III. MISCELLANEOUS QUARTERMASTER UNDERTAKINGS
Sergt. Irving Berlin, one of the fountain sources of American jazz music, found a special job cut out for him when he was drafted into the military service. The needs of the war machine called upon a wide range of individual talents, and this range did not exclude the artists. The painters engaged in camouflage work and made sketches and pictures of such things as unusual surgical operations for the permanent records of the Government, the poets fired the zeal of the country, and the musicians inspired the soldiers by providing them with music.
The American Expeditionary Forces as they grew in size found themselves possessed of some 390 regimental bands. These bands organized themselves, gathered such music as they could get, practiced, and presently regaled the soldiers of units to which they were attached; and then the inevitable happened--they played and played the same old pieces until their audiences yearned for something new. One day a cry of distress trickled through the cables, and then the plight of the hapless lover of band music in France became the problem of the quartermaster organization in the United States, resulting in the largest purchase of band music ever made, 200,000 sheets of it, costing nearly $50,000.
The music problem of the American Expeditionary Forces was put into the hands of a special committee of three well-known authorities in the musical world. Sergt. Berlin was the authority on popular numbers; Lieut. R. C. Deming, the bandmaster at Camp Meigs, Washington, D. C., was the member in charge of the ceremonial numbers; while Mr. Ward Stephens, the well-known composer, organist, and accompanist, was in charge of the concerted numbers.
This committee picked out a repertoire of 333 selections, consisting of 172 concert pieces, 43 ceremonial numbers, and 118 popular numbers. Four hundred complete sets of these were bought, one for each of the 390 bands of the American Expeditionary Forces, with 10 sets as a reserve. The music was bought from some 27 music publishers, the largest suppliers being Carl Fischer, the Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., the Leo Feist Co., the Jerome H. Remick Co., and G. Schirmer (Inc.), all of New York, and the Oliver Ditson Co., of Boston.
Each complete set was packed in a separate case so that each case upon arrival in France could be sent immediately to a band of the American Expeditionary Forces without being disturbed. The sorting and packing of this consignment of sheet music was handled by Sergt. Berlin and a staff of technical musical assistants, who, at his request, contributed their services.
The supply of music was but one of hundreds of enterprises required to make the Army efficient, comfortable, and happy, quite aside from the more obvious ones of supplying guns and ammunition, artillery, aerial observation, and food and clothing. And these scattered undertakings in military supplies accounted for the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars. Nearly all of them were quartermaster enterprises. But before we lift the curtain on this, one of the most interesting branches of our military preparation, involving, as it did, the scientific solution of problems ranging from the production of super-gasoline for the fighting airplanes to the proper and most economical method of cutting up the carcass of a steer, let us continue the musical overture by observing how the Army secured its band instruments.
There was a special branch of the Quartermaster Corps which concerned itself exclusively with the musical requirements of the Army. This branch bought in all approximately 143,000 musical instruments. These were secured at a saving of about $500,000 under the prices which the Government had been paying for such instruments prior to the war. Without going into the details of how this economy was effected, one typical instance may be cited. For years it had been the custom of manufacturers of musical instruments to embellish the trumpets and brass horns of bandsmen with engraving, chasings, and other markings. These were decorative only and had nothing to do with the quality of tone produced. By eliminating all such markings from the specifications, a substantial saving in cost was attained.
The principal suppliers of musical instruments were the Wm. Frank Co., of Chicago; J. M. York & Son, of Grand Rapids, Mich.; and the H. M. White Co., of Cleveland, Ohio. C. S. Conn & Co., of Elkhart, Ind.; the Eugene Geisler Co., of Chicago; and the Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., of Cincinnati, also supplied several thousand musical instruments.
FUEL, OIL, AND PAINTS.
During the months of hostilities the American public was constantly informed in advertising literature that fuel would win the war, and indeed fuel would win it, and did win it, in the sense that without fuel or with any grave shortage of fuel we could not have won. In this sense there was no commodity contributing to success in the great drama more important than coal. Coal not only furnished the power that transported the khaki-clad millions to France, but it furnished the manufacturing power in the United States and supplied the coke, which is essential to the manufacture of steel, thus entering into every rifle and piece of artillery.
America began keeping the records of coal mining in the year 1807. Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated President of the United States in 1913. In the 106 years between 1807 and 1913, and including those years, American mines produced a total of 9,844,159,937 tons of coal. In the succeeding five years of President Wilson's administration American mines turned out 2,960,938,597 tons of coal, almost one-third as much as was mined in the entire 1807-1913 period, and almost one-fourth of all the coal mined in the United States since records have been kept.
The American coal miners in 1918 met the war emergency by producing 150,000,000 tons of coal more than they had dug in 1914. The shortage of coal in the winter of 1917-18 was due not to the inability of the mines to produce the required tonnage but to inadequate railroad transportation facilities and severe weather conditions.
The war-coal project was in the hands of the United States Fuel Administration, but the office of the Quartermaster General assisted in the effort. Army officers were stationed at the offices of the various district representatives of the Fuel Administration throughout the country. These officers kept in constant touch with the factories making war supplies and saw to it that coal was diverted from less essential enterprises to the munitions factories. This service operated with such excellent effect that few manufacturers working on Government contracts were compelled to suspend operations because of the lack of fuel, and those who did have to suspend were able to resume again within a few days.
During the summer of 1918 the usual seasonal slack in the demand for fuel was taken up by the action of the fuel branch in absorbing practically all of the excess coal in the United States and storing it at Army posts, camps, and stations. This action kept the mines working at maximum capacity during a period when there is normally a curtailment in output. Of course, at the time there was no realization that the fighting was to end so soon, and this policy was adopted in preparation for unchecked industrial activity during the winter of 1918-19.
The Army itself was a heavy user of fuel, requiring it not only at its various manufacturing establishments but also at the great camps for heating purposes. The following table shows the Army purchases of fuel for the calendar year 1918.
-------------------------+------------+------------ | Amount. | Cost. -------------------------+------------+------------ Anthracite coal tons | 710,304 | $4,362,237 Bituminous coal do. | 2,706,737 | 11,711,335 +------------+------------ Total | 3,417,041 | 16,073,572 Coke do. | 9,576 | 80,643 Wood cords | 786,177 | 5,178,161 +------------+------------ Total fuel | | 21,332,376 -------------------------+------------+------------
The Army was an enormous consumer of oil, the total oil purchases, both in the United States and in France, in the nine-month period from April 1 to December 31, 1918, amounting to $30,522,837. There were 49 items in the oil-purchasing schedule for the troops in the United States alone, including lubricating oils, fuel oils, oils for paints and varnishes, gasoline for motor trucks and airplanes, axle grease, floor oil, tempering oil, oil for the preservation and waterproofing of shoes, harness, and other leather equipment, and numerous other varieties of oils. The gasoline purchases were heaviest of all, Army motor trucks and cars in the United States requiring 484,282 barrels of it, worth $5,448,570, in the nine months between April 1 and December 31, 1918. The American Army motor trucks and cars with the American Expeditionary Forces were supplied with 703,104 barrels, worth $10,104,437, in the same period. For Army airplanes in the United States during the same months there were purchased 306,082 barrels of special aviation gasoline, at a cost of $3,906,650, and for the planes in France 146,780 barrels, worth $2,748,839.
To give the American aviator the hottest, most instantaneously explosive, and surest-fire gasoline ever produced, the American refiners turned out a naphtha along specifications drawn by the Government that was the highest refinement of gasoline ever produced in large quantities. This was done by taking the best gasoline that had ever been produced in commercial quantities and giving it another run through the distilling retorts. Thus it was literally the cream of the cream, containing only the most combustible elements of liquid fuel and nothing else.
This refinement became known as "257° fighting naphtha," and the Army confined its use to the service planes actually at the front. It was not supplied to the aviation training camps, either in this country or in France. In order to distinguish this naphtha as the finest engine fuel available and to mark it so that it would not be wasted by accident in any use other than that of service at the front, it was colored red with aniline dyes. The Army did not even trust 257° fighting naphtha to bulk transportation on tank ships, but stored it in steel drums and freighted it across the ocean in this form in cargo boats.
America has always been the largest producer of gasoline, and the experience and development in this country has resulted in many grades of the fuel. The ordinary commercial gasoline comes in five grades, the best grade being known as "straight-run" gasoline and the other grades, in the order of their cost and purity, as "casing-head," "blended," "pressure-still," and "cracked." For motor fuel for the Army the quartermaster specifications would accept nothing but "straight-run" gasoline, unblended and without dangerous additions which have a damaging effect upon motor cylinders. This gasoline, the best that could be bought by the civilian users, is known as "428° gasoline;" and it was the fuel used universally in our motor trucks and motor cars.
Above that were the three grades of gasoline, or rather, naphtha, produced specially for the American Army airplanes. The lowest grade of these was called domestic aviation gasoline, and it was the best commercial gasoline refined until its boiling point had been brought down to 347° F. This fuel was used by our aviators in this country and was known as "347° domestic aviation naphtha." A still greater refinement was the splendid "302° export aviation naphtha," which was used by planes in France, other than those at the front. The fighting naphtha was obtained by taking the cream of export aviation naphtha. Although purchased in enormous quantities, it cost the Government more than 41 cents a gallon. The Government paid slightly less than 22 cents a gallon for its motor gasoline.
Another new development in the oil industry brought about by the Government's war needs was known as "Liberty aero oil." This was an airplane lubricating oil of pure mineral origin, a refined lubricant of excellent viscosity and a low cold test, an oil which proved itself to be capable and reliable under the ever-changing atmospheric and pressure conditions of mechanical flight at the front. Liberty aero oil was a success. Most of it which was shipped overseas was made from paraffin base oils, although in this country we used successfully many aero oils of asphaltum base.
The Ordnance Department submitted a requisition for a three-months' supply of pure neat's-foot oil, which was in quantity almost twice the total American production of neat's-foot oil in the preceding year. The Government oil experts worked out a satisfactory substitute by combining animal and mineral oils. This was not only equal to neat's-foot oil under tests, but it was considerably cheaper.
The American Expeditionary Forces submitted a rush order for 6,000,000 pounds of dark axle grease. The specifications called for containers made of tin. But it was almost impossible to secure the tin for such a shipment. Experiments were conducted with all possible haste, and the result was a container made of black iron sheets treated with a special varnish to prevent the moisture in the grease from rusting the iron. This container proved to be satisfactory.
BRUSHES.
Offhand, one would scarcely say that brushes play any part of vast importance in the life of an individual; yet to buy the brushes for the Army required a special organization, competent to spend money by the millions of dollars and get value received for it.
Indeed it was quite surprising how many brushes in variety the Army required. The tooth brush, the shaving brush, the hair brush, the clothes brush, the shoe brush, and the paint brush might occur to anybody as necessities; but the Army used all these and in addition, artists' brushes, bottle brushes, chimney brushes, whitewashing brushes, gun-cleaning brushes, floor brushes, roofing brushes, stove brushes, horse brushes, and dozens of other kinds. In all, the Government bought 9,224,210 brushes, at a cost of $3,039,000. It required 59 factories in the United States to manufacture these brushes. The most numerous class of all were the tooth brushes, more than 1,500,000 of these being ordered from one company alone.
Brushes are made from many different materials, such as bristle, horsehair, fiber of various kinds, imitation bristle, split quills, and the like, but the most important is bristle. Only a little bristle is produced in the United States in comparison to the demand for it, the bulk of the supply coming from China, India, Siberia, and Russia. The procurement of bristle was no small part of the problem of supplying brushes for the Army.
Not one in every 10 tooth brushes used in the United States was of American manufacture before the war, the rest coming from Japan, France, England, Germany, and Austria. When the European supply was cut off, Japan became the principal source of supply. The problem of tooth brushes was further complicated by an embargo on bristles coming into this country and another on the exporting of bone to Japan.
The Army bought no shaving brushes made of horsehair, even in part, since horsehair is known to be the carrier of the much dreaded anthrax germ. The Government specified a shaving brush with an abbreviated handle, making it more convenient to carry. A handle-less hairbrush was also specified. Paint brushes were largely standardized, but it was impossible to standardize toilet brushes because there were not enough facilities in the country to turn out sufficient quantities, if machinery had to be remodeled to meet Government specifications.
ROLLING KITCHENS.
Those in charge of general quartermaster purchases designed and produced the liberty rolling field kitchen, an equipment which could cook for 200 men. Rolling field kitchens were not new to our Army or the trade, there being about six types of commercial kitchens manufactured at the time we entered the war. Most of these were being produced on foreign war orders. In order, however, to secure a standardized kitchen with interchangeable parts, thus insuring a constant supply of spare parts, the division designed the liberty kitchen. There were two types of it--the horse-drawn type and the motor-drawn or trailmobile type.
Each kitchen consisted of a stove and a limber. The stove unit contained a bake oven and three kettles. The limber contained four bread boxes, which were also used as water containers, one cook's chest, four fireless cookers, and four kettles. In July, 1918, contracts were awarded for 15,000 complete kitchens, including the necessary cooking and camp utensils. Deliveries of these kitchens eventually reached a rate of over 200 per day.
Two factories adopted and installed track conveyor equipment on which the assembling process was carried forward from operation to operation until the finished kitchen, painted and boxed, was delivered to the car for shipment to the port of embarkation. The kitchens were packed each in a single crate, ready to be delivered to the front after arriving in France.
Before this kitchen was designed the Army had been paying from $700 to $1,050 apiece for rolling kitchens. The average price of the liberty kitchen was $502. Subsequent orders brought the total projected purchases of mobile kitchens to 25,000, of which 10,000 were of the animal-drawn type.
Substantial shipments of these kitchens had been received overseas before hostilities ceased, and in November deliveries were expanding at a rate which would have exceeded several times the 3,000 liberty kitchens required by the American Expeditionary Forces by January 1, 1919. About 7,000 rolling kitchens of all types were shipped to France.
TOOLS AND TOOL CHESTS.
Another important result accomplished in the purchase of general supplies was the standardization of tool chests. At one time the Army was buying and using approximately 100 different kinds of quartermaster tool chests. A committee to standardize tools and tool chests was appointed, and this committee reduced the number of types of tool chests to seven standardized ones--the carpenter's chest, the blacksmith's, the farrier's, the saddler's, the electrician's, the plumber's, and the horseshoer's emergency chest.
The committee also standardized the tools. Many varieties of such things as drawknives and handsaws had been purchased previously. This committee adopted a standard type of draw knife and a standard handsaw, and also standardized many other tools. Standardization of tool chests effected a large saving in transportation space by keeping the dimensions to a minimum. The standardized carpenter's chest occupied 3½ cubic feet less space than the older type wooden chest.
Since at the time the armistice was signed the Army was in the market for approximately 135,000 tool chests of the seven standardized types, the saving in shipping space would have been no slight achievement. But there was also in sight an enormous saving of money, not to speak of the fact that standardization would greatly increase the rate of manufacturing the chests.
HARDWARE.
The general supplies division of the quartermaster organization operated much of the Army's hardware store. In this work the division not only standardized Army tools, but also standardized the proportions in which the various tools were bought. This was not only an intensely interesting development, but it was of utmost importance to the American people, since it saved large sums of money and great quantities of shipping space.
The supply officers of the American Expeditionary Forces early began making up their estimates of the materials that must be produced in the United States and shipped to France, to maintain the efficiency of an indefinitely growing Army over a protracted period of time. In the matter of hardware these estimates came originally from the company units. Each repair unit, for instance, would look over the future, and its officers would estimate kinds and quantities of tools required for such and such a period. These little estimates came together in larger groups, and so on, the consolidation of figures continuing until eventually in the case of a certain tool there would be one figure on file at headquarters. Then one day one of those long daily cablegrams from France, signed "Pershing," came to Washington, bringing the future requirements for tools and other hardware.
Theoretically it might be assumed that the proportioning of items in these requisitions would be correct and that the American Expeditionary Forces might be expected to need tools in the proportions named. Of course, Sergt. A, in a repair unit with the artillery, might estimate too many hammers and too few wrenches, but Machinist X, miles away in some base shop, might call for too many wrenches and too few hammers. These two estimates would thus balance correctly; and, following out this line of reasoning, it would seem that the entire American Expeditionary Forces' hardware requisitions, compiled as they were, would be properly proportioned.
Yet when these requisitions came to Washington and were found to call for the manufacture of such things as files and bolts by the tens of millions, the supply officers here would not accept the theory that the proportions of various sizes called for were correct, but turned the searchlight of science upon these estimates.
The method selected of checking these estimates was simplicity itself, yet unique in the history of American industry and almost majestic in the scope of its comprehensive vision. The officer in charge of the procurement of hardware, in the case of files, for instance, simply called together the entire file-manufacturing industry--and that means that not a single manufacturer was overlooked--and asked that industry to assemble the results of its experience over a period of the last five or six years. Each manufacturer would show, for instance, how many flat files he had sold of each length and of each type of cutting surface--either bastard, second cut, or smooth--how many half-round files, how many hand files, how many round files, how many square files, how many warding files, how many knife files, how many taper files, etc., all by lengths and by cutting surfaces. Thus when all these experience figures were assembled, the officers in charge at Washington knew exactly in what proportions the whole American industrial world had used files of various types throughout a considerable period of time.
This procedure was followed with respect to many common articles in hardware. The Hardware Manufacturers' Organization for War Service was formed to give just such assistance, cooperating up to 100 per cent of the hardware industry. The consolidation of the experience figures in American hardware consumption resulted in a schedule of supplies known as the Army's hardware tariff, a schedule showing the proportions in which hardware might be expected to be consumed.
The hardware tariff disclosed some surprising errors in the estimates from the American Expeditionary Forces. The American Expeditionary Forces' requisitions, for instance, had called for a total of 127,180,387 bolts of various kinds. The experience of bolt consumption in the American industry was able to correct this to a total of 125,285,000 bolts, or a saving of nearly 2,000,000 in number of pieces. The requisitions had called for 39,945,458 large carriage bolts. The experience of American consumption showed that only 9,700,000 large carriage bolts would be required. The original specifications had called for 31,839,741 small carriage bolts. The experience in American consumption showed that 60,300,000 would be necessary. In other words, the off-hand estimates of the American Expeditionary Forces had called for 30,000,000 too many large carriage bolts and nearly 30,000,000 too few small carriage bolts.
The specifications from France called for 5,000,000 stove bolts of the five-eighths-inch dimension. Since this size was not used or was not made at all by stove-bolt manufacturers, the item was canceled, and 2,000,000 smaller-dimension bolts substituted.
All bolts were supplied in quantities and proportions determined by following the proportions of the scientific tariff. They were shipped to France in these proportions, whence reports from the American Expeditionary Forces showed that the quantities sent completely covered the needs of the troops in the field. The saving in the manufacture of bolts alone came to nearly $4,000,000, and this says nothing of the saving in railroad and ocean freight charges, or the still more important saving in ocean tonnage space, since the bolts supplied according to the scientific tariff occupied many hundreds of cubic feet less space than the bolts originally specified would have filled.
The same procedure was followed in the supplying of files. The hardware manufacturers consulted their records and on the basis of actual consumption in American industry discovered that a repair unit consisting of a machine shop, a horseshoeing shop, a blacksmith shop, and a woodworking shop, with 11 mechanics working in the unit, would consume 305 dozen files per year, the experience tables showing precisely the proportions of the various sizes of files in this consumption. Consequently, when the American Expeditionary Forces requested 439,200 dozen files, the quantities of each size, kind, and style as specified in the requisition from France were disregarded, and the so-called tariff proportions substituted. The files as supplied not only proved adequate in number in every style, but they cost $250,000 less than it would have cost to fill the original order. Moreover, by using tariff sizes the industry was able to make immediate shipments and to run at full production from the start, since it needed only to produce files in the proportions known in the regular trade.
What was done with bolts and files was done in many other lines of hardware. When the American Expeditionary Forces saw that its hardware was coming in correct quantities, its officers notified the hardware supply organization to ship all tools and hardware materials in accordance with the so-called tariffs. The executive committee of the Hardware Manufacturers' Association for War Service, which made possible this achievement in commercial science, consisted of Messrs. Murray Sargent, Alexander Stanley, Charles W. Asbury, Fayette R. Plumb, and Isaac Black.
The standardization of proportions in the hardware supply succeeded in cutting an original requisition of the American Expeditionary Forces for 8,750 tinners' machines to 860, and an original requisition for 21,600 tinners' assorted groovers to 240, and still met every need of the Army's tin shops in France.
The Army hardware office was also called upon to supply such small hardware as fasteners for gas-mask knapsacks and pistol holsters, and some metallic parts for cartridge belts and similar goods. Less than two months before the armistice was signed orders were in sight for the manufacture of some 500,000,000 pieces of these small metallic devices. Most of them were to be made of brass. The uses of the Army in October, 1918, were calling for these articles in such quantities that it required approximately 250,000 pounds of brass per working day to meet the demand.
At one time there came an order to procure 135,000,000 stud fasteners within approximately 90 days. The result was that one manufacturer, who had been producing 400,000 such fasteners in a day succeeded in raising his production to 1,000,000 per day, and this was only typical of the expansion elsewhere in the industry. The demands of the Army overtaxed the brass rolling-mill capacity of the land. As a result the hardware specialists investigated the possibility of substituting iron and steel for brass, and these substitutes were under consideration when the war came to an end.
Vast quantities of large sizes of rope were requested for overseas to replace steel hoisting cables, which could not be secured in sufficient quantities. Standard specifications drawn by the Government in cooperation with rope manufacturers insured the supply to the Army of rope only of the highest grades. Approximately 14,000,000 pounds of manila rope, 2,500,000 pounds of halter rope, and 2,000,000 pounds of cotton and jute twine were purchased at a cost of approximately $9,000,000.
Army hardware men bought 1,534,679 axes, at a cost of $1,838,979. They bought 1,256,994 shovels at a cost of $1,140,412, and 425,522 wrenches costing $395,776. They purchased 380,752 fire extinguishers at a cost of $1,761,711. They purchased 2,621,521 safety razors and 45,300,000 safety razor blades, the razors costing $3,171,806 and the blades $1,318,750. These items selected at random give some idea of the extent of the Army's hardware business.
QUARTERMASTER FACTORY ENTERPRISES.
It may not be generally known that the Quartermaster organization was an extensive manufacturer of war goods in Government shops. In another chapter has been described the method by which the Army was supplied with clothing. While many of the clothing contractors were private manufacturers, the Government itself manufactured more uniforms than it secured from any single outside source.
There were two Government uniform factories--one at the plant of the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot and the other at the Jeffersonville (Ind.) Quartermaster Depot. The Philadelphia factory also manufactured chevrons, flags, and tents. The Jeffersonville depot produced army shirts in addition to outer clothing. The Jeffersonville depot expanded in size during the war until it became the largest shirt manufacturing establishment in the world. When the armistice was signed the Philadelphia uniform factory was rapidly gaining the eminence of being the largest clothing manufacturing plant in the United States.
The total value of the articles manufactured by the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot during the war was $26,230,000. The garment factory at Philadelphia was started in June, 1918, and in five months it turned out 751,883 garments and 45,578 flags of various kinds. It was working toward an output of 12,000 pairs of trousers and 6,000 woolen coats per day. There were 3,000 employees in the shop and 2,000 outside seamstresses. The outside seamstresses made denim jumpers and trousers, white clothing, and olive drab shirts, the production of shirts alone reaching a total of 1,359,801 garments.
The Philadelphia factory attained an output of 5,000 pairs of chevrons per day, most of them embroidered by hand or by machinery. Before the war the Philadelphia factory had a maximum capacity of 68 pyramidal tents per day. This output was raised to 300 per day.
The Jeffersonville uniform factory was established in February, 1918. Jeffersonville is just a few minutes' ride from Louisville, Ky., which is a clothing center, and therefore there was little trouble in securing experienced workers. The factory was operated day and night with two shifts, each working eight hours. The plant reached a capacity of 750 woolen coats and 1,500 pairs of woolen trousers per day. The salaries of the women employees ranged from $50 to $80 per month. The Government established at Jeffersonville one of the most modern woolen cloth shrinking plants in the United States, costing approximately $50,000 and providing a capacity for sponging 10,000 yards of cloth per day. The Army supply officers pronounced the uniforms turned out at Jeffersonville to be the best and most honestly made clothing delivered to the Army during the war, yet the cost of manufacturing uniforms in this plant was at least 25 per cent under the average price paid to private contractors. The average cost of making a woolen service coat at Jeffersonville was $1.02, and the average cost of making a pair of woolen trousers was 54 cents.
The shirt factory at Jeffersonville was that depot's largest manufacturing enterprise. The Jeffersonville depot had been making army shirts since 1872. The shirt factory greatly expanded during the Spanish-American War, until it was employing nearly 2,000 operatives, mostly home workers. Thereafter the depot continued to make shirts at the rate of about 200,000 per year until the United States declared war against Germany, and in that time it had accumulated a roll of 2,000 sewing operatives who had worked for the factory at one time or other.
When the great demand for shirts came in the spring of 1917, the most expert of these seamstresses were hired outright by the month to act as instructors in the homes of new sewing women who had volunteered for the work. Advertisements were then sent out through the newspapers of that entire section for women workers, and presently the factory had a sewing force of 20,000 operatives from practically every town and village throughout southern Indiana and northwestern Kentucky. The output of shirts was increased from 600,000 per year to 8,500,000. Each home worker was supplied with one complete shirt to be used as a guide, and she secured from the factory as often as she needed it shirt material cut from the pattern and tied up in bundles of 10 sets. A large corps of sanitary inspectors was employed to visit the thousands of homes and see to it that the shirts were made under proper conditions. All shirts accepted from the home workers were thoroughly fumigated before being issued from the depot.
SHOE FITTING.
The Quartermaster Department, along with its other activities, was a school-teacher on a large scale. Without going into a general description of the quartermaster schools and the branches they taught, we will here consider some of the most interesting educational enterprises such as the shoe-fitting schools, the schools for butchers, and the school of goods packing.
Elsewhere in this volume the mechanical system of shoe measuring, perfected and adopted by the War Department, was described. Studies made at the camps at various times during 1917 and 1918, studies which examined nearly 59,000 men, showed that a little more than 70 per cent were wearing shoes too short, more than 9 per cent were wearing shoes too long, while less than 19 per cent were correctly fitted. It is probable that these proportions ran clear through the Army before shoe fitting was scientifically taken up, and there is no reason to believe that in civil life the averages of correct shoe fitting are any better.
After the so-called Resco system of shoe fitting was adopted, schools for shoe measuring were held at Camp Meigs, D. C., and at Jefferson Barracks, Mo. Each camp and cantonment in the country sent two officers to one or the other of these schools. The course of instruction lasted five days and consisted of lectures by experts and demonstrations of the various appliances. In this way the science of correct shoe fitting was scattered throughout the Army.
MEAT CUTTING.
It is no easy trick to teach a man to cut meat properly; butchering is a skilled trade. As soon as it was apparent that the American Expeditionary Forces in France were to be greatly expanded in size, our officers overseas sent requests that several trained and experienced butchery companies be sent over to cut meats properly for the organizations abroad. In order to comply with this request there was added to the curriculum of the quartermaster training camp in Florida a butchery course in the cutting, boning, rolling, and tying of fresh and frozen beef.
In this course there was developed an entirely new method of cutting beef known as the "natural guide" method; and by it men who had never cut meat before were developed into practical meat cutters in less than eight weeks of instruction and practice. The natural guide method, which was found to be far superior for Army use to any other meat-cutting system which had been known, was exactly what it was named, as it was essentially a separating rather than a cutting process. The beef quarters were boned and divided into their major parts by following the natural separations between muscles, tissues, and bones.
This method, which is not at all like that in commercial use, proved to be more economical than any meat-cutting system known, because it utilized every ounce of meat and produced a greater proportion of choice cuts suitable for pot roasts and other roasts than the older Army Cooks' Manual method of meat cutting. The Cooks' Manual method was similar to the method used by the retail butcher, in that it cut meat along artificial indetermined lines. The natural guide method actually produced 3 per cent more edible meat than the other method, since even the most expert meat cutters can not remove all meat from the bones by the Cooks' Manual method. Moreover, by the natural guide method all cuts are uniform, and the fats, suets, and bones are separated as clean, sweet, edible products.
Butchery companies were trained by the natural guide method and sent overseas in numbers sufficient for the requirements of the American Expeditionary Forces.
After the discovery of this method and the fact that it produced at least 3 per cent more meat than even the expert cutters could secure by the artificial cutting system, it was evident that further research work along this line would be profitable. Even expert butchers, in spite of all their skill and care, wasted meat. What must be the conditions in the mess kitchens of the Army where the cooks, with no expert knowledge of butchery, cut the meats? It was evident that numerous edible by-products of meat, such as fats and marrow, were going into the kitchen garbage pails and thence to the rendering plants.
The result of the investigation was a project to establish central meat-cutting and rendering plants for all large concentrations of troops, where all meats would be cut, boned, rolled, and tied, by experts, and delivered direct to the company kitchens ready for roasting or cooking in any manner. The fat and suet at such plants would not be soiled or made unsound by handling, and so it could be rendered and its food value retained. The oil could be cooked from the bones as a valuable by-product, the bones could be dried and sold commercially, and the plant could also have machinery for making sausage and hamburg steak. A plant of this character was put in operation during the summer and autumn of 1918 at Camp Johnston, the quartermaster training camp, and it proved to be a complete success. When the armistice was signed, the General Staff was considering the proposition of establishing these centralized meat plants at all the larger camps.
The meat experts also effected notable economies in ship space by developing what was known as shankless beef. Shank-less beef was beef quarters with the four shanks removed. Quarters thus prepared occupied 14 per cent less freezer, cargo, and shipping space than quarters with their shanks.
A still further economy in shipping space was projected in the plan to bone all beef at the packing plants and ship it boxed or frozen in molds and wrapped in burlap. This method saved about 50 per cent of cargo space, and it began to be extensively used during the winter of 1918-19. One set of packages included tenderloins, sirloins, butts, loin steaks, top rounds, and shoulder steaks. Another set of packages contained roasts, including prime ribs, rumps, bottom rounds, and bottom chucks. A third set was for stews, including flanks, plates, blades, necks, shanks, and trimmings.
PACKING.
American exporters generally for many years have had the reputation of packing goods improperly for overseas shipment. Time and again travelers and investigators in foreign lands have pointed out that if America expected to compete successfully with other manufacturing nations in foreign trade, she must learn to pack goods so that the packages will not break en route and damage the contents. When we sent an Army of over 2,000,000 men to France, it was evident that unless we learned quickly how to put up our supplies properly for overseas shipment, our lack of knowledge would be costly to us.
Accordingly the packing service branch of the Quartermaster Department was established. One of its first acts was to set up a school of baling, packing, and crating, this school being located at the Forest Products Laboratory at Madison, Wis., where studies of packing were being made by scientists. The school started in July, 1918, and before the armistice came it had graduated 400 students from its six-weeks' course.
Now, while it was important that Army supplies reached the other side in good condition, it was soon seen that of even greater importance would be the economy that might be effected in shipping space by the scientific packing of goods. This obscure and little known packing service branch was really one of the most important agencies in the whole war organization, since the results which it accomplished in the saving of ship space were nothing short of astonishing. These economies came at a time when the German submarines were still highly destructive to American and allied shipping, and the shortage of ocean tonnage was one of the most disturbing factors in the whole war situation. The American packing service, in saving thousands of tons of shipping space, in reality offset the operations of the U-boats over a considerable period of time.
These space economies resulted usually from specifications drawn by the packing experts reducing the sizes of packing cases that were too large for the goods contained, and also by packing articles more compactly. For instance, these experts studied the rolling kitchen and determined the most compact assembly of its parts in a crate. The crate was then carefully designed to occupy a minimum amount of space. Some 18,000 rolling kitchens were packed ready for shipment to France. Had all of these been floated, a total of 22,500 cubic tons of ship space would have been saved, or the equivalent of five or six whole shiploads. As it was, room aboard ship could be found for only 6,940 rolling kitchens, which by being scientifically packed occupied 8,700 cubic tons less cargo space, or about two whole shiploads, than they would have occupied otherwise.
Wherever possible, entire units of such heavy articles as escort wagons and ambulances were packed in single crates. Wherever open spaces were inevitable in the crating, these vacancies were filled with various subsistence stores, such as dried peas or beans. Galvanized-iron cans, for instance, were packed with two sacks of flour inside each one.
The experts studied boxing to determine the best thickness of wood required by various commodities and the proper method of strapping or otherwise fastening the boxes. As a result there was a great improvement in the condition of goods arriving in France.
In no respect did the packing service effect greater space economy than in the packing of clothes for the American Expeditionary Forces. Formerly clothing had gone forward to troops packed loosely in wooden boxes. The packing service devised the system of baling all clothing, and a baling plant was set up at the Army supply base in Brooklyn. The service gave scientific attention to the proper folding of garments and eventually, after exhaustive experiments, developed a system of folding that allowed the maximum number of pieces which could go into a bale. It was found that these new methods saved two-thirds of the space that had been used formerly for the shipment of the same quantity of goods in boxes, to say nothing of the great saving both in labor and in boxing materials.
The baling plant at New York in the calendar year 1918 shipped to France approximately 1,000,000 bales of clothing and textile and other equipment that could be baled. The saving in money to the United States Government by this method of packing at this one plant in a single year amounted to approximately $55,000,000. The largest item in this economy was the matter of cargo space, which is estimated at $49,080,000 saved to the Government. The complete statement of the financial saving in the shipment of these 1,000,000 bales is as follows:
Material $1,940,000 Labor 583,000 Tare weight 75,000 Cargo space 49,080,000 ---------- Total 51,678,000 ==========
To these savings are to be added:
Savings effected in rent and maintenance 700,000 Freight to the shipping warehouses 490,000 Rent of additional warehouse awaiting shipment 30,000 Freight from warehouse to ship side 1,250,000 Re-cooperage 200,000 Unloading at the forwarding stations 1,000,000 ---------- Total 3,670,000 ========== Grand total 55,348,000
In addition to the financial saving there was a large saving in raw materials, which count for more than money to a nation engaged in a desperate war. This million bales of clothing saved 58,000,000 board feet of lumber, which would have been used in boxing had the old system of packing been followed. The lumber which might have gone into these boxes requires 30 years for its growth, but the burlap covering the bales was made of jute, which is raised in semiannual crops.
The size of the bale adopted was 30 by 15 by 14 inches and up to 19 inches. It is interesting to note that this size was determined upon because it was found that the burlap covering such bales of this size would cut into sandbags with a minimum amount of waste material. The Army abroad used great quantities of sandbags. Thus, by wrapping bales in burlap pieces of proper size, there was saved a considerable amount of cargo space previously occupied by baled burlap being shipped to France to be made into sandbags. It is also notable that baled clothing arrived in France in much better condition than clothing which had been packed in cases.
HORSES AND MULES.
The Quartermaster Corps was charged with the duty of providing horses and mules for the Army. This function is known technically as remount, and the buying of horses was in the hands of the remount division.
There were three permanent remount depots in the United States when the war began in April, 1917--one at Front Royal, Va., one at Fort Reno, Okla., and one at Keogh, Mont.,--an auxiliary remount depot at Fort Bliss, Tex., and a purchasing headquarters at Kansas City, Mo. When it became apparent that the Army would need a large number of horses, some of the most celebrated horsemen and riders in the country offered their services as buyers. Some 50 of them were commissioned as captains in the Quartermaster Reserve Corps and sent to the various purchasing headquarters for short training in the proper types of horses and animals required by the Army. These buyers purchased a large number of excellent animals.
In addition to the existing three remount depots there were established 33 additional auxiliary remount depots and two animal embarkation depots. The horses purchased were shipped to the various remount depots and there trained and conditioned for Army use.
It required a large number of officers and men to care for the remount establishment. Shortly before the armistice was signed there were approximately 400 officers and 19,000 enlisted men in the American remount service. The following statement shows the total numbers of horses and mules purchased for the American Army in the calendar years 1917-18, including those acquired by the remount service in France:
_(a) Number of horses and mules purchased from Jan. 1, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919._
-------------------+------------------------------+---------------+------- | Horses. | Mules. | +--------+----------+----------+-------+-------+ Grand Where purchased. | | Light | Heavy | | Pack | total. |Cavalry.|artillery.|artillery.| Draft.| and | | | | | |riding.| -------------------+--------+----------+----------+-------+-------+------- From French | 21,450 | 61,944 | 42,973 | 2,181| 7,160 |135,708 From Spanish | 1,400 | 423 | | 13,329| 3,295 | 18,447 From British | 2,633 | 6,388 | 4,352 | 6,714| 943 | 21,030 In United States | 60,439 | 106,554 | 9,129 |114,687| 9,450 |300,259 Private mounts | 507 | 47 | | | | 554 Young horses | 4,474 | 1,045 | | | | 5,519 +--------+----------+----------+-------+-------+------- Total purchased to | 90,903 | 176,401 | 56,454 |136,911|20,848 |481,517 Jan. 1, 1919 | | | | | | -------------------+--------+----------+----------+-------+-------+-------
_(b) Number of horses and number of mules lost in America and abroad Apr. 6, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919._
-------------------+---------+---------+------- | Horses. | Mules. | Total. -------------------+---------+---------+------- In America | 24,144 | 6,040 | 30,184 Abroad | 37,615 | 5,667 | 43,282 +---------+---------+------- Total | 61,759 | 11,707 | 73,466 -------------------+---------+---------+-------
_(c) Number of horses and mules on hand in the United States and insular possessions, Jan. 1, 1919._
Horses: Cavalry 83,774 Draft 77,172
Mules: Draft 96,542 Pack and riding 13,950 ------- Grand total 271,438
Thousands of American animals were shipped to the American Expeditionary Forces in France. Because of the lack of tonnage there were no animal shipments between March 26, 1918, and August 11. Between the declaration of war and March 26, 1918, a total of 30,329 animals were shipped abroad, and in the August 12-November 30 period 37,619 animals crossed the Atlantic, making a total of 67,948 American horses and mules sent to the American Expeditionary Forces.
The total expenditures of the Army both abroad and at home for horses and mules during the war period was $115,957,000, divided about half and half between the United States on the one hand and France, England, and Spain on the other.
The largest remount depot developed during the war is located at Camp Jackson, Columbia, S. C. This depot has a capacity of about 10,000 animals and its construction cost was about $300,000. Soon after the armistice was signed, when it became apparent that animals would no longer be needed, thousands of horses and mules at the different remount depots were sold at auction, these auction sales drawing large crowds of buyers.
STORAGE.
The problem of storing Army supplies became great only after hostilities had ceased. Before that time supplies were going through the warehouses and to the ships at the deep-water ports so rapidly that there was no backing up of the tide of them in the vast warehouse facilities that had been provided as a war measure. But as soon as the armistice was signed and the Army no longer grew in size but rapidly diminished as men were discharged, the manufacturing operations under way, necessarily continued for a time on a scale which had been developed in preparation for an Army nearly double the size of the one that existed on November 11, 1918, soon began filling up the warehouses.
The total storage capacity which the Army had on hand at the time of the fighting, exclusive of that at ports and that for the Department of Military Aeronautics, was as follows:
-----+-------------------+----------------+----------------+----------- Zone.| Depot. | Warehouse. | Open. | Total. -----+-------------------+----------------+----------------+----------- | | Square feet. | Square feet. | 1 | Boston | 1,295,460 | | 1,295,460 2 | New York | 2,900,141 | | 2,900,141 3 | Philadelphia | 2,333,124 | | 2,333,124 4 | Baltimore | 1,468,572 | | 1,468,572 5 | Atlanta | 1,499,848 | 14,300 | 1,514,148 6 | Jeffersonville | 2,000,000 | | 2,000,000 7 | Chicago | 3,825,286 | 1,742,400 | 5,567,686 8 | St. Louis | 1,216,776 | | 1,216,776 9 | New Orleans | 405,172 | 100,000 | 505,172 10 | San Antonio | 991,582 | | 991,582 11 | Omaha | 130,472 | | 130,472 12 | El Paso | 232,803 | 80,212 | 313,015 13 | San Francisco | 1,170,533 | | 1,170,533 14 | Newport News | 234,879 | | 234,879 15 | Washington, D. C. | 815,606 | 342,100 | 1,157,706 | +----------------+----------------+----------- | Grand total | 20,520,254 | 2,279,012 | 22,799,266 =====+===================+================+================+=========== | Warehouse | Open | Total. -------------------------+----------------+----------------+----------- | Square feet. | Square feet. | Camps | 5,326,590 | 5,104,901 | 10,431,491 -------------------------+----------------+----------------+-----------
The operation of one of the Quartermaster depot warehouses might be described at this point, and the general supply depot at Jeffersonville, Ind., is typical. During the war this depot procured for the Quartermaster Corps of the entire Army all horse-drawn vehicles and harness, and such items as barrack ranges, field ranges, and ovens, pack-train equipment, and other supplies.
The war deliveries began at Jeffersonville in the late summer of 1917. Receipts soon outgrew storage space. Adjoining lands were leased, and supplies, covered by paulins, were stored in the open. This early period of the war, prior to the spring of 1918, was a back-up period at all the warehouses, as supplies were produced faster than men were trained and transported to France. In the late spring of 1918 Jeffersonville began making heavy shipments of supplies overseas and from then on shipments exceeded receipts. For three months before the armistice was signed the Jeffersonville depot's shipments averaged 60 carloads a day and its receipts about 25 carloads.
After the armistice was signed, Jeffersonville was designated as the depot for the storage of all surplus horse-drawn vehicles and black harnesses therefor. Extensive temporary storage sheds were erected. Inbound shipments increased to about 80 cars a day. The depot has stored 4,000 rolling kitchens of the trailmobile type, these kitchens being packed in boxes, each package weighing about 4,300 pounds. The work of storing these kitchens is still in progress, and the pile of boxes will ultimately be 45 feet wide, 30 feet high, and 1,000 feet long. As the pile is made, corrugated-iron roofing is placed on the sides and top, thus forming a waterproof building.
Crated automobile trailers, weighing about 9,000 pounds per crate, are being handled in the same manner. Wagons are stored in galvanized-iron warehouses, each one capable of receiving 2,500 wagons, without wheels. Wagon wheels are stored in specially adapted sheds. About 2,000 automobile trucks have already been received for storage in specially constructed sheds. These trucks are mainly Nash Quads, four-wheel-drive trucks, and G. M. C. ambulance chassis. These chassis are stored on end, resting on the bumpers. The engines of all trucks are well oiled and the magnetos are covered with waterproof material.
As the supplies backed up into the warehouses, it became necessary for the Army to know where it stood in the matter of property; and a complete inventory was ordered, since there had been no time during the hurry and bustle of the war period to take stock. This inventory in itself was an enormous undertaking. To prepare for it the quartermaster training school at Camp Meigs, D. C., was completely transformed into a school for training experts for taking inventories. A standard scheme was worked out. The experts, after being trained in the standard method, were sent out into every zone in the country as instructors. In each zone they convened the so-called "town meetings." The town meeting was made up of Army storekeepers from each depot, post, camp, and station in the zone--any place where Army supplies were stored. These representatives were schooled in the inventory method and then sent back to their stations with instructions to start the inventory on December 31, 1918. The next operation was to organize an inventory factory in Washington as the consolidating point for all the inventories in the United States.
Some idea of the number of articles which Uncle Sam accumulated as a result of the war may be gained from the fact that the inventories received in Washington filled 40,600 sheets of paper, the size of an ordinary large letterhead, with typewriting single spaced. To take the inventory required a force in Washington of approximately 100 officers and 400 civilians, while there were probably over 10,000 officers and men engaged in the entire operation over the country. The inventory was undoubtedly the largest ever taken in the world.
Before the war the standard items of Army supplies had been 20,000. The inventory in the consolidation of its figures in Washington disclosed the fact that at the beginning of the year 1919 there were 120,000 standard items, and many of these stood for large quantities of individual pieces. As this report is written, a catalogue, or standard nomenclature list of supplies, comprising 120,000 items, is being prepared, to establish throughout the United States one language of supply for all items stored, distributed, and issued under the direction of the Director of Storage.
IV. MOTOR AND HORSE-DRAWN VEHICLES
The punitive expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Francisco Villa marked the real beginning of the use of motor transportation for the Army, although for many years the motor truck had received some attention for military purposes.
In 1904 a few progressive officers at West Point made preliminary tests of 1½-ton trucks, but these tests, while demonstrating that the truck would doubtless be of value to the Army in the future, were not sufficiently successful to create any particular interest. A few trucks were in use in the Army in 1907, but no systematic tests were made until 1912. At that time officers were seriously studying the motor transportation needs and problems of the Army.
In 1914 the Society of Automobile Engineers, having learned from the experience of European nations then at war that motor transportation is one of the most vital factors in the success of any army, offered its services to our War Department for the purpose of making a complete survey of the automotive industry, in the hope that the interests of the industry and of the Army could be coordinated so that in an extreme emergency the industry might be able to provide the necessary motor equipment for the Army, and that the Army might be able to use such equipment in the most efficient manner.
Pursuant to this offer, on April 28, 1916, the War Department asked the society's cooperation in issuing revised specifications for the purchase of 1½-ton and 3-ton Army trucks. In May of the same year, a committee consisting of the engineers from five companies manufacturing trucks, from five companies assembling trucks, and an engineer from a truck company not making the types of trucks under consideration, was appointed to cooperate with Army officers in making plans to provide our troops with motor vehicles suitable to their needs. On this committee were representatives of the Locomobile Co. of America, the Packard Motor Car Co., the Peerless Motor Car Co., the Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., the Kelly-Springfield Motor Truck Co., the Selden Motor Vehicle Co., the Commercial Truck Co. of America, the White Co., and the General Motors Co. This committee went over the Government specifications for the 1½-ton and 3-ton trucks, which had been proposed by the Army, and after a few changes had been made, the specifications were drawn up for what then seemed to be the ideal trucks for Army use in these two sizes.
Trucks at this time were urgently needed for our forces along the Mexican border and for the punitive expedition entering Mexico. Consequently rush orders for the first large quantities of trucks ever purchased or used by our Army were placed with the White Co., the Packard Motor Car Co., The Garford Motor Truck Co., the Kelly-Springfield Motor Truck Co., the Four Wheel Drive Co., and the Jeffery (Nash) Quad. It was with the trucks of these concerns that our Army officers obtained their first real experience on a big scale with motor transportation. The trucks themselves also received the most severe tests while in service on the border and in Mexico.
Not only did the Army officers secure valuable experience in operating this motor equipment but the manufacturer also took this exceptional opportunity to study motor vehicles in actual operation under Army conditions, and early in 1917 revised specifications for Army trucks were issued as a result of the numerous conferences that had been held between representatives of the War Department and the automobile industry.
In May standard specifications for the so-called class A (1½-ton to 2-ton) and the class B (3-ton to 5-ton) motor trucks were established, showing that the fundamental requirements of motor trucks for the Army were as follows: low-gear reduction, larger engines, 4-speed transmission (with very low first speed), maximum ground clearance, demountable tires of standardized size and specifications, large gasoline tank, electric lighting system, 3-point engine suspension, locking differential, extra quality alloy steel springs, and larger radiators.
After deciding on the requisites of an Army truck, the matter of standardization began to receive definite attention, it being the belief of many of the Army officers that it would be entirely possible and practicable so to standardize Army vehicles that but one type of truck would be sufficient for each size, and it became quite evident if this ideal could be worked out, the maintenance of Army vehicles would be a simple matter. Without some standardization, the providing of the proper stock of spare parts became a problem of extreme difficulty.
In the early summer of 1917 an appropriation of $175,000 was set aside by the Quartermaster Department for the purpose of financing the cost of designing and drawing up specifications for a complete new vehicle, which would become a standardized truck for our military forces. On August 1, 1917, there were assembled in Washington 50 automotive engineers who had been in touch with the truck needs of the Army; and these men, with the help of Army officers, began the task of designing a sample standardized truck, first centering their efforts on the 3-ton size, as this was at that time most urgently needed by the Army. On October 10 of this same year the engineers had finished designing the new type of truck and had completed the first two sample trucks of this type, afterwards known as the "Standardized B." These two sample trucks were driven to Washington on October 19, were formally presented to the War Department, tested, and pronounced wholly successful.
Orders for 10,000 of these class B trucks were placed within the next few weeks. Five additional trucks were rushed through the plants as a check on tools and were completed January 10, 1918. In April, actual production having begun on the first 10,000, the purchase of an additional 8,000 was authorized, and orders for them were placed in May. In September, 1918, additional orders were placed for 25,000, but on account of the signing of the armistice no trucks were delivered under this last order.
Production of these standardized class B trucks was directed by the following men, who were called to Washington: Christian Girl, head of the Standard Parts Co., of Cleveland; James F. Bourquin, Continental Motor Co., Louisville, Ky.; Percy W. Tracy, of the Premier Motor Co., Indianapolis; Walter S. Quinlan, of the Maynard H. Murch Co., Cleveland; Guy Morgan, of the Mitchell Motors Corporation, Racine, Wis.; J. G. Utz, of the Standard Parts Co., Cleveland; G. W. Randels, of the Foote-Burt Co., Cleveland; and A. G. Drefs, of the Miller-Franklin Co.
All materials for the building of a standardized truck were mobilized through officials at Washington. In general, it was the idea to have at least three or four sources of supply for each part that went into the standardized truck, and as a result 150 parts manufacturers were given contracts.
During the time in which the Quartermaster Department was attempting to standardize all Army cargo-carrying vehicles, and up to May 15, 1918, the other branches of the Army were buying commercial trucks of different makes for their special uses. The Ordnance Department had concentrated on the Nash and F. W. D. trucks for ammunition and other ordnance work, and had ordered approximately 30,000 of these two types. The Signal Corps had specialized in the light and heavy aviation trucks, these being assembled from known and tried units, such as motors, axles, transmission, etc., and equipped with special apparatus for the Signal Corps. Approximately 4,000 of the light aviation and 4,600 of the heavy aviation trucks were ordered. The Engineer Corps had adopted the Mack 5½-ton truck and had ordered approximately 3,600. The Medical Corps had gone in for the G. M. C. model 16 for ambulances, of which approximately 5,800 had been ordered, and they had also purchased approximately 2,600 Ford ambulances.
These five branches of the Army had purchased trucks of other makes as well, and during the winter of 1917 and 1918 it became evident that the buying of so many makes and from so many different manufacturers was not a logical solution of the motor transportation problem. Each corps had its own ideas as to the type of truck required, and the sum of these ideas resulted in a decided lack of standardization for the Army as a whole, and no complete standardization for any corps as a unit.
During the first year of operations in France the American Expeditionary Forces had purchased various types of vehicles abroad in order to fill their immediate requirements, and the result was that over 200 different makes of motor vehicles were actually in use by the American Expeditionary Forces. This diversity in types was to some extent caused by lack of shipping space in which to transport motor equipment abroad. Not being able to secure sufficient trucks from the United States, due to shortage of ocean tonnage, the American Expeditionary Forces were compelled to purchase a miscellaneous assortment of foreign-made vehicles, thus complicating the maintenance problem beyond the possibility of a satisfactory solution.
The buying of motor equipment by so many different agencies of the Government was not only confusing to the manufacturer, who was selling to five different corps, but it also precluded any possibility of real standardization; and with a view of eliminating these two evils, Special Order 91, W. D. 1918, and General Order 38, W. D. 1918, were issued. The first created a standardization board and the second consolidated the procurement of all motor vehicles in the Motor Transport Service, which service operated under the direction of the Quartermaster General.
Under the special orders the standardization board was charged with selecting and approving the proper types for the use of the Army, the board being composed of representatives from each of the various corps. In this manner the various ideas of the different corps were coordinated through the discussion of the board, and the final result was that the following chassis were standardized for use:
Passenger cars: light, Ford and Dodge; heavy, Cadillac.
Ambulances: G. M. C. and Ford (with longer wheel base).
Trucks: one-half-ton to ¾-ton, Ford and Dodge (same chassis as in passenger cars); ¾-ton to 1-ton, G. M. C. Model 16; 1½-ton to 2-ton, White; 3-ton to 5-ton, Quartermaster standardized "B."
The 4-wheel-drive TT type, called the "Militor," was also standardized, this being a special truck tractor designed by the Ordnance Department. These latter vehicles were never furnished to the Army, as production had not progressed far enough at the time of the signing of the armistice.
On this limited number of chassis could be mounted any bodies required by the Army. For instance the White ¾-ton to 1-ton chassis could be used as a passenger car when equipped with pneumatic tires and with the ordnance staff observation or reconnaissance body. The Ford and Dodge chassis could be used either with the regular passenger-car bodies or with light-delivery or light-repair bodies. The G. M. C. chassis could be used either as an ambulance or could be equipped with a light-cargo body, thus providing a ¾-ton to 1-ton truck. The standardized "B" chassis could be used with special machine-shop bodies, special Signal Corps apparatus, or the regular "B" cargo body, etc. The work of the board was painstaking and thorough, and decisions were rendered only after experts had been consulted and exhaustive tests made.
While the board was standardizing on the types of vehicles to be purchased in the future for the Army, the Motor Transport Service was being formed, and by June 1, 1918, the consolidation of procurement, inspection, production, maintenance, etc., was well underway.
The needs of the American Expeditionary Forces for motor equipment were increasing by leaps and bounds, and the Motor Transport Service found that it was impossible to purchase the trucks standardized by the motorization board in sufficient quantities to meet the overseas requirements. It was therefore decided, after the consent of the board had been received, that certain other types of vehicles should be procured to fill the requirements of the Army until such time as production of the standardized truck could be increased. Therefore, the makes of trucks which were already in use in large quantities with the American Expeditionary Forces were temporarily made standard to meet the immediate needs of the Army. It being extremely difficult to purchase sufficient trucks, even of these additional makes, to meet the needs overseas, it was decided that still other makes of trucks would be procured for use in the United States, thus allowing all the makes standardized for overseas use to be shipped to France.
The Motor Transport Service operated from May 15 until August 15, 1918, when the Motor Transport Corps was organized under General Order No. 75. This order created a separate corps under the operations division of the General Staff for the operation as well as the procurement of all passenger and cargo carrying motor equipment for the Army. A few weeks later, however, Supply Circular 87, P., S. & T., was issued, placing the procurement of the above under the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic (Motors and Vehicles Division), but the operation and maintenance of vehicles was left with the Motor Transport Corps. From September on these organizations remained unchanged up to and after the signing of the armistice.
The table appended shows the status of the procurement and production of motor-vehicle orders as of November 1, 1918, 11 days prior to the signing of the armistice. It will be noted that there had been ordered for delivery before July 1, 1919, a total of 185,000 trucks, 23,053 ambulances, and 38,462 passenger cars.
The Army in April, 1917, possessed 3,039 trucks, 437 automobiles, 670 motor cycles, and 12 tractors. One and one-half years later it owned approximately 85,000 trucks, and had the war continued until July 1, 1919, there would have been approximately 185,000 trucks provided for its use by American industry. In addition, this same industry would have provided 30,000 ambulances, 40,000 passenger cars, 70,000 motor cycles, 70,000 bicycles, making a grand total approaching 400,000 vehicles, costing (with spare parts) over $700,000,000.
From the very beginning the Government received the hearty cooperation of the entire industry. The need was urgent, the demand tremendous, and many manufacturers were called upon to sacrifice their own product in order to meet the needs of the Army, and many were on a 100-per-cent war-work basis.
Motor truck production.
VEHICLES STANDARDIZED FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENT.
Key: (A) - Class (B) - Capacity in tons (C) - Total ordered to Nov. 1, 1918 (D) - Total completed to Nov. 1, 1918 (E) - Floated overseas
---------------+---+-------+---------------------------+------+------+------- Name. |(A)| (B) | Manufacturer. / Address. | (C) | (D) | (E) ---------------+---+-------+---------------------------+------+------+------- G. M. C. |AA | 1 |Commerce Motor Car Co. | 450| | standard | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Velie Motors Corp. | 1,000| | | | | Moline. Ill. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Dort Motor Co. | 1,000| | | | | Flint, Mich. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Elgin Motor Car Corp. | 500| | | | | Elgin, Ill. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Lexington Motor Co. | 500| | | | | Connersville, Ind. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Auburn Auto Co. | 500| | | | | Auburn, Ind. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Hupp Motor Car Corp. | 500| | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Do. |AA | do. |General Motor Truck Co. | 1,000| | | | | Pontiac, Mich. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Saxon Motor Car Co. | 500| | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Campbell Motor Car Co. | 200| | | | | Kingston, N. Y. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Columbia Motor Co. | 300| | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Moon Motor Car Co. | 300| | | | | St. Louis, Mo. | | | Do. |AA | do. |Liberty Motor Co. | 450| | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | G. M. C. |AA | do. |General Motors Truck Co. | 5,811| 5,553| 4,001 ambulance | | | Pontiac, Mich. | | | White |AA | do. |The White Co. | 2,695| 2,196| 809 | | | Cleveland, Ohio | | | | | | +------+------+------- Total | | | |15,706| 7,749| 4,810 | | | +======+======+======= Dodge light |AA | ½ |Dodge Bros. Co. | 9,352| 2,644|} delivery | | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} 1,802 Dodge light |AA | ¾ | do. do. | 1,012| 1,012|} repair | | | | | | Ford light |AA | do. |Ford Motor Co. |12,002| 5,492| 7,206 delivery | | | do. | | | Ford |AA | do. | do. do. |10,042| 5,340| 4,362 ambulances | | | | | | | | | +------+------+------- Total | | | |32,408|14,488| 13,370 | | | +======+======+======= White | A | 1½ |The White Co. | 9,201| 1,813| 1,532 standard | | | Cleveland, Ohio | | | Do. | A | do. |Peerless Motor Co. | 3,000| | | | | do. | | | | | | +------+------+------- Total | | | |12,201| 1,813| 1,532 | | | +======+======+======= Light aviation | A | 1½ |General Motor Truck Co. | 2,400| 1,888|} | | to 2 | Pontiac, Mich. | | |} Do. | A | do. |Paige Motor Car Co. | 500| 480|} | | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} 1,829 Do. | A | do. |Republic Motor Truck Co. | 500| 354|} | | | Alma, Mich. | | |} Do. | A | do. |Denby Motor Truck Co. | 500| 488|} | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Garford | A | 1½ |Garford Motor Truck Co. | 5,010| 1,010| 499 | | | Lima, Ohio | | | Packard | A | do. |Packard Motor Car Co. | 831| 636| 526 | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Pierce-Arrow | A | do. |Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. | 4,023| 2,423| 534 | | | Buffalo, N. Y. | | | | | | +------+------+------- Total | | | |13,764| 7,279| 3,388 | | | +======+======+======= Standardized B | B | 3 |Packard Motor Car Co. | 5| 5| | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Do. | B | do. |Gramm-Bernstein Motor | 3,750| 1,000| | | | Truck Co. | | | | | | Lima, Ohio | | | Do. | B | do. |Kelly-Springfield Motor | 1,045| 301| | | | Truck Co. | | | | | | Springfield, Ohio | | | Do. | B | do. |Indiana Truck Corporation | 2,545| 475| | | | Marion, Ind. | | | Do. | B | do. |Service Motor Truck Co. | 1,795| 337| | | | Wabash, Ind. | | | Do. | B | do. |Republic Motor Truck Co. | 3,750| 967| | | | Alma, Mich. | | | Do. | B | do. |Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. | 1,000| 975| | | | Buffalo, N. Y. | | | Do. | B | do. |Selden Truck Sales Co. | 3,750| 1,000| | | | Rochester, N. Y. | | | Do. | B | do. |Bethlehem Motors | 2,725| 675| | | | Corporation | | | | | | Allentown, Pa. | | | Do. | B | do. |Diamond T Motor Co. | 3,203| 638| | | | Chicago, Ill. | | | Do. | B | do. |U. S. Motor Truck Co. | 2,545| 490| | | | Cincinnati, Ohio | | | Do. | B | do. |Brockway Motor Truck Co. | 2,202| 587| | | | Cortland, N. Y. | | | Do. | B | do. |Velie Motors Corporation | 3,045| 455| | | | Moline, Ill. | | | Do. | B | do. |Sterling Motor Truck | 1,795| 479| | | | Corporation | | | | | | Milwaukee, Wis. | | | Do. | B | do. |Garford Motor Truck Co. | 1,750| 978| | | | Lima, Ohio | | | Do. | B | do. |Hurlburt Motor Truck Co. | 100| | | | | New York, N. Y. | | | Do. | B | do. |Midland Motor Truck Co. | 500| | | | | Oklahoma City, Okla. | | | Do. | B | do. |Atterbury Motor Car Co. | 750| | | | | Buffalo, N. Y. | | | Do. | B | do. |Standard Motor Truck Co. | 750| | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Do. | B | do. |Maccar Co. | 500| | | | | Scranton, Pa. | | | Do. | B | do. |Clyde Cars Co. | 500| | | | | Clyde, Ohio | | | Do. | B | do. |Rowe Motor Manufacturing | 500| | | | | Co. | | | | | | Lancaster, Pa. | | | Do. | B | do. |J. C. Wilson Co. | 500| | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Do. | B | do. |Lewis Hall Iron Works | 500| | | | | do. | | | Do. | B | do. |Denby Motor Truck Co. | 1,500| | | | | do. | | | Do. | B | do. |Winther Motor Truck Co. | 500| | | | | Winthrop Harbor, Ill. | | | Do. | B | do. |Vim Motor Truck Co. | 500| | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Do. | B | do. |Signal Motor Truck Co. | 500| | | | | do. | | | Do. | B | do. |United Motors Co. | 500| | | | | Grand Rapids, Mich. | | | | | | +------+------+------- Total | | | |43,005| 9,452| 7,655 | | | +======+======+======= Packard | B | 3 |Packard Motor Car Co. |10,106| 4,856| 3,479 | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | Heavy aviation | B | do. |United Motors Co. | 200| 188|} | | | Grand Rapids, Mich. | | |} Do. | B | do. |Federal Motor Truck Co. | 1,000| 1,000|} | | | Detroit Mich. | | |} Do. | B | do. |Kelly-Springfield Motor | 2,225| 1,725|} 2,110 | | | Truck Co. | | |} | | | Springfield, Ohio | | |} Do. | B | do. |Standard Motor Truck Co. | 250| 186|} | | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} Do. | B | do. |Velie Motors Corporation | 1,000| 700|} | | | Moline, Ill. | | | Riker | B | 4 |Locomobile Co. of America | 3,690| 1,690| 1,351 | | | Bridgeport, Conn. | | | Pierce-Arrow | B | 5 |Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. | 3,170| 1,970| 1,660 | | | Buffalo, N. Y. | | | Mack | B | 5½ |International Motors Co. | 5,575| 2,563| 1,365 | | | New York, N. Y. | | | | | | +------+------+------- Total | | | |27,216|14,878| 9,965 | | | +======+======+======= Four-wheel |TT | 2 |Nash Motors Co. |14,684| 8,139|} drive | | | Kenosha, Wis. | | |} Do. |TT | do. |Hudson Motor Car Co. | 3,000| 219|} | | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} Do. |TT | do. |National Motor Car & | 3,000| 95|} | | | Vehicle | | |} | | | Indianapolis, Ind. | | |} 7,034 Do. |TT | do. |Paige Motor Car Co. | 3,000| 145|} | | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} Do. | W | do. |Nash Motors Co. | 100| 100|} | | | Kenosha, Wis. | | |} Do. | W | 3 |Four-Wheel Drive Auto Co. | 800| 364|} | | | Clintonville, Wis. | | | Do. |TT | do. | do. do. | 7,150| 4,233|} | | | | | |} Do. |TT | do. |Mitchell Motors | 5,023| 855|} | | | Corporation | | |} | | | Racine, Wis. | | |} 4,748 Do. |TT | do. |Premier Motor Co. | 4,500| 1,307|} | | | Indianapolis, Ind. | | |} Do. |TT | do. |Kissel Motor Car Co. | 3,500| 997|} | | | Hartford, Wis. | | | | | | +------+------+------- Total | | | |44,757|16,454| 11,782 | | | +======+======+======= Cadillac, | P | |Cadillac Motor Car Co. | 1,043| 222|} limousine | | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} 1,503 Cadillac, open | P | | do. do. | 2,970| 1,734|} | | | | | | Dodge, open | P | |Dodge Bros Co. | 8,559| 5,065|} | | | | | |} 3,390 Dodge, Winter | P | | do. do. | 3,201| 2,126|} top | | | | | | Ford; touring | P | |Ford Motor Co. |20,201| 5,379| 2,344 | | | do. | | | | | | +------+------+------- Total | | | |35,974|14,526| 7,237 ---------------+---+-------+---------------------------+------+------+-------
Key: W - Winch P - Pass
MOTOR VEHICLES FOR DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION.
Key: (A) - Class (B) - Capacity in tons (C) - Ordered to Nov. 1, 1918 (D) - Completed to Nov. 1, 1918 (E) - Completed to Dec. 1, 1918 (F) - Total floated overseas P - Passenger
--------------+---+-----+----------------------+------+------+-------+------ Name. |(A)| (B) |Manufacturer./Address.| (C) | (D) | (E) | (F) --------------+---+-----+----------------------+------+------+-------+------ Commerce |AA |1 |Commerce Motor Car Co.| 1,548| 1,548| 1,548 | 272 | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | | Ford trucks | |¾ |Ford Motor Co. | 2,494| 2,474| 2,474 | 1,772 | |to 1 | do. | | | | | | | +------+------+-------+------ Total | | | | 4,042| 4,022| 4,022 | 2,044 | | | +======+======+=======+====== White Un- | A |1½ |The White Co. | 394| 394| 394 | 327 standardized| | | Cleveland, Ohio | | | | Kelly- | A | do. |Kelly-Springfield | 356| 16| 16 | Springfield | | | Motor Co. | | | | | | | Springfield, Ohio | | | | Denby | A | do. |Denby Motor Truck Co. | 500| | 182 | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | | International | A | do. |International | 1,125| 125| 485 | | | | Harvester Co. | | | | | | | Akron, Ohio | | | | Miscellaneous | A |1½ | | 949| 945| 949 | 220 | |to 2 | | | | | American | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wilson | A |1½ |J. C. Wilson Co. | 200| | 75 | | |to 2 | Detroit, Mich. | | | | Moreland | A | do. |Moreland Motor Truck | 85| 43| 76 | | | | Co. | | | | | | | Los Angeles, Cal. | | | | Miscellaneous | A | do. | | 78| 78| 78 | American | | | | | | | ambulance | | | | | | | | | | +------+------+-------+------ Total | | | | 3,687| 1,601| 2,255 | 547 | | | +======+======+=======+====== White | B |3 |The White Co. | 306| 306| 306 | 280 | | | Cleveland, Ohio | | | | Peerless | B | do. |Peerless Motor Car | 385| 385| 697 | 385 | | | do. | | | | Mack | B |3½ |International Motors | 368| 368| 368 | 278 | | | Co. | | | | | | | New York, N. Y. | | | | Velie | B | do. |Velie Motors | 125| | 28 | | | | Corporation | | | | | | | Moline, Ill. | | | | Gramm- | B | do. |Gramm-Bernstein | 100| | 66 | Bernstein | | | Truck Co. | | | | | | | Lima, Ohio | | | | Federal | B | do. |Federal Motor Truck | 500| | 85 | | | | Co. | | | | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | | Standard | B | do. |Standard Motor Truck | 287| 35| 89 | | | | Co. | | | | | | | do. | | | | Selden | B | do. |Selden Motor Truck Co.| 171| 71| 121 | 5 | | | Rochester, N. Y. | | | | Republic | B | do. |Republic Motor Truck | 250| | | | | | Co. | | | | | | | Alma, Mich. | | | | Moreland | B |4 |Moreland Motor Truck | 60| | 40 | | | | Co., Los Angeles, | | | | | | | Calif. | | | | White | B |5 |The White Co. | 48| 48| 48 | 34 | | | Cleveland, Ohio | | | | Packard | B | do. |Packard Motor Car Co. | 65| 60| 60 | 17 | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | | Hurlburt | B | do. |Hurlburt Motor Truck | 200| | | | | | Co. | | | | | | | New York, N. Y. | | | | Federal | B | do. |Federal Motor Truck | 300| | 53 | | | | Co., Detroit, Mich. | | | | Miscellaneous | B |3 to | | 278| 278| 250 | 209 American | | 5 | | | | | | | | +------+------+-------+------ Total | | | | 3,443| 1,551| 2,211 | 1,20 | | | +======+======+=======+====== | | | | | | | Dodge Sedan | P | |Dodge Bros. | 10| | | | | | Detroit, Mich. | | | | Dodge Roadster|do.| | do. do. | 550| 22| 175 | | | | | | | | Ford Roadster |do.| |Ford Motor Co. | 435| 185| 186 | | | | do. | | | | Ford Closed |do.| | do. do. | 16| 16| 16 | | | | | | | | Miscellaneous |do.| | | 958| 958| 958 | American | | | | | | | | | | +------+------+-------+------ Total | | | | 1,969| 1,181| 1,335 | --------------+---+-----+----------------------+------+------+-------+------
MOTORCYCLES, SIDE CARS, AND BICYCLES.
The need of the Army for motorcycles, side cars, and bicycles was so tremendous that for many months during the war practically the entire output of these vehicles of the kinds selected as being most suitable for Army use was taken by the Government.
It was found that the Indian and Harley-Davidson motorcycles were best adapted to meet the necessities of the Expeditionary Forces in France, and these types were standardized for overseas shipment. Orders for a total of 39,070 Indian motorcycles were placed with the manufacturers at Springfield, Mass., and before the end of 1918, 18,081 of these had been delivered. From the Harley-Davidson manufacturers at Milwaukee, Wis., the Government received 14,666 machines of the total of 26,487 ordered before the end of 1918. In addition to the Harley-Davidson and Indian machines, 1,526 Cleveland motorcycles, made in Cleveland, Ohio, were contracted for, and 1,476 delivered previous to 1919.
Side-car equipment for the Indian and Harley-Davidson machines was bought in almost as great quantities as the motorcycles themselves. In fact, the demand for motorcycles and side cars from these two concerns was so great that they were working at 100-per-cent capacity for the Government before the summer of 1918.
The needs of the Army for machines increased so steadily and the requirements were so vast that both the Indian and Harley-Davidson concerns had made large additions to their plants for meeting the Government needs at the time the armistice was signed.
A standard military type of bicycle was turned out for the Army by the Westfield Manufacturing Co., at Westfield, Mass., and other bicycles were ordered from the Great Western Manufacturing Co., at Laporte, Ind., and the Davis Sewing Machine Co., at Dayton, Ohio.
Motorcycles, bicycles, and side cars.
MOTORCYCLES. ----------+-----------------+------------+--------+-----------------+--------- | | |Ordered | Completed to-- | Name. | Manufacturer. | Address. | to +--------+--------+ Shipped | | |Nov. 1, |Nov. 1, |Dec. 31,|overseas. | | | 1918. | 1918. | 1918. | ----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+--------- Cleveland |Cleveland Motors |Cleveland, | | | | | Mfg. Co. | Ohio | 1,526 | 780 | 1,476 | 1,003 Harley- |Harley-Davidson |Milwaukee, | | | | Davidson | Motorcycle Co. | Wis. | 26,485 | 12,376 | 14,666 |} | |Springfield,| | | |} 20,007 Indian |Hendee Mfg. Co. | Mass. | 39,870 | 14,054 | 18,018 |} | | +--------+--------+--------+--------- Total | | | 67,881 | 27,210 | 34,160 | 21,010 ----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+--------- SIDE CARS. ----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+--------- Harley- |Harley-Davidson |Milwaukee, | | | | Davidson | Motorcycle Co. | Wis. | 26,099 | 11,934 | 14,332 |} | |Springfield,| | | |} 19,160 Indian |Hendee Mfg. Co. | Mass. | 39,124 | 13,863 | 16,804 |} | | +--------+--------+--------+--------- Total | | | 65,223 | 25,797 | 31,136 | 19,160 ----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+--------- BICYCLES. ----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+--------- Military |Westfield |Westfield, | | | | Standard | Mfg. Co. | Mass. | 36,002 | 19,164 | 22,502 |} Do. |Great Western |Laporte, | | | | | Mfg. Co. | Ind. | 15,750 | | 3,750 |} 26,407 Do. |Davis Sewing |Dayton, | | Machine Co. | Ohio | 15,750 | 1,992 | 3,252 |} | | +--------+--------+--------+--------- Total | | | 67,502 | 21,156 | 29,504 | 26,407 ----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+---------
HORSE AND HAND DRAWN VEHICLES.
It was early realized by Army officers upon our entry in the war that procurement of horse-drawn vehicles for the Army would require mobilization of practically the entire wagon-making industry of the Nation. Consequently one of the first steps taken to provide the Army with the necessary vehicles of this type was to call into conference representatives of the four largest manufacturing companies in the industry.
R. V. Board, of the Kentucky Wagon Co.; A. B. Thielens, of the Studebaker Corporation of America; E. E. Parsonage, of the John Deere Wagon Co.; and R. W. Lea, of the Moline Plow Co., were named members of an advisory committee to assist the Army in the procurement of vehicles.
Our first requisition called for the manufacture of 34,000 escort wagons. This order, with the necessary spare parts for these vehicles meant the building of the equivalent of about 50,000 wagons.
At the beginning of the war the manufacture of vehicles from kiln-dried lumber was almost unknown, as there had always been a sufficient amount of air-dried lumber on hand to meet every demand for farm-wagon construction. Our first order, however, practically used up all of the air-dried lumber then in existence in the country. In order that dry lumber could be obtained in sufficient quantities to keep up with the demands for Army vehicles, the War Department entered into an arrangement by which dry-kilns were built by contractors with the Government defraying half of the cost, the wagon manufacturer being reimbursed at the rate of $10 for each wagon produced, or on a basis of $10 for each $185 worth of spare parts fabricated.
Despite the fact that ordinarily six months were required even with kiln-drying before a log was ready for fabrication into a vehicle, all orders for the War Department were filled on time and in accordance with the plans outlined. To make this possible every manufacturer of the industry capable of turning out the class of vehicles desired did his part and did it so well that up to the signing of the armistice approximately 110,000 horse-drawn or hand-drawn vehicles had been delivered, of the total of 185,727 for which contracts had been placed.
Escort wagons formed the large bulk of the requirements at the start, but as the war progressed, the necessity was created for different designs of vehicles. So from time to time there were designed drinking-water carts and wagons, medical and ration carts, combat wagons, veterinary ambulances, sprinkling wagons, and various other types to meet special needs.
In the early spring of 1918 it was found that the wagon industry had about reached its limit so far as output was concerned, and that, if the war continued another year, new sources of supply would have to be developed. Then it was that the furniture industry was called upon to produce spare parts for vehicles. Under the presidency of P. B. Schravesande, president of the Grand Rapids School Equipment Co., the Furniture and Fixture and Light-wood Industry War Service Committee was organized to cooperate in arranging to have furniture makers enter the field of manufacture of spare parts.
It was arranged that the furniture manufacturers were to produce 75 per cent of the spare parts then requisitioned, totaling in value about $8,000,000. While the furniture industry was preparing its plants for the manufacture of these parts, the wagon industry continued to manufacture 25 per cent of the required parts in order to keep up a satisfactory flow.
When the armistice was signed practically all the furniture manufacturers had prepared to fill the spare-parts orders, but none of them had reached quantity production.
Automobile-wheel manufacturers were induced to turn out the immense quantity of wheels needed for escort wagons.
There were in all about 250 manufacturers of wagons, wagon parts, and wheels. Among the prominent wagon companies engaged in this work were: Bain Wagon Co., Oshkosh, Wis.; Columbia Wagon Co., Columbia, Pa.; Deere & Co., Moline, Ill.; Emerson-Brantingham Co., Rockford, Ill.; Florence Wagon Co., Florence, Ala.; Hackney Wagon Co., Wilson, N. C.; International Harvester Co., Memphis, Tenn.; Moline Plow Co., Moline, Ill; Mogul Wagon Co., Hoskinsville, Ky.; Owensboro Wagon Co., Owensboro, Ky.; Pekin Wagon Co., Pekin, Ill.; Peter Schuttler Co., Chicago, Ill.; Springfield Wagon Co., Springfield, Mo.; Stoughton Wagon Co., Stoughton, Wis.; A. Streich & Bros. Co., Oshkosh, Wis.; Thornhill Wagon Co., Lynchburg, Va.; Tiffin Wagon Co., Tiffin, Ohio; Eagle Wagon Works, Auburn, N. Y.; A. A. Cooper Wagon & Buggy Co., Dubuque, Iowa; Winona Wagon Co., Winona, Minn.; White Hickory Wagon Co., Atlanta, Ga.; Kentucky Wagon Co., Louisville, Ky.; Studebaker Corporation, South Bend, Ind.; American Car & Foundry Co., Jeffersonville, Ind.
Among the leading automobile-wheel manufacturers who were given contracts for escort-wagon wheels were the following: Mutual Wheel Co., Moline, Ill.; Roger Wheel Co., Aurora, Ind.; Crane & McMahon (Inc.), St. Marys, Ohio; Hayes Wheel Co., Jackson, Mich.; Imperial Wheel Co., Flint, Mich.; Kelsey Wheel Co., Detroit, Mich.; Binnel Spoke & Auto Wheel Co., Portland, Ind.; Archibald Wheel Co., Lawrence, Mass.; Chattanooga Wagon Co., Chattanooga, Tenn.; Hoopes Bros. & Dalington (Inc.), Westchester, Pa.; Prudden Wheel Co., Lansing, Mich.; Standard Wheel Co., Terre Haute, Ind.; Avoca Wheel Co., Avoca, N. Y.; New Wapakoneta Wheel Co., Wapakoneta, Ohio; Piedmont Wagon Co., Hickory, N. C.
Furniture factories that assumed contracts for making spare parts for horse-drawn vehicles included about 30 furniture manufacturers of Rockford, Ill., as well as the following: Grand Rapids School Equipment Co., Grand Rapids, Mich.; Sherman Bros. Co., Jamestown, N. Y.; Ramsey-Alton Manufacturing Co., Portland, Mich.; Connersville Furniture Co., Connersville, Ind.; P. Derby & Co., Gardner, Mass.; Ebert Furniture Co., Red Lion, Pa.; S. Karpen & Bros., Chicago, Ill.; Chas. T. Lambert & Co., Holland, Mich.; The Macey Co., Grand Rapids, Mich.; Thos. Madden Son & Co., Indianapolis, Ind.; Sidney Manufacturing Co., Sidney, Ohio; Basic Furniture Co., Waynesboro, Va.; Brecht Co., St. Louis, Mo.
Production data for horse-drawn vehicles.
-------------------+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+---------- | Number | Value of |Quantity |Quantity | Value of | ordered | orders. |delivered| shipped | quantity | between | | up to |overseas.| shipped | Apr. 6, | |Nov. 11, | | overseas. | 1917, and | | 1918. | | | Nov. 11, | | | | | 1918. | | | | -------------------+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+---------- Commercial vehicles| 181,077|$41,247,911| 89,024| 28,918|$7,247,522 Spare parts | | 39,690,255| | | 2,551,642 -------------------+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+---------- Total | 181,077| 80,938,166| 89,024| 28,918| 9,799,164 -------------------+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+----------
The following table shows the principal items listed under commercial vehicles, with the total number ordered, value of the order, and the total number delivered up to November 11, 1918:
---------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+-------------- | | Value of | | Value of Item. | Total | number | Total | number | ordered.| ordered. | delivered.| delivered. ---------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+-------------- Wagons. | | | | Ambulance | 3,339 | $1,168,650 | 3,319 | $1,161,650 Escort, model A | 1,000 | 242,000 | 1,000 | 242,000 Escort, J-118 | 102,078 | 20,415,600 | 37,613 | 7,522,600 Combat | 15,500 | 7,750,000 | 7,099 | 3,549,500 Drinking water | 2,687 | 1,262,890 | 2,687 | 1,262,890 Mountain, 3-seat | 1,000 | 300,000 | 1,000 | 300,000 Sprinkling | 1,056 | 496,320 | 1,056 | 496,320 Bottom, dump | 436 | 71,940 | 255 | 42,075 Milk | 4 | 1,400 | 4 | 1,400 Buckboard | 1,859 | 232,375 | 1,155 | 144,375 |---------+-------------+-----------+-------------- Total | 128,959 | 31,941,175 | 55,188 | 14,722,810 |================================================== Carts. | | | | Drinking water | 22,000 | 6,050,000 | 14,729 | 4,050,475 Ration | 15,000 | 1,875,000 | 10,185 | 1,273,125 Medical | 5,500 | 819,500 | 2,350 | 350,150 Hand | 7,309 | 211,961 | 4,607 | 133,003 Dump | 1,183 | 118,300 | 1,037 | 103,700 Sanitary | 1,009 | 201,800 | 811 | 162,200 Veterinary ambulance | 80 | 20,000 | 80 | 20,000 Disinfecting spray | 37 | 10,175 | 37 | 10,175 |---------+-------------+-----------+-------------- Total | 52,118 | 9,306,736 | 33,836 | 6,103,428 |================================================== Grand total | | 41,247,911 | | 20,826,238 ---------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+--------------
This table shows the total number of horse-drawn vehicles sent overseas during the war; also the value of these shipments and the unit prices.
Horse-drawn vehicles.
--------------+-------+--------+------------------ | | | Items shipped. Article. | Unit. | Number.+-------+---------- | | | Unit | Total | | | value.| value. --------------+-------+--------+-------+---------- Ambulances | Each | 507 | $350 | $177,450 Escort wagons | do. | 15,979 | 230 | 3,675,170 Combat wagons | do. | 2,672 | 500 | 1,336,000 Spring wagons | do. | 147 | 235 | 34,545 Water carts | do. | 5,314 | 275 | 1,461,350 Ration carts | do. | 3,231 | 125 | 403,875 Medical carts | do. | 1,068 | 149 | 159,132 | | | +---------- Total | | | | 7,247,522 --------------+-------+--------+-------+----------
V. MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUPPLIES
Lest it be thought that the American Army was dependent in any way for its hospital facilities and surgical supplies upon private contributions, it may be said that the Government during the period between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, placed contracts for medical supplies amounting to $424,761,031. Contract cancellations after the armistice was signed amounted to $56,000,000. The remaining $370,000,000 approximately represents the cost to the United States of medicine, surgical instruments and dressings, ambulances, hospital furniture, equipment and supplies, and dental and veterinary supplies for the war.
This was considerably more money than was contributed by the American people to the American Red Cross, a great part of whose funds went to the relief of civilian populations in Europe, or to any other war charity. Thus it will be seen that the Government with billions of dollars to spend could well afford the few hundreds of millions necessary to give the American soldiers who needed it the best possible hospital attention. It accepted the gifts of this sort, ranging from gauze bandages to fully equipped motor ambulances, as the offerings of the people whose hearts overflowed with love and gratitude to the American soldiers and took this means of showing their concern; but the Government in no sense was dependent upon these donations.
Before 1914 four-fifths of all surgical instruments used in the United States were imported from Germany. This country, too, was practically dependent upon Germany for many of its most important medicines, including the potassium salts and such drugs as digitalin, salvarsan, atropin, etc. While in a way we had been developing substitute sources of supply in the United States for these indispensable commodities in the months between the outbreak of the great war and the date of our participation in it, the raising of a vast army and the project to send this army to the bloody battle fields of France created an American demand for medicines and surgical instruments beyond anything ever known in the United States. Yet, through the cooperation of manufacturers and the officers of the Medical Department's general purchasing office, which was on November 15, 1918, incorporated in the office of the Director of Purchase and Storage, sufficient supplies were developed, not only of medicine but of surgical instruments.
The development of the production of medicines for the use of troops in the field was particularly notable. The important drug, salvarsan, used in the treatment of syphilis, was a patented formula and had been furnished formerly by a single German manufacturer. In this country we produced arsphenamine as a substitute, gradually increasing the supply and constantly improving the drug until at length its toxicity had been so reduced that it equaled or even excelled the German product.
The facilities of the American drug and tablet manufacturers were taxed to the utmost to supply the Army. For example, during the year 1918 a total of 46,000,000 quinine tablets was produced, while 172,000,000 aspirin tablets were manufactured during the same period, and 835,000 pounds of calomel ointment, 45,000,000 iodine swabs, 10,250,000 tins of foot powder, and 300,000,000 tubes of iodine-potassium. All other items of medicines, antiseptics, and disinfectants, required by the Medical Department, were increased in proportion. This production not only strained the facilities of the manufacturers of chemicals and drugs but also called upon the glassware manufacturers for the necessary bottles and tubes in which to pack these medicines satisfactorily. Here again was an effort that required close cooperation between the trade and the Medical Department in order to meet the demand.
When it became evident that a declaration of war against Germany was imminent, the Medical Department proceeded to analyze the country's resources of medical supplies. These resources were to a large extent limited. The Allied nations had been making heavy and constant demands for these materials, so much so that even the mobilization of such a relatively small number of troops as were centered along the Mexican Border put a severe burden upon the medical supply facilities of the country.
The Council of National Defense took up the medical supplies problem at the outset. The various manufacturers sent their representatives to consult with the Surgeon General, and committees on surgical instruments, surgical dressings, medicines, and other important supplies were formed. These committees allocated among the various manufacturers the first emergency orders for these materials. The result was that the base hospitals at the 32 mobilization camps in 1917 were equipped in an amazingly short time. The New York Medical Supply Depot, which was then the largest purchasing agent, was called upon to supply 500 hospital beds each to 22 of the camps. This work was handled so rapidly that in some cases the shipments had to be held back to wait for the completion of the hospital buildings.
Perhaps the most difficult task was to determine what quantities of medical supplies would be needed for a given period. It is a comparatively simple matter to estimate the quantity of clothing necessary for a certain number of troops, or to figure what food they will require; but it is not possible to forecast the number of men who will be sick at a given camp at a specified time, nor is it possible to foretell the nature of diseases or injuries. An epidemic of measles or mumps requires different treatment than an epidemic of influenza, and makes necessary the use of a different variety of medical supplies. Experience sheets of supplies actually used in the past formed the basis of our requirements schedules.
Eventually there was worked out a system of supply based on the initial requirements of the unit of 25,000 men in the Expeditionary Forces and the automatic supply of replenishment of this equipment. In this system use was made of the knowledge and experience obtained by the British and French medical forces during their nearly three years of warfare before America went in.
The following statement of estimated expenditures for the fiscal year 1920 illustrates the difference in the medical requirements of an army of 500,000 men under peace conditions and an army of 5,000,000 men in a war such as the recent one:
-------------------------------------------+--------------+-------------- |Peace--500,000|War--5,000,000 | men. | men. -------------------------------------------+--------------+-------------- Surgical dressings | $3,059,525| $121,230,924 Textiles, hospital supplies | 880,124| 70,682,673 Miscellaneous hospital supplies | 230,477| 12,626,848 Medicines, etc | 1,969,901| 18,431,614 Hospital furniture and equipment | 500,000| 16,600,184 Surgical instruments | 200,000| 34,727,863 Dental instruments, equipment, and supplies| 150,000| 6,256,482 X-ray, equipment, and supplies | 200,000| 5,004,900 Field supplies | 300,000| 3,604,695 Veterinary | 701,692| 6,656,894 Laboratory | 852,673| 7,858,004 Stationery | 159,183| 2,228,634 +--------------+-------------- Total | 9,203,575| 305,909,715 -------------------------------------------+--------------+--------------
Civilian experts in various lines of medical supplies were brought into the organization to supply the wide range of specialized knowledge required in such a universal buying program as the Medical Department was about to conduct. Before the war the Army's purchases of instruments for oral and brain surgery, orthopedic supplies, Dakin outfits, and other special apparatus were practically negligible. During the war period these purchases amounted to millions of dollars. It may be seen readily that the purchasing office had to possess more than a superficial understanding of the materials to be bought.
Orders customarily went to the lowest bidders, with a careful review in Washington of all prices named in contracts. The inspection of material was an important phase of the work. This inspection was handled through the New York Medical Supply Depot, which called in as assistants the United States Board of Customs Appraisers at New York City. That corps of men had had long years of experience in inspecting and determining the value of surgical supplies, as most of these supplies in the past had come through the customhouse from foreign countries. The inspection of drugs was handled by the Medical Department's laboratories, the Army Medical School, and by the Bureau of Standards, which rendered valuable assistance in examining and testing samples. In addition the Medical Department maintained a corps of inspectors to travel from one factory to another, keeping in close touch with the progress and assisting in procuring raw materials and expediting deliveries.
The medical supplies were divided under the following classifications:
(a) Hospital equipment, such as beds, bedside tables, enamelware, etc. (b) Surgical dressings. (c) Surgical instruments. (d) Medicines, antiseptics, and disinfectants. (e) Field supplies (chests and units for extended field service). (f) Dental supplies. (g) Veterinary supplies. (h) Laboratory supplies. (i) Motor ambulance supplies. (j) X-ray supplies.
The New York depot was intrusted with the purchase of miscellaneous hospital equipment and dental and X-ray supplies. The St. Louis depot purchased the veterinary supplies, and the field medical supply depot at Washington purchased the laboratory and field supplies. The motor ambulance supply depot, established at Louisville, Ky., purchased ambulances and ambulance spare parts. Appreciating the necessity for a certain amount of cooperation where the purchase of conflicting articles by the various depots was concerned, the general purchasing office of the Medical Department was organized at Washington. This purchasing office bought all surgical dressings, surgical instruments, and medicines and such items as were used in the field, post, veterinary, and dental stations.
In connection with the production of surgical instruments in this country it was necessary for the Medical Department to educate in the manufacture of these instruments certain concerns which had been engaged in the production of similar devices. Men skilled in the manufacture of instruments, with long years of experience, were sent to these factories to work out with the forces there satisfactory processes. It was necessary to recruit toolmakers, jewelers, and cutlery manufacturers in order to build up a sufficient supply of forged and finished instruments.
Surgical needles, for instance, had never been made in this country, but had all been obtained in England. As a war measure the British Government placed this item on its list of restricted exports. After long and continued effort the general purchasing office developed American sources of supply of needles with remarkable success.
In one month we shipped 65 tons of surgical instruments to France. A few of the principal instruments, quantities purchased, and the prices paid were as follows:
Average cost, each. 1,301,476 hæmostatic forceps $1.04 284,600 tissue forceps .59 348,500 minor operating knives .57 225,000 probes .047 309,548 surgical scissors .741 2,102 general operating cases 159.55 3,400 small operating cases 45.30 10,000 instrument cases for officers' belts 5.28 300,000 enlisted men's belt cases 1.35
Each general operating case contains more than 50 instruments and the small operating case more than 30 instruments, and in these two items alone are more than 207,000 forgings, practically all handwork.
The quantity of surgical dressings used in peace times was relatively small, so that the sources for supplying this material had to be increased enormously. To do this the Government went out into the cotton goods industry and induced such concerns as curtain makers and manufacturers of waists and white goods to make bandages for surgical uses. The Government obtained the raw material, gray gauze, and turned it over to the various manufacturers for bleaching, cutting, sterilizing, and packing in the necessary cartons.
Among other items during the last year of the war a total of 12,000,000 individual dressing packets were purchased and 795,000 boxes of gauze bandages, 574,400,000 yards of bandage, 10,000,000 first-aid packets, and 108,000,000 yards of gauze. During the same period a total quantity of 3,814,000 pounds of absorbent cotton was also bought.
Among the miscellaneous items obtained were approximately 1,600,000 blankets, 258,000 litters, and over 1,000,000 clinical thermometers. The rate of output of clinical thermometers was not all that the Medical Department thought it should be, and as a result a large quantity of thermometers was obtained on mandatory orders.
The heaviest buying period during the war was between July 1 and November 30, 1918. The supplies purchased or ordered in that period were the following, with their costs:
Medicines, antiseptics, and disinfectants $19,728,715 Hospital furniture and equipment 8,220,297 Hospital supplies, textiles 69,321,787 Hospital supplies, miscellaneous 1,808,465 Surgical instruments 6,576,238 Surgical dressings 75,762,383 X-ray equipment and supplies 2,466,089 Dental equipment and supplies 4,932,178 Laboratory equipment and supplies 2,301,683 Veterinary equipment and supplies 3,258,119 Motor ambulances and supplies 25,625,000
It is interesting to note that the purchases made in France for the Medical Department consisted mostly of large and bulky items, mainly hospital furniture and equipment, which, if transported from the United States, would necessitate the use of considerable valuable cargo space. Foreign purchases were made primarily to save ship space and not because of any shortage or failure to function in this country.
Although America is famous throughout the world for her dentists and dentistry, yet the participation of this country in the war created a demand for dental supplies that the American manufacturing facilities in existence in 1917 were unable to fill. For that reason it was necessary to extend the production capacity. The manufacturers in the trade rose to the occasion, and as a result the Government was able to supply to the A. E. F. from the United States all dental materials required, the only purchases made in France being of exceedingly bulky apparatus.
The total amount allotted for dental supplies for an army of 5,000,000 men in 1919 was $6,256,482. During the five months between July 1 and November 30, 1918, the dental purchases amounted to approximately $5,000,000.
The six leading dental items purchased by the Medical Department and the quantity and cost of each were as follows:
-------------------------+--------------+-------- Items. | Quantity. | Cost, | | each. -------------------------+--------------+-------- Tooth-extracting forceps | 47,319 | $2.86 Dental Chairs: | | Hospital Equipment | 1,112 | 167.06 Portable | 3,200 | 49.00 Lathes: | | Unique | 110 | 10.00 Electric | 70 | 43.96 Fountain cuspidors | 1,253 | 32.51 Burs | 3,836,776 | .081 Engines: | | Portable | 1,790 | 63.00 Electric | 814 | 122.80 -------------------------+--------------+--------
VI. SALVAGE
Tables of statistics are apt to be tiresome affairs; but in the annals of the War Department, as part of the record of the American Army in the great war, there is a table of statistics that is replete with human interest. This is the table which depicts the activities of the salvage operations of the Army, both at home and abroad.
Until the war came to America and brought to us the necessity of being provident, thrift and economy could not be called characteristic American qualities. As virtues in the individual we were apt to despise them. Paris can live on what New York throws away, runs the old saying. For the prudent man we invented opprobrious names. Such names and phrases were but the surface outcroppings of a national tendency to be wasteful.
But the war came along to put a stop to waste and to raise thrift high in the esteem of America. Partly because of the mounting prices of food and clothing and partly because of well-organized and well-conducted propaganda on the part of various agencies of the Government, chief among them being the United States Food Administration and the Liberty Bond and War Saving Stamp organizations of the Treasury Department, America began to practice economy in the use of materials.
How much of the credit for the change can be claimed by the Government itself we may never know; but this may be said--in urging the people to save materials in their own homes, the Government did not, as it had done in previous wars, allow the traditional wastes of military campaigns. The Government practiced what it preached. It cleaned up its own back yard and utilized every scrap of useful material. It mended the shoes and clothing of the Army; it darned the socks; it tinkered the tin cans; it starved the garbage pails by economy in the mess kitchens and recovered the valuable components of garbage at rendering plants; it collected the junk; it swept the stables and put the manure on the land, and then produced crops from the increased fertility. All of these adventures in conservation and reclamation were known to the Army simply as Salvage; which after all was but the scientific attention which the Army paid to the "p's" and "q's" of military housekeeping--it was household economy on the scale of a family of 3,500,000 members.
The figures of the Army's thrift are most impressive. The figures of our war salvage are as follows:
_Financial summary of the activities of the salvage service in France for 1918._
------------------------------+-------------------------- Depots and shops. | Kitchen economics branch. ----------+-------------------+-----------+-------------- Month. | Value of output. | Month. | Recoveries. ----------+-------------------+-----------+-------------- January | No record | May | $1,350.65 February | No record | June | 17,881.03 March | $850,000.00 | July | 74,167.31 April | 900,000.00 | August | 23,581.20 May | 1,500,000.00 | September | 35,677.03 June | 2,000,000.00 | October | 109,013.84 July | 3,500,000.00 | November | 120,158.63 August | 5,500,000.00 | December | 92,685.43 September | 7,251,512.40 | +-------------- October | 8,007,980.39 | Total | 474,515.12 November | 8,072,042.08 | | December | 9,436,839.14 | | +-------------------| | Total | 47,018,374.01 | | ----------+-------------------+-----------+--------------
Battle-field recoveries.
October $8,000,000.00 November 4,000,000.00 December 3,100,000.00 ------------- Total 15,100,000.00
Capitulation of salvage activities in France for year 1918.
Value of output, depots and shops $47,018,374.01 Battle-field recoveries 15,100,000.00 Kitchen economies 474,515.12 Waste sales 39,680.23 Rubber salvaged, 1,591,585 pounds, at estimated value of 10 cents per pound 159,156.50 Wool cloth shipped to British, 359,920 pounds, at estimated value of 20 cents per pound 71,984.00 Lumber salvaged, 1,737,940 board feet 69,025.20 -------------- Total 62,932,735.06
_Financial summary of the activities of the salvage service in the United State from Apr. 1 to Dec. 31, 1918._
-------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+-------------- | | Estimated | Estimated | Activity. | Total | cost | value |Estimated net | articles.| of service. | reclaimed | saving. | | | articles. | -------------------+----------+-------------+---------------+-------------- Clothing, shoe, | | | | and hat repair |12,635,458|$7,103,940.00| $37,632,158.05|$30,528,218.05 Cot repair | 486,892| 779,027.20| 1,752,811.20| 973,784.00 Canvas repair | 122,480| 611,900.00| 3,023,418.79| 2,411,518.79 +----------+-------------+---------------+-------------- Total | | | | 33,913,520.84 | | | | Dry-cleaning | | | | operations | 4,686,415| 2,247,292.52| |[35]166,233.29 Government laundry | | | | operations |72,263,964| 1,888,823.93[36]3,115,847.31| 1,227,023.38 +----------+-------------+---------------+-------------- Grand total | | | | 35,306,777.51 | DISPOSITION OF WASTE MATERIAL | | Estimated value of material turned over to organisations | 941,709.00 Cash sales: | Scrap material from June 1 to Dec. 31 $1,194,395.01 | Garbage, May 1 to Dec 31 414,832.60 | Dead animals, May 1 to Dec. 31 7,043.91 | Manure, May 1 to Dec. 31 225,227.29 | Condemned hay, straw, etc., May 1 to 50,158.92 | Dec. 31 | --------------+ Total | 1,891,657.73 Farm products invoiced to quartermaster, May 1 to Dec. 31 | 107,271.79 +-------------- Estimated net saving to Government | 38,247,416.03 ------------------------------------------------------------+--------------
[35] On articles dry cleaned in Government shops.
[36] Receipts and operating credits.
A consolidation of these figures shows that the total amount returned to the Government in money value by the savings of the salvage service of the Army for the single calendar year of 1918 was $101,180,151. With this figure some interesting comparisons may be made.
In 1912, to meet every expense of the American standing Army, Congress appropriated $99,676,767.43; in 1913 the appropriations were $100,292,855.04. Salvage, reclaiming the materials once wasted and using them over again, saved enough in 1918 to have maintained the entire Military Establishment in 1912 or 1913.
But there is even a more striking comparison. During the fiscal year of 1898--the Spanish-American War year--the entire appropriations for the support of the Army amounted to $70,394,739.96. Salvage in 1918 saved $30,000,000 more than was appropriated to fight the Spanish-American War up to July 1, 1898, at which date the fighting was nearly over.
Take the cost of clothing the Army raised to fight against Spain, and add to it the appropriations for clothing the Army and equipping it with shoes, leather and rubber goods, and textile equipment for the years 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917, and you have a total Government expenditure of $100,050,271.65. The savings of salvage in 1918 could pay this entire cost with $1,129,880 to spare.
It cost $20,280,000 for the clothing and equipage of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1917, at which date the war with Germany had begun. Salvage in the United States alone in 1918 saved to the Government $17,967,416 more than this appropriation.
Salvage undertakings touched intimately every soldier in the Army. This service which taught economy in the use of materials could with equal facility operate a laundry or dry-cleaning plant, or run a farm, or drive a good bargain in the sale of junk, or return goods that did not meet specifications and be reimbursed for them.
Wherever the experts of the service saw a leak through which the Government's money might flow out, they plugged it. An innovation in warfare as we knew it, it had to fight its way against prejudice at the start, but it developed what formerly was waste and a liability into a tremendous asset. Yet when the armistice came salvage had only commenced to show its possibilities. It had merely scratched the surface, but it had opened up unlimited fields for utilizing worn-out or unserviceable products or by-products of war. It had saved thousands of tons of shipping space in the transportation of supplies to the American Expeditionary Forces by using over again in France the things that otherwise would have had to be replaced by new; it saved this tonnage at the time when every ton saved counted heavily. In this and in the saving of materials at a time when all the raw materials of the earth would scarcely meet the insatiable demands of Moloch, the value of salvage can scarcely be measured by the money figures of its record.
SALVAGE IN THE UNITED STATES.
War salvage in the United States started on October 5, 1917, when the conservation branch was created in the Quartermaster Department. It started with an executive force of two commissioned officers and one stenographer. When the armistice was signed about 13 months later, the salvage service in the United States alone had a force of approximately 500 commissioned officers, 20,000 enlisted men, and 2,000 civilian employees.
In this period the method of clothing and feeding the American soldier had been revolutionized. The old way was to issue a uniform to a soldier and hold him responsible for the repair and cleaning of it. He owned his uniform and had to keep it in good condition at his own expense out of the $15 per month the Government paid him. The new way was for the Government itself to retain ownership of the uniform and to repair and clean it at public expense. The soldier was required to pay only for his laundry work at a uniform charge of $1 per month, much under what he would have had to pay at commercial rates.
Formerly the soldier had to repair his own shoes. The soldier prefers repaired shoes to new ones for campaign service because the former are broken in and are comfortable. After the salvage service was established the Government retained ownership of Army shoes and repaired them at Government expense.
Once the Army seldom conducted sales of the boxes and crates in which supplies were packed. Salvage undertook such sales, thereby bringing considerable revenue to the Army.
But in these and similar economies, it was not so much the saving of money that was important as it was the saving of materials at a time when the supply of all materials was scarcely adequate to the war demands. When our troops first reached France the officers were surprised at the emphasis placed upon salvage operations by the British and French armies. They were soon to learn that salvage was stressed because it supplied materials which were scarce. Glycerine, a component of high explosives, had become so short in supply that the British Ministry of Munitions paid as much as $1,250 a ton for it. The British army distilled its garbage and procured from the operation glycerine at a cost of $250 per ton. This was a financial saving of $1,000 a ton; but, more important, it supplied glycerine at the time when money did not count. The British Ministry of Munitions got the glycerine, which meant explosives for use against the Germans, which was the main thing.
The British appreciated the importance of salvage so much that one of the officers sent with the British mission to the United States early in the war was a salvage expert, included in the mission so that we might early have the benefit of the British experience in this work.
Although the salvage service of America was authorized in the autumn of 1917, it was not until winter was declining into the spring of 1918 that the service became a working organization fully clothed with authority. Consequently its record was accomplished within a period of 9 or 10 months. The purpose and ideals of the service were embodied in its code, known as special regulations No. 77, promulgating rules and regulations for the conservation and reclamation of Army supplies and materials. The principal provisions of these regulations were as follows:
(a) The repair of clothing and equipage.
(b) Laundering and dry cleaning of clothing and equipage.
(c) Supervision of contracts for the renovation of clothing and equipage.
(d) The development of agricultural, mineral, and forest lands for the benefit of the Army.
(e) The organization, discipline, and training of men of special units, companies, battalions, and regiments for salvage work.
These regulations likewise--
(a) Created salvage companies of 7 officers and 588 enlisted men each, based on a camp strength of 27,000 troops where all salvage utilities exist.
(b) Provided methods of receiving and disposing of clothing and equipage turned in for renovation.
(c) Provided methods for the conservation of food and the reduction of waste through a systematic check on the disposal of garbage.
(d) Fixed the responsibility of organization in connection with salvage work.
(e) Provided definite rules and instructions to be followed by organization commanders and their commands in the care of clothing and equipage in order that the cost of maintenance might be reduced to a minimum and that usefulness might be conserved to the utmost, consistent with the health and well being of the troops.
(f) Provided a basis for the operation and financing of camp laundries and dry-cleaning plants operated in connection with base salvage plants.
(g) Provided a uniform monthly laundry charge of $1 per enlisted man at each camp and station where there was a Government-operated laundry, as well as a uniform charge for service rendered to officers, civilians, hospitals, and other camp agencies.
Thus it may be seen that special regulations No. 77 were not only a charter for the salvage service but a code of conduct in economy and thrift for the soldier of the American Army. Although the regulations did not become official until midsummer of 1918, they had a profound effect in the few months before the fighting in Europe came to an end.
Prior to July 1, 1918, all reports of garbage collection, etc., in the military camps in this country indicated that the American soldier in training wasted on the average of 2 pounds of food per day. This was not excessive, judged by civilian standards, since our large cities, a great part of whose population are fed not nearly so well as soldiers were fed in the camps, show a food waste nearly as great. But the camp waste of food was regarded as excessive by the salvage officers. Special regulations No. 77 contained minute directions for conserving food in the camp kitchens. The result of these regulations was that in the four-month period beginning July 1, 1918, the average mess waste per man in the camps fell to 0.3 of a pound per day. Since there was an average strength of 1,500,000 men in training during these four months, the reduction of waste amounted to many thousands of tons of food.
These regulations also set up a salvage equipment for the use of the Army. As a rule each camp had a shoe-repair shop large enough to fix 400 to 500 pairs of shoes per day; a clothing-repair shop large enough to take care of the everyday mending of 30,000 troops; a hat-repair shop sufficient in size to restore the headgear of 30,000 men; and other miscellaneous shops.
But at the change of seasons there could be expected an exceptionally large turn in of worn-out clothing, and to handle these periodical floods of garments large base salvage plants were established at Fort Sam Houston, Tex.; Washington, D. C.; Atlanta, Ga.; New York City; Philadelphia; El Paso; and Newport News, Va.; with a base salvage plant for rejuvenating shoes at Jeffersonville, Ind. Smaller base plants were established at Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco, and at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and at Alcatraz Island, Calif. Other base plants to receive and classify and dispose of waste materials were established at New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, St. Louis, Fort Sam Houston, and Atlanta.
The shoe-salvage base plant at Jeffersonville Depot was more than a repair shop in the accepted sense of the term, for it became one of the most complete shoe factories to be found anywhere in the country. When this shop was being projected as a plant to take care of the overflow of worn shoes from the camps and depots, the United Shoe Machinery Co. agreed to furnish machinery sufficient to repair 2,000 pairs of shoes a day, supplying this equipment for a period of six months without any expense to the Government, except upkeep and the cost of supplies.
At the Jeffersonville shop shoes went through the mill from department to department much as machines are assembled in the familiar quantity-production manner. Shoes arriving were first counted, and then sorted and graded as follows:
Class 1. Unrepairable.
Class 2. Inner soles required.
Class 3. Regular run of repairs (half soles or full soles, heels, patching of uppers, and other minor repairs).
Class 4. Civilian.
The shoes arriving at this plant were in a condition that would have resulted in their being discarded altogether in the old days. The experience at Jeffersonville showed that 65 of each 100 pairs arriving at the factory could be repaired, and repaired cheaply. In January, 1919, of 132,112 pairs of shoes sorted, 45,000 were in irreparable condition and had to be thrown away. There were 11,475 pairs of class 2 shoes, 74,362 pairs of class 3, and 1,175 pairs of class 4.
From the sorting room the shoes went to the wash room, where they were disinfected and cleaned in a bath containing a solution of 40 ounces of formaldehyde and 1 pound of castile soap to each 10 gallons of water. After being washed the shoes were placed on rolling racks, each rack holding 24 pairs of the same size and width. The loaded racks were wheeled to the lasting section where lasts were inserted according to sizes.
Next, machines cut off the worn portions of the old heels, after which the shoes went to the stripping bench, where the old soles were removed and the shank pieces skived to prepare a smooth joint for the new half sole. The next process was welting. The welts were prepared, and tarred felt was glued to the old inner sole to fill out uneven parts and prevent squeaking. The next operation was to lay on the half sole in a setting of rubber cement. Another machine rough rounded the soles to conform with the shape of the shoes.
Then the shoes reached the stitching machines, where the soles were sewed on, and then the leveling machines, which smoothed out the wrinkles of the inner soles. The next step brought them to the heeling machines, where the complete heels were attached in one motion. Next, machinery for nailing soles and heels, and then the trimming machinery for smoothing off the work. The final mechanical operation was on the scouring and finishing machines. Meanwhile, if the shoes needed patching on the uppers, this work was done by women operating sewing machines.
The final process was to give the field shoe a thorough coat of waterproof dubbin. A good polish was put on the russet shoes. A split leather insole was inserted in each shoe to insure perfect smoothness of the bottom. A pair of laces was tied to each pair of shoes, and then the shoes were packed in boxes of 24 pairs each and turned in to the Army stores.
The Jeffersonville shop repaired 222,135 pairs of shoes in seven months of operation. Thousands of pairs of shoes were discovered to have been fitted too short. This was shown by the fact that many of the shoes were worn out entirely in the toes. A shoe that is too long will turn up at the toes, while one that is too short will stub with nearly every step taken.
On August 8, 1918, the Secretary of War authorized the expenditure of $5,287,852 for the construction of laundries to serve from 20,000 to 40,000 men in each of 20 camps and posts. About this same time repair shops were authorized at each of the training camps and special dry-cleaning plants at Atlanta, Fort Sam Houston, El Paso, and Alcatraz Island. Before the armistice was signed many of these plants were in operation. In addition to these the salvage service eventually operated printing plants, wagon repair shops, and carpentry shops, so that at the time the armistice was signed there was hardly anything of quartermaster issue not subject to rehabilitation by the salvage division.
Each shoe-repair shop at the training camps had equipment sufficient to repair 500 pairs of shoes per day, utilizing the services of 40 to 50 men. When the shops were officially authorized, an inventory of the Army's old shoes showed there were approximately 1,500,000 pairs on hand in need of rehabilitation. In order to assist the camp shops in the work, the salvage service brought between 50 and 55 shoe factories into the reclamation effort, these private factories repairing about 500,000 pairs until the camp shops were able to catch up.
Because of the shortage of linen thread it was decided to use nails for attaching half soles, particularly in the repair shops in France. More than 2,500 nailing machines were bought and shipped to the American Expeditionary Forces. The American Expeditionary Forces adopted the English system of company cobblers and regimental repair shops. Upward of 11,000 cobblers' kits were shipped to France. In July, 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces requested machinery for a base shoe-repair plant in France. This machinery was shipped considerably before hostilities ceased.
The service maintained a corps of civilian instructors, who traveled from camp to camp and improved the efficiency of the Army cobbling. The accumulation of worn shoes at the embarkation camps was sent to various contractors for repairs. By November, 1918, the shoe-repair facilities of the Army had reached full operation, 500,000 pairs of shoes being repaired that month, a figure representing all the repairing required by 1,500,000 men. All shoe-repairing activities were under the direction of Philip H. Fraher, who was assisted by Joseph Caunt, of Pasadena, Calif., a retired shoe manufacturer with a wide experience both in this country and in England.
In its clothing-repair activities the salvage service dry-cleaned uniforms and woolen equipment, repaired and renovated hats, and reclaimed outer clothing and underclothing.
For the first time in dry-cleaning history, a method was worked out to destroy all living organisms and a considerable amount of bacteria, a process which is likely to have a lasting effect in the dry-cleaning industry. The specifications of this process were the result of cooperative laboratory research by the Bureau of Standards, the Public Health Service, and the salvage division. In addition to destroying germs and bacteria the process also thoroughly cleansed the garments. Experts from the salvage division were on hand to see to it that the various contractors lived up to the standard specifications. The authorized Government-owned dry-cleaning plants, which were to be the last word in what such establishments should be, were not completed, due to the signing of the armistice. Dr. Harry E. Mechling, a graduate physician and president of the Swiss Cleaners & Dyers, of Louisville, Ky., was in charge of the Army's dry-cleaning activities.
In the repair of clothing the service received much assistance from the Red Cross. Local Red Cross units in the vicinity of camps worked in conjunction with the officers of the salvage service in the reclamation of such garments as woolen shirts, underclothing, sweaters, helmets, socks, and gloves.
The base salvage plants at Atlanta and Fort Sam Houston reached a high state of efficiency in the repair of clothing. Shipment after shipment was made from such congested centers as Newport News and Hoboken to these plants, and within a comparatively short time the property was ready for reshipment and reissue. Capt. Harvey A. Rosenthal, a graduate of the first officers' training school, and in civil life in the clothing business, was in charge of clothing repairs.
All of the camps had shops for renovating and repairing hats. The average cost for repairing a hat was 35 cents, whereas the lowest contract price was 65 cents, and the quality of work at the Government shops was far better than that obtained from private contractors.
The following table gives an idea of the approximate saving to the Government in hat-repair operations:
-----------------------------+-----------+-----------+----------- | | Cost of | Place. | Quantity. | repair of | Estimated | | each. |total cost. -----------------------------+-----------+-----------+----------- Government shop | 181,764 | $0.35 | $63,617.00 Contract | 539,495 | .65 | 350,671.00 |-----------+-----------+----------- | 721,259 | | 414,288.00 -----------------------------+-----------------------+-----------
Estimated value of hats made serviceable $1,000,746 Estimated net saving 586,468 Cost of 721,259 new hats 1,334,329
Mr. E. Leroy Cummings, of the John B. Stetson Co., of Philadelphia, was in charge of hat-repair activities.
Extensive repairs to canvas materials were confined to the base plants at Philadelphia, El Paso, Fort Sam Houston, and Atlanta, and, on a smaller scale, at Jeffersonville. Minor repairs were conducted at camp shops, some of which were only in the course of construction when the armistice was signed. Tents were generally reconditioned while standing. Patches to tents were attached by means of a nitrocellulose cement, the best cement for the purpose which the salvage service found, being called vanite. Experiments at the Bureau of Chemistry resulted in the adoption of three waterproofing compounds named Preservol, Candeline, and Truscon. These compounds were applied to both standing tents and tents which had been taken down, with complete and effective results.
Laundering was not a new activity for the War Department, since when the war was declared the Government already owned 14 small steam laundries. Later the Government went into the laundry business on the scale demanded by the great chain of training camps, building cantonment laundries at a cost of approximately $300,000 each. Experienced laundrymen were placed in charge of camp laundries. Through the cooperation with the Government's insect experts of the Bureau of Entomology, laundering processes were worked out successfully to disinfect all clothing while washing it and to free it from vermin without shrinking fabrics or causing other damage. Government laundries during the war operated 24 hours per day with three labor shifts and cleaned an average of 10,909,850 pieces of clothing monthly, with gross receipts of over $500,000 per month, approximately half of which was profit.
One of the most interesting features of laundry activity was the development of mobile laundry units for overseas use near the front. The men to operate these units were trained in a special school at Camp Meigs, D. C. Each mobile unit required a crew of 37 men. The men of the Army nicknamed these special troops the "Fighting Chinamen."
The need of the American Expeditionary Forces for wash-up and delousing stations at the front, so that even troops engaged in battle might have clean clothes, called the mobile laundry units into being. The first experimental equipment was designed and constructed early in 1918. After that the salvage service produced 50 others, 32 of which were shipped to France.
Each unit consisted of a large steam tractor and four trailers, an outfit which on the road made up a train over 100 feet long. The trailers could be placed together in the field to form a building 30 feet long and 28 feet wide, the tractor acting as the power plant. On the trailers were washing machines, wringers, drying machines, tanks for water and soap, a pump, and a dynamo to supply electric lights. One of these plants working 24 hours per day could do the washing of 10,000 men. This unit was designed by officers of the salvage division.
Army laundry activity was in charge of three New York laundrymen: J. E. Dann, president of the Pilgrim Laundry, of Brooklyn, and his assistants, William Longfelder, of H. Kohnstamn & Co., and E. D. Tribbett, of the American Laundry Machinery Co.
Wherever possible waste materials were reclaimed for use by the Army instead of being sold as junk. This was particularly true of bags and burlap. Hundreds of thousands of bags and great quantities of burlap furnished by the salvage division were utilized for army purposes. Without salvage, all of this would have been thrown away or sold at junk prices. When the fighting ended the base salvage plant at Chicago was being equipped to repair about 15,000 bags daily.
The purpose of garbage separation was threefold--the reduction of mess waste, the increase in revenue to the Government, and the recovery of glycerine contents for military purposes. Before the war with Germany the Army regulations required the burning of garbage at camps. When the great training camps were established, the Government adopted generally the policy of selling garbage to contractors, except at Camps Fremont, Hancock, McClellan, Sevier, and Shelby, where it was incinerated. Originally contracts had been let on a per-man basis, the contracts extending for several months, comparable to municipal contracts for the disposal of garbage. Later on, however, the policy was adopted of letting contracts for periods of one month only, since the number of men at the camps was continually increasing, and the garbage grew correspondingly bulkier. It is estimated that this change in contracting saved the Government considerably over $400,000. Contract sale prices ranged from 1 cent to 9 cents per man per month, the latter price in most cases including the manure from the stables.
With a view to obtaining glycerine, the War Department authorized the construction of 16 garbage-rendering plants at the larger concentration centers, but only one, that at Camp Lee, was actually constructed, since it was determined later by an investigation of our national resources that the amount of glycerine to be obtained in this manner did not justify the expenditure of the money. Also the project of establishing piggeries at camps was abandoned, after investigation by the salvage service, since it would have required 18 months to clear the investment, and in the meantime the Government would have been deprived of revenue from the sale of garbage.
The disposition of waste materials was under the direction of Louis Birkenstein, of Chicago, assisted by R. D. Cunningham, of Troy, N. Y.
In response to an insistent demand that farms be operated at various camps, the salvage division, on May 15, 1918, secured $60,000 from the vocational fund for the training of soldiers and allotted sums to 15 camps.
On November 4, 1918, Congress appropriated $250,000 for the same purpose, but little of this money was expended. The total acreage under cultivation in 1918 was 3,483, and the equivalent revenue derived from the camp farms amounted to $108,000. The farm work was under the direction of Capt. Henry G. Parsons, a practical and scientific farmer.
Salvage activities, in general, in the United States were under the direction of Philip W. Wrenn, who was chief of the salvage division during the most active period of its existence.
SALVAGE IN FRANCE.
Salvage in France was under the direction of the chief quartermaster with the American Expeditionary Forces. At first, it was undertaken in a smattering way, but as the American Army grew in size, salvage increased, until the salvage service became one of the features in the field, with thousands of men and women working in salvage activities, with salvage plants, branches, and depots, large and small, saving, repairing, conserving, and putting into shape, ready for reissue, materials of all sorts and descriptions. The word "salvage" became the watchword and pride of many an organization at the front.
Each field army had its chief salvage officer. Each division of troops had its salvage organization under a salvage officer. Each organization had its salvage dump, in which it took a just pride, and there was a spirit of friendly rivalry between different organizations as to which could save the most for the Government.
In the flood times of battle, when waste materials piled up on the fields, the regular salvage specialists were assisted in various ways. In some divisions the regimental bands were designated to act as emergency salvage companies. Sometimes after an engagement whole battalions and regiments were enlisted to clean up an area, and there is one instance on record where a wise general of the American Expeditionary Forces turned out his entire field army to clean up for salvage the area which it had just won from the enemy. The salvage service in France handled not only the recovery of quartermaster supplies, but it also collected and disposed of all materials captured from the enemy, including ordnance materials, and also all materials abandoned by our own troops and found on the battle fields. When troops moved into combat they took with them only such equipment as they could carry on their backs or on the meager transportation facilities allowed. Thus they frequently left behind them an enormous quantity of their possessions; including personal baggage. The salvage units went through such areas, visited every billet, and collected all Government and personal property and cared for it. As an indication of the magnitude of this work, there was one salvage dump in France 40 acres in area piled as high as goods could be thrown from trucks.
The salvage operations in France were conducted over an area of 4,000 square miles, and there were approximately 4,000 men in the salvage service field force. The various salvage depots and shops in France occupied a floor space of 736,000 square feet and had a personnel of 11,632 on December 31, 1918. Even before the war, the Quartermaster Corps of the Army was a good-sized organization, yet there were more French women and girls mending clothing for the American Army in France at one time than there were commissioned officers and enlisted men in the whole Quartermaster Service before the war.
Clothing generally for the American troops in France was repaired at special shops and at the homes of seamstresses in the small towns and communes. Each town had a forewoman who distributed the damaged clothing, after it had been disinfected and laundered, and kept all counts. There were 880 of these home workers, nearly all of them from needy families. The best record for darning socks was made by an old French grandmére, aged more than 80.
Numerous soldiers were discovered in the American Expeditionary Forces who were unfit physically for the hard service on the front line. These were permitted to go into the various salvage depots and shops, where they learned to be shoemakers, harness makers, saddle makers, wood workers, painters, metal workers, tailors, laundrymen, electricians, mechanics, checkers, warehousemen, etc., occupations in which many of them expected to engage after their separation from the military service.
The salvage troops in France were in five classes--the salvage headquarter detachments, depot battalions, field salvage battalions, laundry units, and the clothing and bathing units. One of the last named was attached to each division to handle field bathhouses and delousing and disinfecting plants, to receive old clothes, and to issue new or reclaimed serviceable garments.
The ordnance property salvaged in the field in the period between January 1, to October 31, 1918, included 5,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 71,909 shell of the 75-millimeter size, and 16,195 of the 155-millimeter size, more than 32,000 rifles, and 21,000 machine guns and automatic rifles. The unexploded or "dud" shell is a menace to life, and the duty of destroying these in immense quantities fell to the salvage service.
Some of the salvage squads in the field were composed of men who through lack of education or lack of knowledge of the English language were unable to do front-line service. They were largely composed of American troops of alien birth.
The divisional salvage squads sorted the materials at the railhead dumps for shipment to the various depots. When trucks brought up supplies to the front and unloaded, the salvage detachments there filled them up again with all sorts of materials which had been picked up, and the trucks carried their loads back to the railheads, the railroad stations of the division. This queer conglomeration of trash consisted of everything from a hairbrush to a 77-millimeter enemy gun. To show the sorts of articles that are picked up in an area over which an army has fought, there is given here the following list of items selected at random from the check of a salvage shipment from the railhead of the Twenty-sixth Division on August 12, 1918:
1,100 pairs of leggins. 21 pairs of shoes. 30 leather gun cases. 21 bags of harness. 350 mess kits. 750 condiment cans. 750 bacon cans. 150 first-aid packets. 50 feed bags. 300 pistol holsters. 1 wagon bed. 275 German rifles. 3 boxes tent poles. 7 boxes gun repairs. 150 rifle grenade throwers. 4 German machine guns. 200 German canteens. 6,000 gas masks. 50 saddlebags. 1,400 canteens. 200 caps. 900 helmets. 1,025 pack carriers. 750 canteen covers. 1 wagon. 76 wagon parts. 1 ammunition cart. 4 ration carts. 17 wagon wheels. 4 boxes artillery material (telephones, etc.). 1,400 American canteens. 400 American rifles. 47 German automatic guns. 75 gun bolts. 100 respirators.
The kitchen economics branch of the salvage branch of the American Expeditionary Forces in the recovery of fats and glycerine and other kitchen by-products during the month of September, 1918, saved $57,404.19 to the Government. The value was increased in October to $109,013.84, and in November to $120,158.63. In addition to this saving, kitchen salvage in October produced over 25,000 pounds of grease and over 14,000 pounds of dubbin for waterproofing shoes. This branch of the service also had the disposition of unserviceable food supplies, entailing the salvage of large quantities of flour, sugar, rice, and beans damaged in transportation or injured by exposure to weather so as to become unfitted for troops. Such vegetables as peas and canned corn, unsatisfactory for use, were dried and ground and sold for chicken feed or hog feed, bringing in a considerable revenue.
The question of laundering for the field hospitals, particularly after hard fighting, was a vital one. During the month of December, 1918, a total of 7,811,566 pieces of laundry was handled by the laundry branch of the salvage service. This included 3,700,000 pieces for the hospitals alone. The American Expeditionary Forces were required to establish three large shops for mending clothing sent to the laundries.
The salvage service in France rendered a peculiar service in being the repository for lost articles. The baggage branch of the salvage service worked in close cooperation with the Army transportation service, railroad transportation service, the central records office, the graves registration service, the effects depot, the French railroad officials, and other agencies which might assist them to recover and handle all lost baggage for the members of the American Expeditionary Forces or for their heirs in the United States.
The garden service of the American Expeditionary Forces was operated as a separate branch of the Quartermaster Corps, but a word about its work may not be amiss here. In addition to gardens at the camps and hospitals in France, there was a large central farm at Versailles, near Paris, where American officers and men were assembled to learn intensive farming before being sent to the various stations to assume charge of garden work. This service was composed entirely of men who had been wounded or gassed, or were otherwise physically unfit for service at the front. The garden operations provided welcome additions of fresh vegetables to the American Expeditionary Forces' diet and also gave many Americans an insight of the French methods of intensive farming.
The 85,000 German helmets used in advertising the American Government's fifth war loan--the Victory loan of April, 1919--were all collected and shipped to the United States by the salvage service of the American Expeditionary Forces. In fact the immense quantities of dunnage and junk collected by the service are expected to be of untold historic value as time goes on. Various historical societies and museums are taking steps to secure collections of this war material.
Civilians in Europe are now wearing shoes built originally for American troops, later worn out by them, and still later reconditioned by the salvage service in France. A large number of these shoes recently sold for approximately $4.30 a pair. Since the average total cost to repair shoes was $1.05 a pair, the Government realized a net gain of $3.25 from every pair of these shoes.
In connection with the conservation of waste materials the salvage service conducted a considerable manufacturing enterprise in France. It turned waste into a large number of small articles, such as metal markers for graves or effects of deceased soldiers, sheet tin (this from discarded tin containers) for lining the stables at the remount depots, large shipping bags, cement sacks, collar ornaments, divisional insignia, brassards, overseas caps, guidons, curtains for engine cabs, and many other things. The service took discarded campaign hats and old uniform and overcoat cloth and made hospital slippers with cloth tops and felt soles.
Such things as waste cotton scrap, waste paper, shredded rope, tin cans, and woolen rags collected in France were saved and sold, but nothing was sold that could be utilized for repairing or manufacturing purposes. Leather scrap was used to make leather straps or shoe laces, and the worst of the leather scrap was burned at the power plants of the salvage depots as a fair substitute for coal. Old harness, books, small scraps, leather washers, and the like, canvas and burlap scrap, went to the camouflage screen makers. Woolen rags were shredded and used over again for making cloth. Cotton rags too poor for other purposes went to the paper mills. Rubber scrap became new rubber material. Nothing which had a value was allowed to go to waste.
The salvage depot at Tours, France, alone in the period from March to November, 1918, inclusive, produced goods to the value of $19,383,353.58, at a total expense of $268,955.37, giving the Government a net profit of $19,114,398.21.
The value of all this work went far beyond the value of the figures in dollars and cents, which is the only concrete way in which it can be expressed. The saving in raw material alone which it effected was an important factor in the war; yet of even greater service was the salvage production of materials, particularly ordnance materials, which took much time to manufacture at home and after that required a long haul to get them to the American Expeditionary Forces. Some of the materials recovered on the battle field were scarce and hard to get, and every pound of them recovered added that much to the power of the American Army in France.
I. CANTONMENTS AND CAMPS
As soon as America had arranged to raise an army by selective conscription, the Government proceeded to provide living quarters for the soldiers to be mobilized for training.
This was a job magnificent in its proportions, carried out with a speed that was little short of magical. At 16 points, widely scattered over the country, the construction expert and the civil engineer struck the earth with their potent wands; workmen swarmed forth; the staccato of myriads of hammers and the whine of saws merged into a rolling chorus of industry; and 16 new cities arose--almost overnight, it seemed--built of wood to be sure, raw and unpainted it is true, but snug and taut and equipped with every necessary convenience known to the dwellers of modern American cities.
The United States had been wont to measure other public works by that of the Panama Canal, which had been the largest construction operation ever undertaken by America, or any other nation, prior to the great war. The construction cost of the Panama Canal was approximately $375,000,000 and the operation continued over a period of 10 years. The 16 cantonments for the National Army and the 16 camps for the National Guard cost about seven-tenths as much as the Panama Canal, but they were completed in shorter time than it takes to build an ordinary suburban dwelling house.
The science of warfare had made mighty strides since America's last great war, that of 1861 to 1865, but in no respect more than in those matters relating to the individual soldier's comfort and bodily welfare. The soldier of 1863 lived in a tent, or in the chance shelter of a billet. When the weather was cold he might alternately toast and congeal at his camp fire, and at night he rolled himself in his blanket and reposed on a pallet of straw.
His grandson warrior who went to the training camp in 1917 found life comfortable in a substantial barrack, warmed with steam heat or stoves. A good mattress on a hygienic metal bed wooed his slumbers after a hard day of training.
The soldier of 1861 bathed where he could and when he could. He of 1917 kept clean daily under the shower bath. The soldier of 1861 slaked his thirst at neighboring wells or streams; and water-borne diseases, such as typhoid fever, reaped a harvest of lives. His successor drank water which was tested and filtered, sterilized when necessary, and the once fatal epidemics of armies were kept away from his cantonment. This water, moreover, came to him in a pipe under a pressure sufficient to throw a stream from a nozzle clear over his barrack, an efficient safeguard against the fire that might destroy his wooden city.
The soldier in the Civil War washed out his own clothing on the infrequent occasions when he possessed both water and leisure. The National Army recruit received his khaki immaculate from a modern laundry equipped with the latest types of labor-saving machinery. The latter's grandfather suffered from scurvy because of the limitations of his diet. The soldier of 1917 ate tender beef and green vegetables kept fresh in ammonia-cooled refrigerators. The fighter of 1861 relished the hoecake baked in the ashes; his successor partook of white bread fresh from camp ovens.
The camps of 1861 were arranged in haphazard fashion; those of 1917 were laid out by expert city planners. In the spring the soldier of 1861 waded and toiled through mud; the soldier of 1917 walked dry-shod upon walks or drove his autotruck upon macadamized or concrete or brick camp roads. The illumination of the camps of 1861 was the light of the stars and the bivouac fires; the 1917 barracks were built along streets radiant with electrical incandescence. For amusement the soldiers of 1861 had their campfire choruses and rough military sports, but the private in the National Army had the theater, the motion picture, a library of good reading matter, the Y. M. C. A. and similar clubhouses, the gymnasium, the post exchange where he could buy periodicals, candy, fruit, and other small luxuries.
And so the contrast might be carried along. The marvel of the cantonments of 1917 was not that a grateful Republic gave to its conscripted soldiers the conveniences of existence enjoyed by all urban communities, but that it provided them in such short time. Ninety days after the first spade struck into the ground the cantonments were ready to receive two-thirds of their men, while one or two of the largest of all were complete in every essential respect.
The houses of the National Army and the National Guard went up at the rate of $2,000,000 a day. It is almost impossible to visualize this speed or to comprehend the feat of nailing fifteen hundred and some odd million board feet of lumber into place in about three months, or that of stringing wire in that time in length sufficient to reach from New York to San Francisco and back and westward again to Cleveland, or that of tacking enough rain-tight roofing paper to make a canopy for the island of Manhattan, another for Atlantic City, with nearly a square mile of it left over.
The cantonment job took so many nails and spikes that it created an actual shortage in that industry. All of the factories in the United States that make metal pipes could not turn out enough to supply the needs of the water, sanitary, and heating systems of the cantonments, and so wooden pipes made from staves were used in most of the camps for piping water.
In the matter of lumber alone it has been computed that the total amount ordered and mobilized by the Washington office for the 32 camps would build a board walk 12 inches wide and 1 inch thick to the moon and half way back again. In addition to this vast quantity of lumber there were used in the camps and cantonments about 100,000,000 square feet of wall board--wall board being universally used instead of lath and plaster to line and ceil rooms--12,000,000 square feet of window glass, and 100,000,000 square feet of roofing. The 2,000,000,000 eight-penny nails used, if placed end to end, would girdle the earth three and one-half times. The heating systems would make a single steam radiator 100 miles long, while the heating boilers were equivalent to one boiler 6 feet in diameter and 3 miles long.
The rate of the flow of materials to the army of 200,000 workmen on the cantonment jobs gives an inkling of the speed with which they put lumber and nails together to make barracks. It took 12 heavy freight trains a day, 50 loaded cars to the train, to keep wood and metal supplies at the builders' elbows. These builders erected the camps at the rate of 30,000 tons of material a day. America had never seen construction progress to equal that.
We liken swift building to the mushroom's growth, but almost always this figure of speech is used as hyperbole. Some of the feats of the cantonment builders, however, equaled the growth of the mushroom in fact. In more than one instance at spots where the sod sparkled with dew at dawn, when the builders put away their tools at sunset there stood structures roofed and inclosed, needing only a few interior touches each to be ready to shelter 200 men.
Efficiency in war is a matter of teamwork. Every vital branch of the military organization must do its part well if the whole effort is not to fail. The weak link in the chain might well have been the construction organization of the Army, for here was an emergency job on a scale beyond anything in the experience of our greatest builders. America in her first 18 months of war was able to send to France across 3,000 miles of dangerous water more men than the United Kingdom in a similar period could send to the front over the netted and laned 40 miles of English Channel. No slight share of the credit for this achievement must go to the cantonment builders, who despite great difficulties had the housing ready for the new armies when they were called forth for training.
As soon as the United States entered the war the Government sent out the call for technical experts of all sorts. For a quarter of a century the United States had been specializing in technical training for its young men, and now in the hour of need the ability existed to conduct the war, which in its first year was to be largely a matter of construction and manufacture of equipment. There was a wonderful outpouring of these men of action, the technicians who had been building the bridges and skyscrapers of the Nation, developing its mines, providing its water systems, designing its machinery, organizing and commanding its trained and untrained workers, engaging in public and private works of every description and magnitude.
The Army prior to the 6th of April, 1917, consisted of a relatively insignificant force of men. For this Army the construction of barracks and other quarters had been in the hands of the Quartermaster General.
The officer in charge of the Construction and Repair Division of the Quartermaster General's Office was relieved of his former duties and placed by the Secretary of War in charge of a new and almost entirely independent division, reporting directly to the Secretary, called the Cantonment Division, and charged with providing the necessary construction and camp facilities for the National Army and the National Guard. This was in May, 1917, at which time the commissioned personnel of the division consisted of only three officers. This step was recommended by the General Staff, acting in accordance with the advice of civilian construction experts on the Council of National Defense.
One year later the personnel of this division had grown to 263 officers and 1,100 civilians in Washington, the best constructors, engineers, draftsmen, managers, purchasing agents, and other specialists obtainable by the Government; there were hundreds of other officers and civilian experts in the field for this organization; it had an enlisted personnel of some 16,000 men and employed over 200,000 laborers and craftsmen; it had jobs on hand, complete and incomplete, aggregating $600,000,000, or nearly twice the cost of the canal at Panama, while future works then being planned and later actually undertaken came to another $600,000,000; it had now become the Construction Division of the Army, attached directly to the office of the Secretary of War, charged with all the army construction within the United States. Such was the expansion of one branch of the Army to meet the emergency. Construction operations for the Army overseas, conducted principally with troop labor, was in charge of the Corps of Engineers.
Congress passed the selective service bill on May 18, 1917. Before the end of May the military authorities had decided to call the first levies of the National Army on September 1. The little Cantonment Division, which had in the week after its birth grown to a personnel of 30 officers and numerous civilian experts, received orders to have the camps--16 complete cities to accommodate 40,000 inhabitants each and 16 tent camps, with many incidental buildings and public utilities--ready in 90 days.
Actually the time allowed for construction was much shorter than that, for the last site was not approved until July 6. About 60 days later, on September 4, the National Army cantonments were ready for 430,000 men, two-thirds of the first draft. Although some construction, subsequently authorized, was not entirely complete until later, the cantonments nevertheless were at all times prepared to receive the conscripted soldiers faster than the Army could assimilate them.
However irksome to the impatient construction officers the interval between the time when the cantonments were ordered and the day when the last sites were approved, it was not time wasted by any means. There was much preliminary work to be done. The magnitude of the task ahead was appalling. Yet the Cantonment Division, with scarcely anything to start with, with not even the ground selected for a single camp site, must design and adopt types for buildings, mobilize materials, standardize everything possible, adopt an emergency contract that should protect the Government from the grafter and the profiteer, locate stores of materials, commandeering them if necessary, and also discover manufacturing plants capable of turning out supplies as rapidly as they were needed, build up an organization to handle the work in every detail, and be ready to start hammering in the nails on the day the materials arrived on the jobs. Actually these officers had something less than 20 days in which to accomplish this feat.
There had been, however, a measure of pioneering in several of these directions. The Council of National Defense had an organization of civilian experts in many lines gathered together in Washington to give advice to the military authorities. Through its committees the council prepared a form of contract upon what came to be known as the "cost-plus with sliding scale and fixed maximum fee" plan, which limited the cantonment contractor in each case to a maximum fee of not more than $250,000, the Army itself retaining control of the cost of materials and the wages paid to labor.
Since the cantonments cost anywhere from $8,000,000 to more than $12,000,000 each, the average fee to the contractor was slightly less than 2½ per cent, out of which the contractor had to pay overhead expenses, such as his main office expenses and the like; so it will be seen that the United States drove a close bargain with its cantonment builders in spite of the breathless haste to get the work done.
It was not until the 1st of June that the war authorities decided upon wood construction for the 16 National Army cantonments and canvas tentage for the 16 camps of the National Guard. According to the original plan, so far as could be foreseen, the cantonments were to be permanent camps to receive fresh contingents of selectives as long as the war should last, whereas after receiving its training the National Guard would go to France and leave its American camps deserted. The wood construction was much more expensive than tentage--amounting to $215 per man of the first draft, as it proved--but it was permanent; once installed it made no further demands for materials, and in convenience and comfort, especially in winter, it was far superior to tentage.
Meanwhile the Cantonment Division had designed a model barrack building, 43 feet wide and 140 long, to house 150 men, or one company, as the company was in the spring of 1917. Here, in the adoption of this model and general camp plans, there might easily have occurred in Washington a fatal indecision. Both the British and the French armies had found by experience that a company of 250 men was a more convenient size for trench warfare than a smaller one. There was some question whether the American Army would be guided by this experience. Gen. Pershing was to decide this matter, but he did not reach Europe until June 15. A weak executive control in Washington might have justified itself in waiting for this decision before starting in at full speed to build the cantonments. Those in charge of the program took upon themselves the responsibility of building the 150-man barrack, trusting to their own ability to adjust the buildings later to changed conditions. As a matter of fact, when the company unit was enlarged to 250 men, it was readily possible to house two companies in three barracks, leaving space in two of them for the kitchen and mess room. Still later the Construction Division built smaller barracks for 66 men each, providing four such barracks to the company.
Before a single site was selected the experts in Washington had designed the buildings and mapped out the future cities. America, leaving behind her the decorative atrocities of the old Victorian days, had been seeking beauty; and this yearning had produced a new profession, that of town planning. Town planners in the Construction Division grouped the 1,500 buildings required by each cantonment into two typical arrangements, known as the straight-line and the U-shape layouts. Later at each cantonment there was a town planner who adapted one or the other of these plans to his local camp topography.
The selection of camp sites was in the hands of boards of officers designated by the commanding officers of the six Army departments. Early in May these boards set forth on their quest. Then ensued a lively bidding on the part of American cities to secure cantonments for their own neighborhoods. The Government took the utmost advantage of such inducements as were offered. The city of Tacoma, Wash., sold its municipal bonds to the amount of $2,000,000 and with the proceeds bought 61,000 acres at American Lake and presented the land to the Army. This tract became the site of Camp Lewis, most beautiful of all the cantonments.
A DAY'S WORK IN BARRACK CONSTRUCTION.
The site for Camp Upton, at Yaphank, Long Island, 15,198 acres, was provided for the Government at an annual rental of $1 per acre. San Diego, Calif., gave 8,000 acres at Linda Vista to the Government rent free for five years. This became the location of Camp Kearney for the National Guard. Camp Fremont, another National Guard training center, was pitched on 7,203 acres of ground donated rent free for one year by the city of San Francisco. Louisville gave the site of Camp Zachary Taylor for the National Army rent free for two years. And there were numerous other similar inducements.
In all the National Army cantonments occupied 167,741 acres which the Government obtained at an average annual rental of $3.93 per acre after the second year of occupancy. The National Guard camps covered 78,639 acres, at a rental of $112,042 the second year of occupancy and thereafter.
The clearing of the sites was no mean part of the cantonment job. The site of Camp Upton at Yaphank, Long Island, proved to be covered with underbrush, and when this was cleared off it was discovered that the remains of an old forest were still there, and stumps were thickly scattered over the entire site. These had to be blasted or pulled out before any building operations could proceed. The sites in character ranged from the sandy loam of Camp Devens, in Massachusetts, to the red clay of Virginia and South Carolina; from the farm lands of Michigan to the prairie on which was built Camp Travis, Tex. Some were flat; some rolling; all were different in shape and extent; and the layout of the camp and the arrangement of the buildings in each case had to be adapted to the local conditions by the constructing quartermaster on the job.
To give a picture of a typical cantonment, let us take Camp Grant, at Rockford, Ill., as an illustration. It cost approximately $11,000,000; it could accommodate 45,000 men and 12,000 horses; its buildings numbered 1,600. Water was supplied from six wells drilled 175 feet deep. There were 38 miles of water main, while the reservoir tanks could hold 550,000 gallons. Its electric lighting system entailed the use of 1,450 miles of copper wire, 1,200 poles, and 35,000 incandescent lamps.
During the construction period 50 carloads of building material were unloaded at Camp Grant every day, and an average of 500,000 board feet of lumber was put up every day over a period of weeks. In the Camp Grant schedule we find such items as 50,000,000 feet of lumber, 700 tons of nails, 4,000,000 square feet of roofing, and 3,000,000 square feet of wall board.
Only a builder of secure financial standing could handle such a construction contract. Frequently his pay roll and current bills for supplies amounted to half a million dollars in a week. Let the Government delay a few days in its payments to him and he might find himself obliged to raise a million dollars in cash on the instant to meet his immediate obligations.
To avoid such embarrassments the Construction Division adopted the policy of paying its bills the day and sometimes the hour they were incurred. At each cantonment job it stationed a disbursing officer with a checkbook. This officer reported by telegraph each night, and the next morning there was deposited to his credit in the Treasury a sum of money sufficient for his immediate needs. On numerous occasions this officer paid for materials the instant they were unloaded from the cars and checked. The Government maintained an auditing organization at each job. This organization checked and inspected all material as it was received, comparing the delivery in each case with the original order, and counted the workmen at least twice a day.
An intense rivalry sprang up in the construction of the 16 cantonments. Sixteen teams, with an average of 10,000 men on each team, began racing for the goal, which was to be 80 per cent completion by September 5, the date when the first contingents of selective soldiers were to be received by the cantonments. It was more exciting than any campaign in any professional baseball league, because the time was shorter and the stake vastly greater. The Cantonment Division kept alive this spirit of rivalry by posting each day in each cantonment the figures showing the rates of construction at all of them. The team, from the superintendents down to the humblest unskilled laborers, discussed these ratings as fans talk about the baseball averages.
The race was a close one, being won by Camp Taylor at Louisville, which was 79.4 per cent complete on the day the contest ended, lacking only six-tenths of 1 per cent of coming up to the maximum 80 per cent of completion regarded as possible in the time available. But other construction gangs were pressing that at Camp Taylor closely: Camp Travis, with 78.6 per cent of completion at the end of the contest; Camp Lee, 78.5 complete; Camp Devens, 74; Camp Lewis, 72; and Camp Sherman, 70. The Camp Lewis percentage was taken on August 31.
All construction work, including numerous additions not contemplated in the original plans, was virtually complete by November 30. These additional structures included cantonment base hospitals, on which the Government spent $10,000,000 for the National Army and $7,500,000 at the National Guard camps. With one or two exceptions these hospitals each had facilities for 1,000 patients at once, being the largest in the United States, at that time.
At several of the cantonments the water problem was simplified by the near presence of water mains of the systems of adjacent cities. At the other camps, however, it was necessary to construct independent water systems sufficient to furnish 55 gallons of water daily to each of 45,000 men. This is nearly twice as much water as was then being furnished to the average European army camp, and it meant in each case a system of centrifugal pumps and gravity tanks with a capacity of 2,250,000 gallons daily.
The local water supply was secured either from running streams or from dug wells. If the purity of the water was in doubt it was sterilized by the chlorine process and sometimes filtered in addition. The purity of the water and the care exercised in screening kitchens, mess halls, and later the dormitories themselves, from flies is seen in the hospital record for the first year of the war. Of all the soldiers who sought hospital treatment for sickness during that first year, only one patient in 5,000 was suffering from a water-borne disease.
In each cantonment there were about 1,500 wooden buildings, presenting a constant fire menace. As a protection from such disasters each cantonment organized its own fire department with modern motor equipment stationed in three or more fire houses. The men of the fire companies were usually those who had had previous training as members of city fire departments. There was not a single serious fire at the cantonments during the war period.
Besides keeping soldiers well and clean, the camp facilities provided them with opportunity for moral and healthy amusement. Various organizations combined to supply the camps with amusement facilities. There were the library buildings, the Red Cross buildings and halls, the Y. M. C. A. buildings, the Knights of Columbus buildings, the Salvation Army buildings, Y. W. C. A. buildings, and the Jewish Welfare Board buildings.
Although the American soldier bought liberally of Liberty bonds, took out War Risk insurance, and sent to his family the greater portion of his monthly pay, still he had a small amount of money to spend for little luxuries or necessities. These included small supplies such as candy and fruits, and they were on sale at the usual post exchange or company store. This was a small building, usually with a broad covered porch or shelter around three sides, so that the men in bad weather could be dry as they waited in line for their turn at the windows. The Y. M. C. A., K. of C., Red Cross, Y. W. C. A., Jewish Welfare Board, and Salvation Army buildings offered reading and writing rooms and general gathering places; yet these were insufficient for a total camp population averaging 40,000. Hence the Commission on Training Camp Activities built through the agency of the Construction Division a Liberty Theater at each camp.
The Liberty Theaters were of temporary construction, but in size compared favorably with the largest theaters in our modern cities. To provide these amusement facilities the Construction Division put up approximately 5,000,000 board feet of lumber, 9,000,000 square feet of wall board, and 40,000 square feet of roofing.
The average large city laundry was insufficient in capacity to handle the laundry work of an average of 6,000 people per day, which was the requirement to keep some 40,000 men in clean clothing. Consequently the camps and cantonments were provided with their own laundries built by the Construction Division. This put such a demand upon the manufacturers of laundry machinery that it created a shortage, and later there was a shortage of soap and powder. The 30 laundries built used up 13,000,000 board feet of lumber and 300,000 square feet of wall board.
The householder may throw his old shoes into the trash box and sell his old suit to the ragman, but the Army threw nothing away. Consequently the Construction Division was called upon to build reclamation plants at many stations. Usually one large plant was built at a center convenient to several camps, and to this center were sent the worn-out uniforms, shoes, leggins, and all other equipment.
Every camp of considerable size in the United States was provided with model bakeries. The total capacity of all the baking equipment installed by the Construction Division would turn out 1,000 tons of bread per day. This is a total of 2,000,000 loaves of 1 pound each. Each camp bakery oven would take care of 4,500 men per day in two 8-hour shifts, or it could bake 5,000 loaves in 24 hours.
There were required at all the camps and cantonments numerous storehouses for materials to be used immediately by the troops. The Construction Division built 789 of these small storehouses at the National Army cantonments alone.
The question of cold-storage facilities for the camps offered a knotty problem. Certain camps generally relied upon cold-storage space obtained near by, or else upon refrigerator cars iced in the vicinity, but in the other camps it was necessary to build special refrigeration plants. These had an ice-making capacity ranging from 6 to 35 tons daily. The ice consumption of the American soldiers in the United States proved to be 2¾ pounds per man per day.
The kitchens in the camps and hospitals would be paradise to any woman who had drudged with old-fashioned methods and equipment in cooking. As far as possible the Army's housekeeping was done by machinery. The bread slicer in common use would cut 200 slices of bread per minute and stack the slices automatically, the loaves feeding automatically into the slicer. The meat choppers would cut up 20 pounds of meat or vegetables in five minutes, and the electrically operated potato peeler would peel 40 pounds of potatoes in three minutes. The meat slicers would cut meat at the rate of 40 slices to the minute. Vegetables were cooked and meats roasted by high-pressure steam. The vegetable cooker could turn out 35 gallons of cooked product in 15 minutes. The dish-washing machines could wash, dry, and sterilize 10,000 dishes per hour. At the hospitals the food was taken from the central kitchen to the outlying wards in mobile fireless cookers, designed to keep the food hot until served.
To prepare food for 45,000 men, 350 kitchens were required by each cantonment. The National Army in training used 9,000 hotel ranges.
In most of the cantonments, particularly those in the South, the heating of quarters in winter was accomplished by means of room heaters and cannon stoves. The constructors installed 75,000 of these. The officers' quarters everywhere and four entire cantonments in the North--Devens in Massachusetts, Grant in Illinois, Custer in Michigan, and Dodge in Iowa--were heated by steam either from central heating plants or by means of ordinary boilers such as are used in residences. The total surface of the steam radiators installed would make five gigantic stoves 300 feet square and as high as the Woolworth Building in New York.
Besides the camps and cantonments used by the line troops, the Construction Division also built various special camps required by the mobilization, training, and transportation of the Army. These included the quartermaster training camp at Jacksonville, Fla., accommodating approximately 35,000 men; and the camps for the Engineering Corps, camps for heavy and light artillery training schools, and for other special units.
Camp Joseph F. Johnston at Blackpoint, the quartermaster camp near Jacksonville, is a good example of one of these special training camps. This consisted of quarters for 150 officers, 32 barracks to house 200 men each, together with barracks for wagon companies, pack companies, truck companies, and a bakery company, as well as stables for 1,200 animals and 50 riding horses, together with storeroom buildings and truck and auto garages.
Camp Holabird, near Baltimore, used for teaching men to repair and crate motor trucks and vehicles, had accommodations for about 7,500 men. Another special camp was Camp Humphreys, for the training of men in the Corps of Engineers, located a few miles down the Potomac River from Washington. This camp could accommodate 33,000 men in 1,350 buildings located on a camp area of 2,500 acres. Every foot of this site had to be cleared of timber and underbrush during one of the severest winters of recent years. All material had to be hauled in trucks over fearful roads pending the construction of a 5-mile spur of railroad track, yet the job was completed approximately on time.
Other special camps included Camp Bragg for training Field Artillery, located at Fayetteville, N. C., with quarters for 11,000 men; Camp Knox at Stithon, Ky., for 30,000 men, having an area of nearly 60,000 acres for training troops in the use of Field Artillery; and Camp Franklin, located on part of the Camp Meade cantonment reservation, a special camp for Signal Corps instruction, with accommodations for 11,000 men.
Then there was the Coast Artillery training cantonment, Camp Eustis at Lee Hall, Va., which had accommodations for 17,000 men; Camp Meigs at Washington, D. C., a quartermaster camp, providing accommodations for 4,000 men; and Camp Benning, at Columbus, Ga., an infantry school of arms, to accommodate 5,040 men, on a camp area of 98,000 acres. At Camp Raritan, at Raritan River, N. J., the Ordnance Department established a training school for 6,250 men.
Camps and cantonments built by Construction Division.
Key: (A) - Maximum capacity.
----------------+------------------+------+-----------+---------------------- | | |Approximate| Name. | Location. | (A) | cost. | Contractors. ----------------+------------------+------+-----------+---------------------- Camp Beauregard |Alexandria, La. |29,121| $4,300,000|Stewart McGehee, | | | | Hudson Construction | | | | Co., J. W. Snyder. | | | | Camp Bowie |Fort Worth, Tex. |41,879| 3,400,000|J. W. Thompson, | | | | H. G. Bush. | | | | Camp Bragg |Fayetteville, N.C.|11,831| 11,000,000|James Stewart Co. | | | | Camp Cody |Deming, N. Mex. |44,959| 3,800,000|J. W. Thompson Co., | | | | H. G. Bush. | | | | Camp Custer |Battle Creek, Mich|49,014| 13,000,000|Porter Bros., R. G. | | | |Phelps, W. E. Wood Co. | | | | Camp Devens |Ayer, Mass. |36,832| 11,800,000|Fred T. Ley Co., | | | | Coleman Bros. | | | | Camp Dix |Wrightstown, N. J.|42,806| 12,300,000|Irwin & Leighton Co., | | | | J. S. Rogers Co., | | | | J. W. Ferguson & Co. | | | | Camp Dodge |Des Moines, Iowa |49,229| 10,800,000|Charles Weltz Sons. | | | | Camp Doniphan |Lawton, Okla. |46,183| 2,706,000|Selden-Breck | | | | Construction Co., | | | | Trope & Carney. | | | | Camp Abraham |Lee Hall, Va. |16,759| 11,700,000|Winston & Co. Eustis | | | | | | | | Camp Fremont |Palo Alto, Calif. |30,000| 2,556,000|Lindgren Co., | | | | E. A. Hettinger. | | | | Camp Funston |Fort Riley, Kans. |42,806| 10,500,000|George A. Fuller | | | | Construction Co., | | | | Henry Bennet & Son, | | | | Gray Construction Co. | | | | Camp Gordon |Atlanta, Ga. |46,612| 11,100,000|Arthur Tufts Co., | | | | Mackie Construction | | | | Co., Southern-Ferro | | | | Construction Co. | | | | Camp Meade |Odenton, Md. |52,575| 16,200,000|Claiborne Johnson Co., | | | | Smith, Houser & | | | | McIsaacs. | | | | Camp Meigs |Washington, D. C. | 3,774| 655,000|Philip F. Gormley, | | | | Frank L. Wagner. | | | | Camp Merritt |Dumont, N. J. |39,079| 14,500,000|McArthur Bros. Co., | | | | W. H. Fissell & Co. | | | | Camp Mills |Garden City, L. I.|25,000| 13,000,000|Clough-Bourne Co. | | | | | | | |{Westinghouse-Church- | | | |{ Kerr Co., Hampton Camp Hill |Newport News, Va. | 5,852|}16,125,000|{ Roads Engineering Camp Stuart | do. |24,234|} |{ Construction Co., | | | |{ Boyle-Robertson | | | |{ Construction Co. Camp Oglethorpe |} | | |{ Fort Greenleaf|} |24,457| $5,600,000|{Park-Grimes Co. Forrest |} | | |{ | | | | Camp Pike |Little Rock, Ark. |55,010| 12,700,000|James Stewart & Co. | | | | (Inc.), | | | | Stewart McGehee Co. | | | | Camp Polk |Raleigh, N. C. | [37] | |Holliday-Krouse Co. | | | | Camp Sevier |Greenville, S. C. |41,693| 6,508,000|Gallivan Building Co. | | | | Camp Shelby |Hattiesburg, Miss.|36,010| 5,400,000|T. S. Moudy Co., | | | | Richard McCarthy Co. | | | | Camp Sheridan |Montgomery, Ala. |41,593| 3,500,000|Algernon Blair, | | | | Paschen Bros. | | | | Camp Sherman |Chillicothe, Ohio |49,112| 12,900,000|Thomas A. Bently & | | | | Sons, D. W. | | | | McGrath & Sons. | | | | Camp Taylor |Louisville, Ky. |45,424| 8,000,000|Mason & Hanger, | | | | Alfred Struck Co. | | | | Camp Travis |San Antonio, Tex. |42,809| 8,200,000|Stone & Webster, | | | | McKenzie Construction | | | | Co. | | | | Camp Upton |Yaphank, L. I. |43,567| 13,500,000|Thompson-Starrett Co., | | | | Mark C. Tredennick | | | | Co., C. H. & R. C. | | | | Peckworth (Inc.). | | | | Camp Grant |Rockford, Ill. |62,675| 14,400,000|Bates & Rogers | | | | Construction Co., | | | | Ross T. Beckstrom | | | | Co., Henry Erickson | | | | Co. | | | | Camp Green |Charlotte, N. C. |48,305| 4,300,000|Consolidated | | | | Engineering Co., | | | | J. A. Jones Co. | | | | Camp Hancock |Augusta, Ga. |45,099| 6,000,000|T. O. Brown Co., | | | | William Crawford. | | | | Camp Humphreys |Belvoir, Va. |32,434| 12,745,000|Phillip F. Gormley Co. | | | | Camp Jackson |Columbia, S. C. |44,009| 10,000,000|Hardaway Construction | | | | Co., Columbia Lumber | | | | & Manufacturing Co., | | | | H. B. Hann. | | | | Camp Jackson, | do. | [37] | |Hardaway Construction No. | | | | Co. | | | | Camp Johnston |Jacksonville, Fla.|18,265| |T. A. Bentley & Sons., | | | | J. Y. Wilson. | | | | Camp Kearney |San Diego, Calif. |32,066| 5,838,000|W. E. Hampton Co., | | | | John Roberts Co. | | | | Camp Knox |Stithton, Ky. |27,805| 18,733,184|John W. Griffith & | | | | Sons. | | | | Camp Las Casas |San Juan, |13,265| 2,500,000|Purdy & Henderson Co. | Porto Rico | | | | | | | Camp Lee |Petersburg, Va. |60,335| 16,500,000|Rhinehart & Dennis | | | | (Inc.), Harrison | | | | Construction Co., | | | | John T. Wilson & Co. | | | | (Inc.). | | | | Camp Lewis |American Lake |46,232| 8,400,000|Hurley Mason Co., | (Tacoma), Wash. | | | The Construction Co. | | | | Camp Logan |Houston, Tex. |44,899| 3,300,000|American Construction | | | | Co., Horton & Horton. | | | | Camp McArthur |Waco, Tex. |45,074| 4,000,000|Fred A. Jones | | | | Construction Co., | | | | Blome & Sinek Co., | | | | Edgar H. Bruyere. | | | | Camp McClellan |Anniston, Ala. |57,746| 9,800,000|John O. Chisholm & | | | | Co., Labarre & Erwin, | | | | A. W. Stoolman. | | | | Camp Wadsworth |Spartanburg, S. C.|56,249| 4,000,000|Fiske Carter Co. | | | | Camp Wheeler |Macon, Ga. |43,011| 3,200,000|W. Z. Williams. ----------------+------------------+------+-----------+----------------------
[37] Abandoned.