A photographic record of the Russo-Japanese war

Introduction

The Russo-Japanese War was notable for the fact that, although there were more men on the spot ready to transmit the news to the world than there have been in any other war in modern times, there never has been a war since the days of the telegraph and the professional correspondent the daily news of which the world at large knew so little. There is, therefore, a unique interest in so vivid and comprehensive a pictorial history as that gathered by Collier’s correspondent photographers and presented in the following pages. Practically all the photographs, with the exception of a very few of those depicting scenes in Russia’ and with the Russian forces, were taken originally and exclusively for Collier’s, and they have not appeared elsewhere except by special arrangement and permission. A large number of these photographs have never been printed in Collier’s, and they are published in this book for the first time. Even these were chosen from many hundreds of others, and they represent but a small part of the great mass of photographs which were secured by Collier’s indefatigable representatives at the front. In each weekly issue of Collier’s it was obviously impossible to devote more than a few pages exclusively to war pictures, and in such a small space it is a task of exceeding difficulty to convey to the casual reader any adequate realization of the unique value and the comprehensive extent of Collier’s Russo-Japanese War service. In this book the cumulative effect of many pictures helps to give at least a partial idea of the amount of material gathered by Collier’s correspondents, and it should be further explained that almost every one of the pictures herein reproduced is chosen from perhaps a dozen or score of photographs of similar scenes.

Since the days of the telegraph and the modern war correspondent, there has never been a war in which the work of the chroniclers was beset with such difficulties. During the early months of hostilities practically all of the correspondents were bottled up in Tokio, chafing at their delay, beseeching this official and that, buying winter outfits only to be compelled to change them for summer equipment, and wasting their energies during this fretful period of uncertainty in the description of conventional phases of Japanese life or of the entertainments given them by their inscrutable hosts of the Japanese war departments. It was only by some rare stroke of forehandedness, daring, or luck, by which he escaped temporarily from the Japanese watchfulness and censorship, that any correspondent was able at this time to do effective work. Of the little army of men who tried to chronicle the war, with pencil or camera, none more really “made good” than Collier’s photographer, James H. Hare. Mr. Hare worked in Tokio before war was declared, and he followed Kuroki’s army from its landing in Korea through the Yalu campaign and until the battle of the Sha-Ho. Mr. Hare is a specialist not in any sense a “button-pusher,” as he calls the amateur who carries a camera as an incidental. “When we stood on the heights of Wiju,” wrote Collier’s correspondent, Frederick Palmer, “the soldiers appeared only as the veriest specks to a camera lens. Jimmy wanted to see the charge as much as the rest of us. But the detail had to be shown and the photographer must be near the detail, so Jimmy slipped away when the censor wasn’t looking. I wonder if those who saw the realistic pictures of the groups of wounded around the hospital tents at the Yalu realized at all what they cost this little man, who is nearing his fiftieth year. He was the first of the correspondents’ corps to cross the river. He trudged through miles of sand up to his knees. His pony was worn out; his weary servant promptly resigned. But Jimmy himself was up the next morning at daybreak, ill and pale, developing the first photographs of the army at the front to be published.”

Another of Collier’s photographers, Robert L. Dunn, was sent to Chemulpo before hostilities broke out and “beat” the newspaper and periodical world with his pictures of the first battle of the war and the landing of Japanese troops. The greater portion of the Russian pictures were taken by Victor K. Bulla, whose work in this country was controlled exclusively by Collier’s. Dozens of photographs which the reader may survey at his ease were taken only after long marches over frozen and wind-swept country. Films were developed in the field with the help of Korean coolies or Japanese commissary officers, and they reached Collier’s office only after being carried scores and perhaps hundreds of miles by coolie runners through a country where a mail service was unknown. Every one of the photographs printed in this book represents an outlay of time, energy, and money of which the uninitiated reader can have only a slight understanding.

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I. THE CAUSES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The war between Russia and Japan was a fight for disputed territory. Its immediate cause was the failure of the two nations to agree on the relation which each should maintain toward Korea and Manchuria. The underlying cause of the struggle was the mighty clash that was bound to come when those measures which Japan believed were necessary to her self-existence met the glacier-like progress of Russia eastward toward the Pacific. Through nearly three centuries the Russian Empire had advanced from the Ural Mountains to outposts and outlets on the Pacific Coast. Her mighty plans met no serious check until they came athwart the ambitions and policy of the modernized Japan, which saw in this alleged expansion for industrial development a menace to her integrity as a kingdom. Korea, a buffer between these two powers, became involved in the dispute by the results of the war between Japan and China in 1894. The intervention of the European Powers in the terms of treaty settlement robbed Japan of her chief spoil, the Liaotung Peninsula, whose stronghold was Port Arthur. Russia, Germany, and France intimated that Japanese occupation of this base must be regarded as a permanent threat to the independence of China and Korea. Three years later, Russia began to fortify Port Arthur, on the pretext that German acquisition of Kiaochau would otherwise disturb the balance of power in North China.

The Boxer outbreak of 1900 furnished Russia reasons for vastly increasing her military strength in Manchuria, to safeguard her railway across Siberia and her rapidly expanding commercial and colonization interests. Promises were made, and broken, that Manchuria would be evacuated and restored to Chinese control as soon as peaceful conditions were resumed in accordance with the joint agreements of the powers that the integrity of China should be preserved. When it became certain that Russia had no intention of loosening her grip on Manchuria, the Japanese Government proposed a conference, in July of 1903, for the purpose of assuring the lasting peace of Eastern Asia, by agreeing upon a working basis for settlement of the points at issue with Russia. Japan wished guarantees of the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and the “open door” in both countries for commercial opportunity. Russia replied that she was ready to recognize the rights of Japan as the predominating influence in Korea, but refused to discuss further pledges regarding the future of China and Manchuria. The Russian attitude was influenced most strongly by the facts that Russia wanted an outlet to the Pacific, and that the outlay of three hundred million dollars in Manchuria, to make that province both Russian and prosperous, called for some tangible return. Japan refused to consider herself outside the sphere of active interest in Manchuria, and negotiations came to a deadlock early in 1904.

On January 4, Japanese advices said that a conflict with Russia was inevitable, that the newspapers were urging the opening of hostilities, and that the Government was massing troops ready to embark on transports. The diplomats in St. Petersburg were delaying over the final reply to the Japanese note and were not expecting war, according to their assurances.

During the following week, Russia was hurrying troops toward the frontier and buying horses, while the Argentine cruisers, Nisshin and Kasuga, bought by Japan, were making ready to leave Genoa with rush orders to proceed to Yokohama. Meantime, the negotiations were continued with proposals and counter-proposals that made no progress.

On January 13, a conference before the Throne in Tokio decided upon the final terms to be sent to Russia, the only conditions which could avert war. Russia started two divisions of troops over the Trans-Siberian Railway to China, an obvious war measure. Two days later two transports crowded with Russian troops for the Far East sailed through the Bosphorus. Russia asked Turkey for permission to send the Black Sea fleet through the Dardanelles, and Lord Lansdowne said that such action would be considered a breach of treaty in which Great Britain could not acquiesce.

There was a lull of nearly two weeks, while Tokio fretted over the delay of the Russian reply. Japan adopted plans for raising seventy-five million dollars of an emergency war fund.

The long-drawn tension of January ended with a pretence of negotiations oscillating between Tokio and St. Petersburg, but by this time the pursuits of diplomacy had become a farce, and both nations were making all possible preparations for a long struggle at arms. Although the Russian ultimatum had not been officially delivered, its contents were forecasted, and it was known that Japan’s final demands had been evaded. On February 2, the mobilization of the Manchurian reserves was announced, and on the next day a semi-official despatch from Vladivostok reported that the Russian squadron there had been stripped for action, and that the ships in the harbor of Port Arthur had joined those in the outer roadstead to unite the fighting strength for aggressive action. The Russian General Staff granted to Alexieff the right to declare war. Nearly a week before the first blow was struck, it was seen that the prolonged tension had reached the breaking point. At one of the last Cabinet conferences in Tokio hope of peace was abandoned, for the reason that, while Russia was unreasonably delaying her reply to the last Japanese note, she was daily increasing her warlike activities. It was known in advance that while Russia partly conceded the demands of Japan regarding Korea, important reservations were made, and that as regards Manchuria the reply would refuse to place on record recognition of the sovereignty of China, or even to discuss that question with Japan.

Japanese residents were told to leave Vladivostok, and 20,000 Russian troops were moving with the view of occupying Northern Korea. Japan continued extraordinary preparations for instant action, but the plans of her army and navy were so carefully guarded that no news of them was published up to the day war was declared by the first overt act.

On Saturday, February 6, the Russian note was already in the hands of Baron de Rosen, the Russian Minister at Tokio, for delivery to Baron Komura, the Japanese Foreign Minister, when at four o’clock in the afternoon, M. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, called personally to inform the Russian Government that, in view of the delays in connection with the Russian replies, and the obvious futility of the negotiations, Japan considered it useless to continue diplomatic relations. Japan would take such steps as she deemed proper for the protection of her interests, therefore M. Kurino asked for his passports. The Russian Minister, a few hours later, prepared to leave Tokio as soon as possible.

The startling action of Japan, in severing diplomatic relations before the actual delivery of the Russian note, came like a bolt from a clear sky at St. Petersburg. It was expected that Japan would invade Korea and seek a naval battle within the next twenty-four hours. This was an accurate surmise, for in even less time forty Japanese transports were loaded with troops to be landed at various points in Southern and Central Korea. One naval division sailed from Japanese waters for Chemulpo, and another for Port Arthur, as soon as the news that there could be no peace was sent by wireless telegraphy to the waiting ships.

In the afternoon of February 8 a fleet of Japanese transports, escorted by a squadron of battleships and powerful cruisers, appeared off the harbor of Chemulpo. The Russian gunboat Korietz, on its way to Port Arthur with despatches, sighted the hostile craft; the commander cleared for action, fired a shot at the Japanese torpedo scouts, then returned at full speed to shelter near the Russian cruiser Variag, inside the Korean harbor. This proved to be the first shot of the war, and was so claimed by the Japanese when accused of attacking Port Arthur without formal declaration of war later in the same day. Early on the morning of February 9, Admiral Uriu, commander of the Japanese fleet, notified the two Russians that they must surrender or leave the harbor by noon, else he would attack them where they lay. The Russians did not surrender, but sailed out of the bay, with bands playing, to certain destruction. By four o’clock that afternoon the Variag and the Korietz were at the bottom of Chemulpo Harbor, and the war was on.

The man who judges things by weight, bulk, and dollars may well wonder at Japanese temerity. To Japan, with her 147,000 square miles, the annexation of Korea, with 82,000 square miles, meant what the annexation of Mexico would to the United States. To Russia, with her 8,666,000 square miles, it meant less than Southern California to us. Russia’s population was 140,000,000; Japan’s 44,000,000. On a peace footing the Russian army had 1,000,000 officers and men; the Japanese, 175,000. On a war footing, the Russian 4,600,000 and the Japanese 675,000.

Russia is the Christian nation which has been slowest in development. Mentally, she is just out of the Dark Ages, equipped with the mechanical progress of modern times. Japan is the pagan nation which has been foremost in adopting the worldly essentials of a civilization which is Christian in its origin. Russia is a union of nomadic races, but lately ushered into feudalism, which have, in turn, conquered many other races. Japan has had a stable, organized government longer than England, and the Japanese were a free people when the Saxons were the serfs of the Normans. The Czar is a pope; the Mikado divinity itself. If the Jews were still a nation and a descendant of Moses were their king, he would mean to them what the Mikado means to the Japanese. For all the centuries of the nation’s existence the Japanese had known no acquisition of territory. The Russians have lived by this.

JAPANESE TROOPS PREPARING FOR WAR

These photographs were taken on the parade ground at the Oyama Barracks in Tokio just before the outbreak of the war. Japan had already been practically on a war footing for months, and the busy work of preparation here suggested was typical of the spirit that prevailed throughout the nation and brought Japan’s army to a state of preparedness perhaps never before duplicated in the history of war.

The Japanese cavalry was the weakest branch of the service. The Japanese are not natural horsemen, and both the men and their mounts were inferior, in a military sense, to the other branches of the service. The horses were scrubby little beasts with neither speed nor tractability. The trooper whose mount finally succeeded in clearing the bar shown above thought the feat very remarkable

In spite of his inscrutable manner the Japanese soldier when with a crowd of his comrades becomes almost as loquacious as the typical regular of other countries. In the Oyama Barracks, where this photograph was taken, a large number of troops were quartered ready to be rushed to the front as soon as hostilities were declared

On the breaking off of diplomatic relations the Russian Minister took passage for Marseilles on the French steamship “Yarra.” He left Yokohama on February 12, when war had actually been begun by the actions at Chemulpo and Port Arthur. The French and Belgian Ministers and attaches and a few other friends from the diplomatic circle accompanied him to the dock to bid him farewell

RUSSIAN MINISTER TO KOREA DEPARTING FROM SEOUL

MOBILIZATION OF TROOPS IN TOKIO AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

DEPARTURE OF JAPANESE TROOPS FOR KOREA

JAPANESE TROOPS DETRAINING AT HIROSHIMA

At Hiroshima the troops were detrained for the port of Ujina, whence a large part of the Japanese forces were embarked for Korea. Many of the cavalry horses were injured during their railroad journey by kicking each other or their stalls. The light “collapsable” carts shown here were one of the features of the mobile Japanese equipment. They kept pace with the marching column

CAVALRY TRAIN LEAVING SHIMBASHI STATION

It was not until the troops had been departing from Tokio for several days that the general populace showed any such resemblance to Occidental enthusiasm as this. When some of the members of the staff left Tokio, they awakened and behaved like any other crowd at such a time. They shouted good-bys and the band, in a quaint imitation of Western customs, played “Auld Lang Syne”

ENGINEERS AT HIROSHIMA PRACTICING BUILDING BRIDGES LIKE THOSE USED AT THE YALU

The bridges used at the Yalu were all planned and constructed in practice in Japan long before war was declared. After being built they were taken apart, carried along with the rest of the equipment, and put together when the time came. The Japanese engineers had complete maps and measurements of the streams in Manchuria, so that they always knew just what difficulties were to be met

Enthusiasm at Kobe upon the departure of a troop train for Ugina, a port of embarkation for Korea. On leaving for the front the Japanese soldier suppressed all emotions of sorrow. Not to be impassive was unmanly. It was only at such times as this that the collective enthusiasm showed itself, and it was not until a number of trains had passed en route for the front that it awoke.

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II. THE FIRST BATTLES OF THE WAR

It was on the night of February 8, 1904, that all hope of a peaceful solution of the Russo-Japanese entanglement was blown to the winds by the startling attack of Admiral Togo’s torpedo-boats on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. The Russians were quite unready for so swift an onslaught; many officers were on shore, while the lookouts and scouting service were scarcely more vigilant than in time of peace. The Japanese torpedo flotilla sped in among the close-huddled battleships, launched their missiles, and were scurrying to sea before the Russian crews began to repel the attack. The first-class battleships “Retvizan” and “Czarevitch” and the cruiser “Pallada” were so badly injured that they had to be beached. The Japanese fleet returned the next day and bombarded the Russian ships and forts. In this attack the battleship “Poltava,” and the cruisers “Diana,” “Novik,” and “Askold” were temporarily disabled.

Before the news of the battle of Port Arthur had fairly reached the eyes of the Western world came the more tragic story of the destruction of the “Variag” and the “Korietz” in Chemulpo Harbor. Admiral Uriu, commanding six Japanese battleships, six cruisers, and twelve torpedo craft, appeared off Chemulpo and demanded the surrender of the two Russian ships. Captain Behr of the “Variag” and Captain Roudnoff of the “Korietz” refused to surrender, and on the morning of February 9, the “Variag,” with bands playing, steamed out of the harbor to meet the hopeless odds. She met the Japanese fleet eight miles out, the enemy using long-range 12-inch guns, and pounding away at distances which made the “Variag’s” batteries harmless. Ten large projectiles riddled the cruiser, and in fifty minutes not a gun could be worked, the ship was on fire, engines crippled, and 109 officers and men of a complement of 540 lay dead and wounded on the decks. The “Variag” crept back into port, her crew was removed to the British cruiser “Talbot” and the French cruiser “Pascal,” and she was set on fire. Three hours later, the “Variag,” after only eighteen months’ service, was at the bottom, a shattered and blackened mass of steel. The “Korietz” was a slow gunboat of only 1,200 tons, mounting one 6-inch gun and two 8-inch guns, with no armor protection. She was untouched, but after the fight her commander decided to destroy his ship, because Admiral Uriu had promised to renew the attack at four in the afternoon. Precisely at four o’clock, two deafening explosions came from the “Korietz.” As the smoke cleared, where the “Korietz” had been, only bits of wreckage and about four feet of her funnel could be seen.

On the day after the Russian ships had been destroyed a division of the Japanese army was thrown ashore at Chemulpo. The landing was made in perfect order. The army was dependent for nothing upon the port. A large force was sent to occupy Seoul, and within two days Japan was in complete control of the most advantageous strategic bases of Korea.

DESTRUCTION OF THE “VARIAG” AND “KORIETZ” IN THE HARBOR OF CHEMULPO

WRECKS OF THE RUSSIAN WARSHIPS IN CHUMULPO HARBOR

THE NIGHT LANDING OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS AT CHEMULPO

All through the night of February 9 boatloads of these little soldiers, with their inscrutable, unimpassioned faces, were landed in the snow on the Korean shore. This landing was one of the first proofs the Western world had of the wonderful preparedness of the soldiers of the Mikado. In spite of the darkness, fitfully punctuated by blazing torches, fires, and braziers, the task went on like clockwork

Mrs. Pavlov, the wife of the Russian Minister, is a cousin of the Countess Cassini. When the Minister was invited to leave on the arrival of the Japanese, she was accompanied to the station not only by the Japanese guard, but by all the gallant young men of the diplomatic circle. Dr. Allen, the United States Minister, is shown standing at the door of the Legation at Seoul

THE JAPANESE ADVANCE THROUGH KOREA

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SEOUL

THE JAPANESE RED CROSS HOSPITAL AT CHEMULPO

As soon as the Japanese landed after the battle between the warships in Chemulpo Harbor, a hospital was improvised and the more dangerously wounded Russians brought ashore from the foreign battleships, where they had been cared for temporarily, and nursed by the Japanese Red Cross service. As a mark of appreciation Russia contributed 2,000 yen ($1,000) to the Japanese branch of the Red Cross]

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III. RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

Not only were the available Russian forces ill prepared for meeting the agile and ready Japanese, not only was their equipment ponderous and unwieldy, their knowledge of the strategic difficulties and advantages of the country in which the fighting was to be done scant and inaccurate, but the big fact which put Russia at a disadvantage during the early months of the war was the immense distance between her military bases and the front. Across the trackless wastes of Siberia the only path was a single-track railroad—a line of communication none too well equipped in times of peace, and open to complete and immediate disablement should the enemy succeed in cutting it at any point along a comparatively vulnerable stretch of many hundreds of miles. By sea—that is to say, by the way of the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the route round the southern coast of Asia—Russian ships and soldiers were over 12,000 miles, or about fifty-one days, away from the seat of hostilities. When to these material difficulties were added the dissensions, jealousies, and shifting policies of St. Petersburg, the effective strength of Russia in these early days of the war could in no way be measured by her vast extent and apparently illimitable power.

In Japan, on the other hand, preparedness was the keynote of the situation. Although nominally at peace, Japan had been practically on a war footing for months, yet so secretly was this preparation made that even after war was declared a casual and incurious visitor in Tokio would have seen little to indicate that he was in one of the great military centres of the world, and that all round and about him was being planned one of the greatest struggles of modern times.

The results of this preparedness were vividly enough shown when the “Variag” and the “Korietz” were sunk in Chemulpo Harbor, before the world was really aware that war was seriously intended and inevitable. They were no less convincingly demonstrated by the perfection of the Japanese field equipment, and by the almost microscopic exactness with which every possible contingency had been foreseen and provided for. Ever since their war with China the Japanese had been perfecting their military organization, as though the coming war with Russia were a certainty. They had military maps of every nook and corner of Korea and Manchuria; they had spies working as coolies on the Russian railroads, and in Russian ports and shipyards; they had their light equipment especially adapted for the heavy Manchurian roads. Their baggage was so arranged and distributed that it made compact cube-shaped bundles which could be packed like so many building blocks, or made into easily carried packs for coolies. The collapsable boats with which a pontoon bridge was thrown across the Yalu were made for that special purpose months before, when the Korean peninsula was yet to be invaded. In fact, the whole early part of the war was an almost grotesque struggle between preparedness and unpreparedness, extreme mobility and clodhopping heaviness, cleverness and stupidity.

Under the auspices of the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna, a circle of titled ladies met regularly at the Grand Ducal residence to sew for the men at the front. The Grand Duchess herself equipped and sent to the front an entire train fitted out for hospital purposes. At the Winter Palace the Czarina sewed with nearly a thousand ladies and the Dowager Empress presided over another sewing circle

A division of regular troops mobilizing in Southeastern Russia for transportation northward. The infantry regiments may be seen marching along the main road, while the artillery and transport wagons are moving up in the middle distance. A large body of cavalry, half hidden in dust clouds, is visible near the horizon. These troops were among the first mobilized

THE AUTOCRAT OF RUSSIA AND THE ROYAL FAMILY

The most sorrowful figure in the Russian Court at the beginning of the war was the Autocrat from whom all the Muscovite power and splendor radiated. Helpless among the cliques of the bureaucracy, he knew not what course to pursue and was beset with apprehensions not only of the fidelity of those about him, but for the safety of his own life

The Russian sailors were treated as heroes wherever they went after their return from the disastrous engagement at Chemulpo. There were fêtes and processions in their honor at Odessa, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. A banquet was held at St. Petersburg, the officers received costly mementos and the sailors souvenirs and money rewards. The welcome was like that given to a victorious army

INTERNATIONAL BALLOON CONTEST AT ST. PETERSBURG

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IV. WITH THE JAPANESE IN KOREA

Having secured a safe landing-place at Chemulpo, Japan poured troops into Korea and along the old Peking Road through Seoul to Ping-Yang and on to the northward toward the Yalu. Russia abandoned all hope of effective aggression by sea with her crippled fleet, and, except for the elusive Vladivostok squadron of four powerful cruisers, Japan was free to rush her troops into Korea. Russia bent all her energies toward hurrying her levies and supplies into Manchuria. Seoul was occupied and the Russian minister invited to leave. He complied at once.

Moving at the rapid pace of from fifteen to twenty-five miles a day, the mobile Japanese pushed on to Ping-Yang. No opposition was met with, the native Koreans staring dumbly at the invaders without much curiosity and with no desire to make resistance. The march from Seoul to Ping-Yang was made along the ancient road to Peking, which was a quagmire most of the distance, crowded with cavalry, infantry, pack-trains, bullock-carts, and long trains of white-clad natives burdened with bags of provisions, plodding knee-deep through slush and mud. Half-frozen at night, stumbling and slipping all day, each soldier carrying sixty pounds of equipment, this infantry column swept along at a speed of from fifteen to twenty-five miles a day. That such speed was possible was due to the lightness of the Japanese baggage and wagon equipment, which had been specially prepared for the heavy Korean and Manchurian roads.

It was apparent even to casual observers that immense military operations were under way, yet the civilized world was wholly in ignorance of their scope or direction. On February 15, for example, scores of crowded transports were leaving the Japanese naval bases, and a small army of alert correspondents from the world over could only guess whether these thousands of troops were going to Korea, to the Yalu region, or within a hundred miles of the Liaotung Peninsula. While the Japanese troops were pushing northward, the advance guard of the Russian army crossed the Yalu into Korean territory and occupied Wiju. The Russian headquarters were established at Harbin, the chief strategic centre of railway communication in inland Manchuria.

Chenampo is one hundred and thirty miles north of Chemulpo on Korea Bay, and correspondingly nearer to the Yalu. Early in April, after the troops which had landed at Chemulpo two months before had completed their arduous march northward through the Korean Peninsula, and had captured the town of Wiju, on the east bank of the Yalu River, what was known as the main army, under General Kuroki, landed from transports at Chenampo. The success of the advance column had given the Japanese control of the mouth of the Yalu before Kuroki began to mobilize his co-operating columns, and two forces were thus ready by the end of April to force the passage of the Yalu and fight their way into Manchuria.

The Japanese troops were ferried from the transports to the shore at Chenampo in heavy, blunt-nosed sampans. These sampans are sculled from the stern ordinarily with huge sweeps. The boatmen can be seen over the heads of the seated soldiers, standing over their sweeps like gondoliers. At Chenampo the sampans were in most cases lashed together in groups of three or four and towed by tugs

The lone Japanese pedler is shown at lower right-hand corner of the picture sitting behind his wares. The men at the left of the picture are not armless, as it might appear, but have their arms inside their kimonos, as is their habit on cold days. The march of the Japanese through their country and the whole excitement of war stirred the placid Koreans to little more unrest than they show here

WITH THE JAPANESE ON THE ADVANCE TO THE YALU

General Kuroki not only misled the Russians as to the point at which he would probably cross the Yalu, but masked the march of his forces to the point north of the Wiju, where the crossing was made, by these grass screens and by marching behind hills. The Russians knew that some movement was going on, but could not make out the extent of it

On the left of General Kuroki sits General Fuji, his chief of staff, on the right Prince Kuni. Next to Prince Kuni is Colonel Hageno, the Russian scholar of the staff. One of Kuroki’s absolute prohibitions to correspondents was the mention either of the general’s name or of the place from which they wrote, lest news of the army’s location should be brought to the Russians

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V. THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE TO THE FRONT

The supreme difficulty under which Russia labored during the early months of the war was the enormous distance from her military base to the battle front. The only line of land communication between Russia and Manchuria was the single-track Siberian railroad, and when war began this line was broken by the ice-locked Lake Baikal. Russia had need of 300,000 men in Manchuria as soon as they could be rushed there, and with Lake Baikal frozen to the depth of nine feet, less than four thousand and more often not more than one thousand men could cross it in a day.

Lake Baikal, this weakest link of a very weak chain, is the largest body of fresh water in the Old World, except the Victoria Nyanza in Africa. It is nearly 15,000 square miles in extent, and therefore inferior only to Superior and Huron among the great American lakes. It is 600 versts long, with a width varying from 27 to 85 versts. It is 3,185 feet deep. The railroad was broken by the southern end of this lake, where it is about 40 miles wide. This is the gap that disastrously impairs the utility of the Trans-Siberian for the moving of troops and war supplies to the Manchurian and Korean frontier.

The lake begins to freeze in November, is completely ice-bound by the middle of December, remaining so for five months. The ice freezes to a thickness of nine feet, which would make sledge traffic perfect, were it not for the fact that wide fissures break its surface, which have a way of frequently closing up and piling the ice high into impassable windrows. These crevices have a width of three to six feet, and are often more than a verst in length, forming a serious impediment to progress on the ice and rendering next to impossible the marching of troops across the lake or the safe sledging of supplies. A thunderous crash, as of an explosion, marks the forming of the crevice, followed by a long, rolling reverberation. The rift instantly fills with water to the level of the ice, and is so agitated at the surface by currents or other forces that eight to fourteen days are required for it to freeze over, when the operation of cracking begins anew, and is repeated throughout the coldest portion of the winter.

The obvious solution to this difficulty was to build a railroad round the end of the lake, a detour of nearly 150 miles, and necessitating the construction of four tunnels. This was out of the question. A powerful ice-crusher, the “Baikal,” modeled after the ice-crushers successfully used in the Straits of Mackinac, had been built. She could break ice four feet thick, but on the nine-foot ice of the Russian inland sea she made no successful impression. The result was that a line of track had to be laid across the lake, and that before this was completed the troops had to be marched across the forty-mile stretch of wind-swept ice, while their supplies and baggage had to be dragged after them in sledges. Many of the men, wandering on to treacherous ice, were drowned; many were frost-bitten, and all suffered extremely from the arduous labor of the march and the bitter cold.

RUSSIANS CROSSING LAKE BAIKAL IN MIDWINTER

WITH THE RUSSIAN FORCES ON THEIR WAY TO THE FRONT

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE TO THE FRONT

WITH THE RUSSIANS DURING THE EARLY ADVANCE TO THE FRONT

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VI. THE BATTLE OF THE YALU AND THE JAPANESE ADVANCE

The battle of the Yalu was the first great land action of the Russo-Japanese War. The Russians were outnumbered by their opponents, but they were also outwitted and outmanœuvred, and the result was an overwhelming victory for the Japanese. In the crossing of the Yalu the Japanese exhibited the decided superiority of their shell-fire, they accomplished the brilliant strategic feat of crossing a river in the face of an intrenched enemy, and their commander, General Kuroki, proved himself a tactician of the first rank.

The first triumph of Japanese cleverness was in deceiving the enemy as to the probable place of crossing. Bridge materials were brought to the shore below Wiju and preparations were apparently made for building a bridge at that point. Under cover of night most of these materials were rushed to the north of Wiju and above the extreme left of the Russian line. From this position the main body of the Japanese army crossed to the Manchurian side with comparatively little opposition. On the Russian left (up the river) the bank rose in a precipitous rocky formation to a height of a thousand feet. At the base was a path and a line of sand left by the falling current. Stretching along this for a mile or more, like so many blue pencil marks on brown paper, were the Japanese. Any Russians above them could have done more damage with tumbling bowlders than with rifle fire. Once on this, the Japanese were under a shelf. They could be reached only by shooting straight down the stream, and had gun or rifle ventured this the Russians would have found no cover save the smoke of shrapnel from the batteries which would have sent them back. The crossing of the Yalu was effected by a few rounds of musket-fire. The impregnable position of the enemy became cover for the Japanese advance.

Once on the western bank and far enough north of the Russian line to be safe from attack on his own right flank, Kuroki’s plan was to execute a series of flank movements and attacks from the rear which would drive the Russians from their position and render what slight fortifications they had made on the heights along the river valueless. In spite of the reckless bravery of the Russians and the stubbornness of their defence, the impetus of the Japanese attack and the marvelous speed and effectiveness of the Japanese shell-fire could not be withstood, and the Russians were routed all along the line. They made a last stand at Hamatan Hill, a few miles to the rear of their original position, but the Japanese surrounded them on three sides and before the force retreated nearly four hundred men were compelled to surrender. Of the Japanese forces, 5 officers and 160 men were killed, while 29 officers and 666 men were wounded. The Russian dead, buried by the Japanese, numbered nearly 1,400, and 475 wounded Russians were taken to Japanese hospitals. Probably 500 wounded Russians, at least, escaped with the retreating army. The Japanese captured 28 guns, 50 ammunition wagons, and many other munitions of war.

INCIDENTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE YALU

THE CROSSING OF THE YALU

WITH THE WOUNDED AFTER THE FIGHT AT THE YALU

HOSPITAL CORPS AND WOUNDED JAPANESE AT THE BATTLE OF THE YALU

The fence behind which these reserves are standing was one of those with which the Japanese concealed their march, from the point south of Wiju where they first made a feint at crossing to the point north of the town where the brilliant crossing was finally made. The impetus of this final attack was such that the Russians were soon routed all along the line.

ARTILLERY SPOILS CAPTURED BY THE JAPANESE DURING THE YALU BATTLE

The care of the Russian wounded by the Japanese after the Yalu battle, and the burial of several Russian officers with military honors, were things which surprised many sceptical observers of Japanese civilization, who had predicted that, once in hand-to-hand conflict with the enemy, the veneer of European civilization would quickly drop off and reveal the barbarian

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF FENG-WANG-CHENG

These representatives of the Queen, Miss St. Aubyn and Miss McCall, accompanied by Madame Kuroda, a Japanese lady, and Dr. Tamura, visited the hospitals at Feng-Wang-Cheng. They found everything so satisfactory that they remained with the army only a few days. The photograph shows them about to enter their palanquins, after visiting one of the hospitals. Miss McCall is at the right

This impressive funeral ceremony was held at Feng-Wang-Cheng while the army was gathering its breath after the Yalu victory to push on into Manchuria. The whole army was drawn up in a vast body on the plain, while on the hilltop, in view of all, the officers and priests stood, going through the curious Shinto ceremonies in honor of the dead who had fallen in battle

SCENES AT FENG-WANG-CHENG AFTER THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

JAPANESE GETTING READY TO PUSH ON INTO MANCHURIA

RECREATIONS OF THE JAPANESE BETWEEN BATTLES IN MANCHURIA

JAPANESE BATTERY GOING INTO ACTION AT FENG-WANG-CHENG

WITH THE JAPANESE INVADERS IN MANCHURIA

INCIDENTS OF THE ADVANCE FROM FENG-WANG-CHENG

WITH THE VICTORIOUS JAPANESE AT LIENSHANKWAN

INTO MANCHURIA WITH THE JAPANESE INVADERS

This temple was the scene of two severe fights between the advancing Japanese and the Russians, in which the Russians were routed and driven back. The temple was built by the Chinese after their last war with Japan because they thought that the gods of another temple had prevented the Japanese from taking the pass. The gods and the Russians together could not stop the enemy this time.

The Japanese in the trenches in the foreground are firing on the Russians retreating up the hillside in the distance clear across the valley. The Japanese advance is concealed in the timber in the middle distance just beyond the farmhouses. The Russians are too far away to be seen. Collier’s photographer, J. H. Hare, took this unusual picture from a tree-top just behind the Japanese trenches

SCENES DURING THE BATTLE OF MOTIENLING

RUSSIAN WOUNDED AND DEAD AT MOTIEN PASS

WITH THE WOUNDED AND CAPTURED AT MOTIEN PASS

PRISONERS AND CAPTORS AT MOTIENLING

INCIDENTS OF THE RUSSIAN ATTEMPT TO RECAPTURE MOTIEN PASS

The Japanese commander is shown standing on the steps of the Kwantei temple during the battle of July 4, receiving reports from his staff and sending out orders. Motien Pass was one of the places on the line of march taken by Kuroki’s army which was thought before the battle to be practically impregnable. The Russians attempted to recapture it afterward, but were defeated with great loss

WITH THE JAPANESE ADVANCE FROM THE YALU THROUGH THE MANCHURIAN MOUNTAINS

WITH THE JAPANESE DURING THE FIGHTING NEAR ANPING

JAPANESE AND CAPTURED RUSSIANS IN MANCHURIA DURING THE RAINY SEASON

WITH THE SMOKELESS BATTERIES HIDDEN IN FIELDS OF KOWLIANG

IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF TOWAN DURING THE FIGHTING IN THE FIRST WEEK OF JULY

DIFFICULTIES OF CAMPAIGNING DURING THE RAINY SEASON IN MANCHURIA

ALONG THE LINE OF BATTLE IN THE MANCHURIAN PASSES SOUTH OF LIAO-YANG

PRESSING THE RUSSIANS CLOSE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF LIAO-YANG

WITH THE JAPANESE ON AUGUST THIRTIETH CLOSE TO LIAO-YANG

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VII. BEGINNING THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR

As soon as the Japanese learned of Kuroki’s success at the Yalu, they hurried troops ashore at Takushan and Pitsewo, on the eastern shore of the Liaotung Peninsula north of Port Arthur. This was on May 5. The landing was quite unexpected by the Russians; there was no sufficient force to attempt any resistance, and in three days an army was marching southward to begin the closing-in movement that ended in the fall of Russia’s supposedly impregnable fortress. On May 26, after fighting in and about Kinchow for nine days, Nanshan Hill, on the narrow isthmus joining the Port Arthur Peninsula to the main part of the Liaotung Peninsula, was captured by assault. Every device of modern warfare—the railway, telegraph, telephones, a captive balloon, mine-fields, barbed wire network, iron-roofed trenches, searchlights, illuminating star-shells—was used at Nanshan Hill to increase the natural strength of the fort. The ranges were known and the approach was from but one direction. There had been three months and a half since the war began and three weeks since the landing at Pitsewo. If Russian troops could be driven from such a position, and under such circumstances, by the Japanese, it seemed perfectly certain that no fortifications that Russia could devise could withstand the enemy. One last and unsuccessful attempt was made to cut the Japanese off before it was too late. The Russian army at Tashichao, under General Stakelberg, made a sortie southward and met General Oku’s army on June 14 at Wafengtien. The Russians were completely defeated. The Liaotung Peninsula was then open to the Japanese, and as soon as General Nogi and his army arrived to hold it and to begin to close in on Port Arthur, Oku was free to wheel north, and to co-operate with the armies of Kuroki and Nodzu in the general movement toward Liao-Yang. By the middle of June parallel columns of Japanese were moving northward through the valleys of Manchuria like so many fingers of one giant hand.

Meanwhile Admiral Togo had maintained a strict blockade of the harbor and the Russian fleet had been practically destroyed. Beginning with the destruction of the “Variag” and “Korietz” in February, and including the tragic sinking of the “Petropavlovsk,” and the death of Admiral Makaroff and the painter Verestchagin on April 13, the Japanese successes gradually wore down the Port Arthur fleet until the Russian naval power in the East was no longer a factor in the reckoning. Up until the end of April the Japanese losses were practically nothing at all. Then came the sinking, by submarine mines, of the battleship “Hatsuse,” the third class cruiser “Miyako,” and Torpedo Boat No. 48. The battleship “Yoshino” was sunk in a collision. These losses came too late, however, for the Russians to take advantage of them, and the death of Admiral Makaroff may be said to mark the climax of the naval campaign against Port Arthur. After that the land campaign against the “Gibraltar of the East” began in earnest.

SCENES ALONG THE WATER FRONT AT PORT ARTHUR BEFORE THE DECLARATION OF WAR

NAVAL AND CIVILIAN ACTIVITY IN PORT ARTHUR AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

GETTING READY FOR THE JAPANESE ON A RUSSIAN WARSHIP AT PORT ARTHUR

RUSSIAN SHIPS AT PORT ARTHUR BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE JAPANESE

PART OF RUSSIA’S FIGHTING FLEET AT PORT ARTHUR

THE MAN WHO BOTTLED UP PORT ARTHUR, AND THE FLAGSHIP OF HIS FLEET

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VIII. EARLY CAMPAIGNING BEFORE THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG

With Port Arthur cut off from the north, the three Japanese armies pushed rapidly northward in a general closing-in movement on Liao-Yang. General Nodzu’s army on June 26 captured Fengshuiling, on the main road northward from Takushan to Newchwang, and the Russian forces began to fall steadily back. At the same time, Kuroki, on the north, was capturing two passes of even greater importance, Motienling and Taling, and Oku, to the southward, was driving the Russians back with similar success. On July 17 the Russians, under General Count Keller, did make a desperate effort to retake Motienling, but were repulsed with heavy loss. Keller made another attempt to force the Japanese back a fortnight later, but it was equally disastrous and the general himself was killed. Meanwhile, on July 22 and 23, General Oku, on the extreme south and west of the long Japanese front, closed in upon Tashichao, and, with the assistance of Nodzu’s army, which had pushed up from Fengshuiling, captured the town and compelled the 40,000 Russians there to retreat. This, together with the unsuccessful battle in which Keller was killed, was practically the last of the Russians’ attempts to make a forward movement. General Kuropatkin devoted himself to preparing for a decisive battle at Liao-Yang, meanwhile keeping up all along the line just enough resistance to delay and hamper the Japanese advance.

At the outset of the war Russia had in Manchuria about 45,700 men and 120 field guns. Of this force about 20,000 men were at Port Arthur, 4,400 at Talienwan, 1,400 at Yinkow, 1,150 at Haicheng, 1,900 at Liao-Yang, 2,750 at Tieling, north of Mukden, 1,250 at Ninguta in northeast Manchuria, 4,550 at Harbin, 1,950 at Tsitsihar in northwest Manchuria, and the rest in the smaller garrisons scattered through the territory from northeast Manchuria to Port Arthur. In addition there was a separate organization of railway patrol troops stationed in small bodies at many points on and near the railway. On January 1, 1904, the number of these railway troops was estimated at 15,200 with 32 guns, so that the grand total at the beginning of the war was about 60,000 men with about 150 field guns. In spite of the pressure on the Siberian Railroad and the hard marches cross Lake Baikal in the winter, Russia soon found that, however many millions she might have in Europe, she could not maintain in the field, at the end of 6,000 miles of single track, more than 300,000 troops, and keep them fully supplied with food, ammunition, and fresh men to take the place of the killed, wounded, and sick.

During all this campaigning in Manchuria the Japanese showed the same preparedness and mobility which had been so strikingly characteristic of them during the earlier months of the war. They knew at all times the strength of their enemy as well as they knew the country, and to the information gathered by their spies and outposts was added that supplied by a generally friendly native population.

MUKDEN, WHEN THE JAPANESE WERE STILL MANY MILES AWAY

RUSSIANS AT MUKDEN ON THEIR WAY TO THE FRONT

WITH THE RUSSIANS IN MANCHURIA

WITH THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN MANCHURIA

IN THE FIELD WITH THE RUSSIANS IN MANCHURIA

WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT

PART OF THE MOVEMENT OF FORTY THOUSAND MEN SOUTHEAST OF LIAO-YANG

SCENES AT LIAO-YANG ON THE ARRIVAL OF THE RUSSIANS

WHEN NEWS FROM THE FIRING LINE CAME BACK TO THOSE WHO HAD NOT YET MET THE JAPANESE

WITH THE RUSSIAN TROOPS NEAR HAICHENG

WITH THE RUSSIAN TROOPS DURING THE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE JAPANESE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF HAICHENG

RUSSIAN BATTERIES IN ACTION GUARDING TOWAN PASS

WITH THE RUSSIAN OFFICERS AND FIGHTING MEN DURING THE ENGAGEMENT AT TOWAN PASS

WITH THE RUSSIAN TROOPS DURING THE EARLY CAMPAIGNING IN MANCHURIA

WITH THE RUSSIANS AT TOWAN PASS

THE REWARDS OF VALOR WITH KUROPATKIN’S ARMY IN MANCHURIA

WITH THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN MANCHURIA DURING THE EARLY CAMPAIGNING

WITH THE TENTH RUSSIAN ARMY CORPS AT YUSHULING, NEAR LIAO-YANG

WITH THE RUSSIAN TROOPS DURING THE EARLY CAMPAIGNING IN MANCHURIA

WITH THE RUSSIAN RED CROSS SERVICE IN MANCHURIA

WAR BALLOON AND GAS BAG USED BY THE RUSSIANS IN MANCHURIA

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IX. THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG

The battle of Liao-Yang was the culminating event of the four months’ Manchurian campaign which the Japanese began when they crossed the Yalu. In the point of number of men engaged it was the greatest battle of modern times, and it resulted in a decisive, though hard-won, victory for the Japanese. Between 400,000 and half a million men fought in the two armies, and when the five days’ duel was over the total losses in killed and wounded were estimated at about 30,000. The result of the battle was that the Japanese gained complete control of the Liaotung Peninsula, north of Port Arthur, and that the Russian army was forced to retreat northward toward Mukden and Harbin.

The Russians under General Kuropatkin had collected a large amount of ammunition and supplies at Liao-Yang and the town itself was elaborately fortified. It was generally understood that General Kuropatkin’s plan was to lure the Japanese on to the plain in front of Liao-Yang and there to meet them in decisive battle. When the battle proper began on August 26, the Russian army occupied three groups of positions, extending in a semicircle in front of and to the southward of the fortifications of the town. Kuroki’s army on the east, Nodzu’s on the south, and Oku’s on the west—the whole under the command of Field Marshal Oyama—attacked along the whole front. After five days of the most persistent attack and defence, and a terrific and almost continuous artillery duel, during which the Russians were pushed back into Liao-Yang, General Kuroki succeeded in throwing a considerable force across the Taitse River, which extends eastward and westward just north of the town. With his left flank and rear thus menaced, Kuropatkin was compelled, on September 1, to evacuate Liao-Yang and retreat on Mukden.

With the loss of Liao-Yang crumbled to pieces the plan for the defence of Manchuria which the Russian commanders had adopted when they were preparing for war with Japan. With the exception of the beleaguered garrison at Port Arthur, Russia had lost every foothold on the Liaotung Peninsula. In only one thing were the Japanese unsuccessful. They had failed to get to the rear of the Russian army and to cut off Kuropatkin from his line of retreat, and the manner in which the Russian commander withdrew his army in the face of almost insurmountable difficulties went far to mitigate the humiliation of defeat. The estimates of the number of troops engaged on either side vary from somewhat less than 200,000 to 250,000 men. It was generally believed at the time the battle was fought that the Japanese outnumbered the Russians, but inasmuch as they were attacking an intrenched force this advantage was apparent rather than real. No battle in our Civil War was on as large a scale as that at Liao-Yang. The battle of Leipsic, where Napoleon arrayed 130,000 men against the 300,000 of the Allies, was, in point of number of men engaged, the greatest previous battle of modern times.

ON THE LAST OF THE HILLS, ON SEPTEMBER THIRD, JUST BEFORE THE JAPANESE ENTERED LIAO-YANG

SEARCHING OUT AND BURYING THE DEAD THE DAY THE JAPANESE ENTERED LIAO-YANG

INCIDENTS OF THE EVACUATION OF LIAO-YANG AND ITS OCCUPATION BY THE JAPANESE

VIEWS OF FORTIFICATIONS AND ENTANGLEMENTS BUILT BY THE RUSSIANS AT LIAO-YANG

SCENES IN LIAO-YANG ON THE MORNING OF ITS OCCUPATION BY THE JAPANESE

VIEWS OF THE FIRST ENTRY OF THE JAPANESE FORCES INTO LIAO-YANG

SCENES IN LIAO-YANG IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ITS CAPTURE BY THE JAPANESE

SCENES AT LIAO-YANG AFTER ITS OCCUPATION BY THE JAPANESE FORCES

SCENES AT LIAO-YANG IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF THE CITY BY THE JAPANESE

Dr. Alexander Westwater is a Scotch medical missionary who had worked for twenty-five years in Manchuria. He and his colleague, the Rev. T. McNaughton, and their wives remained in Liao-Yang during the siege and after it, ministering to the defenceless non-combatants. Mrs. Westwater and Mrs. McNaughton were the only European ladies in the city when the Japanese arrived

SCENES AT LIAO-YANG BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE JAPANESE

BRINGING ORDER OUT OF CHAOS AFTER THE RUSSIANS EVACUATED LIAO-YANG

JAPANESE ACTIVITY AT LIAO-YANG IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF THE CITY

SCENES AT LIAO-YANG AFTER OYAMA’S THREE ARMIES HAD TAKEN POSSESSION OF THE CITY

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X. THE CHRONICLERS OF THE WAR

The most interesting stories written by the correspondents who were sent to cover the Russo-Japanese War were probably the ones that never passed the censor, the most extraordinary sights those which the correspondents did not see. There has never been a struggle since the days of the telegraph and the professional correspondent of which the world at large knew so little. During the early months of the war practically all of the correspondents were bottled up in Tokio, and when at last a few of them were released and allowed to follow the army, they were kept far in the rear, and were only permitted to see the fighting at the Yalu from the top of a hill several miles from the firing line.

Marking time in Tokio for months were newspaper men and special writers who were correspondent veterans of many wars, and who were compelled to waste their energies in the description of tea-houses, theatres, and other conventional show places. The unfortunate correspondents were repeatedly told that they were soon to leave for the front, only to learn presently that there was to be more delay, and to see a repetition of the Japanese smile, and hear again the Japanese “I’m so very, very sorry.”

R. L. Dunn, Collier’s special photographer, who was fortunate enough to get into Korea before the rigid censorship of correspondents began, but was subsequently forced to return, thus described some of the distresses of the luckless who were held up in Tokio: “I found more than a hundred war correspondents at Tokio, hustling from morning to night in order to get ready in time, and buying a thousand odd things at war prices, so that their equipments might meet every conceivable emergency. That was in April. Spring changed into summer. Fur-lined sleeping bags and firepots made the days seem hotter than they were. The whole winter outfit had to be exchanged for one suited to summer. On June 1 everything was as it had been at the beginning, except that some correspondents were contemplating the necessity of acquiring a third outfit for the rainy season.”

“Never was parting guest more happy to get away,” wrote Collier’s special correspondent, Frederick Palmer, when he and J. H. Hare, Collier’s special photographer, at last left Tokio with three other Americans—the first to be allowed to go to the front; “never was parting guest more heartily and sincerely sped. With the correspondents of the first contingent actually going, the hopes of the second and the third rose to the dignity of expectations. They gathered at Shimbashi Station with tin horns and gave the chosen few an Anglo-Saxon cheer. For over two months some of us have waited for official passes to join the Japanese army in the field. Now that we have the treasure it is not much to look at—only a slip of paper which would go into the average sized envelope. By rights, it should be on vellum, with marginal decorations of storks standing on one leg and an inscription of summa cum laude for patience in flourishes.”

CORRESPONDENTS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES WITH THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN MANCHURIA

CIVILIANS AND MILITARY ATTACHÉS WITH THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN MANCHURIA

THE TARGET-SHOOT GIVEN FOR THE MILITARY ATTACHÉS BY GENERAL KUROKI IN THE WINTER QUARTERS ON THE SHA-HO

MILITARY ATTACHÉS, FIRING AT GENERAL KUROKI’S TARGET-SHOOT WITH CAPTURED RUSSIAN RIFLES

WITH THE WAR CORRESPONDENTS IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA

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XI. THE FIGHTING ALONG THE SHA-HO

The Japanese armies occupied Liao-Yang on September 4, and on September 8 the Russians announced that their entire forces had safely reached Mukden. For a fortnight or so the two vast armies paused for breath, while far to the southward the bombardment of Port Arthur continued, and thousands of miles to the westward Russia’s Baltic fleet sailed from Kronstadt for the Far East. During the latter part of September there was desultory fighting along a considerable battle front, and when General Gripenberg took command of the second Russian army in Manchuria, General Kuropatkin began, the first week in October, an offensive movement against his conquerors.

Whether this advance was his own idea or whether it was prematurely ordered from St. Petersburg was not positively known, but it began with an oratorical proclamation to the army that the time had come for Russia to take the initiative and force Japan to do her bidding. Kuropatkin’s force numbered nearly 300,000 men, his artillery was said to be superior to the Japanese, and it was plain that the fight was to be on as vast if not a vaster scale than that at Liao-Yang. For a time there were a few slight Russian successes, and after sharp fighting Kuropatkin succeeded in capturing Bentziaputze, about half-way between Liao-Yang and Mukden and on the Japanese right. The offensive movement was directed along the whole Japanese line, extending about thirty miles from Bentziaputze westward to the Sha-Ho. For nearly a fortnight fierce fighting continued, a test of endurance on both sides, until the Russians were finally obliged to retreat, leaving behind many guns and having lost, it was estimated, some sixty thousand men. The Japanese losses were about twenty thousand. Desultory engagements continued through October and November, in the midst of heavy rains, until the cold set in in earnest, and both armies went into winter quarters.

In zero weather the two armies faced each other, burrowing underground in their dugouts, in many places so close to each other that the sentries could almost call one to another. The time was spent in target practice, in chopping up wood to be used for building and for making charcoal, and in drilling the recruits who were sent up to refill the shattered regiments. The quarters in which the armies found shelter were dugouts roofed over with logs, kowliang, and earth. That same attention to detail which was characteristic of the Japanese army during the campaign was as noticeable now that they were idle. There were even hot baths for the soldiers. Earthenware jars were sunk in the ground much like the Russian soup kettles. Water was heated in these and baths could be taken as in so many vertical bathtubs. During the lull in the fighting there was a celebration in honor of the successes on the Sha-Ho at which there was a target-shoot between the military attaches. Meanwhile the Baltic fleet was pursuing its slow journey to the Orient, and the army of General Nogi was closing-in on Port Arthur.

SCENES DURING THE FIGHTING EARLY IN OCTOBER IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE SHA-HO

CLOSE TO THE FIRING LINE DURING THE ENGAGEMENT NEAR THE YENTAI COAL MINES

Of these two unusual close-range photographs the lower one shows how shrapnel looks when it bursts properly. The thick white smoke is one bursting shell, and the little puffs of smoke to the right are the 250 or so shrapnel bullets zipping along the ground. Those to the left are from another shell. The photographs were taken at great personal risk by Collier’s photographer, James H. Hare

WITH THE JAPANESE ON OCTOBER TENTH AT THE SHA-HO

ON THE SHA-HO BATTLEFIELD WITH THE JAPANESE

VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN THE FIGHTING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE SHA-HO

THE AFTERMATH OF BATTLE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF YENTAI

PREPARING CHARCOAL FOR THE ARMY WHILE IT WAS ENCAMPED ON THE SHA-HO

IN WINTER QUARTERS WITH THE JAPANESE ARMY ON THE SHA-HO

WITH THE JAPANESE ARMY IN DECEMBER IN CAMP ON THE SHA-HO

BETWEEN BATTLES WITH THE JAPANESE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE SHA-HO

WITH THE JAPANESE IN WINTER QUARTERS AT THE SHA-HO

TYPICAL VIEWS OF MANCHURIAN PEASANTS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE JAPANESE

SCENES AT NEWCHWANG SHORTLY AFTER THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR

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XII. THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR

The first day of January, 1905, witnessed the end of the gigantic siege that had furnished a tragic background for eleven of the twelve months of 1904. The first blow struck by the Japanese in the war was aimed at Port Arthur, and during the month that followed they and the defenders employed and endured more terrific forces of destruction than were ever used at any other siege in the history of the world. The fall of this Gibraltar of the East seemed to prove that there can be no such thing as an impregnable fortress. The attack on Port Arthur began with Togo’s dash against the Russian fleet on the night of February 8. Four months later, through the successes of the Japanese on the Liaotung peninsula, the fortress had been cut off from all outside help.

From the outer line of defence at Nanshan, and thirty miles from the town, the Japanese worked their way literally inch by inch, burrowing underground, digging deep trenches that zig-zagged toward the enemy’s lines, until near enough to make a rush. In many places the ground was solid rock and countermining was impossible. Barbed-wire entanglements covered the country for miles, and wide stretches of bare ground had been covered a foot deep with powdered white ash, which stirred into a thick white cloud when trodden on, so as to make a splendid target for machine guns. There were buried mines, some to explode automatically, others to explode when the lookout man in a distant fort pressed a button. At night searchlights flashed across every yard of the country near the lines of forts, and sometimes the Russian gunboats creeping along the shore outside the harbor got far enough to pour a cross-fire into the Japanese encampments. Day and night Togo’s squadron sent in from long range the terrible Shimose shells, worse than lyddite, on the battered town and forts. Where it was impossible to tunnel or burrow, masses of rock and bags full of sand were rushed forward at night to make a temporary shelter where a regiment could go forward a hundred yards, rest, fire for a few minutes, and advance another hundred yards, until at last they were close to the enemy. Then, in the teeth of fierce rifle fire, reinforced, perhaps, by shells from the other forts, the final charge was made.

The last stage of the advance began on November 30 with the capture of 203-Metre Hill. From this hill the Japanese were able for the first time to get the range of the Russian ships in the harbor. All the larger vessels of the Russian fleet were soon disabled. The great Keekwan Mountain fort was captured on December 18, and on the 30th Ehrlung Fort, the key of the inner defences, was stormed. That day and the next the Japanese captured half a dozen neighboring positions, and finally, on January 1, General Stoessel, who had said at the beginning of the siege that Port Arthur would be his tomb, sent a message to General Nogi offering to surrender. For a second time Port Arthur passed into the hands of those from whom the European powers had wrested it ten years before.

WITH THE JAPANESE DURING THE LAST DAYS OF THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR

THE GREAT SIEGE GUNS THROWING ELEVEN-INCH SHELLS INTO PORT ARTHUR

SCENES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF PORT ARTHUR DURING THE LONG SIEGE

General Nogi sits in the centre, the gray-bearded man with the round decoration on his breast. On his right is General Ijichi, his chief of staff, who conducted the negotiations for the surrender. On Ijichi’s right is the Surgeon-General of the Third Army, and beyond, with the beard and many decorations, is Major Arriga, Japan’s greatest expert on international law

WITH THE JAPANESE AS THEY CLOSED IN AROUND PORT ARTHUR

INCIDENTS OF THE SURRENDER OF PORT ARTHUR TO THE JAPANESE

Although a woman was killed in this shelter shortly before the photograph was taken, they were, generally speaking, fairly effective protections. During the heavier bombardments, the occupants lived in them for days at a time. The Russo-Chinese Bank transacted business underground in “bomb-proofs” constructed in this manner for some time during the latter part of the siege

VIEWS OF PORT ARTHUR, IN OCTOBER, WHEN THE SIEGE WAS HALF OVER

INSIDE SOME OF THE RUSSIAN FORTS AT PORT ARTHUR AFTER ITS SURRENDER

SCENES AT PORT ARTHUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SURRENDER

SCENES AT PORT ARTHUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SURRENDER

SUNKEN RUSSIAN BATTLESHIPS AT PORT ARTHUR AFTER ITS CAPTURE BY THE JAPANESE

VIEWS OF THE HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR WHEN THE JAPANESE TOOK POSSESSION

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XIII. THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN

Judged by the number of men engaged, the vast extent of the battlefield, and the losses, the battle of Mukden was the greatest of modern times, if not of all history. Even the tremendous duel at Liao-Yang, which was on a larger scale than any modern battle that had preceded it, pales before this nineteen days’ struggle. Between 750,000 and 800,000 men were engaged, of which about 361,000 were Russian and at least 400,000 Japanese. When the nineteen days’ struggle began, both sides faced each other in the valley of the Sha River, the Russian lines stretching back upon tiers of defences, backed up with over 1,300 guns and forming south of Mukden a barrier which foreign experts pronounced impregnable.

From east to west the five Japanese armies were assigned under the following commanders—Kawamura, Kuroki, Nodzu, Oku, and Nogi. Field Marshal Oyama’s plan was for these five armies to form a crescent nearly one hundred miles in length, the cusps of which would gradually draw together, the western cusp being finally thrown forward so as to form a closed curve with the eastern. The plan thus outlined worked with perfect success. Kawamura, in the eastern sector, began the attack first on February 22, driving the Russians back toward Tita. For over a fortnight the fiercest sort of fighting continued in this part of the field, in the midst of zero weather and almost continuous snowstorms. It ended with the Russians driven across the Hun River and the right horn of the crescent having reached its final position opposite Mukden. Meanwhile, Kuroki broke through the formidable works which guarded the road to the Hun River from Pensihu, and arrived on March 5 in line with the general advance. Nodzu, to the left of Kuroki, drove the enemy from his last outworks south of the Sha River, and on March 6 paused to await the other turning attacks on east and west. Oku, between the Sha and Hun Rivers, rolled back the enemy’s line until its superior numbers and strong intrenchments near Patishu, about ten miles from Mukden, forced him to await the final turning movement of Nogi’s men on the extreme west. These men of Nogi’s were Port Arthur veterans, who looked upon this work as a mere picnic. On March 1 they reached Sinmintung, thirty-three miles west of Mukden, where they wheeled to the right. They carried position after position, assisted Oku’s attacks against the enemy’s position southwest of Mukden, swinging eastward in an arch-shaped line with a front of fifteen miles.

The crisis of the fight had come. On March 7 Kuropatkin gave the order to retreat. All along the hundred-mile line the Japanese closed in. The whole stupendous structure of the defence fell to pieces in an instant. The Russians poured northward almost in a rout, and on March 10 the Japanese occupied Mukden. The Russians had left more than 30,000 dead on the field, lost 50,000 prisoners, and they had over 100,000 wounded. The total Japanese casualties, as reported by Oyama, were 50,000.

VIEWS AT PORT ARTHUR AND WITH A RUSSIAN BATTERY ON THE HUN RIVER

RUSSIAN CAVALRY AND NATIVE HORSEMEN IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF MUKDEN

All the battalions were full before the battle. There was not one that did not lose at least ten or fifteen per cent of its quota—as the gaps in the ranks show. Kuroki’s army during the closing-in movement on Mukden was between Nodzu’s and Kawamura’s, the latter being on the extreme right wing. This photograph was taken by Frederick Palmer, Collier’s special correspondent

SCENES IN THE MUKDEN NEIGHBORHOOD BEFORE THE JAPANESE WERE NEAR

SCENES IN THE VICINITY OF MUKDEN AFTER THE RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS

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XIV. THE END OF RUSSIA’S SEA POWER

BY CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U. S. N., RETIRED

The Battle of the Japan Sea resulted from the wish of Russia to overthrow the naval control which has enabled the island Empire of Japan to sustain her land warfare upon the continent of Asia. Preliminary to this struggle, it was desirable that the fleet despatched for the purpose, under Admiral Rojestvensky, should reach Vladivostok. There it could refit after its long voyage, and there leave in security the train of supply ships which had been the necessary accompaniment of so distant an expedition.

After the junction of a second division under Admiral Nebogatoff, the whole Russian fleet moved northward, passing between the Philippine Islands and Formosa. Rojestvensky thus left open to doubt, and retained in his hands the decision, whether he would seek his port by the Straits of Korea, or, circumnavigating the main island of Japan, pass through the Straits of Tsugaru, opposite Vladivostok. It may be presumed he was as ignorant as the rest of the world just where Togo was; but he knew that, whether in the Straits of Korea or of Tsugaru, he would have to fight, if Togo chose, as he probably would. He decided to take the most direct and shortest route through the Korean Channel.

Toga awaited him there; at what particular point is immaterial, for the Straits are but sixty miles wide, which space is halved by the Island of Tsushima, whence the Straits have the alternate name—Tsushima. In such narrow waters, wherever the Japanese Admiral might be, he was certain, by an extensive scouting system, to receive notice timely enough to ensure intercepting his enemy. The notice came by wireless telegraphy early on Saturday, May 27, from cruisers off Quelpaert Island, 150 miles southwest of Tsushima; and as the Russian fleet, heading for Vladivostok, drew up with Tsushima, the Japanese battleships were seen rounding its northern point. As regards the position of the Russian ships, it seems certain, that, upon sighting the enemy, they formed in two columns of vessels. One contained the armored ships, a very heterogeneous assembly in size and qualities, composed of battleships of the first and second class, armored cruisers, and coast-defence ironclads. The second column was of lighter cruisers. This took the left hand, toward Tsushima, while the battleships were on the right, toward Japan. At the head of the battle column were three battleships; two of the first order of strength, 13,516 tons, the third of 10,000 tons, between them.

Admiral Togo divided his principal force of fighting ships into two squadrons. One, of four battleships and two armored cruisers, he kept under his own immediate direction. The other, of six armored cruisers, which are battleships of superior swiftness, but somewhat lighter armor and armament, was intrusted to Admiral Kamimura. The first of these approached from the north of Tsushima; the second, and faster, followed a little later from round its southern end. The head of the Russian battle column received the weight of the Japanese fire, and the superior speed of the latter enabled them so to choose their positions as to keep their fire concentrated on these leading ships. Kamimura’s attack was on the rear, and after that the battle soon became general. There was also a third Japanese squadron, of vessels not belonging to the armored fleet. These alone had been shown by Togo, until the Russian was committed to the passage of the Straits. They are said now to have attacked the other side of the Russian column. In brief, while Togo threw the weight of his force upon the head of the enemy’s order, he provided that the remainder should be so occupied as not to render serious assistance.

There was a strong breeze from southwest with a heavy sea. This favored the Japanese, because of their longer experience and better training in the use of their guns when the ships were in violent motion. This disadvantage of the Russians was increased by the rolling of their vessels, exposing the underwater body, giving the Japanese a target more easily pierced, and the holes from which are more dangerous. Through the five hours of daylight the contest was purely one of gunnery under the conditions named: concentration upon the head of the Russian columns, and heavy sea. The result was twofold. The head of the column, beaten down by superior gunfire, was disordered; and individual ships, pierced below water, filled and sank. As described, the Japanese, keeping ahead of their enemy, forced them to change direction; but this by no means need follow, were the Russians holding their own in the gunnery contest. Had they given as good as they got, there was no reason why they should forsake their course. The disorder, thus occasioned in the front, was transmitted to the ships which followed; and there ensued the confusion which is the sure precursor of defeat.

Upon this scene night fell. Of the Russians, three battleships and two others had already been sunk. Then came the time and opportunity for the torpedo vessels; darkness, and an enemy both crippled and broken. By a singular coincidence, the wind which in its strength favored the Japanese gunners—an advantage which they had earned and deserved—now fell somewhat; and with it fell the sea, rendering easier the work of the torpedo craft. This is one of the chances of war. Of the scenes of that night we as yet have little description, and from the fearful loss of life we possibly may never know enough justly to estimate the difficulties of the defence of the routed ships, or the degree of resistance experienced by the assailants. From Japanese sources we have heard that, under all the disadvantages of the Russians, some attacks were successfully repelled; and three torpedo destroyers were sunk. That pursuit continued to the Liancourt Rocks, 200 miles from the scene of the battle, indicates that, had not superior gunnery already won a decisive victory, the torpedo alone would scarcely so have reduced the Russian fleet as to leave the Japanese the secure mastery they now possess of the waters which constitute their vital line of communications.

The captured ships were the battleships “Orel” and “Emperor Nicholas I,” the coast-defence vessels “General Admiral Apraxine” and “Admiral Seniavin,” and the destroyer “Bedovy.” Six battleships, five cruisers, one coast-defence ship, three destroyers, and a repair ship were sunk.

FIGHTING SHIPS OF VARIOUS CLASSES IN RUSSIA’S BALTIC FLEET

FORMIDABLE FIGHTING SHIPS OF RUSSIA’S BALTIC FLEET

FOUR OF THE BATTLESHIPS OF RUSSIA’S BALTIC FLEET

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. ● Enclosed italics font in underscores.

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