Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16) (part 2 of 8)

Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16) (part 2 of 8)

But while the gentlemen consider the character of these judges so sacred that their conduct cannot be inquired into, notwithstanding such proofs of want of confidence in them, and that as a gentleman near me from South Carolina (Mr. LOWNDES) has said that he is afraid of impeachment, and grounds his fears on the incapacity or the unfitness of the members of this House, or because the members of this House may abuse the power; Mr. F. asked, were not the members of this House selected and qualified for the discharge of this necessary duty? Were they not appointed by a respectable authority as the judges? Were they not under a solemn oath of office for the faithful discharge of this as well as every part of their high trust? And were they not protected by special privileges and protection during the discharge of their trust equally with the judges, and their stations as respectable as the judges’? They are not only protected from civil actions, but are not subjected to impeachment for misbehavior in office as the judges are. They are, in their official capacity, subjected only to the censure of public opinion. If this is true, it is improper, it is impolitic, for the members of this House to degrade their own character: it amounts to saying they are not capable of discharging the trust they are solemnly bound to discharge, and ought not to have been invested with. He knew, however, that this was only introduced as an excuse for unwillingness. But the same gentleman adds, as a reason for opposing the resolution, that he is not acquainted with the history of the business. That is probably the case with him and others, especially such as had not a seat in the last session of Congress, or who resided at a great distance from the scene alluded to in the resolution. Admitting this to be true, the best and the only regular way to become acquainted with the history of the case, is to carry the resolution into effect--to have a committee appointed with such power as would enable them to procure such information as that gentleman and every other member could depend on. The gentleman’s objection, in fact, is one of the strongest arguments in favor of the resolution. The gentleman from South Carolina has, however, offered one other objection to the resolution, which merits some notice. He has said that if a committee is appointed for the object proposed by the resolution, men of character and talents will not accept of appointments in the Judiciary. The solidity of this objection will be best examined by the test of observation and experience. It has been already mentioned that several States have appointed their supreme judges for short periods, and that others have vested the Legislature with the power of removing judges from office without impeachment, merely on their own opinion. Can the gentleman from South Carolina say--can any member on this floor, where all the States are represented, say--that these States are deficient in judges of respectability and talents? They cannot say so--there is no such complaint. The Judiciary of New Jersey, where the judges are chosen but for seven years, is as respectable, and the application of her laws as well brought home to the security and happiness of her citizens as they are in the States where judges are appointed for life. The same may be asserted with confidence of the State of Pennsylvania before the revision of her constitution, as they are since. There is this difference, however: where they have been appointed for limited periods there have been no impeachments or removals, and generally, if not always, the judges were reappointed, and justice was well administered; but since they have been appointed for good behavior, there have, at least in Pennsylvania, been both, and more complaints of inattention, expense, and delays, in the administration of justice than had been formerly. Many of the judges, however, are very respectable, and enjoy a high degree of confidence, but not more confidence than they did before the change of the constitution. There has been no attempt to remove or impeach the judges of the Supreme Court of that State.

To inquire into the conduct of the judges when confidence is evidently wanting, is the only true way to secure the respectability of the Judiciary. If that necessary confidence is withdrawn without cause, an official inquiry will restore confidence and the usefulness of the judges. This observation is supported by precedent and parliamentary usage. In that country from which precedents are so frequently sought, one precedent offers itself to recollection. In the year 1730, a committee of the British House of Commons was appointed to examine the jails. In the course of examination, the committee discovered that Sir Robert Eyres, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, a judge of very respectable character, was suspected, not of tyranny on the bench, or of putting any man’s life in jeopardy, but of having held an improper correspondence with a person confined for crime or misdemeanor, and this suspicion chiefly supported by anonymous letters. A committee of the House of Commons were appointed to make inquiry, and it was found, to the satisfaction of the committee and of the people, that the allegations on which the suspicion was founded were false, and the judge’s character was vindicated and restored.

Mr. F. said this precedent applied well to the present case. If the judges mentioned in the resolution had done their duty, their characters would be vindicated by the inquiry, and the public confidence in their integrity restored; if they were guilty, and not entitled to confidence, they ought to be removed from office, and neither the one nor the other could be done unless the inquiry proposed was authorized.

He said that the inquiry was necessary to secure the purity, honor, and usefulness of the Judiciary Department. If that House refused or neglected to exert the powers vested therein for securing public confidence in the Judiciary, unprincipled men would find means of recommending themselves to appointments, and would vitiate the streams where justice is expected to flow, and the citizens would be oppressed without the means or hopes of redress, and would feel the effects of tyrannical power in the administration of a government which, in its other departments, was the greatest and best of any in the world. Let proper inquiries be made where they are necessary; let the character of judges unjustly charged be vindicated, and the vicious and unworthy be removed, and improper characters will cease to intrude themselves; their friends will not dare to recommend, and Congress will have confidence that the laws which they pass will be applied agreeably to their genuine principles, to the protection and ease of the citizens; if we do not provide for this, we had better cease to make laws.

If virtuous men are appointed and the vicious discouraged, Congress may, from particular circumstances, be called on to make inquiries, but very rarely indeed to be employed in impeachments, (no men of real virtue and talents would refuse a seat on the bench for fear of inquiry or impeachment.) He said that the judges of the Supreme Court in the State he had the honor of representing, though they differed in political opinions, administered justice with such purity and diligence, that though some of them had been long in office, they enjoyed the confidence of the citizens, were in no danger of impeachment or removal by vote, and he believed would not shrink from inquiry if necessary. The more extensive the confidence of the citizens that was reposed in the Judiciary, the easier it would be to supply vacancies with men of character and talents. He said that among several other observations which occurred to his mind, with offering which he would not now detain the House, he had once thought of stating other charges against the official conduct of these judges, of which he had been well informed, but on due reflection he declined mentioning them, and thought it most for the public good to insist on the appointment demanded by a member on the responsibility of his own official character, and as a matter of right, and would do nothing that would impair the weight of the precedent that he hoped would be set by agreeing to the resolution as it stood.

Mr. F. said that having so long engaged the attention of the House he would conclude by observing, that as the case now stood it is proper for all the members to vote for the resolution; those that believed as he did, that there was a want of necessary confidence in those judges, and that this want of confidence was occasioned by their unauthorized and oppressive conduct, were obliged in conscience to vote for the inquiry; and every member who believed the judges to have done their duty, and that the public confidence is withdrawn from them without cause, are bound in duty to vote for the resolution, in order that the judges may have an opportunity to vindicate their character, that confidence in them being restored they may become useful to the public; therefore, in every light he could view it, he was convinced it was his duty to vote for the resolution, and would act accordingly.

Mr. JACKSON.--As, Mr. Speaker, this subject is novel in its nature, and may be important in its consequences, I presume there exists a disposition to hear the reasoning which any gentleman may be disposed to offer upon it. It is with this view that I rise to express my opinion in favor of creating a committee of inquiry. I consider this House as the grand inquest of the nation, whose duty it is to inquire, on a proper representation, into the conduct of every official character under the Government. Like a grand jury, we ought, in my opinion, at the instance of any member, to send for all persons possessed of information calculated to throw light upon the conduct of any individual inculpated. A contrary doctrine would lead to the most unfortunate consequences. It would lead to this, that a minority would never be able to inquire into the conduct of a State offender, unless such inquiry were favored by the majority. As it is now contended that the inquiry is not a matter of right which any member may demand, but a matter of favor, to be granted according to the pleasure of the majority, it may be said that, if a majority favor an individual, he will always escape without an impeachment. But I believe otherwise; and that the Senate, like a virtuous judge, will not suffer an atom of prejudice or partiality to fall into the scales of justice.

But, say gentlemen, though it may be the duty of the House to impeach an officer, it is necessary that facts, warranting such an impeachment, should be first presented. This is not the course pursued in cases where a grand jury is called upon to act. If a murder is committed, it is their duty to inquire, and diligently inquire, who is guilty of the act, and to send for all persons capable of giving information respecting it. Such is the practice. If it shall be required to furnish facts, as is urged by gentlemen, the consequence will be that offences of the highest nature will be committed with impunity. It has been observed that it is odious to undertake the task of a public informer. But what the constitution and laws make our duty, so far from being odious, is honorable; because we thereby discharge a duty imposed upon us by our oaths, and because we show ourselves unawed by the vicious conduct of bad men. If the character of a public informer be odious, are we to expect that private individuals will come forward with affidavits? In such a case, to say the least of it, the duty would be of an unpleasant nature.

We have, in the course of this debate, been frequently called upon for precedents, and been told, that, when found, they ought to be adhered to. In a country from which we are accustomed to draw precedents--England--common report has been considered as a sufficient authority for similar inquiries. We do not, however, ask for an inquiry in this case on common report, but on the declaration of a member of this House, made in his place. Suppose there was no such declaration, has not a common report, from Maine to Georgia, condemned the conduct of the judge in the case of Fries and others, at Philadelphia, in the case of a grand jury in Delaware, whom he directed to inquire for seditious practices, and in the case of Callender, in Virginia? Has not the general sentiment of the country charged him with having, in these cases, abused his powers as a judge by tyrannizing over those who were brought before him? If we possess the right to inquire, on common report, surely we ought to institute this inquiry on the prevalence of so general a sentiment. To such an inquiry I would unhesitatingly agree, if the character of the President were implicated, the opinion of the gentleman from Vermont to the contrary notwithstanding. I would likewise agree to make the same inquiry in any other case; because the inquiry would redound to the honor of the individual implicated, if innocent; and because, if guilty, he ought to be punished.

I am sorry my friend from Pennsylvania stated any facts, as I do not consider it necessary that the House should be acquainted with any facts to make this inquiry; and because I think the facts, stated as grounds of impeachment, are not such as will warrant an impeachment. I have always understood that it was the right of a judge to expound the law, and I have known frequent instances where the court have refused the counsel the liberty of discussing the law on points on which they have made up their minds. While I am free to declare that the conduct of the court in the trial of Fries is not, in my opinion, such as to require an impeachment, yet I am in favor of instituting the inquiry. But, say gentlemen, by the passage of this resolution, we shall censure the judge. I believe not. If I believed so, I would first require testimony; for I hold it a good principle, that no man ought to be condemned until he has been heard. In my opinion, this resolution will have no such tendency; as, if the judge has not been guilty of misconduct, the inquiry will redound to his honor, and as it is the duty of a virtuous man to demand an inquiry whenever charged with an offence.

Gentlemen, in opposition to this measure, say they wish to guard against suspicion. But suspicion has long since gone forth; has been heard and re-echoed from every part of the Union; and the only way of defeating it, if ill-founded, is to institute an inquiry, and if the character of the judge be innocent, to pronounce it so. I am surprised to find gentlemen, who profess a friendship for the character of one of the persons implicated, opposed to this inquiry, when they believe him innocent. I should suppose it their peculiar duty to call for the inquiry, that the accused might have an opportunity of proving to the world that his character has been assailed without cause.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD.--After what has passed on this floor, there can be no doubt that the gentlemen whose characters are implicated by this resolution will ardently desire an investigation of their conduct; and if, on this floor, we were merely to consult our own wishes, we should unanimously agree on an investigation. But this is not our duty; our duty is to take on this, as well as on all other occasions, a correct course; to take those steps only which are warranted. It is because I doubt, after considerable deliberation, whether this course is warranted, that I am opposed to it. What, I ask, is the nature of the resolution on the table? It contains no charges against the judges implicated; it only proposes to raise a committee to inquire whether their official conduct has been such as to justify the interposition of the constitutional power of this House. If a committee of inquiry is raised, what will be their powers? One thing will certainly follow. They will be clothed with a power to send for persons, and probably for papers. Is it consistent with principle to appoint a committee, which, from its nature, must be secret, with power to ransack the country in the first instance for accusations against the judges, and then for proofs to support them? Is this correct? Are gentlemen prepared to say so? to seek for accusations, and then for proofs to support those accusations, against high officers of the Government? For one, I believe that this course is not correct. I believe it to be dangerous. I agree with the gentleman from Vermont, that it operates in the nature of an inquisition. A committee will be raised to act in secret, first to find an accusation, and next to prove it. If there is now any accusation against the judges, let it be made; let it be made on this floor; and, as the gentleman from New Jersey has observed, let us ascertain, if true, whether it will be a sufficient ground for an impeachment. This will be a correct course, and it will be the only safe course. If, on the contrary, we proceed in the manner proposed, it will be attended with this consequence: at the commencement of every session we shall raise a secret committee, to compose an inquisition, to ascertain whether there are not charges against some public officer, and to search for proofs to justify them. Is the Government of this country founded on this principle? I know that this secret course of procedure is practised by the Spanish Government, and by some others, but I never thought that it would be the practice of this Government. When a charge is made against a public officer, it ought to be boldly made. It ought to be made here, and should be committed to writing. Instead of this being done, there is no charge made. The resolution contains none. It is merely calculated to raise a secret committee. Why? Because the gentleman from Virginia is of opinion that it is proper. Is his opinion, or the opinion of any other gentleman, to govern this House? Are we brought to this? I trust this is not the case. I trust that gentlemen will think it necessary not only to consider his opinion, but to form their own. What can gentlemen say, if they agree to this resolution? That they voted to investigate the conduct of two judges. Why? Because the gentleman from Virginia says it is necessary to investigate. Why investigate? Because the gentleman demands it. This is the language of that gentleman yesterday. Because a gentleman of this House gives his opinion of the course proper to be pursued on this occasion, it does not follow that we are to be governed by it. We may respect it; but we must respect our own opinions still more, if we faithfully discharge our duty. I am sensible that some facts have been mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or rather, that that gentleman has heard a story; but it is mere hearsay.

I ask, also, how this formidable charge has rested to this day? When and where did the transaction, on which it is founded, happen? In Philadelphia, and in the winter of the year 1800, when Congress were in session within twenty rods of the place where the court was held. The gentleman from Virginia, as well as other members on this floor, were then in the House. The case being, I believe, the only one in which there was a charge of treason, excited, in a considerable degree, the attention of members, many of whom attended the trial. How comes it, then, that this charge was not then made? If it shall be said the House did not interfere at that time because the criminal was lying under sentence of death, it will be recollected that, in 1801, Fries was pardoned. Why was not the inquiry then made? If it shall be said that it would have been imprudent to make it on account of the party then in power, why was it not made in the seventh Congress, when a change of men took place? How can gentlemen reconcile this great delay with the high regard they profess for the purity of the streams of justice, and for justice itself? For such is the respect they entertain for justice, that they have determined to bring to conviction this unjust and criminal judge. Gentlemen ought to account for this culpable neglect. It is impossible that they should have been ignorant of the trial of this man. It was not a sudden or a hidden thing, done in a corner; it was done in public, in the face of the Legislature, and yet it has slept to the present day. Under such circumstances, I submit it to the House, whether much respect ought to be paid to the hearsay of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. The very delay, and other circumstances attending this transaction, show that it is not of the serious nature contended. I therefore think that, if properly brought before the House, and suffered to rest upon proof, it would constitute no ground for impeachment. As to the proposed form of proceeding, if we examine precedents, we shall find that it is not warranted by them. None mentioned compare with the case under consideration. The precedent in the case of Lord Bolingbroke does not compare with that. In that case the House of Commons raised a secret committee to examine the negotiations made for a peace. The committee was not raised to impeach Lord Bolingbroke, but to investigate the negotiations of the Ministry; and on the disclosure of facts, which took place on that occasion, the impeachment was grounded. Such, also, was the case in the instance of the Western expedition. The House appointed a committee vested with general powers to inquire into the causes of its failure, without particular reference to the conduct of any person.

If we turn our attention to British precedents, we shall find that a committee has never failed to investigate the official conduct of any person contemplated to be impeached. In the case of Hastings, Mr. Burke came forward and moved an impeachment directly. In all cases this course has been pursued in the British House of Commons. So far as we have precedents in this country, a similar course has been pursued. In the instance of Governor Blount, the Executive transmitted documents to this House, which contained, as it was supposed, evidence of his guilt; they were referred to a committee to examine them, and also to determine whether it was proper to print them. The committee reported that, in their opinion, they contained evidence of his guilt, and he was impeached. In the case of Judge Pickering, the same course has been pursued. The Executive transmitted documents to the House which contained, as it was supposed, proofs of misconduct, and the House proceeded to an impeachment. These precedents confirm the principle of those drawn from the practice of the British House of Commons. What course is now proposed? Without any charge against the judges, without any man saying they are guilty of any misconduct, we are about to appoint a secret committee, to determine whether any charges can be made, and whether any proofs to support them can be found. Although I am willing that the conduct of these gentlemen shall be investigated, for I am sure they must desire it, and although I have no objection to impeach them, if gentlemen wish it, and exhibit proper proofs on which to ground it, yet I cannot consent to pursue a course so improper as that now proposed. For this reason I am against the resolution, not because I am hostile to an investigation, but because I cannot consent to the appointment of a secret committee to search, in the first instance, for an accusation, and to look for proofs to justify it.

Mr. FINDLAY rose to explain. He said it was not the object of the House, in their investigation of the causes of the failure of the Western expedition, to make new arrangements, but to inquire into the conduct of certain officers who had directed it, viz: the Secretary of War, the Commander-in-chief, and the Commissary.

Mr. NICHOLSON said, he happened not to be in the House yesterday at the moment when the resolution under consideration was introduced; and when he entered he found the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. R. GRISWOLD) on the floor, who concluded his remarks by moving a postponement. Mr. N. did not think it then correct to offer remarks upon the main question, but as the resolution itself was now under consideration, and the subject of no common nature, he could not think of passing a silent vote upon it.

When he rose to-day, for a few moments, on the motion to amend, by inserting the name of Judge Peters, he had then declared, and he now begged leave to repeat it, that whenever any member of the House should rise in his place and state that any officer of the Government had been guilty of official misconduct, he had no hesitation in saying, that he would consent to an inquiry. He cared not how exalted his station, or how far he was raised above the rest of the community; the very circumstance of his superior elevation would prove an additional incitement. Such, he said, was the nature of the Government, and so important the duty in this respect devolved upon the House of Representatives, that the conduct of the Chief Magistrate himself, as far as his vote could effect it, should be subjected to an inquiry whenever it was demanded by a member. The greater responsibility, the more easy and more simple should be the means of investigation. Were he, indeed, the friend, personal or political, of the officer charged, and he believed that impeachment would be the result of inquiry, it was possible that his feelings as a man might induce him to forget his duty as a Representative, and urge him to resist the inquiry; but, were he convinced of his innocence, he would do all in his power to promote it, in order that he might stand justified to the nation and to the world.

Upon the present occasion, he begged that he might not be understood to say that the offence with which these judges were charged, was such as would warrant an impeachment. But, while he meant not to commit himself on a question of such high moment, he could not avoid expressing his astonishment that the conduct stated should not only be defended upon the floor of the House, but entirely approved; that gentlemen should venture to declare that the court acted strictly in the line of their duty, in refusing to hear counsel on a point of law which involved the guilt or the innocence of the prisoner. A man was charged with the highest offence against the Government, and, if guilty, was subject to the severest and most ignominious punishment recognized by our laws. High treason was the crime, and death the penalty. The constitution declared that treason against the United States should consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. The framers of the constitution intended to be as precise as possible in their definition of treason; they were anxious that no room should be left for doubt afterwards. They had seen to what an infinite variety of objects the crime of treason had been extended in England, and wisely confined it here to the only two offences which could be said to strike at the existence of the Government. The laws of the United States had declared that resistance to the execution of a law should only be considered as sedition, and had provided the punishment of fine and imprisonment. Fries was charged with resisting the execution of a law, and this offence the court determined to be treason, without hearing his counsel, and refused to permit them to address the jury on the subject, although the jury were the judges as well of the law as the fact. A resistance to the execution of a law, they construed to be treason, in the face of the act of Congress, which declared it to be a misdemeanor only, punishable with fine and imprisonment. These constructive treasons, he said, had been reprobated by the wise and good in all ages, and at a very early period in the history of English jurisprudence had received the pointed disapprobation of the Parliament. He adverted to what he called a wise and humane provision in the statute of Edward III., by which the judges were prohibited from declaring any thing to be treason not so expressly defined by the letter of the statute. That the court had given such an opinion, was not now, however, the point of charge against them; that they extended the doctrine of treason beyond both the letter and spirit of the constitution, was not now the foundation of the present motion. The accusation was that, in a case involving the life or death of a freeman, the party was condemned without a hearing; that he was denied the assistance of counsel, which was secured to him by the constitution of his country; that the right of the jury to decide both the law and the fact was refused; for it amounted to a refusal when the court would not permit the jury to be assisted by the arguments of counsel. He asked if gentlemen would consider it correct in a court, upon an indictment for murder, to prohibit the prisoner’s counsel from contending before the jury, that the offence charged amounted to manslaughter only? Surely not. The question, in the case of Fries was, whether the act of which he had been guilty amounted to treason, or to a misdemeanor? and this the court refused to suffer the jury to have an argument upon. He declared that, in all criminal prosecutions, the jury had a clear, undoubted right to decide, as well the law as the fact; they were not bound by the direction of the court; and that, in capital cases, it was a right which they ought always to exercise. But, in Fries’s case, the law was not permitted to be brought into the view of the jury by his counsel; the court denied to the prisoner the assistance of counsel, which was secured to him by the constitution, and he was condemned to an ignominious death, which he must have suffered but for the subsequent interference of the Executive. Mr. N. said, he had thought proper to make these remarks in answer to those gentlemen who had undertaken to pronounce the conduct of the court to be strictly correct. Although he did not mean to commit himself by declaring that this afforded sufficient ground for impeachment, yet he could not avoid saying, that the refusal to hear counsel in defence of the prisoner, did not meet his approbation.

The gentleman from Connecticut had doubted whether the present proceeding was conformable to principle. He thought that we ought to have the proof before we take any steps to procure it. Mr. N. begged leave to ask how proof was to be procured before inquiry was made? In what manner information was to be obtained before it was sought for? If a member had stated upon oath that a judge had been guilty of improper conduct, which would warrant an impeachment, the motion would not be, in the first instance, to inquire, but to impeach. If information was necessary, how was it to be procured? By sitting here, and writing for depositions to be sent in? Surely not. If a person was in the lobby, acquainted with all the facts, how were they to be communicated to the House? Was he to come to the bar, and offer a voluntary affidavit, or would it be correct to introduce him without any previous proceeding? In that case, would it not be necessary to declare, by a prior resolution, that we would commence an inquiry before testimony could be offered at the bar? If a member should state that a witness was at hand who could prove official misconduct in a judge, the correct course would be to introduce a resolution, declaring that the House would inquire, and it could not be resisted. What, he asked, was the proposed course? Instead of making the inquiry in the House, it was requested that it might be made by a committee. Instead of using our power to bring witnesses before us, it is proposed to authorize a committee to examine them. This would be more convenient and more proper. To bring them before the House would be attended with inconvenience, and unnecessary delay. He could not tell what the mode of proceeding before the House of Representatives would be, but, generally, he believed, it was the practice for a member to propound the question to the Speaker; the Speaker then to propound it to the witness; the answer to be made to the Speaker, and by him reverberated back again to the House. He asked, if the House would consent to this? If they would agree to a course of proceedings so tedious, so procrastinating, so evidently embarrassing? And yet this must be the course, unless that proposed was adopted.

It was said by a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. R. GRISWOLD,) that we were about to appoint a committee to ransack the country for an accusation, and afterwards to search for proof to support it. He complains that no accusation is made. Mr. N. averred that an accusation was made; it was made during the last session, and again repeated during the present. He asked, if it was no charge to declare that a judge had condemned a man to the most ignominious death, without a hearing; without allowing him those benefits which he claimed under the constitution? Was it a trivial circumstance for a member of this House to declare that a freeman had been indicted for a high capital offence; that he appeared at the bar and pleaded not guilty; that his counsel were ready to prove the truth of the plea, but that the presiding judge had refused to hear them? If this was not a charge, and a charge, too, of a most solemn nature, he did not understand the meaning of the words. It was brought forward as boldly as the gentleman from Connecticut could wish, and the only question now was, in what manner shall we inquire into the truth of it? Shall we appoint a committee to make the inquiry by calling witnesses before them, or shall we dismiss it without investigation? Shall we give it the go-by, and suffer the character of the judges to rest under an imputation so heavy? Shall we proclaim our own dishonor, by publishing abroad that a heavy charge had been made, in the face of this House, against one of the highest judicial officers of the Government, and that we were too pusillanimous to notice it?

What the gentleman meant by comparing the proposed committee to the Spanish Inquisition, Mr. N. did not really understand. Did the gentleman wish to make a false impression upon the public mind? Was he anxious to cast an odium upon the proceeding by calling it an inquisitorial committee, and affecting to believe that it was to be clothed with the powers of the Holy Inquisition? The Inquisition had the power to seize the person of the party, to deny him all access to his friends, to confine him in a cell, and refuse him all assistance whatever; to stretch him on the wheel, and rack and torture him into confession. Does the gentleman wish to induce a belief that this committee is to be clothed with the same powers? All committees appointed to inquire, might, to be sure, be called Inquisitorial, because they were to make inquiry, but the epithet of Spanish Inquisition was intended to convey an idea totally incorrect.

The gentleman had asked why this charge had been suffered to rest so long? The facts upon which it was made were said to have taken place in 1800. Mr. N. thought it would be fair to reply to the gentleman that, possibly, he himself had, in some measure, accounted for the delay; the proper time had not before arrived. But if the act upon which the charge was grounded was criminal at that day, was it less so now? If Justice had slept so long, did it follow that she was dead? He hoped and trusted not. Though she had lain dormant till she was almost trampled to death, she was again roused to her accustomed vigilance, would pursue her victims, and drag them to punishment. The day of retribution, he hoped, was at hand.

The gentleman from Connecticut had declared that the proposed course was not warranted by precedent. He had noticed, but had not explained away, the precedents introduced by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. FINDLAY.) His own precedent, derived from the impeachment of Mr. Hastings, instead of being in his favor, was directly against him.

In that case it was not pretended that the proof was before the House of Commons. Mr. Burke had derived his information from certain papers relative to Indian affairs, which some years before had been produced and referred to a select committee. In the year 1786, Mr. Burke rose in his place, not as a member of that committee, and charged Warren Hastings with high crimes and misdemeanors. About the same time he presented a written paper containing a specification of these charges. But this was not the impeachment. The written paper stated that as Governor General of Bengal he had disobeyed the instructions of the court of directors; that he had acknowledged himself perfectly acquainted with their wishes, but instead of obeying, had used his utmost endeavors to defeat them; and much more of an important nature. This he moved might be referred to a Committee of the whole House, in order that an inquiry might be made; and there was not a single dissenting voice. He did not adduce the proofs in the first instance, but stated his opinions that Mr. Hastings’s conduct had been criminal, and demanded an inquiry. The Commons of England did not hesitate--they instantly resolved to inquire. No one was heard to declare that there was no charge, because there was no proof. Witnesses were brought to the bar and there examined by a Committee of the Whole, in support of the charges; nor was there a motion to impeach until the testimony was gone through. On the contrary, the facts proved were reported by the Committee of the Whole, who likewise expressed an opinion that Warren Hastings had been guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, and ought to be impeached. The impeachment therefore was not upon the motion of Mr. Burke, but upon the report of a committee, who under the instruction of the House had made an inquiry.

What then, Mr. N. asked, was the course now proposed? His friend from Virginia had called the attention of the House to certain alleged misconduct of a judge, which had been stated by a member in his place during the last session. That statement had again been repeated in the House yesterday, not in writing, indeed, but in language so clear and in terms so unequivocal that none were so stupid as not to understand it. Like Mr. Burke, he asked that a committee should be appointed to inquire into the truth of the charge. The House of Commons had referred the subject before them to a Committee of the Whole, and the House of Representatives were moved to refer the subject before them to a select committee. A select committee was proposed, because it would be more convenient and more expeditious. If the subject might with propriety be referred to a Committee of the Whole, with equal propriety might it be referred to a select committee.

He had noticed this precedent, not because he thought it necessary to cross the Atlantic for authorities, but because the gentleman had introduced it as favoring his own doctrines. If there was already no precedent, in his opinion the House ought to make one; but he believed their own journals would furnish them with one. At the first session of the seventh Congress, in a very few days after the House met, Mr. N. said he had risen in his place, and stated that he had seen in the public prints, during the preceding summer, charges of a serious nature against an individual who had filled one of the highest stations under the Government, that he had misapplied considerable sums of public money, and was a defaulter to a very large amount. Upon this vague rumor, he had moved that the accounts of the former Secretary of State should be laid before the House. No gentleman then declared that it was necessary to have proof before an inquiry took place. No one dreamt that information as to facts was to be had, before it was sought for. Some indeed had asked how far the motion was to extend; whether it was to embrace all the other Secretaries of State? Others desired that the accounts from all the departments should be called for, and finally it was determined to let the resolution lie for a short time. In a few days after, on the 14th of December, he modified the resolution, in conformity with the wishes of several gentlemen, and it passed directing that “a committee should be appointed to inquire and report, whether moneys drawn from the Treasury had been faithfully applied to the objects for which they had been appropriated, and whether they had been regularly accounted for,” &c. A precedent more in point he thought could not be desired. The inquiry was produced, not upon proof, not even upon the suggestion of a member, but because a report as to the misapplication of public money had circulated through the public prints of the day. He might be told perhaps that this was an inquiry of a general nature. But general as it might be, it was directed at the conduct of individuals, and under other circumstances might have furnished materials for an impeachment. The gentleman from Connecticut was a member of that committee, and Mr. N. asked him if he would pretend to say that it was a secret committee, as he had called that now asked for? Or was this only another attempt to impose upon the public?

Another precedent, he thought, might be furnished from the Journal, but he was unwilling to refer to it.

It had been said, too, that impeachments would be cheap if they were to be made upon the suggestion of a member. It appeared to him that the motion to inquire had been constantly mistaken for a motion to impeach. Did gentlemen suppose that an impeachment must necessarily follow an inquiry? It would seem as if they entertained a poor opinion of those whose conduct was the subject of discussion. But they ought to recollect that the impeachment could not be the act of any individual, nor of the committee, but of the House; and this, too, after all the facts were collected and presented, with the evidence to support them. If this mode was not to be adopted, he did not know any other manner in which an impeachment could be instituted, unless where the President thought the peace of the country or the revenue were endangered, and gave the information himself, as in the case of Governor Blount and Judge Pickering. Nor did he think this could affect the independency of judges, unless they were to be made independent of the laws, the constitution, and the people.

Had it not been for the debate which had taken place on this subject, he should have imagined that the friends to the judge would have been the first to promote the inquiry after it was moved for. If he was innocent, the inquiry ought to be wished for: after passing through the ordeal, he would come out like pure gold from the crucible. If guilty, no man ought to feel a disposition to screen him from punishment. Mr. N. could not avoid on this occasion alluding to the recent conduct of a judge in a neighboring State, upon whose character an imputation of the blackest nature had been thrown by a miscreant. That judge, conscious of his own rectitude, and disdaining to shelter himself from inquiry, demanded an investigation of the charge, and the consequence was an entire and honorable acquittal.

Mr. ELLIOT.--When, in the course of a late debate in this House, it was observed that a member had advanced an anti-republican sentiment, the supposed imputation was repelled by the remark, that the gentleman to whom allusion had been made, had passed a political ordeal which few had experienced, and which ought to place his character as a republican above the reach of suspicion. I have myself suffered an ordeal of that description, under circumstances of gloom and depression which have fallen to the lot of but few young men of this country; and I am far from being confident that one ordeal only will fill up the measure of my humble fortune. A more anti-republican resolution than the one upon your table, sir, I think I never saw. Reflection has confirmed me in the opinion which I expressed yesterday, that it is unprecedented, unparliamentary, and tends to the assumption, on the part of this House, of a censorial and inquisitorial power over the Judiciary, unwarranted by the constitution. The intention and object of the mover, however, must have been extremely different; the motive is pure and the object meritorious; but that honorable gentleman, with all his talents and discernment, has, in my opinion, fallen into an error. I believe it a sound principle, that no official measures should be taken to censure or criminate the conduct of a public officer, until facts shall be stated which amount to a specific and definite charge of misconduct. In the present instance we have no written allegations, and what is the amount of the verbal information with which we are furnished? A gentleman from Pennsylvania has stated in his place that he has heard that some one of the judges, whose name appears in the resolution, was guilty of improper and oppressive conduct, in the exercise of his judicial functions, on a trial for treason some years since. And a gentleman from Virginia has stated that he has received information which induces him to believe that the inquiry he demands will lead to an impeachment. Is it our duty to act upon the vague rumors of common fame, or the opinions of individual members?

The resolution under consideration has been materially altered this morning, and I gave my vote for the alteration, because I believed that the misconduct of a court ought not to be attributed to a single judge.

I feel it my duty, Mr. Speaker, to remark, that the information which is possessed by the members of this House, respecting the conduct of those judges, is extremely contradictory. No gentleman has told us that he possesses personal knowledge of the misconduct imputed to those officers; and I possess information on the subject, derived soon after the transaction, from a source which I considered as authentic, and which produced so deep an impression upon my mind, that I should scarcely abandon my belief of its authenticity, even from the general recollection of persons who were present at the scene. I understand that the judges did nothing more or less than decide a legal question in a legal manner. They did not interdict the counsel for the prisoner from examining a question of law, but they restricted them to what they considered as their legal and constitutional limits. They told them that the constitution of our country had clearly and explicitly defined the crime of treason, and confined them to the plain field of the constitution, inhibiting them from a resort to British authorities to prove that to be treason which the constitution of our country had not made treason, or to prove that what our constitution had made treason, was not recognized as such by foreign precedents. This statement may be incorrect, and, if it be correct, the conduct of the judges may have been improper and severe, but it cannot justify an impeachment. And if the court went farther, interrupted the counsel for the prisoner, informed them that it was the province of the court to determine points of law, declared that their opinion was fixed upon those points, and even forbade the counsel to prolong their arguments upon them, it might still be questionable whether the conduct of the court rendered its members liable to impeachment. A venerable gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. FINDLAY,) who has long been in the service of his country, has been incorrect in stating that I had observed that I would never go into the inquiry without evidence; that incorrectness must have been unintentional; if I used an expression of that description, it was a lapsus linguæ: but I am confident that I said, and I am certain that I intended to say, that I thought it improper to institute the inquiry until some fact or facts should be stated as a ground of accusation. A gentleman from Virginia (Mr. JACKSON) has told us that common fame is sufficient ground for impeachment in Great Britain. That gentleman has not adduced his authorities for this proposition, and, had he adduced them, I am confident they would not have answered his purpose, when contemplated in all their bearings, when examined with all their qualifications. The same gentleman also observed, if I understood him correctly, that were he satisfied that the conduct of the judges, in the case alluded to, was legal and correct, he would still vote for the inquiry. To me this declaration appears extraordinary. Why vote for an inquiry when satisfied that no criminality existed?

A gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) who contends that there is no necessity for precedent in the present instance, as we are competent to form precedents for ourselves, has yet thought proper to explore the books for precedents, and has presented us with the result of his labors. To guide our conduct on the present occasion, we are referred to the case of the Earl of Strafford, over whose tomb genius and virtue love to mourn, and will mourn in future ages! It cannot be possible that that gentleman wishes to recommend for our imitation that flagrant perversion of every principle of law and justice, that cruel catastrophe! A gloomy and terrible precedent, one of the most dark and disgraceful in the British annals, and utterly unsusceptible of application to the principles of a Republican form of Government. The gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. NICHOLSON,) to whom I listened with peculiar pleasure, and who has certainly displayed ingenuity, has been equally unfortunate in his selection of precedents, and in his application of them to the case under consideration. He has cited cases, which, by his own statement, militate against the principles he assumes. We are first presented with the celebrated case of Warren Hastings. In that case, a member rose in his place, and, after accusing Hastings of high crimes and misdemeanors, exhibited specific charges of malconduct, in consequence of which an inquiry was instituted. Here is a solid basis, and the very basis which is wanting on the present occasion, upon which to erect the superstructure of impeachment. That gentleman has also mentioned a resolution introduced by himself in a former Congress, which was expressed in general terms, and directed to general objects, and of course was perfectly dissimilar to the present one.

Allusions have repeatedly been made to a remark of mine in the debate of yesterday, that this House is the grand inquest of the nation. It has been asked, if a grand jury were informed that a murder has been committed, would they not send for evidence to ascertain the fact? We are the grand inquest of the nation, and our practice ought, in many respects, to be analogous to that of grand juries; but in becoming that inquest, we do not entirely lose our deliberative and legislative character. I believe it would be descending from the dignity of our station, to listen to the murmurs of general rumor, and seek for guilt. I have heard that one of the judges whom we are called upon to censure, when in the exercise of his judicial functions, inquired of a jury, “Is there no sedition here? Are there no seditious newspapers within your jurisdiction?” I am ignorant whether this report be or be not founded on fact. But if it be true, let me ask, shall we not pursue a similar course by adopting the present resolution? Shall we not authorize a committee to inquire, Is there no judicial guilt abroad in our land? Is there no latent inquiry in some unexplored corner of our country? A grand jury is sworn diligently to inquire, and true presentment make, of all such offences against the laws of the land, as shall come to their knowledge. Have we taken such an oath? Are we under such obligations? And are we not about to attach to ourselves that character which gentlemen tell us is so odious, the character of common informers? I am under no fears that the stream of justice, which ought to be so pure, will become turbid, from a want of accusers, when our judges shall be guilty of crimes. When our courts shall become corrupt and despotic, patriotic motives will induce our citizens to bring forward accusations. I am also sensible of the propriety and force of the observation of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. R. GRISWOLD,) that the trial in question was a transaction of great publicity, and all its circumstances must have been known to thousands of our citizens. This induces me to believe that the conduct of the court was not so oppressive and despotic as is now represented. Why has this awful charge slumbered so long?

One or two remarks upon the allusions that have been made to my observation, that we are about to assume censorial and inquisitorial powers, and I will dismiss the subject. What is the language of the resolution? Without the allegation of a single fact, it constitutes a committee to inquire whether the judges have not so acted in their official capacity as to render necessary the interposition of the constitutional powers of this House. The expression is unequivocal; the allusion to the power of impeachment is perfectly obvious. This is what is called a petitio principii; it takes for granted, at least in some degree, what remains to be proved, that the conduct of the judges has been improper and illegal. Else why adopt a language which implies suspicion and censure? But gentlemen are alarmed at the epithet inquisitorial, and imagination teems with the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition. If the creation of this committee be an unauthorized act, if in creating it we transcend those limits which we ought, by a reasonable construction of the constitution, to set to our own powers, it instantly becomes inquisitorial in its nature and in its operation. We must delegate to it more than general powers. We must authorize it to send for persons, and probably for papers and records. The proposition is hostile to republican principles, and, as a republican, I cannot give my vote in its favor.

Mr. HOLLAND.--When I before addressed the House on this subject, I had no doubt of the charge being sufficiently explicit to found an inquiry into the conduct of the judges. My only doubt was whether it was proper to proceed without affidavit. Since yesterday I have reflected on the course pursued in similar cases; and I will state to the House the proceedings adopted in two or three cases in the Legislature of which I was a member. In the year 1796, a charge was preferred against certain judges of the State of North Carolina for illegally extending their power. A committee was appointed to inquire into their conduct, and the result was, that the judges had exiled certain persons from the State. The proceedings did not go so far as an impeachment; for the judges wrote an explanatory letter, which gave satisfaction, and they were acquitted with honor. The other charge, to which I have alluded, was against the board of army accounts; that also was referred to a committee. The last case is the most recent. A suspicion existed that the Secretary of State had been guilty of misconduct. A letter had been received by the Governor from some citizens to that effect; in consequence of which, and of other corroborating circumstances, the Legislature appointed a committee of inquiry, of which I had the honor to be a member. That committee was empowered to send for persons and papers. There was no specific charge, but an impeachment was contemplated, if the officer should appear to be guilty. The Secretary was brought before the committee, who examined him on oath, and reported the existence of frauds much more extensive than had been imagined; in consequence of which the land office was shut up, and the Secretary notified that articles of impeachment would be exhibited against him. But the late period of the session not then admitting of a trial, it was postponed to the next General Assembly. At the succeeding Assembly the officer resigned, and superseded the necessity of an impeachment. He was afterwards indicted at common law. These precedents, drawn from the proceedings of the Legislature of the State which I have the honor to represent, induce me to think that the course proposed is proper; and I shall, accordingly, vote for the appointment of a committee of inquiry.

Mr. DENNIS said, he did not rise for the purpose of entering into an investigation of the merits of the question, but principally for the purpose of stating, in a few words, what appeared to be the difference between the friends and the opponents of the resolution. He had never experienced, on any occasion, a stronger conflict between inclination and duty than in the present instance. On the one hand, he was confident that, after the official conduct of the judges had been thus publicly implicated, it must be desirable to them that an investigation of the facts charged against them should take place, and it seemed to be a duty due to those gentlemen, that they should have an opportunity of being confronted with their accusers. On the other hand, we owe to the laws and constitution, as well as to those considerations which must always govern in the establishment of important precedents, a paramount duty, which appeared in this case irreconcilable with the indulgence of individual considerations. The true difference between the advocates and the opponents of the resolution appeared to be this: That the one thought it a proper procedure to raise an inquisitorial committee, without any definite or assignable object, and without stating in the resolution any specific charge. The other did not demand, as it had been supposed, the production of all the evidence in the outset of the proceeding, which might be necessary in the ulterior stages of the transaction, nor that precise and technical specification of the charges which might be proper in articles of impeachment, but only required that some fact should be stated, or charge alleged, as the basis on which to erect a committee. He believed, to create a committee by resolution, with general inquisitorial powers, without specifying any charge, or stating any reason in the resolution for the proceeding, was without precedent, and might become an engine of oppression. In order to satisfy the friends of the resolution on that, he did not wish to avoid that investigation which might be founded on proper principles, and which he believed, after what has been said, is rather courted than avoided by the judges in question. He would beg leave to read, in his place, the form of a resolution, such as he supposed ought to be the groundwork of a procedure like this:

“Whereas information hath been given to the House, by one of its members, that in a certain prosecution for treason, on the part of the United States, against a certain John Fries, pending in the circuit court of the United States, in the State of Pennsylvania, Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Richard Peters, district judge for the district of Pennsylvania, by whom the said circuit court was then holden, did inform the counsel for the prisoner that, as the court had formed their opinion upon the point of law, and would direct the jury thereupon, the counsel for the prisoner must confine themselves to the question of the fact only. And whereas, it is represented that, in consequence of such determination of the court, the counsel did refuse to address the jury on the question of fact, and the said John Fries was found guilty of treason, and sentenced by the court to the punishment in such case, by the laws of the United States, provided, and was pardoned by the President of the United States.”

He said he read this by way of argument, to show that the present resolution ought to be rejected, and though he would not offer it himself, in case the resolution before them should be rejected, yet he would pledge himself to vote for such a one, if the gentleman from Virginia or any other member would offer it. The resolution which has been read, embraces all the facts stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, which contains the only charge that has been exhibited. But if any gentleman possesses a knowledge of any other facts or charges, let him specify them, and he would be willing to vote for an extension of the powers of the committee to them also; for he did not wish to confine the inquiry to the specific charge stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, if other gentlemen had charges to exhibit, and would state them in the resolution. If they would specify a charge or charges of a serious nature, and give us any reason to believe them true, although originating from hearsay evidence, he would vote for the inquiry proposed; and he begged that he should be understood as objecting rather on the ground that no charge had been specified, than on the ground of incompetent evidence. The vague charges verbally communicated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and none of which are reduced to writing, give no grounds of procedure; not only because, if true, they constitute no cause for impeachment, but because they are not specified in the resolution.

The motion was then further amended to read as follows:

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of Richard Peters, district judge of the district of Pennsylvania, and to report their opinion whether the said Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, or either of them, have so acted, in their judicial capacity, as to require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House.

Mr. SPEAKER stated the question, that the House do agree to the said motion, as so amended, when an adjournment was called for and carried--yeas 61, nays 43.

SATURDAY, January 7.

Mr. NICHOLSON, from the committee appointed on the memorial of Alexander Moultrie, agent for the South Carolina Yazoo Company, and of William Cowan, agent of the Virginia Yazoo Company, made a report, going considerably into detail, and concluding with a resolution adverse to the prayer of the memorialist. Referred to a Committee of the Whole on Monday.

Official Conduct of Judge Chase.

The House resumed the consideration of the question depending yesterday, at the time of adjournment, “that the House do agree to the motion of the fifth instant, as amended by the House, for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of Richard Peters, district judge of the district of Pennsylvania.”

Mr. J. RANDOLPH expressed his regret that the attempt which he had made yesterday to reply to the very personal allusions of a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. GRISWOLD,) whom he was sorry not to see in his place, had, by the adjournment, proved abortive. Such was his regard for the opinions of the House, that he should always, when called upon from a respectable quarter, justify any conduct which he deemed it proper to pursue in its deliberations. He felt it due to the respect in which he held the Chair and those around it, to reply to the remarks of the gentleman from Connecticut, and this consideration alone could have induced him to offer any thing in addition to what he had already advanced in favor of the motion. He should otherwise have left the resolution to its fate. In that fate he did not feel himself personally implicated. If it should be rejected, he would be satisfied in having done his duty, and the House, he supposed, would feel equally satisfied in having discharged theirs. It was asked, where was the mover of this resolution at the time when the alleged misconduct took place? Did it not, said the gentleman, pass under their own eyes? Were not their deliberations held on the very spot? and why had the motion slept until this day? He hoped he should be permitted to say that it did not pass under his eyes; although he knew, at the time of the condemnation in question, he did not become acquainted with the circumstances under which it took place until long after their occurrence. It was true that the deliberations of Congress were then held in Philadelphia, the scene of this alleged iniquity, but, with other members he was employed in discharging his duties to his constituents, not in witnessing, in any court, the triumph of his principles. He could not have been so employed. It would be recollected, that the information given by the gentleman from Pennsylvania formed the groundwork of his proceedings, and he asked whether it was more the duty of the mover of the resolution to have brought it forward than every other member of the House who was a witness of the statement made by that gentleman? This information, of an official nature, given by a member in his place, of a transaction in open court, and which it was the duty of them all to have noticed, had been called a story related on hearsay; a rumor of an affair which had happened in a corner; and the House was asked if they would take such evidence as ground of proceeding, on the dictum of any one member, however great their confidence in him might be? If he really felt that respect for the House which the gentleman from Connecticut had professed, he would not have insulted their understandings by such language. He would not have stood up, as amicus curiæ, to prevent their being precipitated into absurdity and injustice by an influential member of their body. That, however, was the station which the gentleman had assumed, and he hoped the duties of it would be discharged with the fidelity which they required. After clothing himself with this character, Mr. R. said he expected to have seen him at his post--he regretted that he did not see him there, and that his duty did not permit him to withhold the observations which he was compelled to make. Whilst, however, the gentleman was engaged in discharging the new and important function with which he stood self-invested, he seemed cautious of replying to the masterly statement of his venerable friend from Pennsylvania, and which he believed had remained unanswered because it was unanswerable. It must, said Mr. R., be a subject of high gratification to us all, and I congratulate this House upon it, that age has not yet dimmed the lustre of those talents which have so long presided in the councils of this country. And if the time shall come when we are to resign our understandings, and place ourselves under the direction of an individual, I hope to be permitted to range myself under the banners of that tried patriot, and not under those of the gentleman from Connecticut. In the same spirit with which he challenged the confidence of the House, as a friend unwilling to see them led into error and absurdity, that gentleman had endeavored to alarm their pride by representing the motion as a demand made upon them. It was so. It was (if he might so express it) a writ of right, not of favor--and as such he demanded it, as such he urged it. But an objection was taken that no act of misconduct had been alleged. With his friend from Maryland he would say, that a fact of the first importance had been adduced, on which he was sorry his friend had not dwelled longer. It could not receive too much attention. On a trial for life and death, the jury, who were the constitutional judges both of the law and fact, were deprived of the right of a discussion of the point of law, “what constitutes treason?” The rights of the jury and of the accused were equally invaded. It was conduct not dissimilar to this, in a case of libel, which drew forth from the English Parliament the famous declaratory bill of Mr. Fox. Lord Mansfield had laid down the doctrine that the jury had a right to decide only upon the bare facts of printing and publishing, and not upon the question of guilt, which was compounded of the law and the fact. This produced the declaratory act which passed a strong censure on the practices of courts--since it did not amend or alter the law, but declared what the law was--and established the point resisted by the court, that the jury was the judge both of the fact and of the law. If, then, on a question of criminal law, where the punishment was only fine and imprisonment, the conduct of a judge was deemed highly reprehensible in encroaching upon the rights of the jury, what shall we say of him who usurps those rights in a case of life and death, in a case of treason? This denial to the prisoner and the jury of the right of having the point of law discussed, seemed to be the first step towards assuming those powers in cases of treason, the exercise of which, in cases of libel, had drawn down upon the English courts the censure of their Parliament. Would the gentleman say this was nothing? Would he affirm that if a man were under trial for murder, the court would be justified in saying to his counsel, You may, if you can, disprove the fact with which the prisoner stands charged, but you shall not endeavor to show that it does not amount to the crime with which he stands charged? If you admit the killing, you shall not argue the point that such killing does not constitute murder. Would the gentleman contend that treason is better defined than murder? What is murder? Killing with malice aforethought; can any definition be clearer? What is burglary? Breaking in during the night. What is treason? The constitution defines it as levying war against the United States; adhering to their enemies; giving them aid and comfort. But what had definitions to do with the case? Because murder was defined, had counsel ever been stopped in an attempt to show that the killing with which their client stood charged was not a killing with prepensive malice, a killing which constituted murder? What was more common than to see the facts admitted, and the crime not only denied, but disproved to the satisfaction of the jury; and upon what principle shall counsel be arrested in the attempt to show that the facts charged in an indictment for treason do not amount to such a levying of war, or an adherence or aid to such enemies as would constitute treason? Mr. R. said that the fact mentioned by the gentleman from Pennsylvania was of a remarkable nature. He had never heard of a similar proceeding, and he rejoiced that another instance of so black a nature could not probably be furnished by any tribunal in this country.

The gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. DENNIS,) however, had entirely abandoned the ground taken by his friend. He agrees that there is a charge of an important nature exhibited, and if it was incorporated into the resolution, and the inquiry confined to that subject only, he would vote for it. The object of the one gentleman was only to confine the inquiry, whilst that of his friend was to deny it altogether. He could not thank the gentleman for his liberality. He would have what he asked or nothing. He would never consent to confine the inquiry; if it could not be full and free, let it be denied.

The gentleman from Maryland had, with very little dexterity, endeavored to confound the resolution of inquiry with the articles of impeachment which may follow from it, and said that if the House would consent to confine the inquiry to any particular charge he would vote for it. It was true that after articles of impeachment should have been exhibited against the accused, the House would not be permitted to prefer any new accusation, or to adduce testimony to prove any guilt other than that which was charged in those articles. In the same manner as when a criminal was indicted, evidence would not be suffered to be brought forward to prove any act of criminality not contained in some one of the counts of the indictment. But would gentlemen persist in confounding things so entirely different, as to confine an incipient inquiry by the same rigid rules which would govern a criminal trial? It was trifling with the judgment of the House. The gentleman was eager for inquiring, but the charge must be incorporated into the resolution, and the inquiry confined to a specific point, before he could be brought to consent to it. Whatever other misdemeanors might come to the knowledge of the committee in the course of the investigation, he would not agree to have them reported to the House. And at the same time he told them of the struggle between his inclination and his sense of duty--his inclination as a friend of the accused to grant the inquiry, his duty as a member of the House and a friend of justice to refuse it. Mr. R. was sorry to find the gentleman in this awkward predicament; he regretted that it was out of his power to gratify him by narrowing the inquiry. This his duty would not suffer him to do. He hoped, however, the strength of the gentleman’s constitution would carry him through the arduous struggle in which he was involved, by his wishes on the one hand, and his principles on the other.

Whilst so much was said on the subject of precedent, he hoped he might offer a few cases to their consideration. He did not come to the House armed with precedents. Neither his health nor leisure permitted him to search for them. Gentlemen of greater industry, and who attached more importance to them than himself, had furnished him with them. For his part he thought precedents had nothing to do with the case, but for the sake of those who thought differently, he would show the course which he advocated was not destitute even of their support. Here Mr. R. referred to Mr. Hatsell’s precedents. “On the 21st of April, 1626, Mr. Glanvylee, from the select committee appointed to consider of the charges against the Duke of Buckingham, reports that they desire the House will resolve whether common fame is a ground for this House to proceed upon?” It is resolved to consider this the next day. After a long debate the House resolve that, “common fame is good ground of proceeding of this House, either to inquire of here, or to transmit the complaint, if the House find cause, to the King or Lords.”

Mr. R. begged to call the attention of the House to the opinion of a gentleman, delivered during the debate, to which he must be permitted to attach more importance than to that of the gentleman from Connecticut. When he mentioned the name of Selden, he believed he should stand justified in the opinion of the gentleman himself, and in that of his warmest admirers. “These cases (said Mr. Selden) are to be ruled by the law of Parliament and not by the common or civil law.” Mr. Littleton says, “this is not a House for definitive judgment, but for information, denunciation, or presentment, for which common fame is sufficient.” Mr. Noy says, “There are two questions--first, Whether a common fame? Second, Whether this fame be true? We will not transmit without the first inquiry: but without the second we may; for peradventure we cannot come by the witnesses; as if the witnesses be in the Lords’ House.”

Again, on the 16th October, 1667, the House being informed “that there have been some innovations of late in the trials of men for their lives and deaths, and in some particular cases restraints have been put upon juries, the matter is referred to a committee.” This case (Mr. R. said) was precisely in point. “On the 18th of November, this committee are empowered ‘to receive information against the Lord Chief Justice Keeling, for any other misdemeanors besides those concerning juries.’” Thus on a particular fact, innovation in trials for life and death, a committee was raised, and yet they were not confined to the examination of that single charge, but empowered to inquire generally into the misconduct of the judge. A stronger or more pointed precedent could not be conceived.

By the constitution, Mr. Randolph said, that House was vested with the sole power of impeachment. How this power was to be exercised must depend on their discretion, and on no other law or principle whatever: for “these cases are not to be ruled by the common or civil law, but by the law of Parliament.” That law of Parliament it remained with them to establish. It could not be matter of surprise that he, one of the leading principles of whose politics it was to support the weight of that branch of the Government, and to be jealous of executive influence--it could not surprise any one, that he should exert himself in behalf of the constitutional rights of that House. When he saw the importance which was attached to precedent, he was more than ever solicitous for that which they were then about to establish. He trusted that they would not consent to abridge the power with which the constitution had invested them--to reduce it below the standard which the English House of Commons had fixed as the measure of their own power in similar cases. A time might come when a wicked President and his flagitious ministers might so conduct themselves in office, as to make every man regret the proceedings of that day, in case they should suffer their power to sleep. The refusing to exercise it, then, would hereafter be adduced as a denial of its existence. Such might be the circumstances of the times, that no private man would dare to step forward with a specific charge against the Executive. If they should deny an inquiry without a specific charge, they would do all in their power to screen such a President and such ministers at a future day. It had been remarked that, in this government, an officer found guilty, on an impeachment, could not be punished capitally. The sentence could only remove him from office, and disqualify him, for ever after, from holding one under the United States. If, in a country where the accused may be brought to the block, free, unfettered inquiry is warranted against any rank however exalted--would it be denied here, where the punishment was comparatively light? Should they hold the other departments of the Government more inviolable than they were considered even in England? Would they afford to a criminal, Executive or Judiciary, a shelter denied by the law of that government? He hoped they would not. He trusted that they would give an example of their readiness to bring every offender to justice, however great might be his station.

Mr. GRIFFIN.--I had hoped that no subject would have been agitated during this session which should have interrupted the tranquillity or disturbed the harmony of this House, so necessary to the faithful and correct discharge of our public duties; but, sir, I perceive, from the turn which the debate upon the resolution now before the House has taken, that sensations have been excited which I fear it will be difficult to allay.

The proposition now before the House, nursed with so much secrecy, and forced on us so suddenly and unexpectedly, comes in such a questionable shape, that I must beg the attention of the House for a few moments while “I speak to it.”

What, sir, does the resolution demand of us? That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, &c. But how is this inquiry to be conducted? Are there any data by which the committee are to be guided? Is there any specific charge to which their attention or inquiries are to be directed? None. And who, sir, before this enlightened day ever heard of a committee of inquiry being raised, without possession of a single subject to direct or guide the inquiry? What, sir, erect an inquiring committee vested with all the rights of a Star Chamber, and yet assign them no specific objects of their duty! But, sir, the official conduct of these judges has given offence--and are we now, sir, to probe and search the whole judicial lives of these gentlemen, for causes of complaint and censure? Are the records of the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania now to be ransacked, for evidences of their guilt and cause of impeachment? I never have and never shall deny the right of this House to inquire into the conduct of public officers--but, sir, if the honorable mover of the resolution is serious----

[Here Mr. RANDOLPH interrupted, and desired the gentleman to explain his meaning by the word serious.]

Mr. GRIFFIN continued. I will answer the gentleman: my meaning is, that if the gentleman believes there are just grounds for impeachment--if he is in possession of information or facts, let him declare them, and if they appear to my mind to be sufficient whereon to ground an impeachment, let him demand it and I will join with him. Let him specify the instances of malfeasance of which these judges have been guilty, and I will unite with him--let him declare the malconduct of these public functionaries, and I will cordially co-operate with him. If these judges have travelled beyond the line of their duty, if they have wantonly exceeded the limits of their power, I will aid in the infliction of such punishment as they may merit; but, sir, I cannot, I will not, in this indirect manner, wound the feelings or censure the characters of men, holding high responsible offices under your Government. Could I induce myself to believe that the course now proposed to be pursued is correct, I will gladly give it my assent; but for reasons very different from those the advocates of this measure adduce: could I deem it correct, I would support the resolution because I believe the characters implicated therein will safely pass the ordeal preparing for them, and that the inquiry will redound to their honor. I would cheerfully support the resolution, because, by the impeachment which I predict will follow, an opportunity will be offered to remove the load of unmerited calumny under which the Federal Judiciary of the United States have too long labored, and with which our public prints have been long filled. But the course is incorrect--the measure in its present shape appears to me to be fraught with incalculable mischief to our country, and I never will assist in the establishment of a precedent which may at some future day be made an engine of persecution, as “wicked as intolerant.” Mr. Speaker, let me ask of you, sir, to remember the consequences which may flow from the adoption of this resolution--let me conjure this House to reflect upon the dreadful effects which must arise to us, if, upon the bare assertion of a single gentleman, unsupported by any direct allegation, a committee of this nature shall be raised, a precedent of this kind established, what public character will be safe? nay, sir, how soon may not we ourselves feel its baneful influence? Far be it from me, sir, to impute to the honorable mover of the resolution any impurity of motives. I believe his conduct has proceeded from a consciousness of duty, and from a similar consciousness of duty I must oppose the measure. I cannot deny the power of this House to adopt the resolution upon your table, but I beg of you to pause ere you take the fatal step, and do not, because “dressed with a little brief authority, play such fantastic tricks before high heaven as make e’en angels weep.”

Sir, I have endeavored to discharge what I conceived to be my duty upon this occasion, and when experience shall fatally convince us of the dreadful effects of the precedent we are now about to establish, I shall derive consolation from the reflection, that I lent my feeble aid to check the overwhelming torrent.

Mr. EUSTIS said, he did not view this subject in the same light with the gentleman last up; he did not see those awful consequences which he had pointed out. He hoped the time would never come, when an inquiry into the conduct of an officer of the Government should be deemed a subject of alarm in that House. It was the first principle of the constitution, that every man was amenable to the constitution and laws of his country; and however elevated any one might be, that he could not be raised above the reach of inquiry. The observations of the gentleman who had last spoken, and of others who had preceded him, were predicated on a principle that was not correct. If the resolution on the table was to impeach the judge, those observations would be relevant, but they were incorrect on the preliminary motion to inquire.

In making up, said Mr. E., my judgment on this subject, I have endeavored altogether to avoid the inquiry, whether the officer implicated in this resolution, has so conducted himself as to require impeachment by this House. I have not accepted the opinion of the mover of the resolution, and I have excluded all the other information adduced in the debate; because I consider it as alone applicable to the question of impeachment, which is not now before the House. The question before the House is a very different one, and, in my opinion, it is plain and simple. What is it? It is that a committee be raised to inquire into the official conduct of a certain public officer. When a member of this House, under the obligations of honor, and the additional obligations of an oath, rises and takes upon himself the responsibility of moving an inquiry into the official conduct of a public officer, which can only be effected in virtue of the impeaching power of this House, which power it exclusively possesses, I view the request for an inquiry in the nature of an information laid before the House as the grand inquest of the nation.

When this proposition was made, the mind of every gentleman was naturally cast about for the situation of the officers in question. If it shall be the opinion of the House that their conduct is such as to afford grounds for an impeachment, it will be granted that it is an indispensable duty to make the inquiry. If, on the other hand, the House are of opinion that no testimony can be produced which will lead to an impeachment, then it is due to the officers to institute an inquiry. The object of an inquiry is two-fold--arising from the duty to the people, and that due to the officer whose conduct is impeached. If gentlemen are of opinion that, in this case, there are no grounds for impeachment, then it is clear that the conduct and character of the officer ought to be vindicated, and the inquiry instituted to afford him the means. If they are of opinion that there are grounds for an impeachment, then the duty they owe to the people urges them to the inquiry. In the constitution I find no excuse, no justification, on which to ground a refusal to institute an inquiry into the conduct of any public officer charged with misbehavior.

To such an inquiry, what is objected? That the power may be abused. Indeed, the objection is, that it is abused in this instance. How abused? To argue from abuse of the power against the use of it, is no argument at all. If the House believe either alternative I have mentioned, and one or the other you must believe, it is their duty to make the inquiry. But it is said that the committee are to be clothed with power to send for persons and papers. Granted. That power is indispensably necessary. It is said their powers are to be inquisitorial. This is not true. Will not the committee be accessible by every member of the House, and what are their ulterior powers but to collect facts, and to express an opinion whether they afford grounds for an impeachment? That opinion they will eventually submit to the House, and, without its approbation, it will be settled.

It is further said that no specific charge is adduced, and if there were, gentlemen say they would vote for the inquiry. But if a specific charge were made, I ask if any member would be enabled to give a more enlightened vote than on the present resolution? I consider the general power to inquire as most important, and that it is the duty of the House, on such occasions as the present, to enlarge rather than to narrow the field of inquiry.

It is further said that this course of proceeding will discourage respectable men from accepting the offices of Government. But certainly every officer, from the President to the most menial, knows that he holds his office subject to inquiry, to impeachment, and to punishment, in case of criminality.

If the House do not pursue the present course, from what quarter are they to expect the origination of an inquiry? Is it to be supposed that it will come from the citizen, when his life and fortune are probably at the disposal of particular officers charged with misconduct. This line of inquiry ought, in my opinion, to be courted and encouraged; more especially in this instance, after the course which the debate has taken, and after specific charges have been adduced. The debate has given an importance to the inquiry, which its original merits may not, perhaps, have entitled it to.

When this subject was first introduced, it appeared to me novel, and that there were no precedents in point under the Federal Government. It is time that this precedent should be established. It is time that every officer should know that this House is ready at any time to inquire into his official conduct, if charged with misbehavior; and instead of declining the inquiry, in this instance, from a false delicacy to the officer, it becomes the House to embrace the resolution and make the inquiry. If evidence shall be collected, and it appears that there are no grounds for impeachment, the officer will be restored to the public confidence, and will be acquitted. If, on the other hand, it appears that he has been guilty of malfeasance in office, a duty will be imposed upon the House, from which they cannot recede, to bring him to trial.

Mr. THATCHER.--As gentlemen seem to consider the decision of the court in the trial of Fries as unprecedented, I beg leave to refer them to the cases of the United States versus Vigol, and the same versus Mitchell, 2 Dallas’s Reports, 346 to 357. They will find that the decision of the court, in the case of Fries, was exactly conformable to cases adjudged in 1795. Without troubling the House with the whole of those cases, I beg leave to read the decision of the court in the last case. “The charge of the court, says the reporter, was delivered to the jury in substance as follows. Patterson justice. ‘The first question to be considered is, what was the general object of the insurrection? If its object was to suppress the excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence, in legal estimation, is high treason: it is a usurpation of the authority of Government; it is high treason by levying of war.’” The decision, sir, is also conformable to the English authorities. The charge then against Judge Chase and Judge Peters, after divesting it of the coloring which imagination has given it, amounts to this--that, in the trial of Fries for treason, the court prevented the counsel from arguing to the jury against a point of law long settled by that and other courts of the United States. I have attended closely to the statement made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) and I believe I am correct.

The very point which the counsel of Fries would have argued to the jury, was that which had long before been settled by the courts of the United States. I contend, sir, that this court did no more than they had a right to do--no more than is practised by every well regulated court. They prevented counsel from arguing law in the face of the authorities, and of the opinion of the court. That this is usual, I appeal to gentlemen of the law who are present. This, sir, is the only fact stated to the House upon which the motion is founded.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) has said, that he has been informed of facts, which convince him that an inquiry ought to be made. But that gentleman has not stated to the House what those facts are.

It has been contended, that where a member of this House shall state that he is convinced that an inquiry ought to be made, the House ought to institute such an inquiry. Precedents have been adduced to prove that this has been done in the British Parliament. There certainly has been no case cited where an inquiry has been commenced upon the motion without stating his facts or his evidence. But whatever may have been the practice in England I can never consent to vote upon any impressions or convictions but my own.

If the official conduct of the judges upon the trial of Fries was such as to require the interposition of this House why, (as the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. GRISWOLD, has asked,) why was not this inquiry sooner announced? This trial, I am told, was in February, 1800. It took place within the hearing of Congress. It was the subject of universal attention. Why has it slept four years? Upon what ground shall we invest a committee with power to ransack the country for charges against our judges? Shall we, upon the motion of a member--shall we, upon the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) commence an inquiry, troublesome and expensive--an inquiry, which must attach suspicion to the official conduct of the judges? Sir, I respect the conduct of the gentlemen who attempt to remove obstructions from the stream of justice, but I must be convinced that obstructions now exist, before I can vote for this resolution.

Mr. EARLY.--Like other gentlemen who have gone before me in this discussion, I do not consider myself at liberty to vote against the resolution on the table. Like them, I deem myself bound to vote for an inquiry into the conduct of any public officer, when that inquiry is demanded by a member of this House. After the view taken of the merits of this measure by the gentlemen from Pennsylvania and Virginia, I did expect that all further opposition to it would have ceased. In this expectation I have been disappointed.

I feel constrained to vote in favor of this resolution, because I believe that the inquiry it contemplates is an act of justice due to the people of the United States on one hand, and to the characters of the individuals charged, on the other. A charge of high crimes and misdemeanors has been made on this floor against two individuals, and two members of this House have demanded an inquiry into their official conduct. To this demand may be added the weight of public opinion. I am apprized of the delicacy of this ground, and when I resort to it, it is my wish to be understood as meaning that when charges of a high nature are instituted and reiterated from one end of the Union to the other, so as to create a general belief, so as to destroy confidence in the principle and integrity of those who administer justice, and to beget a suspicion that justice cannot be obtained equally by all men; under such circumstances the public voice demands an inquiry into the truth of the charges. Is this a fact, or is it not, in relation to the officers implicated in this resolution? I presume that it is the fact to a great extent will not be denied. Every gentleman on this floor, in the habit of reading the public prints, must have had so forcible an impression made on his mind on this subject, as not to have lost a recollection of the conduct charged upon one of the judges named in this resolution, in the case of Fries, Cooper, and Callender. I cannot, therefore, refuse my assent to the inquiry, because I believe it due to the public, as well as to the individuals charged with the improper conduct, and who, if they were on the spot, would undoubtedly memorialize us for an inquiry. Indeed one of the officers referred to in the resolution, if conscious of his innocence, ought, in my opinion, long since, to have demanded an inquiry into his official conduct, when he witnessed the strong and numerous charges against him in the public prints from one end of the continent to the other.

It is objected to this resolution that no proof has been adduced to the House of the truth of the allegations preferred. In my mind there is all the difference that can be imagined between an inquiry and an impeachment; and almost all the arguments urged on this occasion apply exclusively to an impeachment. A strong proof of this has been given by the gentleman who has just sat down. That gentleman (Mr. R. GRISWOLD) has taken this remarkable ground, that this House ought not to inquire without proof. I suppose he meant, by proof, the depositions of witnesses; this is, in other words, saying that we, whose constitutional duty it is to inquire, may omit to do it, because they whose duty it is not to inquire, have not done it.

The present resolution is nothing more than this: A certain officer of the Government is charged, in the face of the nation, with malfeasance in office, and a committee appointed to inquire into the truth of the charge. Gentlemen allege that the committee is to be appointed to inquire what accusations can be found, and then for testimony to sustain them. But this is not so. The accusations have been long since made, and they are not of a day, but of a year’s standing.

The analogy between the functions of this House and a grand jury, is correct and forcible. Before a grand jury, it is the right of any individual to apply for and demand an inquiry into the conduct of any person within their cognizance; and it is more especially the right of any member of the jury to make such a demand; and it is their bounden duty, according to their oaths, to make the inquiry when so demanded.

The official conduct of the judges I view as more delicate and important than that of any other description of officers; for, on their impartiality the whole people of the United States depend for obtaining justice in ordinary cases, and individuals depend, in the last resort, for the preservation of their lives. Their official conduct should, therefore, not only be correct, but likewise free from suspicion. Simply to be charged ought to produce an inquiry; and I must confess that a recent case, in which the integrity of a judicial officer was impeached, excited my warmest approbation. I mean the case of a judge (Judge Tucker) in a neighboring State, who, on a suggestion believed by no man, deemed it a duty to himself and his country to demand an inquiry into his conduct.

Another view, by no means unimportant, which may be taken, is, that the reputation of the Government, of which the judges are a component part, demands the inquiry in question. Will any gentleman pretend to say that reputation is not at stake,--that it is not affected at home or abroad by the charges which have been so long and so loudly made? I presume not. Whether those charges are true or not, is not the question; for, whether true or not, so long as they are generally believed, the reputation of the Government is affected; its reputation for impartial justice is affected, and deeply too. To refuse this inquiry would be to give weight to this impression abroad--to add to the suspicion, at home and abroad, that impartial justice is not done to all men. Let us, then, make the inquiry, and restore the reputation of the Government, by inflicting a proper punishment upon these officers, if guilty, and, if innocent, by proving the charges against them calumnies.

Mr. EPPES.--If, in adopting the resolution before us, we were to attach odium to the characters in question, I should feel no surprise at the course pursued by the gentlemen who oppose this inquiry. In this country the official conduct of every man is, and ought to be, subject to examination. It is not the examination, but the result of that examination, which attaches merit or demerit to a public character. In a Government like ours no principle ought to be cherished with greater care than a free inquiry into the conduct of public officers. So friendly am I to this principle in its fullest extent, so necessary do I believe it to be to the preservation of that purity in public officers essential to a republic, that it will always be sufficient for me to vote an inquiry, for a member to declare he considers an inquiry necessary. A proper regard to his own reputation will always, I am certain, prevent any member of this House from calling on us to exercise this important duty on light or trivial grounds. As to the extensive field of inquiry to which this doctrine may lead, I care not; and whenever a member of this House shall rise in his place and declare that he considers an inquiry into the conduct of a public officer or officers necessary, I shall be ready to pass the whole circle in review, to begin with the first and end with the last, to vote an inquiry into the conduct of each, and even to go further, to vote an impeachment if necessary. I shall on every such occasion consider it a duty I owe to the individual accused, and to the community in whose behalf the accusation is made, to vote an inquiry.

Thus much for the general principle which would induce me to vote for this resolution, if no specific charge had been made. In the present case, however, a specific charge of a serious kind has been made by a member from Pennsylvania; and, however gentlemen may have attempted to weaken the force of this charge, it does substantially amount to this: that, by the opinion of a judge, a citizen of the United States was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel, when arraigned for his life. I will not, however, dwell on this charge. It has been placed by a gentleman from Maryland (Mr. NICHOLSON) in a point of view satisfactory to myself, and, I believe, to the House. I consider it, however, my duty on this occasion to mention a trial which took place in the Commonwealth of Virginia, which affords another specific charge against Judge Chase. I was not present at this trial, and am not personally acquainted with the circumstances. I believe, however, that in the Commonwealth of Virginia but one sentiment prevails as to the conduct of Judge Chase on this occasion, viz: that it was indecent and tyrannical. In the course of the trial he refused to allow a witness on the part of the prisoner to be examined, because the witness could prove the truth of a part only, and not the whole of the words laid in the indictment. By a system of conduct peculiar to himself, he deprived the prisoner of the aid of Mr. George Hay, as counsel, a man, who, although not as generally known as some others in our State, is inferior to none in his profession. I do not mention these circumstances as hearsay evidence, but as facts, which I am induced to believe can be established by legal testimony. If, on this statement, there is any gentleman who can refuse an inquiry, I am willing to leave him in the enjoyment of his opinion. For my own part, I shall be always ready, on the demand of any member of this House, to exercise my constitutional right of inquiry, and, without partiality or prejudice, pursue the course pointed out by my duty, whether it shall lead to impeachment or an honorable acquittal.

Mr. NICHOLSON rose for the purpose of calling the attention of the House to precedents. When he yesterday addressed them he had thought it unnecessary to introduce authorities from foreign nations; but as they had been insisted on by the opponents to the resolution, he would refer to two or three; and he was more solicitous to do so at the present moment, as he saw a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) about to rise, and he wished to call the gentleman’s attention to them, in order that he might remark on them, and show, if it was to be done, that they did not apply to the case under consideration. If gentlemen would refer to the powers exercised by the Commons of England, for time almost immemorial, and to those exercised by the several State Legislatures, he believed that precedents innumerable would be furnished. The Commons of England were the grand inquest of the nation. As such it was their duty to inquire into the official conduct of all those intrusted with the powers of Government. Every officer in the realm was liable to impeachment by them. The same principle would be found to run through the constitutions of most of the States, and it was wisely introduced into the Constitution of the United States. The power to impeach is admitted to be in the House of Representatives, and the only question is, as to the manner in which this power shall be exercised. The proposed method is called a loose one, and we are asked to show some precedent for it. The House of Commons at the commencement of every session appoint what is there called a committee of grievances and courts of justice. Many of the State Legislatures appoint a similar committee annually, and, in the State from which he came, the House of Delegates always appoint a committee of grievances and courts of justice. It was one of their standing committees, and the appointment was as regular and as usual as the appointment of a committee of claims in this House. What then he inquired was the duty, what the authority of this committee? In England, in Maryland, and in every other State where it exists, it is their duty to inquire into the conduct of every officer of the Government, to call witnesses before them to prove official misconduct, to report offences to the House from which their powers are derived, and recommend the proper measures to be adopted.

This House, like the Commons of England, and the most numerous branch in the State Legislatures, is the grand inquest of the nation; they are to inquire into crimes and bring offenders to justice. It had not, he said, heretofore been customary for this House to appoint a committee of grievances and courts of justice, but he believed no man would deny the power, and when appointed they would not only have the authority proposed to be in this committee, but one infinitely more extensive. They would have the right to inquire into the conduct of all civil officers, and to report such facts as might come to their knowledge. If, then, we could with propriety, and agreeably to precedent, authorize an inquiry into the conduct of several hundred officers, could it be denied that the same precedent would warrant an inquiry into the conduct of two only? In 5th Comyn’s Digest, page 204, it would be found that a committee of grievances and justice was one of their standing committees, and in page 205 it was declared that they might “summon any judges and examine them in person upon complaint of any misdemeanor in office.” He presumed it had not been thought necessary heretofore to appoint a general committee of this kind, but at present the necessity was apparent, as a complaint had been made to the House of the official misconduct of two judges. Again, in the same book, page 209, it is said, “The Commons are the general inquisitors of the realm, and therefore if a Lord, spiritual or temporal, commit oppression, bribery, extortion, &c., the Commons shall inquire of it, and if, by the vote of the House, the crime appears to have been committed, they transmit it, with the evidence, to the Lords.” This, he said, would clearly show, what indeed he thought common sense would teach every man, that the inquiry should be made before proof was exhibited upon which an impeachment was to be grounded. In the same page it would be seen that “common fame is a sufficient ground of a proceeding in the House of Commons by inquiry, or by a complaint, if need be, to the King or Lords.” And Rushworth’s Historical Collection, page 217, is cited, it is said, by some of the ablest lawyers of that day that “if common fame were not to be admitted as public accusers, great men would be the only safe ones, as no private man would venture to complain of them.” Mr. N. referred to these authorities at that particular stage of the discussion, as he was desirous of giving gentlemen an opportunity of commenting upon them. As he had no wish to prolong the debate, he would not multiply observations upon that point, but could not sit down without noticing what had fallen from a gentleman from Massachusetts, in which he had again attempted to vindicate the conduct of the judges upon the trial of Fries.

The gentleman had referred to a case in Dallas’s Reports, respecting the Western Insurrection, in which he says the point of law determined upon the trial of Fries, had been previously settled by one of the federal courts, and from thence infers that Mr. Chase and Mr. Peters were justified in preventing counsel from arguing it a second time. That such conduct might be perhaps excusable in a civil cause he was not prepared to deny; but, in a case of criminal jurisdiction, involving the guilt or innocence of a man whose life was to be the forfeit, he held it totally unjustifiable.

All men, he said, were acquainted with the circumstances of what was generally called the Western Insurrection. Some of the Western counties of Pennsylvania were opposed to the excise law. A considerable majority of the people had resolved to oppose its execution, and took strong measures to prevent individuals from accepting offices under it, and compelled some of them to resign the places to which they had been appointed. While they professed an attachment to the Government of the Union they resolved to resist the execution of one of its laws. Among these was a man by the name of Mitchell, and he was charged with high treason before the circuit of Pennsylvania in which Judge Paterson then presided. A doubt existed whether the resistance to the execution of a law, even by force of arms, was such a levying of war within the meaning of the constitution, as amounted to treason. What was the conduct of the judge on that occasion? He had no disposition to preclude inquiry. He had no wish to keep the jury in ignorance by forbidding fair and open argument. On the contrary, it appeared from a note on page 348 that he called the attention of the prisoner’s counsel to the point, and requested that they would notice it in their observations. This was done before the defence was opened, and he said he should beg leave to read a part of the argument made in favor of the prisoner.

“The counsel for the prisoner (E. Tilghman and Thomas) premised that they did not conceive it to be their duty to show that the prisoner was guiltless of any description of crime against the United States, or the State of Pennsylvania, but they contended that he had not committed the crime of high treason, and ought, therefore, to be acquitted on the present indictment. The adjudications in England upon the various descriptions of treason, had been worked incautiously, into a system, by the destruction of which the Government itself would be seriously affected; but even there, the best judges and the ablest commentators, while they acquiesce in the decisions that have already taken place, furnish a strong caution against the too easy admission of future cases, which seem to have a parity of reason. Constructive and interpretive treasons must be the dread and scourge of any nation that allows them--1 Hale, P. C., 132, 259--4 Black. Com., 85. Take, then, the distinction of treason by levying war, as laid down by the attorney of the district, and it is a constructive or interpretive weapon which is calculated to annul all distinctions heretofore wisely established in the grades and punishments of crimes, and by whose magic power a mob may be easily converted into a conspiracy, and a riot aggravated into high treason.”

Such, he said, was the opinion of two gentlemen ranking high in their profession, and who would not be charged with having any feeling toward the offence or the offender inconsistent with the rights or interests of the Government. The whole argument was too lengthy to be read to the House, but he considered it well worth the perusal of every American. Able as it was, however, it had not the wished for weight with the court. Judge Paterson gave the following charge to the jury: “The first question is, what was the general object of the insurrection? If its object was to suppress the excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of Congress, by force and intimidation, the offence, in legal estimation, is high treason; it is a usurpation of the authority of Government; it is high treason by levying of war.” Sir, said Mr. N., this opinion of the court may have been honest; I mean not to impeach the purity of motive which dictated it, but I mean to show that the offence with which Mitchell was charged, the resistance to the execution of a law, was not considered as treason by the highest existing authority of this country. Mitchell was pardoned by the President of the United States, and Congress, not long after, expressed their opinion on the subject in the most ample manner.

The trial of Mitchell which I have just quoted took place in 1795, and in 1798 the subject was taken up by Congress, who, by the act of the 14th of July, 1798, provided that the resistance to the execution of a law should be considered a high misdemeanor only, punishable by fine and imprisonment. The act is in these words: “If any persons shall unlawfully combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the Government of the United States which are, or may be directed by proper authority, or to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person holding a place or office in or under the Government of the United States, from undertaking, performing, or executing his trust or duty, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on conviction before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 and by imprisonment during a term not less than six months nor exceeding five years.” Here, sir, the resistance to the execution of a law is declared to be a high misdemeanor only, punishable by fine and imprisonment. Fries was tried in 1800, two years after the passage of this law. The offence of which he had been guilty was rescuing prisoners from the marshal by force, thereby, in the language of the act, “preventing an officer of the United States from performing and executing his duty,” and it was to show that he was punishable under this act by fine and imprisonment only, that his counsel were desirous of bringing the law before the jury. This, however, the court refused; the man was convicted of high treason, and was sentenced to a most ignominious death. Let such conduct be vindicated where and by whom it may, I must declare that it can never meet my approbation.

Mr. DANA.--It is to be regretted, Mr. Speaker, that a resolution so novel and of so much importance as that on the table was not postponed, at least for one day after it was presented to the House. Had this been done, gentlemen might have had some opportunity deliberately to examine the subject, before they were required to make a decision. But as the resolution was moved without giving any previous notice, and has been pressed upon us immediately after it was moved, I do not feel myself prepared, as I could have wished to be on such a question, before attempting to deliver my sentiments in this House. Unprepared, however, as I am, I request your indulgence while I offer a few remarks.

I will first attend to some precedents mentioned by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. NICHOLSON.) He has stated that it has been usual in the English House of Commons to appoint a committee for courts of justice, with power to inquire into the proceedings of courts, and for this purpose to call persons before them for examination. But, sir, is not such a committee appointed for general purposes, not directed against any individual, and therefore not affecting the character of any magistrate? Their powers relate to the judicial system generally, and do not implicate any one of the judicial officers. Does the resolution on the table propose a committee of this kind? On the contrary, it is explicitly directed against two of the judges. If gentlemen would justify their proceedings by the practice of the British House of Commons, let the resolution be made to have a general reference to all the courts, instead of being pointed, as it now is, against particular persons. In its present form it departs essentially from the principle of the case mentioned by the gentleman from Maryland, and therefore cannot be warranted by that precedent.

The gentleman has also stated that a committee was appointed by the last Congress to investigate the accounts of the officers of Government, merely upon common report. But it should be remembered that those officers were officers of the Executive Departments. It is the acknowledged duty of such officers--it is made their duty by law to give information to Congress, whenever required, upon any of their public transactions. And it is the peculiar right of the House of Representatives, as guardians of the Treasury, at any time, to inquire into the expenditures of public money. But are the judges of the United States placed in the same situation with the Executive officers? Are they to be under the same control, and equally dependent? You may indeed impeach the judges, if guilty of impeachable offence. But what other power over them is given you by the constitution? It should further be remembered, that the resolution for appointing the investigating committee did not criminate any particular officer. At first it was proposed to examine only the accounts of the former Secretary of State. But upon its being suggested by a gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. EUSTIS,) who has been so strenuous an advocate for the present resolution, that it would be improper in that manner to attack the character of a particular officer, the resolution was made general, and extended to the accounts of all the Executive Departments.

Upon the like principle, the resolution now on the table is improper. My objection to it is, that it points out two particular officers as objects of suspicion, and proposes a committee for inquiring into their conduct without assigning any cause, and without specifying any subject of inquiry. Gentlemen have expressed a dissatisfaction that such a committee should be compared to the Star Chamber or the Inquisition. If they do not perfectly resemble the Star Chamber, formerly known in England, or the Inquisition of Spain, the proposed powers of the committee are certainly indefinite and inquisitorial. Perhaps, if a comparison was necessary, they might more properly be compared to the State inquisitors of Venice, who are well known to have formed one of the most detestable tyrannies ever tolerated in a country pretending to freedom.

If charges were specified in the resolution, a member of this House on moving it might then have a right to demand an inquiry. But are the House bound to investigate the conduct of a particular officer, without any charge against him? Gentlemen have said much about the general right of this House to inquire into the conduct of public officers, as if this were the point in dispute. But who has denied the right of inquiry as incident to the power of impeachment? When any officer is charged with an impeachable offence, it is admitted to be, and from the nature of the thing it might be, the right of the House to inquire into the truth of such charge. I trust no gentleman in opposition to the present resolution can be found so ignorant of the true principle on which it is opposed, as to deny the responsibility of the public officers, or the right of the House to inquire into their conduct. But, the right being admitted, the question is made as to the exercise of that right in the manner now proposed. When this House is called upon to direct the whole force of its influence against a particular judge, is it not reasonable, is it not just, that some charge should first be stated against him? This is but a decent respect to judicial character. It is but a decent respect to the character which becomes the assembled Representatives of a nation. The person implicated might then be enabled to meet the inquiry and obviate unfounded suspicion. Our power with respect to the judges is the power of impeachment; but we are not, therefore, justified in wantonly assailing their characters and sporting with their sensibility to reputation. The right of inquiry relates to impeachable offences. Shall we, then, inquire where no offence is stated? So far is the resolution from stating what would warrant an impeachment, that it does not mention any offence, or refer to any transaction.

The gentleman from Virginia, who moved the resolution, (Mr. J. RANDOLPH,) has, indeed, declared his own conviction, that the judicial officer in question had done wrong. Might not other gentlemen also have their opinions and exercise their own judgments in forming them? They ask for the reasons of his conviction before they vote for his resolution. His information, he says, was received in such a manner that he does not choose to disclose it. If any person has communicated any thing to him confidentially, he is not desired to name his informant. The gentleman shall not be desired by me to make any disclosure which would offend against the most delicate sense of honor. But can it be improper for him to state the general nature of the offence which he believes to have been committed? Will this violate any honorary confidence? He is desired to make such a statement that other members of the House may have an opportunity of judging whether the believed offence will warrant a vote of impeachment. In cases of this kind, is any member to be deemed infallible? When a gentleman, in his place, states a fact as of his own knowledge, his veracity is regarded as unquestionable; but his infallibility is not supposed to extend to matters of mere opinion. Upon the principle of its being possible for the gentleman from Virginia to err in opinion, and its being equally the right of the other members to judge what conduct amounts to an impeachable offence, it might have been reasonably thought that he would at least state to the House the nature of the facts on which he relies as the basis of his resolution. If he, or any other member, declaring his conviction that a judge has misdemeaned himself in office, will exhibit to the House a statement of any fact, or series of facts, which would warrant an impeachment, I will be ready instantly to vote for an inquiry. But nothing of this kind is exhibited, and therefore the resolution on the table is now opposed. Before you agree to oppress a judge with all that weight of suspicion which may be imposed by a vote of this House, let him be permitted to know what part of his conduct is supposed to be exceptionable, that opportunity may be had in the progress of any inquiry to vindicate himself against unmerited reproaches! Instead of a course of proceeding so fair and obviously just, the resolution on the table marks two of the judges for public suspicion, without specifying any supposed misconduct. It marks them as public objects of suspicion throughout the whole of their judicial life, and, without naming any thing, invites private enemies to accuse them of every thing.

To support such a resolution, common fame has been mentioned in the course of debate, as a sufficient ground of proceeding; and this idea is supposed to be authorized by English precedent. Whatever may have been done formerly, and in a period of rudeness or violence, the more improved system of modern jurisprudence should discard such a doctrine if it ever prevailed. But even that doctrine, if admitted, would not justify you in adopting the present resolution. You cannot thence infer the propriety of proceeding against a person who is not accused of any thing punishable. Will it be pretended that the common fame, which is to be a ground of proceeding, does not refer to any offence or to any transaction? Common fame, if admitted for proof, must be supposed to apply to some subject of complaint. On the principle even of this very questionable doctrine, a statement of some charge is requisite. What, then, in the present case, is the accusation which could be supported by common fame? If there be any such, let it be stated.

The gentlemen who advocate the resolution in its present form fail in their efforts to support it, notwithstanding all the aid which they have sought from “the leading-strings and crutches of precedents,” (to use the language of the gentleman from Virginia.) On general principles, on the broad basis of universal right, the resolution is condemned; and no precedent is adduced which can justify it. I do not wish to shield any public officers, whether judges or others, who may merit impeachment, but I wish the House, when acting as public accusers, to proceed in such a manner as not to do injury to any individual. Justice is due to the individual as well as to the public. No public duty can require this House to adopt a resolution of general reproach, yet stating no public offence. And it but illy accords with the principles of justice to subject the judicial officers of the Union to all the inconvenience, vexation, and expense, of being obliged to vindicate themselves against secret accusations, which it may be more difficult to discover than to overthrow.

You will observe, sir, that I do not enter into any particular examination of the case referred to by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) whether there was a controversy as to prerogative and privilege between the court and the bar, in which the pride of professional rank appeared in opposition to judicial authority. Whether the judge very properly refused to yield to the counsel, or whether the court committed an error in pronouncing the law, these are topics which I think it needless to examine in considering the resolution now on the table; for the resolution itself states nothing, and there is no case before us for examination.

On so grave a subject as the present, when we are called upon to aid in the administration of justice, it was to be desired that the advocates of the resolution should so far regard their own exhortations as to refrain from attempting to enkindle the animosity of party. The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SMILIE) seems to have thought himself at liberty to pursue a different course. But, considering the nature of the question on which our votes are to be given, I hope to be excused if I deem it not proper in this debate to reply to him on the various topics of party discussion which he has chosen to mention, although the task might be easy indeed to repel his charges against the former Administration. A single observation, however, may be proper on a law to which he has alluded in the language of censure. There was at least one prominent feature which might recommend it to the friends of truth. It expressly declared that the truth might be given in evidence.

Mr. DENNIS observed that in the course of the remarks which he had the honor of making yesterday, he had declared himself in favor of the proposed investigation, provided it were made on proper principles; and, in order the more clearly to illustrate his ideas and evince his sincerity, he had read in his place a resolution embracing all the facts which had been suggested to the House as the foundation of this proceeding. He had then said he would not pledge himself to offer a resolution such as he then read, but would vote for it if offered by others. As the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) had not accepted his overtures, and in the course of his observations had done him the honor of noticing some of his ideas expressed in yesterday’s debate, he rose principally for the purpose of offering an amendment, and partly for the purpose of replying to one or two of the gentleman’s remarks. He was not a little surprised at the animated strain in which that gentleman had addressed the House in the course of this morning, nor did any thing appear to have fallen from any gentleman, in the course of the discussion, which appeared to him calculated to produce so much excitement as he had manifested. But as he did not claim to set up his own feelings or his own conduct as the standard by which the feelings or actions of others ought to be guided, and as the gentleman had applied his observations without implicating motives, he had not at all interrupted the equanimity of his disposition. He had exercised a right which he should always be disposed to accord to that gentleman, and every other member--the right of placing the observations of his opponents in the most ludicrous point of view of which they were susceptible. In this right he would also indulge himself whenever the subject required it.

The gentleman from Virginia, in replying to some of his observations, had said that he had conceived the charge exhibited was of a very serious nature, but did not appear to comprehend in what respect he considered it so, and therefore he wished to explain in what manner he considered it as such. He considered it as serious, inasmuch as it was calculated to excite suspicion and asperse the official conduct of the gentlemen in question; but did not mean to insinuate, but on the contrary repelled the idea of its being serious as regarded its sufficiency, if true, as a foundation of impeachment. In order to show that the conduct of the judges had not been so highly censurable even as the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE,) or his colleague and the gentleman from Virginia, seemed to suppose, he begged leave to state his ideas as to the rectitude of their conduct. Here he might use the observation of the gentleman from Virginia, applied to one of his own remarks, and say that gentleman had with no great dexterity confounded two principles as distant from each other as the northern and the southern pole. He seemed to assimilate the case in which the court have arbitrarily withdrawn the question of law entirely from the jury, to the conduct of the court in this case, which only went to restrict the counsel from arguing before the jury a case already settled in the minds of the court, by a train of judicial determinations in similar cases, and in which they left both law and fact to the determination of the jury; directing them as to the law upon the subject. He was warranted in his opinion, because the gentleman from Virginia, in illustrating some of his positions, had cited the case of libel as decided by Lord Mansfield, and Mr. Fox’s celebrated declaratory bill, which grew out of that decision. What analogy has that case to the case in question? Lord Mansfield decided that in the case of a libel, all the jury had to do was to find the fact of publication or not, and that whether when published it were criminal or not, they had no right to determine, and thus withdrew the question of law altogether from their decision. This was justly regarded as a gross violation of that principle of the criminal law of that country, which invests the jury with the right to decide as well on the law as on the fact. This principle I fully acknowledge, and if the court in the case of Fries had deprived the jury of that right, and withdrawn the question of law from them, there might be some foundation for this resolution. But, according to the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the question of law and fact were both submitted to the jury, with the instructions of the court on the legal question. He had always been taught to believe that the court were the proper organ through which the law was to be communicated to the jury, though he did not deny but the jury had the right which they should cautiously exercise, but which they would always exercise, when they discover an inclination in the court to oppress the citizen or exculpate the guilty, to reject the direction of the court and decide for themselves.

But the complaint is, that the court denied to the counsel the privilege of arguing the law before the jury. Mr. DENNIS said he believed the court possessed a power of this nature, to be regulated by a sound discretion. If the court should believe that a question had been put at rest by a long train of judicial decisions, such as was the case in this instance, they not only have the right, but it becomes their duty to prevent a useless consumption of time, and to prohibit the counsel from agitating the question. Indeed it is indelicate in the counsel to impress on the jury an opinion of law contrary to the known opinion of the court; nor is there any court who will not take on themselves the right of checking counsel, in an attempt to mislead the jury on a question of law. Such was the practice of the courts in Maryland, and in that country from which we derive all our notions of jurisprudence.

But though he did not conceive that there was any ground for impeachment in the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, yet he knew that this discussion would produce a vague and undefined censure, which he believed the judges in question ought to have an opportunity of repelling. He therefore moved the following amendment, by way of preamble to the resolution:

Whereas information has been given to the House by one of its members, that, in a certain prosecution for treason on the part of the United States against a certain John Fries, pending in the circuit court of the United States in the State of Pennsylvania, Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Richard Peters, district judge for the district of Pennsylvania, by whom the said circuit court was then holden, did inform the counsel for the prisoner, that as the court had formed their opinion upon the point of law, and would direct the jury thereupon, the counsel for the prisoner must confine their argument before the jury to the question of the fact only; and whereas it is represented, that, in consequence of such determination of the court, the counsel did refuse to address the jury on the question of fact, and the said John Fries was found guilty of treason, and sentenced by the court to the punishment in such case by the laws of the United States provided, and was pardoned by the President of the United States:

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to investigate the truth of the said allegations, and to report a statement of facts in the case aforesaid, with their opinion thereupon, whether the said Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, or either of them, have so conducted themselves on the trial aforesaid as to render necessary the interposition of the constitutional powers of this House.

This amendment embraces all the facts stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, points out a specific charge as the foundation of the proceeding, and yet, when attached to the resolution, gives to the committee the power of general inquiry.

We are told that the facts have been stated by a member on the floor, and there is no reason for stating them in the resolution. Will the statement of the gentleman from Pennsylvania appear on your journals, and how will it hereafter be known that any fact was stated as the foundation on which to erect a committee with general inquisitorial powers? Posterity will only see the resolution, and to them it will be a precedent which will justify the creation of a committee of inquiry into the official conduct of any officer, without the allegation of a single fact, whenever a member may choose to be of opinion that a vexatious and expensive proceeding shall be instituted. It was therefore that he wished to resist the principle, and for that purpose moved the amendment.

Mr. HUGER said he had before stated, and he now repeated, that he was not averse to an investigation; but he did not consider himself bound to vote for a resolution so general and vague. If the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland were adopted, he should vote for the resolution.

Mr. NICHOLSON moved to amend the amendment, by striking out the whole of it after the word “Whereas,” and by inserting--

“Members of this House have stated in their places that they have heard certain acts of official misconduct alleged against Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Richard Peters, judge of the district court of the district of Pennsylvania.”

Mr. HUGER had no objection to the insertion of the last amendment, but he had to striking out the first. He therefore called for the yeas and nays upon striking out.

The question was then taken by yeas and nays upon striking out, and carried--yeas 79, nays 41, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., Nathaniel Alexander, David Bard, Geo. Michael Bedinger, Phanuel Bishop, William Blackledge, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, George W. Campbell, Levi Casey, Joseph Clay, John Clopton, Jacob Crowninshield, William Dickson, John B. Earle, Peter Early, Ebenezer Elmer, John W. Eppes, Wm. Eustis, William Findlay, John Fowler, James Gillespie, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Oliver Phelps, John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, Tompson J. Skinner, James Sloan, John Smilie, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, Matthew Walton, John Whitehill, Richard Wynn, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

NAYS.--Simeon Baldwin, Silas Betton, John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dennis, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Thomas Griffin, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, David Hough, Benjamin Huger, Samuel Hunt, Joseph Lewis, jun., Thomas Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, Thomas Lowndes, Nahum Mitchell, James Mott, Thomas Plater, Samuel D. Purviance, Joshua Sands, John Cotton Smith, John Smith of New York, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Taney, Samuel Thatcher, George Tibbits, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Daniel C. Verplanck, Peleg Wadsworth, Lemuel Williams, and Marmaduke Williams.

The question was now taken on inserting the amendment of Mr. NICHOLSON, and carried.

The question was then put upon agreeing to the amendment thus amended.

Mr. PURVIANCE said he could not vote for it because it did not state the fact. It declared that members of the House had stated that they had heard of official acts of misconduct of both the judges, when but one act had been charged against Judge Peters.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH observed that he perceived no reason for the preamble. He hoped therefore it would not be agreed to. General inquiry was his object, and, as going to limit it, he was against the preamble.

Mr. ELLIOT said that, had the amendment of the gentleman from Connecticut prevailed, he might have reconciled it to his mind to vote for the resolution thus amended. But as it stood, he could not.

Mr. NICHOLSON remarked that when he offered the amendment, the incorrectness suggested by the gentleman from North Carolina had not occurred to him. To obviate this incorrectness he would move to amend the amendment by saying “a certain act of Richard Peters.”

The SPEAKER said this amendment was not in order.

Mr. NICHOLSON said that under such circumstances he must vote against the whole amendment.

The question being taken, the amendment as amended was lost without a division.

When the resolution for appointing a committee of inquiry was carried--yeas 81, nays 40, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., Nathaniel Alexander, David Bard, George M. Bedinger, Phanuel Bishop, William Blackledge, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, Levi Casey, Joseph Clay, John Clopton, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, William Dickson, John B. Earle, Peter Early, Ebenezer Elmer, John W. Eppes, Wm. Eustis, William Findlay, John Fowler, James Gillespie, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, William Hoge, James Holland, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, Wm. Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B. C. Lucas, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patterson, Oliver Phelps, John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, Tompson J. Skinner, James Sloan, John Smilie, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck, Matthew Walton, John Whitehill, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Wynn, Joseph Winston, Thomas Wynns.

NAYS.--Simeon Baldwin, Silas Betton, John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dennis, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Thomas Griffin, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, David Hough, Benjamin Huger, Samuel Hunt, Joseph Lewis, jun., Thomas Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, Thomas Lowndes, Nahum Mitchell, Samuel L. Mitchill, James Mott, Thomas Plater, Samuel D. Purviance, Joshua Sands, John Cotton Smith, John Smith of New York, Wm. Stedman, James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, George Tibbits, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Peleg Wadsworth, and Lemuel Williams.

Ordered, That Messrs. JOHN RANDOLPH, jun., NICHOLSON, JOSEPH CLAY, EARLY, ROGER GRISWOLD, HUGER, and BOYLE, be appointed a committee pursuant to the said resolution.

MONDAY, January 9.

Another member, to wit, WILLIAM HELMS, from New Jersey, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

WEDNESDAY, January 11.

Virginia Yazoo Company.

On a motion made and seconded,

“That the agent or agents of the Virginia Yazoo Company, ‘claimants of compensation under the late cession and convention between the State of Georgia and the United States, and the acts lately passed by Congress thereon, as purchasers of land in the Mississippi Territory, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine, from the said State of Georgia,’ be heard in person, or by counsel, at the bar of the House, on Monday next:”

The question was taken thereupon, and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 61, nays 49.

On a motion made and seconded that the House do come to the following resolution:

Resolved, That the South Carolina Yazoo Company be heard by their agent, on Monday next, at the bar of the House:

And the said motion being twice read at the Clerk’s table, a motion was made and seconded to amend the same, by striking out all the words from the word “Resolved,” in the first line, to the end of the motion, and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following words: “That this House will, on Monday next, hear all the agents of the different companies claiming lands south of the State of Tennessee, who may choose to speak at the bar of this House.”

And on the question that the House do agree to the said amendment, it passed in the negative. And the main question being taken that the House do agree to the said motion, as originally proposed, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 67, nays 46.

FRIDAY, February 3.

Georgia Militia Claims.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee of Claims, on the petition of John M. Randolph and Randolph McGillis, which is unfavorable to the prayer of the petitioners.

The petitioners claim their pay as militiamen, called out in the State of Georgia for the protection of that State against the Indians. They allege, that, being called out under the authority of the Government of the United States, the General Government is bound to compensate them and the other men called out for their services.

The Committee of Claims report that the petitioners are to look for compensation to the State of Georgia, who, by the articles of cession recently concluded, had agreed to receive one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, in full for all demands for military service.

[This debate, though nominally on a private claim, retains a surviving interest from its historic details, its connection with the Georgia cession, its references to the Yazoo speculation, and its dependence upon the question of protection between the Federal Government and a State.]

Mr. EARLY.--Mr. Chairman: I cannot but be sensible of the difficulty which opposes itself to the present claim after an unfavorable report from the committee to which it was referred. And it is impossible not to discern that this difficulty is increased by the opinion of the Attorney General upon the construction of the articles of cession from Georgia to the United States. But as to that opinion, it may not be improper to observe, that so far as it applies to the case of the claimant, it is repelled by the positive certificates of two of the Georgia Commissioners, gentlemen of veracity and legal talents equal with himself. To give to the opinions, or rather the “private ideas and recollections” of that officer, the weight and authority which have been thereunto attached by the Committee of Claims, would be to adopt in practice a principle at war with the maxims of all free Governments; it would be to constitute the framer of an instrument the judge of its construction. This is the essence of despotism. But I apprehend that neither the principle laid down in that opinion nor the facts therein stated do bear upon the case; but that the facts do negatively prove that the claims now under discussion were not included in the compensation stipulated to Georgia in the articles of cession and agreement. The principles are, that the term “territory,” as used in the instrument, meant not only the territory ceded, but that retained. Now, Mr. Chairman, as I cannot possibly comprehend what bearing this has upon the question before us, I must be excused if I leave the Attorney General in the undisturbed enjoyment of his premises and pursue the discussion.

So early as the year 1787 the State of Georgia, being sorely distressed by the violence of the Indians, passed a law directing the establishment of two regiments of troops, to serve until a restoration of peace could be secured. But the enlistments not having been completed, in the following year a law was passed holding out additional inducement, and in the year 1789 the present federal constitution having gone into operation, and the rights of peace and war thereby vested exclusively in the General Government, the Legislature of Georgia passed a law discharging the troops which had been enlisted, and declaring the rate of pay which they should receive. For this pay certificates were directed to be issued, and these certificates constitute a debt unredeemed to this day. [Mr. E. turned to the several laws above referred to, and read from each extracts as proofs of his statement.] Here, Mr. Chairman, you have unfolded a debt, which, without the least violence to construction, fills up the description given in the articles of cession. Here are expenses incurred by the State totally distinct from and unconnected with the claims now under discussion. It is important also to observe, that every attempt made by the State of Georgia prior to the cession to dispose of her vacant territory, appears from the face of the acts to have been dictated by a view of discharging the public obligations to those troops. No less than three attempts at a disposition of her territory were made prior to the cession. The first was an offer to cede to the General Government, in 1788, provided Congress would pay the expenses which had then accrued in defending the frontiers, and would yield the wonted protection in future at their own expense. This was rejected. In the following year a law passed for disposing of a part of the territory to companies, notoriously with a view to raise money wherewith to meet the same engagements. This also failed, for causes which have been amply unfolded to the House on another occasion. The next attempt was in the year 1795, which, in the very title of the law, is expressed to be made to meet the particular engagements to the same soldiery. Of the result of this transaction the House is also possessed. The last attempt was by the articles of cession. Thus it appears that in no instance were the present claims ever thought of as a debt to be met by the State of Georgia out of the proceeds of her unlocated lands, but that the expenses incurred by, and the engagements made to the troops in the years 1787, 1788, and 1789, were uniformly the moving cause toward a disposition of her territory.

The Committee of Claims however, sir, notwithstanding they have throughout their report endeavored to rest upon the Attorney General the responsibility of the construction given to the cession, have at the same time erected a pillar of their own to support it, where they saw it must fall. They well perceived that all reasoning upon the subject was idle, unless one principle could be established; this they have boldly advanced to, and, instead of proving, have assumed as the groundwork of their whole superstructure. It is, that the State was bound in the first instance to compensate the soldiery, notwithstanding the ulterior responsibility of the General Government. From this they infer that the State had a right and by the cession did exercise the right of exonerating the latter Government. Now, Mr. Chairman, grant to the Committee their premises and there is an end to the question between us; their consequences must result. But, sir, I must supplicate their pardon if I refuse my assent to their position until my judgment is convinced. And I must be pardoned for saying that the reasoning to which they have resorted for the purpose of proving it, strikes my mind as the reverse of sound; that it proves too much to prove any thing. It is, that the State Government is in the first instance liable, because the troops were called into the field by the State Executive. This reasoning, Mr. Chairman, would go to prove that in every instance in which militia have been called into the service of the General Government, the States from which they were drafted were in the first instance liable for their compensation, because, in every case which has taken place, they were called into the field by State Executives. The truth is, sir, that in every case the orders have issued from the Executive of the General Government to that of the State Government, and that orders have from the latter issued in consequence thereof, for making the requisite drafts; so that the troops engaged in service under the immediate directions of the State, but under the mediate directions of the United States. This was the course pursued in both the insurrections in the State of Pennsylvania; it was the course in the State of South Carolina in relation to Indian invasion, at the same period at which the services were performed in Georgia for which we are now claiming compensation. It was the same course the other day with the troops ordered down the Mississippi to occupy New Orleans and its dependency. In all these cases the troops were compensated by the General Government in the first instance. It never entered the heart of any man that the States from which the drafts were made, were in the first instance liable, and that resort must afterwards be had by the State Government against the United States. I have always been taught that precedents established principles, but it now seems that the Committee of Claims in the profoundness of their researches have discovered that by assuming premises, principles may be established in the face of a uniform current of precedents.

There are, Mr. Chairman, two modes marked out in the constitution in which the militia may be called into service. The first is a case where from necessity the war attribute of sovereignty is left in the individual States. It is the case of invasion or such imminent danger thereof as will not admit of delay. The other mode is that of issuing orders from the Executive of the General, to the officers of the State Governments. This is the usual method by which the militia of the States are drawn into the service of the United States. And it is of importance to observe here, that the act of Congress which was intended to give effect to the constitutional powers of the General Government to “call forth the militia,” authorizes the President “to issue his orders for that purpose to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper.” For, inasmuch as there can be no other difference in a military point of view, and for military purposes, between the Governor of a State and the next highest military officer, than the difference of rank, the one being first, the other second, in command, it must follow that if the militia are to resort for pay to the State Governments because their orders have passed through the Governor, they must also resort to the same source in case their orders should pass through the second or third in command; the principles upon which the committee found their reasoning apply equally to both cases. The soundness of conclusions drawn by the committee is, therefore, not merely questionable, but to me it appears not difficult to prove that the conclusions themselves are at war with the most obvious principles of justice.

I hold it, sir, accordant with the most common rules by which individuals are regulated in a state of society, that when service is performed the party for whom it was performed is the only one responsible for the compensation. The rule applies with equal force to the case of Governments, who are moral agents. Happily, Mr. Chairman, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the party for whom the service was performed in the case under discussion. Fortunately for the States in general, it is made the constitutional duty of the General Government to “protect each of them against invasion.” And fortunately for the State of Georgia in the present instance, there is the recorded sanction of the Executive of the Union, couched in the following words--“If the information which you may receive, shall substantiate clearly any hostile designs of the Creeks against the frontiers of Georgia, you will be pleased to take the most effectual measures for the defence thereof, as may be in your power, and which the occasion may require.” If, therefore, the principles and reasoning of the committee be correct, it must follow that troops engaged in performing the constitutional duty of the United States must resort for their compensation in the first place to the States. To premises leading to such conclusions, I will not, cannot yield assent.

Mr. Chairman: It is recollected that when this subject was under discussion at the last session of Congress, a distinction was taken between the situation of troops called into the field by order from the General Government, and those called out by the State Executive in virtue of authority given by the former. But, sir, I humbly apprehend that such a distinction is one of words, and not of principles. And I must here profess to the honorable Committee of Claims my profound acknowledgment, for furnishing me with an idea, and a mode of phraseology most suited to my purpose. They, in their report, have told the House that the “manner of exhibiting” the demand assuredly cannot change its nature. Now, sir, I repeat, in nearly their own words, that the manner of calling out the troops, cannot change the nature of the service. It cannot change the United States service into State service. And indeed the Committee of Claims themselves have given us the strongest proofs, that with them the distinction had no weight. For of claims which have been so contradistinguished in the reports from the War Department, there were committed to them both descriptions; but they draw no difference. Indeed, their principles would admit of none.

But, sir, if a difference in principle did exist between claims of the two kinds, it would prove nothing in the present case, because the difference does not here appear in fact; and I cannot but consider it as one of the unfortunate circumstances attendant upon our claims, that the epithet unauthorized, has, without foundation, been attached to them, because, as was supposed, they were founded upon services not specially ordered. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that they were not only authorized, but they were ordered, by the General Government. I beg leave to compare the tenor of the orders for drafting the militia in Georgia, with the orders issued in other cases, about which no difficulty ever occurred. The words used in the Georgia case are, “you will be pleased to take the most effectual measures for the defence thereof,” &c. What are the words used in the orders issued to the governors of four States, to march militia to quell the insurrection in the Western counties of Pennsylvania? “I have to request your Excellency,” &c. The words are the same in every other instance in which militia have been ordered into the service of the United States. They are the same which were used for enlisting the one hundred horse and one hundred foot to serve upon the frontiers of Georgia, about whose compensation there never has, until the present moment, been any difficulty; they are the same under which several corps were raised in the same quarter, whose services have long since been remunerated.

Let us here pause for a moment, and view the extent to which we shall be led by adopting the report. Sir, the principles of that report, and the application therein made of those principles, lead to a conclusion from which, if I mistake not, every gentleman upon this floor will revolt. Sure I am, every State in the Union will reject it with horror. What, sir! has the great, the all-important right of peace and war been yielded up by the States to the General Government, and yet the States bound to compensate for war services? It is no reply to this conclusion to be told that the States are only liable in the first instance; for it is then completely within the power of the General Government, by withholding, to make them bear the burden altogether. And to that may be added, that the expenditure might frequently be of such magnitude as to create extreme oppression in the imposition of taxes, and, in some States, might produce general ruin and bankruptcy.

Mr. J. C. SMITH observed that the Committee of Claims, in submitting to the House the reports then before them, had not been influenced by the magnitude of the sum claimed for services. The simple question considered by them, was whether compensation had, or had not been rendered for those services. The decision of this question depended on another question, whether from the nature of our Government, the State of Georgia was to be considered as, in the first instance, liable for the satisfaction of these claims. If this should be admitted, he thought the proper construction to be placed on the articles of cession was extremely plain. There are two ways in which the militia of a State may be called out by the Executive of the United States. The first is by a direct detachment of any portion of the militia. It was not necessary, in any instance, for the Government of the United States to call on the Executive of a State for this purpose. It was in their power directly to call into the public service a brigade or other division. This is one course, which may be pursued, and in this case it is admitted that the soldiers are soldiers of the United States, and that for their compensation they are to look to no other Government than that of the United States, in the first instance. The other course is that where a requisition is made by the General Government on the Executive of a State. What is the state of things in this case? It must be presumed that the citizens of a State, thus called into service, are to look to their own State for compensation in the first instance, though he admitted that the General Government was in the last resort responsible. They are to look, in the first instance, to the State Government, for this obvious reason: The Governor of a State is not amenable to the General Government; and he consequently cannot be punished for exceeding their orders. Is that Government then bound at all events to pay the expenses incurred in consequence of the orders of the State Executive, when they may be in direct violation of the orders of the General Government? It is a clear position then, that when the militia are called out by the Executive of a State they are to look to the State in the first instance. Application may be made to the General Government in the first instance, and if there shall have been no disobedience to its orders it may make payment; but, put the case of the orders of the General Government being disobeyed, will it be contended that it will be obliged to remunerate services rendered in opposition to its commands?

Contemplating the subject in this view, it must be admitted that the militia are in the first instance to look to the State Government, which may make a compromise with the General Government.

The second question is, what is the nature of the compromise made in this case? The articles of cession purport to be [Mr. SMITH here quoted the beginning of these articles.]

It may here be proper to premise that Georgia is the first State in the Union that has ever received a compensation for her territory transferred to the United States. That territory was acquired by the joint exertions and blood of the citizens of all the States. Under such circumstances it becomes necessary to inquire into the compensation stipulated to be given by the United States to the State of Georgia; a compensation not given for the land, but for expenses incurred by Georgia in relation to it. The Attorney General tells us that these expenses were incurred for the portion surrendered to the United States, as well as for the whole State.

It behooves the gentleman from Georgia to show the precise expenses incurred. Were this once proved it would remove all doubt. The Commissioners who formed the articles of cession, it may be presumed, had before them the whole materials; and it must be inferred that the claims now made were fully considered by them, and were, so far as they are just, included in the settlement. Mr. S. concluded his remarks by saying he felt no uncommon tenacity or zeal against the claims; but that he would be very willing to allow them in case it should be satisfactorily shown that they were not already compensated.

Mr. MERIWETHER and Mr. HOLLAND opposed the report, when a vote was passed against the claims--yeas 73, nays 28; when the House, on the motion of Mr. J. CLAY, postponed the further consideration of the subject till Monday next.

MONDAY, February 13.

Public Roads.

On motion of Mr. JACKSON, the House took up the bill making provision for the application of the money heretofore appropriated to the laying out and making public roads leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic to the Ohio river.

Mr. J. CLAY moved to postpone the bill to the 1st Monday of December. Lost--yeas 41, nays 40.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD moved so to amend the first section, as to vest the President with a general power to appoint three Commissioners to designate a route, to be reported to Congress for their ultimate decision; which motion, after a short conversation, was agreed to by a considerable majority.

Mr. LYON offered a motion for empowering the President to designate the routes. Lost, without a division.

The committee rose and reported the bill with several amendments, in which the House concurred, and ordered the bill to a third reading on Wednesday.

TUESDAY, February 14.

Importation of Slaves.

The following motion, offered by Mr. BARD, was taken into consideration in Committee of the Whole:

“Resolved, That a tax of ten dollars be imposed on every slave imported into any part of the United States.”

On motion of Mr. JACKSON, it was agreed to add after the words United States, “or their territories.”

Mr. LOWNDES.--I will trespass but a very short time upon the attention of the House at this stage of the business, but as I have objections to the resolution, it may be proper that I should state them now. I will do so briefly, reserving to myself the privilege of giving my opinion more at length when the bill is before the House, should the resolution be adopted, and a bill brought in. I am sorry, Mr. Speaker, to find that the conduct of the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, in repealing its law prohibitory of the importation of negroes, has excited so much dissatisfaction and resentment as I find it has done with the far greater part of this House. If gentlemen will take a dispassionate review of the circumstances under which this repeal was made, I think this dissatisfaction and resentment will be removed, and I should indulge the hope that this contemplated tax will not be imposed. Antecedent to the adoption of the constitution under which we now act, the Legislature of South Carolina passed an act prohibiting the importation of negroes from Africa, sanctioned by severe penalties. I speak from recollection, but I believe not less than the forfeiture of the negro and a hundred pounds sterling for each brought into the State; and this act has been continued in force until it was repealed by the Legislature at its last session. This long interdiction, I think, manifests, on the part of the government of the State, a disinclination to the trade, and, had we received the aid from Congress which was necessary to enforce the act, the repeal which is now complained of would never, in my opinion, have taken place. But, Mr. Speaker, the State was unable to enforce its laws. It had given up to the Government of the United States all revenues derived from foreign imposts, and was, therefore, necessarily divested of the means of preventing the introduction into the country from sea of whatever the excitements to gain might allure it into. The geographical situation of our country is not unknown. With navigable rivers running into the heart of it, it was impossible, with our means, to prevent our Eastern brethren, who, in some parts of the Union, in defiance of the authority of the General Government, have been engaged in this trade, from introducing them into the country. The law was completely evaded, and for the last year or two, Africans were introduced into the country in numbers little short, I believe, of what they would have been had the trade been a legal one. Under these circumstances, sir, it appears to me to have been the duty of the Legislature to repeal the law, and remove from the eyes of the people the spectacle of its authority being daily violated.

I beg, sir, that from what I have said, it may not be inferred that I am friendly to a continuation of the slave trade. So far from it that, without adverting to considerations by which I know other gentlemen are influenced, I think the period has passed when the interests of the country required, and her policy dictated, that an end should be put to it. I wish the time had arrived when Congress could legislate conclusively upon the subject. I should then have the satisfaction of uniting with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who moved the resolution. Whenever it does arrive, should I then have a seat in this House, I will assure him I will cordially support him in obtaining his object. But, Mr. Speaker, I cannot vote for this resolution, because I am sure it is not calculated to promote the object which it has in view. I am convinced that the tax of ten dollars will not prevent the introduction into the country of a single slave. Gentlemen must be sensible of the truth of this observation, when they are informed, and the fact is too notorious even to be doubted, that, notwithstanding the expense and risk which attend an illicit trade, they have been introduced in very great numbers. Was I friendly to the trade, I should, without any hesitation, embrace the proposition contained in the resolution, and I should consider it a point gained of no small importance, that the Legislature of the General Government had given a sanction to it--for I can regard the Government deriving a revenue from it in no other light than a sanction. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, and those who think with him, ought, above all others, to deprecate the passing of this resolution. It appears to me to be directly calculated to defeat their own object--to give to what they wish to discountenance a legislative sanction; and, further, an interest to the Government in permitting this trade after the period when it might constitutionally terminate it. When I say that I am myself unfriendly to it, I do not wish, Mr. Speaker, to be misunderstood; I do not mean to convey the idea that the people of the Southern States are universally opposed to it--I know the fact to be otherwise. Many of the people in the Southern States feel an interest in it, and will yield it with reluctance. Their interest will be strengthened by the immense accession of territory to the United States by the cession of Louisiana. Gentlemen cannot foresee what the situation of the country will be when the period arrives when Congress may constitutionally interdict the trade. The finances of the country, and the exigences of the times, may be such as to prevent the Government from dispensing with any part of its revenue. The tax, if imposed, will undoubtedly produce a revenue, and in proportion to the amount of this revenue will be the interest of the Government in the trade. But, Mr. Speaker, my greatest objection to this tax is, that it will fall exclusively upon the agriculture of the State of which I am one of the representatives. However odious it may be to some gentlemen, and however desirous they may be of discountenancing it, I think it must be evident that this tax will not effect their object; that it will not be a discouragement to the trade, nor will the introduction of a single African into the country be prevented. The only result will be, that it will produce a revenue to the Government. I trust that no gentleman is desirous of establishing this tax with a view to revenue. The State of South Carolina contributes as largely to the revenue of the United States, for its population and wealth, as any State in the Union. To impose a tax falling exclusively on her agriculture would be the height of injustice, and I hope that the Representatives of the landed interest of the nation will resist every measure, however general in its appearance, a tendency of which is to lay a partial and unequal tax on agriculture.

Mr. BEDINGER observed, that the gentleman from South Carolina had so fully expressed the opinions he entertained, that he should say but little. Every body who knew his opinions on slavery might think strange of the vote he should give against the resolution. There was not a member on the floor more inimical to slavery than he was, still he was of opinion that the effect of the present resolution, if adopted, would be injurious. He should, therefore, vote against it.

Mr. BARD.--It was my wish that the question before the committee might be taken without discussion, but, as the gentleman from South Carolina has preferred a different course, I beg permission to offer a few thoughts on the subject.

As to the constitutionality of the measure, I believe there can be but one opinion. It is pretty well understood that the union of the States was a matter of compromise; and, indeed, the language of the constitution suggests the idea that the convention which formed that instrument, must have had the emancipation of slaves under their consideration. They had achieved liberty, and their object was to transmit it to posterity; and we cannot permit ourselves to suppose that men whose minds were so enriched with liberal sentiments, and who had so often reiterated the sacred truth, “That all men were born equally free”--I say we cannot suppose that they would consider slavery to be a subject unworthy their discussion; and it appears to be equally suggested that the convention were not all agreed to an absolute prohibition of the slave trade, but yielded so far that a duty or tax might be imposed on the future importation of that description of people. The question, then, is only on the policy of laying this tax; and it appears that there can be no doubt on this question.

The slave trade, in terms, makes African men mere articles of traffic, and of course they must be as much a subject of commercial regulation as any other species of foreign manufactures. The tax will be high or low, in proportion to the price the article will bring. And if my information is correct, a slave will bring four hundred dollars; the tax, then, is but two and-a-half per cent., which is many degrees lower than any other imported article pays. The tax is a general one; no State in the Union is exempted; it will operate wherever its object can be found. It may be that some States will pay more and some less, but it will be at the option of any State how much, or whether it will pay any of this tax; for it will be just as the State shall please to deal in this article of commerce. And, on the score of uniformity, no objection can lie against the tax--the slaves have already been the object of direct taxation, and Vermont paid none of that tax, because she had none of that kind of taxable property; and yet I never heard it complained of as not being uniform. It is said the tax is impolitic, because it will not prevent the importation of Africans into our country. This may, indeed, be the case; and I believe it will be but a feeble check to the trade if not aided by nobler motives. However, if any of the States engage in the trade, the tax will have two effects--it will add something to the revenue, and it will show to the world that the General Government are opposed to slavery, and willing to improve their power, as far as it will go, for preventing it. Both these ends are valuable; but I deem the latter to be the more important one, for we owe it indispensably to ourselves and to the world, whose eyes are on our Government, to maintain its republican character. Every thing compared to a good name is “trash;” and it rests with us whether we will preserve or destroy it. If our Government will respect power only, and justify whatever it may be able to do, then will our hands be against every man, and every man’s hand against us; and Americans will become the scorn of mankind.

On what principles, whether moral or political, I do not know; but so it was, that about the close of the Revolutionary war, the Quaker society in South Carolina brought the slave trade, or perhaps slavery itself, under their serious consideration, and declared it to be unjustifiable. They afterwards, in 1796 or 1797, addressed Congress on the subject; but failed in their object, and for no other reason, probably, than that the powers of Congress did not reach it.

Some years ago the States, even those in which slaves abound most, loudly exclaimed against the further importation of that class of people, and by their laws prohibited their traffic. Either they did this on moral principles or considerations of policy. In 1802, Congress stretched out her arm to aid the State Governments against the evil they so much deprecated, and passed a law inflicting fines and forfeitures on every man who should be found importing slaves into the United States. What might have been the issue of these combined exertions, or how far they might ultimately secure their end, I cannot tell; but, as to South Carolina, they have become nugatory; by repealing her prohibitory law she has rejected the interference of Congress. Why that State has done so; why she has abandoned a measure which, the other day, was considered so much her interest, I know not, nor is it for me to offer any conjectures. South Carolina is a sovereign State, and has a right to consult and pursue her own interest, so far as the general good will permit; for hitherto she may come, and no further. Every State has a right to import slaves if it so chooses, and Congress has a right to tax all the slaves imported; but when the powers of a State, though constitutional, operate against the general interest, then the exercise of those powers is politically wrong, because it is contrary to the fundamental principle of society, the public good, which is paramount to law and the constitution itself. And, in my opinion, the importation of slaves is hostile to the United States: to import slaves is to import enemies into our country; it is to import men who must be our natural enemies, if such there can be. Their circumstances, their barbarism, their reflections, their hopes and fears, render them an enemy of the worst description.

Gentlemen tell us, though I can hardly think them serious, that the people of this description can never systematize a rebellion. I will not mention facts, it is sufficient to say that experience speaks a different language--the rigor of the laws, and the impatience of the slaves, will mutually increase each other, until the artifices of the one are exhausted, and until, on the other hand, human nature sinks under its wrongs, or obtains the restoration of its rights. The negroes are in every family; they are waiting on every table; they are present on numerous occasions when the conversation turns on political subjects, and cannot fail to catch ideas that will excite discontentment with their condition. And what is to be expected from the people of this description, but that they will some day, and especially if their importation continues, produce a disturbance that may not be easily quieted, or kindle a flame that may not be readily extinguished. If ten thousand of them have been, as it is said, smuggled into the United States, in the course of a year or two past, and if ten or fifteen thousand of them may now be legally brought annually into our country, for four years to come, it will hardly be imagined that the general interest will be unaffected by such an importation.

If they are ignorant, they are, however, susceptible of instruction, and capable of becoming proficients in the art of war. To be convinced of this we have only to look at St. Domingo.

There the negroes felt their wrongs, and have avenged them; they learned the rights of man, and asserted them; they have wrested the power from their oppressors, and have become masters of the island. If they are unarmed, they may be armed; European powers have armed the Indians against us, and why may they not arm the negroes? And if they are already as numerous as is consistent with safety, it must be extreme impolicy to import more; it is to accelerate an event which we cannot contemplate without pain.

Slavery is not only impolitic as it affects the strength and tranquillity of the United States, but as it prevents their wealth, which can only grow out of society where the arts, sciences, and manufactures, are cultivated and improved. But, sir, I despise to argue on the advantages or disadvantages of what is contrary to the genius of our Government; what is radically unjust, and violates the principles of morality.

The Americans boast of being the most enlightened people in the world--they certainly enjoy the greatest share of liberty, and understand the principles of rational government more generally than any other nation on earth. They have denounced tyranny and oppression; they have declared their country to be an asylum for the oppressed of all nations. But will foreigners concede this high character to us, when they examine our census and find that we hold a million of men in the most degraded slavery? This is nearly one-fifth of our whole population; in some of the States nearly the half. Here, then, is a fact that must have weight to sink our national character, in spite of volumes to support it. It is a fact, from which foreigners will infer, that we possess the principles of tyranny, but want the power to carry them into operation, except against the untutored and defenceless African. If, then, we hold a consistency of national character in any estimation, we will give every discouragement in our power to the importation of slaves. It is in this view that the tax contemplated by the resolution is principally to be considered, and only incidentally as matter of revenue.

But, sir, I presume, on permission, to say, that the importation of slaves is in direct contradiction to the principles of morality. On these principles the Constitution of the United States is founded; on them every law ought to be founded; otherwise legislation will progress in the dark, and every step deviate still more from its true direction. “Do unto others as you would that others should do unto you,” is a law paramount to all human institutions; it is the fundamental law of human nature, of Christianity, and of every rational Government; it is a law which we wish all men to respect in their dealings with us; and it is a law which every man confesses he ought to observe, and, in spite of all the sophistry of depravity, must acknowledge himself subject to its cognizance. I need not, nor will I, ask if we have observed this law as to the Africans; for it must be obvious to every man that it is not possible to violate it in a greater degree than we have done towards that unfortunate and wretched people.

But, notwithstanding all the information our country enjoys, numbers in the Eastern States have been embarked, for some years past, in the cruel traffic of slaves, and smuggling them into other States. And it is to be feared that many of them are, at this moment, preparing means to stimulate the barbarous tribes of Africa to war against each other; mutually to torture every human feeling; to violate the strongest ties of nature and affection; to tear the husband from the wife, and the wife from the husband; the parent from the child, and the child from the parent; and are coolly and deliberately forging irons, that they may have the infernal pleasure of coolly and deliberately riveting them on the unfortunate men, women, and children, who may fall into their hands. Such an enterprise, such a traffic as this, must affect our national character; it is self-evidently wrong, and, at first view, must receive the disapprobation of every disinterested man. The genius of our constitution, the mildness of its administration, and the prevailing sentiment of the nation, must sanction every measure to discourage the further admission of a people whose numbers already excite most painful sensations. In a word, the tax is constitutional; no article can bear a tax better than the one here proposed; it is a uniform tax, and justified on the ground of sound policy; and so far as it tends to discourage the slave-trade, it is supported by every principle of virtue. If I have uttered a word offensive to any member of the House, it will not be attributable to design, but to an honest solicitude to promote the honor and interest of our country.

Mr. BEDINGER said he differed widely, as to the effects of this motion, from the gentleman who had just spoken. He was as hostile to the slave-trade as any man in the Union; and if he could believe that the imposition of a tax of ten dollars upon every imported negro would check the importation, he would vote for it. But he believed the resolution would have a different effect, and would rather sanction than discourage the trade. In point of revenue, the tax was of little consideration. Suppose a thousand slaves to be imported monthly, the amount of the tax would be about $100,000 a year; which in four years, at the expiration of which Congress would have power to prohibit the trade altogether, would amount to $400,000--a sum too trifling to be put into competition with the adoption of any measure that went to sanction such a trade.

Mr. MACON (the Speaker) believed the resolution was not founded in good policy. All the declamation and appeal to the passions urged in its behalf appeared to him unnecessary and irrelevant. The avowed object of the proposed tax was to show the hostility of Congress to the principle of importing slaves. How could this opposition of Congress be manifested, when it would become the duty of the armed ships of the United States, as soon as the tax was imposed, to protect this trade, as well as all other trade on which taxes were laid? He asked whether vessels engaged in this trade would not, under such circumstances, possess the same right to the protection of the Government as any other vessels engaged in any other kind of trade? Can this House tax this trade, and refuse it the same protection that is extended to all other trade? The question is not whether we shall prohibit the slave trade, but simply whether we shall tax it. Gentlemen are of opinion that the State of South Carolina has done wrong in permitting the importation of slaves. Suppose that this is the case. May not this measure be wrong also? Will it not look like an attempt in the General Government to correct a State for the undisputed exercise of its constitutional powers? It appeared to him to be something like putting a State to the ban of the empire. It will operate as a censure thrown on the State. To this, said Mr. M., I can never consent. As far as the law that may be founded upon this resolution can go, it will hold forth an evidence of the opinion entertained by Congress of the act of the Legislature of South Carolina. I know that these ideas may be unpopular in some parts of the Union, but I, notwithstanding, consider them just. There does not appear to me to be any necessity for our interposition, as, since the adoption of the constitution, no slaves have, I believe, been permitted to be imported, and as only four years are yet to run before Congress will be possessed of the constitutional right of prohibiting such importation altogether. And the simple question now is, whether for a trifling revenue, we will undertake to protect this trade. My idea is, that those who at present go into the traffic, have no right to claim your protection; but once legalize it by taxing it, and they will acquire the right thereto, and will demand it. All that has been said on the circumstances connected with the slave trade either here or in England, and on its morality or immorality, are in my opinion foreign to the true point involved in this debate, which is, Is the measure contemplated by the resolution politic, or is it not? In my opinion it is impolitic, for the reasons I have assigned, and for many others which might be added. I shall therefore, on this ground, vote against it.

Mr. FINDLAY was of opinion that the policy of the measure embraced by the resolution, and nothing else, was before them. Gentlemen seemed all to unite in their abhorrence of the slave trade; they differed only about the means of preventing it. It was well understood that a large majority of the Federal Convention were inimical to the slave trade. That convention had only acted upon it in a commercial point of view. As they considered imported slaves an article of commerce, the House possessed the same liberty of acting with regard to them, as with regard to other articles of trade. In some of these articles, Congress had the right of exercising unlimited taxation; in this case, their power was limited to a certain amount. Imported goods, on an average, were subjected to a duty of about 20 per cent. On this subject, a difference of opinion exists as to the propriety of making imported slaves an article of revenue. This is the true question, and not whether we shall cast a censure upon any particular State. It does not follow, that, because we lay a particular tax, we censure those who pay it. Considering this, then, as an article of trade, the tax might have been long since laid, had not all the States prohibited the traffic. Under those circumstances, it could not be taken up as a subject of revenue.

Mr. F. observed, that, though it might be unbecoming in the House to be influenced by resentment against the State of South Carolina, yet it was proper that they should be influenced by the policy of the case. As a profitable article of commerce, it appeared as eligible a subject of taxation as could be found, and as justly liable to taxation as any other. As to the disgrace, which some gentlemen were of opinion would arise from taxing it, that arose from the existence of the slave trade. In laying the tax, we shall do all we can to discourage it; and if we do not like to use the money derived from taxing it in the common way, we may apply it to special objects--to ameliorate the state of slavery, or to any other object.

Mr. F. concluded his remarks by observing, that this question being brought forward, he could not justify himself in neglecting to embrace the opportunity it presented of discountenancing the importation of slaves. He considered it proper that Congress should take up the subject as the constitution presented it to them. At a certain period they would possess the right of prohibiting it altogether, and until then they enjoyed the power of taxation. This being the only constitutional power they did possess, he trusted they would exert it.

Mr. S. L. MITCHILL declared his wish that the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BARD) should be considered merely as a subject of political economy. In the remarks which he proposed to offer upon it, he should, therefore, confine himself to that object. He would, therefore, say nothing on the immorality of a trade which deprived a large portion of the human species of their rights. He should pass over, in silence, every thing that might be urged to exhibit it as impious and irreligious; and he would not utter a word on its repugnance to the principles of our equal jurisprudence, and the spirit of our free Government. The slavery of a portion of our species was a copious theme, when viewed in either of these aspects; but, on the present occasion, he was willing to waive them all. The proposition was to be considered only in its commercial, economical, and fiscal relations; and on each of these it would be proper to make a few observations.

It was much to be regretted that the severe and pointed statute against the slave trade had been so little regarded. In defiance of its forbiddance and its penalties, it was well known that citizens and vessels of the United States were still engaged in that traffic. During the present session, memorials had been presented to Congress praying for exoneration from the exportation bonds, which had been given to one of the collectors of the customs, to ensure the landing of a cargo of New England rum in Africa, which it was not pretended to be denied was bartered away for slaves. These voyages were said to be carried on under the flag of a foreign nation; and the common practice, as was alleged, was, to go to the island of St. Croix and procure Danish papers and colors. Under this cover, the voyages were performed. To prevent the confiscation of the vessels under the law, on conviction of being engaged in the slave trade, it had been customary to sell that article of property in a foreign port.

Mr. M. observed that the extent of this shocking commerce was very considerable at this time. Some time ago, he had seen a list of the American vessels then known to be hovering on the coast of Guinea in quest of captive negroes. They were numerous and active, and so fatally busy as to excite the apprehensions of the benevolent Sierra Leone Company. In various parts of the nation, outfits were made for slave-voyages, without secrecy, shame, or apprehension. The construction of the ships, the shackles for confining the wretched passengers, and all the dismal apparatus of cruelty, were attended to with the systematic coolness of an ordinary adventure. Regardless of legal prohibitions, these merciless men, as greedy as the sharks of the element on which they sailed, collected their slaves along the shores, and at the factories of Negroland, from the river Senegal to the countries of Congo and Angola. Countenanced by their fellow-citizens at home, who were as ready to buy as they themselves were to collect and to bring to market, they approached our Southern harbors and inlets, and clandestinely disembarked the sooty offspring of the Eastern, upon the ill-fated soil of the Western hemisphere. In this way, it had been computed that, during the last twelve months, twenty thousand enslaved negroes had been transported from Guinea, and, by smuggling, added to the plantation stock of Georgia and South Carolina.

So little respect seems to have been paid to the existing prohibitory statute, that it may almost be considered as disregarded by common consent. And, therefore, as was observed by a gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. HUGER,) the Legislature of that State had lately repealed their restrictive law, and legitimated a trade which neither that regulation of their common wealth, nor the concurrent authority of the nation, could prevent. And it may be received as a correct general idea on this subject, that the citizens of the navigating States bring negroes from Africa, and sell them to the inhabitants of those States which are more distinguished for their plantations.

Thus in spite of the spirit of our republican institutions, and the letter of our laws, a commerce in slaves is carried on to an alarming extent--a species of slavery peculiar in its form and character, and unlike that which was practised in ancient or modern Europe--a kind of servitude unheard of by the civilized world, until it was made known among the discoveries of the Portuguese along the western coast of that continent which reaches from Ceuta to the Cape of Good Hope. There it seems to have been extant from time immemorial, among the barbarous powers of a country who have eradicated all the tender relations of society, and established in their place the forceful and ferocious distinctions of MASTER and SLAVE. From those rude and uncivilized tribes, did Christian people learn the lessons of negro slavery. Under such instructors, and with such examples before them, have the Europeans and their descendants carried those savage customs of Africans into the New World, and most unfortunately tainted with them the manners and ordinances of a more refined race of men. For a delineation of this peculiar state of society, in its native regions, the world is much indebted to the undaunted enterprise of Mr. Parke; as, for its baneful effects upon the white nations who have adopted it, they will long remember the disclosures of Mr. Wilberforce, and the researches of Mr. Clarkson.

This doleful traffic it was not in the power of Congress to prevent by any present regulations. By the 9th section of the first article of the constitution the power of admitting such persons as they please is reserved to the States, until the year 1808. South Carolina has authorized the importation of negro slaves from Africa. This Congress can neither prohibit nor punish. But the National Legislature can exercise the authority granted by the same paragraph of the constitution, “of imposing on such importation a tax or duty not exceeding ten dollars for each person.”

There could be no doubt of the power of Congress to declare and levy such an impost on imported slaves for four years to come. The only question therefore was, whether it would be good policy to do so? Mr. MITCHILL contended that it would. On this point he replied to a gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. LOWNDES,) who had argued that such a tax would discourage agriculture. He contrasted the cultivation of lands by the labor of freemen, with the more expensive management of them by slaves. He compared the husbandry of the Northern and Middle States, with the rural economy of the South. He examined in detail the moderate profits of a plantation on which bread, corn, grass, and live stock, were raised, and the enormous income derived to the proprietor of an estate employed in the culture of tobacco, rice, cotton, and sugar. He examined the smaller expense of feeding, clothing, and housing laborers in warm than in cold climates. It has been computed by men of observation, that a working slave on a cotton plantation would, besides supporting himself, clear for his master a net sum of two hundred dollars a year. On the average course of crops, where the plants were not attacked by the cherille, this estimate was considerably below the mark. And on this conviction he believed there was no important article whatever that would bear an impost so well.

Mr. M. then replied to an argument of the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. MACON,) that the imposition of the tax would be a recognition of the right to trade in slaves, and bind the nation to protect it with the force of the navy. He considered slavery already recognized in many of the States, and permitted by the constitution. It was a fact that it did exist, and Congress could not put an end to it. But this body might interpose its authority, and discountenance it as far as possible; and by laying the duty as high as the constitution permitted, a very desirable addition would be made to the revenue. Two hundred thousand dollars might be computed to be derived from this sort of merchandise imported into the country. Nor would Congress be bound to protect the African commerce on the high seas; the existing statute would be in force against it; the trade would still be unlawful as far as the power of Congress extended. And under the proposition now under debate, this species of traffic would be so far from receiving encouragement, that it would be punished in cases where Congress could punish it, and taxed in the cases to which the power to punish it did not extend.

He then delineated the wretched condition of a man subdued by fraud or force, deprived of the exercise of his will and judgment, subjected to the dominion and caprice of another, robbed of his rights and privileges, divested of moral power and agency, degraded from the rank of a human being, and brutalized into a chattel--a thing--and divested of the character of a person. In this point of view, such articles, bought and sold publicly in the market, were to be considered as mere merchandise, as working machines, or animals of labor? Distressing as the recollection was to every sympathizing or patriotic heart, it was useless to dwell upon it, as it was beyond our reach to grant relief. He would therefore treat it strictly as a case of foreign merchandise heretofore admitted free, but upon which it was now intended to impose a duty. For his own part, he should be glad if it could be laid, ad valorem, upon the price of the article. But, as the matter was circumstanced, there was no other method that could be adopted than to impose it, per capita, upon the individual persons imported. By laying the tax, he would imitate the ways of Divine Providence, and endeavor to extract good out of evil.

Concluding thus that the tax was constitutional, that the subject would bear it, and that it would be a seasonable and proper expression of the Congressional sentiment on the subject. Mr. M. proceeded to show what an abundance of excellent purposes could be answered by $200,000 collected annually for four years.

In the course of his remarks, Mr. M. said, he had endeavored to avoid all harshness of expression on a topic of a peculiarly delicate nature, and prone to excite much sensibility in debate, but considered it strictly as a matter of political economy. In his attempt to state his reasoning to the committee, not as an abstract speculator, but as a man of business, he hoped he had given no offence to any gentleman by any severity of animadversion. He looked upon negro slavery as a dark spot on some of the members of the national body, which was spreading wider, turning blacker, and threatening a gangrene all around--and he felt a confidence that all friends to the health of this body would take warning by its fatal progress in a neighboring island--which had so mortified in St. Domingo, as to make that extreme part rot and drop off from the system to which it once belonged.

Mr. SLOAN said he rose to observe, in a few words, that however afflicting it might be to contemplate a certain part of the creation used as articles of traffic, imported and exported the same as cattle, he did not consider the morality or immorality of the practice before the House. We must take the constitution as we find it, and as it is not in our power to prohibit the importation, the only question to be considered is, whether we shall most encourage the traffic, by letting the articles imported remain free of duty or by imposing a tax upon them. This view, he believed, presented to the mind the true question, and believing himself that a tax would, in some degree, discourage the importation, he should vote for the resolution.

Mr. T. MOORE.--I am astonished to hear gentlemen, who advocate the resolution now under consideration, reprobate a traffic as horrid and infamous, and yet wish to draw a revenue from infamy, if it is an infamy.

I differ very widely in opinion from the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania, who thinks that a tax of ten dollars per head will operate as a check to the growth of this horrid traffic. If I thought it would have that effect I would cheerfully vote for the resolution. I believe a tax of ten dollars will not prevent the importation of a single person of this description.

The gentleman told us that he hoped the General Government were disposed to discourage this traffic as far as they are authorized by the constitution. I hope this House will discourage this impolitic act of the Legislature of one of the Southern States--not by imposing a tax on those unfortunate people imported into the United States, but by passing a resolution expressive of its disapprobation of all acts permitting the importation of certain people into the United States. As the General Government cannot prohibit this traffic before the year 1808, I hope this House will reject the resolution under consideration, and totally disapprove every measure which attempts to draw revenue from an act that rivets the chains of slavery on any of the human race.

Mr. HUGER regretted that he could not see the subject in the same light with other gentlemen who had taken a part in the debate. He had no hesitation in saying that he had always been hostile to the importation of slaves. Nor had he any hesitation in saying that if he had the power he would prohibit the importation. But the situation in which they were now placed was very different from that in which they would find themselves in the year 1808, when they would possess the constitutional power to prohibit the introduction of slaves. The constitution was known to be the offspring of concession and compromise, and in no part of it was this feature more apparent than in that which related to this subject. When the Southern States were admitted into the Union, they were in the habit of carrying on this species of trade, and they, by the express language of the constitution, retained the right of continuing it until the year 1808. Under this constitution the State of South Carolina enjoyed the exclusive right of judging of the propriety of allowing the trade or of prohibiting it. Had he had the honor of a seat in the Legislature of that State, Mr. H. certainly would have opposed the passage of this law. But he was only one of that community, standing here as their Representative, and after the State had exercised their undoubted right, however he might dislike the measure, it was his duty to defend the right which they had to adopt it. That State had in truth done no more than she possessed a constitutional right to do, and he believed there was in that State as much true compassion as in any other in the Union. He said he could not therefore but feel sensibly the attempt to single out this particular State to censure her for doing that which she had an undisputed right to do.

This was not, as contended by some gentlemen, a mere question of revenue; but it was a question whether the Government of the Union should come forward and condemn the act of a State, which she was fully authorized to pass. If it is necessary to increase the revenue, let us meet that subject fairly and fully, and not single out a particular resource of a particular State. It is on this ground that I principally object to this measure. The gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCHILL) has endeavored to prove that because in the Southern States the article of slaves produces a great profit, it is therefore proper to make it the subject of taxation. I ask if there should be a profitable species of trade carried on in any other part of the Union, would it be deemed politic or just on that account to lay an additional tax upon it? The fair principle of taxation is, that every part of the Union should contribute equally. When any branch of trade is profitable in New York, I, though a Southern man, rejoice at it. When the fisheries of the Eastern States prosper, I feel highly gratified--not because those whom I represent are particularly interested in them, but because I consider myself as a part of the whole, and that whatever advances the interests of any part of this Union must promote the interests of every part of it.

With regard to the moral principle involved in the slave trade, we have nothing to do with it. On this point the Union ought to be silent. On this subject can any thing be more pointed than the provisions of the constitution, which, contrary to most of the other provisions, cannot be altered but with the consent of every State in the Union. Why then shall we cry over what we cannot prevent, like a school boy? Each State, so long as she confines herself within the limits of her constitutional powers, must be the exclusive judge of her own conduct; and it becomes not one State, influenced by different feelings, habits, and interests, to pronounce upon the conduct of another. All, so far as regards themselves, are judges of right and wrong. We, too, have as strong a conviction of the propriety of our measures as those who differ from us in sentiment on this subject. We may perhaps think it more blamable to make slaves of white people than of the blacks.

I confess I have not been able clearly to understand the ideas of the gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCHILL.) A few days since that gentleman offered a report, the object of which was to free raw materials from duty. Will the State of South Carolina profit by this? No. It will conduce to the benefit of other parts of the Union; but we shall bear the burden: and still, on this occasion, because we derive a certain profit from a particular description of trade, the gentleman contends for taxing it.

Let gentlemen also consider that we are not to be hurried away by our feelings or passions. We are sent here to attend to the business of the nation, and, to do that as it ought to be done, we must yield to a spirit of mutual deference and compromise, we must act fairly and impartially. All we ask in the present case is, to do as we would be done by. We permit the Eastern States to import German redemptioners and others. Let them then permit us to enjoy our constitutional right of importing slaves, especially when that right will exist but for a short time.

We do not pretend to advocate the act, but the right of our State to pass this law. It is not to be inferred that we are friendly to the importation. I believe, on the contrary, every Representative of the State on this floor is hostile to it. But how can gentlemen expect that we will disregard the voice of our own State, and especially when the measure may have been dictated by good and substantial reasons. One good reason may be that the importation could not be prevented, and that the restraining law was extensively broken. This we know was the fact. If so, may it not have been sound policy in the State to repeal it? There may have been another reason for the measure. It may have been conceived to have been better to import slaves directly from Africa than to be indebted for them to New York and other States, in which they may have been surreptitiously introduced.

The gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCHILL) observes that it is demonstrable that, even in a pecuniary point of view, slaves are an evil; and that they impoverish those who hold them. What does this show, but that in the North they kept slaves as long as their interest dictated, and then got rid of them; and that because it is a misfortune to have them, we must be punished for our poverty. Though young, I am happy to state that I have seen the evil decreasing in the State I have the honor to represent. Let us alone, and we will pursue the best means the nature of the case admits of. Interfere and you will only increase the evil; for, whenever the Government of the Union interferes in the peculiar concerns of a State, it must excite jealousy and a spirit of resistance.

I beg gentlemen to lay aside, on this occasion, the prejudices to which local circumstances and peculiar State interests and feelings expose them. When I see the lowest of the animal tribe tortured, I feel for them; but does it follow that my interference will mitigate their pain? Do we not all know, that by interfering between a man and his wife, we only aggravate the difference; and do we not likewise know that any interference between a master and his slave induces the former to be more severe. I believe the State of South Carolina has as great an inclination as any State similarly circumstanced, to do away this evil. But they must, and ought to take their own course. It is a circumstance well known, that the people to the North, who make the most noise on this subject, are those, who, when they go to the South, first hire, then buy, and last of all turn out the severest masters among us.

Mr. LUCAS observed that, though much had been said on the merits of the resolution, he would take the liberty of adding a few remarks. It was a maxim that, to justify the raising of a revenue, a Government ought previously to stand in need of money. The pecuniary wants of a Government were absolute and relative. The fit objects of taxation were likewise various. Some objects bore taxation better than others. When Governments want money to satisfy indispensable demands, taxes must be laid; and even when they are not in immediate want of money for pressing emergencies, there are frequently important purposes that might be answered in case they possessed resources. On this occasion it is said that the Government is not in want of money, that the existing revenue meets the wants of the nation, and that, consequently, a new tax ought not to be laid. This may possibly, strictly speaking, be correct. But to say absolutely that we do not want money, he must deny; for he believed if they had money in the Treasury, not required for pressing exigencies, they could find abundant occasions for spending it to good effect. It was known that there were many claims preferred against the Government, of a meritorious kind, and which had been disallowed, not so much on their intrinsic merits, as from the operation of the statute of limitations. This limitation, said Mr. L., it is my wish should be removed, and one way of effecting that end will be to increase our revenue, as we shall thereby be enabled to discharge all just demands exhibited. The laying out, likewise, of roads was an important object. One is contemplated from this place to New Orleans. Without going further into a view of the various demands on the Government, we shall see the occasion that exists for more money being drawn into our Treasury.

As to the nature of the slave trade, we must, in my opinion, consider slaves imported as so much produce or merchandise. This article ought, in my opinion, likewise to be taxed, because the trade is odious; also, because it affords a great profit to those who carry it on. It was yesterday stated by a gentlemen from New York that a slave employed in the Southern States would pay for himself in two years; that is, that a slave that costs four hundred dollars will give a profit to the owner of two hundred dollars a year. As, therefore, no article imported into the United States gives a greater profit, so no article can better bear a tax. It ought also to be taxed, because the importation of slaves into the United States operates injuriously on the poor whites who draw their subsistence from labor. Their comparative situation in relation to the rich, is reduced; for if you increase the black laborers, so as to make them work for a lower compensation, you virtually reduce the value of the labor of the whites, and proportionally lessen the chance of a poor white man getting employment on favorable terms. It is well understood that competition always reduces the price of an article in the market; and although the blacks may not, in all respects, enter into a competition with the whites, yet, so far as respects labor, the competition will be complete. The rich part of the community will not employ a white man who feels the spirit of a freeman, and who will not submit to be subservient to the caprices of his employer, so long as they can employ a slave whom they can control as they please, and at a smaller expense. The indisputable effect, therefore, of the introduction of additional slaves will be the reduction of the value of labor, and the augmented severity of the lot of the poor white man, who is entirely dependent on his labor for the support of himself and family.

Gentlemen tell us we ought not so closely to scrutinize the conduct of the Legislature of South Carolina. I am, said Mr. L., far from scrutinizing in this instance the conduct of that State. I respect the people of South Carolina. Their situation may, perhaps, be such as in a great measure to justify their conduct, though I am far from saying that I approve it. But when we lay a tax on the importation of slaves, it is a sufficient reply to such remarks to say that the tax is not laid exclusively on slaves admitted into South Carolina. It does not therefore apply to South Carolina alone. That State has an undoubted right to admit the importation; but Congress have also an undoubted right of taxing them. The resolution, therefore, does not encroach on the rights of that State. The United States and South Carolina form two bodies politic, both of which are possessed of constitutional rights. To the one belongs the right of importing, to the other, the right of taxation; and this last right may be exercised without involving any censure of the State of South Carolina. The only necessary inquiry is, whether the proposed tax will be oppressive or unjust. I believe it will be universally agreed that an imported article worth four hundred dollars will not be taxed high compared with other articles, when it pays a duty of ten dollars. As to the constitutionality of the tax not a word need be said; that has not and cannot be disputed.

WEDNESDAY, February 15.

Importation of Slaves.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on Mr. BARD’s resolution to impose a tax of ten dollars on every slave imported into the United States; the debate on which occupied the remainder of the sitting.

Mr. LUCAS supported, and Mr. HOLLAND opposed the resolution.

Mr. EARLE moved that the committee rise and report progress. His reason for this motion was, that, from information received from South Carolina, on which he placed much reliance, it was expected that the Legislature would meet in April, and would then repeal the act admitting the importation of slaves. Should the committee rise, he would move a postponement of the consideration of the resolution to the first Monday in May.

Mr. GREGG.--I hope the motion for the committee to rise will prevail; and that any further proceeding on this subject will be postponed for the present. It has been said by the gentleman from South Carolina who made the motion, and I have heard it mentioned by others, that a considerable ferment has been excited in that State by the passage of the law authorizing the importation of slaves, and that it is highly probable the Legislature, at its next session, will repeal that law. That session, it is expected, will be held in April, the Governor having it in contemplation to convene the Legislature at that time for the purpose of submitting to their consideration the proposed amendment to the constitution.

Let it not, Mr. Chairman, be inferred, from what I have said, that I am in principle opposed to the effect which I am confident the mover of the resolution expected it would produce. No member of this House is, or can be, more decidedly opposed to slavery than I am. In the State from which I come slavery is scarcely, if at all, known. I do not know whether, at this moment, it has any existence there. However the inhabitants of that State may differ on other points, on the subject of slavery we are all united. All parties have joined in abolishing it. I sincerely wish that Congress possessed a constitutional power to abolish it, or at least to check its further progress in the United States. If they did possess such power, I would most cordially concur in putting it into operation. Instead of ten dollars, I wish the constitution would warrant us in imposing a tax of one hundred, or of five hundred dollars on each imported slave. I would willingly vote for that sum, because it would amount to an entire prohibition of such importation, and effectually destroy the traffic which I consider highly impolitic, as well as contrary to the principles of justice.

When the present constitution was adopted, there were no laws in several States to prohibit the importation of slaves. It is but a few years since such a law was passed by the State of Georgia. During all that period money was much wanted. The revenue was not adequate to the demand. Government was compelled to have recourse to loans, and in some instances had to submit to a heavy interest; yet in all that time the idea, I believe, was never suggested in Congress of supplying the deficiency by imposing a tax on slaves, although numbers were then imported. From this it may be inferred, that at that time the power vested in Congress by the constitution of imposing a tax of ten dollars on each person imported into any of the then existing States, agreeably to its laws, was not considered as given for the purpose of raising revenue. It was given, it may be presumed, for the purpose of being used as a check to the trade, and at the time the constitution was adopted, the exercise of that power might have contributed to produce such effect. The price of slaves was then low; their labor was not so productive to their owners, and, of course, ten dollars in addition to the then current price might, in some measure, have checked the spirit of purchasing. But soon after that period, by the introduction of the cultivation of cotton, the labor of slaves became more valuable, and their price enhanced in proportion. Ten dollars then bore some proportion to the price of a slave, but at this time it is comparatively as a cipher. A planter who can find his advantage in giving four hundred dollars, which is said to be the present current price of a good negro, will think but little of ten additional dollars. In the present state of things, therefore, I take it the proposed tax cannot effect the object contemplated by the mover of the resolution--it can neither prevent nor remedy the evil; and as it has the appearance of giving legal sanction to the trade, and may have an influence on the Legislature of South Carolina, inasmuch as it is an implied attack on their sovereignty, and a censure on them for passing an act which, however important it may be in our view, the constitution certainly did authorize them to pass, I think the further consideration of the subject had better be postponed for the present; perhaps always, until Government may have it in its power to adopt measures calculated to produce an entire prohibition of the trade.

Mr. HUGER said the arguments urged by the friends of the motion were two-fold. One class of gentlemen say they are not in favor of this tax for purposes of revenue, but to manifest the opinion of the National Legislature; while another class declares their only reason for laying it is the revenue it will bring into the Treasury. A decision, therefore, by the House, will settle no principle; for supposing that a majority of the members shall be found in favor of the tax, one-half of them will vote for it on one principle and one-half on another. Under these circumstances, he appealed to gentlemen inclined to favor the resolution, whether it would not be the best policy to wait until the Legislature of South Carolina had an opportunity of repealing the obnoxious law. Is it a pleasant thing to any gentleman on this floor to throw a stigma upon a State? And will not gentlemen from the Middle and Eastern States recollect that the situation of South Carolina is very different from that of their States? Let them, then, do as much good as they can at home; but let them, in God’s name, permit us to act for ourselves. It is a very easy thing to make some harsh remarks on the conduct of particular States, even of the State of Pennsylvania, much as that State is deservedly respected. Mr. H. said he did not believe that State stood one iota higher than other States in the Union. For he believed that peculiar interest operated there as well as in other States.

Mr. H. said, from what had been expressed to-day, he did not believe the people of South Carolina friendly to the act admitting the importation of slaves. Every Representative of that State on this floor wished, he believed, that it had never been passed. But as it had passed, they conceived it to be their duty to resist a measure which went to censure the State for the exercise of an undoubted right.

Mr. STANTON.--Mr. Speaker: I am highly gratified to find honorable members in every part of the House who reprobate the infamous traffic of buying and selling the human species. On this occasion but a few remarks are necessary, if morality, humanity, and justice, are conducive to the happiness of society. It is not my duty nor intention to criminate the State of South Carolina, whose late conduct has created serious and well founded alarm. It is a duty I owe to my constituents and myself not to connive at a measure that, in my humble opinion, goes to shake the pillars of public security, and threatens corruption to the morals of our citizens, and tarnishes the American character. Sir, while I deprecate the repeal of the non-importation act of South Carolina, I console myself with the pleasing expectation that the State will retract the error they have recently and unguardedly fallen into, and I cannot doubt but the honorable members from that State, on this floor, will lend their aid to effect so desirable a measure--to enact again the prohibitory statute. We are told if the House adopt the resolution, it will irritate South Carolina, notwithstanding the opposers of the resolution confess the impolitic conduct of South Carolina. I wish not to offend any of our sister States, much less, that important State whose wisdom, virtue, and patriotism, have been conspicuous on every other occasion. The opposers of the resolution inform us its adoption will both encourage and sanction the importation, and that they have a constitutional right to import until 1808. I grant it, but I hope better things of that State; and things that accompany reformation. She has recently, with other States, emancipated herself from tyranny and oppression, and will she sully her fair fame by commencing tyrant herself? Sir, the speakers from the State of South Carolina, and particularly the honorable member who offered a resolution as a substitute for the one under consideration, delivered himself in sentiments of the most admirable humanity, and constitutional love and zeal for his country; and, if he were a member from any other State in the Union, I should have the honor, I make no doubt, of voting with him for the resolution on your table. Sir, I am sensible the General Government cannot prohibit the traffic previous to the year 1808. This is one of the most humiliating concessions made by that venerable convention which framed the constitution, and we are bound by it. I ask, is the policy of the measure embraced by the resolution sound? I believe it is. I consider slaves a luxury--they are considered by the constitution, three-fifths of them, to give a Representative, and I ask why not tax them? It is a sound maxim that representation and taxation should go hand in hand. To lay a tax being the only constitutional power the General Government possesses, I think it good policy to exercise it.

The State of Rhode Island, from whence I came, passed a law declaring negro children born posterior to 1784, as free as white children. Mr. Speaker, I mention this statute merely to obviate the erroneous impression, that otherwise might be made with a view to mislead the public mind, that the citizens of Rhode Island are disposed to favor the villanous traffic. I wish not to egotize, but I can assure the House this traffic has been abhorrent to me upwards of forty years, and if I should live to see 1808--that auspicious period in our national compact which shall be exonerated from the tragic feature that has cast a shade on that valuable instrument--if the important acquisition of Louisiana gave ample cause for festivity, still greater cause shall we have when the glorious period shall arrive of 1808. That shall be my jubilee.

After a few further remarks, by Mr. HUGER and Mr. LUCAS, the question was taken on the rising of the Committee, and passed in the negative--yeas 58, nays 60. When the resolution was agreed to.

The committee rose and reported their agreement to the resolution, which the House immediately took into consideration.

Mr. WYNN moved to postpone the further consideration of the resolution till the first Monday in January, and required the yeas and nays.

The question was then taken on the postponement, by yeas and nays, and passed in the negative--yeas 54, nays 62, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., Nathaniel Alexander, George Michael Bedinger, Silas Betton, William Blackledge, Walter Bowie, John Boyle, William Butler, John Campbell, Levi Casey, Thomas Claiborne, Joseph Clay, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dawson, William Dickson, Thomas Dwight, John B. Earle, Peter Early, James Elliot, William Eustis, John Fowler, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Roger Griswold, Samuel Hammond, Wade Hampton, Seth Hastings, Joseph Heister, James Holland, Benjamin Huger, Michael Leib, Thomas Lowndes, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Thomas Moore, Joseph H. Nicholson, Thomas Plater, John Randolph, John Rhea of Tennessee, Thomas Sanford, Tompson J. Skinner, John Cotton Smith, James Stephenson, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Daniel C. Verplanck, Lemuel Williams, Richard Wynn, and Thomas Wynns.

NAYS.--Isaac Anderson, John Archer, Simeon Baldwin, David Bard, Adam Boyd, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Chamberlin, Clifton Claggett, Matthew Clay, Frederick Conrad, Ebenezer Elmer, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, James Gillespie, Peterson Goodwyn, Gaylord Griswold, John A. Hanna, William Helms, William Hoge, David Holmes, David Hough, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Joseph Lewis, jr., Henry W. Livingston, John B. C. Lucas, William McCreery, Samuel L. Mitchill, Nicholas R. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jr., Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, Thomas M. Randolph, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, John Smith of New York, John Smith of Virginia, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, Samuel Taggart, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Hornee, Joseph B. Varnum, Peleg Wadsworth, Matthew Walton, Marmaduke Williams, and Joseph Winston.

And then the main question being taken that the House do agree to the said resolution, as amended to read as follows:

Resolved, That a tax of ten dollars be imposed on every slave imported into any part of the United States:

It was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 71.

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution; and that the Committee of Ways and Means do prepare and bring in the same.

FRIDAY, February 17.

Importation of Slaves.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday, viz: “What day should be made the order to the Committee of the Whole to consider the bill laying a tax of ten dollars upon every slave imported into the United States.”

Mr. LOWNDES moved that the further consideration of the bill should be postponed till the first Monday in December.

Mr. LOWNDES.--In moving a postponement of the bill to the first Monday in December next, my object is to get rid of it altogether. Gentlemen have supported the resolution upon which this bill is founded, upon such a variety of, and contradictory grounds, that their arguments are not very susceptible of a reply. I am, however, very glad that it has been conceded by every gentleman who has spoken upon the subject, that this tax, if laid, would not have the effect of diminishing the number of Africans imported into the country. When it was admitted that the object for which the resolution was avowedly brought forward, would not be obtained, I did hope that the resolution itself would not have been persevered in. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. GREGG,) to whose arguments I generally listen with pleasure, has told us that he would not for the world give his vote for this tax, for the purpose of raising revenue; but that he would be obliged to vote for the resolution, to show his disapprobation of the trade. The gentleman did, however, manifest a disposition to get rid of the question, without taking a direct vote upon it. Another gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. SMILIE) has told us, that he too is averse to this tax with a view to revenue, but that he must vote for it, for if he does not, it will be an admission, on his part, that Congress is favorable to the trade. What am I to infer from this observation? Am I to infer that Congress until this time has been favorable to the trade; and am I to infer that the gentleman himself, who has for so long a time been an active member of Congress, has also been favorable to it? This trade has from the adoption of the constitution until a few years ago, when it was first prohibited by Georgia, been carried on; and yet Congress have never exercised their power of imposing any tax, nor have I heard that the gentleman did ever bring forward a resolution for the purpose. There is another description of persons imported into the United States--I mean those bound to serve for a term of years. The comparison I admit is not analogous throughout, but it is to a certain extent. These persons are chiefly introduced into the States of Pennsylvania and New York; none, or at least very few of them, into New England. Were it proposed to embrace them by this tax, would the Representatives from those States be satisfied with the arguments that it was a tax upon merchandise, and a general one, and therefore fair? Their discernment would quickly point out to them, that whatever was the appearance, it was a tax principally falling upon those States, and they would resist.

Entertaining the opinions which I have expressed against the principle of the bill, and wishing to get rid of it in a manner most agreeable to those gentlemen who feel a difficulty of voting directly upon it, I move that the further consideration of the bill be postponed until December next.

Mr. BEDINGER said he felt the greatest veneration for the honorable mover of the resolution, as he thought it proceeded from the purest motives. But as he thought the slave trade was but little better than murder, he felt a difficulty in his mind as to the propriety of admitting one shilling of it into the treasury of the United States, lest those traders should think themselves entitled to protection; but as the mover and many others declare their assent towards the appropriation of said tax hereafter to humane purposes, he believed he should vote for a bill, if drawn in correspondence with such principles.

Mr. FINDLAY observed that it was not his wish to go into a lengthy argument on this subject; but merely to observe that this was the first instance of a law prohibiting the importation of slaves being repealed, and that it might not be the last; and that, therefore, if the argument advanced by gentlemen was good against taking it up in the first instance, it would be equally good against taking it up in case all the States should repeal their prohibitory laws. He also wished gentlemen to consider that the friends of the motion were conscience-bound as well as they, and that they considered it a moral duty to restrain, as far as they could, the continuance of the slave trade. As, however, a question of expediency was involved in this measure, he entertained no desire to hasten its decision; on the contrary, his wish was to allow ample time for considering its merits. He should therefore vote against the postponement to December; but would move a postponement to the 2d Monday of March, not with the view of getting rid of the subject altogether, but to allow an opportunity of considering it fully.

Mr. HUGER did not rise with the view of going into the merits of the bill, but to impress the propriety of agreeing to the postponement. It was a painful subject, which necessarily excited unpleasant feelings. He thought, if gentlemen suffered it to lie over to the next session, there was a probability that by giving the Representatives of South Carolina an opportunity of returning home and expressing the sentiments of Congress, the Legislature of that State would repeal the law; whereas, should the tax be laid, it would prevent this desirable effect. Where we differ, said Mr. H., it is proper for us to accommodate--to meet each other half way.

Mr. EPPES, believing that either motion of postponement would defeat the main measure, said he should vote against both. It was not his wish to erect the Government of the United States into a national tribunal to censure the proceedings of the Legislature of South Carolina, or to wound their feelings; but he was not prepared to say that Congress, in exercising a constitutional right, erected such a tribunal. It was in some respects immaterial whether they interfered or not, so long as the world knew that a Legislature of a respectable State, in the eighteenth century, passed an act allowing the importation of slaves. That Legislature ought not to complain if the United States availed themselves of the measure to raise revenue from it. According to the estimate of some gentlemen, there would probably be an importation of one hundred thousand in four years, which if this tax shall be laid, will produce a revenue of a million of dollars. And yet we are entreated by the gentleman from South Carolina not to molest the trade. Mr. E. said he was not surprised at this anxiety, as, by gaining a delay of one year, that State might be saved from the payment of above one hundred thousand dollars.

Mr. E. said he came from a Southern country, where slaves were as much a subject of taxation as lands; and he did not know that the statute books of Virginia or South Carolina were stained by imposing taxes upon them. He believed them as fair a subject of taxation as any other species of property. He believed it as fair to lay taxes upon them as to make the poor pay a tax upon brown sugar and other articles of the first necessity. For these reasons he was against the postponement either to December or March.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD considered a postponement till December as destructive to the bill. He said he would as soon meet it on its merits, but being prepared, as far as his vote went, to reject the bill, he should vote for what he considered equivalent, a postponement to December. He did not think it proper for the House to go into the measure contemplated by the bill. There were but two principles that would justify the laying a duty on imported articles: the one to discourage the importation of particular articles, and the other with a view to revenue. As to the first principle, under the constitution as it at present stood, Congress had no right to interfere; as the States had an undoubted right to admit the importation of slaves until the year 1808. The constitution, on this point, had gone so far as to restrict the right of the General Government to a tax not exceeding ten dollars upon each slave imported. This would not amount to a prohibition or prevention of the importation. Congress was, therefore, precluded the right of taxing, with this view, until the year 1808. This part of the argument, on which gentlemen support the measure, must be laid, therefore, out of view. The question then recurs, whether we shall lay this tax for purposes of revenue? For one, (said Mr. G.,) I am unwilling to do this. I abhor the slave trade as much as any member on this floor, and therefore I will not consent to give it a legislative sanction. For this measure will certainly be viewed in that light by the people of this country and by the civilized world. It will appear to the world that Congress are raising a revenue from a commerce in slaves. I am not for introducing such a law, calculated to have this impression, on our statute book. Were it in our power to prohibit the trade, there is not, I trust, a member on this floor that would not unite in the prohibition. But on this point our hands are tied.

Mr. GREGG observed, that when this subject was on a former day before the House, he assigned his reasons at some length, in favor of a postponement. The same reasons would influence his vote this day, and he should not trouble the House with a repetition of them. He only rose to suggest to his colleague that, by attending to one consideration, he would be induced, he thought, to change his opinion, and to vote for the most distant day to which it was proposed to postpone this subject. It had been stated by a gentleman from South Carolina, and he believed correctly stated, that by the law lately passed in South Carolina, a considerable ferment had been excited in that State, and that it was probable that the Legislature would, at their next session, repeal it. If it were probable that they would repeal this law in April, it appeared to him improper to pass an act that would operate as a censure upon the conduct of that State.

Mr. ALSTON was surprised how it was that he and his worthy friend from Virginia (Mr. EPPES) differed so widely upon the present occasion, living, as it were, in the same country, and owning property of the same kind, and pursuing the same means of obtaining a living. My friend advocates the resolution for laying a tax of ten dollars on each slave imported into the United States, because a considerable revenue will be derived from such a tax; it is for that very reason that he opposed it, because he would not consent to pass a law which had for its operation a partial effect. Can it be right to pass a law which will impose a heavy tax upon one part of the community, and not a cent upon the other? No State in the Union would be affected except South Carolina. Gentlemen ought to take care how they acted towards a sister State, and a respectable one too.

Mr. RODNEY said, he should not have troubled the House with any remarks on the present occasion, had he not made up his mind to vote differently from the vote which he had before given. He said he had before voted against the postponement of the consideration of this subject; he should now vote in favor of a postponement; and he would, in a few words, assign his reasons. When the resolution for imposing a tax on imported slaves was first laid on the table, he was of opinion that he could not vote for it without sanctioning the practice it was meant to censure. Reflecting further, he afterwards got his own consent to vote for it. First thoughts were frequently best; we sometimes miss the mark by taking sight too long. In this instance, after a more mature consideration, his mind inclined to his original opinions, for reasons which he would assign.

It was agreed, on all hands, that the conduct of the Legislature of South Carolina was such as to merit the disapprobation of the members of that House. On many occasions there were political dissensions within these walls. But he rejoiced that, when questions of this kind presented themselves, they were sure to find us unanimous. Inhumanity was considered as a common enemy, and so inhuman a practice was justly reprobated by all. Every gentleman from the South, as well as the East, deprecated the act and lamented its existence.

After a few additional remarks from several gentlemen, the question was taken by yeas and nays on a postponement to the first Monday in December, and passed in the negative--yeas 55, nays 62.

Mr. FINDLAY moved a postponement to the second Monday in March; which, after some debate, prevailed--ayes 56, noes 50.

[To prevent an erroneous impression being made on the public by the above proceedings, it is proper to remark that, during the whole discussion, not a single voice was raised in defence of the act of the Legislature of South Carolina, allowing the importation of slaves; but that, on the contrary, while by some of the speakers its immorality and impolicy were severely censured, by all its existence was deprecated. A large number of those who voted for the postponement, advocated it on the express and sole ground that it would give the Legislature of South Carolina an opportunity, which they believed would be embraced, to repeal the act.]

MONDAY, February 20.

Georgia Claims.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH said, the House would recollect that he had, on a former day, offered a resolution barring any claims derived under any act of the State of Georgia passed in the year 1795, in relation to lands ceded to the United States. It was not his purpose in rising at this time to trespass on the patience of the House; nor did he know that he should in future offer any remarks additional to those he had already made. But he conceived it his duty to place the subject in such a point of light that every eye, however dim, might distinctly see its true merits. For this purpose he withdrew the resolution which he had before offered, and moved the following resolutions:

Resolved, That the Legislature of the State of Georgia were, at no time, invested with the power of alienating the right of soil possessed by the good people of that State in and to the vacant territory of the same, but in a rightful manner, and for the public good:

That, when the governors of any people shall have betrayed the confidence reposed in them, and shall have exercised that authority with which they have been clothed for the general welfare, to promote their own private ends, under the basest motives, and to the public detriment, it is the inalienable right of a people, so circumstanced, to revoke the authority thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray them:

That it is in evidence to this House, that the act of the Legislature of Georgia, passed on the seventh of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, entitled “An act for appropriating a part of the unlocated territory of this State, for the payment of the late State troops, and for other purposes,” was passed by persons under the influence of gross and palpable corruption, practised by the grantees of the lands attempted to be alienated by the aforesaid act, tending to enrich and aggrandize, to a degree almost incalculable, a few individuals, and ruinous to the public interest:

That the good people of Georgia, impressed with general indignation at this act of atrocious perfidy and unparalleled corruption, with a promptitude of decision highly honorable to their character, did, by the act of a subsequent Legislature, passed on the thirteenth of February, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, under circumstances of peculiar solemnity, and finally sanctioned by the people, who have subsequently ingrafted it on their constitution, declare the preceding act, and the grants made under it, in themselves null and void; that the said act should be expunged from the records of the State, and publicly burnt; which was accordingly done; provision at the same time being made for restoring the pretended purchase-money to the grantees, by whom, or by persons claiming under them, the greater part of the said purchase-money has been withdrawn from the treasury of Georgia:

That a subsequent Legislature of an individual State has an undoubted right to repeal any act of a preceding Legislature, provided such repeal be not forbidden by the constitution of such State, or of the United States:

That the aforesaid act of the State of Georgia, passed on the thirteenth of February, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-six, was forbidden neither by the constitution of that State, nor by that of the United States:

That the claims of persons derived under the aforesaid act of the seventh of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, are recognized neither by any compact between the United States and the State of Georgia, nor by any act of the Federal Government: Therefore,

Resolved, That no part of the five millions of acres reserved for satisfying and quieting claims to the lands ceded by the State of Georgia to the United States, and appropriated by the act of Congress passed at their last session, shall be appropriated to quiet or compensate any claims derived under any act, or pretended act, of the State of Georgia, passed, or alleged to be passed, during the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five.

On considering the resolutions, the House divided--ayes 53. Carried.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH then moved their reference to the Committee of the Whole on the bill providing for the settlement of sundry claims to public lands lying south of the State of Tennessee. Carried--yeas 50, nays 30.

WEDNESDAY, February 22.

Naval Peace Establishment.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill supplementary to an act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment.

[This is the bill introduced at the instance of Mr. NICHOLSON, with a view to a more economical and beneficial arrangement in relation to the national ships laid up in ordinary.]

Mr. LEIB moved an additional section, virtually abolishing the office of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant of the Marine Corps, and authorizing the President to make such other reductions of the subordinate officers as he may think fit. The object of the bill being a reform of the expenses attending the Naval Establishment, the measure contemplated in the amendment was, in his opinion, a very proper one to be answered by it. The bill, he said, contemplated an annual saving, in the single article of provisions, of $7,000. By abolishing the office of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant, a saving of sixty thousand dollars in addition might be made. This officer made, it appeared, all the contracts, and it would be seen by documents before the House, that while the price of the ration in the War Department was fifteen cents, that fixed by this officer was twenty cents--the difference made the sum of $3,750 a year. It would also be seen that exorbitant sums were expended in postage and fuel. In the single article of postage, $150 had been expended within three months. The amendment was then agreed to--yeas 62.

Mr. EUSTIS moved a new section, for the allowance to captains, holding themselves in readiness to enter the service, of the same rations they are entitled by law to receive when in actual service. Disagreed to--yeas 37, nays 45.

The committee rose, and the House agreed to the amendment of Mr. LEIB without a division.

Mr. JACKSON moved a new section, for the allowance to captains, required to hold themselves in readiness for service, of the same rations they are entitled to receive when in actual service.

Mr. NICHOLSON supported the amendment, to which the House agreed--yeas 44, nays 40; when the bill was ordered to a third reading to-morrow.

On motion, the House adjourned.

FRIDAY, February 24.

Contested Election.

Mr. FINDLAY, from the Committee of Elections, to whom was referred a memorial of Andrew Moore, of Virginia, respecting the election of THOMAS LEWIS, a sitting member, made a report, which, after stating the bad votes given for each of the candidates, concludes with the opinion that THOMAS LEWIS is not, and that ANDREW MOORE is entitled to a seat in the House. The report is as follows:

“That, at an election held on three several days, in the month of April, in the year one thousand eight hundred and three, directed by the law of the State of Virginia, for a member of the House of Representatives of the United States for the district composed of the counties of Botetourt, Rockbridge, Kenawha, Greenbriar, and Monroe, in the western district of Virginia, it appears--

“That, of the polls taken in the county of Botetourt, Thomas Lewis had one hundred and fifty-five votes, and Andrew Moore had three hundred and five votes; that, out of the persons who voted for Thomas Lewis, twenty-three were unqualified to vote; and that out of the persons who voted for Andrew Moore, twenty-eight were unqualified to vote.

“That, of the polls taken in Rockbridge, Thomas Lewis had sixty-five votes, and Andrew Moore had three hundred and twenty-one votes; that out of the persons who voted for Thomas Lewis, there were four persons unqualified to vote; and out of the persons who voted for Andrew Moore, there were twenty persons unqualified to vote.

“That, of the polls taken in Kenawha county, Thomas Lewis had one hundred and sixty-one votes, and Andrew Moore had one vote; that out of the persons who voted for Thomas Lewis there were ninety persons unqualified to vote.

“That, of the polls taken in Greenbriar, Thomas Lewis had five hundred and thirty-nine votes, and Andrew Moore had one hundred and three votes; that out of the persons who voted for Thomas Lewis two hundred and two were unqualified to vote; and out of the persons who voted for Andrew Moore thirty-two were unqualified to vote.

“That, of the polls taken in Monroe county, Thomas Lewis had eighty-four votes, and Andrew Moore had one hundred and two votes; that out of the persons who voted for Thomas Lewis thirty-six were unqualified to vote; and out of the persons who voted for Andrew Moore, forty-four were unqualified to vote. Hence it appears--

“That all the persons who voted for Thomas Lewis in the several counties aforesaid, which compose the western district of the State of Virginia, were one thousand and four; and that all the persons who voted for Andrew Moore in the said counties were eight hundred and thirty-two.

“It further appears, on a deliberate scrutiny, that, of the above votes, three hundred and fifty-five persons voted for Thomas Lewis who were unqualified to vote, and that one hundred and twenty-four voted for Andrew Moore who were unqualified to vote; and that, by deducting the unqualified votes from the votes given for each of the parties at the elections, Thomas Lewis has six hundred and forty-nine good votes, and Andrew Moore has seven hundred and eight good votes, being fifty-nine more than Thomas Lewis. Whereupon,

“Your committee are of opinion that Thomas Lewis, not being duly elected, is not entitled to a seat in this House; and they are further of opinion that Andrew Moore, who has the highest number of votes, after deducting the before-mentioned unqualified votes from the respective polls, is duly elected and entitled to a seat in this House.”

Ordered, That the report be committed to a Committee of the whole House on Wednesday next.

TUESDAY, February 28.

Louisiana Territory.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled “An act erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof.”

The fourth section being under consideration, as follows:

“SEC. 4. The Legislative powers shall be vested in the Governor, and in thirteen of the most fit and discreet persons of the Territory, to be called the Legislative Council, who shall be appointed annually by the President of the United States, from among those holding real estate therein, and who shall have resided one year at least in the said Territory, and hold no office of profit under the Territory or the United States. The Governor, by and with advice and consent of the said Legislative Council, or of a majority of them, shall have power to alter, modify, or repeal the laws which may be in force at the commencement of this act. Their Legislative powers shall also extend to all the rightful powers of legislation: but no law shall be valid which is inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States, or which shall lay any person under restraint, burden, or disability, on account of his religious opinions, professions, or worship; in all which he shall be free to maintain his own, and not burdened for those of another. The Governor shall publish throughout the said Territory all the laws which shall be made, and shall from time to time report the same to the President of the United States, to be laid before Congress; which, if disapproved of by Congress, shall thenceforth be of no force. The Governor or Legislative Council shall have no power over the primary disposal of the soil, nor to tax the lands of the United States, nor to interfere with the claims to land within the said Territory. The Governor shall convene and prorogue the Legislative Council, whenever he may deem it expedient. It shall be his duty to obtain all the information in his power in relation to the customs, habits, and dispositions of the inhabitants of the said Territory, and communicate the same, from time to time, to the President of the United States.”

Mr. LEIB observed that he did not like the provisions of this section, and least of all that which gave the Governor the right of proroguing the Legislative Council. It appeared to him that that body was the most dependent thing of its nature in the United States; and when the power of prorogation vested in the Governor was considered, it seemed to him that the people would do much better without any such body. This was a royal appendage which he did not like. He, therefore, moved to strike out the words “and prorogue.”

Mr. GREGG said he was not only in favor of the motion of his colleague, but against the section generally. It would require much further amendment to induce him to vote for it. He was opposed to the power it gave the President to appoint the members of the Legislative Council. It appeared to him a mere burlesque to say they shall be appointed by the President. How is the President to get information of the qualifications for office? This could only be obtained from the officers appointed by him, and principally from the Governor, who will not fail to recommend to the President the appointment of persons favorable to his own views. Mr. G. said that they would, therefore, rather vest the appointment of the members of the Legislative Council in the Governor; the mode pointed out in the bill was only calculated to rescue the Governor from the responsibility attached to his office, by dividing it among others.

Mr. LEIB said his amendment did not in the least interfere with that of his colleague, with whom he fully accorded in sentiment.

Mr. VARNUM was of opinion that the section in the bill provided such a kind of Government as had never been known in the United States. He thought sound policy, no less than justice, dictated the propriety of making provision for the election of a legislative body by the people. There was not only the common obligation of justice imposed upon Congress to do this, but they were bound by treaty. The treaty with France expressly says:

“The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.”

The treaty makes it obligatory on the United States to admit the inhabitants of Louisiana, as soon as possible, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States. In order to decide the principle of this section of the bill by an expression of the sense of the committee, he would move that the committee should rise, report progress, and ask leave to sit again, with the view of refusing them leave, and afterwards referring the bill to a select committee to receive a modification in conformity to the opinions of the House.

Mr. HUGER trusted the committee would not rise. He knew not the impressions on this subject on the minds of other gentlemen; but the information lately received from Louisiana convinced him of the propriety of proceeding with the bill immediately. In addition to the principles contained in the section under consideration, there were others of great importance. He thought it would be most advisable, in a future stage of discussion, to commit the bill to a select committee, if any material alterations should be made in it. It was best, at present, to deliberate fully on the several provisions of the bill, and for gentlemen to make an interchange of opinions. Were the bill now committed, the report of the committee would not advance the business in the least, as that report might be as objectionable to the House as the bill from the Senate.

Mr. ELLIOT, for like reasons assigned by the gentleman from South Carolina, and for other reasons, hoped the committee would not rise. He did not believe the section under consideration was, in its present form, consistent either with the spirit of the constitution or the treaty; but he believed that, by the introduction of a small amendment, the section might be rendered perfectly consistent with them, and the passage of the bill be greatly accelerated. He preferred a middle course between the existing section and the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. Whatever amendments were necessary would be easily offered and discussed at present; whereas no desirable object could be effected by a reference.

Mr. GREGG said it also appeared to him that no valuable purpose would be answered by referring the bill to a select committee. What can such a committee do? There exists no diversity of sentiment in the House on principle. Some are for giving to the people of the Territory, instead of the President, the power of electing members of the Legislative Council. Here, then, are two distinct principles, and unless the House determine which of them it will adopt, a select committee can do nothing. Let us settle the principle of the bill first, and then refer it to a select committee, to modify it in correspondence with them.

Mr. EUSTIS said this subject was, in his opinion, inferior to no other discussed this session. With regard to the provisions of the section under consideration, it was to be expected that there would be a diversity of opinion. Gentlemen inimical to them had taken different grounds. One gentleman desires the power of the Governor to prorogue the Council to be rescinded; another gentleman wishes an entire change in the formation of the Council; and a third is in favor of the committee rising, that the bill may go to a select committee to report different provisions for the government of the people of Louisiana from those contained in the bill before us. This motion necessarily brings the principle on which the Council is organized by the bill before us.

According to this bill, the Governor and Council are to make the laws. Suppose the Council is in session, and the Governor possess no power to prorogue them. Suppose they should engage in acts subversive of their relation to the United States. Would not this power be of essential utility? It appears to me indispensably necessary that a vein of authority should ascend to the Government of the United States, until the people of the Territory are admitted to the full enjoyment of State rights. From that knowledge of this people which I have been able to acquire, I have formed an opinion that authority should be constantly exercised over them, without severity, but in such a manner as to secure the rights of the United States and the peace of the country.

The government laid down in this bill is certainly a new thing in the United States; but the people of this country differ materially from the citizens of the United States. I speak of the character of the people at the present time. When they shall be better acquainted with the principles of our Government, and shall have become desirous of participating in our privileges, it will be full time to extend to them the elective franchise. Have not the House been informed from an authentic source, since the cession, that the provisions of our institutions are inapplicable to them? If so, why attempt, in pursuit of a vain theory, to extend political institutions to them for which they are not prepared? I am one of those who believe that the principles of civil liberty cannot suddenly be ingrafted on a people accustomed to a regimen of a directly opposite hue. The approach of such a people to liberty must be gradual. I believe them at present totally unqualified to exercise it. If this opinion be erroneous, then the principles of the bill are unfounded. If, on the contrary, this opinion is sound, it results that neither the power given to the President to appoint the members of the Council, nor of the Governor to prorogue them, are unsafe or unnecessary.

Mr. LUCAS was against the rising of the committee, inasmuch as the bill under consideration offered the widest field of discussing the subject before them, and inasmuch as it was proper, that the principles of it should be settled by a majority, to enable a select committee to collect the sense of the House. When this decision should have taken place, he should have no objections to a recommitment for the purpose of modifying the bill in consonance with it.

It was known, by the treaty, that the United States are bound to secure to the people of Louisiana as large a portion of liberty and security of rights, as though they remained under the Government of France and Spain; and he trusted the bill as it stood secured to them much more. As an instance, it might be mentioned that the privilege of habeas corpus had never been enjoyed by them while they were connected with either Spain or France. An argument was drawn from the treaty, that these people are to be admitted to the absolute enjoyment of the rights of citizens; but gentlemen would not deny, that the time when, and the circumstances under which this provision of the treaty was to be carried into effect, were submitted to the decision of Congress. It has been remarked, that this bill establishes elementary principles of government never previously introduced in the government of any Territory of the United States. Granting the truth of this observation, it must be allowed that the United States had never before devolved upon them the making provision for the government of people under such circumstances. Governors must not rest on theory, but must raise their political structures on the state of the people for whom they are made. Mr. LUCAS said, that without wishing to reflect on the inhabitants of Louisiana, he would say that they are not prepared for a government like that of the United States. Governed by Spanish officers, exercising authority according to their whim, supported by a military force, it could not be said that a people thus inured to despotism, were prepared on a sudden to receive the principles of our Government. It was questionable whether there was a nation in Europe whom these principles would be so advantageous to as they are to us. It would be recollected by gentlemen, who so strenuously advocated the abstract principle of right, that the people of Louisiana have not been consulted in the act of cession to this country, but had been transferred by a bargain made over their heads. It was a proof this act had not been received with approbation by them, that when they saw the American flag hoisted in the room of the French, they shed tears; this was a proof that they were not so friendly to our Government as some gentlemen imagined. He was persuaded the people of the Mississippi Territory would not have acted in this manner. There is no doubt but that after they shall have experienced the blessings of a free Government, they will wonder at their having shed tears on this occasion; but they must, in the first instance, feel these blessings.

Mr. L. said he was fully of opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. EUSTIS) in the sentiments he had expressed. The United States had it eminently in their power to make these people happy without an extension to them of all our privileges. They will not be gratified from knowing that the theory of liberty is extended to them, but from its practical effects. The people of Louisiana know but little of political theories, but they will feel the just operation of equal laws; and if they can obtain practical justice, though it may not arise from an extension of our elementary political principles, they will not find fault with it.

Mr. L. said he was not among those who considered the bill, in all its provisions, perfect. He considered it susceptible of much amendment; though not in the principle now under review. In this provision, by declaring that the inhabitants of the Territory shall compose the Legislative Council, a great point is gained by the people. For it cannot be supposed that the inhabitants, thus called upon to discharge high duties to society, will so far lose sight of their own permanent interests as to sacrifice them, together with the good of the country, to whim or corruption.

Their election by the President is another important security. Suppose the Governor shall wish to render the Council his puppets. The President will not feel an interest in gratifying his improper views. It is, however, said that his information will be derived from the Governor. But the fact is, he will receive it in part from the Governor, and in part from others; and he will be sagacious enough to judge, not from a part, but from the whole that reaches him.

A valuable effect will flow from composing the Council of the inhabitants of the country; its members will thereby be initiated in the theory of our Government and laws, and this knowledge will hereafter qualify them for higher political trusts; they will acquire much political knowledge; they will return home, and their conversation with their friends will naturally turn on political topics, and on the laws they have passed; thus will a spirit of inquiry and of political discussion spring up in the country. When this effect shall be produced, it will be time, and only then, to give them a government as liberal and free as that contemplated by the amendment.

Mr. MACON (Speaker) observed that he coincided in opinion with the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. VARNUM,) whose object would, he thought, be better tried by a motion to strike out the section. This motion would bring the principle before the House. If the section should be stricken out, the bill would be recommitted for new modification to a select committee. Mr. M. accordingly moved to strike out the fourth section.

This motion having been stated from the Chair,

Mr. MACON again rose. I will endeavor, said he, to compress my ideas on this point in a few words. My first objection to the principle contained in the section is, that it establishes a species of government unknown to the laws of the United States. We have three descriptions of Government; that of the Union, that of the States, and Territorial governments. I believe the Territorial government, as established by the ordinance of the Old Congress, the best adapted to the circumstances of the people of Louisiana; and that it may be so modified as best to promote their convenience. The people residing in the Mississippi Territory, are now under this kind of government.[8] Is it not likely that the people of Louisiana will expect the same form of government and laws with their neighbors; and is it not desirable for the general peace and happiness that there should be a correspondence between them? If they are as ignorant as some gentlemen represent them, (and of this I know nothing,) will they not expect the same grade of government with the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory, with whom they will have a constant intercourse? Although they lived previously under the Spanish Government, and although their number did not entitle them, when formed into a Territory, to the second grade of government, no inconvenience resulted. It is said, in reply to this observation, that a large number of inhabitants of that Territory were Americans. It is true that many of them were native Americans, but some also were Spanish.

The simple question is, what kind of government is most fitted to this people? It is extremely difficult to legislate for a people with whose habits and customs we are unacquainted. I, for one, declare myself unacquainted with them; nor would I in fixing the government, unless for the safety of the Union, do an act capable of disgusting the people for whom it is adopted. It will be a wise policy to avoid whatever is calculated to disgust them. My opinion is that they will be better satisfied with an old-established form of government, than with a new one. Why? Because they have seen it established in the adjacent Territory of Mississippi, and know the manner in which it operates. If there are bad men in Louisiana, will any thing be more easy than to disgust the people against the General Government by showing that they have given one kind of government to the people of the Mississippi Territory, and a different kind to them? In my mind, it is sound policy to give them no cause of complaint. We ought to show them that we consider them one people.

I will not pretend to say that the people of Louisiana are prepared for a State government, which differs most materially from a Territorial government. The best way to prepare them for such a government, is to take the system already known to our laws; one grade or the other of the Territorial government. For myself, I would prefer the adoption of the second grade, but I would prefer the first to any new system. For these reasons, I hope the section will be struck out, and the bill referred to a select committee.

WEDNESDAY, February 29.

Government of Louisiana.

The House went again into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the government of Louisiana.

The fourth section of the bill being under consideration--

Mr. JACKSON said: As this section is the corner stone on which the whole superstructure rests, and involves the most important principle of the bill, I will ask the indulgence of the committee to make a few remarks upon it. It presents two important questions; first, whether it is proper on the broad principle of political justice to adopt it? And secondly, whether it is consistent with our treaty with France? Two questions arise out of the first proposition; first, Is the system consonant to the habits of a free people? And, secondly, if not, is it the best calculated to advance the happiness of those who have never tasted the blessings of liberty? The first question requires no discussion; it will be answered in the negative by every section of this Union. Every section has been engaged in forming a constitution, and both the State and Federal constitutions have decided this point in the negative, because neither partake of the aristocratical or monarchical features contained in this section.

It is urged by gentlemen, that we ought to give to this people liberty by degrees. I believe, however, there is no danger of giving them too much of it; and I am unwilling to tarnish the national character by sanctioning the detestable calumny that man is not fitted for freedom. What will the world say if we sanction this principle? They will say we possess the principle of despotism under the garb of Republicans; and that we are insincere, with whatever solemnity we may declare it, in pronouncing all men equal. They will tell us that we have emphatically declared to the American people and to the world, in our first act evincive of emancipation from the tyranny of England, that all men are equal; and that all governments derive their rightful power from the consent of the governed; and that notwithstanding, when the occasion offers, we exercise despotic power, under the pretext that the people are unable to govern themselves.

Mr. HOLLAND.--As my ideas are very different from those of the gentleman who has preceded me, and as I do not believe that either policy or moral obligation recommends the adoption of a system such as he has avowed to be proper, I will, in a few words, state the sentiments I entertain.

Can gentlemen conceive the people of Louisiana, who have just thrown off their chains, qualified to make laws? Under the late system the people had no concern in the government, and it was even criminal for them to concern themselves with it; they were set at a distance from the government, and all required from their hands was, to be passive and obedient. Can it be supposed such a people made the subject of government their study, or can it be presumed they know any thing about the principles of the Constitution of the United States? Would persons thus elected be of any service to the Government? So far from being an assistance, they would be an encumbrance. Why then impose this burden upon them? The object of this bill is to extend the laws of the United States over Louisiana, not to enable the people of Louisiana to make laws. This extension, so far from being an act of despotism, will be an important privilege. If the laws of the United States were founded in injustice they might have some right to complain, but we only apply to them laws by which we ourselves consent to be governed.

The provisions of this section are said to be worse than those of the first grade of Territorial governments; but this is incorrect. This plan is not equal to the second grade, but it is certainly superior to the first grade. The first grade gives the Governor and judges all the powers granted by this section; and this section, in addition to the Governor and judges, contemplates the appointment of thirteen councillors. Is not this preferable to giving the whole power to the Governor and judges?

Mr. BOYLE said he should not have risen on this occasion but for the impression that some arguments of weight had been omitted, or had not been sufficiently dwelt on. In the few remarks he purposed to make, he should endeavor to avoid a repetition of ideas already expressed. It was not so much to the novelty, as to the nature of the plan of government contained in the fourth section, that he was opposed. He did not consider the Territorial government proposed to be substituted as perfect, but he believed it infinitely preferable to that contemplated in the bill. Preferring, therefore, either grade to this, said Mr. B., I shall concur in supporting the substitution of the second grade as most fitted to the circumstances of the people of Louisiana. I feel peculiarly hostile to the mode of appointing the Legislative Council. The power of appointing them is unnecessarily vested in the President. Waiving all objection arising from the distance of the President from the men to be appointed; from the necessity of his relying on the representations of others as to their qualifications, and his liability to be deceived by misrepresentations; still one objection remains, which, to my mind, is most important. I am, said Mr. B., unwilling to extend executive patronage beyond the line of irresistible necessity. For, I believe, if ever this country is to follow the destiny of other nations, this destiny will be accelerated by the overwhelming torrent of executive patronage. I feel as high a veneration for the present Chief Magistrate as any man on this floor. Early attached to him, I have retained the full force of my regard for him. But, were he an angel, instead of a man, I would not clothe him with this power; because, in my estimation, the investiture of such high powers is unnecessary. My opinion is, that they will be more properly exercised by the people. To give them to the President is to furnish a dangerous precedent for extending executive power and patronage; and as he has himself said, one precedent in favor of power is stronger than a hundred against it. I am in favor of giving to the people all that portion of self-government and independence which is compatible with the constitution.

WEDNESDAY, March 7.

Georgia Claims.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill providing for the settlement of sundry claims to public lands lying south of the State of Tennessee; to which Committee of the Whole were also referred, on the twentieth ultimo, a motion containing sundry resolutions “respecting claimants to the said lands under an act of the Legislature of the State of Georgia, passed in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five.”

Mr. J. RANDOLPH called for the reading of sundry resolutions lately offered by him on this subject. The resolutions having been read, Mr. R. said, when he had submitted them, it was with the view of trying the question then before the committee as he thought fairly. It was no part of his intention to embarrass the operations of the friends of the bill, further than to take the sense of the committee and of the House on each specific proposition embraced by the resolutions. His wish, therefore, was, that the sense of the committee, in the first instance, should be taken on the resolutions. If they should be rejected, the vote of rejection would be a virtual admission of the claims of 1795; and gentlemen might then modify the bill in such manner as might best please them to do.

Mr. MITCHILL.--These resolutions tend to involve Congress in the proceedings of the State of Georgia. I consider myself as one of those who, by assenting to certain acts heretofore passed by Congress, have consented to a hearing and compromise with the grantees. If this construction be correct, the Committee are precluded from adopting these resolutions; nor is it proper, in my opinion, for Congress to go into a view of the proceedings of Georgia on this occasion. That State is sovereign to a certain extent, and this Government possesses no right to interfere with her sovereignty. Attached to this sovereignty is the right of granting land belonging to her. But it is alleged that Georgia was, in the year 1795, in a disorderly state, and that a certain Legislature in that year did a certain act which a subsequent Legislature declared to be totally unauthorized. This may be so. It is certain the second Legislature declared the act of the first null, under circumstances of a very extraordinary nature. I do not, however, see that it is our duty to give an opinion whether the Legislature of Georgia acted wickedly or uprightly. Whichever course they may have pursued, I do not believe this body to be a constitutional board of censors. We find frequent occasions enough on which, without going out of our way, our duty calls upon us to give our opinions. Believing this to be an occasion on which no opinion is required from us, and one which it is most prudent to pass by without giving such opinion, I wish not to vote for or against the resolutions. I am, therefore, for the committee’s rising and reporting the bill.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--I had hoped that when these resolutions were sent from the House to the committee, they would have received the respectful attention to which every such reference is entitled; and that the committee would at least have deemed them worthy of some expression of opinion on them; that they would have deigned to say whether the reasoning or facts contained in them are or are not erroneous and unfounded. The gentleman from New York tells the committee that, by an act passed at a previous session of Congress, a pledge has been given to a certain description of claimants under the act of 1795, to do something in relation to their claims. If so, is this a reason for not acting on the resolutions? No; it is a reason for taking them up and rejecting them. One of those resolutions says, and I am prepared to prove it true, and I call on gentlemen to show its falsehood, “that the claims of persons derived under the act of January first, 1795, are recognized neither by any compact between the United States and the State of Georgia, nor by any act of the Federal Government.” I deny that they are so recognized. If they are, what can be easier than for the learned gentleman to refer to the compact under which they are recognized? This he cannot show, and hence his unwillingness to express an opinion. At an antecedent session we passed a law on this subject. The gentleman may have given his vote for this law under the impression he states, but it does not follow that the Legislature acted under the same impression; on the contrary, I know several gentlemen who voted for it, though hostile to the claims under the act of 1795, because it contained a general provision for claims, and did not particularly recognize those arising under the act of 1795; and now, because Congress have passed an act of a general nature, when it was notorious there are a variety of claims besides those under the act of 1795, and none of which are mentioned either in the compact or treaty with the State of Georgia, it is said we have given a pledge, and we are called upon to fulfil it. And this language is held by gentlemen who, in the same breath, have expressed a disposition to reject another description of claims. Could absurdity speak in stronger language? A general appropriation has been made by Congress for claims; the claims preferred are of two classes--those under the acts of 1789 and 1795. There might have been claims of a hundred other descriptions--for all these Congress have made a general appropriation--and yet we are told by gentlemen hostile to the claims of 1789 that we are pledged to provide for those of 1795. If we are pledged to satisfy one description, are we not equally pledged to the other? But the truth is, we have given no pledge. If we have, nothing is so easy as to refer to the statute book, and to point it out. No such pledge is recognized by our compact with Georgia. While I am up, permit me to say, if the compact with Georgia be construed according to its letter, the appropriation of $5,000,000 ought to be considered as not embracing claims under the act of 1795, for the best reason in the world: the statute book of Georgia shows the reason. But, say gentlemen, we possess the power to satisfy these claims, though such satisfaction may not have been contemplated by our compact with Georgia. There must, say they, have been an understanding between the Commissioners of Georgia and our Commissioners in favor of compromising them, and therefore it is inferred that we ought to be governed more by the quo animo with which the compact was formed than by its strict letter; it is accordingly attempted to be proved, that there was an understanding between our Commissioners and those of Georgia, that relief should be extended to claimants under the act of 1795. I am authorized by the Commissioners to say that this was not the case. Whether, therefore, we are governed by the strict letter of the contract, or by the quo animo, we cannot discover the grounds for this opinion. I have been told, in a way which removes all doubts, by the Commissioners on both sides, at least by a Commissioner of the United States having a great participation in the business, and by the Georgia Commissioners, that the stipulation in the compact was not inserted at the instance of Georgia, but reluctantly inserted by them at the instance of the Commissioners of the United States.

Mr. MACON (Speaker) remarked that this question, like many others which presented themselves, had taken up a long time in discussing the preliminary point that might have been required on the resolutions. To rise and report the bill, without acting on the resolutions, would be a virtual rejection of them; especially as the House had determined to rise on the 19th. For one, Mr. M. said, he was ready to vote on the resolutions. If it were wrong to vote on them, it was certainly proper to vote against their reference. But why not vote on them? We may not all agree; but have we not a right to think for ourselves? Let us then meet them, and vote as we see best. Mr. M. said he was more desirous of meeting the question, as he differed from those with whom he generally coincided in opinion. It may be said the resolutions embrace an abstract question. If so, gentlemen ought not to have allowed their reference. In the present stage of the business, no question could be taken unless in the committee, or on a motion to discharge the committee from their further consideration. Mr. M. said, he thought it the right of every member of a deliberative body to express his sentiments and record his opinion on any subject before it. This had always been the practice. He trusted, therefore, the committee would not rise, but proceed to the discussion of the resolutions.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH.--I little expected to stand on this floor, in the list of persons hostile to State rights--to be charged, as the gentleman before me has expressed himself, with having brought forward propositions subversive of the rights of the States. The sovereignty of the States has ever been the cardinal principle of my political opinions, and in the outset, I enlisted under the banner of State rights in opposition to federal usurpation. The doctrine of exalting the General Government on the ruin of the authority of the States, is at length exploded, and those who have heretofore been most conspicuous in encroaching upon the rights of the States, generally, and upon those of Georgia in particular, are now foremost in displaying their zeal for both. I cannot but rejoice at the acquisition which this cause has made. But to those of its friends who are too new to it to understand its interests as yet, I would recommend, that they would take the conduct of the Georgia delegation as an evidence of the rights and interests of that State. They surely are not so destitute of information or fidelity, as to misunderstand or abandon the rights of the people whom they represent.--So long, however, as I have the honor of concurring with them in opinion, I shall be very easy under any clamor which the new friends of Georgia and of the rights of States may endeavor to excite. If, however, gentlemen are unwilling to rely on the opinions of so few, however respectable men, I refer them to the act of the Legislature of Georgia herself, generally called the rescinding act, passed under circumstances of unparalleled unanimity, and confirmed by the general voice of the people, who subsequently recognized it in, and ingrafted it upon their constitution. If still they remain dissatisfied, I would ask them if the recognition of the claims against Georgia, in the bill which they are so eager to pass, be not equally a violation of the rights of that State, with the rejection of those claims. Does not the bill before you, in pronouncing upon the validity of the act of Georgia, equally involve the principle against which gentlemen protest so loudly, with the resolutions themselves? They have their choice either to pronounce the corrupt act of 1795, or the rescinding act of 1796, invalid. Are not the rights of Georgia as much affected by the one as by the other? and even more, by annulling the act of 1796, since she alone recognizes that to be her own.

Here Mr. R. read the first and second resolutions:

“Resolved, That the State of Georgia was at no time invested with the power of alienating the right of soil possessed by the good people of that State in and to the vacant territory of the same, but in a rightful manner and for the general good.”

Who will deny it? If Georgia has made a valid contract we must execute it. If invalid, there is no obligation on us to perform it.

“That when the governors of any people shall have betrayed the confidence reposed in them, and shall have exercised that authority with which they have been invested for the general welfare, to promote their own private ends, under the basest motives, and to the public detriment, it is the inalienable right of a people, thus circumstanced, to revoke the authority thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray them.”

I am afraid if we deny this position we have no title to show for our own existence as a nation.

Mr. R. here read the third resolution:

“That it is in evidence to this House that the act of the Legislature of Georgia passed on the 7th of January, 1795, entitled an act &c., was passed by persons under the influence of gross and palpable corruption, practised by the grantees of the lands attempted to be alienated by the aforesaid act, tending to enrich and aggrandize, to a degree almost incalculable, a few individuals, and ruinous to the public interest.”

If there be any objection in my mind to this resolution, it is that it does not sufficiently detail what it contains in substance; that the vendors of this iniquitous bargain being at the same time the vendees, the contract was therefore void. On a former occasion, when this position was advanced, we were told that, on the same principle, the sale of our western lands might be set aside, since members of the Legislature speculated in them to a vast amount. However indecorous and reprehensible this may have been in persons in their situation; there was a wide and material difference between the sales made by the United States and a pretended sale like this--not of a few acres, but of millions; not of sections and half sections, but of thousands of square miles; not measured by chains and perches, but by circles of latitude and longitude; not made in the face of day, on public notice, for a reasonable equivalent, and with the general participation of the citizens, but bartered away in the dark by wholesale for the emolument of the partners in the job, for a pretended consideration too paltry to give an air of validity to the contract; and even this sum, pitiful as it was, had since been drawn from the treasury of Georgia by those who had paid it, or others claiming under them by an act yet more infamous and disgraceful if possible than that by which it was deposited there. But it is not my intention at this time to enter into the particulars of this transaction. In the former stages of this bill I have endeavored to give a faithful history of it. Weak and vain, however, must be every effort to do justice to this enormous and atrocious procedure. Some gentlemen indeed will tell you that we have no proof of these facts. The depositions are ex parte, say they, and therefore in strictness of law cannot be considered as evidence. But when was it known that men could not legislate on less than legal evidence? Have we not the same evidence of the fraud that we have of the existence of the claims? Are not the evidences of both in the same report? the same proof of the corruption as of the claims? They both hang together. Do not gentlemen themselves admit the existence of the corruption? On what other principle could they justify their proposition to withhold from these harpies the whole of their glorious booty, and put them off with a comparative pittance? Set aside the evidence of the corruption, and it cannot be denied, that instead of five, they are entitled to fifty millions of acres. I repeat they are entitled to all or nothing. We at least are consistent, we deny their title to anything, and we propose to give them nothing. Gentlemen on the other side can support the claim to the five millions, which they propose to give, only by arguments which justify a claim to ten times that amount.

Mr. R. here read the fourth resolution:

“That the good people of Georgia, impressed with general indignation at the act of atrocious perfidy and unparalleled corruption, with a promptitude of decision highly honorable to them, did, by the act of a subsequent Legislature, passed on the 13th day of February, 1796, under circumstances of peculiar solemnity, and finally sanctioned by the people, who have subsequently ingrafted it on their constitution, declare the preceding act and the grants made under it, in themselves null and void; that the said act should be expunged from the records of the State and publicly burnt--which was accordingly done--provision at the same time being made for restoring the pretended purchase money to the grantees, by whom, or by persons claiming under them, the greater part of the said purchase money has been withdrawn from the treasury of Georgia.”

This is another of the resolutions not even substantially embraced in the proffered amendment, which has been rejected by the committee. The evidence of the facts contained in the former part of it is to be found in the act of Georgia, which I hold in my hand, commonly called the rescinding act. The report of our Commissioners furnishes the proof of the withdrawal of the money, with a detailed statement of that nefarious business, which in the former stages of this bill has been amply explained. In the rescinding act the Legislature of Georgia take other objections to the usurpation of 1795, besides those founded on its corruption. They deny the constitutional right of their predecessors to have made such an alienation of the public domain, even with honorable views and for a fair equivalent. They declare that their constitution prescribes a certain mode whereby vacant lands shall be sold and granted, and that the pretended act of 1795 is void, not only from its corruption, but from its contravening those provisions. This is a weighty and vital objection. The slow yet equitable method known to the Constitution of Georgia of laying off new counties, granting out the lands, when they were appropriated and settled, laying off and settling others, was ill-suited to the gigantic rapacity of the Assembly of 1795, and their ravenous accomplices, who grasped at every acre within the nominal limits of the State, whether covered by Indian titles, or whether those claims were extinguished.

I must beg leave, in answer to the objection of some gentlemen here, to repeat what was advanced by me in a former discussion of the subject. Georgia ceded this territory to us subject to certain specified claims, arising under Great Britain, under Spain, and under her Bourbon act, as it is commonly called, which has no relation to any of the Yazoo acts, as they are termed. For these claims we have stipulated to provide, moreover paying her a certain sum out of the first proceeds of the lands, as a consideration for the grant. Besides the above-mentioned claims there were others not recognized by, or provided for, in our compact. In relation to these, Georgia gives a reluctant assent, (which is to be inferred as well from the expressions which are used in the treaty, as from the declaration of the Commissioners on both sides,) that we may apply, not exceeding five millions of acres to quiet other claims, generally, without specifying what they are--the appropriation not to exceed the amount above, and to be made within six months from the ratification of the compact, or to revert back to Georgia. Among the claims of this vague description may be ranked those of the Virginia and South Carolina Yazoo Companies (under the act of Georgia of 1789, and those arising under the corrupt act of 1795.) We are at liberty, therefore, to give these reserved five millions of acres to either, or to both, of those descriptions of conflicting claimants, but we are certainly not bound to bestow an acre on one of them, either by compact with Georgia or by our own act of appropriation. When that act passed it was at the close of our session; there was not time to investigate any of these claims. It was then understood that some of them were equitable, and not founded in corruption. If we had not then made the appropriation, the term within which we were permitted to make it, would have elapsed before the next session of Congress. We therefore made the appropriation in the same general terms of our compact with Georgia, pledging ourselves to none, while we thereby reserved the right of examining and recompensing all, in case they should thereafter be found to deserve it. The day of investigation having arrived, you are invited to decline it altogether, and hold that the reservation of the right to give, is converted by some political magic into a duty, and that too by those who propose to give nothing to the companies of 1789, although their claim is embraced by the general provision of our compact with Georgia, and by the terms of our act of appropriation as much as the claims of the companies of 1795.

FRIDAY, March 9.

Government of Louisiana.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the government of Louisiana. The fifth section being read, as follows:

“SEC. 5. The judicial power shall be vested in a superior court, and in such inferior courts, and justices of the peace, as the Legislature of the Territory may, from time to time, establish. The judges of the superior court, and the justices of the peace, shall hold their offices for the term of four years. The superior court shall consist of three judges, any one of whom shall constitute a court. They shall have jurisdiction in all criminal cases, and exclusive jurisdiction in all those which are capital, and original and appellate jurisdiction in all civil cases of the value of one hundred dollars. Its sessions shall commence on the first Monday of every month, and continue till all the business depending before them shall be disposed of. They shall appoint their own clerk. In all criminal prosecutions which are capital, the trial shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the vicinage; and in all cases, criminal and civil, in the superior court, the trial shall be by a jury, if either of the parties require it. The inhabitants of the said Territory shall be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus; they shall be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the proof shall be evident, or the presumption great; and no cruel and unusual punishment shall be inflicted:”

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL moved to strike out “which are capital, the trial shall be by a jury of twelve good and lawful men of the vicinage; and in all cases, criminal and civil, in the superior court, the trial shall be by a jury, if either of the parties require it,” and to insert “the trial shall be by jury, and in all civil cases above the value of twenty dollars.”

Mr. C. said he conceived that in legislating for the people of Louisiana, they were bound by the Constitution of the United States, and that they had not a right to establish courts in that Territory on any other terms than they could in any of the States. Wherever courts were established in a Territory, they must be considered as courts of the United States, and of consequence cannot be otherwise constituted than as courts in the States. The constitution expressly declares that, in criminal cases the trial shall be by jury, and in all civil cases where the sum in controversy exceeds the value of twenty dollars, the trial shall be likewise by jury. In the ninth article of the amendments to the constitution, we find the following words: “In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The eighth article says: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.”

I will observe that the right of trial given by this section, to wit: “if either of the parties require it,” is a dangerous mode of proceeding, and may tend unwarily to entrap them. The person brought before the court for a misdemeanor, asked if he requires a jury trial, may be ignorant of the evidence, and may not know the benefits of a trial by jury; he must at all events show a want of confidence in the court, or waive a jury trial. If he does the first, he may sour the minds of the court. The party is thus put in a situation which may be worse than if he was deprived altogether of the right of a trial, by the necessity of making a choice which may operate more against him. The bill therefore does not secure the right of a jury trial, as contemplated by the constitution.

Mr. SLOAN said a few words in support of the motion, which was lost--yeas 20.

[At this stage of the business we attended the trial of impeachment in the Senate, and cannot with perfect correctness state the further proceedings of the House on the bill. We understand, however, that the new section, sometime since offered by Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL, providing for the election of a Legislature by the people of Louisiana, instead of their being governed according to the bill from the Senate by a council appointed by the President, was disagreed to--yeas 37, nays 43.--Reporter.][9]

SATURDAY, March 10.

Georgia Claims.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH moved the taking up for consideration the resolution offered by him on the claims under the act of Georgia of 1795.

Mr. ELLIOT moved the order of the day on the bill for the compromise of those and other claims.

Mr. GREGG moved to postpone the further consideration of the resolutions till the first day of December next. He was, he said, perfectly prepared to act on the bill for the settlement of the claims, and to give it his decided negative; and should have no objections, but for the lateness of the session, and the great mass of important business that demanded attention.

The SPEAKER said, the motion to consider the resolutions, being first made, must be first put.

It accordingly was put, and carried--yeas 58.

Mr. JACKSON then moved a postponement of the resolutions until the 1st Monday in December.

Mr. STANFORD inquired whether the motion of postponement was not susceptible of a division, so as to apply to each resolution separately.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH hoped the question would be so taken.

Mr. RODNEY expressed the same wish, and that the yeas and nays might be taken on each division of the question. He was opposed to a postponement. He should not have risen at this late period but for the warm opposition the resolutions had received from various quarters, and but for his desire to avail himself of the opportunity to state his reasons for giving them a firm support.

It is objected to these resolutions that they are abstract propositions. By abstract principles, I understand axioms unapplied. But when they are applied to facts, they cease to be considered in the abstract. In geometry there are certain elementary principles which are the basis of all reasoning on any proposition in that department of science. So in law there are principles in the abstract while they remain unapplied, and which bear in every case where facts admit of their application. So in politics certain principles are held sacred, either in the view of right, or in relation to the constitution of a State. But when these principles are applied to a given state of things, they cease to be abstract. In the Declaration of Independence there are several abstract principles, such as “that all men are free,” &c. But when applied to a certain state of things, they are no longer abstract. I apprehend, therefore, that my worthy friend from Pennsylvania will, on more mature reflection, perceive that the principles contained in the resolutions bearing on facts cease to be abstract; on facts which it is necessary for us to decide, and against examining the consequences of which no reason can be urged. But, says another gentleman, we have no jurisdiction in the case; we have nothing to do with the act of Georgia of 1795; we have no authority over it. I confess myself really surprised to be assured, over and over again, that the act of 1795 which gives the House all this trouble, is the corner stone of the present claims, and without which there would not be a shadow of claim, is not to be considered as blended with our proceedings. What! when we are called upon to compromise claims, are we not to go to the cause, to the fountain source, and decide whether they have, or have not, a foundation in justice? Put the act of 1795 out of the way, and would we have ever heard of this compromise? Remove it, and would we have a single claimant before us soliciting a compromise? I consider the act, to Georgia, as involving the all-important point; as intimately and indissolubly blended with the question before us. That question is whether we will consent to give five millions to effect a compromise of claims, directly emanating from the act of 1795; and then, as an incidental question, we are obliged to look at the act of 1795. If the House have authority over the main question, ex vi termini, they have authority over every question incidental to it; and common sense teaches us that it is absolutely necessary to determine on the validity of the act of 1795, in order to decide the justice or policy of compromising claims arising out of it.

Having settled, as I conceive, these preliminary points, I will call the attention of the House to the great point on which their decision must turn. Either the act of 1795 or of 1796 is in force. If that of 1795 is in force the claimants have a legal title to unascertained millions. If that act is not binding, they have no claim at all. If that act is of no authority, there is an end of their title. The tree is cut up by the roots, and all its branches fall. They have either then a title to fifty millions, or they have no title at all. Their case cannot be compared to a common saying, which declares half a loaf better than no bread.

Now let us compare these facts and reasonings with the resolutions. When I rose I intended to have taken them up in order, but as I have been diverted by the course of the argument, I shall pursue the track I have taken. One of the resolutions states “that a subsequent legislature of an individual State has an undoubted right to repeal any act of a preceding legislature, provided such repeal be not forbidden by the constitution of such State, or of the United States.”

This is, I think, a plain and clear axiom. Both legislatures flow from the same source, and are armed with equal powers. What one legislature can do, another may undo, if the interest of the public prescribes it. I know an ingenious distinction is taken, as to the power of a legislative body, between municipal acts and those constituting contracts. The distinction holds to a certain degree as to expediency, but not as to power. When a legislative body forms a contract, it is a solemn thing, and it ought not to be touched, except when the private evil arising from its being annulled should rather be endured than the public calamity arising from its continuance. But still the position of the resolution is perfectly tenable. What one legislature has done another may undo; what one has enacted, a subsequent one may repeal.

Let us examine whether there is any thing in the rescinding act of Georgia at variance with the constitution of that State, or the Constitution of the United States. The whole course of the business shows the previous act to have been a violation of the Constitution of Georgia. The Constitution of the United States declares that no State “shall pass any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.” That no contract has been impaired, is evident from attending to the sense of the word. I know of no contract formed, either in a legal or equitable sense. Did the Constitution of Georgia authorize her Representatives to rob the people of their property? Or did it authorize them only to dispose of it for their welfare? If they had a right to dispose of it in a wrongful manner, it knocks up the argument at once. If they were vested with a right to rob and plunder their constituents, I give up the point. But until this is shown I shall remain of opinion that they only had the right of disposing of it for the general good. I am not about to travel through the fruitful wilderness of inquiry disclosed in the progress of this affair. But gentlemen say that we have no evidence of corruption. What do they want more than we possess? The whole business has been referred to a set of Commissioners, whose comprehensive powers embraced an investigation of every claim. They have fully examined the claims under the act of 1795, and they have reported that--

“A comparison of the schedule annexed to the articles, and which is declared to be a part of the agreement, with the yeas and nays on the passage of the act authorizing the sale, (E.) shows that all the members, both in the Senate and House, who voted in favor of the law, were, with one single exception, (Robert Watkins, whose name does not appear,) interested in, and parties to, the purchase.

“The articles of agreement, and list of associates of the Tennessee company, which have been voluntarily furnished by one of the trustees, show that a number of the members of the Legislature were also interested in that company.”

This stubborn fact appears on the face of a report made by persons duly authorized to investigate the whole transaction. The fact is indisputable, and ought to satisfy the most reluctant and unwilling mind of the enormity of the corruption attending this business. It is fully satisfactory to my mind. But it is said that this statement is founded on ex parte depositions, and that no opportunity has been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. But where were they taken? In Georgia; in probably the same House that witnessed the scene of disgrace; by a tribunal competent to take them and to inquire into facts.

Upon the whole, it appears to me most evident, on referring to the acts of Georgia, the articles of cession, and the laws of Congress, that the claims under the acts of Georgia have no validity. If, therefore, we give any thing, it must be from compassion, and not from the obligations of justice. Let the House, ere it do this, reflect whether there are not objects in the country equally worthy of their compassion. Let them visit the straw shed of the war-worn soldier who bled in the defence of our rights; the comfortless hut of the widow who lost her husband in battle. With but little search we shall find a mountain of claims that overhangs the justice of the country. If, after this view, we shall consider any unfortunate victims of injustice in this transaction entitled to compassion, I will agree to go as far as any man in affording them relief. But were we as rich as Crœsus, I would first administer relief to the Belisariuses of our country. Let us be just to these before we are generous to other descriptions of claimants.

Mr. T. M. RANDOLPH.--Mr. Speaker: I hope the House will not consent to postpone these resolutions. I hope it will, on the contrary, immediately proceed to consider them, and conclude by adopting them, for, taken generally, they meet my warm approbation as to the principles they lay down, and I am anxious to see the last one, which is the fair corollary of the other, incorporated into the bill now before us.

My opinion is, that it will cast a broad stain on the American character, as it must be exhibited in future history, for this body which represents it to grant compensation for their pretended losses, under whatever form ingenuity may invent to disguise it, to any of those adventurers who made the spurious contract with Georgia in the year 1795, for the purchase of her western territory, upon the ground that the fictitious bargain gave the least shadow of title to any part of that territory. This opinion is a conviction irresistibly given to my mind by an impartial investigation, that what were at that time called companies of land adventurers, were, with the exception of one or two misled individuals, whose delusion and consequent implication I lament, no other, in their conduct on this occasion, than shameless bands of sharpers; what was impudently called a contract, was, in reality, a fraud of unprecedented enormity, and what has since been declared an unjust interposition of the primary sovereign authority of the State, to cancel a fair bargain, was no more than the regular and proper application of the only sufficient means which could be used to redress a cheat upon the people of Georgia of unparalleled audacity and magnitude. I am sorry, by entertaining this opinion, to differ with so many on this floor, with whom it is my pride to think; but I am not much surprised at that difference. Very rarely, indeed, have I heard of important questions which did not divide opinions; never have I been at a criminal trial where numbers did not doubt the reality of the crime. Such is the difference in the impression made by the same testimony upon different minds. Were it not for this extraordinary circumstance in our nature, which almost precludes unanimity, and which completely defies explanation upon any general principles of the moral structure of man, there would be but one sentiment in this House upon the question now before it. The information which has satisfied my mind, I have derived from the declarations of the counties of Georgia, in their petitions and remonstrances presented to the convention of that State, which assembled in the month of May, 1795; from the acknowledgment made by that convention of the dignity of those applications, and the respect due to them, in the resolve which referred the matter they contained to the consideration of the succeeding Legislature; from the proceedings of the General Assembly of 1796, upon that matter, and the evidence it collected and recorded relative thereto; and, lastly, from certain declarations and provisions confirming those proceedings, and thereby establishing that evidence, which were made by the convention of 1798, and which exist now in the body of the present Constitution of Georgia. The same means of information are within the reach of all; I ought to say, should be possessed by all; I might say, should be satisfactory to all; since the witnesses are the great body of the people of one of our respectable States, and the testimony is authenticated, confirmed, and preserved, as well by the constitutional as the ordinary code of that State.

It has not been my object in making this inquiry, to learn in what deep sharper’s brain this scheme was first engendered, which of the associates stood most prominent in the development and execution of it, how the price paid for the flagrant treason against posterity was apportioned, or how the spoil obtained by such a stupendous larceny, committed upon the inheritance of the unborn, was divided. I have not desired to know, and it would be unimportant to the House to be informed, which of the associates had no moral sense at all, whose conscience was subdued by his avarice, or who, unthinkingly, gave the control of it into the hands of his friend. I desire not to see any name consigned to infamy; of those which have come to my knowledge, one or two I yet respect; the remainder have not more distinct images annexed to them, in my mind, than those of the men who conceived and executed the South Sea cheat in England, or the Mississippi fraud in France. But, from the investigation I have made, I have learned, as certainly as the actions of men can be known to others than the actual beholders of them, that the Legislature of Georgia, which commenced its session in the autumn of 1794, was assailed by every possible artifice of seduction, to procure from it the act of 7th January, 1795, which constituted what has since been impudently called the Yazoo contract. That it yielded to those artifices, and a considerable majority of its members became treacherous to their constituents, and deaf to the voice of their honor. That bribes were daringly offered and unblushingly received for votes in favor of the land. That the property of the State of Georgia, to the amount of forty millions of dollars, at the most reasonable estimate, was sold by those trustees of the people of Georgia for one half million, and purchased by the sellers themselves in combination with certain abject worshippers of gold, who had artfully infused into them their blind fanaticism. That another offer of four-fifths of a million, made by other men at the same time, was rejected, because the Legislature itself was concerned in the first. That the Chief Magistrate of the State, after one feeble effort of resistance, and a declaration which ought to have bound him to an obstinate opposition, with a conduct which, to my mind, manifests a thorough knowledge of the corrupt views of the Legislature, as well as a want of energy to defeat them, yielded to the impulse, and ratified the fraudulent sale. That the moment his irresolute hand gave the illusive sanction to the vain and ineffectual deed, this ravenous pack of speculators, keen with the hunger of avarice, unkennelled and scoured the whole peopled territory of the Union in quest of their appropriate game--the simple, the credulous, and those who are hoodwinked by the excess of their own cupidity. The most voracious of them sought the great cities, where numbers of the thirsty sons of gain became their prey, while numbers more joined in the promising chase, led the way to the victims, and fattened on their spoil. Many, more fell in their nature, though less keen in their appetites for gold, traversed the tranquil country of New England, scenting the homely purses which hung in the smoky corner of peaceful cottages, into which the solitary dollar had been dropped with religious punctuality every week, perhaps every month only, by the hand of the provident father, from the time when the first birth under his roof gladdened his heart. Great numbers of these receptacles of hard-earned gain, with all their rusty treasure, the fruit of long continued industry and frugality, destined to ensure to many of the rising race the innocent joys of a life of wholesome exertion in their own fields, were devoured by them, and that happy destiny in a moment changed for a short period of certain pain, and, too probable, vice, in the moving prisons of the ocean.

The promulgation of the law produced one general murmur of indignation throughout the State of Georgia. The crime committed by the Representatives of the people was strongly denounced by the grand juries of all the succeeding courts. An assembly of special Representatives, which had been summoned for constitutional purposes, meeting in the succeeding spring, was addressed by all the counties of the State, and by nearly the whole people of it, with memorials, remonstrances, and petitions, according to the different degrees of excitement, all setting forth in strong terms the nefarious act; complaining with bitterness of the perfidy of the Legislature, requiring, urging, and imploring the convention to proclaim the fact, and annul the fraudulent sale. No laborious investigation into the huge and naked scheme of speculation, no troublesome search after testimony to expose the framer of it was necessary. Nothing was requisite but to receive, condense, and record the decisive evidence voluntarily offered from all quarters. But this legitimate and easy task the convention, naturally enough, thought fit to decline, as many of its members were themselves openly concerned, and many more secretly interested in the purchase. The pack of speculators were then in full cry, the game were falling abundantly into their jaws; it could scarcely be expected that those who had contributed so much to set this chase on foot, who expected to share so largely in its profits, should sound the horn of alarm to the objects of it. It quickly occurred to a majority of this body, that a reference of these addresses to the Legislature of the next year, would not only give time for the continuance of the chase, but might be productive of something like safety in the after possession of the spoils of it; while it promised to afford some shield against the popular discontent and indignation which a total neglect, so desirable to themselves, must inevitably have brought on them. Notwithstanding, before midsummer of the same year, the fraudulency and consequently invalidity of the sale must have been unequivocally known throughout the Union, by the ferment in the State of Georgia. Early in the succeeding year all the records of State relative to this transaction were burned, and all recorded evidences of private contracts which had arisen out of the land were cancelled, destroyed, and forbidden to be renewed or afterwards admitted in the courts by the Legislature acting under the authority to consider the matter, and of course the power to redress the complaint of the petitions, which had been given to it by the convention, and also under the express injunction of the people themselves, laid on the individual members of that body at the elections. But the speed of the sharpers had outstripped the slow step of the State. They had, in a great measure, executed their swindling scheme; a number of their dupes were already, instead of amusing their own credulity, insincerely, and I will say, insolently, accusing the perfidy of Georgia.

The question was then taken by yeas and nays on the postponement, until the first Monday of December, of the following resolution:

“Resolved, That the Legislature of the State of Georgia were, at no time, invested with the power of alienating the right of soil possessed by the good people of that State, in and to the vacant territory of the same, but in a rightful manner, and for the public good:”

And passed in the negative--yeas 51, nays 52.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the second clause thereof, being again read, in the words following, to wit:

“That, when the Governors of any people shall have betrayed the confidence reposed in them, and shall have exercised that authority with which they have been clothed for the general welfare, to promote their own private ends, under the basest motives, and to the public detriment, it is the inalienable right of a people, so circumstanced, to revoke the authority thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray them:”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for postponement of the said second clause of the original motion; and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 52, nays 50.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the third clause thereof, being twice read, in the words following, to wit:

“That it is in evidence to this House, that the act of the Legislature of Georgia, passed on the seventh of January, 1795, entitled ‘An act for appropriating a part of the unlocated territory of this State, for the payment of the State troops, and for other purposes,’ was passed by persons under the influence of gross and palpable corruption practised by the grantees of the lands attempted to be alienated by the aforesaid act, tending to enrich and aggrandize, to a degree almost incalculable, a few individuals, and ruinous to the public interest:”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for postponement of the said third clause of the original motion; and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 54, nays 49.

So much of the said original motion as is contained in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh clauses thereof, being again read, in the words following, to wit:

“That the good people of Georgia, impressed with general indignation at this act of atrocious perfidy and of unparalleled corruption, with a promptitude of decision highly honorable to their character, did, by the act of a subsequent Legislature, passed on the thirteenth of February, 1796, under circumstances of peculiar solemnity, and finally sanctioned by the people, who have subsequently ingrafted it on their constitution, declare the preceding act, and the grants made under it, in themselves null and void; that the said act should be expunged from the records of the State, and be publicly burnt, which was accordingly done; provision at the same time being made for restoring the pretended purchase-money to the grantees, by whom, or by persons claiming under them, the greater part of the said purchase-money has been withdrawn from the treasury of Georgia.”

“That a subsequent Legislature of an individual State has an undoubted right to repeal any act of a preceding Legislature; provided such repeal be not forbidden by the constitution of such State, or of the United States.”

“That the aforesaid act of the State of Georgia, passed on the thirteenth of February, 1796, was forbidden neither by the constitution of that State, nor by that of the United States.”

“That the claims of persons derived under the aforesaid act of the seventh of January, 1795, are recognized neither by any compact between the United States and the State of Georgia, nor any act of the Federal Government.”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for postponement of the said fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh clauses of the original motion; and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 53, nays 50.

And then the residue of the said original motion, contained in the eighth and last clause thereof, being twice read, in the following words, to wit:

“Therefore, Resolved. That no part of the five millions of acres reserved for satisfying and quieting claims to lands ceded by the State of Georgia to the United States, and appropriated by the act of Congress passed at their last session, shall be appropriated to quiet or compensate any claims derived under any act, or pretended act of the State of Georgia, passed, or alleged to be passed, during the year 1795:”

The question was taken that the House do agree to the motion for postponement of the said residue of the original motion; and resolved in the affirmative--yeas 54, nays 51, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., Simeon Baldwin, Silas Betton, Phanuel Bishop, John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Jacob Crowninshield, Manasseh Cutler, Richard Cutts, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dawson, William Dickson, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Ebenezer Elmer, William Eustis, William Findlay, John Fowler, Andrew Gregg, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, William Helms, David Hough, Benjamin Huger, Nehemiah Knight, Henry W. Livingston, Thomas Lowndes, Matthew Lyon, Nahum Mitchell, Samuel L. Mitchill, Jeremiah Morrow, Joseph H. Nicholson, Thomas Plater, Erastus Root, Tompson J. Skinner, John Smilie, John Cotton Smith, Joseph Stanton, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, David Thomas, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Joseph B. Varnum, Daniel C. Verplanck, Peleg Wadsworth, Lemuel Williams, and Marmaduke Williams.

NAYS.--Isaac Anderson, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, William Blackledge, Adam Boyd, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, Levi Casey, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Frederick Conrad, John B. Earle, James Gillespie, Peterson Goodwyn, Thomas Griffin, Samuel Hammond, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, James Holland, William Kennedy, Michael Leib, Joseph Lewis, jun., Andrew McCord, David Meriwether, Andrew Moore, Nicholas R. Moore, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smith of Virginia, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, John Stewart, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, Matthew Walton, Richard Wynn, and Joseph Winston.[10]

WEDNESDAY, March 14.

Government of Louisiana.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill from the Senate, providing for the government of Louisiana.

Mr. SLOAN moved an amendment, inhibiting the admission of slaves into Louisiana, as well from the United States as from foreign places.

Mr. S. concisely stated his reasons in favor of this provision, when the question was taken, and the amendment agreed to--ayes 40, noes 36. Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL proposed an amendment, withholding from the parties to a civil suit the right of waiving a jury trial. The bill provides a jury trial in all cases in which either party shall require it.

This amendment, after being supported by Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL, and opposed by Messrs. HOLLAND, SOUTHARD, and DANA, was negatived--ayes 12.

Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL moved to strike out that part of the bill which renders every person settling on lands of the United States liable to a fine of one thousand dollars, and to one year’s imprisonment.

This produced a debate of some length and more animation, in which the motion to strike out was urged by Messrs. G. W. CAMPBELL, LYON, and CLAIBORNE; and opposed by Messrs. GREGG, NICHOLSON, BOYD, SMILIE, MACON, SLOAN, and HOLLAND.

The question was taken, and the amendment was negatived--ayes 23.

SATURDAY, March 17.

Government of Louisiana.

The bill erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof, was read the third time.

Mr. DAWSON moved a recommitment of the bill for amendment.

Mr. ALSTON was against a general recommitment of the bill, but friendly to a recommitment for the purpose of limiting its duration.

Messrs. NICHOLSON, SMILIE, EARLY, and S. N. MITCHILL, opposed the recommitment.

Mr. BEDINGER advocated the recommitment.

The motion to recommit was then negatived--ayes 39, noes 43.

Mr. ALSTON said, if there was no objection, he would move the insertion of a clause to limit the period of the bill, on account principally of the great powers conferred on the Executive.

This motion being objected to, by Mr. LYON, was declared out of order.

The question was then put on the passage of the bill.

Messrs. LYON, SLOAN, JACKSON, and BEDINGER opposed, and Mr. SMILIE supported its passage.

Mr. VARNUM moved to recommit, for amendment, that part of the bill that vests equity powers in the courts of Louisiana.

Motion negatived--ayes 39, noes 44.

A motion was made to recommit the fourth section, which was lost--ayes 15.

Mr. BEDINGER moved to recommit the last section for the purpose of obtaining a limitation to the act.

Motion carried--ayes 52.

The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the last section,

When Mr. NICHOLSON moved an amendment limiting the act to two years, and to the end of the next session thereafter.

Mr. BEDINGER said, he would like its limitation to one year better, but would, if it were the sense of the House, be satisfied with two years.

Mr. NICHOLSON’s motion was agreed to without a division.

The House agreed to the amendment; when the final question was put on the passage of the bill, and carried in the affirmative by yeas and nays--yeas 66, nays 21, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, junior, Isaac Anderson, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, Walter Bowie, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Levi Casey, Thomas Claiborne, Joseph Clay, Frederick Conrad, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, William Dickson, John B. Earle, Peter Early, Ebenezer Elmer, William Eustis, William Findlay, James Gillespie, John A. Hanna, Josiah Hasbrouck, Joseph Heister, William Hoge, James Holland, Benjamin Huger, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, Andrew McCord, William McCreery, David Meriwether, Samuel L. Mitchill, Andrew Moore, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, junior, Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sandford, Ebenezer Seaver, Tompson J. Skinner, John Smilie, John Smith of Virginia, Richard Stanford, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt, Isaac Van Horne, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Wynn, and Joseph Winston.

NAYS.--John Archer, Silas Betton, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Dawson, James Elliot, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, John G. Jackson, Henry W. Livingston, Matthew Lyon, Thomas Plater, James Sloan, John C. Smith, Samuel Tenney, and Lemuel Williams.[11]

WEDNESDAY, March 21.

Tripolitan War and Mediterranean Fund.

Mr. NICHOLSON, from the Committee of Ways and Means, presented a bill further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary Powers.

[The bill provides that an additional duty of two and a half per centum be laid upon all imported goods at present charged with a duty ad valorem, and an additional duty of ten per cent. on all such duties payable on goods imported in foreign vessels. The proceeds of these duties are to constitute a fund to be called the Mediterranean fund. The duties to cease within three months after a peace with Tripoli, in case the United States are not engaged in war with some other of the Barbary Powers, in which case they are to cease within three months after a peace with such powers. The President is authorized to cause to be purchased or built two vessels of war, to carry sixteen guns each, and as many gunboats as he may think proper. One million of dollars, additional to the sum heretofore appropriated, is placed under the direction of the President for the naval service, which sum he is authorized to borrow at a rate of interest not exceeding six per cent.]

Mr. NICHOLSON moved that this bill should be made the order for this day.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD moved to-morrow.

The question on “to-morrow” was lost--yeas 33, nays 50, when Mr. NICHOLSON’s motion prevailed.

Duties on Imports.

The bill laying more specific duties on certain articles, and imposing light-money on foreign vessels entering the ports of the United States, was read the third time.

Mr. HUGER moved its postponement to the first Monday of December, under the impression that its merits, and the principles it contained, had not received that full and deliberate examination to which they were entitled.

Mr. J. CLAY observed that a postponement would be virtually a rejection of the bill.

Mr. MITCHILL concisely advocated the principles of the bill.

Mr. BLACKLEDGE also defended it.

Mr. R. GRISWOLD opposed it, principally on the ground that it increased the existing rate of duties.

Mr. J. CLAY replied, and allowed that the duties imposed by the bill would produce more revenue than that heretofore received, but contended that this would arise from the fraudulent practice heretofore in use of making out invoices of articles subject at present to ad valorem duties. In removing this evil, the necessary effect would be an increase of revenue, not exceeding, however, the probable receipt in case the invoices were fairly made out.

Mr. HUGER followed, in a speech of considerable length, in which he contended that the operation of the bill would be to promote the manufactures of the Eastern and Middle States, to the great detriment of the Southern States. Principally, though not entirely on this ground, he declared himself hostile to the bill.

After a few remarks from Mr. BOYD in defence, and of Mr. CLAIBORNE against the bill, the question of postponement was taken by yeas and nays, and lost--yeas 40, nays 68.

Mr. KENNEDY moved a recommitment of the motion imposing a specific duty on printed calicoes and lime.

Motion rejected--yeas 34.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and carried in the affirmative by yeas and nays--yeas 65, nays 41.[12]

THURSDAY, March 22.

Protection against the Barbary Powers.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary Powers.

Mr. GRISWOLD moved to strike out the first section, which is as follows:

“Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of equipping, officering, manning, and employing such of the armed vessels of the United States, as may be deemed requisite by the President of the United States, for protecting the commerce and seamen thereof, and for carrying on warlike operations against the Regency of Tripoli, or any other of the Barbary Powers, which may commit hostilities against the United States, and for the purpose also of defraying any other expenses incidental to the intercourse with the Barbary Powers, or which are authorized by this act, a duty of two and a half per centum ad valorem, in addition to the duties now imposed by law, shall be laid, levied, and collected upon all goods, wares, and merchandise, paying a duty ad valorem, which shall, after the thirtieth day of June next, be imported into the United States from any foreign port or place; and an addition of ten per centum shall be made to the said additional duty in respect to all goods, wares, and merchandise, imported in ships or vessels not of the United States, and the duties imposed by this act shall be levied and collected in the same manner, and under the same regulations and allowances, as to drawbacks, mode of security, and time of payment, respectively, as are already prescribed by law, in relation to the duties now in force on the articles on which the said additional duty is laid by this act.”

Mr. G. said, that it was much to be regretted that gentlemen had thought proper, upon this occasion, to connect with the great and ostensible object of the bill, any provisions which should produce a disunion in the House. The unfortunate event in the Mediterranean called loudly for vigorous and decisive measures, and he trusted there would not exist on the floor a difference of opinion on that point. For himself, he was disposed to clothe the President with all the power, and to furnish him with all the means which were necessary to bring the war with Tripoli to a successful and speedy termination. And when this was done, to make him, as he ought to be, responsible for the event.

It is always improper, said Mr. G., to connect in the same bill two subjects which are in their natures distinct; and much more improper upon this occasion, to tack to the provisions for the Mediterranean service, upon which there could be no difference of opinion, a new tax, in respect to which gentlemen could not agree.

The first section of the bill, which he had moved to strike out, imposed a new tax of two and a half per centum ad valorem on all goods now liable by law to an ad valorem duty. Goods paying at this time an ad valorem duty were divided into three classes--the first class was liable to a duty of twelve and a half per cent.; the second, to a duty of fifteen per cent.; and the third, to a duty of twenty per cent.

The addition of two and a half per cent. now proposed, would increase the duties to fifteen, seventeen and a half, and twenty-two and a half per cent., when the goods were imported in American bottoms; and if they were imported in foreign bottoms, the duties would be further increased by the addition of ten per cent.

This view of the import, said Mr. G., will satisfy gentlemen that the duties are already high, and that the proposed addition will render them enormous. This step, therefore, ought not to be hazarded, unless the necessities of the Government are absolutely imperious, and no other means can be resorted to for obtaining the money.

The proposed tax, if fairly collected, would produce at least $750,000 per annum. This result might be seen from a view of the imports into the United States of goods now liable to an ad valorem duty. From the last official report, it appeared that the importation of goods of that description, amounted in that year to about forty millions of dollars--the two and a half per cent. on the whole sum would, of course, produce one million, but, allowing for the drawback of duties on goods exported, the net revenue could not be less than $750,000. Why, then, impose a tax of seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars to meet an expenditure which will not probably exceed four or five hundred thousand dollars?

Mr. NICHOLSON.--We are now about to authorize a greater expense than usual, and the Legislature are called upon to provide means for its discharge. For one, said Mr. N., I can never consent to add to the public debt, while the resources of the country are adequate to its wants. These are my ideas; and I feel somewhat surprised at the calculation of the gentleman from Connecticut, on the expense about to be incurred. He estimates this expense at $388,000; though yesterday when this subject was laid before the Committee of Ways and Means, and it was contemplated to provide $750,000, he moved to strike out $750,000, and insert $1,000,000. And yet he now tells us that only $388,000 are required. As to the specie in the Treasury, the gentleman states that on the 1st of October there were $5,000,000. But with what disbursements is this chargeable? Out of it there are to be paid American citizens for French spoliations the sum of $3,750,000 in cash, which must remain in the Treasury, that just claims may be paid as soon as presented. Under the British Convention there is to be paid $800,000; and there is likewise to be paid the interest on Louisiana stock, amounting to $685,000; the aggregate of which sums is $5,235,000. Not having made this calculation until the gentleman made his observation, it is possible it may not be perfectly correct.

When the loss of the Philadelphia was announced, my first inquiry of the Secretary of the Treasury was what money could be spared from the Treasury for the prosecution of vigorous measures. His answer was, that the greatest sum which could be spared would not exceed $150,000. I did not, like the gentleman, go to the clerks or to the navy yard; but I got the best information I could.

The gentleman from Connecticut, who appears willing to incur an expense of a million of dollars, while he is unwilling to provide the means of meeting it, objects to the mode of raising revenue proposed by the Committee of Ways and Means, without proposing any other. He objects to the laying additional duties on imported goods. In his remarks he has made an erroneous statement of the quantity of goods on which ad valorem duties are paid. His error has arisen from not deducting the amount of drawbacks. By an official statement made this session, it will be found that during the year 1802, goods paying ad valorem duties were as follows:

Rate. Amount. Duty. 12½ per cent. $23,377,717 $2,922,214 15 ” 7,888,614 1,183,292 20 ” 439,830 87,966 ----------- ---------- Amounting to $34,706,161 $4,193,472

The average duty on goods charged ad valorem is about thirteen and a half per cent. Let us consider the duties paid by other articles. The gentleman says in laying duties there is a point beyond which we cannot go in safety on account of the temptation to smuggling. This is true. But of all goods imported those chargeable with ad valorem duties are the most difficult to smuggle. The invoices are made out in the country from which they are imported. These must be authenticated, and presented at the custom-house and sworn to. If the collector has any reason to suspect that there are goods on board of a vessel, not in the entry, he is to make a thorough examination of the vessel. If he sees a bale in which he suspects there are goods not stated in the invoice, it is in his power to have it examined. I believe there is but little smuggling at this time; but that the articles on which there is most smuggling are rum and coffee. If the gentleman allows that the duty on articles charged specifically is not so high as to encourage smuggling to any great or dangerous extent, he will allow the same in the case of articles charged ad valorem. The great articles from which revenue is obtained, are

Spirits, which pay an average duty of twenty-nine and two-tenth cents, and which produce $2,253,496, and cost the importer from twenty-five to fifty cents per gallon. Spirits which pay twenty-five cents a gallon do not cost the importer more than fifty cents, and consequently pay a duty of fifty per cent. on the price of the article. Spirits of the third proof pay twenty-eight cents, and do not cost more than fifty-six cents a gallon, which is equal to a duty of fifty per cent. So with spirits of higher proof. From this article is derived more than a fifth of our revenue, and yet I never heard the amount of the duty complained of, until a few days since a petition was presented from the merchants of Connecticut. It is certain that Congress have never considered it so high as to encourage smuggling.

Of imported sugars 39,443,814 lbs. are consumed within the United States, which pay, on an average, a duty of two and a half cents per pound. The price of brown sugar to the importer is about five or six dollars the hundred. The duty is therefore between forty-five and fifty per cent. Is this duty considered so high as to encourage smuggling? If not, shall gentlemen complain when we are about to lay an additional duty of two and a half per cent. upon articles now chargeable with duties of from twelve and a half to twenty per cent.?

Of salt there is consumed 3,244,309 bushels in the United States. It pays a duty of twenty cents a bushel. In many instances this is equal to the first cost; and amounts therefore to one hundred per cent.

The consumption of wines amounts to 1,912,274 gallons, and the average duty is thirty-three cents. The duty on Madeira wine is fifty-eight cents, and it costs the importer one dollar and twenty-five cents. The duty therefore amounts to near fifty per cent. If the cost be taken at one dollar and fifty cents, the duty will be thirty-three and a third per cent. And yet it is not complained that it encourages smuggling.

The greater part of goods charged ad valorem are woollens, linens, manufactures of steel, brass, and articles of a similar kind, and muslins. In a muslin gown the additional duty will make a difference of about five cents. India muslins cost about fifteen cents a yard, and English about twenty-five cents. The additional duty will therefore be about three-eighths of a cent on India, and about three-fourths of a cent on English muslins. This I consider a burden which no one can feel. The additional duty on linens will be equally unfelt. In a bale of osnaburgs, which costs twenty cents, the additional duty on a hundred yards will not exceed fifty cents. So as to Irish linens and woollens. The difference in a coarse suit of clothes for a common man will not be more than twenty-five cents, and that of a better kind will not exceed one dollar and twenty-five cents. I am surprised, after taking this view of the operation of the proposed duty, that gentlemen should dwell upon the great burden it will impose, when it can, in truth, scarcely be felt by the poorest man in the country. It is indeed of no consideration but on account of the money raised by it, which I have estimated at about $750,000.

The gentleman from Connecticut thinks he has discovered in the second section a design that is not avowed, to wit: to liberate the present resources from their application to the support of the Navy. I wonder, however, that the gentleman, before he made this unguarded remark, did not read the section through. He would then have seen that the fund established by this act is to exist no longer than three months after the discontinuance of war in the Mediterranean. Nor is it true that the whole expenses of the Navy are in the Mediterranean. It is true, that at this time they are principally there. But there is likewise considerable expense incurred here in the navy yard on the ships, and on the half-pay of officers not in actual service. Whence the gentleman deduces the inference, when the bill itself declares that the new duties shall cease three months after the end of the war, I am altogether at a loss to comprehend. The duties are to cease with the occasion which produced them. When we shall no longer be at war, the war duties will be at an end.

Mr. DANA.--The gentleman from Maryland must surely have committed a mistake, when he said that there is no measure proposed on his side of the House which does not meet with opposition. When the President considered vigorous measures necessary against the Emperor of Morocco, the Journal will show that we entered into them unanimously. Nor is the objection now urged in any way an objection to the general measure contemplated. The only objection is to the imposition of unnecessary taxes. If the force necessary to be sent into the Mediterranean will not exceed an expense of $380,000, the necessity of the imposition of the proposed taxes surely does not exist. I admit that, after the force is raised, the President, in virtue of his authority as commander-in-chief, is to have its whole direction; but it is perfectly novel to me to learn that we are not previously to be informed of the extent to which it is proposed to carry it. If to the present number of vessels in service we add two frigates and five smaller vessels, they will require only an additional appropriation of $354,000. This, I believe, is the full extent of the additional force contemplated. As to raising money to that amount, I make no objection. Though I dislike laying duties thus in gross, yet I do not know that there can be any great objection to it. The sum proposed to be raised will give $750,000, which is more than double the sum necessary.

Is it proper thus to raise these duties, and hold forth to the nation that the commerce of the Mediterranean is so expensive? The late disaster in the Mediterranean is not of itself an adequate cause for the measure. I object to this measure, because it goes to give an improper impression of the causes of the bill.

Mr. NICHOLSON said, the gentleman from Connecticut seemed to consider the object too general; he would, in case the committee refused to strike out the first section, move to limit the application of the fund “to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States in the Mediterranean.”

The question was then taken on striking out the first section, and passed in the negative--ayes 26.

Mr. N. then offered the amendment just stated.

Mr. EUSTIS hoped the gentleman from Maryland would withdraw his amendment, as in a subsequent part of the bill the object is distinctly specified. It is altogether unnecessary; and if agreed to, it will be necessary to add, “or adjacent seas.”

Mr. NICHOLSON said, he considered the amendment as unnecessary; but as he had promised to make it, he could not withdraw it.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH said he would suggest one reason why it ought not to obtain. One of the Barbary Powers possessed a coast out of the Mediterranean. If the misfortune of the United States should dispose this power, (Morocco,) already predisposed to hostility, to war upon the United States, it would not be in our power to block up the port of Sallee, and several other ports out of the Mediterranean.

The question was taken on the amendment, which was lost without a division.

The committee then rose and reported the bill without amendment.

The House immediately took it up--when Mr. R. GRISWOLD renewed his motion to strike out the first section.

The question on striking out the first section was taken by yeas and nays--yeas 28, nays 77.

FRIDAY, March 23.

District of Columbia.

Mr. DAWSON moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole on the resolutions offered by him, for the recession of the District of Columbia.

Mr. HUGER said this point had been fully and ably investigated the last session. He did not expect, after the decision then made, that the House would have been again called upon to discuss it. He believed the mind of every member was made up respecting it. He hoped, therefore, the House would not agree to go into committee.

Mr. J. LEWIS said he should vote against the House resolving itself into a Committee of the Whole, and should that motion be negatived, he would move to discharge the Committee of the Whole from all further consideration of the resolutions. The question was taken on going into committee, and lost--yeas 20.

Mr. J. LEWIS then moved to discharge the committee. This motion was carried without debate--yeas 53, embracing a great majority of the members present.

MONDAY, March 26.

Impeachment of Judge Chase.

Mr. JOHN RANDOLPH, from the committee appointed on the thirteenth instant, to prepare and report articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, made a report thereon, which was read.

Ordered, That the said report be printed for the use of the members of both Houses; and that the Clerk of this House be directed to transmit to each of the members of the two Houses of Congress, a copy of the said report, as soon as the same shall be printed.

Ordered, That there be a call of the House to-morrow morning at eleven o’clock.

The House adjourned until four o’clock, post meridian.

Four o’clock, p. m.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have passed a resolution, that the resolution of the two Houses authorizing the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives to adjourn their respective Houses on this day, be rescinded; and that the said President and Speaker of the House of Representatives be authorized to close the present session, by adjourning their respective Houses on Tuesday, the 27th of this month; to which they desire the concurrence of this House. The Senate adhere to their amendment, disagreed to by this House, to the bill, entitled “An act supplementary to the act, entitled ‘An act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment, and for other purposes.’”

The House proceeded to consider the resolution of the Senate to rescind the resolution of both Houses, of the thirteenth instant, for an adjournment of the two Houses of Congress, on this day; and authorizing the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, to close the present session, by adjourning their respective Houses on Tuesday the 27th of the present month: whereupon,

Resolved, That this House doth agree to the said resolution of the Senate--yeas 49, nays 44.

The House proceeded to reconsider the amendment disagreed to by this House, and adhered to by the Senate, to the bill, entitled “An act supplementary to the act, entitled ‘An act providing for a Naval Peace Establishment, and for other purposes,’” whereupon,

Resolved, That this House doth recede from their disagreement to the said amendment.

TUESDAY, March 27.

Specific Duties.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have passed the bill, entitled “An act for imposing more specific duties on the importation of certain articles, with amendments, and also for levying and collecting light-money on foreign ships or vessels.”

The House proceeded to consider the amendments proposed by the Senate to the bill, entitled “An act for imposing more specific duties on the importation of certain articles, and also for levying and collecting light-money on foreign ships or vessels,” whereupon,

Resolved, That this House doth agree to the said amendments.

Half-past four o’clock, p. m.

Mr. JOHN RANDOLPH, from the committee appointed on the part of this House, jointly with the committee appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States and notify him of the proposed recess of Congress, reported that the committee had performed that service; and that the President signified to them he had no farther communication to make during the present session.

Ordered, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them that this House, having completed the business before them, are now about to adjourn until the first Monday in November next; and that the Clerk of this House do go with the said message.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate, having completed the Legislative business before them, are now ready to adjourn. Whereupon the SPEAKER adjourned the House until the first Monday in November next.

EIGHTH CONGRESS.--SECOND SESSION.

BEGUN AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 5, 1804.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.

MONDAY, November 5, 1804.

The second session of the Eighth Congress, conformably to the act passed at the last session, entitled, “An act altering the time for the next meeting of Congress,” commenced this day; and the Senate assembled at the City of Washington.

PRESENT:

AARON BURR, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

SIMEON OLCOTT and WILLIAM PLUMER, from New Hampshire.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, from Massachusetts.

URIAH TRACY, from Connecticut.

CHRISTOPHER ELLERY, from Rhode Island.

STEPHEN R. BRADLEY and ISRAEL SMITH, from Vermont.

JOHN CONDIT, from New Jersey.

SAMUEL WHITE, from Delaware.

SAMUEL SMITH, from Maryland.

ABRAHAM BALDWIN, from Georgia; and

THOMAS WORTHINGTON, from Ohio.

WILLIAM B. GILES, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in place of Abraham B. Venable, resigned, took his seat, and his credentials were read.

The VICE PRESIDENT gave notice that he had received a letter from WILLIAM HILL WELLS, a Senator from the State of Delaware, resigning his seat in the Senate.

The number of Senators present not being sufficient to constitute a quorum, the Senate adjourned.

TUESDAY, November 6.

JESSE FRANKLIN, from the State of North Carolina, GEORGE LOGAN, from the State of Pennsylvania, and TIMOTHY PICKERING, from the State of Massachusetts, severally attended.

ANDREW MOORE, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in place of Wilson C. Nicholas, resigned, took his seat, and his credentials were read.

The PRESIDENT administered the oath to Mr. GILES and Mr. MOORE, as the law prescribes.

Ordered--That the PRESIDENT be requested to notify the Executive of the State of Delaware of the resignation of Mr. Wells.

No quorum being present, the Senate adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, November 7.

ROBERT WRIGHT, from the State of Maryland, attended.

Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives that a quorum of the Senate is assembled and ready to proceed to business.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that a quorum of the House of Representatives is assembled and ready to proceed to business. The House of Representatives have appointed a committee on their part, jointly, with such committee as the Senate may appoint, to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them. The House of Representatives have also passed a resolution that two chaplains, of different denominations, be appointed to Congress for the present session, one by each House, who shall interchange weekly; in which several resolutions they desire the concurrence of the Senate.

The Senate took into consideration the resolution of the House of Representatives for the appointment of a joint committee to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled; and concurred therein, and Messrs. SAMUEL SMITH and BALDWIN were appointed the committee on the part of the Senate.

The Senate took into consideration the Resolution of the House of Representatives for the appointment of two chaplains to Congress during the present session, and, having agreed thereto, proceeded to the choice of a chaplain on their part; and the Rev. Mr. MCCORMICK was duly elected.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH reported, from the joint committee, that they had waited on the President of the United States, agreeably to the resolution of this day, and that the President of the United States had informed the committee that he would make a communication to the two Houses to-morrow at 12 o’clock.

THURSDAY, November 8.

JONATHAN DAYTON, from the State of New Jersey, and JAMES HILLHOUSE, from the State of Connecticut, severally attended.

The following message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:--

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

To a people, fellow-citizens, who sincerely desire the happiness and prosperity of other nations, to those who justly calculate that their own well-being is advanced by that of the nations with which they have intercourse, it will be a satisfaction to observe, that the war which was lighted up in Europe a little before our last meeting, has not yet extended its flames to other nations, nor been marked by the calamities which sometimes stain the footsteps of war. The irregularities, too, on the ocean, which generally harass the commerce of neutral nations, have, in distant parts, disturbed ours less than on former occasions. But, in the American seas, they have been greater from peculiar causes; and even within our harbors and jurisdiction, infringements on the authority of the laws have been committed, which have called for serious attention.

While noticing the irregularities committed on the ocean by others, those on our own part should not be omitted, nor left unprovided for. Complaints have been received that persons residing within the United States have taken on themselves to arm merchant vessels, and to force a commerce into certain ports and countries in defiance of the laws of those countries. That individuals should undertake to wage private war, independently of the authority of their country, cannot be permitted in a well-ordered society. Its tendency to produce aggression on the laws and rights of other nations, and to endanger the peace of our own, is so obvious that I doubt not you will adopt measures for restraining it effectually in future.

With the nations of Europe, in general, our friendship and intercourse are undisturbed, and from the governments of the belligerent powers especially, we continue to receive those friendly manifestations which are justly due to an honest neutrality, and to such good offices consistent with that as we have opportunities of rendering.

The activity and success of the small force employed in the Mediterranean in the early part of the present year, the reinforcements sent into that sea, and the energy of the officers having command in the several vessels, will, I trust, by the sufferings of war, reduce the barbarians of Tripoli to the desire of peace on proper terms.

The Bey of Tunis having made requisitions unauthorized by our treaty, their rejection has produced from him some expressions of discontent. But to those who expect us to calculate whether a compliance with unjust demands will not cost us less than a war, we must leave as a question of calculation for them; also, whether to retire from unjust demands will not cost them less than a war. We can do to each other very sensible injuries by war; but the mutual advantages of peace make that the best interest of both.

In pursuance of the act providing for the temporary government of Louisiana, the necessary officers for the Territory of Orleans were appointed in due time, to commence the exercise of their functions on the first day of October. The distance, however, of some of them, and indispensable previous arrangements, may have retarded its commencement in some of its parts; the form of government thus provided having been considered but as temporary, and open to such future improvements as further information of the circumstances of our brethren there might suggest, it will of course be subject to your consideration.

The act of Congress of February 28, 1803, for building and employing a number of gunboats, is now in a course of execution to the extent there provided for. The obstacle to naval enterprise which vessels of this construction offer for our seaport towns; their utility towards supporting, within our waters, the authority of the laws; the promptness with which they will be manned by the seamen and militia of the place in the moment they are wanting; the facility of their assembling from different parts of the coast to any point where they are required in greater force than ordinary; the economy of their maintenance and preservation from decay when not in actual service; and the competence of our finances to this defensive provision, without any new burden, are considerations which will have due weight with Congress in deciding on the expediency of adding to their number from year to year, as experience shall test their utility, until all our important harbors, by these and auxiliary means, shall be secured against insult and opposition to the laws.

The state of our finances continues to fulfil out expectations. Eleven millions and a half of dollars, received in the course of the year ending the 30th of September last, have enabled us, after meeting all the ordinary expenses of the year, to pay upwards of three million six hundred thousand dollars of the public debt, exclusive of interest. This payment, with those of the two preceding years, has extinguished upwards of twelve millions of the principal and a greater sum of interest within that period; and, by a proportionate diminution of interest, renders already sensible the effect of the growing sum yearly applicable to the discharge of the principal.

These, fellow-citizens, are the principal matters which I have thought it necessary, at this time, to communicate for your consideration and attention. Some others will be laid before you in the course of the session; but, in the discharge of the great duties confided to you by our country, you will take a broader view of the field of legislation. Whether the great interests of agriculture, manufactures, commerce, or navigation, can, within the pale of your constitutional powers, be aided in any of their relations; whether laws are provided in all cases, where they are wanting; whether those provided are exactly what they should be; whether any abuses take place in their administration, or in that of the public revenues; whether the organization of the public agents, or of the public force, is perfect in all its parts: in fine, whether any thing can be done to advance the general good, or questions within the limits of your functions, which will necessarily occupy your attention. In these and all other matters which you in your wisdom may propose for the good of our country, you may count with assurance on my hearty co-operation and faithful execution.

TH. JEFFERSON.

NOVEMBER 8, 1804.

The message was read, and with the documents therein referred to, ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

FRIDAY, November 9.

THOMAS SUMTER, from the State of South Carolina, attended.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House have appointed the Rev. WILLIAM BENTLEY a chaplain to Congress on their part during the present session.

MONDAY, November 12.

WILLIAM COCKE, from the State of Tennessee, and DAVID STONE, from the State of North Carolina, severally attended.

THURSDAY, November 15.

SAMUEL MACLAY, from the State of Pennsylvania, and JOHN SMITH, from the State of New York, severally attended.

TUESDAY, November 20.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that the House have passed a “resolution expressive of the sense of Congress of the gallant conduct of Captain Stephen Decatur, the officers and crew of the United States ketch Intrepid, in attacking in the harbor of Tripoli, and destroying a Tripolitan frigate of forty-four guns,” in which they desire the concurrence of the Senate.

The resolution last mentioned was read and passed to the second reading.

THURSDAY, November 22.

The resolution of the House of Representatives expressive of the sense of Congress of the gallant conduct of Capt. Stephen Decatur, the officers and crew of the United States ketch Intrepid, was read the second time, and referred to Messrs. BRADLEY, BALDWIN, and GILES, to consider and report thereon to the Senate.

FRIDAY, November 23.

The PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the credentials of JAMES A. BAYARD, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Delaware, in place of WILLIAM HILL WELLS, resigned, and the credentials were read.

SAMUEL L. MITCHILL, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of New York, in place of John Armstrong, whose seat has become vacant by his mission to France, took his seat in the Senate, and produced his credentials, which were read, and the oath was administered to him by the PRESIDENT, as the law prescribes.

FRIDAY, November 30.

JOHN SMITH, from the State of Ohio, and JOHN BRECKENRIDGE, from the State of Kentucky, severally attended.

MONDAY, December 3.

BENJAMIN HOWLAND, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Rhode Island, in the place of Samuel J. Potter, deceased, took his seat and produced his credentials; which were read, and the oath was administered to him by the PRESIDENT, as the law prescribes.

TUESDAY, December 4.

JAMES JACKSON, from the State of Georgia, attended.

THURSDAY, December 6.

JOSEPH ANDERSON, from the State of Tennessee, attended.

MONDAY, December 17.

The credentials of WILLIAM B. GILES, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the room of Wilson C. Nicholas, resigned, and the credentials of ANDREW MOORE, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the room of Abraham B. Venable, resigned, were severally read, and the oath was administered to them, respectively, as the law prescribes.

WEDNESDAY, December 26.

JOHN BROWN, from the State of Kentucky, attended.

MONDAY, January 7, 1805.

The letter of PIERCE BUTLER, Esq., announcing the resignation of his seat in the Senate, was read.

MONDAY, January 14.

Mourning for the Honorable Mr. Potter.

On motion, it was

Resolved, That the members of the Senate, from a sincere desire of showing every mark of respect to the Honorable SAMUEL J. POTTER, deceased, late a member thereof, will go into mourning for him one month, by the usual mode of wearing a crape round the left arm.[13]

TUESDAY, January 15.

The VICE PRESIDENT being absent, the Senate proceeded to the choice of a President pro tempore, as the constitution provides, and the Honorable JOSEPH ANDERSON was elected.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States and acquaint him that, the VICE-PRESIDENT being absent, the Senate have elected the Honorable JOSEPH ANDERSON President of the Senate pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary make a like communication to the House of Representatives.

JAMES A. BAYARD, from the State of Delaware, attended. His credentials having been presented and read on the 23d of November last, the oath was administered to him by the President, as the law prescribes, and he took his seat in the Senate.

THURSDAY, January 17.

General Moses Hazen.

The bill entitled “An act for the relief of Charlotte Hazen, widow and relict of the late Brigadier General Moses Hazen,” was read the third time, further amended, and the blank filled with the words “two hundred;” and on the question, Shall this bill pass as amended? it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 20, nays 8, as follows:

Yeas.--Messrs. Anderson, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Howland, Logan, Maclay, Mitchill, Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Vermont, Stone, Sumter, Worthington, and Wright.

Nays.--Messrs. Adams, Baldwin, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, and Tracy.

So it was Resolved, That this bill do pass as amended.

MONDAY, January 21.

African Slavery.

Mr. LOGAN presented a petition signed Thomas Morris, clerk, on behalf of the meeting of the representatives of the people called Quakers, in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, &c., stating that the petitioners, from a sense of religious duty, had again come forward, to plead the cause of their oppressed and degraded fellow-men of the African race; and on the question, Shall this petition be received? it passed in the affirmative--yeas 19, nays 9, as follows:

Yeas.--Messrs. Adams, Bayard, Brown, Condit, Franklin, Hillhouse, Howland, Logan, Maclay, Mitchill, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, Stone, Sumter, White, and Worthington.

Nays.--Messrs. Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Cocke, Jackson, Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, and Wright.

So the petition was read.

TUESDAY, January 29.

Government of the Territory of Orleans.

Mr. GILES, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 4th instant, the petition of the merchants, planters, and other inhabitants of Louisiana, reported a bill further providing for the government of the Territory of Orleans; and the bill was read, and ordered to the second reading.

The bill is as follows:

A Bill further providing for the government of the Territory of Orleans.

Be it enacted, &c., That the President of the United States be and he is hereby authorized to establish within the Territory of Orleans, a government in all respects similar (except as is herein otherwise provided) to that now exercised in the Mississippi Territory, and shall, in the recess of the Senate, but to be nominated at their next meeting, for their advice and consent, appoint all the officers necessary therein, in conformity with the ordinance of Congress, made on the 20th day of July, 1787, and that from and after the establishment of the said government, the inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans shall be entitled to and enjoy all the rights, privileges, and advantages, secured by the said ordinance, and now enjoyed by the people of the Mississippi Territory.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That so much of the said ordinance of Congress as relates to the organization of a General Assembly, and prescribes the power thereof, shall, from and after the ---- day of ---- next, be in force in the said Territory of Orleans; and in order to carry the same into operation, the Governor of the said Territory shall cause to be elected twenty-five representatives, for which purpose he shall lay off the said Territory into convenient election districts, on or before the ---- day of ---- next, and give due notice thereof throughout the same and first appoint the most convenient place, within each of the said districts, for holding the elections; and shall nominate a proper officer or officers to preside at and conduct the same, and to return to him the names of the persons who may have been duly elected. All subsequent elections shall be regulated by the Legislature; and the number of representatives shall be determined, and the apportionment made in the manner prescribed by the said ordinance.

Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the representatives to be chosen as aforesaid, shall be convened by the Governor, in the city of Orleans, on the ---- day of ---- next. The General Assembly shall meet at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the ---- Monday in ---- annually, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. Neither House, during the session, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two branches are sitting.

Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That the laws in force in the said Territory, at the commencement of this act, and not inconsistent with the provisions thereof, shall continue in force, until altered, modified, or repealed by the Legislature.

Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That the second paragraph of the said ordinance, which regulates the descent and distribution of estates; and also the sixth article of compact which is annexed to and makes part of said ordinance, are hereby declared not to extend to, but are excluded from all operation within the said Territory of Orleans.

Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That the Governor, Secretary, and Judges, to be appointed by virtue of this act, shall be severally allowed the same compensation which is now allowed to the Governor, Secretary, and Judges, of the Territory of Orleans. And all the additional officers authorized by this act shall respectively receive the same compensations for their services, as are by law established for similar offices in the Mississippi Territory, to be paid quarterly out of the revenues of import and tonnage, accruing within the said Territory of Orleans.

Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That whenever it shall be ascertained by an actual census or enumeration of the inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans, taken by proper authority, that the number of inhabitants included therein shall amount to at least ---- thousand souls, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons, the inhabitants of the said Territory, upon application to Congress for that purpose, and upon producing satisfactory proof that the number of souls included therein, ascertained as aforesaid, does actually amount to at least ---- thousand, shall thereupon be authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State government, and be admitted into the Union upon the footing of the original States, in all respects whatever, conformably to the provisions of the third article of the Treaty concluded at Paris, on the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States and the French Republic: Provided, That the constitution so to be established, shall be republican, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, nor inconsistent with the ordinance of the late Congress, passed the 13th day of July, 1787, so far as the same is made applicable to the Territorial government hereby authorized to be established: Provided, however, That Congress shall be at liberty, at any time prior to the admission of the inhabitants of the said Territory to the rights of a separate State, to alter the boundaries thereof as they may judge proper: except only, that no alteration shall be made which shall procrastinate the period for the admission of the inhabitants thereof to the rights of a State Government, according to the provision of this act.

Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That so much of an act entitled, “An act erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof,” as is repugnant with this act, shall, from and after the ---- day of ---- next, be repealed.

WEDNESDAY, January 30.

Army Uniform.

The PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the petition of Andrew Jackson, Major General, and sundry other militia officers and other citizens of the State of Tennessee, praying Congress to amend the articles and rules for the future government of the army, in respect to certain parts of their dress and uniform; and, on the question, Shall this petition be referred to the committee appointed on the 25th instant, who have under consideration the bill, entitled “An act for establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States?” it passed in the affirmative--yeas 16, nays 15, as follows:

Yeas.--Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Bayard, Bradley, Cocke, Condit, Franklin, Hillhouse, Maclay, Mitchill, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Stone, and Worthington.

Nays.--Messrs. Breckenridge, Brown, Dayton, Giles, Howland, Jackson, Logan, Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, Sumter, White, and Wright.

THURSDAY, January 31.

JOHN GAILLARD, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, in the room of Pierce Butler, resigned, took his seat in the Senate, and the oath prescribed was administered to him by the PRESIDENT.[14]

TUESDAY, February 12.

Opening and Counting Votes for President and Vice President.

Resolved, That the Senate will be ready to receive the House of Representatives in the Senate Chamber, on Wednesday the 13th instant, February, at noon, for the purpose of being present at the opening and counting the votes for PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. That one person be appointed a teller on the part of the Senate, to make a list of the votes for President and Vice President of the United States, as they shall be declared, and that the result shall be delivered to the President of the Senate, who shall announce the state of the vote, which shall be entered on the Journals, and, if it shall appear that a choice hath been made agreeably to the constitution, such entry on the Journals shall be deemed a sufficient declaration thereof.

Ordered, That the Secretary do carry this resolution to the House of Representatives.

WEDNESDAY, February 13.

Counting of Electoral Votes for President and Vice President.

About twelve o’clock the Senators took their seats; and immediately after the SPEAKER and members of the House of Representatives entered; the SPEAKER and Clerk occupying seats on the floor on the right side of the PRESIDENT of the Senate, and the members of the House being seated in front.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH, teller on the part of the Senate, and Mr. JOSEPH CLAY, and Mr. ROGER GRISWOLD, tellers on the part of the House, took seats at a table placed in front of the Chair, in the area between the Senate and House.

The Secretary of the Senate read the resolutions of the two Houses, previously agreed to.

The PRESIDENT (Mr. BURR) stated that, pursuant to law, there had been transmitted to him several packets, which, from the endorsements upon them, appeared to be the votes of the Electors of a President and Vice President; that the returns forwarded by the mail, as well as the duplicates sent by special messengers, had been received by him in due time. You will now proceed, gentlemen, said he, to count the votes as the constitution and laws direct; adding that, perceiving no cause for preference in the order of opening the returns, he would pursue a geographical arrangement, beginning with the Northern States.

The PRESIDENT then proceeded to break the seals of the respective returns, handing each return, and its accompanying duplicate, as the seals of each were broken, to the tellers through, the Secretary; Mr. S. SMITH reading aloud the returns, and the attestations of the appointment of the Electors, and Mr. J. CLAY and Mr. R. GRISWOLD comparing them with the duplicate return lying before them.

According to which enumeration, the following appeared to be the result.

------------------+----------------------+----------------- | President. | V. Pres’dt +-----------+----------+---------+------- STATES. | Th. | C. C. | Geo. |Rufus |Jefferson. |Pinckney. |Clinton. |King. ------------------+-----------+----------+---------+------- New Hampshire | 7 | - | 7 | Massachusetts | 19 | - | 19 | [A]Rhode Island | 4 | - | 4 | Connecticut | - | - | - | 9 Vermont | 6 | - | 6 | New York | 19 | - | 19 | New Jersey | 8 | - | 8 | Pennsylvania | 20 | - | 20 | Delaware | - | 3 | - | 3 Maryland | 9 | 2 | 9 | 2 Virginia | 24 | - | 24 | North Carolina | 14 | - | 14 | South Carolina | 10 | - | 10 | [B]Georgia | 6 | - | 6 | Tennessee | 5 | - | 5 | Kentucky | 8 | - | 8 | [C]Ohio | 3 | - | 3 | ------------------+-----------+----------+---------+------- Total | 162 | 14 | 162 | 14 ------------------+-----------+----------+---------+-------

[A] In this return, after stating the whole number of votes given for Thomas Jefferson and George Clinton, each Elector certifies distinctly his vote for Thomas Jefferson as President, and for George Clinton, as Vice President.

[B] The return certifies the votes to have been given as stated in an enclosed paper.

[C] In this return, the votes are not certified to have been given by ballot, but agreeably to law.

After the returns had been all examined, without any objection having been made to receiving any of the votes, Mr. S. SMITH, on behalf of the tellers, communicated to the PRESIDENT the foregoing result, which was read from the Chair; when, the VICE PRESIDENT said, upon this report it becomes my duty to declare, agreeably to the constitution, that THOMAS JEFFERSON is elected President of the United States, for the term of four years from the third day of March next, and that GEORGE CLINTON is elected Vice President of the United States, for the term of four years from the third day of March next.

[Previous to the above proceedings, a short debate arose in the Senate on the keeping of the doors open or shut during the counting of the votes. Mr. WRIGHT submitted a motion for their being kept open, which, after some opposition, was agreed to.]

SATURDAY, February 16.

Absent Members.

A motion was made,

“That a call of the Senate take place every morning at the hour to which the Senate is adjourned, and that absent members be not permitted to take their seats until a satisfactory excuse be made, or the opinion of the Senate be had thereon.”

WEDNESDAY, February 20.

Tripolitan War.

The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I communicate, for the information of Congress, a letter of September 18th, from Commodore Preble, giving a detailed account of the transactions of the vessels under his command, from July the 9th, to the 10th of September last past.

The energy and judgment displayed by this excellent officer, through the whole course of the service lately confided to him, and the zeal and valor of his officers and men, in the several enterprises executed by them, cannot fail to give high satisfaction to Congress and their country, of whom they have deserved well.

TH. JEFFERSON.

FEBRUARY 20, 1805.

FRIDAY, February 22.

The bill freeing from postage all letters and packets to and from AARON BURR, was read the second time.

SATURDAY, February 23.

Mr. LOGAN gave notice that he should, on Monday next, ask leave to bring in a bill to prohibit the granting clearances to vessels bound to St. Domingo.

MONDAY, February 25.

Commodore Preble.

Mr. JACKSON laid on the table a motion expressive of the high sense Congress entertain of the gallant and meritorious services of Commodore Edward Preble, and the officers, seamen, and marines, under his command; and the motion was read; and it was agreed that it be referred to a select committee.

WEDNESDAY, February 27.

Franking Privilege to Aaron Burr.

The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill freeing from postage all letters and packets to and from AARON BURR; and, on the question, Shall this bill pass to the third reading? it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 18, nays 9, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Jackson, Mitchill, Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Ellery, Hillhouse, Howland, Logan, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Sumter, and Worthington.[15]

THURSDAY, February 28.

The VICE PRESIDENT being indisposed, the Senate proceeded to the choice of a President pro tempore as the constitution provides, and the Hon. JOSEPH ANDERSON was elected.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States, and acquaint him that, the VICE PRESIDENT being absent, the Senate have elected the Hon. JOSEPH ANDERSON President of the Senate pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary make a like communication to the House of Representatives.

The following Messages were received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I now lay before Congress a statement of the militia of the United States, according to the returns last received from the several States. It will be perceived that some of these are not recent dates, and that from the States of Maryland, Delaware, and Tennessee, no returns are stated. As far as appears from our records, none were ever rendered from either of these States.

TH. JEFFERSON.

FEBRUARY 28, 1805.

* * * * *

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I now render to Congress the account of the fund established by the act of May 1st, 1802, for defraying the contingent charges of Government. No occasion having arisen for making use of any part of the balance of $18,560, unexpended on the 31st day of December, 1803, when the last account was rendered by Message, that balance has been carried to the credit of the surplus fund.

TH. JEFFERSON.

FEBRUARY 28, 1805.

The messages and documents therein referred to were severally read, and ordered to lie for consideration.

Franking Privilege to Col. Burr.

The bill freeing from postage all letters and packets to and from AARON BURR was read the third time; on motion to postpone the further consideration thereof until the first Monday in December next, it passed in the negative--yeas 12, nays 18, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Baldwin, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Howland, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Stone, and Sumter.

NAYS.--Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Gaillard, Jackson, Mitchill, Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, Worthington, and Wright.

On the question, Shall this bill pass? it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 18, nays 13, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Gaillard, Jackson, Mitchill, Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, White, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Baldwin, Ellery, Franklin, Hillhouse, Howland, Logan, Maclay, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Stone, Sumter, and Worthington.

So it was Resolved, that this bill do pass, that it be engrossed, and that the title thereof be “An act freeing from postage all letters and packets to and from Aaron Burr.”

SATURDAY, March 2.

Resignation of Vice President Burr.

BURR’S ADDRESS.

The VICE PRESIDENT took an affectionate leave of the Senate, in substance as follows:

“Mr. BURR began by saying, that he had intended to pass the day with them, but the increase of a slight indisposition (sore throat) had determined him then to take leave of them. He touched lightly on some of the rules and orders of the House, and recommended, in one or two points, alterations, of which he briefly explained the reasons and principles.

“He said he was sensible he must at times have wounded the feelings of individual members. He had ever avoided entering into explanations at the time, because a moment of irritation was not a moment for explanation; because his position (being in the chair) rendered it impossible to enter into explanations without obvious danger of consequences which might hazard the dignity of the Senate, or prove disagreeable and injurious in more than one point of view; that he had, therefore, preferred to leave to their reflections his justification; that, on his part, he had no injuries to complain of; if any had been done or attempted, he was ignorant of the authors; and if he had ever heard, he had forgotten, for, he thanked God, he had no memory for injuries.

“He doubted not but that they had found occasion to observe, that to be prompt was not therefore to be precipitate; and that to act without delay was not always to act without reflection; that error was often to be preferred to indecision; that his errors, whatever they might have been, were those of rule and principle, and not of caprice; that it could not be deemed arrogance in him to say that, in his official conduct, he had known no party, no cause, no friend; that if, in the opinion of any, the discipline which had been established approached to rigor, they would at least admit that it was uniform and indiscriminate.

“He further remarked, that the ignorant and unthinking affected to treat as unnecessary and fastidious a rigid attention to rules and decorum; but he thought nothing trivial which touched, however remotely, the dignity of that body; and he appealed to their experience for the justice of this sentiment, and urged them in language the most impressive, and in a manner the most commanding, to avoid the smallest relaxation of the habits which he had endeavored, to inculcate and establish.

“But he challenged their attention to considerations more momentous than any which regarded merely their personal honor and character--the preservation of law, of liberty, and the constitution. This House, said he, is a sanctuary; a citadel of law, of order, and of liberty; and it is here--it is here, in this exalted refuge; here, if any where, will resistance be made to the storms of political frenzy and the silent arts of corruption; and if the constitution be destined ever to perish by the sacrilegious hands of the demagogue or the usurper, which God avert, its expiring agonies will be witnessed on this floor.

“He then adverted to those affecting sentiments which attended a final separation--a dissolution, perhaps for ever, of those associations which he hoped had been mutually satisfactory. He consoled himself, however, and them, with the reflection, that, though they separated, they would be engaged in the common cause of disseminating principles of freedom and social order. He should always regard the proceedings of that body with interest and with solicitude. He should feel for their honor and the national honor so intimately connected with it, and took his leave with expressions of personal respect, and with prayers, and wishes,” &c.[16]

Whereupon, the Senate proceeded to the choice of a President pro tempore, as the constitution provides; and the Honorable JOSEPH ANDERSON was elected.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States, and acquaint him that, the VICE PRESIDENT being absent, the Senate have elected the Honorable JOSEPH ANDERSON President of the Senate pro tempore.

Ordered, That the Secretary notify the same to the House of Representatives.

Resolved unanimously, That the thanks of the Senate be presented to AARON BURR, in testimony of the impartiality, dignity, and ability, with which he has presided over their deliberations, and of their entire approbation of his conduct in discharge of the arduous and important duties assigned him as President of the Senate.

Ordered, That Messrs. SMITH of Maryland, and WHITE, be a committee to communicate to him this resolution.

SUNDAY, March 3.

Reply of Vice President Burr to the Vote of Thanks.

Mr. SMITH of Maryland, from the committee appointed for that purpose, reported that they had waited on the VICE PRESIDENT, agreeably to the resolution of yesterday, to which he made the following reply:

To the Senate of the United States:

GENTLEMEN: Next to the satisfaction derived from the consciousness of having discharged my duty, is that which arises from the favorable opinion of those who have been the constant witnesses of my official conduct; and the value of this flattering mark of their esteem is greatly enhanced by the promptitude and unanimity with which it is offered.

I pray you to accept my respectful acknowledgments, and the assurance of my inviolable attachment to the interests and dignity of the Senate.

A. BURR.

MARCH 3, 1805.

Adjournment.

On motion,

Resolved, That Messrs. ADAMS, and SMITH of Maryland, be a committee on the part of the Senate, with such as the House of Representatives may join, to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that, unless he may have any further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress, they are ready to adjourn.

Ordered, That the Secretary acquaint the House of Representatives therewith, and desire the appointment of a committee on their part.

Mr. ADAMS, from the committee, reported that they had waited upon the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, who informed them that he had no further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress.

The Secretary was then directed to inform the House of Representatives that the Senate, having finished the business before them, are about to adjourn. Whereupon, the Senate adjourned.

MARCH 4, 1805.

Inaugural Speech.

On Monday, at 12 o’clock, THOMAS JEFFERSON, President of the United States, took the oath of office, and delivered the following Inaugural Speech in the Senate Chamber, in the presence of the members of the two Houses, and a large concourse of citizens:

PROCEEDING, fellow-citizens, to that qualification which the constitution requires before my entrance on the charge conferred on me, it is my duty to express the deep sense I entertain of this new proof of confidence from my fellow-citizens at large, and the zeal with which it inspires me so to conduct myself as may best satisfy their just expectations.

On taking this station, on a former occasion, I declared the principles on which I believed it my duty to administer the affairs of our commonwealth. My conscience tells me I have, on every occasion, acted up to that declaration, according to its obvious import, and to the understanding of every candid mind.

In the transaction of your foreign affairs, we have endeavored to cultivate the friendship of all nations, and especially of those with which we have the most important relations. We have done them justice on all occasions; favor, where favor was lawful, and cherished mutual interests and intercourse on fair and equal terms. We are firmly convinced, and we act on that conviction, that with nations, as with individuals, our interests, soundly calculated, will ever be found inseparable from our moral duties; and history-bears witness to the fact, that a just nation is trusted on its word, when recourse is had to armaments and wars to bridle others.

At home, fellow-citizens, you best know whether we have done well or ill. The suppression of unnecessary offices, of useless establishments and expenses, enabled us to discontinue our internal taxes. These, covering our land with officers,[17] and opening our doors to their intrusions, had already begun that process of domiciliary vexation, which, once entered, is scarcely to be restrained from reaching, successively, every article of property and produce. If, among these taxes, some minor ones fell, which had not been inconvenient, it was because their amount would not have paid the officers who collected them; and because, if they had any merit, the State authorities might adopt them instead of others less approved.

The remaining revenue, on the consumption of foreign articles, is paid chiefly by those who can afford to add foreign luxuries to domestic comforts. Being collected on our seaboard and frontiers only, and incorporated with the transactions of our mercantile citizens, it may be the pleasure and the pride of an American to ask, what farmer, what mechanic, what laborer, ever sees a tax-gatherer of the United States? These contributions enable us to support the current expenses of the Government; to fulfil contracts with foreign nations; to extinguish the native right of soil within our limits; to extend those limits; and to apply such a surplus to our public debts, as places, at a short day, their final redemption; and that redemption, once effected, the revenue thereby liberated may, by a just repartition of it among the States, and a corresponding amendment of the constitution, be applied, in time of peace, to rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufactures, education, and other great objects, within each State.[18] In time of war, if injustice by ourselves, or others, must sometimes produce war, increased, as the same revenue will be, by increased population and consumption, and aided by other resources reserved for that crisis, it may meet, within the year, all the expenses of the year, without encroaching on the rights of future generations, by burdening them with the debts of the past. War will then be but a suspension of useful works; and a return to a state of peace, a return to the progress of improvement.

I have said, fellow-citizens, that the income reserved had enabled us to extend our limits; but that extension may possibly pay for itself before we are called on; and, in the mean time, may keep down the accruing interest: in all events, it will replace the advances we shall have made. I know that the acquisition of Louisiana has been disapproved by some, from a candid apprehension that the enlargement of our territory would endanger its union. But who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate effectively? The larger our association, the less will it be shaken by local passions: and, in any view, is it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled by our own brethren and children, than by strangers of another family? With which should we be most likely to live in harmony and friendly intercourse?

In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by the constitution independent of the powers of the General Government. I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the religious exercises suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution found them, under the direction and discipline of the Church or State authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.

The aboriginal inhabitants of these countries I have regarded with the commiseration their history inspires. Endowed with the faculties and the rights of men, breathing an ardent love of liberty and independence, and occupying a country which left them no desire but to be undisturbed, the stream of overflowing population from other regions directed itself on these shores. Without power to divert, or habits to contend against it, they have been overwhelmed by the current, or driven before it. Now reduced within limits too narrow for the hunter state, humanity enjoins us to teach them agriculture and the domestic arts; to encourage them to that industry which alone can enable them to maintain their place in existence; and to prepare them in time for that state of society which, to bodily comforts, adds the improvement of the mind and morals. We have therefore liberally furnished them with the implements of husbandry and household use; we have placed among them instructors in the arts of first necessity; and they are covered with the ægis of the law against aggressors from among ourselves.

But the endeavors to enlighten them on the fate which awaits their present course of life, to induce them to exercise their reason, follow its dictates, and change their pursuits with the change of circumstances, have powerful obstacles to encounter. They are combated by the habits of their bodies, prejudices of their minds, ignorance, pride, and the influence of interested and crafty individuals among them, who feel themselves something in the present order of things, and fear to become nothing in any other. These persons inculcate a sanctimonious reverence for the customs of their ancestors; that whatsoever they did, must be done through all time; that reason is a false guide, and to advance under its counsel in their physical, moral, or political condition, is perilous innovation; that their duty is to remain as their Creator made them; ignorance being safety, and knowledge full of danger. In short, my friends, among them, also, is seen the action and counteraction of good sense and of bigotry. They, too, have their anti-philosophists, who find an interest in keeping things in their present state; who dread reformation, and exert all their faculties to maintain the ascendency of habit over the duty of improving our reason, and obeying its mandates.

In giving these outlines, I do not mean, fellow-citizens, to arrogate to myself the merit of the measures--that is due, in the first place, to the reflecting character of our citizens at large, who, by the weight of public opinion, influence and strengthen the public measures. It is due to the sound discretion with which they select from among themselves those to whom they confide the legislative duties. It is due to the zeal and wisdom of the characters thus selected, who lay the foundations of public happiness in wholesome laws, the execution of which alone remains for others; and it is due to the able and faithful auxiliaries, whose patriotism has associated them with me in the executive functions.

During this course of administration, and in order to disturb it, the artillery of the press has been levelled against us, charged with whatsoever its licentiousness could devise or dare. These abuses of an institution, so important to freedom and science, are deeply to be regretted, inasmuch as they tend to lessen its usefulness, and to sap its safety. They might, indeed, have been corrected by the wholesome punishments reserved to, and provided by, the laws of the several States against falsehood and defamation; but public duties, more urgent, press on the time of public servants, and the offenders have therefore been left to find their punishment in the public indignation.

Nor was it uninteresting to the world, that an experiment should be fairly and fully made, whether freedom of discussion, unaided by power, is not sufficient for the propagation and protection of truth; Whether a Government, conducting itself in the true spirit of its constitution, with zeal and purity, and doing no act which it would be unwilling the whole world should witness, can be written down by falsehood and defamation. The experiment has been tried. You have witnessed the scene. Our fellow-citizens looked on cool and collected. They saw the latent source from which these outrages proceeded. They gathered around their public functionaries; and when the constitution called them to the decision by suffrage, they pronounced their verdict honorable to those who had served them, and consolatory to the friend of man, who believes that he may be trusted with the control of his own affairs.

No inference is here intended, that the laws provided by the States against false and defamatory publications, should not be enforced. He who has time, renders a service to public morals and public tranquillity, in reforming these abuses by the salutary coercions of the law. But the experiment is noted to prove, that, since truth and reason have maintained their ground against false opinions, in league with false facts, the press, confined to truth, needs no other legal restraint. The public judgment will correct false reasonings and opinions, on a full hearing of all parties; and no other definite line can be drawn between the inestimable liberty of the press, and its demoralizing licentiousness. If there be still improprieties which this rule would not restrain, its supplement must be sought in the censorship of public opinion.

Contemplating the union of sentiment now manifested so generally, as auguring harmony and happiness to our future course, I offer to our country sincere congratulations. With those, too, not yet rallied to the same point, the disposition to do so is gaining strength. Facts are piercing through the veil drawn over them: and our doubting brethren will at length see that the mass of their fellow-citizens, with whom they cannot yet resolve to act, as to principles and measures, think as they think, and desire what they desire: that our wish, as well as theirs, is, that the public efforts may be directed honestly to the public good; that peace be cultivated; civil and religious liberty unassailed; law and order preserved; equality of rights maintained; and that state of property, equal or unequal, which results to every man from his own industry, or that of his father. When satisfied of these views, it is not in human nature that they should not approve and support them. In the mean time, let us cherish them with patient affection; let us do them justice, and more than justice, in all competitions of interest; and we need not doubt that truth, reason, and their own interests, will at length prevail; will gather them into the fold of their country, and will complete that entire union of opinion which gives to a nation the blessing of harmony, and the benefit of all its strength.

I shall now enter on the duties to which my fellow-citizens have again called me, and shall proceed in the spirit of those principles which they have approved. I fear not that any motives of interest may lead me astray. I am sensible of no passion which could seduce me, knowingly, from the path of justice; but the weaknesses of human nature, and the limits of my own understanding, will produce errors of judgment, sometimes injurious to your interests. I shall need, therefore, all the indulgence which I have heretofore experienced from my constituents. The want of it will certainly not lessen with increasing years. I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are; who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land, and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life; who has covered our infancy with His providence, and our riper years with His wisdom and power; and to whose goodness I ask you to join in supplications with me, that He will so enlighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper their measures, that, whatsoever they do, shall result in your good, and shall secure to you the peace, friendship, and approbation of all nations.

After which, the Chief Justice of the United States administered to him the oath of office prescribed by the constitution; and the oath was, in like manner, administered to GEORGE CLINTON, Vice President of the United States; after which, the PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT retired.

Trial of Judge Chase.

TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPEACHED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS, BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

[TAKEN IN SHORT-HAND BY SAMUEL H. SMITH AND THOMAS LLOYD.]

This trial was one of the events of the day, greatly exciting party passions, and taking a scope which gives it historic interest, both for the persons concerned, and the matters involved. The account of it is greatly abridged here, but it is believed all is still retained which is necessary to the full knowledge of the case, and to a just conception of the skill, learning, eloquence and ability with which the trial (both the prosecution and the defence) was conducted. The formal charges are omitted, as being sufficiently shown in the pleadings; the testimony of witnesses limited to their principal statements; and the speeches only given in their essential parts.

[The following report of the trial of SAMUEL CHASE has been drawn up with the greatest care. To guard against misconception or omission, two individuals, one of whom is a professional stenographer, were constantly engaged during the whole course of the trial; and the arguments of the managers and counsel have in most instances, and whenever it was attainable, been revised by them. It is with some satisfaction that the editor of this impression is enabled, under these circumstances, to submit to the public a tract, whose fidelity and comprehensiveness, he hopes will amply reward the interest so deeply excited by the progress and issue of this important trial.--Editor National Intelligencer.]

MEASURES PRELIMINARY TO THE TRIAL.

On the fifth day of January 1804, Mr. J. RANDOLPH, a member of the House of Representatives of the United States, rose and addressed that body to the following effect:

He observed “That no people were more fully impressed with the importance of preserving unpolluted the fountain of justice than the citizens of these States. With this view the Constitution of the United States, and of many of the States also, had rendered the magistrates who decided judicially between the State and the offending citizens, and between man and man, more independent than those of any other country in the world, in the hope that every inducement, whether of intimidation or seduction, which should cause them to swerve from the duty assigned to them, might be removed. But such was the frailty of human nature, that there was no precaution by which our integrity and honor could be preserved, in case we were deficient in that duty which we owed to ourselves. In consequence, sir,” said Mr. Randolph, “of this unfortunate condition of man, we have been obliged, but yesterday, to prefer an accusation against a judge of the United States, who has been found wanting in his duty to himself and his country. At the last session of Congress, a gentleman from Pennsylvania did, in his place, (on a bill to amend the judicial system of the United States,) state certain facts in relation to the official conduct of an eminent judicial character, which I then thought, and still think, the House bound to notice. But the lateness of the session (for we had, if I mistake not, scarce a fortnight remaining) precluding all possibility of bringing the subject to any efficient result, I did not then think proper to take any steps in the business. Finding my attention, however, thus drawn to a consideration of the character of the officer in question, I made it my business, considering it my duty, as well to myself as those whom I represent, to investigate the charges then made, and the official character of the judge, in general. The result having convinced me that there exists ground of impeachment against this officer, I demand an inquiry into his conduct, and therefore submit to the House the following resolution:

“Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of SAMUEL CHASE, one of the Associate Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, and to report their opinion, whether the said SAMUEL CHASE hath so acted in his judicial capacity as to require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House.”

A short debate immediately arose on this motion, which was advocated by Messrs. J. RANDOLPH, SMILIE, and J. CLAY; and opposed by Mr. ELLIOT. Several members supported a motion to postpone it until the ensuing day, which was superseded by an adjournment of the House.

The House, on the next day, resumed the consideration of Mr. RANDOLPH’s motion, which was supported by Mr. SMILIE, and, on the motion of Mr. LEIB, so amended as to embrace an inquiry into the official conduct of Richard Peters, district judge for the District of Pennsylvania. On the motion, thus amended, further debate arose, which occupied the greater part of this and the ensuing day. It was supported by Messrs. FINDLAY, JACKSON, NICHOLSON, HOLLAND, J. RANDOLPH, EUSTIS, EARLY, SMILIE, and EPPES; and opposed by Messrs. LOWNDES, R. GRISWOLD, ELLIOT, DENNIS, GRIFFIN, THATCHER, HUGER, and DANA. Some ineffectual attempts were made to amend the resolution, when the final question was taken on the resolution, as amended, in the following words:

“Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of Richard Peters, district judge of the district of Pennsylvania, and to report their opinion, whether the said Samuel Chase and Richard Peters, or either of them, have so acted in their judicial capacity, as to require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House:”

And resolved in the affirmative--yeas 81, nays 40.

Whereupon, Messrs. J. RANDOLPH, NICHOLSON, J. CLAY, EARLY, R. GRISWOLD, HUGER, and BOYLE, were appointed a committee pursuant to the foregoing resolution.

On the 10th of January, the committee were authorized by the House to send for persons, papers, and records; and on the 30th day of the same month they were authorized to cause to be printed such documents and papers as they might deem necessary, previous to their presentation to the House.

On the 6th day of March, Mr. RANDOLPH, in the name of the committee, made a report, “That in consequence of the evidence collected by them, in virtue of the powers with which they have been invested by the House, and which is hereunto subjoined, they are of opinion, 1st. That Samuel Chase, Esq., an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors.

“2d. That Richard Peters, district judge of the district of Pennsylvania, has not so acted in his judicial capacity as to require the interposition of the constitutional power of this House.”

This report, accompanied by a great mass of printed documents, embracing various depositions taken before the committee, as well as at a distance, was made the order of the day for the Monday following.

On that day the House took up the report, and after a short debate concurred in the first resolution by the following vote--yeas 73, nays 32, as follows:

YEAS.--Willis Alston, jun., Isaac Anderson, John Archer, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, William Blackledge, Walter Bowie, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, William Butler, Levi Casey, Thomas Claiborne, Joseph Clay, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Frederick Conrad, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, William Dickson, John B. Earle, Peter Early, James Elliot, William Findlay, John Fowler, James Gillespie, Peterson Goodwyn, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Hammond, James Holland, David Holmes, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, William McCreery, David Meriwether, Andrew Moore, Nicholas R. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun., Joseph H. Nicholson, Gideon Olin, John Patterson, John Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Cæsar A. Rodney, Thomas Sammons, Thomas Sanford, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, David Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Isaac Van Horne, Joseph B. Varnum, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Wynn, and Joseph Winston.

NAYS.--Simeon Baldwin, Silas Betton, John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggett, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, Thomas Dwight, Thomas Griffin, Gaylord Griswold, Roger Griswold, Seth Hastings, William Helms, Benjamin Huger, Joseph Lewis, jun., Henry W. Livingston, Thomas Lowndes, Nahum Mitchell, Thomas Plater, Samuel D. Purviance, John Cotton Smith, John Smith of Virginia, William Stedman, James Stevenson, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Samuel Thatcher, Killian K. Van Rensselaer, Peleg Wadsworth, and Lemuel Williams.

The second resolution was agreed to unanimously.

Whereupon, it was ordered, that Mr. JOHN RANDOLPH and Mr. EARLY be appointed a committee to go to the Senate, at the bar thereof, in the name of the House of Representatives, and of all the people of the United States, to impeach Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors; and acquaint the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles of impeachment against him, and make good the same. It was also ordered, that the committee do demand, that the Senate take order for the appearance of the said Samuel Chase, to answer to the said impeachment.

On the 13th of March, Messrs. J. RANDOLPH, NICHOLSON, J. CLAY, EARLY, and BOYLE, were appointed a committee to prepare and report articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase, and invested with power to send for persons, papers, and records.

On the 14th, a message was received from the Senate, notifying the House, that they would take proper order on the impeachment, of which due notice should be given to the House.

On the 26th, Mr. RANDOLPH, from the committee appointed for that purpose, reported articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase. No order was taken on the report during the remainder of the session, which terminated the next day.

At the ensuing session of Congress, on the 6th of November, 1804, on the motion of Mr. J. RANDOLPH, the articles of impeachment were referred to Messrs. J. RANDOLPH, J. CLAY, EARLY, BOYLE, and J. RHEA of Tennessee.

On the 30th of November, Mr. RANDOLPH reported articles of impeachment against Samuel Chase, in substance not dissimilar from those reported at the last session, with the addition of two new articles.

This report was made the order for the 3d of December. On that and the ensuing day the House took the articles into consideration, to all of which they agreed, according to the following votes:

Yeas. Nays. Art. 1 83 34 2 83 35 3 84 34 4 84 34 5 72 45 6 73 42 7 73 42 8 1st sec. 74 32 8 2nd sec. 78 32

On the 5th, the House proceeded to the choice, by ballot, of seven managers to conduct the impeachment; and on counting the votes, Messrs. J. RANDOLPH, RODNEY, NICHOLSON, EARLY, BOYLE, NELSON, and G. W. CAMPBELL, appeared to be elected.

On a subsequent day, Mr. NELSON having declined his appointment, on account of absence, Mr. CLARK was chosen in his place.

The following resolution was then adopted:

Resolved, That the articles agreed to by this House be exhibited in the name of themselves, and of all the people of the United States, against Samuel Chase, in maintenance of their impeachment against him, for high crimes and misdemeanors, be carried to the Senate by the managers appointed to conduct the said impeachment.

The Senate having appointed the 7th of December for receiving the articles of impeachment, the managers repaired on that day, at 1 o’clock, to the Senate Chamber. Having taken seats assigned them within the bar, and the Sergeant-at-Arms having proclaimed silence, Mr. J. RANDOLPH read the foregoing articles: whereupon the President of the Senate informed the managers that the Senate would take proper order on the subject of the impeachment, of which due notice should be given to the House of Representatives. The managers delivered the articles of impeachment at the table and withdrew.

On the 10th of December, the Senate, sitting as a High Court of Impeachments, adopted the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Secretary be directed to issue a summons to Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, to answer certain articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives on Friday last: That the said summons be returnable the 2d day of January, and he served at least fifteen days before the return day thereof.

On the 24th and 31st of December, the Senate adopted the following rules of proceeding, to be observed in cases of impeachment.

1. Whensoever the Senate shall receive notice from the House of Representatives, that managers are appointed on their part, to conduct an impeachment against any person, and are directed to carry such articles to the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate shall immediately inform the House of Representatives, that the Senate is ready to receive the managers for the purpose of exhibiting such articles of impeachment, agreeably to the said notice.

2. When the managers of an impeachment shall be introduced to the bar of the Senate, and shall have signified that they are ready to exhibit articles of impeachment against any person, the President of the Senate shall direct the Sergeant-at-Arms to make proclamation; who shall, after making proclamation, repeat the following words: “All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of imprisonment, while the grand inquest of the nation is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States, articles of impeachment against ---- ----;” after which the articles shall be exhibited, and then the President of the Senate shall inform the managers, that the Senate will take proper order on the subject of the impeachment, of which due notice shall be given to the House of Representatives.

3. A summons shall issue, directed to the person impeached, in the form following:

The United States of America, ss.

The Senate of the United States, to ----, greeting:

Whereas, the House of Representatives of the United States of America, did, on the ---- day of ----, exhibit to the Senate articles of impeachment against you, the said ----, in the words following, viz: [here recite the articles] and did demand that you the said ---- should be put to answer the accusations as set forth in said articles; and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments, might be thereupon had, as are agreeable to law and justice: You, the said ----, are therefore hereby summoned, to be, and appear before the Senate of the United States of America, at their Chamber in the City of Washington, on the ---- day of ----, then and there to answer to the said articles of impeachment, and then and there to abide by, obey, and perform such orders and judgments as the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Hereof you are not to fail.

Witness, ----, Vice President of the United States of America, and President of the Senate thereof, at the City of Washington, this ---- day of ----, in the year of our Lord ----, and of the Independence of the United States, the ----.

Which summons shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate, and sealed with their seal, and served by the Sergeant-at-Arms to the Senate, or by such other person as the Senate shall specially appoint for that purpose; who shall serve the same, pursuant to the directions given in the form next following:

4. A precept shall be endorsed on said writ of summons, in the form following, viz:

United States of America, ss.

The Senate of the United States, to ----, greeting:

You are hereby commanded to deliver to, and leave with ----, if to be found, a true and attested copy of the within writ of summons, together with a like copy of this precept, showing him both; or in case he cannot with convenience be found, you are to leave true and attested copies of the said summons and precept, at his usual place of residence, and in whichsoever way you perform the service, let it be done at least ---- days before the appearance day mentioned in said writ of summons. Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept, with your proceedings thereon endorsed, on or before the appearance day mentioned in said writ of summons.

Witness, ----, Vice President of the United States of America, and President of the Senate thereof, at the City of Washington, this ---- day of ----, in the year of our Lord ----, and of the Independence of the United States, the ----.

Which precept shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate, and sealed with their seal.

5. Subpœnas shall be issued by the Secretary of the Senate, upon the application of the managers of the impeachment, or of the party impeached, or his counsel, in the following form, to wit:

To ----, greeting:

You, and each of you, are hereby commanded to appear before the Senate of the United States, on the ---- day of ----, at the Senate Chamber, in the City of Washington, then and there to testify your knowledge in the cause which is before the Senate, in which the House of Representatives have impeached ----. Fail not.

Witness, ----, Vice President of the United States of America, and President of the Senate thereof, at the City of Washington, this ---- day of ----, in the year of our Lord ----, and of the Independence of the United States, the ----.

Which shall be signed by the Secretary of the Senate, and sealed with their seal.

Which subpœnas shall be directed, in every case, to the Marshal of the district, where such witnesses respectively reside, to serve and return.

6. The form of direction to the Marshal, for the service of the subpœna, shall be as follows:

The Senate of the United States of America, to the Marshal of the district of ----:

You are hereby commanded to serve and return the within subpœna, according to law.

Dated at Washington, this ---- day of ----, in the year of our Lord ----, and of the Independence of the United States, the ----.

Secretary of the Senate.

7. The President of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in the Senate Chamber, and all the forms of proceeding, while the Senate are sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment, and all forms during the trial, not otherwise specially provided for by the Senate.

8. He shall also be authorized to direct the employment of the Marshal of the District of Columbia, or any other person or persons, during the trial, to discharge such duties as may be prescribed by him.

9. At twelve o’clock of the day appointed for the return of the summons against the person impeached, the legislative and executive business of the Senate shall be suspended and the Secretary of the Senate shall administer an oath to the returning officer, in the form following, viz: “I, ----, do solemnly swear, that the return made and subscribed by me, upon the process issued on the ---- day of ----, by the Senate of the United States, against ----, is truly made, and that I have performed said services as therein described. So help me God.” Which oath shall be entered at large on the records.

10. The person impeached shall then be called to appear, and answer the articles of impeachment exhibited against him. If he appears, or any person for him, the appearance shall be recorded, stating particularly, if by himself, or if by agent or attorney; naming the person appearing, and the capacity in which he appears. If he does not appear, either personally, or by agent or attorney, the same shall be recorded.

11. At twelve o’clock of the day appointed for the trial of an impeachment, the Legislative and Executive business of the Senate shall be postponed. The Secretary shall then administer the following oath or affirmation to the President:

“You solemnly swear, or affirm, that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of ----, you will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

12. And the President shall administer the said oath or affirmation to each Senator present.

The Secretary shall then give notice to the House of Representatives, that the Senate is ready to proceed upon the impeachment of ----, in the Senate Chamber, which Chamber is prepared with accommodations for the reception of the House of Representatives.

13. Counsel for the parties shall be admitted to appear, and be heard upon an impeachment.

14. All motions made by the parties, or their counsel, shall be addressed to the President of the Senate, and if he shall require it, shall be committed to writing, and read at the Secretary’s table; and all decisions shall be had by yeas and nays, and without debate, which shall be entered on the records.

15. Witnesses shall be sworn in the following form, to wit: “You ---- do swear, (or affirm, as the case may be,) that the evidence you shall give in the case now depending between the United States and ----, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God.” Which oath shall be administered by the Secretary.

16. Witnesses shall be examined by the party producing them, and then cross-examined in the usual form.

17. If a Senator is called as a witness, he shall be sworn, and give his testimony standing in his place.

18. If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a witness, it shall be reduced to writing and put by the President.

19. At all times, whilst the Senate is sitting upon the trial of an impeachment, the doors of the Senate Chamber shall be kept open.

HIGH COURT OF IMPEACHMENTS.

WEDNESDAY, January 2, 1805.

The Court having been opened by proclamation,

The return made by the Sergeant-at-Arms was read, as follows:

“I, James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms to the Senate of the United States, in obedience to the within summons to me directed, did proceed to the residence of the within named Samuel Chase, on the 12th day of December, 1804, and did then and there leave a true copy of the said writ of summons, together with a true copy of the articles of impeachment annexed, with him the said Samuel Chase.

“JAMES MATHERS.”

After which the Secretary administered to him the oath as follows:

“You, James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms to the Senate of the United States, do solemnly swear, that the return made and subscribed by you, upon the process issued on the 10th day of December last, by the Senate of the United States, against Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, is truly made, and that you have performed said services as therein described. So help you God.”

SAMUEL CHASE, having been solemnly called, appeared.

The PRESIDENT of the Senate (Mr. BURR) informed Mr. CHASE, that having been summoned to answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, the Senate were ready to receive any answer he had to make to them.

Mr. CHASE requested the indulgence of a chair,[19] which was immediately furnished.

After being seated for a short time, Mr. CHASE rose, and commenced the following address to the Senate, which he read from a paper that he held in his hand:

“Mr. President: I appear, in obedience to a summons from this honorable Court, to answer articles of impeachment exhibited against me, by the honorable the House of Representatives of the United States.

“To these articles, a copy of which was delivered to me with the summons, I say that I have committed no crime or misdemeanor whatsoever, for which I am subject to impeachment according to the Constitution of the United States. I deny, with a few exceptions, the acts with which I am charged; I shall contend, that all acts admitted to have been done by me were legal; and I deny, in every instance, the improper intentions with which the acts charged are alleged to have been done, and in which their supposed criminality altogether consists.”

The PRESIDENT reminded Mr. CHASE that this was the day appointed to receive any answer he might make to the articles of impeachment.

Mr. CHASE said his purpose was to request the allowance of further time to put in his answer.

The PRESIDENT desired him to proceed.

Mr. CHASE proceeded in his address; and having finished it, was desired by the PRESIDENT, if he had any motion to make, to reduce it to writing, and hand it to the Secretary.

Whereupon, Mr. CHASE submitted the following motion:

“I solicit this honorable Court to allow me until the first day of the next session, to put in my answer, and to prepare for my trial.”

The PRESIDENT informed Mr. Chase, that, the Court would take time to consider his motion.[20]

The Senate withdrew to a private apartment, where debate arose on the question, whether it was not incumbent on the Senators to take the oath required by the constitution, before they took into consideration the motion of Mr. Chase, which issued in the adoption of the following resolution:

Resolved, That, on the meeting of the Senate, to-morrow, before they proceed to any business on the articles of impeachment before them, and before any decision of any question, the oath prescribed by the rules, shall be administered to the President and members of the Senate.

On the ensuing day, previously to the entrance of the Senate into the public room, considerable debate took place on the motion of Mr. Chase, without any decision being made.

THURSDAY, January 3.

The Court was opened by proclamation about two o’clock.

The oath prescribed was administered to the President by the Secretary.

The PRESIDENT administered the oath prescribed to the following members:

Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Giles, Hillhouse, Howland, Jackson, Mitchill, Moore, Olcott, Pickering, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, Sumter, Tracy, White, Worthington, and Wright.

And the affirmation was administered to Messrs. Logan, Maclay, and Plumer.

The PRESIDENT stated that he had received a letter from the defendant, enclosing an affidavit that further time was necessary for him to prepare for trial; which affidavit was read, as follows:

City of Washington, ss:

Samuel Chase made oath on the Holy Evangels of Almighty God, that it is not in his power to obtain information respecting the facts alleged in the articles of impeachment to have taken place in the city of Philadelphia in the trial of John Fries; or of the facts alleged to have taken place in the city of Richmond, in the trial of James T. Callender, in time to prepare and put in his answer, and to proceed to trial, with any probability that the same could be finished on or before the fifth day of March next. And further, that it is not in his power to procure information of the names of the witnesses, whom he thinks it may be proper and necessary for him to summon, in time to obtain their attendance, if his answer could be prepared in time sufficient for the finishing of the said trial, before the said fifth day of March next; and the said Samuel Chase further made oath, that he believes it will not be in his power to obtain the advice of counsel, to prepare his answer, and to give him their assistance on the trial, which he thinks necessary, if the said trial should take place during the present session of Congress; and that he verily believes, if he had, at this time full information of facts, and of the witnesses proper for him to summon, and if he had also the assistance of counsel, that he could not prepare the answer he thinks he ought to put in, and be ready for his trial, within the space of four or five weeks from this time. And further, that his application to the honorable the Senate, for time to obtain the information of facts, in order to prepare his answer, and for time to procure the attendance of necessary witnesses, and to prepare for his defence in the trial, and to obtain the advice and assistance of counsel, is not made for the purpose of delay, but only for the purpose of obtaining a full hearing of the articles of impeachment against him, in their real merits.

SAMUEL CHASE.

Sworn to, this third day of January, 1805, before

SAMUEL HAMILTON.

Whereupon the following motion was made by Mr. BRADLEY:

“Ordered, That Samuel Chase file his answer, with the Secretary of the Senate, to the several articles of impeachment exhibited against him, by the House of Representatives, on or before the ---- day of ----.”

On motion, by Mr. BRECKENRIDGE, to fill the blank with the words “the fourth day of February next,” the yeas and nays being taken, it passed in the affirmative--yeas 22, nays 8, as follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Baldwin, Breckenridge, Brown, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Giles, Howland, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Mitchill, Moore, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Ohio, Smith of Vermont, Sumter, Worthington, and Wright.

NAYS.--Messrs. Bradley, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Tracy, and White.

Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives, and Samuel Chase, thereof.

[Between this day, and that assigned for receiving the answer of Mr. Chase, the Senate Chamber was fitted up in a style of appropriate elegance. Benches, covered with crimson, on each side, and in a line with the chair of the President, were assigned to the members of the Senate. On the right and in front of the chair, a box was assigned to the Managers, and on the left a similar box to Mr. Chase and his counsel, and chairs allotted to such friends as he might introduce. The residue of the floor was occupied with chairs for the accommodation of the members of the House of Representatives; and with boxes for the reception of the foreign Ministers, and civil and military officers of the United States. On the right and left of the chair, at the termination of the benches of the members of the Court, boxes were assigned to stenographers. The permanent gallery was allotted to the indiscriminate admission of spectators. Below this gallery, and above the floor of the House, a new gallery was raised, and fitted up with peculiar elegance, intended primarily for the exclusive accommodation of ladies. But this feature of the arrangement, made by the Vice President, was at an early period of the trial abandoned, it having been found impracticable to separate the sexes! At the termination of this gallery, on each side, boxes were specially assigned to ladies attached to the families of public characters. The preservation of order was devolved on the Marshal of the District of Columbia, who was assisted by a number of deputies.]

TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE.

MONDAY, February 4, 1805.

About a quarter before ten o’clock the Court was opened by proclamation, all the members of the Senate, thirty-four, attending.

The Chamber of the Senate, which is very extensive, was soon filled with spectators, a large portion of whom consisted of ladies, who continued, with little intermission, to attend during the whole course of the trial.

The oath prescribed was administered to Mr. BAYARD, Mr. COCKE, Mr. GAILLARD, and Mr. STONE, members of the Court, who were not present when it was before administered.

Ordered, That the Secretary give notice to the House of Representatives that the Senate are in their public chamber, and are ready to proceed on the trial of Samuel Chase; and that seats are provided for the accommodation of the members.

In a few minutes the Managers, viz: Messrs. J. RANDOLPH, RODNEY, NICHOLSON, BOYLE, G. W. CAMPBELL, EARLY, and CLARK, accompanied by the House of Representatives in Committee of the Whole, entered and took their seats.

SAMUEL CHASE being called to make answer to the articles of impeachment, exhibited against him by the House of Representatives, appeared, attended by Messrs. HARPER, MARTIN, and HOPKINSON, his counsel; to whom seats were assigned.

The PRESIDENT, after stating to Mr. CHASE the indulgence of time which had been allowed, inquired if he was prepared to give in his answer?

Mr. CHASE said he had prepared it, as well as circumstances would permit; and submitted the following motion:

“Samuel Chase moves for permission to read his answer, by himself and his counsel, at the bar of this honorable Court.”

The PRESIDENT asked him if it was the answer on which he meant to rely? to which he replied in the affirmative.

The motion being agreed to by a vote of the Senate, Mr. CHASE commenced the reading of his answer, (in which he was assisted by Messrs. HARPER and HOPKINSON,) as follows:[21]

This respondent, in his proper person, comes into the said Court, and protesting that there is no high crime or misdemeanor particularly alleged in the said articles of impeachment, to which he is, or can be bound by law to make answer; and saving to himself now, and at all times hereafter, all benefit of exception to the insufficiency of the said articles, and each of them, and to the defects therein appearing in point of law, or otherwise; and protesting also, that he ought not to be injured in any manner, by any words, or by any want of form in this his answer; he submits the following facts and observations by way of answer to the said articles.

The first article relates to his supposed misconduct in the trial of John Fries, for treason, before the circuit court of the United States at Philadelphia, in April and May, 1800; and alleges that he presided at that trial, and that, “unmindful of the solemn duties of his office, and contrary to the sacred obligation by which he stood bound to discharge them faithfully and impartially, and without respect to persons,” he did then, “in his judicial capacity, conduct himself in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust.”

This general accusation, too vague in itself for reply, is supported by three specific charges of misconduct:

1st. “In delivering an opinion, in writing, on the question of law, on the construction of which the defence of the accused materially depended:” which opinion, it is alleged, tended to prejudice the minds of the jury against the case of the said John Fries, the prisoner, before counsel had been heard in his favor.

2d. “In restricting the counsel for the said John Fries, from recurring to such English authorities as they believed apposite; or from citing certain statutes of the United States which they deemed illustrative of the positions, upon which they intended to rest the defence of their client.”

3d. “In debarring the prisoner from his constitutional privilege of addressing the jury (through his counsel) on the law, as well as on the fact, which was to determine his guilt or innocence, and at the same time endeavoring to wrest from the jury their indisputable right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of law, as well as the question of fact, involved in the verdict which they were required to give.”

This first article then concludes, that in consequence of this irregular conduct of this respondent, “the said John Fries was deprived of the right secured to him by the eighth article amendatory of the constitution, and was condemned to death, without having been heard by counsel, in his defence.”

In the year 1794, an insurrection took place in four of the western counties of Pennsylvania, with a view of resisting, and preventing by force the execution of these two statutes; and a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, in the year 1795, by William Patterson, Esq., then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, two persons, who had been concerned in the above-named insurrection, namely, Philip Vigol and John Mitchell, were indicted for treason, of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force the execution of the two last-mentioned acts of Congress; and were, after a full and very solemn trial, convicted of the indictments and sentenced to death. They were afterwards pardoned by George Washington, then President of the United States.

In the first of these trials, that of Vigol, the defence of the prisoner was conducted by very able counsel, one of whom, William Lewis, Esq., is the same person who appeared as counsel for John Fries, in the trial now under consideration. Neither that learned gentleman, nor his able colleague, then thought proper to raise the question of law, “whether resisting and preventing by armed force the execution of a particular law of the United States, be a ‘levying of war against the United States,’” according to the true meaning of the constitution? although a decision of this question in the negative must have acquitted the prisoner. But in the next trial, that of Mitchell, this question was asked on the part of the prisoner, and was very fully and ably discussed by his counsel; and it was solemnly determined by the Court, both the judges concurring, “that to resist, or prevent by armed force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, is a levying of war against the United States, and consequently is treason, within the true meaning of the constitution.” The decision, according to the best established principles of our jurisprudence, became a precedent for all courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction; a precedent which, although not absolutely obligatory, ought to be viewed with very great respect, especially by the court in which it was made, and ought never to be departed from, but on the fullest and clearest conviction of its incorrectness.

On the 9th of July, an act of Congress was passed, providing for a valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and an enumeration of slaves throughout the United States; and directing the appointment of commissioners and assessors for carrying it into execution; and on the 4th day of July, in the same year, a direct tax was laid by another act of Congress of that date, on the lands, dwelling-houses, and slaves, so to be valued and enumerated.

In the months of February and March, A. D. 1799, an insurrection took place in the counties of Bucks and Northampton, in the State of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of resisting and preventing by force the execution of the two last-mentioned acts of Congress, and particularly that for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses. John Fries, the person mentioned in the article of impeachment now under consideration, was apprehended and committed to prison, as one of the ringleaders of this insurrection; and at a circuit court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, in the month of April, A. D. 1799, he was brought to trial for this offence, on an indictment for treason, by levying war against the United States, before James Iredell, Esq., then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, who presided in the said court, according to law, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, who sat in the said circuit court as assistant judge.

In this trial, which was conducted with great solemnity, and occupied nine days, the prisoner was assisted by William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, Esqs., two very able and eminent counsellors; the former of whom, William Lewis, is the person who assisted, as above mentioned, in conducting the defence of Vigol, on a similar indictment. These gentlemen, finding that the facts alleged were fully and undeniably proved, by a very minute and elaborate examination of witnesses, thought proper to rest the case of the prisoner on the question of law which had been determined in the cases of Vigol and Mitchell, above mentioned, and had then been acquiesced in, but which they thought proper again to raise. They contended, “that to resist by force of arms a particular law of the United States, does not amount to levying war against the United States, within the true meaning of the constitution, and therefore is not treason, but a riot only.” This question they argued at great length, and with all the force of their learning and genius; and after a full discussion at the bar, and the most mature deliberation by the Court, the learned and excellent judge who then presided, and who was no less distinguished by his humanity and tenderness towards persons tried before him, than by his extensive knowledge and great talents as a lawyer, pronounced the opinion of himself and his colleague, “that to resist, or prevent by force, the execution of a particular law of the United States, does amount to levying war against them, within the true meaning of the constitution, and does, therefore, constitute the crime of treason:” thereby adding the weight of another and more solemn decision to the precedent which had been established in the above-mentioned cases of Vigol and Mitchell.

Under this opinion of the Court on the question of law, the jury, having no doubt as to the facts, found the said John Fries guilty of treason on the above-mentioned indictment. But a new trial was granted by the Court, not by reason of any doubt as to the correctness of the decision on the question of law, but solely on the ground, as this respondent hath understood and believes, that one of the jurors of the petit jury, after he was summoned, but before he was sworn on the trial, had made some declaration unfavorable to the prisoner.

On the 11th day of April, 1800, and from that day until the 2d day of May in the same year, a circuit court of the United States was held at Philadelphia, in and for the district of Pennsylvania, before this respondent, then one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the above-mentioned Richard Peters, then district judge of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania. At this court the indictment on which the said John Fries had been convicted as above mentioned, was quashed ex officio by William Rawle, Esq., then attorney of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, and a new indictment was by him preferred against the said John Fries, for treason of levying war against the United States, by resisting and preventing by force in the manner above set forth, the execution of the above-mentioned acts of Congress, for the valuation of lands and dwelling-houses, and the enumeration of slaves, and for levying and collecting a direct tax. This indictment, of which a true copy, marked No. 1, is herewith exhibited by this respondent, who prays that it may be taken as part of this his answer, being found by the grand jury on the 16th day of April, 1800, the said John Fries was on the same day arraigned thereon, and plead not guilty. William Lewis, and Alexander James Dallas, Esqs., the same persons who had conducted his defence at his former trial, were again at his request assigned by the Court as his counsel; and his trial was appointed to be had on Tuesday the 22d day of the last-mentioned month of April.

After this indictment was found by the grand jury, this respondent considered it with great care and deliberation, and finding from the three overt acts of treason which it charged, that the question of law arising upon it was the same question which had already been decided twice in the same court, on solemn argument and deliberation, and once in that very case, he considered the law as settled by those decisions, with the correctness of which, on full consideration, he was entirely satisfied; and by the authority of which he should have deemed himself bound, even had he regarded the question as doubtful in itself. They are moreover in perfect conformity with the uniform tenor of decisions in the courts of England and Great Britain, from the Revolution in 1688 to the present time, which, in his opinion, added greatly to their weight and authority.

It was for these reasons that on the 22d day of April, 1800, when the said John Fries was brought into court, and placed in the prisoners’ box for trial, but before the petit jury were impanelled to try him, this respondent informed the above-mentioned William Lewis, one of his counsel, the aforesaid Alexander James Dallas not being then in court, “that the Court had deliberately considered the indictment against John Fries for treason, and the three several overt acts of treason stated, therein: that the crime of treason was defined by the Constitution of the United States. That as the Federal Legislature had the power to make, alter, or repeal laws, so the judiciary only had the power, and it was their duty, to declare, expound and interpret the Constitution and laws of the United States. That it was the duty of the Court, in all criminal cases, to state to the petit jury their opinion of the law arising on the facts; but the petit jury, in all criminal cases, were to decide both the law and the facts, on a consideration of the whole case. That there must be some constructive exposition of the terms used in the constitution, “levying war against the United States.” That the question, what acts amounted to levying war against the United States, or the Government thereof, was a question of law, and had been decided by Judges Patterson and Peters, in the cases of Vigol and Mitchell, and by Judges Iredell and Peters, in the case of John Fries, prisoner at the bar, in April 1799. That Judge Peters remained of the same opinion, which he had twice before delivered, and he, this respondent, on long and great consideration, concurred in the opinion of Judges Patterson, Iredell, and Peters. That to prevent unnecessary delay, and to save time on the trial of John Fries, and to prevent a delay of justice, in the great number of civil causes depending for trial at that term, the Court had drawn up in writing their opinion of the law, arising on the overt acts stated in the indictment against John Fries; and had directed David Caldwell, their clerk, to make out three copies of their opinion, one to be delivered to the attorney of the district, one to the counsel for the prisoner, and one to the petit jury, after they shall have been impanelled and heard the indictment read to them by the clerk, and after the district attorney should have stated to them the law on the overt acts alleged in the indictment, as it appeared to him.”

After these observations, this respondent delivered one of the above-mentioned copies to, the aforesaid William Lewis, then attending as one of the prisoner’s counsel; who read part of it, and then laid it down on the table before him. Some observations were then made on the subject, by him and the above-mentioned Alexander James Dallas, who had then come into court; but this respondent doth not now recollect those observations, and cannot undertake to state them accurately.

As to the second specific charge adduced in support of the first article of impeachment, which accuses this respondent “of restricting the counsel for the said Fries from recurring to such English authorities as they believed apposite, or from citing certain statutes of the United States, which they deemed illustrative of the positions upon which they intended to rest the defence of their client,” this respondent admits that he did, on the above-mentioned trial, express it as his opinion to the aforesaid counsel for the prisoner, “that the decisions in England, in cases of indictments for treason at common law, against the person of the King, ought not to be read to the jury, on trials for treason under the Constitution and statutes of the United States; because such decisions could not inform, but might mislead and deceive the jury: that any decisions on cases of treason, in the courts of England, before the Revolution of 1688, ought to have very little influence in the courts of the United States; that he would permit decisions in the courts of England or of Great Britain, since the said Revolution, to be read to the court or jury, for the purpose of showing what acts have been considered by those courts, as a constructive levying of war against the King of that country, in his legal capacity, but not against his person; because levying war against his Government was of the same nature as levying war against the Government of the United States: but that such decisions, nevertheless, were not to be considered as authorities binding on the courts and juries of this country, but merely in the light of opinions entitled to great respect, as having been delivered, after full consideration, by men of great legal learning and ability.”

It is only, then, for the correctness of his motives in delivering these opinions, that he can now be called to answer; and this correctness ought to be presumed, unless the contrary appear by some direct proof, or some violent presumption, arising from his general conduct on the trial, or from the glaring impropriety of the opinion itself. For he admits that cases may be supposed, of an opinion delivered by a judge, so palpably erroneous, unjust, and oppressive, as to preclude the possibility of its having proceeded from ignorance or mistake.

With respect to the statutes of the United States, which he is charged with having prevented the prisoner’s counsel from citing on the aforesaid trial, he denies that he prevented any act of Congress from being cited either to the Court or jury on the said trial, or declared at any time that he would not permit the prisoner’s counsel to read to the jury or to the Court any act of Congress whatever. Nor does he remember or believe that he expressed on the said trial any disapprobation of the conduct of the circuit court, before whom the said case was first tried, in permitting the act of Congress relating to crimes less than treason, commonly called the Sedition Act, to be read to the jury. He admits indeed that he was then and still is of opinion that the said act of Congress was wholly irrelevant to the issue, in the trial of John Fries, and therefore ought not to have been read to the jury, or regarded by them.

And this respondent further answering saith, that after the above-mentioned proceedings had taken place in the said trial, it was postponed until the next day, (Wednesday, April 23, 1800,) when, at the meeting of the Court, this respondent told both the above-mentioned counsel for the prisoner, that, “to prevent any misunderstanding of any thing that had passed the day before, he would inform them, that, although the Court retained the same opinion of the law, arising on the overt acts charged in the indictment against Fries, yet the counsel would be permitted to offer arguments to the Court, for the purpose of showing them that they were mistaken in the law; and that the Court, if satisfied that they had erred in opinion, would correct it; and also that the counsel would be permitted to argue before the petit jury that the Court were mistaken in the law.” And this respondent added, that the Court had given no opinion as to the facts in the case, about which both the counsel had declared that there would be no controversy.

After some observations by the said William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, they both declared to the Court, “that they did not any longer consider themselves as the counsel for John Fries, the prisoner.” This respondent then asked the said John Fries, whether he wished the Court to appoint other counsel for his defence? He refused to have other counsel assigned; in which he acted, as this respondent believes and charges, by the advice of the said William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas: whereupon, the Court ordered the trial to be had on the next day, Thursday, the 24th of April, 1800.

On that day the trial was proceeded in; and before the jurors were sworn, they were, by the direction of the Court, severally asked on oath, whether they were in any way related to the prisoner, and whether they had ever formed or delivered any opinion as to his guilt or innocence, or that he ought to be punished? Three of them answering in the affirmative, were withdrawn from the panel. The said John Fries was then informed by the Court, that he had a right to challenge thirty-five of the jury, without showing any cause of challenge against them, and as many more as he could show cause of challenge against. He did accordingly challenge peremptorily thirty-four of the jury, and the trial proceeded. In the evening, the Court adjourned till the next day, Friday, the 25th of April; when, after the district attorney had stated the principal facts proved by the witnesses, and had applied the law to those facts, this respondent, with the concurrence of his colleague, the said Richard Peters, delivered to the jury the charge contained and expressed in exhibit marked No. 3, and herewith filed, which he prays may be taken as part of this his answer.

Immediately after the petit jury had delivered their verdict, this respondent informed the said Fries, from the bench, that if he, or any person for him, could show any legal ground, or sufficient cause to arrest the judgment, ample time would be allowed him for that purpose. But no cause being shown, sentence of death was passed on the said Fries, on Tuesday, the 2d day of May, 1800, the last day of the term; and he was afterwards pardoned by John Adams, then President of the United States.

And this respondent further answering saith, that if the two instances of misconduct, first stated in support of the general charge, contained in the first article of impeachment, were true as alleged, yet the inference drawn from them, viz: “that the said Fries was thereby deprived of the benefit of counsel for his defence,” is not true. He insists that the said Fries was deprived of the benefit of counsel, not by any misconduct of this respondent, but by the conduct and advice of the above-mentioned William Lewis and Alexander James Dallas, who having been, with their own consent, assigned by the Court as counsel for the prisoner, withdrew from his defence, and advised him to refuse other counsel when offered to him by the Court, under pretence that the law had been prejudged, and their liberty of conducting the defence, according to their own judgment, improperly restricted by this respondent; but in reality, because they knew the law and the facts to be against them, and the case to be desperate, and supposed that their withdrawing themselves under this pretence, might excite odium against the Court; might give rise to an opinion that the prisoner had not been fairly tried; and in the event of a conviction, which from their knowledge of the law and the facts they knew to be almost certain, might aid the prisoner in an application to the President for a pardon. That such was the real motive of the said prisoner’s counsel for depriving their client of legal assistance on his trial, this respondent is fully persuaded, and expects to make appear, not only from the circumstances of the case, but from their own frequent and public declarations.

Finally, this respondent, having thus laid before this honorable Court a true state of his case, so far as respects the first article of impeachment, declares, upon the strictest review of his conduct during the whole trial of John Fries for treason, that he was not on that occasion unmindful of the solemn duties of his office as judge; that he faithfully and impartially, and according to the best of his ability and understanding, discharged those duties towards the said John Fries; and that he did not in any manner, during the said trial, conduct himself arbitrarily, unjustly, or oppressively, as he is accused by the honorable the House of Representatives.

And the said Samuel Chase, for the plea to the said first article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said first article is alleged; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The second article of impeachment charges, that this respondent, at the trial of James Thompson Callender for a libel, in May 1800, did, “with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the said Callender, overrule the objection of John Basset, one of the jury, who wished to be excused from serving on the said trial, because he had made up his mind as to the publication from which the words, charged to be libellous in the indictment, were extracted.”

In answer to this article, this respondent admits that he did, as one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, hold the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Virginia, at Richmond, on Thursday, the 22d day of May, in the year 1800, and from that day, till the 30th of the same month; when Cyrus Griffin, then district judge of the United States for the district of Virginia, took his seat in the said court; and that during the residue of that session of the said court, which continued till the ---- day of June, in the same year, this respondent and the said Cyrus Griffin held the said court together. But how far any of the other matters charged in this article, are founded in truth or law, appear from the following statement, which he submits to this honorable Court, by way of answer to this part of the accusation.

By an act of Congress passed on the 4th day of May, A. D. 1798, it is among other things enacted, “That if any person shall write, print, utter, or publish, or shall knowingly and wittingly assist and aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing, any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the President of the United States, with intent to defame or to bring him into contempt or disrepute, such person, being thereof convicted, shall be punished by fine, not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment, not exceeding two years;” and “that if any person shall be prosecuted under this act, it shall be lawful for him to give in evidence in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel; and the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the Court, as in other cases,” as in and by the said act, commonly called the sedition law, to which this respondent begs leave to refer this honorable Court, will more fully appear.

At the meeting of the last above-mentioned circuit court, this respondent, as required by the duties of his office, delivered a charge to the grand jury, in which, according to his constant practice, and to his duty as a judge, he gave in charge to them several acts of Congress for the punishment of offences, and among them, the above-mentioned act, called the sedition law; and directed the jury to make particular inquiry concerning any breaches of these statutes or any of them, within the district of Virginia. On the 24th day of May, 1800, the said jury found an indictment against one James Thompson Callender, for printing and publishing, against the form of the said act of Congress, a false, scandalous, and malicious libel, called “The Prospect before Us,” against John Adams, then President of the United States, in his official conduct as President; as appears by an official copy of the said indictment, marked exhibit No. 4, which this respondent begs leave to make part of this his answer.

On Wednesday, the 28th day of the same month, May 1800, Philip Norbonne Nicholas, Esq., now attorney-general of the State of Virginia, and George Hay, Esq., now district attorney of the United States, for the district of Virginia, appeared in the said circuit court as counsel for the said Callender; and on Thursday the 3d of June following, his trial commenced, before this respondent, and the said Cyrus Griffin, who then sat as assistant judge. The petit jurors being called over, eight of them appeared, namely, Robert Gamble, Bernard Mackham, John Barrell, William Austin, William Richardson, Thomas Tinsley, Matthew Harvey, and John Basset, who, as they came to the book to be sworn, were severally asked on oath, by direction of the Court, “whether they had ever formed or delivered any opinion respecting the subject-matter then to be tried, or concerning the charges contained in the indictment?” They all answered in the negative, and were sworn in chief to try the issue. The counsel for the said Callender declaring that it was unnecessary to put this question to the other four jurymen, William Mayo, James Hayes, Henry S. Shore, and John Prior, they also were immediately sworn in chief. No challenge was made by the said Callender or his counsel, to any of these jurors; but the said counsel declared, that they would rely on the answer that would be given by the said jurors to the question thus put by order of the Court.

After the above-mentioned John Basset, whom this respondent supposes and admits to be the person mentioned in the article of impeachment now under consideration, had thus answered in the negative to the question put to him by order of the Court, as above mentioned, which this respondent states to be the legal and proper question to be put to jurors on such occasions, he expressed to the Court his wish to be excused from serving on the said trial, because he had made up his mind, or had formed his opinion, “that the publication, called ‘The Prospect before Us,’ from which the words charged in the indictment as libellous were said to be extracted, but which he had never seen, was, according to the representation of it, which he had received, within the Sedition law.” But the Court did not consider this declaration by the said John Basset as a sufficient reason for withdrawing him from the jury, and accordingly directed him to be sworn in chief.

In this opinion and decision, as in all the others delivered during the trial in question, this respondent concurred with his colleague, the afore-mentioned Cyrus Griffin, in whom none of these opinions have been considered as criminal. He contends that the opinion itself was legal and correct; and he denies that he concurred in it, under the influence of any “spirit of persecution and injustice,” or with any “intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the prisoner,” as is most untruly alleged by the second article of impeachment. His reasons were correct and legal. He will submit them with confidence to this honorable Court; which, although it cannot condemn him for an incorrect opinion, proceeding from an honest error in judgment, and ought not to take on itself the power of inquiring into the correctness of his decisions, but merely that of examining the purity of his motives; will, nevertheless, weigh his reasons, for the purpose of judging how far they are of sufficient force to justify a belief that they might have appeared satisfactory to him. If they might have so appeared, if the opinion which he founded on them be not so palpably and glaringly wrong, as to carry with it internal evidence of corrupt motives, he cannot in delivering it have committed an offence.

The juror in the present case had expressed no opinion. He had formed no opinion as to the facts. He had never seen the “Prospect before Us,” and, therefore, could have no fixed or certain opinion about its nature or contents. They had been reported to him, and he had formed an opinion that if they were such as reported, the book was within the scope and operation of a law for the punishment of “false, scandalous and malicious libels, against the President in his official capacity, written or published with intent to defame him.” And who is there, that having either seen the book or heard of it, had not necessarily formed the same opinion?

But this juror had formed no opinion about the guilt or innocence of the party accused; which depended on four facts wholly distinct from the opinion which he had formed. First, whether the contents of the book were really such as had been represented to him? Secondly, whether they should, on the trial, be proved to be true? Thirdly, whether the party accused was really the author or publisher of this book? And fourthly, whether he wrote or published it “with intent to defame the President, or to bring him into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against him the hatred of the good people of the United States?” On all these questions, the mind of the juror was perfectly at large, notwithstanding the opinion which he had formed. He might, consistently with that opinion, determine them all in the negative; and it was on them that the issue between the United States and James Thompson Callender depended. Consequently, this juror, notwithstanding the opinion which he had thus formed, did stand indifferent as to the matter in issue, in the legal and proper sense, and in the only sense in which such indifference can ever exist; and therefore his having formed that opinion, was not such an excuse as could have justified the Court in discharging him from the jury.

And the said Samuel Chase, for plea to the said second article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said second article is alleged against him; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The third article of impeachment alleges that this respondent “with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the prisoner, did not permit the evidence of John Taylor, a material witness in behalf of the said Callender, to be given in, on pretence that the said witness could not prove the truth of the whole of one of the charges contained in the indictment, although the said charge embraced more than one fact.”

In answer to this charge, this respondent begs leave to submit the following facts and observations:

The indictment against James Thompson Callender, which has been already mentioned, and of which a copy is exhibited with this answer, consisted of two distinct and separate counts, each of which contained twenty distinct and independent charges, or sets of words. Each of those sets of words was charged as a libel against John Adams, as President of the United States, and the twelfth charge embraced the following words: “He (meaning President Adams) was a professed aristocrat; he proved faithful and serviceable to the British interest.” The defence set up was confined to this charge, and was rested upon the truth of the words. To the other nineteen charges no defence of any kind was attempted or spoken of, except such as might arise from the supposed unconstitutionality of the sedition law; which, if solid, applied to the twelfth charge as well as to the other nineteen. It was to prove the truth of these words that John Taylor, the person mentioned in the article of impeachment now under consideration, was offered as a witness. It can hardly be necessary to remind this honorable Court, that when an indictment for a libel contains several distinct charges, founded on distinct sets of words, the party accused, who in such cases is called the “traverser,” must be convicted, unless he makes a sufficient defence against every charge. His innocence on one, does not prove him innocent on the others. If the sedition law should be considered as unconstitutional, the whole indictment, including this twelfth charge, must fall to the ground, whether the words in question were proved to be true or not. If the law should be considered as constitutional, then the traverser, whether the words in the twelfth charge were proved to be true or not, must be convicted on the other nineteen charges, against which no defence was offered. This conviction on nineteen charges would put the traverser as completely in the power of the Court, by which the amount of the fine and the term of the imprisonment were to be fixed, as a conviction upon all the twenty charges. The imprisonment could not exceed two years, nor the fine be more than two thousand dollars. If, then, this respondent were desirous of procuring the conviction of the traverser, he was sure of his object without rejecting the testimony of John Taylor. If his temper towards the traverser were so vindictive as to make him feel anxious to obtain an opportunity and excuse for inflicting on him the whole extent of punishment permitted by the law, still a conviction on nineteen charges afforded this opportunity and excuse as fully as a conviction on twenty charges. One slander more or less, in such a publication as the “Prospect before Us,” could surely be of no moment. To attain this object, therefore, it was not necessary to reject the testimony of John Taylor.

That the Court did not feel this vindictive spirit is clearly evinced by the moderation of the punishment, which actually was inflicted on the traverser, after he was convicted of the whole twenty charges. Instead of two thousand dollars, he was fined only two hundred, and was sentenced to only nine months’ imprisonment, instead of two years. And this respondent avers that he never felt or expressed a wish to go further; but that in this decision, as well as in every other given in the course of the trial, he fully and freely concurred with his colleague, Judge Griffin.

In the case under consideration, no proof was offered as to the whole matter contained in the twelfth article. No witness except the above-mentioned John Taylor was produced or mentioned. When a witness is offered to a court and jury, it is the right and duty of the court to require a statement of the matters intended to be proved by him. This is the invariable practice of all our courts, and was done most properly by this respondent and his colleague, on the occasion in question. From the statement given by the traverser’s counsel of what they expected to prove by the said witness, it appeared that his testimony could have no possible application to any part of the indictment, except the twelfth charge above mentioned, and but a very weak and imperfect application even to that part. The Court, therefore, as it was their right and duty, requested that the questions intended to be put to the witness should be reduced to writing, and submitted to their inspection, so as to enable them to judge more accurately, how far those questions were proper and admissible. This being done, the questions were of the following tenor and effect:

1st. “Did you ever hear Mr. Adams express any sentiments favorable to monarchy, or ‘aristocracy,’ and what were they?”

2d. “Did you ever hear Mr. Adams, while Vice President, express his disapprobation of the funding system?”

3d. “Do you know whether Mr. Adams did not, in the year 1794, vote against the sequestration of British debts, and also against the bill for suspending intercourse with Great Britain?”

The second question, it is manifest, had nothing to do with the charge; for Mr. Adams’ approbation or disapprobation of the funding system could not have the most remote tendency to prove that he was an aristocrat, or had proved faithful and serviceable to the British interest. The third question was in reality as far as the second from any connection with the matter in issue, although its irrelevancy is not quite so apparent. Mr. Adams’s having voted against the two measures alluded to in that question, if he did in fact vote against them, could by no means prove that he was “faithful and serviceable to the British interest,” in any sense, much less with those improper and criminal views, with which the publication in question certainly meant to charge him. The fact, if true, was no evidence to support such an inference, therefore the fact was immaterial; and as it is the province and duty of the Court, in such circumstances, to decide on the materiality of facts offered in evidence, it follows clearly that it was the right and duty of the Court, in this instance, to reject the third question; an affirmative answer to which could have proved nothing in support of the defence.

For these reasons this respondent did concur with his colleague, the said Cyrus Griffin, in rejecting the three above-mentioned questions; but not any other testimony that the said John Taylor might have been able to give.

And for plea to the said third article of impeachment, the said Samuel Chase saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said third article is alleged against him: this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The fourth article of impeachment alleges, that during the whole course of the trial of James Thompson Callender, above mentioned, the conduct of this respondent was marked by “manifest injustice, partiality, and intemperance;” and five particular instances of the “injustice, partiality, and intemperance,” are adduced.

The first consists, “in compelling the prisoner’s counsel to reduce to writing and submit to the inspection of the Court, for their admission or rejection, all questions which the said counsel meant to propound to the above-mentioned John Taylor, the witness.”

This respondent, in answer to this part of the article now under consideration, admits that the Court, consisting of himself and the above-mentioned Cyrus Griffin, did require the counsel for the traverser, on the trial of James Thompson Callender, above mentioned, to reduce to writing the questions which they intended to put to the said witness. But he denies that it is more his act than the act of his colleague, who fully concurred in this measure. The measure, as he apprehends and insists, was legal and proper; his reasons for adopting it, and he presumes those of his colleague, he will submit to this honorable Court, in order to show that if he, in common with his colleague, committed an error, it was an error into which the best and wisest men might have honestly fallen.

The next circumstance stated by the article now under consideration, as an instance and proof of “manifest injustice, partiality, and intemperance” in this respondent, is his refusal to postpone the trial of the said James Thompson Callender, “although an affidavit was regularly filed, stating the absence of material witnesses on behalf of the accused, and although it was manifest that, with the utmost diligence, the attendance of such witnesses could not have been procured at that term.”

This respondent, in answer to this part of the charge, admits that, in the above-mentioned trial, the traverser’s counsel did move the court, while this respondent sat in it alone, for a continuance of the trial until the next term; not merely a postponement of the trial, as the expressions used in this part of the article would seem to import; and did file, as the groundwork of their motion, an affidavit of the traverser, a true and official copy of which (marked exhibit No. 5) this respondent herewith exhibits, and begs leave to make part of this answer; but he denies that any sufficient ground for a continuance until the next term was disclosed by this affidavit, as he trusts will clearly appear from the following facts and observations:

The trial of an indictment at the term when it is found by the grand jury, is a matter of course, which the prosecutor can claim as a right, unless legal cause can be shown for a continuance. The prosecutor may consent to a continuance, but if he withholds his consent, the Court cannot grant a continuance without legal cause. Of the sufficiency and legality of this cause, as of every other question of law, the Court must judge; but it must decide on this, as on every other point, according to the fixed and known rules of law.

One of the legal grounds, and the principal one on which such a continuance may be granted, is the absence of competent and material witnesses, whom the party cannot produce at the present term, but has a reasonable ground for expecting to be able to produce at the next term. Analogous to this, is the inability to procure, at the present term, legal and material written testimony, which the party has a reasonable expectation of being able to procure at the next term.

Public justice will not permit the trial of offenders to be delayed, on light or unfounded pretences. To wait for testimony which the party really wished for, but did not expect to be able to produce within some definite period, would certainly be a very light pretence; and to make him the judge, how far there was reasonable expectation of obtaining the testimony within the proper time, would put it in his power to delay the trial on the most unfounded pretences. Hence the rule, that there must be reasonable ground of expectation, in the judgment of the Court, that the testimony may be obtained within the proper time.

It is therefore a settled and most necessary rule, that every application for a continuance, on the ground of obtaining testimony, must be supported by an affidavit, disclosing sufficient matter to satisfy the Court, that the testimony wanted “is competent and material,” and that there is “reasonable expectation of procuring it within the time prescribed.” From a comparison of the affidavit in question with the indictment, it will soon appear how far the traverser in this case brought himself within this rule.

The absent witnesses, mentioned in the affidavit, are William Gardner, of Portsmouth in New Hampshire; Tench Coxe, of Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania; Judge Bee, of some place in South Carolina; Timothy Pickering, lately of Philadelphia, in Pennsylvania, but of what place at that time the deponent did not know; William B. Giles, of Amelia County, in the State of Virginia; Stevens Thompson Mason, whose place of residence is not mentioned in the affidavit, but was known to be in Loudon County, in the State of Virginia; and General Blackburn, of Bath County, in the said State. The affidavit also states, that the traverser wished to procure, as material to his defence, authentic copies of certain answers made by the President of the United States, Mr. Adams, to addresses from various persons; and also, a book entitled “an Essay on Canon and Feudal Law,” or entitled in words to that purport, which was ascribed to the President, and which the traverser believed to have been written by him; and also, evidence to prove that the President was in fact the author of that book.

It is not stated, that the traverser had any reasonable ground to expect, or did expect, to procure this book or evidence, or these authentic copies, or the attendance of any one of these witnesses, at the next term. Nor does he attempt to show in what manner the book, or the copies of answers to addresses, were material, so as to enable the Court to form a judgment on that point. Here, then, the affidavit was clearly defective. His believing the book and copies to be material, was of no weight, unless he showed to the Court sufficient grounds for entertaining the same opinion. Moreover, he does not state where he supposes that this book, and those authentic copies, may be found; so as to enable the Court to judge, how far a reasonable expectation of obtaining them might be entertained. On the ground of this book and these copies, therefore, there was no pretence for a continuance. As to the witnesses, it is manifest, that from their very distant and dispersed situation, there existed no ground of reasonable expectation that their attendance could be procured at the next term, or at any subsequent time. Indeed, the idea of postponing the trial of an indictment till witnesses could be convened at Richmond, from South Carolina, New Hampshire, and the western extremities of Virginia, is too chimerical to be seriously entertained. Accordingly, the traverser, though in his affidavit he stated them to be material, and declared that he could not procure their attendance at that term, could not venture to declare, on oath, that he expected to procure it at the next, or at any other time; much less that he had any reasonable ground for such an expectation. On this ground, therefore, the affidavit was clearly insufficient; and it was consequently the duty of the Court to reject such application.

But the testimony of these witnesses, as stated in the affidavit, was wholly immaterial; and, therefore, their absence was no ground for a continuance, had there been reasonable ground for expecting their attendance at the next term.

William Gardner and Tench Coxe were to prove that Mr. Adams had turned them out of office, for their political opinions or conduct. This applied to that part of the publication which constituted the matter of the third charge in the indictment, in these words, “the same system of persecution extended all over the continent. Every person holding an office, must either quit it, or think and vote exactly with Mr. Adams.” Judge Bee was to prove, that Mr. Adams had advised and requested him by letter, in the year 1799, to deliver Thomas Nash, otherwise called Jonathan Robbins, to the British Consul, in Charleston. This might have had some application to the matter of the seventh charge; which alleged that “the hands of Mr. Adams were reeking with the blood of the poor, friendless Connecticut sailor.” Timothy Pickering was to prove that Mr. Adams, while President, and Congress was in session, was many weeks in possession of important despatches from the American Minister in France, without communicating them to Congress. This testimony was utterly immaterial; because, admitting the fact to be so, Mr. Adams was not bound, in any respect, to communicate those despatches to Congress, unless, in his discretion, he should think it necessary; and also, because the fact, if true, had no relation to any part of the indictment. There are, indeed, three charges, on which it might at first sight seem to have some slight bearing. These are the eighth, the words furnishing the matter of which are, “every feature in the administration of Mr. Adams forms a distinct and additional evidence that he was determined, at all events, to embroil this country with France;” the fourteenth, the words stated in which allege, that “by sending these Ambassadors to Paris, Mr. Adams and his British faction designed to do nothing but mischief;” and the eighteenth, the matter of which states, “that in the midst of such a scene of profligacy and usury, the President persisted as long as he durst, in making his utmost efforts for provoking a French war.” To no other charge in the indictment had the evidence of Timothy Pickering, as stated in the affidavit, the remotest affinity. And surely, it will not be pretended by any man, who shall compare this evidence with the three charges above mentioned, that the fact intended to be proved by it, furnished any evidence proper to go to a jury, in support of either of those charges; that “every feature of his administration formed a distinct and additional evidence of a determination, at all events, to embroil this country with France,” that “in sending Ambassadors to Paris, he intended nothing but mischief,” that “in the midst of a scene of profligacy and usury, he persisted, as long as he durst, in making his utmost effort for provoking a French war,” are charges, which surely cannot be supported or justified, by the circumstance of his “keeping in his possession, for several weeks, while Congress was in session, despatches from the American Minister in France, without communicating them to Congress,” which he was not bound to do, and which it was his duty not to do, if he supposed that the communication, at an earlier period, would be injurious to the public interest. The testimony of William B. Giles and Stevens Thompson Mason was to prove that Mr. Adams had uttered in their hearing certain sentiments favorable to aristocratic or monarchical principles of Government.

This had no application except to a part of the twelfth charge; which has been already shown to be wholly immaterial if taken separately, and wholly incapable of a separate justification, if considered as part of an entire charge. And, lastly, it was to be proved by General Blackburn, that in his answer to an address, Mr. Adams avowed, “that there was a party in Virginia which deserved to be humbled into dust and ashes, before the indignant frowns of their injured, insulted, and offended country.” There were but two charges in the indictment to which this fact, if true, had the most distant resemblance. These are the fifteenth and sixteenth, the words forming the matter of which, call Mr. Adams “an hoary-headed libeller of the Governor of Virginia, who with all the fury, but without the propriety or sublimity of Homer’s Achilles, bawled out, to arms, then, to arms!” and “who, floating on the bladder of popularity, threatened to make Richmond the centre point of a bonfire.” It would be an abuse of the patience of this honorable Court, to occupy any part of its time in proving that the fact intended to be proved by General Blackburn, could not in the slightest degree support or justify such charges as these.

To the third charge adduced in support of the article now under consideration, the charge of using “unusual, rude, and contemptuous expressions towards the prisoner’s counsel,” and of “falsely insinuating that they wished to excite the public fears and indignation, and to produce that insubordination to law to which the conduct of this respondent did manifestly tend,” he cannot answer otherwise than by a general denial. A charge so vague, admits not of precise or particular refutation. He denies that there was any thing unusual or intentionally rude or contemptuous in his conduct or his expressions towards the prisoner’s counsel; that he made any false insinuation whatever against them, or that his own conduct tended in any manner to produce insubordination to law. On the contrary, it was his wish and intention to treat the counsel with the respect due to their situation and functions, and with the decorum due to his own character. He thought it his duty to restrain such of their attempts as he considered improper, and to overrule motions made by them, which he considered as unfounded in law; but this it was his wish to accomplish in the manner least likely to offend, from which every consideration concurred in dissuading him. He did indeed think at that time, and still remains under the impression, that the conduct of the traverser’s counsel, whether from intention or not he will not undertake to say, was disrespectful, irritating, and highly incorrect. That conduct which he viewed in this light, might have produced some irritation in a temper naturally quick and warm, and that this irritation might, notwithstanding his endeavors to suppress it, have appeared in his manner and in his expressions, he thinks not improbable; for he has had occasions for feeling and lamenting the want of sufficient caution and self-command, in things of this nature. But he confidently affirms, that his conduct in this particular was free from intentional impropriety; and this respondent denies, that any part of his conduct was such as ought to have induced the traverser’s counsel to “abandon the cause of their client,” nor does he believe that any such cause did induce them to take that step. On the contrary, he believes that it was taken by them under the influence of passion, for some motive into which this respondent forbears at this time to inquire. And this respondent admits that the said traverser was convicted, and condemned to fine and imprisonment, but not by reason of the abandonment of his defence by his counsel; but because the charges against him were clearly proved, and no defence was made or attempted against far the greater number of them.

The fourth charge in support of this article attributes to this respondent “repeated and vexatious interruptions of the said counsel, which at length induced them to abandon the cause of their client, who was therefore convicted, and condemned to fine and imprisonment.” To this charge, also, it is impossible to give any other answer but a general denial. He avers that he never interrupted the traverser’s counsel vexatiously, or except when he considered it his duty to do so.

Lastly, this respondent is charged, under this article, with an “indecent solicitude, manifested by him, for the conviction of the accused, unbecoming even a public prosecutor, but highly disgraceful to the character of a judge, as it was subversive of justice.” This is another charge of which it is impossible to give a precise refutation, and to a general denial of which this respondent must therefore confine himself. He denies that he felt any solicitude whatever for the conviction of the traverser; other than the general wish natural to every friend of truth, decorum, and virtue, that persons guilty of such offences as that of which the traverser stood indicted, should be brought to punishment for the sake of example.

And the said respondent for plea to the said fourth article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime and misdemeanor, as in and by the said fourth article is alleged against him, and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to require.

The fifth article of impeachment charges this respondent with having awarded “a capias against the body of the said James Thompson Callender, indicted for an offence not capital, whereupon the said Callender was arrested and committed to close custody, contrary to law in that case made and provided.”

This charge is rested, 1st, on the act of Congress of September 24, 1789, entitled “An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,” by which it is enacted “that for any crime or offence against the United States, the offender may be arrested, imprisoned, or bailed, agreeably to the usual mode of process, in the State where such offender may be found.” And, 2dly, on a law of the State of Virginia, which is said to provide “that upon presentment by any grand jury, of an offence not capital, the Court shall order the clerk to issue a summons against the person or persons so offending, to appear and answer such presentment at the next court.” It is contended, in support of this charge, that the act of Congress above mentioned made the State law the rule of proceeding, and that the State law was violated by issuing a capias against Callender, instead of a summons.

It will also appear, as this respondent believes, by a reference to the laws and practice of Virginia, into which he has made all the inquiries which circumstances and the shortness of time allowed him for preparing his answer would permit, that all the cases in which a summons is considered as the only proper process, are cases of petty offences, which, on the presentment of a grand jury, are to be tried by the court in a summary way, without the intervention of a petit jury. Therefore these provisions had no application to the case of Callender, which could be no otherwise proceeded on than by indictment, and trial on the indictment by a petit jury.

And the said respondent, for plea to the said fifth article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime and misdemeanor, as in and by the said fifth article is alleged against him; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The sixth article of impeachment alleges that this respondent, “with intent to oppress and procure the conviction of the said James Thompson Callender, did, at the court aforesaid, rule and adjudge the said Callender to trial during the term at which he, the said Callender, was presented and indicted, contrary to the law in that case made and provided.”

This charge also is founded, 1st, on the act of Congress of September 24, 1789, above mentioned, which enacts, section 34, “that the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise provide, shall be regarded as the rules of decision, in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply;” and, 2dly, on a law of the State of Virginia, which is supposed to provide, “that in cases not capital, the offender shall not be held to answer any presentment of a grand jury, until the court next preceding that during which such presentment shall have been made.” This law, it is contended, is made the role of decision by the above-mentioned act of Congress, and was violated by the refusal to continue the case of Callender till the next term.

In answer to this charge this respondent declares, that he was at the time of making the above-mentioned decision wholly ignorant of any such law of Virginia as that in question; that no such law was adduced or mentioned by the counsel of Callender, in support of their motion for a continuance; neither when they first made it, before this respondent sitting alone, nor when they renewed it, after Judge Griffin had taken his seat in court; that no such law was mentioned by Judge Griffin, who concurred in overruling the motion for a continuance and ordering on the trial; which he could not have done had he known that such a law existed, or considered it as applicable to the case; and that this respondent never heard of any such law until the articles of impeachment now under consideration were reported, in the course of the present session of Congress, by a committee of the House of Representatives.

And for plea to the said sixth article of impeachment, the said Samuel Chase saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said-article is alleged against him; and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The seventh article of impeachment relates to some conduct of this respondent in his judicial capacity, at a circuit court of the United States held at Newcastle, in the State of Delaware, in June, 1800. The statement of this conduct, made in the article, is altogether erroneous; but if it were true, this respondent denies that it contains any matter for which he is liable to impeachment.

These charges amount in substance to this: that the respondent refused to discharge a grand jury, on their request, which is every day’s practice, and which he was bound to do, if he believed that the due administration of justice required their longer attendance; that he directed the attention of the grand jury to an offence against a statute of the United States, which, he had been informed, was committed in the district; and that he desired the District Attorney to aid the grand jury in their inquiries concerning the existence and nature of this offence. By these three acts, each of which it was his duty to perform, he is alleged “to have degraded his high judicial functions, and tended to impair the public confidence in, and respect for, the tribunals of justice, so essential to the public welfare.”

That this honorable Court may be able to form correctly its judgment concerning the transaction mentioned in this article, this respondent submits the following statement of it, which he avers to be true, and expects to prove:

On the 27th day of June, 1800, this respondent, as one Of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, presided in the circuit court of the United States, then held at Newcastle, in and for the district of Delaware, and was assisted by Gunning Bedford, Esq., then district judge of the United States for that district. At the opening of the court on that day, this respondent, according to his duty and his uniform practice, delivered a charge to the grand jury, in which he gave in charge to them several statutes of the United States, and, among others, an act of Congress, passed July 14th, 1798, entitled “An act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,” and commonly called the “sedition law.” He directed them to inquire concerning any breaches of those statutes, and especially of that commonly called the sedition law, within the district of Delaware.

On the same day, before the usual hour of adjournment, the grand jury came into court, and informed the Court that they had found no indictment or presentment, and had no business before them, for which reason they wished to be discharged. This respondent replied, that it was earlier than the usual hour of discharging a grand jury; and that business might occur during the sitting of the court. He also asked them if they had no information of publications within the district, that came under the sedition law, and added, that he had been informed that there was a paper called the Mirror, published at Wilmington which contained libellous charges against the Government and President of the United States: that he had not seen that paper, but it was their duty to inquire into the subject; and if they had not turned their attention to it, the attorney for the district would be pleased to examine a file of that paper, and if he found any thing that came within the sedition law, would lay it before them. This is the substance of what the respondent said to the grand jury on that occasion, and, he believes, nearly his words; on the morning of the next day they came into court and declared that they had no presentments or indictments to make, on which they were immediately discharged. The whole time, therefore, for which they were detained, was twenty-four hours, far less than is generally required of grand juries.

And for plea to the said seventh article of impeachment, the said Samuel Chase saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said seventh article is alleged against him, and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

The eighth article of impeachment charges that this respondent, “disregarding the duties and dignity of his official character, did, at a circuit court for the district of Maryland, held at Baltimore, in the month of May, 1803, pervert his official right and duty to address the grand jury then and there assembled, on the matters coming within the province of the said jury, for the purpose of delivering to the said grand jury an intemperate and inflammatory political harangue, with intent to excite the fears and resentment of the said grand jury, and of the good people of Maryland, against their State government and constitution,” and also that this respondent, “under pretence of exercising his judicial right to address the grand jury as aforesaid, did endeavor to excite the odium of the said grand jury, and of the good people of Maryland, against the Government of the United States, by delivering opinions which were, at that time and as delivered by him, highly indecent, extra-judicial, and tending to prostitute the high judicial character with which he was invested to the low purpose of an electioneering partisan.”

In answer to this charge this respondent admits that he did, as one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, preside in a circuit court held at Baltimore in and for the district of Maryland, in May, 1803, and did then deliver a charge to the grand jury, and express in the conclusion of it some opinions as to certain public measures, both of the Government of Maryland and of that of the United States. But he denies that, in thus acting, he disregarded the duties and dignity of his judicial character, perverted his official right and duty to address the grand jury, or had any intention to excite the fears or resentment of any person whatever against the Government and Constitution of the United States or of Maryland. He denies that the sentiments which he thus expressed were “intemperate and inflammatory,” either in themselves or in the manner of delivering; that he did endeavor to excite the odium of any person whatever against the Government of the United States, or did deliver any opinions which were in any respect indecent, or which had any tendency to prostitute his judicial character to any low or improper purpose. He denies that he did any thing that was unusual, improper, or unbecoming in a judge, or expressed any opinions, but such as a friend to his country and a firm supporter of the Governments, both of the State of Maryland and of the United States, might entertain. For the truth of what he here says, he appeals confidently to the charge itself: which was read from a written paper now in his possession ready to be produced. A true copy of all such parts of this paper as relate to the subject matter of this article of impeachment, is contained in the exhibit marked No. 8, which he prays leave to make part of this his answer.

Admitting these opinions to have been incorrect and unfounded, this respondent denies that there was any law which forbids him to express them in a charge to a grand jury, and he contends that there can be no offence without the breach of some law. The very essence of despotism consists in punishing acts which, at the time when they were done, were forbidden by no law. Admitting the expression of political opinions by a judge, in his charge to a grand jury, to be improper and dangerous, there are many improper and very dangerous acts, which not being forbidden by law, cannot be punished. Hence the necessity of new penal laws, which are from time to time enacted for the prevention of acts not before forbidden, but found by experience to be of dangerous tendency. It has been the practice in this country, ever since the beginning of the Revolution which separated us from Great Britain, for the judges to express from the bench, by way of charge to the grand jury, and to enforce to the utmost of their ability such political opinions as they thought correct and useful. There have been instances in which the Legislative bodies of this country have recommended this practice to the judges; and it was adopted by the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States as soon as the present Judicial system was established.

Nor can the incorrectness of the political opinions thus expressed have any influence in deciding on the guilt or innocence of a judge’s conduct in expressing them. For if he should be considered as guilty or innocent, according to the supposed correctness or incorrectness of the opinion thus expressed by him, it would follow that error in political opinion, however honestly entertained, might be a crime; and that a party in power might, under this pretext, destroy any judge who might happen, in a charge to a grand jury, to say something capable of being construed by them into a political opinion adverse to their own system.

And the said Samuel Chase, for plea to the said eighth article of impeachment, saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime and misdemeanor, as in and by the said eighth article is alleged against him, and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable Court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require.

This respondent has now laid before this honorable Court, as well as the time allowed him would permit, all the circumstances of the case, with an humble trust in Providence, and a consciousness that he has discharged all his official duties with justice and impartiality, to the best of his knowledge and abilities; and that intentionally he hath committed no crime or misdemeanor, or any violation of the constitution or laws of his country. Confiding in the impartiality, independence, and integrity of his judges, and that they will patiently hear, and conscientiously determine this case, without being influenced by the spirit of party, by popular prejudice, or political motives, he cheerfully submits himself to their decision.

He is satisfied that every member of this tribunal will observe the principles of humanity and justice, and will presume him innocent until his guilt shall be established by legal and creditable witnesses, and will be governed in his decision by the moral and Christian rule of rendering that justice to this respondent which he would wish to receive.

This respondent now stands not merely before an earthly tribunal, but also before that awful Being whose presence fills all space, and whose all-seeing eye more especially surveys the temples of justice and religion. In a little time, his accusers, his judges, and himself, must appear at the bar of Omnipotence, where the secrets of all hearts shall be disclosed, and every human being shall answer for his deeds done in the body, and shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, in the presence of an assembled universe. To his Omnipotent Judge, at that awful hour, he now appeals for the rectitude and purity of his conduct, as to all the matters of which he is this day accused.

Mr. RANDOLPH, on behalf of the Managers, requested time to consult the House of Representatives, and likewise to be furnished with a copy of the answer of Judge Chase, for the purpose of making a replication to it.

The PRESIDENT said the Senate would take the request into consideration, and make known to the House of Representatives such order as should be taken thereon.

Whereupon the Senate, at the suggestion of the PRESIDENT, retired to their legislative apartment.

On Wednesday, the 6th instant, the House of Representatives received a copy of the foregoing answer, which was referred to the Managers. On the same day, Mr. RANDOLPH reported a replication to the answer, which was immediately taken into consideration. Several motions were made and rejected, after a short debate, to soften the style; when the replication, as reported, was adopted--yeas 77, nays 34. Whereupon, it was resolved that the Managers be instructed to proceed to maintain the said replication at the bar of the Senate, at such time as shall be appointed by the Senate.

THURSDAY, February 7.

The Court was opened about two o’clock.

Present: The Managers, and Mr. HOPKINSON, of the counsel for Mr. Chase.

Mr. RANDOLPH, on behalf of the Managers, read the replication of the House of Representatives, to the answer of Samuel Chase, as follows:

Replication by the House of Representatives of the United States, to the answer of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the Articles of Impeachment exhibited against him by the said House of Representatives.

The House of Representatives of the United States have considered the answer of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the Articles of Impeachment against him, by them exhibited, in the name of themselves and of all the people of the United States, and observe,

That the said Samuel Chase hath endeavored to cover the high crimes and misdemeanors laid to his charge, by evasive insinuations and misrepresentation of facts; that the said answer does give a gloss and coloring utterly false and untrue, to the various criminal matters contained in the said Articles; that the said Samuel Chase did, in fact, commit the numerous acts of oppression, persecution, and injustice, of which he stands accused; and the House of Representatives, in full confidence of the truth and justice of their accusation, and of the necessity of bringing the said Samuel Chase to a speedy and exemplary punishment, and not doubting that the Senate will use all becoming diligence to do justice to the proceedings of the House of Representatives, and to vindicate the honor of the nation, do aver their charge against the said Samuel Chase to be true, and that the said Samuel Chase is guilty in such manner as he stands impeached; and that the House of Representatives will be ready to prove their charges against him, at such convenient time and place as shall be appointed for that purpose.

Signed by order, and in behalf of, the said House.

NATH. MACON, Speaker,

Attest:

JOHN BECKLEY, Clerk.

Mr. HOPKINSON requested a copy of the replication, which, the PRESIDENT replied, would be furnished by the Secretary.

Mr. BRECKENRIDGE moved a resolution to the following effect:

That the Secretary be directed to inform the House of Representatives that the Senate will, to-morrow, at twelve o’clock, proceed with the trial of Samuel Chase; which was agreed to without one dissenting voice, 34 members voting for it.

Whereupon, the Senate withdrew to their legislative apartment.

FRIDAY, February 8.

The Court opened precisely at twelve o’clock.

Present: The Managers, and the House of Representatives, in Committee of the Whole; and Mr. Chase, attended by his counsel, Messrs. MARTIN, HARPER, HOPKINSON, and KEY.

The crier having, agreeably to a prescribed form, notified all those concerned to come forward and make good the charges exhibited against Samuel Chase,

Mr. RANDOLPH, the leading Manager, requested that the witnesses on the part of the prosecution might be called, to ascertain who were present.

They were accordingly called, to the number of twenty-four.

Present: Alexander James Dallas, William Lewis, William Rawle, William S. Biddle, Edward Tilghman, George Reed, John Montgomery, John Stephen, John Thompson Mason, Samuel H. Smith, John Taylor, George Hay, William Wirt, and John Heath.

Absent: James Lea, John Crow, Risdon Bishop, Aquila Hall, Philip Stewart, Thomas Hall, Philip N. Nicholas, John Harvie, Meriwether Jones, and James Pleasants.

Mr. RANDOLPH observed that various considerations, which it was unnecessary to detail, induced him, on behalf of the Managers, to move a postponement of the trial till to-morrow, when they hoped to be prepared to proceed with it.

Mr. HARPER said that, on behalf of Judge Chase, he would not object to the motion.

The PRESIDENT informed the Managers that the Senate acceded to their request, and added, that the Senate would attend to-morrow at twelve o’clock, for the purpose of proceeding with the trial.

At the request of Mr. HARPER, the witnesses on the part of Judge Chase were called over, to the number of forty.

Present: John A. Chevalier, David M. Randolph, John Marshall, John Basset, Samuel P. Moore, William C. Frazier, David Robertson, Edward Tilghman, Wm. Meredith, Jared Ingersoll, Samuel Ewing, James Winchester, Walter Dorsey, James P. Boyd, Nicholas Brice, John Purviance, William M. Mechin, Thomas Chase, William H. Winder, William Gwynn, William Rawle, William J. Govane, Gunning Bedford, Nicholas Vandyke, John Hall, jun., Archibald Hamilton, and Thomas Carpenter.

Absent: William Marshall, Edmund Randolph, Robert Gamble, Philip Moore, Cornelius Comegys, John Stewart, and Edward J. Coale.

Not found: John Hopkins, Philip Gooch, William Minor, and Samuel Wheeler.

Sick: Cyrus Griffin. Dead: J. C. Barrett.

Whereupon the Court rose.

SATURDAY, February 9.

The Court was opened precisely at 12 o’clock.

Present: The Managers, attended by the House of Representatives in Committee of the Whole; and Judge Chase, attended by his counsel, as mentioned in the proceedings of yesterday.

At a quarter after 12 o’clock, Mr. RANDOLPH, on behalf of the Managers, opened the impeachment, as follows:

Mr. President: It becomes my duty to open this cause on behalf of the prosecution. From this duty, however incompetent I feel myself to its performance at all times, and more especially at this time, as well from the very short period which has been allowed us to consider the long and elaborate plea of the respondent, as from the severe pressure of disease, it does not become me to shrink. The station in which I have been placed calls for the discharge of an important public trust at my hands. It shall be performed to the best of my ability, inadequate as I know that ability to be. When I speak of the short period which has been allowed us, I hope not to be understood as expressing, on our part, any dissatisfaction at the course which has been pursued, or any wish to prolong the time which has been allotted for trial. We are sensible of a disposition in this honorable Court to grant us every indulgence which we ought to ask, and when their attention is called to the precipitate hurry of our preparation, it is only to offer, on behalf of an individual, perhaps a weak apology for the weak defence which he is about to make of the cause confided to his care. A desire for the furtherance of justice and the avoidance of delay, but, above all, an unshaken conviction that we stand on impregnable ground, induce us on this short notice to declare that we are ready to substantiate our accusation, to prove that the respondent is guilty in such manner as he stands impeached.

It is a painful but indispensable task which we are called upon to perform: to establish the guilt of a great officer of Government, of a man, who, if he had made a just use of those faculties which God and nature bestowed upon him, would have been the ornament and benefactor of his country, would have rendered her services as eminent and useful as he has inflicted upon her outrages and wrongs deep and deadly. A character endowed by nature with some of her best attributes, cultivated by education, placed by his country in a conspicuous station, invested with authority whose righteous exercise would have rendered him a terror to the wicked, whilst it endeared him to the wise and good: such a character, presented to the nation in the light in which he now stands, and in which his misdeeds have made it our duty to bring him forward, forms one of the saddest spectacles which can be offered to the public eye. Base is that heart which could triumph over him.

I will now proceed to state the principal points on which we mean to rely, and which we expect to establish by the clearest evidence. In doing this I shall be necessarily led to notice many of the leading statements of the respondent’s answer. We will begin with the first article. [Here Mr. R. read that article.] The answer to the first of these charges is by evasive insinuation and misrepresentation, by an attempt to wrest the accusation from its true bearing, the manner and time of delivering the opinion, and the intent with which it was delivered, to the correctness of the opinion itself, which is not the point in issue. And here permit me to remark, that if the Managers of this impeachment were governed only by their own conviction of the course which they ought, necessarily, to pursue, and not by the high sense of duty which they owe to their eminent employers, they would have felt themselves justified in resting their accusation on the admissions of the respondent himself. It is not for the opinion itself, that the respondent is impeached; it is for a daring inroad upon the criminal jurisprudence of his country, by delivering that opinion at a time and in a manner (in writing) before unknown and unheard of. The criminal intent is to be inferred from the boldness of the innovation itself, as well as from other overt acts charged in this article. The admission of the respondent ought to secure his conviction on this charge. He acknowledges he did deliver an opinion, in writing, on the question of law, (which it was the right and duty of the jury to determine, as well as the fact,) before counsel had been heard in defence of John Fries, the prisoner. I must beg the assistance of one of the gentlemen with whom I am associated, to read this part of the answer. [Mr. Clark accordingly read the reply of Mr. Chase to this charge.] We charge the respondent with a gross departure from the forms, and a flagrant outrage upon the substance of criminal justice, in delivering a written, prejudicated opinion on the case of Fries, tending to bias the minds of the jury against him before counsel had been heard in his defence. The respondent (page 33, of the answer) admits the fact, for he knew that we are prepared to prove it. But he artfully endeavors to shift the argument from the real point in contest, to the soundness of the opinion itself, which, however questionable, (and of its incorrectness I entertain no doubt,) it is not our object at this time to examine. For the truth of this opinion and, as it would seem, for the propriety of this proceeding, the respondent takes shelter under precedent. He tells you, sir, this doctrine had been repeatedly decided on solemn argument and deliberation, twice in the same court, and once in that very case. What is this, but a confession, that he himself hath been the first man to venture on so daring an innovation on the forms of our criminal jurisprudence? To justify himself for having given a written opinion before counsel had been heard for the prisoner, he resorts to the example set by his predecessors, who had delivered the customary verbal opinion, after solemn arguments and deliberation. And what do these repeated arguments and solemn deliberations prove, but that none of his predecessors ever arrogated to themselves the monstrous privilege of breaking in upon those sacred institutions, which guard the life and liberty of the citizen from the rude inroads of powerful injustice? The learned and eminent judges, to whose example he appeals, for justification, decided after, and not before a hearing. They exercised the acknowledged privilege of the bench in giving an opinion to the jury on the question of law, after it had been fully argued by counsel on both sides. They never attempted, by previous and written decisions, to wrest from the jury their undeniable right of deciding upon the law as well as the fact, necessarily involved in a general verdict, to usurp the decision to themselves, or to prejudice the minds of the jurors against the defence. I beg this honorable Court never to lose sight of the circumstance, that this was a criminal trial, for a capital offence, and that the offence charged was treason. The respondent also admits, that the counsel for Fries, not meaning to contest the truth of the facts charged in the indictment, rested their defence altogether upon the law, which he declared to have been settled in the cases of Vigol and Mitchell: a decision which, although it might be binding on the Court, the jury were not obliged to respect, and which the counsel had a right to controvert before them, the sole judges, in a case of that nature, both of the law and fact. I do not deny the right of the Court to explain their sense of the law to the jury, after counsel have been heard; but I do deny that the jury are bound by such exposition. If they verily believe that the overt acts charged in the indictment did not amount to treason, they could not without a surrender of their consciences into the hands of the Court, without a flagrant violation of all that is dear and sacred to man, bring in a verdict of guilty. I repeat that in such a case the jury are not only the sole judges of the law, but that where their verdict is favorable to the prisoner, they are the judges without appeal. In civil cases, indeed, the verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted; but in a criminal prosecution, the verdict, if not guilty, is final and conclusive. It is only when the finding of the jury is unfavorable to the prisoner, that the humane provisions of our law, always jealous of oppression when the life or liberty of the citizen is at stake, permits the verdict to be set aside, and a new trial granted to the unhappy culprit. When I concede the right of the Court to explain the law to the jury in a criminal, and especially in a capital case, I am penetrated with a conviction that it ought to be done, if at all, with great caution and delicacy. I must beg leave to take, before this honorable Court, what appears, to my unlettered judgment, to be a strong and obvious distinction. There is, in my mind, a material difference between a naked definition of law, the application of which is left to the jury, and the application by the Court of such definition to the particular case upon which the jury are called upon to find a general verdict. Surely, there is a wide and evident distinction between an abstract opinion upon a point of law, and an opinion applied to the facts admitted by the party accused, or proven against him. But it is alleged, on behalf of the respondent, that the law in this case was settled, and upon this he rests his defence. Will it be pretended by any man that the law of treason is better established than the law of murder? What is treason, as defined by the constitution? Levying war against the United States, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. What is murder? Killing with malice aforethought, a definition at least as simple and plain as the other. And because what constitutes murder has been established and settled through a long succession of ages and adjudications, has any judge, for that reason, been ever daring enough to assert that counsel should be precluded from endeavoring to convince the jury that the overt acts, charged in the indictment, did not amount to murder? Is a Court authorized to say, that, because killing with a deliberate malice is murder, therefore the act of killing, admitted by the prisoner’s counsel, or established by evidence, was a killing with malice prepense, and did constitute murder? I venture to say that an instance cannot be adduced, familiar as the definition of murder is even to the most ignorant, numerous as have been the convictions for that atrocious crime, where counsel have been deprived of their unquestionable right to address the jury on the law, as well as on the fact. Much less can an instance be produced, in any trial for a capital offence, where they have found themselves anticipated in the question of law by a written opinion, to be taken by the jury out of court, as the landmark by which their verdict is to be directed. I have always understood, that even in a civil case, when the jury carried out with them a written paper, relating to the matter in issue, and which was not offered, or permitted to be given in evidence to them, it was sufficient to vitiate their verdict, and good ground for a new trial. This written opinion of the Court, delivered previous to a hearing of the cause, is a novelty to our laws and usages. It would be reprehensible in any case, but in a criminal prosecution, for a capital offence, and that offence treason, (where, above all, oppression and arbitrary proceedings on the part of courts are most to be dreaded and guarded against,) it cannot be too strongly reprobated or too severely punished.

What would be said of a judge who in a trial for murder, where the facts were admitted (or proved) should declare from the bench, that whatever argument counsel had to offer, in relation to the facts, may be addressed to the jury, but that they should not attempt to convince the jury that such facts came not within the law, did not amount to murder, but that every thing which they had to say upon the question of law, should be addressed to the Court, and to the Court only. Can you figure to yourselves a spectacle more horrible?

We are prepared to prove, what the respondent has in part admitted, that he “restricted the counsel of Fries from citing such English authorities as they believed apposite, and certain statutes of the United States which they deemed material to their defence:” that the prisoner was debarred by him from his constitutional privilege of addressing the jury, through his counsel, on the law, as well as the fact involved in the verdict which they were required to give, and that he attempted to wrest from the jury their undeniable right to hear argument, and, consequently, to determine upon the question of law which in a criminal case it was their sole and unquestionable province to decide. These last charges (except as far as relates to the laws of the United States) are impliedly admitted by the respondent. He confesses that he would not admit the prisoner’s counsel to cite certain cases, “because they could not inform but might deceive and mislead the jury.” Mr. President, it is the noblest trait in this inestimable trial, that in criminal prosecutions, where the verdict is general, the jury are the sole judges, and, where they acquit the prisoner, the judges, without appeal, both of law and fact. And what is the declaration of the respondent but an admission that he wished to take from the jury their indisputable privilege to hear argument and determine upon the law, and to usurp to himself that power which belongs to them, and to them only? It is one of the most glorious attributes of jury trial, that in criminal cases (particularly such as are capital) the prisoner’s counsel may (and they often do) attempt “to deceive and mislead the jury.” It is essential to the fairness of the trial, that it should be conducted with perfect freedom. It is congenial to the generous spirit of our institutions to lean to the side of an unhappy fellow-creature, put in jeopardy of limb, or life, or liberty. The free principles of our Governments, individual and federal, teach us to make every humane allowance in his favor, to grant him, with a liberality unknown to the narrow and tyrannous maxims of most nations, every indulgence not inconsistent with the due administration of justice. Hence, a greater latitude is permitted to the prosecutor. The jury, upon whose verdict the event is staked, are presumed to be men capable of understanding what they are called upon to decide, and the Attorney for the State a gentleman learned in his profession, capable of detecting and exposing the attempts of the opposite counsel to mislead and deceive. There is, moreover, the Court, to which, in cases of difficulty, recourse might be had. But what, indeed, is the difficulty arising from the law in criminal cases, for the most part? What is to hinder an honest jury from deciding, especially after the aid of an able discussion, whether such an act was killing with malice prepense, or such other overt acts set forth in an indictment, constituted a levying war against the United States; and to what purpose has treason been defined by the constitution itself, if overbearing, arbitrary judges are permitted to establish among us the odious and dangerous doctrine of constructive treason? The acts of Congress which had been referred to on the former trial, but which the respondent said he would not suffer to be cited again, tended to show that the offence committed by Fries did not amount to treason; that it was a misdemeanor only, already provided for by law, and punishable with fine and imprisonment. The respondent indeed denies this part of the charge, but he justifies it even (as he says) if it be proved upon him. And are the laws of our own country (as well as foreign authorities) not to be suffered to be read in our courts, in justification of a man whose life is put in jeopardy?

I now proceed to the second article--the case of Basset, whose objection to serve on Callender’s jury was overruled by the judge who stands arraigned before this honorable Court. In the 30th page of the respondent’s answer it is stated, that a new trial was granted to Fries, “upon the ground (as this respondent understood and believes) that one of the jurors, after he was summoned, but before he was sworn, had made some declaration unfavorable to the prisoner.” It will be remembered that both the trials of Fries preceded that of Callender. Upon what principle, then, could the respondent declare Basset a good juryman, when he was apprised of the previous decision in the case of Fries, by his brother judge, whom he professes to hold in such high reverence, and by whose decision, on his own principles, he must have held himself bound. For surely the same exception to a juryman which would furnish ground for a new trial, ought to be a cause of setting aside such juror, if it be taken previous to his being sworn.

From the respondent’s own showing it appears, that the question put to the jurymen generally, and to Basset among others, was, whether they “had formed and delivered any opinion upon the subject-matter then to be tried, or concerning the charges contained in the indictment.” And here let me refer the Court to the question which the respondent put to the jurors in the case of Fries. It was, “whether they had ever formed or delivered any opinion as to his guilt, or innocence, or that he ought to be punished?” How is this departure from the respondent’s own practice, this inconsistency with himself, to be reconciled? In the one case the question is put in the disjunctive; “have you formed or delivered?” In the other, it is in the conjunctive, “formed and delivered;” besides other material difference in the terms and import of the two questions. Wherefore, I repeat, this contradiction of himself? But, Mr. President, we shall be prepared to prove that the words “subject-matter then to be tried,” were not comprised in the question propounded to Basset, or to any of the other jurors. The question was, as will be shown in evidence, “have you ever formed and delivered any opinion concerning the charges contained in the indictment?” And it is remarkable that the whole argument of the respondent upon this point goes to justify the question which was actually put, and which he probably expected we should prove that he did put, rather than that which he himself declares to have been propounded by him. Such a question must necessarily have been answered in the negative. Basset could never have seen the indictment: and although his mind might have been made up on the book, whatever opinion he might have formed and delivered as to the guilt of Callender, or however desirous he might have been of procuring his conviction and punishment, still, not having seen the indictment, he could not divine what passages of the book were made the subject of charges, and, by the criterion established by the judge, he was a good juror. But if the juror’s mind was thus prejudiced against the book and the writer, was he, merely because he had not seen the indictment, competent to pass between him and his country on the charges contained in it, and extracted out of the book? And even if the question had been such as the respondent states, yet being put in the conjunctive, the most inveterate foe of the traverser who was artful, or cautious enough to forbear the expression of his enmity, would thereby have been admitted as competent to pass between the traverser and his country in a criminal prosecution.

The third article relates to the rejection of John Taylor’s testimony. This fact also is admitted, and an attempt is made to justify it, on the ground of its “irrelevancy” on the pretext that the witness could not prove the whole of a particular charge. By recurring to “The Prospect before Us,” a book, which, with all its celebrity, I never saw till yesterday, I find this charge consists of two distinct sentences. Taken separately the respondent asserts that they mean nothing; taken together, a great deal. And because the respondent undertook to determine (without any authority as far as I can learn) that Colonel Taylor could not prove the whole, that is both sentences, he rejected his evidence entirely, for “irrelevancy.” Might not his testimony have been relevant to that of some other witness, on the same, or on another charge? I appeal to the learning and good sense of this honorable Court, whether it is not an unheard of practice (until the present instance) in a criminal prosecution, to declare testimony inadmissible because it is not expected to go to the entire exculpation of the prisoner? Does it not daily occur in our courts, that a party accused, making out a part of his defence by one witness and establishing other facts by the evidence of other persons; does it not daily occur that the testimony of various witnesses sometimes to the same, and sometimes to different facts, does so relieve and support the whole case, as to leave no doubt of the innocence or guilt of the accused, in the minds of the jury, who, it must never be forgotten, are, in such cases, the sole judges both of the law and the fact? Suppose, for instance, that the testimony of two witnesses would establish all the facts, but that each of those facts are not known by either of them. According to this doctrine the evidence of both might be declared inadmissible, and a man whose innocence, if the testimony in his favor were not rejected, might be clearly proved to the satisfaction of the jury, may thus be subjected by the verdict of that very jury to an ignominious death. Shall principles so palpably cruel and unjust be tolerated in this free country? I am free to declare that the decision of Mr. Chase, in rejecting Colonel Taylor’s testimony, was contrary to the known and established rules of evidence, and this I trust will be shown by my learned associates, to the full satisfaction of this honorable Court, if indeed they can require further satisfaction on a point so clear and indisputable. But this honorable Court will be astonished when they are told (and the declaration will be supported by undeniable proof) that at this very time neither the traverser, his counsel, nor the Court, knew the extent to which Colonel Taylor’s evidence would go. They were apprised, indeed, that he would show that Mr. Adams was an aristocrat, and that he had proved serviceable to the British interest, in the sense conveyed by the book; but they little dreamed that his evidence, if permitted to have been given in, would have thrown great light upon many other of the charges. There is one ground of defence taken by the respondent, which, I did suppose, a gentleman of his discernment would have sedulously avoided: that although the traverser had justified nineteen out of twenty of the charges contained in the indictment, if he could not prove the truth of the twentieth, it was of little moment, as he was, “thereby, put into the power of the Court.” Gracious God! sir, what inference is to be drawn from this horrible insinuation?

In justification of the charges contained in the fourth article, the respondent, unable to deny the fact, confesses that he did require “the questions intended to be put to the witness to be reduced to writing, and submitted to the Court,” in the first instance, as we shall prove, and before they had been verbally propounded. And this requisition, he contends, it was “the right and duty of the Court” to make. It would not become me, elsewhere, or on any other occasion, to dispute the authority of the respondent, on legal questions, but I do aver that such is not the law, at least in the State in which that trial was held, nor do I believe that it is law any where. I speak of the United States. Sir, in the famous case of Logwood, whereat the Chief Justice of the United States presided, I was present, being one of the grand jury who found a true bill against him. It must be conceded that the Government was as deeply interested in arresting the career of this dangerous and atrocious criminal, who had aimed his blow against the property of every man in society, as it could be in bringing to punishment a weak and worthless scribbler. And yet, although much testimony was offered by the prisoner, which did by no means go to his entire exculpation; although much of that testimony was of a very questionable nature, none of it was declared inadmissible; it was suffered to go to the jury, who were left to judge of its weight and credibility; nor were any interrogatories to the witnesses required to be reduced to writing. And I will go farther, and say that it never has been done before or since Callender’s trial, in any court of Virginia, and I believe I might add in the United States, whether State or Federal. No, sir, the enlightened man who presided in Logwood’s case knew that, although the basest and vilest of criminals, he was entitled to justice, equally with the most honorable member of society. He did not avail himself of the previous and great discoveries, in criminal law, of this respondent; he admitted the prisoner’s testimony to go to the jury; he never thought it his right or his duty to require questions to be reduced to writing; he gave the accused a fair trial, according to law and usage, without any innovation or departure from the established rules of criminal jurisprudence in this country.

The respondent also acknowledges his refusal to postpone the trial of Callender, although an affidavit was regularly filed, stating the absence of material witnesses on his behalf; and here again the ground of his defence is, in my estimation, good cause for his conviction. The dispersed situation of the witnesses, which he alleges to have been the motive of his refusal, is, to my mind, one of the most unanswerable reasons for granting a postponement. The other three charges contained in this article will be supported by unquestionable evidence: the rude and contemptuous expressions of the judge to the prisoner’s counsel; his repeated and vexatious interruptions of them; his indecent solicitude and predetermined resolution to effect the conviction of the accused. This predetermination we shall prove to have been expressed by him long before, as well as on his journey to Richmond, and whilst the prosecution was pending; besides the proofs which the trial itself afforded.

The fifth article is for the respondent’s having “awarded a capias against the body of James Thompson Callender, indicted for an offence not capital, whereupon the said Callender was arrested and committed to close custody, contrary to law in such case made and provided:” that is, contrary to the act of Assembly of Virginia, recognized (by the act of Congress passed in 1789, for the establishment of the judicial courts of the United States) as the rule of decision in the federal courts, to be held in that State, until other provision be made. The defence of the respondent embraces several points: That the act of Virginia was passed posterior to the act of Congress, viz: in 1792, and could not be intended by the latter to be a rule of decision. Fortunately, there is no necessity to question, which we might well do, the truth of his position. It may be necessary to inform some of the members of this honorable Court, that, about twelve or thirteen years ago, the laws of Virginia underwent a revision; all those relating to a particular subject being condensed into one, and the whole code thereby rendered less cumbrous and perplexed. Hence, many of our laws, to a casual and superficial observer, would appear to take their date so late as the year 1792, although their provisions were, long before, in force. The twenty-eighth section of this very act, on which we rely, the Court will perceive to have been enacted in 1788, one year preceding the act of Congress. (Virg. laws, chap. 74, sec. 28, page 106, note b. Pleasants’ edition.) [Here Mr. Randolph read the act referred to.] “Upon presentment made by a grand jury of an offence not capital, the Court shall order the clerk to issue a summons, or other proper process, against the person so presented, to appear and answer such presentment at the next court,” &c. But the respondent, aware, no doubt, of this fact, asserts that the act not being adduced, he was not bound to know of its existence, and that he ought not to be censured for the omissions of the traverser’s counsel, whose duty it was to have cited it on behalf of their client; and this objection, with the preceding ones, which I have endeavored to answer, will equally apply to the sixth article. Sir, when the counsel for the traverser were told by the judge at the outset, when they referred to a provision of this very law, “that such may be your local State laws here in Virginia, but that to suppose them as applying to the courts of the United States, is a wild notion,” would it not, indeed, have been a wild experiment in them to cite the same law with a view of influencing the opinion of a man, who had scornfully scouted the idea that he was to be governed by it?

Unwilling, however, to rest himself now on the ground which he then took, the respondent justifies himself by declaring that he complied, although ignorantly, with this law, by issuing that other proper process, of which it speaks, that is, a capias. But that other process must be of the nature of a summons, notifying the party to appear at the next term; and will any man pretend to say, that a capias taking him into close custody and obliging him to appear, not at the next, but at the existing term, is such process as that law describes? Sir, not only the law, but the uniform practice under it, as we are prepared to show by evidence, declares the capias not to be the proper process. But it is said that this would be nothing more than notice to the party accused to abscond, and therefore ought not to be law. Sir, we are not talking about what ought to have been the law; that is no concern of ours; the question is, what was the law? But the impolicy of this mode of proceeding is far from being ascertained. It is a relief to the innocent who may be in a state of accusation. It saves the expense of imprisoning the guilty, and if they should prefer voluntary exile to standing a trial, is it so very clear that the State is thereby more injured than by holding them to punishment, after which they would remain in her bosom to perpetrate new offences? Remember, this proceeding is against petty offenders, not felons. It does not apply to capital cases; to felonies, then capital, for which our law has since commuted the punishment of death, into that of imprisonment at hard labor.

For further defence against the sixth article, the respondent takes shelter under this position: That the provision of the law of the United States establishing the judicial courts relates only to rights acquired under State laws, which come into question on the trial, and not to forms of process before the trial, and can have no application to offences created by statute, which cannot, with propriety, be termed trials at “common law.” We are prepared to show that the words “trials at common law,” are used in that statute, not in their most restricted sense, but to contradistinguish a certain description of cases from those arising in equity, or under maritime or civil law.

I will pass over the seventh article of impeachment, as well because I am nearly exhausted, as being content to leave it on the ground where the respondent himself has placed it. It would be impossible for us to put it in a stronger light than has been thrown upon it by his own admission.

The eighth and last article remains to be considered--[article read.] I ask this honorable Court whether the prostitution of the bench of justice, to the purposes of an hustings, is to be tolerated? We have nothing to do with the politics of the man. Let him speak, and write, and publish, as he pleases. This is his right in common with his fellow-citizens. The press is free. If he must electioneer and abuse the government under which he lives, I know no law to prevent or punish him, provided he seeks the wonted theatres for his exhibition. But shall a judge declaim on these topics from his seat of office? Shall he not put off the political partisan when he ascends the tribune? or shall we have the pure stream of public justice polluted with the venom of party virulence? In short, does it follow that a judge carries all the rights of a private citizen with him upon the bench, and that he may there do every act which, as a freeman, he may do elsewhere, without being questioned for his conduct?

But, sir, we are told that this high Court is not a court of errors and appeals, but a court of impeachment, and that however incorrectly the respondent may have conducted himself, proof must be adduced of criminal intent, of wilful error, to constitute guilt. The quo animo is to be inferred from the facts themselves; there is no other mode by which, in any case, it can be determined, and even the respondent admits that there are acts of a nature so flagrant that guilt must be inferred from them, if the party be of sound mind. But this concession is qualified by the monstrous pretension that an act to be impeachable must be indictable. Where? In the federal courts? There, not even robbery and murder are indictable, except in a few places under our exclusive jurisdiction. It is not an indictable offence under the laws of the United States for a judge to go on the bench in a state of intoxication--it may not be in all the State courts; and it is indictable nowhere for him to omit to do his duty, to refuse to hold a court. But who can doubt that both are impeachable offences, and ought to subject the offender to removal from office? But in this long and disgusting catalogue of crimes and misdemeanors, (which he has in a great measure confessed,) the respondent tells you he had accomplices, and that what was guilt in him could not be innocence in them. I must beg the Court to consider the facts alleged against the respondent in all their accumulated atrocity; not to take them, each in an insulated point of view, but as a chain of evidence indissolubly linked together, and establishing the indisputable proof of his guilt. Call to mind his high standing and character, and his superior age and rank, and then ask yourselves whether he stands justified in a long course of oppression and injustice, because men of weak intellect and yet feebler temper--men of far inferior standing to the respondent, have tamely acquiesced in such acts of violence and outrage? He is charged with various acts of injustice, with a series of misconduct so connected in time, and place, and circumstance, as to leave no doubt, on my mind at least, of intentional ill. Can this be justified, because his several associates have at several times and occasions barely yielded a faint compliance, which perhaps they dared not withhold? Can they be considered as equally culpable with him whose accumulated crimes are to be divided amongst them, who had given at best but a negative sanction to them? But, sir, would the establishment of their guilt prove his innocence? At most, it would only prove that they too ought to be punished. Wherever we behold the respondent sitting in judgment, there do we behold violence and injustice. Before him the counsel are always contumacious. The most accomplished advocates of the different States, whose demeanor to his brethren is uniformly conciliating and temperate, are to him, and him only, obstinate, perverse, rude, and irritating. Contumacy has been found to exist only where he presided.

I have endeavored, Mr. President, in a manner, I am sensible, very lame and inadequate, to discharge the duty incumbent on me; to enumerate the principal points upon which we shall rely, and to repel some of the prominent objections advanced by the respondent. Whilst we confidently expect his conviction, it is from the strength of our cause, and not from any art or skill in conducting it. It requires so little support that (thank Heaven) it cannot be injured by any weakness of mine. We shall bring forward, in proof, such a specimen of judicial tyranny, as, I trust in God, will never be again exhibited in our country.

The respondent hath closed his defence by an appeal to the great Searcher of Hearts for the purity of his motives. For his sake, I rejoice that, by the timely exercise of that mercy which, for wise purposes, has been reposed in the Executive, this appeal is not drowned by the blood of an innocent man crying aloud for vengeance; that the mute agony of widowed despair, and the wailing voice of the orphan, do not plead to Heaven for justice on the oppressor’s head. But for that intervention, self-accusation before that dread tribunal would have been needless. On that awful day the blood of a poor, ignorant, friendless, unlettered German, murdered under the semblance and color of law, sent without pity to the scaffold, would have risen in judgment at the Throne of Grace, against the unhappy man arraigned at your bar. But the President of the United States by a well-timed act, at once of justice and mercy, (and mercy, like charity, covereth a multitude of sins,) wrested the victim from his grasp, and saved him from the countless horrors of remorse, by not suffering the pure ermine of justice to be dyed in the innocent blood of John Fries.

The Managers proceeded to the examination of witnesses in support of the prosecution.

William Lewis, affirmed.

Mr. Dallas, Mr. W. Ewing, and I were counsel for John Fries, at his request, and I believe by the assignment of the Court, on his trial in the year 1799. It was conducted, I believe, in the usual manner, and we were certainly allowed all the privileges that were customary on such occasions. The trial was had before Judges Iredell and Peters. He was convicted, and a new trial was ordered, because one of the jurors had manifested a prejudice against the people in general concerned in the insurrection, and against Fries in particular. This trial took place partly in April and partly in May, 1799. At October session following, Mr. Dallas and I attended at Norristown, expecting the trial would again take place; but it did not. The proceedings on the first indictment were quashed by the District Attorney, and a new bill was found at April term, 1800, at which Judges Chase and Peters presided. Mr. Dallas and I appeared again as the counsel of Fries, at his request, and I believe we were assigned by the Court, but of this I am not certain. On the morning of a certain day, which I do not now recollect, I entered the court room when the judges were on the bench, and, if I recollect rightly, the prisoner was in the bar; but if he was not then there, I feel very sure that he soon was. The list of petit jurors was called over, and many of them answered.

Almost immediately after the jurors were called over, Judge Chase began to speak. At this time Mr. Dallas had not come into court. Judge Chase said, he understood, or had been informed, that on the former trial or trials, for it was impossible for me to know whether he alluded to the case of Fries only, or of him and others, there had been a great waste of time in making long speeches on topics which had nothing to do with the business, and in reading common law cases on treason, as well as on treason under the statute of Edward the Third, and also certain statutes of the United States, respecting the resisting of process, and other offences less than treason. He also said, that to prevent this in future, he or they, I do not precisely recollect which, had considered the law, had made up their minds, and had reduced their opinion to writing on the subject, and would not suffer these cases to be read again; and in order that the counsel (but whether for the prisoner, or the counsel on both sides, I cannot say) might govern themselves conformably, he had ordered three copies of that opinion to be made out, one to be delivered to the prisoner’s counsel, one to the counsel in support of the prosecution, and the other, as soon as the case was fully opened, or gone through, I cannot say which, to be delivered by the clerk of the court to the jury. I rather think that the expression was, fully gone through.

Judge Chase said, I think on the first day, that they were judges of the law, and if they did not understand it they were unworthy of their seats, or unfit to sit there, and that if the prisoner’s counsel had any thing to say, to show that they had mistaken the law, or that they were wrong, the counsel must address themselves to the Court for that purpose, and not to the jury. I made some observations in answer, which it is impossible for me in all respects particularly to recollect, as having passed at this time, since some parts of it may perhaps have taken place in other stages of the business. At this time Mr. Dallas was not in court. I was struck with what appeared to me to be a great novelty in the proceedings; and as I was extremely anxious to be of service to Fries, I was desirous that Mr. Dallas might be present. I think I went out of the bar to get somebody to go for him, and while I was out of the bar, he entered the room. I briefly stated to him what had taken place, or some parts of it; but I believe, not the whole. We came forward, and we made some remarks, which I am unable to repeat. I was early struck with the idea, that as the Court had made up their minds, and decided the question of law, before the jury was sworn, or the witnesses or counsel heard, it was not likely we should alter that opinion by any thing we might say, and that we should probably render Fries more service by withdrawing from his defence, than by engaging in it. We told him so, and earnestly recommended to him to pursue that course. He appeared greatly alarmed and extremely agitated, and much at a loss what determination to come to. We, however, told him that, if he insisted on it, we would proceed in his defence at every hazard, and contend for what we deemed our constitutional rights as his counsel, until stopped by the Court; or we used expressions to this effect. His state of alarm and apprehension scarcely left him the power to decide for himself. After some time he acquiesced in our advice; said he had nobody to depend on but us; that he was sure we would do our best for him, and he would leave us to do for him as we pleased. Being very anxious for him, we told him we would call upon him at the jail, and satisfy his mind as to the course which we wished him to pursue. He finally agreed to our proposal to withdraw; but as we were apprehensive that the Court might assign him other counsel in our place, and that our views might be defeated by such an arrangement, we advised him against accepting any, and I understood that he afterwards did refuse to accept of any other counsel. I will not assign my reasons for giving this advice, as it might, perhaps, be improper, unless I am directed by the Court.

Mr. Martin asked what those reasons were?

The President desired the examination to proceed on the part of the House of Representatives, and said when that was closed, the witness might be examined by the counsel for Judge Chase.

Mr. Lewis. It being thus determined that we should withdraw, and that Fries should not accept any counsel that might be assigned him, I left the court, expecting to have little or nothing more to say, as we were no longer counsel for the prisoner. The next morning, soon after the court was opened, and, I believe, when the prisoner was in the bar, Judge Chase addressed Mr. Dallas and myself, and probably Mr. Rawle, and asked us if we were ready to proceed? I answered that I was not, or that we were not any longer counsel for the prisoner. He asked our reasons for this; and I began to answer by mentioning what had taken place the day before; on which he and Judge Peters certainly manifested a strong disposition that we should proceed in the prisoner’s defence, and that they would remove every restriction which had been previously imposed. I was stopped in what I was about to say by Judge Chase telling us to go on in our own way, and address the jury on the law as well as the facts, as we thought proper; but, at the same time, he said it would be under the direction of the Court; and at our own peril, or the risk of our characters, if we conducted ourselves with impropriety. This had rather a contrary effect on my mind than that of inducing me to proceed, as I did not know that there had been any thing in my conduct so indecorous as to make it necessary to remind me that, if I proceeded, it should be at my own peril and risk of character; and this expression, therefore, rather strengthened than lessened the determination which I had taken.

Spotted a typo or a problem in this chapter? Tell us