also truly deny the same predicate of the same subject, it is manifest that all subjects are one: there is nothing to discriminate man, horse, ship, wall, &c., from each other; every one speaks truth, and every one at the same time speaks falsehood; a man believes and disbelieves the same thing at the same time; or he neither believes nor disbelieves, and then his mind is blank, like a vegetable.[27]
[Footnote 20: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 26; K. v. p. 1062, a. 32. Here Aristotle intimates that Herakleitus may have asserted what he did not believe; though we find him in another place citing Herakleitus as an example of those who adhered as obstinately to their opinions as other persons adhered to demonstrated truth (Ethic. Nik. VII. v. p. 1146, b. 30.).]
[Footnote 21: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 5: [Greek: a)xiou=si dê\ kai\ tou=to a)podeiknu/nai tine\s di' a)paideusi/an; e)/sti ga\r a)paideusi/a to\ mê\ gignô/skein ti/nôn dei= zêtei=n a)po/deixin kai\ ti/nôn ou) dei=.]]
[Footnote 22: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 11: [Greek: e)/sti d' a)podei=xai e)legktikô=s kai\ peri\ tou/tou o(/ti a)du/naton, a)\n mo/non ti le/gê| o( a)mphisbêtô=n.]--K. v. p. 1062, a. 2: [Greek: kai\ peri\ tô=n toiou/tôn a(plô=s me\n ou)k e)/stin a)po/deixis, pro\s to/nde d' e)/stin.]--p. 1062, a. 30.]
[Footnote 23: Ibid. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 18-34. [Greek: diaphe/rei d' ou)the\n ou)/d' ei) plei/ô tis phaiê/ sêmai/nein, mo/non de\ ô(risme/na.]--K. v. p. 1062, a. 12.]
[Footnote 24: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, b. 7: [Greek: to\ ga\r mê\ e(/n ti sêmai/nein ou)the\n sêmai/nein e)sti/n, mê\ sêmaino/ntôn de\ tô=n o)noma/tôn a)nê/|rêtai to\ diale/gesthai pro\s a)llê/lous, kata\ de\ tê\n a)lê/theian kai\ pro\s au(to/n; ou)the\n **ga\r e)nde/chetai noei=n mê\ noou=nta e(/n.]--K. v. p. 1062, a. 20.]
[Footnote 25: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, b. 30-p. 1007, a. 20. [Greek: sumbai/nei to\ lechthe/n, a)\n a)pokri/nêtai to\ e)rôtô/menon. e)a\n de\ prostithê=| e)rôtô=ntos a(plô=s kai\ ta\s a)popha/seis, ou)k a)pokri/netai to\ e)rôtô/menon.--e)a\n de\ tou=to poiê=|, ou) diale/getai.]]
[Footnote 26: Ibid. p. 1007, a. 20-b. 19: [Greek: o(/lôs d' a)nairou=sin oi( tou=to le/gontes ou)si/an kai\ to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai.--ei) de\ pa/nta kata\ sumbebêko\s le/getai, ou)the\n e)/stai prô=ton to\ kath' ou(=, ei) a)ei\ to\ sumbebêko\s kath' u(pokeime/nou tino\s sêmai/nei tê\n katêgori/an; a)na/gkê a)/ra ei)s a)/peiron i)e/nai; a)ll' a)du/naton.]]
[Footnote 27: Aristot. Met. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, a. 18-b. 12: [Greek: ei) de\ o(moi/ôs kai\ o(/sa a)pophê=sai pha/nai a)na/gkê--pa/nta d' a)\n ei)/ê e(/n--ou)the\n dioi/sei e(/teron e(te/rou--ei) de\ mêthe\n u(polamba/nei a)ll' o(moi/ôs oi)/etai kai\ ou)k oi)/etai, ti/ a)\n diaphero/ntôs e)/choi tô=n phutô=n?] K. v. p. 1062, a. 28.]
The man who professes this doctrine, however (continues Aristotle[28]), shows plainly by his conduct that his mind is not thus blank; that**, in respect of the contradictory alternative, he does not believe either both sides or neither side, but believes one and disbelieves the other. When he feels hungry, and seeks what he knows to be palatable and wholesome, he avoids what he knows to be nasty and poisonous. He knows what is to be found in the market-place, and goes there to get it; he keeps clear of falling into a well or walking into the sea; he does not mistake a horse for a man. He may often find himself mistaken; but he shows by his conduct that he believes certain subjects to possess certain definite attributes, and not to possess others. Though we do not reach infallible truth, we obtain an approach to it, sometimes nearer, sometimes more remote; and we thus escape the extreme doctrine which forbids all definite affirmation.[29]
[Footnote 28: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, b. 12-31; K. vi. p. 1063, a. 30.]
[Footnote 29: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1008, b. 36: [Greek: ei) ou)=n to\ ma=llon e)ggu/teron, ei)/ê ge a)/n ti a)lêthe\s ou(= e)ggu/teron to\ ma=llon a)lêthe/s; ka)\n ei) mê/ e)stin, a)ll' ê)/dê ge/ ti e)sti\ bebaio/teron kai\ a)lêthinô/teron, kai\ tou= lo/gou a)pêllagme/noi a)\n ei)/êmen tou= a)kra/tou kai\ kôlu/onto/s ti tê=| dianoi/a| o(ri/sai.]]
It is in this manner that Aristotle, vindicating the Maxims of Contradiction and of Excluded Middle as the highest principia of syllogistic reasoning, disposes of the two contemporaneous dogmas that were most directly incompatible with these Maxims:--(1) The dogma of Herakleitus, who denied all duration or permanence of subject, recognizing nothing but perpetual process, flux, or change, each successive moment of which involved destruction and generation implicated with each other: Is and is not are both alike and conjointly true, while neither is true separately, to the exclusion of the other;[30] (2) The dogma of Anaxagoras, who did not deny fixity or permanence of subject, but held that everything was mixed up with everything; that every subject had an infinite assemblage of contrary predicates, so that neither of them could be separately affirmed or separately denied: The truth lies in a third alternative or middle, between affirmation and denial.[31]
[Footnote 30: Aristot. Met. A. vi. p. 987, a. 34; [Greek: G]. v. p. 1010, a. 12: [Greek: Kra/tulos--o(\s to\ teleutai=on ou)the\n ô/|eto dei=n le/gein a)lla\ to\n da/ktulon e)ki/nei mo/non, kai\ Ê(raklei/tô| e)peti/ma ei)po/nti o(/ti di\s tô=| au)tô=| pota/mô| ou)k e)/stin e)mbê=nai; au)to\s ga\r ô)/|eto ou)/d' a(pa/x.] Herakleitus adopted as his one fundamentum Fire or Heat, as being the principle of mobility or change: [Greek: chrô=ntai ga\r ô(s kinêtikê\n e)/chonti tô=| puri\ tê\n phu/sin]--Metaph. A. iii. p. 984, b. 5. Ibid. K. v. p. 1062, a. 31-b. 10; K. x. p. 1067, a. 5; M. iv. p. 1078, b. 15.]
[Footnote 31: Aristot. Met. K. vi. p. 1063, b. 25; A. viii. p. 989, a. 31-b. 16. [Greek: o(/te ga\r ou)the\n ê)=n a)pokekrime/non, dê=lon ô(s ou)the\n ê)=n a)lêthe\s ei)pei=n kata\ tê=s ou)si/as e)kei/nês, le/gô d' oi(=on o(/ti ou)/te leuko\n ou)/te me/lan ê)\ phaio\n ê)\ a)/llo chrô=ma, a)ll' a)/chrôn ê)=n e)x a)na/gkês; o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ a)/chumon tô=| au)tô=| lo/gô| tou/tô|, ou)de\ a)/llo tô=n o(moi/ôn ou)the/n; ou)/te ga\r poio/n ti oi(=o/n te au)to\ ei)=nai ou)/te poso\n ou)/te ti/.]--[Greek: G]. iv. b. 1007, b. 25: [Greek: kai\ gi/gnetai dê\ to\ tou= A)naxago/rou, o(mou= pa/nta chrê/mata; ô(/ste mêthe\n a)lêthô=s u(pa/rchein.]--[Greek: G]. viii. p. 1012, a. 24: [Greek: e)/oike d' o( me\n Ê(raklei/tou lo/gos, le/gôn pa/nta ei)=nai kai\ mê\ ei)=nai, a(/panta a)lêthê= poiei=n, o( d' A)naxago/rou ei)=nai/ ti metaxu\ tê=s a)ntipha/seôs, ô(/ste pa/nta pseudê=; o(/tan ga\r michthê=|, ou)/t' a)gatho\n ou)/t' ou)k a)gatho\n to\ mi=gma, ô(/st' ou)the\n ei)pei=n a)lêthe/s.]]
Having thus refuted these dogmas to his own satisfaction, Aristotle proceeds to impugn a third doctrine which he declares to be analogous to these two and to be equally in conflict with the two syllogistic principia which he is undertaking to vindicate. This third doctrine is the "Homo Mensura" of Protagoras: Man is the measure of all things--the measure of things existent as well as of things non-existent: To each individual that is true or false which he believes to be such, and for as long as he believes it. Aristotle contends that this doctrine is homogeneous with those of Herakleitus and Anaxagoras, and must stand or fall along with them; all three being alike adverse to the Maxim of Contradiction.[32] Herein he follows partially the example of Plato, who (in his Theætêtus[33]), though not formally enunciating the Maxim of Contradiction, had declared the tenets of Protagoras to be coincident with or analogous to those of Herakleitus, and had impugned both one and the other by the same line of arguments. Protagoras agreed with Herakleitus (so Plato and Aristotle tell us) in declaring both affirmative and negative (in the contradictory alternative) to be at once and alike true; for he maintained that what any person believed was true, and that what any person disbelieved was false. Accordingly, since opinions altogether opposite and contradictory are held by different persons or by the same person at different times, both the affirmative and the negative of every Antiphasis must be held as true alike;[34] in other words, all affirmations and all negations were at once true and false. Such co-existence or implication of contradictions is the main doctrine of Herakleitus.
[Footnote 32: Aristot. Met [Greek: G]. v. p. 1009, a. 6: [Greek: e)/sti d' a)po\ tê=s au)tê=s do/xês kai\ o( Prôtago/rou lo/gos, kai\ a)na/gkê o(moi/ôs a)/mphô au)tou\s ê)\ ei)=nai ê)\ mê\ ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 33: Aristotle refers here to Plato by name, Metaphys. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1010, b. 12.]
[Footnote 34: Ibid. p. 1009, a. 8-20. [Greek: a)na/gkê pa/nta a(/ma a)lêthê= kai\ pseudê= ei)=nai.]--p. 1011, a. 30.]
I have already in another work,[35] while analysing the Platonic dialogues Theætêtus and Kratylus, criticized at some length the doctrine here laid down by Plato and Aristotle. I have endeavoured to show that the capital tenet of Protagoras is essentially distinct from the other tenets with which these two philosophers would identify it: distinct both from the dogma of Herakleitus, That everything is in unceasing flux and process, each particular moment thereof being an implication of contradictions both alike true; and distinct also from the other dogma held by others, That all cognition is sensible perception. The Protagorean tenet "Homo Mensura" is something essentially distinct from either of these two; though possibly Protagoras himself may have held the second of the two, besides his own. His tenet is nothing more than a clear and general declaration of the principle of universal Relativity. True belief and affirmation have no meaning except in relation to some believer, real or supposed; true disbelief and negation have no meaning except in relation to some disbeliever, real or supposed. When a man affirms any proposition as true, he affirms only what he (perhaps with some other persons also) believes to be true, while others may perhaps disbelieve it as falsehood. Object and Subject are inseparably implicated: we may separate them by abstraction, and reason about each apart from the other; but, as reality, they exist only locked up one with the other.
[Footnote 35: 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. II. c. xxvi. pp. 325-363: "The Protagorean doctrine--Man is the measure of all things--is simply the presentation in complete view of a common fact; uncovering an aspect of it which the received phraseology hides. Truth and Falsehood have reference to some believing subject--and the words have no meaning except in that relation. Protagoras brings to view this subjective side of the same complex fact, of which Truth and Falsehood denote the objective side. He refuses to admit the object absolute--the pretended thing in itself--Truth without a believer. His doctrine maintains the indefeasible and necessary involution of the percipient mind in every perception--of the concipient mind in every conception--of the cognizant mind in every cognition. Farther, Protagoras acknowledges many distinct believing or knowing Subjects: and affirms that every object known must be relative to (or in his language, measured by) the knowing Subject: that every cognitum must have its cognoscens, and every cognoscibile its cognitionis capax; that the words have no meaning unless this be supposed; that these two names designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact of cognition--actual or potential--not two factors, which are in themselves separate or separable, and which come together to make a compound product. A man cannot in any case get clear of or discard his own mind as a Subject. Self is necessarily omnipresent, concerned in every moment of consciousness, &c." Compare also c. xxiv. p. 261.]
That such is and always has been the state of the fact, in regard to truth and falsehood, belief and disbelief, is matter of notoriety: Protagoras not only accepts it as a fact, but formulates it as a theory. Instead of declaring that what he (or the oracle which he consults and follows) believes to be true, is absolute truth, while that which others believe, is truth relatively to them,--he lowers his own pretensions to a level with theirs. He professes to be a measure of truth only for himself, and for such as may be satisfied with the reasons that satisfy him. Aristotle complains that this theory discourages the search for truth as hopeless, not less than the chase after flying birds.[36] But, however serious such discouragement may be, we do not escape the real difficulty of the search by setting up an abstract idol and calling it Absolute Truth, without either relativity or referee; while, if we enter, as sincere and bonâ fide enquirers, on the search for reasoned truth or philosophy, we shall find ourselves not departing from the Protagorean canon, but involuntarily conforming to it. Aristotle, after having declared that the Maxim of Contradiction was true beyond the possibility of deception,[37] but yet that there were several eminent philosophers who disallowed it, is forced to produce the best reasons in his power to remove their doubts and bring them round to his opinion. His reasons must be such as to satisfy not his own mind only, but the minds of opponents and indifferent auditors as referees. This is an appeal to other men, as judges each for himself and in his own case: it is a tacit recognition of the autonomy of each individual enquirer as a measure of truth to himself. In other words, it is a recognition of the Protagorean canon.
[Footnote 36: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. v. p. 1009, b. 38.]
[Footnote 37: Ibid. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, b. 11: [Greek: bebaiota/tê d' a)rchê\ pasô=n, peri\ ê(\n diapseusthê=nai a)du/naton.]]
We know little about the opinions of Protagoras; but there was nothing in this canon necessarily at variance either with the Maxim of Contradiction or with that of Excluded Middle. Both Aristotle and Plato would have us believe that Protagoras was bound by his canon to declare every opinion to be alike false and true, because every opinion was believed by some and disbelieved by others.[38] But herein they misstate his theory. He did not declare any thing to be absolutely true, or to be absolutely false. Truth and Falsehood were considered by him as always relative to some referee, and he recognized no universal or infallible referee. In his theory the necessity of some referee was distinctly enunciated, instead of being put out of sight under an ellipsis, as in the received theories and practice. And this is exactly what Plato and Aristotle omit, when they refute him. He proclaimed that each man was a measure for himself alone, and that every opinion was true to the believer, false to the disbeliever; while they criticize him as if he had said--Every opinion is alike true and false; thus leaving out the very qualification which forms the characteristic feature of his theory. They commit that fallacy which Plato shows up in the Euthydêmus, and which Aristotle[39] numbers in his list of Fallaciæ Extra Dictionem, imputing it as a vice to the Sophists: they slide à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. And it is remarkable that Aristotle, in one portion of his argument against "Homo Mensura," expressly admonishes the Protagoreans that they must take care to adhere constantly to this qualified mode of enunciation;[40] that they must not talk of apparent truth generally, but of truth as it appears to themselves or to some other persons, now or at a different time. Protagoras hardly needed such an admonition to keep to what is the key-note and characteristic peculiarity of his own theory; since it is only by suppressing this peculiarity that his opponents make the theory seem absurd. He would by no means have disclaimed that consequence of his theory, which Aristotle urges against it as an irrefragable objection; viz., that it makes every thing relative, and recognizes nothing as absolute. This is perfectly true, and constitutes its merit in the eyes of its supporters.
[Footnote 38: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 171-179. Aristot. Met. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1007, b. 21: [Greek: ei) kata\ panto/s ti ê)\ kataphê=sai ê)\ a)pophê=sai e)nde/chetai, katha/per a)na/gkê toi=s to\n Prôtago/rou le/gousi lo/gon.] Compare v. p. 1009, a. 6; viii. p. 1012, b. 15.]
[Footnote 39: Aristot. Soph. El. p. 167, a. 3; Rhetoric. II. xxiv. p. 1402, a. 2-15. [Greek: ô(/sper kai\ e)pi\ tô=n e)ristikô=n to\ kata/ ti kai\ pro/s ti kai\ pê=| ou) prostithe/mena poiei= tê\n sukophanti/an.]]
[Footnote 40: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. vi. p. 1011, a. 21: [Greek: dio\ kai\ phulakte/on toi=s tê\n bi/an e)n tô=| lo/gô| zêtou=sin, a(/ma de\ kai\ u(pe/chein lo/gon a)xiou=sin, o(/ti ou) to\ phaino/menon e)/stin, a)lla\ to\ phaino/menonô(=| phai/netai kai\ o(/te phai/netai kai\ ê(=| kai\ ô(/s.]--b. 1: [Greek: a)ll' i)/sôs dia\ tou=t' a)na/gkê le/gein toi=s mê\ di' a)pori/an a)lla\ lo/gou cha/rin le/gousin, o(/ti ou)k e)/stin a)lêthe\s tou=to, a)lla\ tou/tô| a)lêthe/s.]]
Another argument of Aristotle[41] against the Protagorean "Homo Mensura"--That it implies in every affirming Subject an equal authority and equal title to credence, as compared with every other affirming Subject--I have already endeavoured to combat in my review of the Platonic Theætêtus, where the same argument appears fully developed. The antithesis between Plato and Aristotle on one side, and Protagoras on the other, is indeed simply that between Absolute and Relative. The Protagorean doctrine is quite distinct from the other doctrines with which they jumble it together--from those of Herakleitus and Anaxagoras, and from the theory that Knowledge is sensible perception. The real opponents of the Maxim of Contradiction were Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and Plato himself as represented in some of his dialogues, especially the Parmenides, Timæus, Republic, Sophistes. Each of these philosophers adopted a First Philosophy different from the others: but each also adopted one completely different from that of Aristotle, and not reconcileable with his logical canons. None of them admitted determinate and definable attributes belonging to determinate particular subjects, each with a certain measure of durability.
[Footnote 41: Ibid. v. p. 1010, b. 11.]
Now the common speech of mankind throughout the Hellenic world was founded on the assumption of such fixed subjects and predicates. Those who wanted information for practical guidance or security, asked for it in this form; those who desired to be understood by others, and to determine the actions of others, adopted the like mode of speech. Information was given through significant propositions, which the questioner sought to obtain, and which the answer, if cognizant, enunciated: e.g., Theætêtus **is sitting down[42]--to repeat the minimum or skeleton of a proposition as given by Plato, requiring both subject and predicate in proper combination, to convey the meaning. Now the logical analysis, and the syllogistic precepts of Aristotle,--as well as his rhetorical and dialectical suggestions for persuading, for refuting, or for avoiding refutation--are all based upon the practice of common speech. In conversing (he says) it is impossible to produce and exhibit the actual objects signified; the speaker must be content with enunciating, instead thereof, the name significant of each.[43] The first beginning of rhetorical diction is, to speak good Greek;[44] the rhetor and the dialectician must dwell upon words, propositions, and opinions, not peculiar to such as have received special teaching, but common to the many and employed in familiar conversation; the auditors, to whom they address themselves, are assumed to be commonplace men, of fair average intelligence, but nothing beyond.[45] Thus much of acquirement is imbibed by almost every one as he grows up, from the ordinary intercourse of society. The men of special instruction begin with it, as others do; but they also superadd other cognitions or accomplishments derived from peculiar teachers. Universally--both in the interior of the family, amidst the unscientific multitude, and by the cultivated few--habitual speech was carried on through terms assuming fixed subjects and predicates. It was this recognized process in its two varieties of Analytic and Dialectic, which Aristotle embraced in his logical theory, and to which he also adapted his First Philosophy.
[Footnote 42: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 262-263.]
[Footnote 43: Aristot. Soph. El. p. 165, a. 5: [Greek: e)pei\ ga\r ou)k e)/stin au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata diale/gesthai phe/rontas, a)lla\ toi=s o)no/masin a)nti\ tô=n pragma/tôn chrô/metha sumbo/lois.]]
[Footnote 44: Aristot. Rhet. III. v. p. 1407, b. 19: [Greek: e)/sti d' a)rchê\ tê=s le/xeôs to\ E(llêni/zein.]]
[Footnote 45: Aristot. Rhet. I. i. p. 1354, a. 1: [Greek: ê( r(êtorikê\ a)nti/stropho/s e)sti tê=| dialektikê=|; a)mpho/terai ga\r peri\ toiou/tôn tinô=n ei)si\n a(\ koina\ tro/pon tina\ a(pa/ntôn e)sti\ gnôri/zein kai\ ou)demia=s e)pistê/mês a)phôrisme/nês; dio\ kai\ pa/ntes tro/pon tina\ mete/chousin a)mphoi=n.]--p. 1355, a. 25: [Greek: didaskali/as ga/r e)stin o( kata\ tê\n e)pistê/mên lo/gos, tou=to de\ a)du/naton, a)ll' a)na/gkê dia\ tô=n koinô=n poiei=sthai ta\s pi/steis kai\ tou\s lo/gous, ô(/sper kai\ e)n toi=s Topikoi=s e)le/gomen peri\ tê=s pro\s tou\s pollou\s e)nteu/xeôs.]--p. 1357, a. 1: [Greek: e)/sti de\ to\ e)/rgon au)tê=s peri/ te toiou/tôn peri\ ô(=n bouleuo/metha kai\ te/chnas mê\ e)/chomen, kai\ e)n toi=s toiou/tois a)kroatai=s oi(\ ou) du/nantai dia\ pollô=n sunora=n ou)de\ logi/zesthai po/r)r(ôthen.]--p. 1357, a. 11: [Greek: o( ga\r kri/tês u(pokei=tai ei)=nai a(plou=s.] Compare Topica, I. ii. p. 101, a. 26-36; Soph. El. p. 172, a. 30.]
But the First Philosophy that preceded his, had not been so adapted. The Greek philosophers, who flourished before dialectical discussion had become active, during the interval between Thales and Sokrates, considered Philosophy as one whole--rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia--destined to render Nature or the Kosmos more or less intelligible. They took up in the gross all those vast problems, which the religious or mythological poets had embodied in divine genealogies and had ascribed to superhuman personal agencies.
Thales and his immediate successors (like their predecessors the poets) accommodated their hypotheses to intellectual impulses and aspirations of their own; with little anxiety about giving satisfaction to others,[46] still less about avoiding inconsistencies or meeting objections. Each of them fastened upon some one grand and imposing generalization (set forth often in verse) which he stretched as far as it would go by various comparisons and illustrations, but without any attention or deference to adverse facts or reasonings. Provided that his general point of view was impressive to the imagination,[47] as the old religious scheme of personal agencies was to the vulgar, he did not concern himself about the conditions of proof or disproof. The data of experience were altogether falsified (as by the Pythagoreans)[48] in order to accommodate them to the theory; or were set aside as deceptive and inexplicable from the theory (as by both Parmenides and Herakleitus).[49]
[Footnote 46: Aristot. Met. B. iv. p. 1000, a. 9: [Greek: oi( me\n ou)=n peri\ Ê(si/odon kai\ pa/ntes o(/soi theo/logoi mo/non e)phro/ntisan tou= pithanou= tou= pro\s au)tou/s, ê(mô=n d' ô)ligô/rêsan;--kai\ ga\r o(/nper oi)êthei/ê le/gein a)/n tis ma/lista o(mologoume/nôs au(tô=|, E)mpedoklê=s, kai\ ou(to\s tau)to\n pe/ponthen.]--Metaph. N. iv. p. 1091, b. 1-15.]
[Footnote 47: This is strikingly expressed by a phrase of Aristotle about the Platonic theory, Metaph. N. iii. p. 1090, a. 35: [Greek: oi( de\ chôristo\n poiou=ntes, o(/ti e)pi\ tô=n ai)sthêtô=n ou)k e)/stai ta\ a)xiô/mata, a)lêthê= de\ ta\ lego/mena kai\ sai/nei tê\n psuchê/n, ei)=nai/ te u(polamba/nousi kai\ chôrista\ ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 48: Metaph. N. iii. p. 1090, a. 34: [Greek: e)oi/kasi peri\ a)/llou ou)ra/nou le/gein kai\ sôma/tôn a)ll' ou) tô=n ai)sthêt ô=n.]--Metaph. A. v. p. 986, a. 5; and De Coelo, II. xiii. p. 293, a. 25.]
[Footnote 49: Physic. I. ii.-iii. pp. 185-186.]
But these vague hypotheses became subjected to a new scrutiny, when the dialectical age of Zeno and Sokrates supervened. Opponents of Parmenides impugned his theory of Ens Unum Continuum Immobile, as leading to absurdities; while his disciple Zeno replied, not by any attempt to disprove such allegations but, by showing that the counter-theory of Entia Plura Discontinua Moventia, or Mutabilia, involved consequences yet more absurd.[50] In the acute dialectical warfare, to which the old theories thus stood exposed, the means of attack much surpassed those of defence; moreover, the partisans of Herakleitus despised all coherent argumentation, confining themselves to obscure oracular aphorisms and multiplied metaphors.[51] In point of fact, no suitable language could be found, consistently with common speech or common experience, for expanding in detail either the Herakleitean[52] or the Parmenidean theory; the former suppressing all duration and recognizing nothing but events--a perpetual stream of Fientia or interchange of Ens with Non-Ens; the latter discarding Non-Ens as unmeaning, and recognizing no real events or successions, but only Ens Unum perpetually lasting and unchangeable. The other physical hypotheses, broached by Pythagoras, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Demokritus, each altogether discordant with the others, were alike imposing in their general enunciation and promise, alike insufficient when applied to common experience and detail.
[Footnote 50: Plato, Parmenid. p. 128, D.]
[Footnote 51: Plato, Theætêt. p. 179, E: [Greek: peri\ tou/tôn tô=n Ê(rakleitei/ôn,--to\ e)pimei=nai e)pi\ lo/gô| kai\ e)rôtê/mati kai\ ê(suchi/ôs e)n me/rei a)pokri/nasthai kai\ e)re/sthai ê(=tton au)toi=s e)/ni ê)\ to\ mêde/n;--ô(/sper e)k phare/tras r(êmati/skia ai)nigmatô/dê a)naspô=ntes a)potoxeu/ousi, ka)\n tou/tou zêtê=|s lo/gon labei=n, ti/ ei)/rêken, e(te/rô| peplê/xei kainô=s metônomasme/nô|, peranei=s de\ ou)de/pote ou)de\n pro\s ou)de/na au)t ô=n.]]
[Footnote 52: Ibid. p. 183, B: [Greek: a)lla/ tin' a)/llên phônê\n thete/on toi=s to\n lo/gon tou=ton le/gousin, ô(s nu=n ge pro\s tê\n au(tô=n u(po/thesin ou)k e)/chousi r(ê/mata, ei) mê\ a)/ra to\ ou)/d' o(/pôs; ma/lista d' ou(/tôs a)\n au)toi=s a(/rmottoi, a)/peiron lego/menon.]
Plato applies this remark to the theory of Protagoras; but the remark belongs properly to that of Herakleitus.]
But the great development of Dialectic during the Sokratic age, together with the new applications made of it by Sokrates and the unrivalled acuteness with which he wielded it, altered materially the position of these physical theories. Sokrates was not ignorant of them;[53] but he discouraged such studies, and turned attention to other topics. He passed his whole life in public and in indiscriminate conversation with every one. He deprecated astronomy and physics as unbecoming attempts to pry into the secrets of the gods; who administered the general affairs of the Kosmos according to their own pleasure, and granted only, through the medium of prophecy or oracles, such special revelations as they thought fit. In his own discussions Sokrates dwelt only on matters of familiar conversation and experience--social, ethical, political, &c., such as were in every one's mouth, among the daily groups of the market-place. These he declared to be the truly human topics[54]--the proper study of mankind--upon which it was disgraceful to be ignorant, or to form untrue and inconsistent judgments. He found, moreover, that upon these topics no one supposed himself to be ignorant, or to require teaching. Every one gave confident opinions, derived from intercourse with society, embodied in the familiar words of the language, and imbibed almost unconsciously along with the meaning of these words. Now Sokrates not only disclaimed all purpose of teaching, but made ostentatious profession of his own ignorance. His practice was to ask information from others who professed to know; and with this view, to question them about the import of vulgar words with the social convictions contained in them.[55] To the answers given he applied an acute cross-examination, which seldom failed to detect so much inconsistency and contradiction as to cover the respondent with shame, and to make him sensible that he was profoundly ignorant of matters which he had believed himself to know well. Sokrates declared, in his last speech before condemnation by the Athenian Dikasts, that such false persuasion of knowledge, combined with real ignorance, was universal among mankind; and that the exposure thereof, as the great misguiding force of human life, had been enjoined upon him as his mission by the Delphian God.[56]
[Footnote 53: Xenophon, Mem. IV. vii. 5: [Greek: kai/toi ou)de\ tou/t ôn ge a)nê/koos ê)=n].]
[Footnote 54: Xenophon, Mem. I. i. 12-16: [Greek: kai\ prô=ton me\n au)tô=n e)sko/pei po/tera/ pote nomi/santes i(kanô=s ê)/dê ta)nthr ô/peia ei)de/nai e)/rchontai e)pi\ to\ peri\ tô=n toiou/tôn phronti/zein, ê)\ ta\ me\n a)nthrô/peia pare/ntes, ta\ de\ daimo/nia skopou=ntes, ê(gou=ntai ta\ prosê/konta pra/ttein.--au)to\s de\ peri\ tô=n a)nthrôpei/ôn a)ei\ diele/geto, skopô=n ti/ eu)sebe/s, ti/ a)sebe/s, ti/ kalo/n, ti/ ai)schro/n, ti/ di/kaion, ti/ a)/dikon, ti/ sôphrosu/nê, ti/ mani/a, ti/ po/lis, ti/ politiko/s, ti/ a)rchê\ a)nthrô/pôn, ti/ a)rchiko\s a)nthrô/pôn], &c.
Compare IV. vii. 2-9.]
[Footnote 55: Xenoph. Memor. I. ii. 26-46; III. vi. 2-15; IV. ii.; IV. vi. 1: [Greek: skopô=n su\n toi=s sunoi=si ti/ e(/kaston ei)/ê tô=n o)/ntôn ou)de/pot' e)/lêge.]--IV. iv. 9: [Greek: a)rkei= ga\r o(/ti tô=n a)/llôn katagela=|s, e)rôtô=n me\n kai\ e)le/gchôn pa/ntas, au)to\s d' ou)deni\ the/lôn u(pe/chein lo/gon ou)de\ gnô/mên a)pophai/nesthai perei\ ou)deno/s.]--Plato, Republic I. pp. 336-337; Theætêt. p. 150 C.]
[Footnote 56: Plato, Apol. Sokrat. pp. 22, 28, 33: [Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to, ô(s e)gô/ phêmi, proste/taktai u(po\ tou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k manteiô=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/ôn kai\ panti\ tro/pô|, ô(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/llê thei/a moi=ra a)nthrô/pô| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein.]--Plato, Sophist. pp. 230-231; Menon, pp. 80, A., 84, B.
Compare the analysis of the Platonic Apology in my work, 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. I. c. vii.]
The peculiarities which Aristotle ascribes to Sokrates are--that he talked upon ethical topics instead of physical, that he fastened especially on the definitions of general terms, and that his discussions were inductive, bringing forward many analogous illustrative or probative particulars to justify a true general proposition, and one or a few to set aside a false one.[57] This Sokratic practice is copiously illustrated both by Plato in many of his dialogues, and by Xenophon throughout all the Memorabilia.[58] In Plato, however, Sokrates is often introduced as spokesman of doctrines not his own; while in Xenophon we have before us the real man as he talked in the market-place, and apparently little besides. Xenophon very emphatically exhibits to us a point which in Plato's Dialogues of Search is less conspicuously marked, though still apparent: viz., the power possessed by Sokrates of accommodating himself to the ordinary mind in all its varieties--his habit of dwelling on the homely and familiar topics of the citizen's daily life--his constant appeal to small and even vulgar details, as the way of testing large and imposing generalities.[59] Sokrates possessed to a surprising degree the art of selecting arguments really persuasive to ordinary non-theorizing men; so as often to carry their assent along with him, and still oftener to shake their previous beliefs, if unwarranted, or even if adopted by mere passive receptivity without preliminary reflection and comparison.
[Footnote 57: Aristot. Metaph. M. iv. p. 1078, b. 28: [Greek: du/o ga/r e)stin a(/ tis a)\n a)podoi/ê Sôkra/tei dikai/ôs, tou/s t' e)paktikou\s lo/gous kai\ to\ o(ri/zesthai katho/lou; tau=ta ga/r e)stin a)/mphô peri\ a)rchê\n e)pistê/mês.]--ib. A. p. 987, b. 1: [Greek: Sôkra/tous de\ peri\ me\n ta\ ê)thika\ pragmateuome/nou, peri\ de\ tê=s o(/lês phu/seôs ou)the/n, e)n me/ntoi tou/tois to\ katho/lou zêtou=ntos kai\ peri\ o(rismô=n e)pistê/santos prô/tou tê\n dia/noian.]]
[Footnote 58: No portion of the Memorabilia illustrates this point better than the dialogue with Euthydêmus, IV. vi.]
[Footnote 59: Xenophon, Memor. IV. vi. 15: [Greek: o(/pote de\ au)to/s ti tô=| lo/gô| diexi/oi, dia\ tô=n ma/lista o(mologoume/n ôn e)poreu/eto, nomi/zôn tau/tên tê\n a)spha/leian ei)=nai lo/gou; toigarou=n polu\ ma/lista ô(=n e)gô\ oi)=da, o(/te le/goi, tou\s a)kou/ontas o(mologou=ntas parei=chen; e)/phê de\ kai\ O(/mêron tô=| O)dussei= a)nathei=nai to\ a)sphalê= r(ê/tora ei)=nai, ô(s i(kano\n au)to\n o)/nta dia\ tô=n dokou/ntôn toi=s a)nthrô/pois a)/gein tou\s lo/gous.]
Compare ib. I. ii. 38; IV. iv. 6; also Plato, Theætêtus, p. 147, A, B; Republic I. p. 338, C.]
Without departing from Aristotle's description, therefore, we may conceive the change operated by Sokrates in philosophical discussion under a new point of view. In exchanging Physics for Ethics, it vulgarized both the topics and the talk of philosophy. Physical philosophy as it stood in the age of Sokrates (before Aristotle had broached his peculiar definition of Nature) was merely an obscure, semi-poetical, hypothetical Philosophia Prima,[60] or rather Philosophia Prima and Philosophia Secunda blended in one. This is true of all its varieties,--of the Ionic philosophers as well as of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, and even Demokritus. Such philosophy, dimly enunciated and only half intelligible,[61] not merely did not tend to explain or clear up phenomenal experiences, but often added new difficulties of its own. It presented itself sometimes even as discrediting, overriding, and contradicting experience; but never as opening any deductive road from the Universal down to its particulars.[62] Such theories, though in circulation among a few disciples and opponents, were foreign and unsuitable to the talk of ordinary men. To pass from these cloudy mysteries to social topics and terms which were in every one's mouth, was the important revolution in philosophy introduced in the age of Sokrates, and mainly by him.
[Footnote 60: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 31.]
[Footnote 61: Ibid. A. x. p. 993, a. 15: [Greek: psellizome/nê| ga\r e)/oiken ê( prô/tê philosophi/a peri\ pa/ntôn, a(/te ne/a te kat' a)rcha\s ou)=sa kai\ to\ prô=ton.]]
[Footnote 62: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: a.] i. p. 993, b. 6: [Greek: to\ o(/lon ti e)/chein kai\ me/ros mê\ du/nasthai dêloi= to\ chalepo\n au)tê=s (tê=s peri\ tê=s a)lêthei/as theôri/as).]
Alexander ap. Schol. p. 104, Bonitz: [Greek: ei)s e)/nnoian me\n tou= o(/lou kai\ e)pi/stasin pa/ntas e)lthei=n, mêde\n de\ me/ros au)tê=s e)xakribô/sasthai dunêthê=nai, dêloi= to\ chalepo\n au)tê=s.]
Aristotle indicates how much the Philosophia Prima of his earlier predecessors was uncongenial to and at variance with phenomenal experience--Metaphys. A. v. p. 986, b. 31.
To shape their theories in such a way--[Greek: ta\ phaino/mena ei) me/llei tis a)podô/sein] (Metaphys. [Greek: L]. viii. p. 1073, b. 36), was an obligation which philosophers hardly felt incumbent on them prior to the Aristotelian age. Compare Simplikius (ad. Aristot. Physic. I.), p. 328, a. 1-26, Schol. Br.; Schol. (ad. Aristot. De Coelo III. I.) p. 509, a. 26-p. 510, a. 13.]
The drift of the Sokratic procedure was to bring men into the habit of defining those universal terms which they had hitherto used undefined, the definitions being verified by induction of particulars as the ultimate authority. It was a procedure built upon common speech, but improving on common speech; the talk of every man being in propositions, each including a subject and predicate, but neither subject nor predicate being ever defined. It was the mission of Sokrates to make men painfully sensible of that deficiency, as well as to enforce upon them the inductive evidence by which alone it could be rectified. Now the Analytic and Dialectic of Aristotle grew directly out of this Sokratic procedure, and out of the Platonic dialogues in so far as they enforced and illustrated it. When Sokrates had supplied the negative stimulus and indication of what was amiss, together with the appeal to Induction as final authority, Aristotle furnished, or did much to furnish, the positive analysis and complementary precepts, necessary to clear up, justify, and assure the march of reasoned truth.[63] What Aristotle calls the syllogistic principia, or the principles of syllogistic demonstration, are nothing else than the steps towards reasoned truth, and the precautions against those fallacious appearances that simulate it. The steps are stated in their most general terms, as involving both Deduction and Induction; though in Aristotle we find the deductive portion copiously unfolded and classified, while Induction, though recognized as the only verifying foundation of the whole, is left without expansion or illustration.
[Footnote 63: Though the theorizing and the analysis of Aristotle presuppose and recognize the Sokratic procedure, yet, if we read the Xenophontic Memorabilia, IV. vii., and compare therewith the first two chapters of Aristotle's Metaphysica, in which he describes and extols Philosophia Prima, we shall see how radically antipathetic were the two points of view: Sokrates confining himself to practical results--[Greek: me/chri tou= ô)phelimou=]; Aristotle extolling Philosophia Prima, because it soars above practical results, and serves as its own reward, elevating the philosopher to a partial communion with the contemplative self-sufficiency of the Gods. Indeed the remark of Aristotle, p. 983, a. 1-6, denying altogether the jealousy ascribed to the Gods, &c., is almost a reply to the opinion expressed by Sokrates, that a man by such overweening researches brought upon himself the displeasure of the Gods, as prying into their secrets (Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 6; I. i. 12).]
If we go through the Sokratic conversations as reported in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, we shall find illustration of what has been just stated: we shall see Sokrates recognizing and following the common speech of men, in propositions combining subject and predicate; but trying to fix the meaning of both these terms, and to test the consistency of the universal predications by appeal to particulars. The syllogizing and the inductive processes are exhibited both of them in actual work on particular points of discussion. Now on these processes Aristotle brings his analysis to bear, eliciting and enunciating in general terms their principia and their conditions. We have seen that he expressly declares the analysis of these principia to belong to First Philosophy.[64] And thus it is that First Philosophy as conceived by Aristotle, acknowledges among its fundamenta the habits of common Hellenic speech; subject only to correction and control by the Sokratic cross-examining and testing discipline. He stands distinguished among the philosophers for the respectful attention with which he collects and builds upon the beliefs actually prevalent among mankind.[65] Herein as well as in other respects his First Philosophy not only differed from that of all the pre-Sokratic philosophers (such as Herakleitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, &c.) by explaining the principia of Analytic and Dialectic as well as those of Physics and Physiology, but it also differed from that of the post-Sokratic and semi-Sokratic Plato, by keeping up a closer communion both with Sokrates and with common speech. Though Plato in his Dialogues of Search appears to apply the inductive discipline of Sokrates, and to handle the Universal as referable to and dependent upon its particulars; yet the Platonic Philosophia Prima proceeds upon a view totally different. It is a fusion of Parmenides with Herakleitus;[66] divorcing the Universal altogether from its particulars; treating the Universal as an independent reality and as the only permanent reality; negating the particulars as so many unreal, evanescent, ever-changing copies or shadows thereof. Aristotle expressly intimates his dissent from the divorce or separation thus introduced by Plato. He proclaims his adherence to the practice of Sokrates, which kept the two elements together, and which cognized particulars as the ultimate reality and test for the Universal.[67] Upon this doctrine his First Philosophy is built: being distinguished hereby from all the other varieties broached by either his predecessors or contemporaries.
[Footnote 64: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 19-b. 11.]
[Footnote 65: See Aristot. De Divinat. per Somnum, i. p. 462, b. 15; De Coelo, I. iii. p. 270, b. 3, 20; Metaphys. A. ii. p. 982, a. 4-14. Alexander ap. Scholia, p. 525, b. 36, Br.: [Greek: e)n pa=sin e)/thos a)ei\ tai=s koinai=s kai\ phusikai=s tô=n a)nthrô/pôn prolê/psesin a)rchai=s ei)s ta\ deiknu/mena pro\s au)tou= chrê=sthai.]]
[Footnote 66: Aristot. Metaph. A. vi. p. 987, a. 32; M. iv. p. 1078, b. 12. That Plato's Philosophia Prima involved a partial coincidence with that of Herakleitus is here distinctly announced by Aristotle: that it also included an intimate conjunction or fusion of Parmenides with Herakleitus is made out in the ingenious Dissertation of Herbart, De Platonici Systematis Fundamento, Göttingen (1805), which winds up with the following epigrammatic sentence as result (p. 50):--"Divide Heracliti [Greek: ge/nesin ou)si/a|] Parmenidis, et habebis Ideas Platonicas." Compare Plato, Republic VII. p. 515, seq.]
[Footnote 67: Aristot. Metaph. M. iv. p. 1078, b. 17, seq.; ix. p. 1086, a. 37: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s kath' e(/kasta r(ei=n e)no/mizon] (Platonici) [Greek: kai\ me/nein ou)the\n au)tô=n, to\ de\ katho/lou para\ tau=ta ei)=nai/ te kai\ e(/tero/n ti ei)=nai. tou=to d', ô(/sper e)n toi=s e)/mprosthen e)le/gomen, e)ki/nêse me\n Sôkra/tês dia\ tou\s o(rismou/s, ou) mê\n e)chô/rise/ ge tô=n kath' e(/kaston. kai\ tou=to o)rthô=s e)no/êsen ou) chôri/sas.]]
The Maxim of Contradiction, which Aristotle proclaims as the first and firmest principium of syllogizing, may be found perpetually applied to particular cases throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Sokratic dialogues of Plato. Indeed the Elenchus for which Sokrates was so distinguished, is nothing more than an ever-renewed and ingenious application of it; illustrating the painful and humiliating effect produced even upon common minds by the shock of a plain contradiction, when a respondent, having at first confidently laid down some universal affirmative, finds himself unexpectedly compelled to admit, in some particular case, the contradictory negative. As against a Herakleitean, who saw no difficulty in believing both sides of the contradiction to be true at once, the Sokratic Elenchus would have been powerless. What Aristotle did was, to abstract and elicit the general rules of the process; to classify propositions according to their logical value, in such manner that he could formulate clearly the structure of the two propositions between which an exact contradictory antitheses subsisted. The important logical distinctions between propositions contradictory and propositions contrary, was first clearly enunciated by Aristotle; and, until this had been done, the Maxim of Contradiction could not have been laid down in a defensible manner. Indeed we may remark that, while this Maxim is first promulgated as a formula of First Philosophy in Book [Greek: G]. of the Metaphysica, it had already been tacitly assumed and applied by Aristotle throughout the De Interpretatione, Analytica, and Topica, as if it were obvious and uncontested. The First Philosophy of Aristotle was adapted to the conditions of ordinary colloquy as amended and tested by Sokrates, furnishing the theoretical basis of his practical Logic.
But, as Aristotle tells us, there were several philosophers and dialecticians who did not recognize the Maxim; maintaining that the same proposition might be at once true and false--that it was possible for the same thing both to be and not to be. How is he to deal with these opponents? He admits that he cannot demonstrate the Maxim against them, and that any attempt to do this would involve Petitio Principii. But he contends for the possibility of demonstrating it in a peculiar way--refutatively or indirectly; that is, provided that the opponents can be induced to grant (not indeed the truth of any proposition, to the exclusion of its contradictory antithesis, which concession he admits would involve Petitio Principii, but) the fixed and uniform signification of terms and propositions. Aristotle contends that the opponents ought to grant thus much, under penalty of being excluded from discussion as incapables or mere plants.[68] I do not imagine that the opponents themselves would have felt obliged to grant as much as he here demands. The onus probandi lay upon him, as advancing a positive theory; and he would have found his indirect or refutative demonstration not more available in convincing them than a direct or ordinary demonstration. Against respondents who proclaim as their thesis the negative of the Maxim of Contradiction, refutation and demonstration are equally impossible. No dialectical discussion could ever lead to any result; for you can never prove more against them than what their own thesis unequivocally avows.[69] As against Herakleitus and Anaxagoras, I do not think that Aristotle's qualified vindication of the Maxim has any effective bearing.
[Footnote 68: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. iv. p. 1006, a. 11, seq.]
[Footnote 69: Ibid. a. 26: [Greek: a)nairô=n ga\r lo/gon u(pome/nei lo/gon.]--p. 1008, a. 30.]
But Aristotle is quite right in saying that neither dialectical debate nor demonstration can be carried on unless terms and propositions be defined, and unless to each term there be assigned one special signification, or a limited number of special significations--excluding a certain number of others. This demand for definitions, and also the multiplied use of inductive interrogations, keeping the Universal implicated with and dependent upon its particulars--are the innovations which Aristotle expressly places to the credit of Sokrates. The Sokratic Elenchus operated by first obtaining from the respondent a definition, and then testing it through a variety of particulars: when the test brought out a negative as against the pre-asserted affirmative, the contradiction between the two was felt as an intellectual shock by the respondent, rendering it impossible to believe both at once; and the unrivalled acuteness of Sokrates was exhibited in rendering such shock peculiarly pungent and humiliating. But the Sokratic Elenchus presupposes this psychological fact, common to most minds, ordinary as well as superior,--the intellectual shock felt when incompatible beliefs are presented to the mind at once. If the collocutors of Sokrates had not been so constituted by nature, the magic of his colloquy would have been unfelt and inoperative. Against a Herakleitean, who professed to feel no difficulty in believing both sides of a contradiction at once, he could have effected nothing: and if not he, still less any other dialectician. Proof and disproof, as distinguished one from the other, would have had no meaning; dialectical debate would have led to no result.
Thus, then, although Aristotle was the first to enunciate the Maxim of Contradiction in general terms, after having previously originated that logical distinction of contrary and contradictory Propositions and doctrine of legitimate Antiphasis which rendered such enunciation possible,--yet, when he tries to uphold it against dissentients, it cannot be said that he has correctly estimated the logical position of those whom he was opposing, or the real extent to which the defence of the Maxim can be carried without incurring the charge of Petitio Principii. As against Protagoras, no defence was needed, for the Protagorean "Homo Mensura" is not incompatible with the Maxim of Contradiction; while, as against Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, &c., no defence was practicable, and the attempt of Aristotle to construct one appears to me a failure. All that can be really done in the way of defence is, to prove the Maxim in its general enunciation by an appeal to particular cases: if your opponent is willing to grant these particular cases, you establish the general Maxim against him by way of Induction; if he will not grant them, you cannot prove the general Maxim at all. Suppose you are attempting to prove to an Herakleitean that an universal affirmative and its contradictory particular negative cannot be both true at once. You begin by asking him about particular cases, Whether it is possible that the two propositions--All men are mortal, and, Some men are not mortal--can both be true at once? If he admits that these two propositions cannot both be true at once, if he admits the like with regard to other similar pairs of contradictories, and if he can suggest no similar pair in which both propositions are true at once, then you may consider yourself as having furnished a sufficient inductive proof, and you may call upon him to admit the Maxim of Contradiction in its general enunciation. But, if he will not admit it in the particular cases which you tender, or if, while admitting it in these, he himself can tender other cases in which he considers it inadmissible, then you have effected nothing sufficient to establish the general Maxim against him. The case is not susceptible of any other or better proof. It is in vain that Aristotle tries to diversify the absurdity, and to follow it out into collateral absurd consequences. If the Herakleitean does not feel any repulsive shock of contradiction in a definite particular case, if he directly announces that he believes the two propositions to be both at once true, then the collateral inconsistencies and derivative absurdities, which Aristotle multiplies against him, will not shock him more than the direct contradiction in its naked form. Neither the general reasoning of Aristotle, nor the Elenchus of Sokrates brought to bear in particular cases, would make any impression upon him; since he will not comply with either of the two conditions required for the Sokratic Elenchus: he will neither declare definitions, nor give suitable point and sequence to inductive interrogatories.
Nor is anything gained, as Aristotle supposes, by reminding the Herakleitean of his own practice in the daily concerns of life and in conversation with common persons: that he feeds himself with bread to-day, in the confidence that it has the same properties as it had yesterday;[70] that, if he wishes either to give or to obtain information, the speech which he utters or that which he acts upon must be either affirmative or negative. He will admit that he acts in this way, but he will tell you that he has no certainty of being right; that the negative may be true as well as the affirmative. He will grant that there is an inconsistency between such acts of detail and the principles of the Herakleitean doctrine, which recognize no real stability of any thing, but only perpetual flux or process; but inconsistency in detail will not induce him to set aside his principles. The truth is, that neither Herakleitus, nor Parmenides, nor Anaxagoras, nor Pythagoras, gave themselves much trouble to reconcile Philosophy with facts of detail. Each fastened upon some grand and impressive primary hypothesis, illustrated it by a few obvious facts in harmony therewith, and disregarded altogether the mass of contradictory facts. That a favourite hypothesis should contradict physical details, was noway shocking to them. Both the painful feeling accompanying that shock, and the disposition to test the value of the hypothesis by its consistency with inductive details, became first developed and attended to in the dialectical age, mainly through the working of Sokrates. The Analytic and the First Philosophy of Aristotle were constructed after the time of Sokrates, and with regard, in a very great degree, to the Sokratic tests and conditions--to the indispensable necessity for definite subjects and predicates, capable of standing the inductive scrutiny of particulars. In this respect the Philosophia Prima of Aristotle stands distinguished from that of any of the earlier philosophers, and even from that of Plato. He departed from Plato by recognizing the Hoc Aliquid or the definite Individual, with its essential Predicates, as the foundation of the Universal, and by applying his analytical factors of Form and Matter to the intellectual generation of the Individual ([Greek: to\ su/nolon--to\ sunampho/teron]); and thus he devised a First Philosophy conformable to the habits of common speech as rectified by the critical scrutiny of Sokrates. We shall see this in the next Chapter. * * * *
[Footnote 70: Aristot. Metaph. K. vi. p. 1063, a. 31.]
[The Author's MS. breaks off here. What follows on the next page, as Chapter XII, is the exposition of Aristotle's Psychology, originally contributed to the third edition of Professor Bain's work 'The Senses and the Intellect,' in 1868.]